CAPSIZING OF ROLL-ON/ROLL-OFF VEHICLE CARRIER GOLDEN RAY

Maritime Accident Report to Module 1 “Ship Stability”

1 On August 27, 2019, Ro/Ro Golden Ray arrived

in Freeport, Texas, USA to offload a portion of its
cargo (vehicles) and load new cargo.
2 Shortly after departing Freeport on August 30,
Master was notified that Hurricane Dorian was
proceeding up the east coast of Florida. To
enhance the stability of the vessel in anticipation
of encountering the storm, Master had Chief
Officer load additional ballast without specifying
how much additional ballast to load. Chief Officer
Ro-Ro vehicle vessel Golden Ray oversaw the loading of about 1,500 MT of sea
water ballast into four double bottom water ballast
tanks. The Golden Ray then waited for three days to allow the hurricane to pass.
3 On September 3, the charterer directed Master to proceed to the Port of Jacksonville. Before
entering the port, the ship’s agent informed Chief Officer that the port had draft restrictions. To
reduce the vessel’s draft to less than 9.4 m as required by the port, Chief Officer discharged about
1,500 MT of sea water ballast from the same tanks that were loaded on August 30.
4 Over the next few days, cargo was offloaded from and loaded onto the vessel. On September 7,
the vessel departed the port, en route to the Port of Brunswick. The vessel was carrying 4,067
vehicles and was displacing 35,044 MT with a midship draft of 9.4 m.
5 The Golden Ray arrived outside the Port of Brunswick that afternoon, and a pilot boarded the
vessel to navigate the vessel into the port. The pilot and Master conducted a master/pilot exchange
to discuss the transit; then the pilot navigated the vessel to a terminal in Brunswick.
6 After docking, shoreside personnel and the vessel’s crew began cargo operations, offloading and
loading vehicles through the stern ramp. Chief Officer was responsible for ensuring that all
vehicles were properly stowed and secured.
7 On completing cargo operations, Chief Officer supervised preparations for the vessel’s
departure. He stated that he transferred 8 MT of water from No. 5 port double bottom water ballast
tank to No. 5 starboard double bottom water ballast tank, resulting in the vessel’s list changing
from 0.42° to port to 0.03° to starboard while at the dock.
8 On September 8, the same pilot boarded to pilot the vessel from the port. During the master/pilot
exchange, the pilot remarked that the vessel’s draft was the same as the previous day (9.4 m
forward and 9.5 m aft), which met the required minimum underkeel clearance.
9 The pilot began issuing orders to take in the vessel’s lines and maneuver the Golden Ray off the
pier with assistance from the tugboat Dorothy Moran. The pilot used a Portable Pilot Unit which
provided him with a navigation chart and an AIS interface that displayed the headings, speeds, and
rates of turn of the Golden Ray and other nearby vessels, as well as tidal and water depth
information. After all lines were let go, the Golden Ray eased into the harbour with the pilot issuing
rudder and engine commands to begin the transit through the channel and out to the sea buoy
before heading to Baltimore, Maryland.
10 The pilot ordered slow ahead. About two minutes later, the pilot ordered half ahead, and soon
the Golden Ray was proceeding at 6 knots. About three minutes later, the pilot ordered full ahead.
The vessel passed under Sydney Lanier Bridge and proceeded outbound, following pilot orders.
11 About the same time, Master ordered the crew to open the portside pilot door, located on deck
5, in preparation for the pilot’s planned departure just outside of the Port of Brunswick at the sea
buoy. The pilot door was a watertight hatch in the side shell that opened and closed locally by an
electronic/hydraulic system; it was 2.1 meters high and 2.1 meters wide. After supervising the
opening of the portside pilot door, Chief Officer went to his stateroom. The crewmembers left to
conduct other duties, and no one remained at the open door as the vessel proceeded outbound.
12 The vessel approached Cedar Hammock Range. The pilot ordered 20° port rudder to turn left
into Cedar Hammock Range at the course of 075° (a change in course of 38°). From this turn, it
was 1.3 nautical miles to the next left turn into Jekyll Island Range. A bit later, at the speed of 12.1
knots, the pilot again ordered 20° port rudder to enter the range at the course of 037° (a change in
course of 38°). The vessel made both left turns without incident.
13 At 0135, at the speed of 12.4 knots and the heading of 039°, the Golden Ray approached the
68° right turn. The pilot ordered the heading of 044°. About one minute later, the pilot ordered
“starboard 10” to initiate the turn. At the speed of 12.9 knots, the helmsman informed the pilot that
the rudder was at starboard 10. Shortly after, the pilot ordered “starboard 20” to enter Plantation
Creek Range, which had the course of 105° and led to the Atlantic Ocean. The helmsman moved
the rudder to comply with the pilot’s command; the vessel’s speed at the time was 13.3 knots.
14 Seconds later, the pilot ordered the rudder returned to midships (zero rudder angle). The
helmsman complied with the pilot’s order, and, according to the pilot, the “ship just took off.” At
0137, the vessel started to heel to port. The pilot stated that as the vessel began to turn, it “felt
directionally unstable…meaning when I started the turn, she wanted to keep turning.” The
crewmembers on the bridge could be heard on VDR expressing surprise, and the pilot asked,
“What’s the GM [metacentric height] on this thing?”
15 The pilot issued a “port 10” order to counter the heel and the increasingly sharp turn to
starboard. The pilot and Master began swiftly issuing additional rudder commands to the
helmsman to attempt to counter the heeling. However, the Golden Ray continued to rapidly heel
to port, its rate of turn to starboard increased, and the vessel heeled to port to about 60° in less than
a minute. Additionally, the equipment began shifting on the bridge, and numerous alarms began
to sound.
16 The pilot issued orders to turn on the vessel’s bow thruster and put the engine in reverse in an
attempt to stop the vessel from heeling over. Water entered deck 5 through the vessel’s open
portside pilot door and flooded through open watertight doors to the engine and steering gear
rooms. The vessel eventually settled on its port side at an angle of 90°.
17 The flooding caused four engineers to become trapped in the engine room for 40 hours before
getting rescued. The vessel's other 19 seafarers and the pilot on board were rescued shortly after the
incident. Two crew members sustained serious injuries.
Adapted from
https://maritimecyprus.com

TASKS
1 Knowing what happened
1.1 What type of ship was the Golden Ray?
1.2 What was her route?
1.3 What were the key figures in the situation?
1.4 Who was responsible for the vessel’s stability?
1.5 How did he regulate the vessel’s draft and stability?
1.6 What was the major role of the pilot?
1.7 How did the helmsman react to the pilot’s orders?
1.8 How did the voyage finish?
2 Critical understanding of facts (chain of misdoings)
2.1 Did the hurricane have any impact on the events that followed?
2.2 Should Master have explained Chief Officer how much ballast water and in what spaces to
load or unload?
2.3 Was Chief Officer’s decision to load and later unload the same amount of ballast water
justified?
2.4 How much did Master participate in navigating the vessel? Was it enough?
2.5 What do the pilot’s words ‘she wanted to keep turning’ and his question “What’s the GM
[metacentric height] on this thing?” mean (paragraph 14)?
2.6 Whose fault caused the Golden Ray to capsize?
3 Identifying goals
3.1 Why didn’t Master and Chief Officer exchange any information about the vessel and its
state?
3.2. Why did the pilot compare the vessel’s draft on both days of his work on the Golden Ray?
3.3 Why could Chief Officer leave the scene at the critical moment?
3.4 Why did Master start giving commands simultaneously with the pilot (paragraph 15)?

4 Conducting analysis based on theoretical readings

4.1 Does the explanation and the scheme concern the reason for capsizing in the report?

5 Problem statement
5.1 In short, define the basic problem of managing the Golden Ray as the report prompts it.
6 Analyzing case data
6.1 Should a pilot navigating a vessel be involved in ensuring ship stability?
6.2 Should Master be active in navigating the vessel when a pilot is on board?
6.3 When and how long should the pilot boarding door be open? Whose responsibility is it?

7 Generating and evaluating alternatives

7.1 How different would your actions be in this situation if you were Master? Chief Officer?
7.2 Discuss and select the best alternative of those suggested.
8 Developing an action plan
8.1 Compile a list of actions to implement the suggested alternative.
8.2 Arrange the list of actions in sequential order.

ABBREVIATIONS
MT – metric tons
m - metre
AIS - Automatic Identification System
VDR - voyage data recorder

NOTES TO PROPER NAMES

Florida is a state located in the Southeastern region of the United States.
Freeport, Texas; Jacksonville, Florida; Brunswick, Georgia; Baltimore, Maryland are
seaports in the USA.