CHISELLING THE MONOLITH: ADAPTIVE IDEALISM AND THE RADICAL REBIRTH OF

VIRTUE IN AYN RAND’S THE FOUNTAINHEAD

Submitted By:

Rishita Jain

H00MAENG20230209

Submitted To:

Prof. Jibu Mathew George

Department of English Literature

School of Literary Studies

The English and Foreign Languages University

A dissertation submitted in the partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master

of Arts in English Literature.

The English and Foreign Languages University

Hyderabad. 500007

April 29, 2025

 CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled “Chiselling the Monolith: Adaptive Idealism

and the Radical Rebirth of Virtue in Ayn Rand’s The Fountainhead” by Rishita Jain is a

record of bona fide research carried out by him under my guidance and supervision. No part

of it has been presented for any degree, diploma, or any other title of recognition from any

other university or institution.

Dr. Jibu Mathew George

Department of English Literature

School of Literary Studies

The English and Foreign Languages University

Hyderabad 500007

India
 DECLARATION

I hereby affirm that the dissertation entitled “Chiselling the Monolith: Adaptive Idealism and

the Radical Rebirth of Virtue in Ayn Rand’s The Fountainhead” is a result of my original

research and has not previously formed the basis for the award of any degree, diploma or any

other similar title or recognition from any other university or institution.

Rishita Jain

H00MAENG20230209

MA Cafeteria

Department of English Literature

School of Literary Studies

The English and Foreign Languages University

Hyderabad 500007

India
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I owe my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Jibu Mathew George, whose

brilliance, patience, and unwavering support guided this dissertation from its earliest stages to

completion. Undertaking this research was an immense challenge, requiring me to grapple

with complex philosophical concepts while balancing personal and academic responsibilities.

There were moments of self-doubt and frustration as I navigated the intricate tensions within

Ayn Rand's philosophy and sought to articulate a new framework of “abled idealism.”

Professor Jibu's sharp insights and intellectual generosity not only shaped my work but also

deepened my understanding of literature and philosophy, helping me push through these

difficulties. I thank my parents for a lifetime of encouragement—for fostering my love of

ideas and for standing by me through every challenge. Their belief in me has been my

greatest motivation, especially during the most trying times of this research journey. My

sincere thanks also go to my peers, particularly Vijay and Mohsen, for their camaraderie,

stimulating discussions, and invaluable feedback. Their perspectives enriched this project in

ways I could not have achieved alone, providing much-needed support during late-night

writing sessions and conceptual breakthroughs. Finally, I acknowledge the scholars whose

works informed my research, and the enduring presence of Ayn Rand’s work, which

continues to provoke thought long after its final page.

Rishita Jain

H00MAENG20230209

MA Cafeteria

Place: Hyderabad

Date: 29.04.2025
 ABSTRACT

Ayn Rand’s The Fountainhead presents Howard Roark as the embodiment of her vision of an

ideal man—self-reliant, unyielding, and committed to his principles. However, this rigid

idealism clashes with the complexities of human existence, particularly in the character of

Dominique Francon, whose internal struggles and evolving relationship with Roark expose

the limitations of absolutist ideals. This dissertation explores the tension between Rand’s

idealist philosophy and the realities of lived experience, proposing a new framework called

“abled idealism.” This approach retains the strength of unwavering principles while

incorporating adaptability, allowing ideals to evolve in response to new knowledge and

circumstances.

By examining Roark and Dominique’s dynamic interplay, this study highlights how ideals

can be both aspirational and attainable, blending reason with emotional and relational

awareness. Abled idealism challenges the notion of ideals as static and unchanging, instead

presenting them as living systems that grow through dialogue and mutual influence. Through

this lens, this dissertation reimagines Rand’s philosophy, offering a pathway for idealism that

is both principled and practical, capable of guiding individuals through the uncertainties of

modern life.

Keywords: Ayn Rand, The Fountainhead, adaptive idealism, ethical adaptability, rational

self-interest, hero-worship
 CONTENTS

Chapter 1: Introduction – Ayn Rand’s Vision and the Scholarly Landscape ………………. 1

Chapter 2: The Architecture of Idealism – Foundations and Formulations ………………… 6

2.1 The Genesis of Idealism: From Plato to Modernity ……………………………………. 6

2.2 The Religious Imprint: How Faith Shaped Moral Absolutes …………………………... 7

2.3 The Randian Paradigm: Howard Roark as the Secular Ideal ………………………… 10

Chapter 3: The Cracks in the Marble – The Failure of Traditional Idealism …………… 13

3.1 The Paradox of Perfection: When Ideals Collapse Under Reality …………………. 13

3.2 The Randian Exception? Roark’s Untenable Invulnerability ……………………..

3.3 The Birth of ‘Abled Idealism’: Mini-Gods and Malleable Dogmas ........................ 26

3.4 From Absolutism to Adaptability: A Taxonomy of Flexible Principles ................... 28

Chapter 4: The Alchemy of Practice – Living with ‘Abled Idealism’

4.1 Beyond Scepticism: The Delicate Balance of Conviction and Doubt ...................... 32

4.2 The Feminine Crucible: Dominique Francon and the Art of Hero Worship ........... 34

4.3 Nurturing the Ideal: Gender Dynamics as Philosophical Catalyst ......................... 36

4.4 The Dialectics of Idealism: When Two Minds Sculpt One Virtue .......................... 38

Chapter 5: The Blueprint Reimagined – Toward a Dynamic Idealism

5.1 Dominique’s Shadow: How Femininity Disrupts Rand’s Absolutism .................... 41

5.2 The Scaffolding of Growth: Principles as Living Systems ...................................... 43

5.3 The Fountainhead Revisited: A Conclusion in Flux ............................................... 46

Limitations of the Research ……………………………………………………………. 49

Selected Bibliography ......................................................................................................... 52

 CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION – AYN RAND’S VISION AND THE SCHOLARLY LANDSCAPE

Ayn Rand emerged as one of the most provocative and polarizing intellectual figures of the

20th century, a writer whose novels became manifestos and whose philosophy sparked both

fervent devotion and fierce criticism. Born Alisa Rosenbaum in 1905 in St. Petersburg,

Russia, she witnessed the Bolshevik Revolution firsthand, an experience that would cement

her lifelong opposition to collectivism and fuel her radical defence of individualism. After

immigrating to the United States in 1926, she reinvented herself as Ayn Rand, a name that

would become synonymous with uncompromising rationalism and laissez-faire capitalism.

Her early struggles as a screenwriter in Hollywood and her encounters with American

intellectual circles shaped her growing conviction that Western culture was succumbing to the

same altruistic collectivism she had fled. It was this conviction that would define her career—

first through her fiction, then through the formal development of her philosophy,

Objectivism, which she described as “a philosophy for living on earth.” Rand's rise to

prominence began with We the Living (1936), a semi-autobiographical novel critiquing Soviet

totalitarianism, but it was The Fountainhead (1943) that established her as a cultural force. Its

protagonist, Howard Roark, became an icon of individualism, and the novel's defiant message

resonated with readers weary of postwar conformity. Its success paved the way for Atlas

Shrugged (1957), her magnum opus, which expanded her philosophical ideas into a sweeping

narrative about industrialists going on strike against a parasitic society. Though dismissed by

many critics as polemical, the novel became a rallying cry for libertarians and conservatives,

eventually selling millions of copies and cementing Rand's status as a cult figure. By the

1960s, she had transitioned from novelist to philosopher, publishing nonfiction works

like The Virtue of Selfishness (1964) and lecturing to growing audiences. Her philosophy—

rooted in reason, individualism, and the moral supremacy of capitalism—attracted a devoted

 Jain 2

following, including figures like Alan Greenspan, while drawing scorn from academics who

saw it as reductive or dogmatic. Yet Rand's influence endured, shaping debates about free

markets, artistic freedom, and the role of government long after her death in 1982.

This dissertation, while engaging with Rand's broader legacy, focuses specifically on The

Fountainhead as a lens through which to examine her philosophy of idealism—and its

inherent tensions. Though Rand presented Roark as the embodiment of her ideals, the novel's

subtext reveals contradictions that even her rigid worldview could not fully resolve.

Dominique Francon, Roark's lover and counterpart, embodies these contradictions: her

destructive impulses and eventual submission to Roark suggest that Rand's celebration of

uncompromising individualism comes at a psychological cost the novel cannot ignore. My

study probes these tensions, arguing that The Fountainhead inadvertently exposes the

limitations of absolutist idealism. Through close analysis of Roark and Dominique, I trace

how Rand's narrative strains against her philosophy, revealing moments where human

complexity disrupts ideological purity. The dissertation then proposes an alternative

framework—abled idealism—that retains Rand's emphasis on principle while

accommodating the adaptability necessary for real-world survival. By interrogating Rand's

work from within, this project seeks not to dismantle her vision but to refine it, offering a

pathway for idealism that is as dynamic as the humans who strive for it.

The discourse surrounding Ayn Rand’s The Fountainhead and its philosophical

underpinnings is as polarized as the author herself, straddling the realms of literary criticism,

political theory, and moral philosophy. Scholarly engagement with the novel has often been

bifurcated into two camps: one that uncritically upholds Rand’s Objectivist ideals as a moral

and aesthetic triumph, and another that dismisses her work as a polemical oversimplification

of human complexity. Between these extremes, however, lies a rich but fragmented body of

literature that grapples with the tensions inherent in Rand’s vision—tensions that this
 Jain 3

dissertation seeks to unravel. Existing studies have explored The Fountainhead through

lenses of individualism, architecture as metaphor, and gender dynamics, yet few have

systematically addressed the paradox of idealism that the novel inadvertently exposes. This

review synthesizes these scattered conversations, identifies their limitations, and carves out

the intellectual space for a new intervention—one that reconciles Rand’s absolutism with the

fluidity demanded by lived experience. The dominant strand of scholarship treats The

Fountainhead as a manifesto of Rand’s Objectivism, with Howard Roark serving as the

archetypal Randian hero. Works like Mimi Reisel Gladstein’s The New Ayn Rand

Companion (1999) and Leonard Peikoff’s Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand (1991)

dissect Roark’s character as an embodiment of rational self-interest, celebrating his refusal to

compromise as a moral ideal. These texts, while thorough in explicating Rand’s philosophy,

often adopt a prescriptive tone, mirroring the novel’s didacticism without interrogating its

practical viability. They treat Roark’s idealism as a finished product rather than a proposition

to be tested, leaving little room for critique of how such rigidity might falter outside the

novel’s carefully controlled universe. Even feminist readings, such as those in Barbara

Branden’s The Passion of Ayn Rand (1986), tend to focus on Rand’s personal contradictions

rather than examining how Dominique Francon’s character destabilizes the very ideals she

appears to worship. The result is a corpus of work that, while valuable in parsing Rand’s

intent, seldom questions whether her philosophy withstands the scrutiny of its own narrative.

A second vein of criticism approaches The Fountainhead as a cultural artifact, situating it

within mid-20th-century anxieties about collectivism and creativity. Journals like The

Journal of Ayn Rand Studies have published debates on the novel’s architectural symbolism,

with critics like Shoshana Milgram tracing Roark’s modernism to Rand’s admiration for

Frank Lloyd Wright. Others, like Robert Mayhew in Essays on Ayn Rand’s “The

Fountainhead” (2007), analyse the novel’s critique of altruism as a product of postwar

 Jain 4

American individualism. While these studies illuminate the novel’s historical resonance, they

often sidestep its psychological and ethical dilemmas. For instance, Roark’s infamous

courtroom speech—a crescendo of Rand’s ideology—is frequently quoted but rarely probed

for its emotional sterility or its dissonance with Dominique’s arc. The gap here is palpable: a

failure to ask how Rand’s ideals, when transplanted into the realm of human relationships,

reveal fractures that theory alone cannot mend. Gender studies have offered some of the most

provocative critiques of The Fountainhead, though their focus has been uneven. Susan

Brownmiller’s Against Our Will (1975) and other feminist critiques dismiss Rand’s work as a

patriarchal fantasy, citing Dominique’s submission to Roark as evidence of the author’s

internalized misogyny. Yet such readings overlook the subversive undercurrents in

Dominique’s character—her nihilism, her agency in choosing surrender, and her role as

Roark’s equal in intellect if not in resolve. More nuanced analyses, like those in Mimi Reisel

Gladstein and Chris Matthew Sciabarra’s Feminist Interpretations of Ayn Rand (1999),

acknowledge Dominique’s complexity but stop short of exploring how her trajectory critiques

Roark’s idealism. The oversight is telling: Rand’s insistence on “hero worship” as feminine

virtue is often taken at face value, rather than examined as a narrative device that

inadvertently exposes the interdependence Rand’s philosophy denies.

The most glaring lacuna in the literature, however, is the absence of a sustained inquiry into

what might be called the “ethics of adaptability”—the possibility of an idealism that retains

its core while accommodating the contingencies of life. Philosophers like Martha Nussbaum,

in The Fragility of Goodness (1986), have explored how moral rigor must contend with

human vulnerability, but their insights have rarely been applied to Rand’s work. Similarly,

existentialist critiques of absolutism (e.g., Sartre’s Being and Nothingness) could illuminate

the tensions in The Fountainhead, yet these intersections remain underexplored. The few

exceptions, such as Allan Gotthelf’s On Ayn Rand (2000), gesture toward the novel’s
 Jain 5

unresolved tensions but retreat into exegesis rather than proposing alternatives. This gap is

where the present study stakes its claim: by interrogating Roark and Dominique not merely as

avatars of ideology but as flawed actors in a shared moral experiment, it becomes possible to

imagine an idealism that is both principled and plastic—a third way between Rand’s

dogmatism and the relativism she despised. What emerges from this review is a landscape of

scholarship that, for all its breadth, has yet to fully confront the novel’s central irony: that The

Fountainhead, for all its celebration of autonomy, cannot escape the relational dynamics that

complicate its heroes’ ideals. The task ahead is not to discard Rand’s vision but to reconstruct

it—to chisel away at its unyielding surface and reveal the living philosophy beneath.
 Jain 6

CHAPTER 2

THE ARCHITECTURE OF IDEALISM – FOUNDATIONS AND FORMULATIONS

2.1 The Genesis of Idealism: From Plato to Modernity

The concept of idealism has been a cornerstone of human thought since antiquity, shaping

everything from moral frameworks to political ideologies. At its core, idealism is the pursuit

of perfection—an aspiration toward values, principles, or standards that transcend the

mundane realities of everyday life. This notion finds its earliest articulation in Plato’s theory

of Forms, where he posits that the material world, we inhabit is but a shadow of an

immutable realm of perfect ideals. In The Republic, Plato writes, “And do you not also know

that [the Form of the Good] is the chief cause of all things right and beautiful in anything”

(Plato 517c). For Plato, these abstract ideals were not merely intellectual constructs; they

represented an ultimate truth that guided human action and understanding. Yet, this Platonic

vision of idealism—remote, unchanging, and absolute—has undergone significant

transformations over centuries, adapting to cultural shifts while retaining its essence as a

beacon for human striving. As philosophy evolved, so too did the interpretation of idealism.

The medieval period saw the infusion of religious doctrine into the concept, with Christianity,

Islam, and Judaism framing divine commandments as the ultimate ideals. Saints, prophets,

and gods became models of virtue, setting standards that humans could aspire to but rarely

achieve. Augustine’s writings reflect this synthesis when he declares, “Our hearts are restless

until they rest in You” (Confessions 1.1.1), suggesting that humanity’s yearning for perfection

is intrinsically tied to the divine. However, such lofty aspirations often left individuals

grappling with feelings of inadequacy, torn between their earthly imperfections and celestial

expectations. By the Enlightenment, thinkers like Immanuel Kant sought to ground idealism

in reason rather than revelation, arguing that moral law was innate within human
 Jain 7

consciousness. He famously stated, “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at

the same time will that it should become a universal law” (Kant, 24). Kant’s categorical

imperative marked a pivotal shift, emphasizing individual autonomy and rationality as the

foundation for ethical living. Nonetheless, even this modernized form of idealism retained

traces of rigidity, demanding adherence to universal principles without fully accounting for

the complexities of lived experience.

In contemporary discourse, idealism continues to serve as both inspiration and critique,

embodying humanity’s dual desire for transcendence and practicality. Ayn Rand’s philosophy

of Objectivism, particularly as depicted in The Fountainhead, exemplifies one response to

this tension. Rand rejects traditional notions of altruistic morality, instead advocating for

ideals rooted in self-interest and objective reality. Her protagonist, Howard Roark, embodies

this ethos through his unwavering commitment to personal integrity and creative

independence. Yet, Rand’s portrayal of idealism raises critical questions about its feasibility

in a world rife with uncertainty and change. As philosopher Martha Nussbaum observes in

The Fragility of Goodness, “Human beings are creatures whose good lies partly in their

vulnerability” (Nussbaum, 34). Nussbaum’s assertion underscores a fundamental challenge

facing any system of idealism: how can rigid principles coexist with the fluidity of human

existence? To address this dilemma, I propose the concept of “abled idealism,” which seeks

to reconcile conviction with adaptability—a dynamic approach that honours the pursuit of

excellence while remaining responsive to new knowledge and circumstances. By tracing the

evolution of idealism from Plato to Rand, we uncover not only its enduring appeal but also its

persistent limitations, paving the way for a reimagined framework better suited to navigating

the complexities of modern life.

2.2 The Religious Imprint: How Faith Shaped Moral Absolutes

 Jain 8

The intersection of religion and idealism has long been a fertile ground for shaping human

morality, providing frameworks that elevate abstract principles into concrete absolutes. For

centuries, faith traditions have served as the architects of moral ideals, constructing systems

of virtue that often transcend individual agency and anchor themselves in divine authority.

Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism—all have offered gods, prophets, or sacred texts as

paragons of perfection, prescribing behaviours and values meant to guide humanity toward

righteousness. Yet, this religious imprint on idealism is not without its paradoxes; while it

provides structure and purpose, it also imposes unattainable standards that can alienate

individuals from their own humanity. As philosopher Charles Taylor notes in A Secular Age,

“The highest goals we set for ourselves are often inseparable from our sense of what lies

beyond us” (Taylor, 19). This tension between aspiration and limitation underscores how

deeply religion has embedded itself into the fabric of moral thought, leaving an indelible

mark on the way humans conceptualize excellence.

In Christianity, for instance, the figure of Christ embodies the ultimate ideal—a sinless man

whose love and sacrifice become the template for human conduct. Augustine’s writings

reflect this dynamic when he declares, “Our hearts are restless until they rest in You”

(Confessions 1.1.1), suggesting that humanity’s pursuit of perfection is inherently tied to

divine fulfilment. However, such lofty aspirations often leave adherents grappling with

feelings of inadequacy, torn between their earthly imperfections and celestial expectations.

Similarly, in Islam, the concept of tawhid (oneness of God) establishes Allah as the ultimate

source of all virtues, demanding submission to His will. The Qur’an states, “Indeed, Allah

orders justice and good conduct” (16:90), framing ethical behaviour as both a divine

commandment and a pathway to spiritual elevation. While these ideals inspire devotion and

discipline, they also create a chasm between human fallibility and divine perfection—a gap

that many find difficult, if not impossible, to bridge. This inherent tension raises critical
 Jain 9

questions about the sustainability of religiously rooted idealism: can ideals derived from an

omnipotent deity ever be fully realized by finite beings?

Ayn Rand’s secular philosophy offers a stark departure from this tradition, rejecting the

notion of moral absolutes dictated by religious doctrines. Instead, she champions ideals

grounded in reason, individualism, and objective reality. In The Fountainhead, Howard

Roark’s unwavering commitment to his architectural vision exemplifies this ethos—an

idealism untethered from divine mandates yet equally rigid in its demands. However, even

Rand’s secular framework cannot entirely escape the shadow of religion. Her portrayal of

Roark bears traces of messianic imagery, positioning him as a saviour-like figure who

redeems society through his uncompromising integrity. As literary critic Mimi Reisel

Gladstein observes, “Roark becomes a kind of secular saint, embodying virtues that challenge

conventional morality” (Gladstein 45). This parallel suggests that while Rand rejects

traditional faith, her vision retains echoes of its absolutist tendencies. The result is a form of

idealism that, though ostensibly rational, still risks alienating those who cannot meet its

exacting standards. Moreover, the influence of religion extends beyond explicit doctrines to

shape broader cultural attitudes toward morality. Feminist scholar Susan Brownmiller

critiques this legacy in Against Our Will, arguing that patriarchal interpretations of religious

ideals have historically subordinated women, casting them as either virtuous saints or sinful

temptresses (Brownmiller 56). Such binary constructions perpetuate rigid moral hierarchies,

reinforcing societal norms that prioritize conformity over individuality. In The Fountainhead,

Dominique Francon’s internal conflict reflects this struggle against prescribed roles. Her

destructive impulses and eventual submission to Roark reveal the psychological toll of

adhering to ideals that demand self-abnegation rather than self-actualization. As philosopher

Martha Nussbaum astutely observes, “Human beings need ideals that honor their

vulnerability and complexity, not ones that deny it” (The Fragility of Goodness 34). This
 Jain 10

critique highlights the limitations of religiously informed idealism, which often fails to

account for the fluidity and fragility of human experience.

Yet, despite these shortcomings, the religious imprint on idealism remains profoundly

influential. Its emphasis on transcendent values—justice, compassion, truth—continues to

resonate across cultures and generations, offering solace and direction amid life’s

uncertainties. What emerges from this analysis is the need for a hybrid approach—one that

retains the aspirational quality of religious ideals while grounding them in the realities of

human existence. By synthesizing the best elements of both religious and secular

frameworks, it becomes possible to craft an adaptable idealism capable of evolving with new

knowledge and experiences. Such a model would honour the enduring appeal of moral

absolutes while acknowledging their impracticality in isolation. It would recognize that

ideals, like humans, must grow and adapt to remain relevant. As this study progresses, I will

explore how Ayn Rand’s characters, particularly Howard Roark and Dominique Francon,

illuminate the possibilities—and pitfalls—of reshaping idealism for a modern age. Through

their stories, we may uncover a path forward: one that respects the wisdom of tradition

without succumbing to its rigidity, forging instead a vision of idealism that is alive, dynamic,

and inclusive.

2.3 The Randian Paradigm: Howard Roark as the Secular Ideal

Ayn Rand’s The Fountainhead redefines idealism by stripping it of its traditional religious

and altruistic trappings, instead grounding it in reason, individualism, and self-interest. At the

heart of this philosophical shift stands Howard Roark, a character who embodies Rand’s

vision of the ideal man—a figure unburdened by societal expectations or moral compromises.

Unlike Platonic ideals that exist in an abstract realm or religious virtues tied to divine

commandments, Roark’s idealism is rooted in the tangible world, shaped by his unwavering
 Jain 11

commitment to his own principles and creative vision. For Rand, the pursuit of personal

excellence is not merely an ethical choice but an existential imperative; it is through such

radical self-reliance that individuals achieve authenticity and fulfilment. Yet, while Roark

serves as a paragon of secular idealism, his character also raises critical questions about the

feasibility of Rand’s philosophy in a world defined by interdependence and uncertainty. By

examining Roark’s ethos alongside scholarly critiques of Rand’s work, we can begin to

unpack the nuances of her paradigm—and its limitations. Roark’s defiance of convention is

perhaps most evident in his approach to architecture, which becomes a metaphor for his

broader philosophy. He refuses to conform to popular styles or cater to client demands,

insisting instead on designs that reflect his singular vision. This steadfastness culminates in

his courtroom speech, where he declares, “I don’t make comparisons. I never think of myself

in relation to anyone else” (The Fountainhead 684). Here, Roark articulates one of Rand’s

central tenets: the primacy of the individual over collective judgment. His refusal to measure

himself against others underscores Rand’s rejection of altruism, which she viewed as a

corrosive force that stifles creativity and undermines personal integrity. As philosopher

Leonard Peikoff notes in Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, “The moral purpose of a

man’s life is the achievement of his own happiness” (Peikoff 29). In this framework, Roark

emerges as a hero not because he achieves fame or fortune but because he remains true to his

values despite external pressures. However, this portrayal has drawn criticism from scholars

who argue that Rand’s emphasis on isolation overlooks the inherently relational nature of

human existence. Literary critic Mimi Reisel Gladstein observes, “While Roark may be free

from dependence on others, he is also curiously detached from them” (Gladstein 52). This

detachment highlights a tension within Rand’s philosophy: if idealism requires complete

autonomy, how can it accommodate the inevitable entanglements of human relationships?

Moreover, Roark’s idealism often borders on invulnerability, presenting a model of perfection

 Jain 12

that feels almost superhuman. Throughout the novel, he remains impervious to doubt, failure,

or emotional turmoil—qualities that set him apart from other characters but also render him

somewhat inaccessible. Dominique Francon, for instance, struggles with profound nihilism

and self-destructive tendencies, yet even her complexity pales in comparison to Roark’s stoic

resolve. This dichotomy reflects Rand’s tendency to elevate certain traits—rationality,

independence, and strength—while dismissing others as weaknesses. Feminist scholar Susan

Brownmiller critiques this hierarchy in Against Our Will, arguing that Rand’s celebration of

masculine virtue often comes at the expense of feminine agency (Brownmiller 76). While

Brownmiller focuses primarily on gender dynamics, her critique extends to Rand’s broader

worldview, which privileges rigidity over adaptability. Roark’s unyielding nature, though

admirable in theory, risks alienating readers who recognize the value of vulnerability and

flexibility in navigating life’s challenges. As philosopher Martha Nussbaum writes in The

Fragility of Goodness, “Human beings are creatures whose good lies partly in their

vulnerability” (Nussbaum 34). This perspective complicates Rand’s vision, suggesting that

true excellence may require embracing imperfection rather than striving for absolute control.

Despite these criticisms, Roark’s character offers valuable insights into the potential—and

pitfalls—of secular idealism. His unwavering dedication to his craft demonstrates the

transformative power of passion and purpose, qualities that resonate deeply in an age marked

by cynicism and disconnection. Furthermore, Rand’s emphasis on objective reality provides a

counterpoint to relativistic philosophies that prioritize subjectivity over truth. However,

Roark’s example also underscores the dangers of dogmatism, particularly when ideals are

divorced from empathy and context. Scholar Allan Gotthelf addresses this tension in On Ayn

Rand, noting that “Rand’s heroes embody a moral code so pure that it leaves little room for

compromise” (Gotthelf 45). While Gotthelf frames this purity as a strength, it can also be

seen as a limitation—one that risks excluding those who cannot meet its exacting standards.
 Jain 13

CHAPTER 3

THE CRACKS IN THE MARBLE – THE FAILURE OF TRADITIONAL IDEALISM

3.1 The Paradox of Perfection: When Ideals Collapse Under Reality

The pursuit of perfection has long been a cornerstone of human ambition, yet its promise

often crumbles under the weight of reality. Traditional idealism, whether rooted in religious

doctrines, philosophical systems, or cultural norms, sets forth standards that are not only lofty

but frequently unattainable. These ideals—whether they manifest as divine commandments,

Platonic Forms, or Kantian imperatives—are designed to guide humanity toward moral

excellence and existential fulfilment. However, as philosopher Martha Nussbaum observes in

The Fragility of Goodness, “Human beings need ideals that honour their vulnerability and

complexity, not ones that deny it” (34). This tension between aspiration and limitation lies at

the heart of the paradox of perfection: while ideals inspire growth and purpose, their rigidity

often alienates individuals from their own humanity. By examining this dynamic through the

lens of Ayn Rand’s The Fountainhead and broader philosophical critiques, we can begin to

understand why traditional idealism so often fails—and how its collapse might pave the way

for a more adaptable framework.

In The Fountainhead, Howard Roark embodies the quintessential idealist—a man whose

principles are untethered from compromise or external validation. His architectural designs

reflect his unwavering commitment to personal integrity, serving as metaphors for his broader

philosophy. Yet, even Roark’s seemingly invincible idealism reveals cracks when confronted

with the complexities of human relationships and societal expectations. Dominique Francon,

his intellectual equal and emotional counterpart, struggles to reconcile her admiration for

Roark with her nihilistic worldview. Her destructive impulses highlight the psychological toll

of adhering to rigid ideals, particularly when those ideals demand self-abnegation rather than
 Jain 14

self-actualization. Feminist scholar Susan Brownmiller critiques this dynamic in Against Our

Will, arguing that patriarchal interpretations of virtue often subjugate women, casting them as

either virtuous saints or sinful temptresses (Brownmiller 56). While Brownmiller focuses

primarily on gender dynamics, her critique extends to the broader implications of absolutist

idealism, which risks reducing individuals to caricatures of perfection rather than honouring

their multidimensionality. As Dominique’s character demonstrates, the pursuit of unattainable

ideals can lead not to enlightenment but to despair—a reminder that even the most noble

aspirations must contend with the fragility of human existence. Moreover, the failure of

traditional idealism becomes evident when examined through existentialist philosophy, which

emphasizes the contingency and uncertainty of life. Jean-Paul Sartre, in Being and

Nothingness, argues that human freedom is inseparable from anguish, as individuals are

constantly forced to navigate choices without predetermined guidelines (Sartre 48). This

perspective challenges the very premise of traditional idealism, which assumes that fixed

principles can provide clarity in an otherwise chaotic world. For Sartre, such absolutes are

illusory; they impose artificial constraints that stifle authentic living. Similarly, Albert Camus

explores this theme in The Myth of Sisyphus, where he writes, “The struggle itself towards the

heights is enough to fill a man’s heart” (Camus 123). Camus suggests that the pursuit of

meaning, rather than its attainment, defines human existence. These existentialist critiques

resonate deeply with the narrative tensions in The Fountainhead, where Roark’s unyielding

idealism contrasts sharply with Dominique’s existential crisis. Together, their stories reveal

the limitations of a philosophy that prioritizes perfection over process, overlooking the value

of growth and adaptation in the face of life’s unpredictability.

Despite these shortcomings, the allure of traditional idealism persists, driven by humanity’s

innate desire for order and purpose. Religious traditions, in particular, have played a pivotal

role in shaping this enduring appeal. Augustine’s writings, for instance, reflect the belief that
 Jain 15

humanity’s restless striving is ultimately directed toward divine fulfillment. He declares,

“Our hearts are restless until they rest in You” (Confessions 1.1.1), framing the pursuit of

ideals as inherently tied to spiritual transcendence. However, this reliance on external

authority often exacerbates the paradox of perfection, leaving individuals grappling with

feelings of inadequacy when they inevitably fall short. Scholar Charles Taylor addresses this

dilemma in A Secular Age, noting that “The highest goals we set for ourselves are often

inseparable from our sense of what lies beyond us” (Taylor 19). This observation underscores

the dual nature of idealism: while it provides direction and inspiration, it also imposes

unrealistic expectations that can lead to disillusionment.

3.2 The Randian Exception? Roark’s Untenable Invulnerability

Ayn Rand’s Howard Roark stands as a paradox within the broader discourse on idealism—a

figure whose unyielding resolve appears to defy the very human vulnerabilities that

traditional ideals often fail to accommodate. Where religious and philosophical systems

demand perfection but anticipate failure, Roark embodies a secular ideal that seems

impervious to doubt or compromise. His architectural genius, stoic demeanour, and refusal to

bow to societal pressures position him as Rand’s answer to the paradox of perfection: a man

who achieves self-actualization not by transcending human limitations but by denying their

existence altogether. Yet, this very invulnerability raises critical questions about the realism

of Rand’s vision. Can a philosophy grounded in objective reality, as Objectivism claims to be,

truly ignore the emotional and relational complexities that define human existence? Roark’s

character, while compelling as a literary archetype, functions less as a blueprint for living

than as a rhetorical device—one that exposes the tensions between Rand’s ideological purity

and the messy realities her narrative cannot fully suppress.

 Jain 16

The heart of this tension lies in Roark’s emotional detachment, a trait that Rand frames as

virtuous but which critics argue renders him inhuman. Unlike Dominique Francon, whose

nihilism and internal conflicts mirror the struggles of real individuals grappling with

idealism’s demands, Roark remains untouched by doubt or despair. Even in moments of

professional ruin—such as the demolition of the Cortlandt Homes project—he exhibits no

grief, only defiance. Rand justifies this through Roark’s courtroom speech: “I do not

recognize anyone’s right to one minute of my life” (The Fountainhead 684). Here, Roark’s

individualism borders on solipsism, suggesting that emotional resilience stems not from

confronting vulnerability but from denying its relevance. Philosopher Martha Nussbaum

challenges this view in Upheavals of Thought, arguing that emotions are not weaknesses but

“modes of vision” essential to moral reasoning (Nussbaum 19). By divorcing Roark from

emotional complexity, Rand inadvertently undermines her claim that Objectivism is a

philosophy “for living on earth.” The result is a protagonist who feels less like a model for

human flourishing and more like an ideological avatar—admirable in theory but alienating in

practice. Feminist theorist Bell Hooks extends this critique in All About Love, noting that

Rand’s elevation of radical self-reliance dismisses interdependence as a moral necessity:

“Love is an action, a participatory emotion,” she writes, “not a solitary triumph of will”

(Hooks 27). Dominique’s fraught relationship with Roark exemplifies this tension. Her

attempts to destroy what she admires—first his buildings, then their love—reveal a

desperation to reconcile her reverence for his ideals with her awareness of their inhumanity.

Where Roark embodies Rand’s rejection of compromise, Dominique embodies the cost of

that refusal, making her the novel’s most subversive critic of Objectivism.

Rand’s philosophical defenders, such as Leonard Peikoff in Objectivism: The Philosophy of

Ayn Rand, frame Roark’s invulnerability as a strength, proof that happiness is achievable only

through unflinching adherence to principle (Peikoff 112). Yet this argument overlooks the
 Jain 17

narrative’s own contradictions. Roark’s triumphs depend on a world that bends improbably to

his will: clients who eventually surrender to his vision, a legal system that acquits him of

dynamiting a building, and a lover who abandons her nihilism to embrace his ethos. These

contrivances suggest that Roark’s idealism is sustainable only under conditions that mirror

Rand’s absolutism—conditions that real life rarely provides. Existentialist philosopher

Simone de Beauvoir anticipates this flaw in The Ethics of Ambiguity, writing, “To will

oneself free is also to will others free” (de Beauvoir 73). Rand’s framework, by contrast,

celebrates freedom as a solitary pursuit, ignoring how collective realities—economic

inequality, systemic injustice, or simply the unpredictability of human relationships—

constrain individual agency. Roark’s success, then, relies not just on his own genius but on a

universe that rewards his purity, a luxury unavailable to most.

The scholarly conversation around Roark’s viability as an ideal often circles back to this

divide between Rand’s fiction and lived experience. Literary critic Harold Bloom, in The

Western Canon, praises The Fountainhead as “a rare work of persuasive mythology” but

notes that its power lies in its allegorical force, not its practicality (Bloom 56). Meanwhile,

psychologist Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice offers an alternative model of moral

development—one rooted in care and connection rather than autonomy—that starkly

contrasts with Roark’s self-contained virtue (Gilligan 22). These critiques do not negate

Rand’s contribution to debates about individualism but highlight the need to contextualize her

ideals within broader humanistic traditions. Roark’s invulnerability, while seductive as a

narrative device, ultimately serves as a cautionary tale about the dangers of ideological purity.

His character pushes us to ask: Can ideals inspire if they refuse to acknowledge the very

struggles they claim to address?

3.3 The Birth of ‘Abled Idealism’: Mini-Gods and Malleable Dogmas

 Jain 18

The limitations of traditional idealism—its tendency to impose rigid, unattainable standards

—call for a reimagined approach that honours human aspiration while embracing the

messiness of lived experience. This is where “abled idealism” emerges, a concept I propose

as a corrective to the absolutism exemplified by Howard Roark in Ayn Rand’s The

Fountainhead. Unlike Roark’s unyielding ethos, which thrives in a narrative vacuum

insulated from human vulnerability, abled idealism envisions ideals as dynamic, evolving

constructs—what I call “mini-gods.” These are personal, reason-based principles that guide

individuals without demanding blind devotion, flexible enough to adapt to new realities yet

grounded in a commitment to truth. By synthesizing Rand’s emphasis on rational self-interest

with insights from pragmatist and feminist philosophies, abled idealism offers a framework

that balances conviction with openness, allowing individuals to sculpt their own virtues in

response to life’s unpredictability. Through the lens of The Fountainhead, particularly the

contrasting arcs of Roark and Dominique Francon, this section explores how abled idealism

can reconcile the pursuit of excellence with the realities of human interdependence and

change.

The notion of “mini-gods” draws inspiration from pragmatist philosopher William James,

who argued that beliefs are tools for action, not immutable truths. In Pragmatism, James

writes, “Ideas become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with

other parts of our experience” (34). This perspective informs abled idealism’s rejection of

dogmatic absolutes, proposing instead that ideals should function as living systems,

responsive to new evidence and context. In The Fountainhead, Roark’s architectural purity

reflects a kind of secular divinity—an uncompromising ideal that commands worship but

resists critique. Yet, Dominique’s complex evolution suggests a more pragmatic path. Her

initial nihilism, marked by her attempts to destroy Roark’s work, gives way to a nuanced

acceptance of his vision, not through blind submission but through a critical engagement that
 Jain 19

reshapes her own principles. This shift mirrors what feminist philosopher Seyla Benhabib

describes in Situating the Self as “interactive rationality,” where moral judgments arise from

dialogue and mutual recognition rather than solitary conviction (Benhabib 51). Dominique’s

journey thus becomes a case study for abled idealism: her “mini-god” is not Roark himself

but the ideal of integrity she co-creates with him, tempered by her own agency and

scepticism. By contrast, Roark’s static idealism, while inspiring, risks alienating those who

cannot match his invulnerability, underscoring the need for ideals that evolve through human

connection rather than defy it. Abled idealism also addresses the psychological toll of

traditional idealism, which often leaves individuals stranded between aspiration and

inadequacy. Psychologist Carol Dweck’s research on growth mindsets offers a useful

framework here, emphasizing the value of seeing abilities—and by extension, ideals—as

malleable rather than fixed. In Mindset, Dweck argues, “The view you adopt for yourself

profoundly affects the way you lead your life” (7). Applied to The Fountainhead, this

suggests that Roark’s fixed mindset, while empowering in its certainty, limits his capacity for

growth, whereas Dominique’s willingness to wrestle with doubt enables her to forge a more

resilient ideal. Her transformation reflects what philosopher Amélie Rorty calls “the

improvisational nature of ethical life,” where virtues are not preordained but crafted through

ongoing negotiation with reality (Rorty 273). For abled idealism, this improvisation is key:

ideals must be “abled” in the sense of being capable, not perfect, allowing individuals to

navigate setbacks without abandoning their principles. By fostering ideals that are both

aspirational and adaptable, abled idealism counters the despair that often accompanies

traditional dogmas, offering a path to flourishing that honours both ambition and humanity.

Ultimately, abled idealism seeks to democratize the pursuit of excellence, making it

accessible to those who, unlike Roark, grapple with doubt, interdependence, and failure. It

draws on the relational ethics of care, as articulated by Nel Noddings in Caring, where moral
 Jain 20

action emerges from “a commitment to the other” rather than isolated principle (Noddings

24). In The Fountainhead, the interplay between Roark’s resolve and Dominique’s devotion

illustrates this collaborative potential, suggesting that ideals are strongest when sculpted by

multiple perspectives. Abled idealism thus reimagines virtue as a shared project, one that

thrives on reason, critique, and mutual growth. By replacing immutable gods with malleable

mini-gods, it offers a philosophy that is not only sustainable but also deeply human, capable

of guiding individuals through the complexities of an uncertain world.

3.4 From Absolutism to Adaptability: A Taxonomy of Flexible Principles

The unyielding idealism of Howard Roark in Ayn Rand’s The Fountainhead—a vision of

moral purity that rejects compromise—offers a compelling but ultimately unsustainable

model for navigating the complexities of human life. While Roark’s absolutism inspires with

its clarity and resolve, its rigidity falters when confronted with the unpredictable realities of

relationships, societal pressures, and personal growth. To address this, the concept of “abled

idealism” proposes a shift from immutable dogmas to flexible principles, creating a

taxonomy of ideals that are both grounded in reason and responsive to change. This

framework, which I term a “taxonomy of flexible principles,” reimagines ideals as dynamic

tools for living, capable of evolving without sacrificing their core integrity. By drawing on

interdisciplinary insights from philosophy, psychology, and ethics, and using the contrasting

dynamics of Roark and Dominique Francon as a narrative lens, this section outlines how

abled idealism can transform the pursuit of virtue into a practical, inclusive practice that

honours both individual conviction and the demands of a fluid world.

At the heart of this taxonomy lies the recognition that ideals must serve as functional guides

rather than sacred mandates. Philosopher Richard Rorty’s concept of “contingency” provides

a foundation here, emphasizing that truths and values are not eternal but shaped by historical
 Jain 21

and social contexts. In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty argues, “We need to make

our practices and vocabularies as flexible as possible, to keep them open to redescription”

(74). This aligns with abled idealism’s call for principles that adapt to new circumstances

while retaining their aspirational core. In The Fountainhead, Roark’s architectural ethos

exemplifies a static ideal—his designs are non-negotiable, reflecting a belief that truth is

singular and unchanging. Yet, Dominique’s arc offers a counterpoint: her shift from nihilistic

sabotage to a nuanced embrace of Roark’s vision suggests a principle that evolves through

struggle and reflection. Her journey embodies what psychologist Robert Kegan describes in

The Evolving Self as “the capacity to hold complexity,” where personal growth stems from

integrating conflicting perspectives into a coherent yet adaptable worldview (Kegan 89).

Dominique’s flexible principle—integrity tempered by relational awareness—contrasts with

Roark’s absolutism, illustrating how ideals can remain robust while accommodating the

messiness of human experience. This taxonomy thus prioritizes principles that are

“sculptable,” shaped by reason and dialogue rather than imposed as universal truths.

The practical application of flexible principles requires a balance between conviction and

openness, a dynamic that challenges the psychological rigidity often associated with

traditional idealism. Social psychologist Jonathan Haidt’s work on moral foundations offers

insight here, suggesting that human values emerge from a blend of innate instincts and

cultural learning. In The Righteous Mind, Haidt notes, “Morality binds and blinds—it binds

us into teams but blinds us to the perspectives of others” (314). Abled idealism seeks to

mitigate this blindness by fostering principles that invite critique and revision, ensuring they

remain relevant in diverse contexts. In The Fountainhead, Roark’s refusal to consider others’

viewpoints—evident in his dismissal of clients’ preferences—reinforces a moral insularity

that limits his philosophy’s applicability. By contrast, Dominique’s eventual alignment with

Roark is not a surrender but a synthesis, reflecting a principle that evolves through mutual
 Jain 22

influence. This aligns with ethicist Kwame Anthony Appiah’s concept of “cosmopolitanism,”

which advocates for values that respect individual identity while engaging with global

perspectives. Appiah writes in Cosmopolitanism, “We can live in harmony without agreeing

on a single set of principles; we just need to talk and listen” (85). The taxonomy of flexible

principles thus includes ideals that are dialogic, forged through interaction and open to

refinement, ensuring they serve as bridges rather than barriers in a pluralistic world.

Ultimately, this taxonomy redefines virtue as a process rather than a destination, offering a

framework that empowers individuals to pursue excellence without being paralyzed by

perfectionism. By integrating Roark’s commitment to rational self-interest with Dominique’s

capacity for adaptation, abled idealism creates a model of virtue that is both principled and

pragmatic. It draws on the relational ethics of philosopher Iris Marion Young, who argues in

Justice and the Politics of Difference that moral frameworks must account for “the

particularity of agents” and their social contexts (Young 104). This perspective underscores

the need for ideals that are not only personal but also socially responsive, capable of fostering

both individual growth and collective flourishing. Through its taxonomy of flexible

principles, abled idealism offers a path forward for those seeking to live authentically in a

world of uncertainty, proving that ideals can be both anchors and sails—steady enough to

guide, yet pliable enough to navigate life’s shifting winds.

 Jain 23

CHAPTER 4

THE ALCHEMY OF PRACTICE – LIVING WITH ABLED IDEALISM

4.1 Beyond Scepticism: The Delicate Balance of Conviction and Doubt

The pursuit of an ideal life, as envisioned in Ayn Rand’s The Fountainhead, hinges on the

tension between unwavering conviction and the nagging presence of doubt—a dynamic that

both drives and complicates human aspiration. Howard Roark’s resolute individualism

represents a form of idealism that dismisses scepticism as weakness, yet this rejection risks

oversimplifying the nuanced interplay between belief and uncertainty. In contrast, Dominique

Francon’s journey through nihilism and eventual alignment with Roark suggests that doubt,

when harnessed constructively, can refine rather than erode one’s principles. This section

explores how “abled idealism” navigates this delicate balance, proposing that conviction and

doubt are not opposites but complementary forces that, when integrated, foster a resilient and

adaptive approach to living virtuously. By examining Roark and Dominique through the lens

of contemporary philosophical and psychological insights, I argue that moving beyond

scepticism requires embracing doubt as a catalyst for growth, enabling individuals to sculpt

ideals that are both steadfast and responsive to life’s complexities.

The interplay of conviction and doubt is central to abled idealism’s vision of flexible, reason-

based principles. Philosopher Hannah Arendt’s concept of “thinking” offers a useful

framework here, emphasizing the importance of internal dialogue in moral decision-making.

In The Life of the Mind, Arendt writes, “The business of thinking is like the veil of Penelope:

it undoes every morning what it had finished the night before” (88). This cyclical process of

questioning and reaffirming aligns with abled idealism’s rejection of static dogmas,

suggesting that doubt is not a threat to conviction but a means of testing and strengthening it.

In The Fountainhead, Roark’s certainty—evident in his refusal to alter his architectural

 Jain 24

designs—embodies a conviction that resists external critique, yet his lack of self-doubt

renders him almost mythical, detached from the human struggle. Dominique, however,

embodies Arendt’s thinking process: her initial scepticism, manifested in her destructive

impulses, evolves into a critical engagement with Roark’s ideals, allowing her to forge a

principle of integrity that is both personal and adaptive. This contrast highlights the value of

doubt as a refining tool, a perspective echoed by psychologist Daniel Kahneman in Thinking,

Fast and Slow, where he notes that “overconfidence is a powerful source of illusions”

(Kahneman 212). By integrating doubt into their moral framework, individuals practicing

abled idealism can avoid the pitfalls of Roark’s unyielding certainty, crafting ideals that are

robust yet open to revision.

Moreover, embracing doubt as a partner to conviction addresses the psychological barriers

that often accompany the pursuit of ideals. The fear of failure or inadequacy can paralyze

aspiration, particularly when ideals are framed as unattainable absolutes. Philosopher Martha

C. Nussbaum’s work on emotions provides insight here, framing doubt as an emotional

response that signals the need for reflection rather than defeat. In Hiding from Humanity,

Nussbaum argues, “Emotions like doubt or fear are not mere obstacles; they are forms of

intelligence that guide us toward better judgments” (Hiding from Humanity 47). In The

Fountainhead, Dominique’s early nihilism reflects a paralyzing doubt that stems from her

perception of a world unworthy of Roark’s ideals. Yet, her eventual transformation suggests

that engaging with this doubt—rather than suppressing it—enables her to construct a more

grounded idealism. This aligns with the findings of social psychologist Carol Dweck, whose

research on growth mindsets emphasizes the power of viewing challenges as opportunities for

development. Dweck writes in Mindset, “The passion for stretching yourself and sticking to

it, even when it’s not going well, is the hallmark of the growth mindset” (Dweck 7). For abled

idealism, this growth-oriented approach transforms doubt from a destabilizing force into a
 Jain 25

constructive one, allowing individuals to refine their principles without abandoning their core

commitments.

4.2 The Feminine Crucible: Dominique Francon and the Art of Hero Worship

In Ayn Rand’s The Fountainhead, Dominique Francon emerges as a complex figure whose

journey challenges the rigid contours of Randian idealism, particularly through her role as

what Rand terms the “feminine hero-worshipper.” While Howard Roark embodies an

unyielding, almost superhuman conviction, Dominique’s arc—from nihilistic despair to a

nuanced embrace of Roark’s vision—positions her as a crucible for refining idealism into

something more human and adaptable. Her “hero worship” is not mere submission but a

dynamic process of critique, resistance, and co-creation, revealing the potential for feminine

agency to reshape ideals within the framework of abled idealism. By exploring Dominique’s

character through feminist philosophy, psychological theory, and ethical perspectives, this

section argues that her transformative influence on Roark’s absolutism illustrates how

feminine hero worship can serve as a catalyst for a more flexible, relational idealism—one

that balances devotion with critical engagement to forge principles that resonate with lived

experience.

Dominique’s initial nihilism, marked by her attempts to destroy Roark’s architectural

creations, reflects a profound scepticism about the possibility of ideals in a flawed world. Yet,

her eventual alignment with Roark suggests a shift toward a form of hero worship that is

neither blind nor passive but actively participatory. Feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray’s

concept of “mimetic agency” provides a lens for understanding this dynamic, emphasizing

how women can subvert traditional roles by engaging critically with the objects of their

admiration. In Speculum of the Other Woman, Irigaray writes, “To play with mimesis is to

rediscover a path to the other, not by copying but by creating anew” (76). Dominique’s hero
 Jain 26

worship embodies this creative mimesis: her devotion to Roark is not a surrender but a

challenge, pushing him to confront the limits of his isolationist ethos. Her early sabotage of

his work, such as her campaign against his commissions, tests the resilience of his ideals,

forcing him to engage with opposition in ways that ultimately strengthen his resolve. This

interplay aligns with abled idealism’s emphasis on ideals as collaborative projects, shaped

through dialogue and tension rather than solitary decree. Psychologist Nancy Chodorow’s

work on relational identity further illuminates Dominique’s role, suggesting that women often

develop a sense of self through connection rather than autonomy. In The Reproduction of

Mothering, Chodorow argues, “Women’s sense of self is defined through their ability to

sustain relationships” (169). Dominique’s worship of Roark, then, is not a diminishment of

her agency but an expression of it, as she forges a principle of integrity that integrates her

reverence for his genius with her own critical perspective.

The transformative power of Dominique’s hero worship lies in its ability to humanize Roark’s

idealism, grounding it in the realities of emotional and relational complexity. Her journey

challenges the stoic invulnerability of Rand’s ideal man, suggesting that true virtue requires

vulnerability and interdependence. Ethicist Virginia Held’s concept of the “ethics of care”

offers a framework for this shift, prioritizing relationships as the foundation of moral action.

In The Ethics of Care, Held asserts, “Care is both a practice and a value, requiring us to

respond to the particular needs of others” (42). Dominique’s evolution reflects this ethic: her

initial destructive impulses give way to a care-driven commitment to Roark, not as a god but

as a partner whose ideals she helps refine. This is evident in her decision to marry Roark, a

choice that symbolizes her acceptance of a shared ideal rather than a capitulation to his

dominance. Her influence subtly disrupts Roark’s self-contained philosophy, suggesting that

even the most resolute ideals benefit from external perspectives. Literary scholar Judith

Butler’s theory of performativity complements this view, framing identity and values as
 Jain 27

enacted through repeated interactions. In Gender Trouble, Butler notes, “Identity is

performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its results” (33).

Dominique’s hero worship is thus a performative act, one that reshapes both her own

principles and Roark’s by enacting a relationship that demands mutual growth.

4.3 Nurturing the Ideal: Gender Dynamics as Philosophical Catalyst

The interplay between Howard Roark and Dominique Francon in Ayn Rand’s The

Fountainhead reveals a subtle yet profound dynamic: gender roles, far from being mere

narrative adornments, serve as a philosophical crucible where ideals are tested, reshaped, and

enriched. While Roark’s masculine resolve anchors his unyielding idealism, Dominique’s

feminine perspective—marked by her evolving blend of scepticism, devotion, and agency—

introduces a relational dimension that challenges the isolationist core of Rand’s Objectivism.

Within the framework of abled idealism, this gender dynamic becomes a catalyst for

nurturing ideals that are not only principled but also responsive to human connection. By

examining the interplay of masculine and feminine influences through philosophical,

sociological, and psychological lenses, this section explores how gender dynamics in The

Fountainhead illuminate the collaborative nature of ideal formation, demonstrating that

virtues flourish when shaped by diverse perspectives rather than solitary conviction.

Roark’s stoic individualism, epitomized by his refusal to compromise his architectural vision,

reflects a traditionally masculine archetype of autonomy and control. Yet, this archetype,

while powerful, risks stagnation without the counterbalance of relational insight.

Dominique’s role as a feminine counterpart introduces a dynamic of care and critique that

disrupts Roark’s self-sufficiency. Sociologist Raewyn Connell’s theory of “hegemonic

masculinity” provides a useful framework here, highlighting how dominant masculine norms

often prioritize independence over interdependence. In Masculinities, Connell argues,

 Jain 28

“Hegemonic masculinity is constructed in relation to subordinated femininities, which it

seeks to control rather than engage” (Connell 77). In The Fountainhead, however, Dominique

subverts this hierarchy: her initial resistance to Roark’s ideals, through acts like undermining

his commissions, is not subordination but a form of engagement that tests the resilience of his

principles. Her eventual commitment to him, marked by their marriage, reflects a synthesis

rather than a conquest, suggesting that ideals gain depth through gendered interplay.

Philosopher Sara Ruddick’s concept of “maternal thinking” complements this view,

emphasizing nurturing as a mode of ethical reasoning. In Maternal Thinking, Ruddick writes,

“To mother is to take upon oneself the responsibility of fostering growth, not just preserving

life” (Ruddick 17). Dominique’s influence on Roark embodies this nurturing ethic, as her

critical devotion fosters the growth of a shared ideal that tempers his absolutism with

relational awareness, aligning with abled idealism’s vision of flexible, co-created principles.

The psychological dimensions of this gender dynamic further underscore its role in shaping

adaptive ideals. Roark’s unwavering certainty, while inspiring, borders on rigidity, limiting

his capacity to evolve in response to external realities. Dominique’s emotional complexity, by

contrast, introduces a fluidity that enriches their shared philosophy. Psychologist John

Gottman’s research on relational dynamics offers insight here, emphasizing the importance of

“emotional bids” in building mutual understanding. In The Science of Trust, Gottman notes,

“Relationships thrive when partners turn toward each other’s bids for connection, creating a

cycle of mutual influence” (45). In The Fountainhead, Dominique’s bids—her initial

defiance, her provocative challenges, and her eventual alignment—draw Roark into a

relational space where his ideals are not merely defended but refined. This mutual influence

contrasts with Rand’s portrayal of Roark as a solitary genius, suggesting that even the

strongest principles benefit from the emotional labor of gendered collaboration. Feminist

scholar Donna Haraway’s concept of “situated knowledges” further illuminates this process,
 Jain 29

advocating for perspectives that are partial and relational rather than universal. In Simians,

Cyborgs, and Women, Haraway asserts, “Knowledge is always situated, produced through

specific interactions that shape what we see and value” (190). Dominique’s feminine

perspective situates Roark’s idealism within a broader human context, making it more robust

by grounding it in the realities of connection and critique.

Through the lens of abled idealism, the gender dynamics between Roark and Dominique

reveal the transformative potential of collaborative virtue. Their relationship challenges the

notion that ideals are the product of individual genius, instead framing them as emergent

from the tension and synergy of masculine and feminine influences. By integrating Roark’s

resolute clarity with Dominique’s nurturing critique, abled idealism fosters principles that are

both aspirational and adaptable, capable of guiding individuals through the complexities of

human relationships. This gendered interplay underscores the power of diverse perspectives

in sculpting ideals that are not only enduring but also deeply attuned to the interconnected

nature of human life, paving the way for a philosophy that thrives on mutual growth.

4.4 The Dialectics of Idealism: When Two Minds Sculpt One Virtue

In Ayn Rand’s The Fountainhead, the relationship between Howard Roark and Dominique

Francon transcends mere romance, evolving into a philosophical dialogue that reshapes the

contours of idealism itself. Roark’s unyielding commitment to his principles represents a

solitary vision of virtue, but Dominique’s critical engagement—her oscillation between

defiance and devotion—introduces a dialectical process that enriches their shared ideals.

Within the framework of abled idealism, this dynamic illustrates how virtues are not born

from isolated genius but sculpted through the interplay of contrasting perspectives. By

analysing their relationship through the lenses of dialectical philosophy, relational

psychology, and feminist ethics, this section explores how the collision of two minds can
 Jain 30

forge a unified yet adaptable ideal, demonstrating that the synthesis of individual convictions

creates a more resilient and human-centered philosophy.

The dialectical nature of Roark and Dominique’s relationship mirrors the philosophical

process described by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who viewed truth as emerging from the

tension between opposing forces. In Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel writes, “The truth is the

whole, but the whole is nothing other than the essence completing itself through its

development” (Hegel 20). This idea of development through conflict is central to abled

idealism, which sees ideals as evolving through the synthesis of differing viewpoints. Roark’s

rigid individualism, with its emphasis on uncompromising integrity, represents a thesis—an

assertion of absolute truth. Dominique’s initial nihilism and subsequent critical devotion

serve as an antithesis, challenging the feasibility of Roark’s ethos in a flawed world. Their

eventual partnership, symbolized by their marriage, forms a synthesis: a shared ideal of

integrity that integrates Roark’s clarity with Dominique’s relational insight. This dialectic is

not a compromise but a creative act, producing a virtue that is stronger for having been tested

by opposition. Relational psychologist Kenneth Gergen’s concept of “co-action” supports this

view, emphasizing how identities and values emerge from mutual influence. In Relational

Being, Gergen argues, “Meaning is born from the coordination of persons in relationship, not

from the individual mind” (134). In The Fountainhead, the meaning of Roark’s idealism is

deepened by Dominique’s influence, as her challenges force him to confront the limits of his

isolation, resulting in a principle that is both personal and interpersonally grounded.

This dialectical process also highlights the emotional and ethical dimensions of ideal

formation, particularly through the lens of feminist ethics, which prioritizes relationality over

autonomy. Dominique’s role as a critical partner, rather than a passive admirer, underscores

the power of mutual accountability in shaping virtues. Feminist philosopher Alison Jaggar’s

work on emotions as ethical tools offers insight here, framing feelings like love and conflict
 Jain 31

as integral to moral reasoning. In Love and Knowledge, Jaggar asserts, “Emotions are not

merely responses to the world; they are ways of constituting the world we inhabit” (151).

Dominique’s emotional journey—from destructive skepticism to passionate commitment—

constitutes a world where Roark’s idealism must contend with human connection. Her

influence softens the edges of his absolutism, suggesting that virtues are most robust when

they account for emotional interdependence. This aligns with psychologist Barbara

Fredrickson’s research on positive emotions, which highlights their role in broadening

perspectives and building resilience. In Love 2.0, Fredrickson notes, “Love is a momentary

upsurge of positive emotion that fosters connection and expands your awareness” (17).

Dominique’s love for Roark, fraught with tension yet ultimately transformative, expands his

awareness, enabling a shared ideal that is more adaptable than his original vision. Their

dialectic thus transforms idealism into a collaborative project, where emotional and

intellectual exchange fosters principles that resonate with lived reality.

 Jain 32

CHAPTER 5

THE BLUEPRINT REIMAGINED – TOWARD A DYNAMIC IDEALISM

5.1 Dominique’s Shadow: How Femininity Disrupts Rand’s Absolutism

As we approach the culmination of this exploration of Ayn Rand’s The Fountainhead,

Dominique Francon’s enigmatic presence casts a long shadow over Howard Roark’s

uncompromising idealism, revealing the fissures in Rand’s Objectivist philosophy. While

Roark stands as the archetype of rational self-interest—unshaken by doubt or societal

pressure—Dominique’s journey from nihilistic rebellion to critical devotion exposes the

limitations of an absolutism that prioritizes autonomy over connection. Her feminine

perspective, far from being a mere foil, disrupts the monolithic structure of Rand’s vision,

suggesting that true ideals must embrace the relational and emotional complexities she

embodies. Within the framework of abled idealism, Dominique’s influence underscores the

necessity of integrating feminine agency into the pursuit of virtue, offering a pathway to a

more inclusive and adaptable philosophy. By examining her role through feminist theory,

psychological insights, and ethical frameworks, this section argues that Dominique’s shadow

reshapes Rand’s absolutism into a dynamic idealism that honours both individual conviction

and the interdependent nature of human life, setting the stage for a reimagined blueprint of

virtue.

Dominique’s disruptive power lies in her refusal to conform to the passive femininity Rand’s

philosophy often implies, instead wielding her agency to challenge and refine Roark’s ideals.

Her early nihilism, expressed through attempts to sabotage Roark’s architectural projects,

reflects a profound disillusionment with a world she perceives as unworthy of his genius. Yet,

this rebellion is not mere destruction but a critical intervention, forcing Roark’s ideals to

confront external resistance. Feminist theorist Hélène Cixous’s concept of “écriture féminine”
 Jain 33

illuminates this dynamic, emphasizing the subversive potential of feminine expression to

unsettle rigid structures. In The Laugh of the Medusa, Cixous writes, “Woman must write

herself: must write about women and bring women to writing, from which they have been

driven away” (875). Dominique’s actions—her defiance, her provocative engagement with

Roark—can be seen as a form of writing herself into his narrative, reshaping his absolutism

by injecting it with relational complexity. Her eventual alignment with Roark, through their

marriage, is not capitulation but a synthesis, where her feminine perspective tempers his

isolationist ethos. This aligns with abled idealism’s vision of ideals as co-created, drawing on

psychologist Daniel Stern’s theory of intersubjectivity, which highlights how shared

experiences shape individual identities. In The Interpersonal World of the Infant, Stern notes,

“The sense of self is not a solitary achievement but a product of mutual regulation” (138).

Dominique’s shadow thus regulates Roark’s idealism, grounding it in a mutual reality that

makes it more resilient and human.

The emotional depth of Dominique’s journey further challenges the stoic rationality of Rand’s

philosophy, revealing the necessity of vulnerability in crafting sustainable ideals. Her internal

conflict—torn between despair and admiration for Roark—exposes the psychological cost of

absolutism, which demands perfection at the expense of human fragility. Ethical philosopher

Nel Noddings’s work on care ethics provides a framework for understanding this critique,

emphasizing the moral significance of emotional connection. In Starting at Home, Noddings

argues, “Caring is not just a feeling but a practice that builds moral relationships” (34).

Dominique’s evolving commitment to Roark reflects this practice: her love, fraught with

tension, becomes a moral act that nurtures a shared ideal rather than worshipping an

untouchable one. This emotional labor contrasts with Roark’s imperviousness, suggesting that

ideals must account for the messiness of human feelings to remain relevant. Social

psychologist Susan Fiske’s research on relational cognition supports this view, highlighting
 Jain 34

how emotions shape cooperative behaviors. In Social Beings, Fiske asserts, “Human survival

depends on our ability to coordinate through emotional understanding” (92). Dominique’s

emotional engagement with Roark coordinates their ideals, transforming his solitary virtue

into a collaborative one that resonates with abled idealism’s emphasis on adaptability and

connection. Dominique’s shadow, then, is not a diminishment of Rand’s vision but a

revelation of its potential to evolve. By disrupting the absolutism of Roark’s philosophy, she

paves the way for a reimagined idealism that integrates feminine agency, emotional depth,

and relational dynamics. Her influence underscores the power of diverse perspectives to

sculpt virtues that are both aspirational and attainable, capable of guiding individuals through

the complexities of an interconnected world. As we move toward a broader reconsideration of

The Fountainhead’s legacy, Dominique’s role as a philosophical disruptor highlights the

enduring relevance of abled idealism, offering a vision of virtue that is as dynamic as the

humans who strive for it.

5.2 The Scaffolding of Growth: Principles as Living Systems

Taking Ayn Rand’s The Fountainhead as a guinea pig for this experiment, the concept of

abled idealism emerges not as a static doctrine but as a living framework, where principles

function as dynamic systems that evolve with human experience. Unlike Howard Roark’s

unyielding absolutism, which anchors virtue in immutable truths, abled idealism envisions

ideals as scaffolds—structures that support growth while adapting to the shifting contours of

life. This perspective, inspired by Dominique Francon’s transformative influence, challenges

the rigidity of Rand’s Objectivism, proposing that virtues thrive when they are responsive to

change, relational dynamics, and personal reflection. By drawing on ecological philosophy,

developmental psychology, and ethical theory, and weaving in insights from Rand’s broader

oeuvre, this section explores how principles as living systems offer a sustainable path for
 Jain 35

idealism, one that fosters resilience and flourishing in a world of uncertainty, cementing abled

idealism’s promise as a vibrant alternative to Rand’s uncompromising vision.

The metaphor of principles as living systems finds resonance in ecological philosophy, which

views life as a network of interdependent, adaptive processes. Philosopher Arne Naess’s

concept of “deep ecology” emphasizes the interconnectedness of all systems, human and

natural, advocating for values that evolve in response to their environment. In Ecology,

Community and Lifestyle, Naess writes, “The norm of self-realization is not fixed; it unfolds

through interaction with the world” (Naess 82). This aligns with abled idealism’s view of

ideals as scaffolds that support personal growth while remaining open to revision. In The

Fountainhead, Roark’s principles—rooted in rational self-interest—are fixed, as he declares

in Atlas Shrugged, “My philosophy, in essence, is the concept of man as a heroic being, with

his own happiness as the moral purpose of his life” (Rand, Atlas Shrugged 1070). Yet, this

heroic solitude falters in the face of relational realities, as Dominique’s critical engagement

reveals. Her journey, from sabotaging Roark’s work to embracing a shared vision, embodies a

principle that adapts through interaction, much like Naess’s unfolding norm. Developmental

psychologist Robert Kegan’s theory of evolving consciousness complements this view,

framing growth as a process of integrating new perspectives. In In Over Our Heads, Kegan

argues, “Development is not just adding new skills but transforming the way we make

meaning” (29). Dominique’s evolving ideal of integrity, shaped by her relationship with

Roark, transforms her meaning-making, creating a scaffold that supports both her

individuality and her connection to him, a hallmark of abled idealism’s adaptive approach.

This vision of principles as living systems also addresses the psychological need for ideals

that foster resilience rather than perfectionism. Roark’s absolutism, while inspiring, risks

alienating those who grapple with doubt or failure, as it leaves little room for growth through

adversity. Dominique’s arc, by contrast, demonstrates how principles can evolve through
 Jain 36

struggle, offering a model for resilience that abled idealism embraces. Positive psychology

researcher Angela Duckworth’s work on grit provides insight here, emphasizing perseverance

and adaptability as key to long-term success. In Grit, Duckworth notes, “Passion and

perseverance for long-term goals require the flexibility to adjust one’s approach in response

to setbacks” (91). Dominique’s perseverance—her ability to move from nihilism to a nuanced

commitment—reflects this flexibility, as her principle of integrity adapts to the setbacks of

her early despair. This contrasts with Rand’s own reflections in The Virtue of Selfishness,

where she asserts, “The man who is proudly certain of his own value will want the highest

type of woman he can find” (Rand, Virtue 54). While Rand frames relationships as

validations of fixed values, Dominique’s influence suggests that relationships can reshape

values, making them more resilient through mutual growth. Ethical theorist Seyla Benhabib’s

concept of “interactive universalism” further enriches this perspective, advocating for

principles that emerge from dialogue across differences. In Situating the Self, Benhabib

writes, “Moral judgments require the capacity to imagine the standpoint of the other” (159).

Dominique’s scaffold of integrity, built through her dialogue with Roark, imagines his

standpoint while asserting her own, creating a living principle that thrives on reciprocal

influence.

The scaffolding of growth, as envisioned by abled idealism, redefines idealism as a process of

continuous adaptation, where principles evolve like living systems to meet the demands of

human experience. By integrating Roark’s clarity with Dominique’s relational adaptability,

this framework offers a philosophy that is both aspirational and practical, capable of guiding

individuals through life’s complexities. As we prepare to revisit The Fountainhead’s broader

implications, the idea of principles as living systems stands as a testament to the power of

dynamic ideals, promising a future where virtue is not a monument but a garden, ever-

growing and ever-responsive to the human spirit.

 Jain 37

5.3 The Fountainhead Revisited: A Conclusion in Flux

As we draw this exploration of Ayn Rand’s The Fountainhead to a close, the novel’s towering

ideals—embodied in Howard Roark’s unyielding individualism—stand in stark contrast to

the fluid, relational insights offered by Dominique Francon’s transformative journey. Rand’s

Objectivism, with its fierce commitment to rational self-interest, presents a vision of virtue

that is both inspiring and isolating, a monument to human potential that risks crumbling

under the weight of its own rigidity. Through the lens of abled idealism, this study has

reimagined these principles as dynamic, living systems, shaped by dialogue, vulnerability,

and adaptability. By revisiting The Fountainhead with fresh eyes, drawing on Objectivist

scholarship, feminist ethics, and psychological perspectives, and incorporating Rand’s

broader writings, this section reflects on how the novel’s tensions illuminate the enduring

relevance of abled idealism. Rather than a fixed doctrine, this philosophy offers a conclusion

in flux—a vision of virtue that evolves with the complexities of human life, inviting us to

sculpt ideals that are as resilient as they are aspirational.

Rand’s philosophy, as articulated in The Fountainhead and expanded in works like The

Romantic Manifesto, celebrates the artist as a creator of uncompromising truth, with Roark as

the ultimate exemplar. She writes, “Art is a selective re-creation of reality according to an

artist’s metaphysical value-judgments” (Rand, Romantic Manifesto 19). Objectivist scholar

Leonard Peikoff echoes this, framing Roark as “a man who lives for his own sake, neither

sacrificing himself to others nor sacrificing others to himself” (Objectivism 29). Yet, this

vision of solitary genius falters when confronted with Dominique’s relational complexity. Her

initial nihilism and eventual partnership with Roark reveal the limits of an idealism that shuns

interdependence, suggesting that virtues are not solitary creations but collaborative

endeavors. Feminist ethicist Eva Feder Kittay’s concept of “dependency work” provides a

powerful counterpoint, emphasizing the moral significance of relationships in sustaining

 Jain 38

human flourishing. In Love’s Labor, Kittay argues, “Dependency is not a diminishment but a

condition of our humanity, requiring care as a moral practice” (36). Dominique’s care—her

critical devotion to Roark—reshapes his ideals, infusing them with a relational depth that

Rand’s framework struggles to accommodate. This tension underscores abled idealism’s core

insight: principles must be nurtured through connection, not preserved in isolation, to remain

vital in a world of change. The psychological resilience of abled idealism further

distinguishes it from Rand’s absolutism, offering a path for individuals to navigate doubt and

adversity without abandoning their aspirations. Roark’s invulnerability, while heroic, is an

outlier; Dominique’s struggle, marked by emotional turmoil and growth, resonates more

deeply with human experience. Psychologist Martin Seligman’s work on “learned optimism”

illuminates this dynamic, suggesting that resilience stems from adapting one’s perspective in

response to challenges. In Learned Optimism, Seligman writes, “Optimism is not about

denying reality but about reframing it to foster hope and action” (44). Dominique’s reframing

—from despair to a shared commitment with Roark—mirrors this process, crafting a

principle of integrity that evolves through adversity. Objectivist scholar Allan Gotthelf, while

defending Rand’s vision, acknowledges its narrative constraints, noting that “Rand’s heroes

embody a moral code so pure that it leaves little room for the contingencies of life” (On Ayn

Rand 45). Abled idealism addresses this gap, proposing ideals that are scaffolds for growth,

capable of bending without breaking. Rand’s own reflections in Capitalism: The Unknown

Ideal hint at this need for adaptation, as she writes, “Reason is man’s tool of survival, but it

must be applied to the facts of reality” (Rand, Capitalism 24). Dominique’s influence ensures

that Roark’s reason engages with the reality of human connection, making their shared ideal

more robust.

Revisiting The Fountainhead through abled idealism reveals a philosophy that transcends

Rand’s absolutism, embracing the flux of human experience. Dominique’s shadow, her
 Jain 39

relational critique, and her emotional depth transform Roark’s monumental ideals into living

systems, responsive to dialogue and change. This vision aligns with philosopher Martha C.

Nussbaum’s call for an ethics that honours vulnerability, as she writes in Women and Human

Development, “To be human is to be capable of growth, and growth requires openness to

revision” (76). Abled idealism, as sculpted by the novel’s tensions, offers a hopeful path

forward—a dynamic idealism that invites us to build virtues that evolve, connect, and endure,

ensuring that our highest aspirations remain tethered to the vibrant, ever-shifting reality of

life.
 Jain 40

LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

While this dissertation offers a nuanced reinterpretation of Ayn Rand’s The Fountainhead

through the lens of abled idealism, several limitations constrain its scope and generalizability,

reflecting the challenges inherent in literary and philosophical analysis. These limitations,

rooted in methodological choices, textual focus, and theoretical framing, do not undermine

the study’s contributions but highlight areas for further exploration and refinement.

First, the study’s exclusive focus on The Fountainhead limits its engagement with Rand’s

broader oeuvre, which could provide additional context for her philosophy of Objectivism.

Works like Atlas Shrugged or The Virtue of Selfishness expand on themes of individualism

and rational self-interest, and their inclusion might have enriched the analysis of Roark and

Dominique’s dynamics or revealed contradictions in Rand’s thought that this study only

partially addresses. For instance, Atlas Shrugged’s portrayal of Dagny Taggart offers a

different feminine perspective that could complicate or complement Dominique’s role as a

“hero-worshipper.” By narrowing the scope to one novel, the dissertation sacrifices a

comprehensive view of Rand’s evolving ideas, potentially overlooking insights that could

strengthen or challenge the concept of abled idealism. Second, the reliance on a single

theoretical framework—abled idealism—while innovative, risks oversimplifying the

complexity of Rand’s narrative and its philosophical implications. The study draws heavily

on feminist, psychological, and ethical perspectives to construct this framework, but other

lenses, such as postcolonial or Marxist critiques, could reveal alternative tensions in The

Fountainhead. For example, a Marxist analysis might highlight the socioeconomic privileges

underpinning Roark’s ability to pursue his uncompromising vision, which the dissertation

does not explore. This theoretical constraint limits the study’s ability to address how abled

idealism might apply to diverse social contexts, particularly those marked by systemic

inequities that Rand’s philosophy often ignores.

 Jain 41

Third, the textual analysis centers primarily on Roark and Dominique, sidelining other

characters who could offer additional insights into the novel’s exploration of idealism.

Figures like Peter Keating or Ellsworth Toohey represent contrasting approaches to ambition

and morality, and their exclusion limits the study’s ability to test abled idealism against a

broader spectrum of human experiences. Keating’s conformism, for instance, might

illuminate the psychological barriers to adopting flexible principles, while Toohey’s

collectivism could challenge the relational aspects of abled idealism in ways Dominique’s arc

does not. This narrow focus risks creating a binary narrative that overlooks the novel’s richer

tapestry of ideological conflicts. Finally, the dissertation’s interdisciplinary approach, while a

strength, introduces challenges in maintaining depth across all cited disciplines. The

integration of philosophy, psychology, and feminist theory requires balancing diverse

methodologies, and some analyses—particularly those drawing on psychological frameworks

like growth mindsets or relational dynamics—may lack the rigor of specialized studies in

those fields. For example, the application of Carol Dweck’s or John Gottman’s theories to

literary characters is interpretive rather than empirical, potentially limiting their persuasive

power for readers accustomed to data-driven research. This interdisciplinary breadth, while

fostering creativity, occasionally sacrifices the precision needed to fully ground abled

idealism in each field.

These limitations suggest avenues for future research, such as expanding the textual scope to

include Rand’s other works, incorporating diverse theoretical perspectives, or exploring

secondary characters to test abled idealism’s versatility. By acknowledging these constraints,

the study invites further dialogue, ensuring that the reimagination of idealism remains a

dynamic, evolving project, much like the living systems it advocates.

 Jain 42

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