Environmental Politics

ISSN: 0964-4016 (Print) 1743-8934 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fenp20

Exploring the framing power of NGOs in global

climate politics

Jen Iris Allan & Jennifer Hadden

To cite this article: Jen Iris Allan & Jennifer Hadden (2017): Exploring the framing power of NGOs
in global climate politics, Environmental Politics, DOI: 10.1080/09644016.2017.1319017

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ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS, 2017
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2017.1319017

Exploring the framing power of NGOs in global

climate politics
Jen Iris Allana and Jennifer Hadden b

a
Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada;
b
Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA

ABSTRACT
The Paris Agreement contains a separate article for loss and damage – an out-
come that aligns with a central demand of many nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) at COP21. By shifting to a justice framing of loss and damage, NGOs were
able to expand their mobilization and, in turn, enhance their influence. While it is
not claimed that NGO advocacy was sufficient to produce the outcome, pathways
by which issue framing can support increased NGO influence via persuasion and
coercion are illustrated. First, the justice frame garnered additional media atten-
tion and raised the stakes should states fail to include the issue in the Paris
Agreement. Second, the climate justice frame helped forge alliances with vulner-
able countries and within civil society that enhanced bargaining. The findings
contribute to theory building in NGO politics, connecting framing shifts to
important outcomes in the global governance of climate change.

KEYWORDS Climate change; climate activism; climate justice; NGOs

Introduction
On 12 December 2015 the 196 parties to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) adopted the Paris Agreement.
Among the many provisions, countries recognized in a standalone article ‘the
importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage asso-
ciated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather
events and slow onset events ’ (UNFCCC 2015a). This compromise resolved
one of the most divisive issues on the agenda of the Paris conference, by
including both a standalone article and separate decision excluding liability
and compensation. This outcome was generally viewed as a shift toward, but
not full alignment with, the demands of nongovernmental organizations
[NGOs] (see Burkett 2016, Vanhala and Hestbaek 2016).
Here, we examine the campaign around loss and damage to explore the
‘framing power’ of NGOs in global climate politics. NGO framing is an

CONTACT Jennifer Hadden [email protected]

© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 J. I. ALLAN AND J. HADDEN

important area of activity, but its consequences are rarely examined. We

explore an important question: how do framing shifts affect the mobilization
of NGOs, and in turn, their ability to influence global governance outcomes?
Previous scholarship has drawn attention to the ‘symbolic politics’ of
NGO campaigns (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Joachim 2003, Tarrow 2005),
emphasizing that how NGOs present issues to their audiences affects their
likelihood of campaign success. While scholars have examined how NGOs
can have a ‘discursive influence’ by inserting words into negotiating texts
(Betsill and Corell 2001, Gulbrandsen and Andresen 2004), they have not
adequately examined issue framing and its consequences for political out-
comes. Similarly, work on NGO influence highlights the role of allies and
agenda setting in facilitating NGOs’ ability to sway international outcomes
(Arts 1998, Joachim 2007, Betsill and Corell 2008) but has not tended to
tackle questions about how framing might enhance coalition formation and
prompt increased issue attention.
Here, we draw on the case of the NGO campaign around loss and
damage to make two arguments. First, NGOs’ shift to a justice-based
issue framing increased attention to the issue and laid the groundwork
for the formation of new coalitions, increasing solidarity among NGOs and
state actors and amplifying the voices of developing countries. Second, this
frame shift increased attention to loss and damage, raising the stakes for
state delegates to address the issue in a way that fits the frame. Together,
intensified issue attention and coalition growth enhanced NGOs’ ability to
coerce and persuade state actors, ultimately translating into influence.
Drawing on multiple kinds of data, we engage in careful process-tracing
analysis and analysis of alternative explanations to demonstrate the rele-
vance of frame shifts for NGO influence (Van Evera 1997, Bennett 2010).
While our case study cannot demonstrate that NGO advocacy was sufficient
to explain the outcome, it contributes to theory building by offering a useful
complement to existing work, documenting two plausible pathways by
which such an outcome may occur. We do not argue that NGOs are always
able to obtain their preferred policy outcome. Yet, we do show that by
shifting frames NGOs can sometimes add to their political heft, making this
tool worthy of future scholarly attention.

The framing power of NGOs

NGOs typically have no formal decision-making power in interstate nego-
tiations. Yet scholars have documented numerous cases in which NGOs
influenced the outcomes of interstate environmental processes as a result of
their advocacy activity, including negotiations on climate change (Betsill
2008), biosafety (Burgiel 2008), forests (Humphreys 2008), whaling
(Andresen and Skodvin 2008) and desertification (Corell 2008). In these
 ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 3

studies, influence is commonly understood as activity that affects the

behavior of actors within a political process or the ultimate outcome of
the negotiations, encompassing actions that shape the positions of indivi-
dual countries or the outcome text (Betsill and Corell 2008).
NGOs have two routes to influence: persuasion and coercion (Betsill and
Corell 2008). Persuasion is the ability of an actor to change the preferences
of another actor (Payne 2001). Scholars often argue persuasive appeal of
NGOs may be particularly strong in contexts where they serve as niche
information providers to states (Raustiala 1997, Arts 1998). NGOs are also
commonly viewed as particularly legitimate actors in world politics due to
their dedication to ‘principled’ causes and representational role in inter-
governmental settings, potentially enhancing their persuasive capacity
(Scholte 2011).
Coercion is the ability of an actor to change the behavior of another
actor, without the actor first altering its preferences (Payne 2001). NGOs
can coerce other actors by threatening or inflicting punishment in both
ideational and material terms. For example, strategies such as naming and
shaming in international negotiations and media can realize costs for states
unwilling to cede to NGOs’ demands (Betsill and Corell 2008, Murdie and
Peksen 2014, Murdie and Urpelainen 2014). NGOs are sometimes able to
harness the political and economic power of their constituents to threaten
boycotts and electoral punishment for those actors that violate their stan-
dards (Bloomfield 2013).
While scholars understand some of the conditions that favor NGOs’
ability to persuade or coerce (Joachim 2003, Betsill and Corell 2008), there
has been relatively less attention to how the strategic decisions of NGOs
themselves affect their influence. When scholars have focused on the
strategic decisions of NGOs, they have tended to study their use of parti-
cular tactics (Dalton et al. 2003, Tallberg et al. 2015), their adoption of
particular intra-organizational structures (Wong 2012) or their issue selec-
tion (Carpenter 2014). To our knowledge, only very few studies have
examined frame selection or how shifting frames affects NGO influence
(but see Joachim 2003, 2007, Sell and Prakash 2004).
Goffman’s (1974, p. 21) classic work defines frames as ‘schemata of
interpretation’ that enable actors to ‘locate, perceive, identify and label’
specific events and occurrences. An interpretive frame functions much
like a picture frame: it focuses attention on certain elements of importance
and deflects away from other aspects that may be less relevant. In doing so,
frames help to condense the world in order to give meaning to events and
experiences (see also Snow and Benford 1988, p. 137, Chong and
Druckman 2007). This work often focuses on the importance of ‘framing’
as a process, emphasizing that actors are not simply passive recipients of
frames but are engaging in ongoing processes of ‘meaning making’
4 J. I. ALLAN AND J. HADDEN

(Gamson et al. 1982, Snow et al. 1986). Much existing work has focused on
the factors constraining and facilitating the framing process itself, treating
the process as the outcome of interest (see Johnston and Noakes 2005). In
shifting the focus to the implications of framing for outcomes, we necessa-
rily bracket the framing process and the internal debates over frame mean-
ing, departing from some previous work in this field.
NGOs engage in a great deal of issue framing, making this an important
area of strategic activity. For example, Joachim (2007) illustrates how
women’s rights organizations strategically framed violence against women
as a human rights violation, and not simply a ‘women’s issue’, enhancing
their ability to influence agenda setting. Sell and Prakash (2004) emphasize
how NGOs employ ideas strategically to frame debates, demonstrating
similarities in business and civil society campaigns on intellectual property
rights.
We build on this work by treating framing shifts – the change intro-
duced as a product of collective framing activity – as the independent
variable in our analysis. We ask: how might a frame shift change NGO
campaigns and their influence in global governance? Here, we hypothesize
that NGO framing can enhance influence, identifying two potential path-
ways, as reflected in Figure 1.
First, frame shifts, especially toward master frames, can provide the basis
for coalition formation with new partners. Snow and Benford (1992, 2000)
illustrate how frames that are particularly malleable and resonant, such as
‘rights’ and ‘justice’, can bring together actors despite conditions uncondu-
cive to mobilization. Broader frames can serve as an umbrella for mobiliza-
tion under which different ideological and political strains can coexist in the
same coalition (see Smith 2002).
Coalition formation aided by frame shifts can enhance both persuasive
and coercive efforts. There is a power in numbers. A frame adopted by a
large and diverse group of actors is more likely to be seen as credible, and in
turn, persuasive (Benford and Snow 2000). A larger group of actors typi-
cally has more resources available to mobilize a boycott or to spread
information that names and shames, particularly using the media. A master
frame could also help forge alliances with states that share similar views, an

Figure 1. Issue framing and influence in global governance.

 ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 5

outcome that Betsill and Corell (2008) characterize as critical for influence
in formal negotiations.
Second, strategic frame shifts can increase attention to an issue. Master
frames may be easier to communicate to a range of audiences. They may
also garner more attention by simplifying and highlighting more media-
friendly aspects of a multi-dimensional issue. As NGOs are often viewed as
authorities (Avant et al. 2010), their ties to citizens and media can give
them tools to drive the issue attention cycle on topics of interest (Thrall
et al. 2014). Their ability to do so may be heightened when they are
presenting a new frame, as novelty can also drive coverage.
Increased issue attention can aid coercive and persuasive strategies. The
attention of the media or public can be leveraged to isolate intransigent
actors and to threaten future public shaming (Murdie and Urpelainen
2014). NGOs can threaten consequences for failure to reach agreement on
these high-profile issues. As Busby (2010) shows, states sometimes pursue
costly action as a result of moral framing activating a desire to appear
virtuous. Increased issue attention may make it more likely that the issue
frame reaches state delegates directly via media coverage and interaction
with NGOs, potentially amplifying the persuasive effect.

Research methods
We employ the method of process tracing, which Collier defines as the
‘systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected in light of research
questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator’ (Collier 2011). Process
tracing requires careful description and attention to sequence among
events. In our case, there are three main descriptive tasks: establishing
that there was a shift in NGO framing toward a justice-based approach
(the independent variable); documenting the growth in issue attention and
coalitions on loss and damage (the intervening variables); and providing
evidence of persuasion and coercion of state actors by NGOs (the depen-
dent variable). Our task is to characterize this process by establishing the
sequence of events and causal pathways and evaluating our hypothesis vis-
à-vis rival hypotheses.
We use two approaches to evaluate our hypothesis. First, we conduct an
empirical test for causal inference known as a ‘hoop test’. A hoop test is
necessary but not sufficient for affirming a hypothesis; a hypothesis must
‘jump through the hoop’ to remain under consideration, but passing a hoop
test does not provide sufficient evidence for accepting a hypothesis (see Van
Evera 1997, Bennett 2010, Collier 2011). In our case, the ‘hoop test’ is that
there must be evidence connecting the frame shift to the Paris outcome in a
plausible causal sequence through the intervening variables. If we do not
find this evidence, the hypothesis fails the hoop test.
6 J. I. ALLAN AND J. HADDEN

As stated earlier, the hoop test is not sufficient for accepting the hypoth-
esis, as it does not provide a basis for eliminating alternative explanations.
We further strengthen the hypothesis by considering plausible alternative
hypotheses through the exploration of alternative explanations. We parti-
cularly focus on two alternatives: that the outcome could be explained by
increased advocacy overall, not specifically a change in issue framing, and
that the outcome is solely explained by inter-state bargaining. While we
cannot definitively eliminate these alternatives, we suggest that considera-
tion of these explanations further strengthens our hypothesis.
Using the process-tracing approach, we see our work as enhancing theory
building on NGO influence, an area acutely challenging from a methodolo-
gical standpoint due to problems of reciprocal causation, spuriousness and
selection bias (see Arts 1998, Betsill and Corell 2008, pp. 8–9). Loss and
damage may be a ‘tough test’ for our argument because it is an unlikely place
for NGOs to exert influence. Most works suggest that NGO influence is
lessened in negotiations over issues characterized by high political salience or
entrenched economic interests (Arts 1998, Betsill and Corell 2008, Lund
2013). Loss and damage is characterized by deeply entrenched economic
interests, due to the potential to implicate developed countries in liability
for climate change impacts and the significant potential economic impact for
fossil fuel companies and other economic sectors. That we find evidence of
influence speaks to the potential importance of framing as a tool in advocacy.
We draw on diverse primary and secondary data sources, including both
qualitative and quantitative data and observations. In building our analysis,
we first identified a general timeline of events from press sources, drawing
in particular on the Earth Negotiations Bulletin, a daily account of the
international climate negotiations. We then conducted quantitative histor-
ical and frame analysis of documents, including the daily NGO newsletter
ECO, formal submissions to the UNFCCC and general media sources, to
establish: the shift in framing; the increased media attention to the issue; the
growth in the NGO coalitions; and the increased use of coercive tactics.
Both researchers have conducted extensive interviews with participants in
the UNFCCC process for larger research projects, and we also draw on that
pool of interview data and relevant documents to establish the sequencing
of events where needed.
Previous scholarship has identified the ‘justice frame’ as a strategic
innovation in the climate movement. Our work documents the deployment
of the justice frame, which has been previously elaborated by other scholars
(see Goodman 2009, Chatterton et al. 2012, Wahlström et al. 2013,
Schlosberg and Collins 2014). Our work contributes to this field by tracing
the implications of this framing shift for outcomes at the Paris Conference.
In doing so, our analysis brackets questions about the diverse content of the
frame and tensions over the meaning of ‘justice’ in order to better focus on
 ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 7

how frames affect political outcomes (but see Cagnilia et al. 2015,
Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2016).

Shifting to a justice frame

Using a justice frame in the loss and damage campaign was part of a broader
shift in the climate movement away from scientific framings of climate change
and toward a justice frame. The justice framing of the climate issue emerged after
more than a decade of the UNFCCC’s existence where climate change had been
treated primarily as a scientific problem (see Gupta 2014). The early articulation
of the climate justice frame emerged from a dissatisfaction and perceived failure
of mainstream environmentalism to address climate change and was articulated
by the global justice movement, domestic environmental justice movements,
several indigenous rights activists and some environmental NGOs such as the
Durban Group for Climate Justice (Bond and Dorsey 2010).1 In its original form,
the climate justice frame grounds itself in antagonism to traditional climate
politics, drawing on ideas in global justice and domestic environmental justice
movements (Goodman 2009, Chatterton et al. 2012, Schlosberg and Collins
2014). It foregrounded structural and ecological inequalities and commodifica-
tion of nature as causes of climate change (Goodman 2009; Roberts and Parks
2009, della Porta and Parks 2014, p. 24). In Copenhagen, this framing caused
tensions to emerge between groups employing a climate justice framing and
those (including the major NGO coalition, Climate Action Network (CAN))
advancing a science-based framing (Fisher 2010, Hadden 2015).
After Copenhagen, the use of climate justice framing became widespread
among climate NGOs, contending with existing discourse in this issue area
(Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2016, Hadden 2015, Thorn et al. 2017). At the global
and domestic levels, the climate movement involves several coalitions (Newell
2008, Cagnilia et al. 2015), and as the frame became more widespread, it also
became more contested discursive terrain. But as articulated by many NGOs, the
climate justice frame elevates the moral or ethical dimensions of the problem,
drawing attention to two related elements. First, it highlights distributional issues
related to who is affected by climate change and who must bear the costs. On the
basis of this, justice framing often stimulates attention to the equity of outcomes
or calls for compensation. Second, those employing a justice frame often
emphasize the importance of procedural justice, calling attention to voices that
are unrepresented or unheard in the official negotiating process. This formula-
tion is intentionally broad:
We’ve defined climate justice as something like ‘climate change both stems
from inequalities and the people who feeling the impacts had no role in cause
it. That’s the injustice of climate change.’ That broad definition allows the
sub-definitions to hang off of it (CAN representative, 2016).
8 J. I. ALLAN AND J. HADDEN

To document this shift in framing, we conducted a coding of the framing of

the articles in the NGO newsletter ECO, CAN’s major publication, from
each COP from 2007 to 2013. Each ECO article was coded in Atlas.ti as
employing a justice/equity framing, a scientific framing, or both. To identify
a justice framing, we coded direct references in the text to ‘justice’ and
‘equity’, as well as associated the concept of ‘fairness’. To identify a scientific
framing, we coded direct references to scientific evidence (e.g. the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)), scientific targets
(e.g. 350ppm) or scientific urgency.
As Figure 2 reveals, the framing of articles in ECO dramatically shifted
away from scientific framing between 2007 and 2013, focusing to a much
greater extent on justice-based framing. This framing shift had important
implications for the campaign on loss and damage.

Implications for the politics of loss and damage

In the UNFCCC context, the phrase ‘loss and damage’ refers to the residual
impacts of climate change that mitigation and adaptation cannot avoid. The
IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (2014) concluded that ‘without additional
mitigation efforts beyond those in place today, and even with adaptation,
warming by the end of the 21st century will lead to high to very high risk of
severe, widespread and irreversible impacts globally’. In this report, the
IPCC judges that some climate change risks are unavoidable, providing the
basis for claims for ‘loss and damage’.
Politically, loss and damage has been defined more narrowly to include only
those countries least responsible and most vulnerable to climate change. As the
UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) defined it in 2012, loss

Figure 2. Number of articles by frame per page from the NGO newsletter ECO.
 ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 9

and damage is ‘the actual and/or potential manifestation of impacts associated

with climate change in developing countries that negatively affect human and
natural systems’. The ‘loss’ component involves irreparable harms such as
human fatalities, cultural destruction, or species extinction. The ‘damage’
concerns reparable harms to human infrastructure or natural areas.
In the agenda-setting phase, the Association of Small Island Developing
States (SIDS) and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) groups pushed the
UNFCCC to discuss issues related to compensation for damages from
climate change. But the issue did not gain traction until the establishment
of a 2-year work program on loss and damage in 2010. Once on the table,
sharp divides emerged between developing countries’ calls for compensa-
tion and developed countries resistant to these proposals.
In the negotiations for the Paris Agreement throughout 2014 and 2015 it
was clear that SIDS would not accept an agreement without a strong
provision for loss and damage, while developed countries were reluctant
to discuss the issue separately from adaptation. The Paris Agreement’s
drafts produced throughout 2015 included both options for a standalone
loss and damage article that included liability and compensation and a ‘no
text’ option, promising that this would be one of the biggest areas of debate.
The ultimate outcome in the Paris Agreement was a compromise on loss
and damage in the form of Article 8.1, a standalone article that states:
Parties recognize the importance of averting, minimizing, and addressing loss
and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including
extreme weather events and slow onset events, and the role of sustainable
development in reducing the risk of loss and damage.

The decision excludes liability and compensation but also establishes a

permanent institution and provides risk insurance contributions. Further,
and crucial for many developing countries, loss and damage has its own
article in the Agreement and is not subsumed under adaptation. While not
fully satisfying advocates, many saw the outcome as a compromise and a
net win for NGO advocacy, pending discussion and elaboration at subse-
quent meetings (Burkett 2016).

Shift to justice framing on loss and damage

The broader shift from a technical toward a justice frame in the climate
movement informed how climate NGOs advocated on loss and damage. As
Burkett (2016) and Vanhala and Hestbaek (2016) document, the initial
framing of the loss and damage issue had two related, technical compo-
nents. One of the initial framings of loss and damage was highly legalistic. It
evoked strong connotations of liability and compensation: in most ‘loss and
damage’ clauses in contract law, the responsible party is liable to
10 J. I. ALLAN AND J. HADDEN

compensate the claimant for loss and damage. In the second framing, states
and observers drew upon notions of risk transfer and risk management to
frame the issue (see Burkett 2016, Vanhala and Hestbaek 2016).
NGOs shared these legalistic and technical frames, using them in their early
campaigns on the issue. Parties and observers widely used these two frames when
the work program was established in 2010. An early study published by WWF
titled ‘Beyond Adaptation: The Legal Duty to Pay Compensation for Climate
Change’ considers how rules in international customary law and other interna-
tional law precedents could support claims for compensation for loss and damage
(WWF 2008). The Third World Network wrote a series of briefing papers
discussing the importance of risk reduction and risk transfer policies in addres-
sing loss and damage because of climate change (Stabinsky and Hoffmeister
2011). In a submission to the SBI expert group in 2011, CAN recommended that
a future work program on loss and damage be organized on technical topics:
Parties and experts should discuss tools to assess and map exposures to loss &
damage. These include risk assessment, modeling, mapping, and an evalua-
tion of future loss & damage potentials. It should also entail discussions on
the type of natural resources and assets exposed (e.g. economic exposure,
social exposure like loss in life, loss in ecosystem and their services etc.) and
about suitable metrics to measure these losses (CAN 2011).

By 2012, there were initial efforts to find a less legalistic way to discuss loss
and damage, but it still relied on technical language. In a joint report,
ActionAid, CARE, GermanWatch, and WWF (2012) make four recommen-
dations for developed countries to: continue to pursue mitigation; provide
resources to address vulnerability; scale up disaster risk reduction; and
discuss rehabilitation and compensation, considering the precautionary
principle. The report focuses on scientific projections of temperature
increases and economic valuations of losses.
A major frame transformation in campaigning on the topic of loss and
damage occurred between 2012 and 2013. Naderev ‘Yeb’ Sano, a delegate
from the Philippines, became a major focus of attention for his advocacy on
the topic after a typhoon devastated his country in both 2012 and 2013. He
gave an emotional speech at the Doha conference in 2012 calling for parties
to ‘stop this madness’ and built the case for a moral responsibility to act:
I appeal to all, please, no more delays, no more excuses. . . Please, let 2012 be
remembered as the year the world found the courage to find the will to take
responsibility for the future we want. I ask of all of us here, if not us, then
who? If not now, then when? If not here, then where? (UNFCCC 2012)

Youth NGO leaders were particularly quick to rally to Sano’s support and
to take on the issue of loss and damage, which seemed to become more
sharply defined by its association with a key spokesperson and a vulnerable
population. As a Young Friends of the Earth delegate explained:
 ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 11

In Doha we stood shoulder to shoulder with Yeb and the people of the
Philippines. The youth stood with the Philippines as the Doha climate talks
stumbled to a close at 4am in the morning, the conference center con-
tinued to echo with our support for those being impacted by the climate
crisis . . . What the world needs is climate justice, and we need it now
(Lundberg 2013).

Six months after the Doha conference, by June 2013, CAN undertook its
own framing shift on loss and damage to encompass justice issues, con-
trasting with the earlier technical approach. As CAN stated in an SBI
submission in 2013:
Tackling loss and damage is about climate justice. It is about protecting
people, their livelihoods and, most importantly, their human rights and
dignity. It is time for those who are mainly responsible for climate change
to act here in Warsaw (CAN 2013a).

CAN’s frame transformation initially bridged issues of morality and

social inequity with calls for legal remedies. But because the justice
framing was broader than the legal frame, it could also encompass
compromises that did not include liability and compensation, as the
next section shows.
Immediately before the Warsaw meeting in 2013, NGOs organized a loss
and damage workshop with technical experts from developing countries,
which provided NGOs with a direct connection to national delegations
(Interview CAN 2016). In Warsaw, CAN further cemented the frame
transformation. After a second emotional speech in plenary, Yeb Sano
began a hunger strike. CAN members, including its Director, Wael
Hmaidan, visibly joined the hunger strike by pinning red circles to their
lapels. In their statement to plenary on November 19, a CAN spokesperson
again underlined that: ‘The devastation of Typhoon Haiyan in the
Philippines is a harsh reminder that there can’t be any further delay in
tackling loss and damage. This is about climate justice.’ (CAN 2013b)

Coalition growth and increased issue attention

This shift in framing had two main consequences for NGO advocacy on
loss and damage. First, it significantly broadened the coalition of actors
supporting action on loss and damage, bringing in those with whom the
focus on social inequities and morality was particularly resonant. Among
civil society, the number of organizations using the climate justice frame to
advocate for loss and damage grew, and those advocating on the topic
became more diverse, encompassing important environmental groups, cli-
mate justice groups, youth groups, development groups and faith organiza-
tions. For example, while only CAN and faith-based groups mentioned loss
12 J. I. ALLAN AND J. HADDEN

and damage in their statements to the high-level segment in 2012, women

and gender and youth groups, as well as other environmental NGOs and
climate justice groups included references to loss and damage in their
statements in 2015.2
As participants explain it, the justice frame served as a master frame that
helped the climate movement to grow beyond just the ‘usual suspects in the
environmental community’ by incorporating a broader set of concerns
(Hadden 2014). A participant echoed the significance of this shift on the
part of Northern NGOs, emphasizing how the framing shift helped to spur
additional mobilization:

Using that framework [climate justice] got people’s attention. . . they were
activated and motivated by it. There was also a sense that as climate change
got worse it became more and more of unjust and inequitable, so there were
more people thinking about it that way. . . I think there is a desire to bridge
the gap. I think also Northern NGOs have actually come a long way . . .and
are no longer seeing this as a purely environmental issue divorced from issues
of global justice (Interview CAN, 2014).

The breadth of support was demonstrated by the scale of the massive and
unprecedented civil society walkout in Warsaw. Representatives of NGOs
from different ends of the political spectrum, including WWF, Friends of
the Earth, Oxfam, Greenpeace and the International Trade Union
Confederation, participated, many of which carried signs with climate
justice themes. In a press release announcing the walkout these organiza-
tions and others cited ‘stalled’ talks on loss and damage, saying ‘organiza-
tions and movements representing people from every corner of the Earth
have decided that the best use of our time is to voluntarily withdraw from
the Warsaw climate talks’ (WWF 2013). The walkout drew media attention
and clearly aligned these NGOs with developing countries.3
The adoption of the climate justice framing also gave NGOs the opportunity
to strengthen alliances with state partners. Most obviously, this framing strength-
ened the connection between NGOs and the delegation of the Philippines, as
demonstrated by the joint actions in 2013. Ties with other countries that are
acutely vulnerable to climate change – particularly SIDS and the LDCs – were
also enhanced by NGOs taking a more forward-leaning position, as demon-
strated by the joint strategy workshop held in 2013. Adopting the justice framing
and supporting calls for loss and damage may have helped enhance the credibility
of these groups in the eyes of developing countries’ delegates who may have been
skeptical of them otherwise (see Hadden 2015).
Some NGOs also employed the justice frame in order to shame developed
countries. Oxfam issued a press release after the Warsaw walkout, stating,

Loss and damage, the support poor countries need where there is no hope of
adaptation, is vital . . .The decision to walk out highlights the level of
 ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 13

exasperation there is with rich countries at these talks – particularly the

Australian delegation which has blocked every attempt of progress and
turns up to negotiations in t-shirts (Oxfam 2013).

ActionAid singled out a ‘few rich countries including the US [that] held
it [loss and damage] hostage till the very end’ (Climate Home 2013). The
justice frame helped NGOs align with developing countries, putting them in
the moral right and shaming developed countries for their inaction.
The frame shift also contributed to increased attention for the loss and
damage issue. As one NGO representative explained, it is common for
coalitions to pick relatively few issues to highlight in media communica-
tions in order to set standards for success at the climate negotiations. For
Paris, loss and damage was one of the main topics used as benchmarks for
whether the negotiations were going well (Interview, CAN 2016). The
media strategy was designed to put loss and damage high on the agenda
for the negotiations:
If you look at the year before Paris, big influence. Largely through the media.
We talked up loss and damage and the need to deal with it. Civil society helped
put it high on the agenda, even though it was clear that developed countries
did not want to deal with loss and damage at Paris (Interview, CAN 2016).

Media coding reveals this shift. Within the UNFCCC, the number of
mentions of loss and damage in the Earth Negotiations Bulletin increased
from 21 in 2010 to 55 in 2015 (with a peak of 65 in 2014), reflecting the
increased prominence of the issue on the UNFCCC agenda. The number of
references to loss and damage in a media search of LexisNexis increased
from 40 in 2010 to 603 in 2015, reflecting an outsized growth in media
attention. There is also evidence that the media picked up on the frame
shift, potentially driving the additional coverage. An analysis of LexisNexis
shows that in 2010, 1.25% of articles that mention ‘loss and damage’ and
‘climate change’ also mention the term ‘justice’. In contrast, 10.27% of
articles in 2013 mentioned justice, and 21.9% did so in 2015, reflecting
that the NGO message was diffusing via this channel.

Enhanced persuasion and coercion

This increased issue attention and coalition growth had consequences for
the ability of NGOs to coerce and persuade states within the negotiations.
Before the Paris conference, progress on loss and damage was set as a
benchmark to determine the extent to which states succeeded; failure to live
up to that mark would risk generating negative attention to the new
agreement and the states that negotiated it. Representatives from Oxfam,
WWF France and Christian Aid all listed it as one of their top priority for
the conference in their opening press conference (UNFCCC 2015b). This
14 J. I. ALLAN AND J. HADDEN

coercive assessment power was repeatedly communicated to states through

the ECO publication. On the opening day of the conference CAN published
a strong warning:
On the other hand, the extreme position from the US, Japan, Canada, Australia
and Switzerland of no reference to loss and damage in the Paris agreement
(Article 5, Option 2) is not an option if we want a fair agreement. . . Remember,
Heads of State, we are listening to you today! (ECO, 30 November 2015)

NGOs also attempted to name and shame states on the issue of loss and
damage. CAN sponsors a ‘Fossil of the Day’ ceremony to draw attention to
states that civil society representatives believe are blocking the climate talks.
Positions on loss and damage became the basis for the United States,
Australia, Japan, Norway and Saudi Arabia to win the Fossil of the Day
‘awards’ from 2013 to 2015, with the USA winning two Fossils for its
position on loss and damage during the Paris Conference. States were
made aware that loss and damage was an issue on which they would be
‘punished’ by NGOs if they did not behave. This was particularly true for
the United States, where domestic NGOs were very active in pushing for
loss and damage language, as the director of US CAN stated:
I’d like to speak to the massive amount of support that exists within the
United States for language on loss and damage . . .What we have seen in the
United States is the faith community coming forward, the youth activists
coming forward very strongly and saying ‘here in the United States among
our own vulnerable community and abroad, we are in solidarity with the
notion that we have to address loss and damage’ (UNFCCC 2015b).

The dedication of a large and diverse group of NGOs to the loss and
damage issue may have also enhanced the persuasive appeal of NGO
arguments, and in turn, lent support to allied developing country negotia-
tors. A CAN representative described the interaction between NGOs and
developing country delegates as a two-way street, ‘[it] has been about trying
to influence them. But equally taking on board their views and being driven
by their agenda. We try to ensure that we understand their perspective and
what we can to support it’ (Interview CAN, 2016).
For example, while CAN and other NGO advocates vocally supported
developing countries’ calls for compensation, they also pushed developed
countries to accept the ‘bridging proposal’ on loss and damage that was
floated prior to Paris (ECO 2016). This bridging proposal treated loss and
damage as separate from adaptation but did not include language on
liability. The ECO newsletter called on developed countries – in particular
the United States, Australia and the European Union – as having a ‘moral
responsibility’ to compromise on the loss and damage issue, stating,
‘Recognising responsibilities, including moral ones, is not a sign of weak-
ness but a sign of true strength’ (ECO 2016).
 ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 15

Developing country negotiators pointed to the efforts of civil society to

raise attention to the issue as evidence that it is a common, global concern,
potentially enhancing the persuasiveness of this position. As one delegate
puts it:
‘It makes a difference, having civil society outside championing your cause,
your issue. It can be easy to neglect small states, to push our issues aside. If
civil society also pushes for our issues, we can say that the world supports our
position, that our position is the morally right thing because all the NGOs
agree with us. It gives us support in the negotiation room.’ (Interview,
developing country delegate 2014).

Because NGOs had strong connections to developing country delegations,

they were able to provide information and advice even when negotiations
moved behind closed doors, as they often did during Paris where, according
to the Earth Negotiations Bulletin, loss and damage was exclusively dis-
cussed in informal, usually bilateral, discussions among states (IISD 2015).
NGOs also attempted behind the scenes to exercise persuasion with
national delegations of developed countries, claiming to represent moral
authority. This kind of behind the scenes lobbying is hard to measure, but it
may have played a role in softening the position of some developed country
delegates. Perhaps paradoxically, the justice-based framing of loss and
damage may have been easier for developed country parties to accept
than the legal framing, by directing attention away from the issues of
liability and compensation. For example, US Secretary of State John Kerry
stated in an interview shortly before Paris:
We’re not against [loss and damage]. We’re in favor of framing it in a way
that doesn’t create a legal remedy because Congress will never buy into an
agreement that has something like that . . .The impact of it would be to kill
the deal (Goodell 2015).

Domestic NGOs growing attention to the loss and damage issue may well
have accelerated the softening of the US position, contributing to the
overall compromise that emerged in the final agreement.

Alternative explanations
As noted earlier, exploring NGO influence is a methodologically fraught
exercise, in part because of the many possible confounding factors. There
are at least two strong alternative hypotheses that deserve consideration.
First, would the result of NGO advocacy have been the same without the
shift in frames? Is the outcome attributable to simply the amount of
campaigning, not specifically the framing shift? To assess this alternative,
we have to imagine a situation where, post-Copenhagen, climate NGOs
continue to employ a technical and scientific frame on the loss and damage
16 J. I. ALLAN AND J. HADDEN

issue. We suspect that without the deployment of the justice-based framing,

the amount of campaigning observed in Paris simply would not have been
possible: the framing itself contributed to the growth in the movement by
allowing organizations to build broader coalitions. For example, youth
activists were among those most active in campaigning on loss and damage
after 2013 but would have been unlikely to adopt this issue if it had
remained a technical discussion (Interview, SustainUS 2016). Moreover,
the content of the frame also mattered: ‘shaming’ is a more effective strategy
when issues are framed in terms of morality (Busby 2010). Our analysis
leads us to believe that the justice framing brought NGOs additional
resources helping to expand their campaigning and influence in ways that
otherwise would be unlikely.
Second, is the outcome attributable solely to the dynamics of interstate
bargaining? To assess this question, we draw on work by Sprinz et al. (2016)
that attempted to forecast the outcome of the Paris conference using a
combination of an expert survey and a negotiations simulation model
(DECIDE) known as the ‘Predictioneers Game’. Since this work makes ex
ante predictions about what seemed likely before the conference (and does
not include NGOs in its actor calculus), it is a useful way to explore NGOs’
possible influence. The Predictioneer’s Game does predict an eventual
compromise between developed and developing on loss and damage, and
also suggests that the issue would take much longer to negotiate than the
end of 2015. Though the model’s general predictions were borne out, it
seemed to err slightly on the loss and damage issue, which was included in
the Paris Decision through compromise in 2015.
Thus we suggest it is plausible that NGOs did contribute to the political
heft of developing countries in the negotiations, shifting negotiations slightly
toward their preferences and on a faster timeline. Our analysis suggests that
NGOs’ justice framing supported more shaming attempts. As a result, states
like United States, Japan, Australia and Switzerland knew that this is an issue
for which they would be punished domestically as well as internationally if
they did not reach a compromise, raising the stakes for getting to an
agreement. In turn, claims about loss and damage being a matter of justice
became harder to dismiss as they were adopted more broadly, becoming
more persuasive and costlier for developed countries to ignore.
However, the alignment of NGO and developing country positions
makes it difficult to attribute responsibility for the outcome solely to the
strategic decisions of NGOs. We acknowledge that the question of whether
developing country diplomacy would have been sufficient to produce the
outcome is not one we can answer definitively based on our case study. At
the same time, we suggest that the persuasion and shaming conducted by
NGOs surpassed what vulnerable developing countries could have
 ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 17

accomplished through diplomacy alone, suggesting that NGO advocacy

potentially had an independent impact on the outcome.

Conclusion
We have argued that issue framing can be an important tool for NGOs. By
adopting a climate justice issue framing, NGOs have been able to draw
more attention to the issue of loss and damage and to build broader
alliances both within civil society and with state partners. We conclude –
at minimum – that NGOs were able to enhance their own mobilization and
resources with strategic framing; we also present evidence that suggests that
NGO framing can be plausibly linked to increased influence through
persuasion and coercion. We see our work as contributing to theory build-
ing in this area by examining the pathways by which framing is connected
to global governance outcomes and suggest that future research might
employ comparative designs to further examine this issue.

Notes
1. For example, while human rights discourse may be a productive way to push
for climate action as Nicholson and Chong (2011) argue, those linking climate
change and human rights may have used the term climate justice but were
unrelated to the early climate justice movement.
2. This is based on NGOs’ statements to high-level segments of COP 18, 19, 20 and
21 available at: http://unfccc.int/meetings/paris_nov_2015/meeting/8926.php.
3. See, for example, The Guardian, ‘Green Groups Walk Out of the UN Climate
Talks.’ Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/nov/21/
mass-walk-out-un-climate-talks-warsaw.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

ORCID
Jennifer Hadden http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1337-5827

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