Balmukand vs. Kamla Wati and Ors.

(1964)

FACTS OF BALMUKUND CASE:

On October 1, 1943, Balmukund (plaintiff) purchased 23/120th share in the land belonging to one
Devishai. He thus became the owner of 17/20th share in this land.The remaining 3/20th share
belongs to the joint Hindu family of which Pindidas was the Manager and his brother, Haveliram
Khemchand and Satyapal were the members. Plaintiff paid Rs. 175 per marla for the land which he
purchased from Devisahai.

In order to merge his holding, the plaintiff desired to gain the 3/20th share held by the joint family of
Pindidas and his brothers. He, therefore, approached Pindidas in the matter and Pindidas agreed to
sell the 3/20th share of belonging to the family at the rate of Rs. 250 per marla.

The contract was entered on October 1, 1945, with Pindidas and Rs. 100 were paid to him as earnest
money.As the manager of the family, Pindidas failed to execute the sale deed in the plaintiff’s favor.
The plaintiff instituted the suit for specific performance and made Pindidas and his brother
defendants thereto.

CONTENTIONS:

The Brothers of Pindidas (the other 3 defendants) denied the existence of any contract and pleaded
that even if Pindidas was proved to be the Karta of the joint family and had agreed to sell the land in
suit, the transaction was not binding upon them because the sale was not for the benefit of the
family nor was there any necessity for that sale.

RATIO

The Court was of the view that for a transaction to be one which is of benefit to the family, it need
not be only of a defensive character, i.e. a transaction carried out to protect the estate from
imminent danger or destruction.

The Court observed where adult members exist; the judgment is to be not that of the manager of the
family alone but that of all the adult members of the family, including the manager.

It was observed that the manager did not ask for any suggestions on the transaction from the other
adult brothers. They neither consulted them about it nor knew about the transaction.

Mudholkar, J., held that no part of the joint family property could be parted with or agreed to be
parted with by the manager on the grounds of alleged benefit to the family when the transaction
is opposed by the adult members of the family
Kakumanu Pedasubhayya v. Kakumanu Akkamma, AIR 1968 SC 1042

This encircles the concept that the partition would be in the interests of the minor and not affecting
a partition would adversely affect his interests. This case deals with the situation where if the minor
dies during the pendency of the suit, whether the suit would be abated or the same can
be continued by legal representative.s

Facts In this case, the suit was filed for the partition on the behalf of the minor who died during the
pendency by his maternal grandfather as the next friend of minor. The defendants were the father
and his sons from first wife who were continuously dissipating the ancestral estate by selling land
and by incurring large-scale debts without any legal necessity. The family properties were sold, and
fresh ones purchased in the name of adult coparceners. The petition was admitted but during the
pending of the suit minor died.

Issues Involved

Whether the minor died as undivided member of the family? Whether the suit be abated on his
death?

Observations

The Supreme Court observed that there is no distinction between the rights of a minor and a major
coparcener as far as the coparcenary property is concerned but the court acts as parens partiae in
order to protect the rights of the minor.The Court further observed that the partition must be in
the interest of the minor even if it was filed by his next friend.

The Court further said that minor would be deemed to be a separate member from the date when
the petition was presented in the Court. The Court said the only difference between the minor and
major coparcener is that it was conditional upon the Court coming to the conclusion that it will
further the interest of the minor.The Court said that minor’s severance from the joint family took
place on the date of filing of the partition suit and at the time of his death, he was a separate
member.

Conclusion The Court held that the suit can be continued by the legal representative of minor and
the minor was the divided member at the time of his death.
In Uttam vs Saubhag Singh case concerns the Mitakshara Coparcenary system and the Joint Hindu
Family, as well as the legislation governing testamentary and intestate succession. Prior to the
2005 modification, it concentrates on sections 6 and 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The issue
is the devolution of the deceased’s property and the plaintiff/position appellant’s in order to
determine his claim.

FACTS OF UTTAM v. SAUBHAG CASE: Jagannath Singh, the plaintiff’s grandpa, died in 1973, leaving
behind his wife, Mainabai, and four children, one of whom was the plaintiff’s father.Uttam, the
plaintiff, filed a partition claim against his father, defendant no. 3, and his father’s siblings,
defendants number 1, 2, and 4.He sued the defendants to get his part of the suit property, which he
claimed was ancestral property.He argued that as a coparcenary; he was entitled to a part of the
proceeds.

ISSUES:

Whether the joint family property kept its joint family character following Jagannath Singh’s death?

Whether the appellant has a claim to the contested property by birth as a coparcener?

Whether the appellant had the authority to file a partition action while his father (the Class 1 heir)
was still alive?

CONTENTIONS:

Plaintiff’s contention It was argued that because the deceased’s widow was alive at the time of his
death, the case would fall within the proviso to Section 6’s jurisdiction. As a result, the deceased’s
stake in the coparcenary property would pass through intestate succession rather than survivorship
under Section 8 of the Act.

Defendant’s contention The main argument was that if Section 8 is implemented, the joint family
property ceases to be joint family property because of the application of the proviso to Section 6.
Only Section 30 or Section 8 can be used to inherit such property if a will has been written or if a
member of the joint family has died intestate.

RATIO DECIDENDI: ‘All the implications that arise from a true partition must be rationally worked
out,’ so the heirs’ share must be determined because they were separated from one another and got
a share in the division that occurred during the deceased’s lifetime.’ When dealing with the proviso
to Section 6, they decided they should give the explanation full weight.

Through virtue of Section 6, when a Hindu male with an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary
property dies after the commencement of the 1956 Act, his interest in the property passes to the
remaining members of the coparcenary by survivorship.

The exclusion in the Act’s explanation to Section 30 makes it plain that a male Hindu’s interest in
Mitakshara coparcenary property is limited to that which he can dispose of through the execution of
a will or any other form of testamentary disposition.

DECISION: The court ruled that because Jagannath Singh died behind a widow and four children; the
proviso to Sections 6 and 8 of the Act covered him.

Under Schedule 1, it classified the widow as a Class 1 heir by Jagannath Singh. If the widow had not
been present, the caveat to Section 6 of the Act could not have been applied, and the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956, would have applied, and the succession would have been by survivorship.
As a coparcenary to the ancestral property, Uttam would have the right to his grandfather’s property.
Unless it invoked the proviso, every coparcenary has a title on the ancestral property under Section
6.

CONCLUSION:

 It can be determined that, following the breakup of the JHF property under Section 8, the
various parties who have succeeded to it own the property as tenants in common rather
than joint tenants.

 The property was decisively determined to be ancestral property, and it ceased to be joint
family property upon Jagannath Singh’s death.

 The widow and her four sons were also tenants in common, not joint tenants. The case was
dismissed with no ruling as to costs since it was found to be unmaintainable.
Bhagat Ram v Teja Singh

The article also provides an analysis of the judgement with respect to the succession rights of a
female Hindu after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

One Kehar Singh (A) was the owner of a land in Pakistan. He died before the partition of India and
Pakistan. After his death, his widow Smt. Kirpo (B) and his two daughters Smt. Santi (D1) and Smt.
Indro (D2) migrated to India. In place of the property owned by ‘A’, his widow, B was allotted some
portion of land in India. After the death of B, D1 and D2 inherited the property. D1 died without any
heir. D2 inherited the property of D1 after her death as per Section 15(2)(a) of the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”). D2 entered into an agreement to sell the same
property to Bhagat Ram (hereinafter referred to as the “appellant”). D2 filed a suit for specific
performance, which was decreed in the favour of Bhagat Ram.

Teja Singh (hereinafter referred to as the “respondent”) is the brother of the husband of the
deceased D1. The respondent filed a suit alleging that after the death of D1, her property devolved in
favour of the respondent according to Section 15(1)(b) of the Act.

Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956

 The objective behind enacting the Act was to order a balance between the property rights of
male and female Hindus.
 Section 14 of the Act converted the limited ownership held by a female Hindu to absolute
ownership, empowering her to dispose of the property as per her wishes.
 Section 15 of the Act is the first statutory enactment which provides for succession of the
property of an intestate female Hindu.
 The provisions of Section 15 are not applicable to the property held by a female Hindu as a
limited owner under Section 14(2) of the Act.

In order to enlarge the ambit of Section 14, the legislature provided an Explanation to the section.
The Explanation makes it clear that Section 14 encompasses every kind of acquisition of property. It
includes the acquisition of property by inheritance or partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of
maintenance or by gift, among other instruments.

In order to attract Section 14(1) of the Act, the female Hindu must acquire the property as an heir.
When a female Hindu acquires a property as an heir, she acquires it absolutely. However, while
acquiring a property through a gift or other transaction, if any restrictions have been placed on her
right, these restrictions will have effect in the view of Section 14(2) of the Act.

Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 For adjudication of the dispute between the parties,
the following issues came to be decided by the Apex Court:

 Who will inherit the property of an intestate female Hindu without any issue which has been
inherited by the deceased female Hindu from her mother before the enactment of the Act?

 After a female Hindu’s limited rights convert to absolute ownership over the property, does it
alter the rules of succession as provided under Section 15(2) of the Act?

Judgement in Bhagat Ram vs. Teja Singh (2001)

The Supreme Court held that in the present scenario, Section 15(2) is the appropriate provision to
apply in the succession of the property left by deceased ‘D1’.

Omprakash & Ors. vs. Radhacharan & Ors. (2009)

Also, this article stressed giving a detailed explanation of the concept of inheritance for a female
Hindu who died without writing a will. Furthermore, it highlights the doctrine of proportionality and
the importance of literal rule during the interpretation of statutes and legal principles.

In this case, the main issue revolves around Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which
deals with the devolution of property of Hindu women who died intestate.

Section 15(1) talks about the general rules on how the property will be devolved to a Hindu woman
dying intestate, but it doesn’t mention whether the property is self-acquired or inherited.

Section 15(2)(a) talks about how the property that was inherited from the father or mother shall be
delegated to a Hindu woman dying intestate,

Section 15(1)(b) deals with how the property inherited from parents-in-law shall be devolved to a
Hindu woman dying intestate. So, there was no law that mentioned or dealt with how the self-
acquired property of Hindu women dying intestate would be devolved.

Facts of the case

Smt. Narayani Devi was an educated woman, and she was employed by a company soon after she
completed her education. In 1955, Smt. Narayani Devi got married to Dindayal Sharma, but soon
after the marriage, within three months, Dindayal Sharma died because of a snake bite, and thinking
of Narayani Devi as a burden, her in-laws kicked her out of the matrimonial house. After this
incident, she went back to her parents’ house to seek support. Within a span of a few months, she
again started to work for a company and acquired a lot of property without receiving any kind of help
from her in-laws.

When everything was right in her life after her husband’s death, she lost her life in the preceding
year, on July 11, 1966. Before she died, she had a fortune of wealth in her bank accounts and in her
provident funds as well. Also, she acquired some properties in her name, but there was no ‘will’ on
the devolution of property written by Narayani Devi since her death was so sudden at such a
young age. This issue of ‘will’ was the key factor that commenced this case.

Her mother and in-laws both filed for a succession certificate for the wealth and property of Naryani
Devi; this is the point where the dispute arose. This conflict between Narayani Devi’s mother and her
in-laws raised several legal issues and arguments, which led to a significant revolution in the
devolution of Hindu women’s self-acquired property.

Issues raised

The main issues in this case are listed below:

 Whether the property of Narayani Devi shall be inherited by her parents or by her in-laws?

 Whether the self-acquired property of a Hindu woman dying intestate falls under the
ambit of the term ‘property’, mentioned under Section 15(1) of the Hindu Succession Act,
1956?

 What kind of interpretation should be applied while interpreting Section 15 of the Hindu
Succession Act 1956, the literal rule or the golden rule?
Petitioners

The main argument of the petitioner was based on Section 15(2)(a) of the Hindu Succession Act,
which clearly indicated that in the absence of a child, the property of a Hindu female, which was
self-acquired by her, must devolve upon the heiress of her father.

Also, in this argument, if we see through the legislative intent of the petitioner, they
emphasised Section 15(2) to ensure the property that was inherited from a woman’s parental
family must revert back to them in the absence of direct descendants, thus protecting the lineage
of the property in the family origin. Also, they highlighted that applying Section 15(1) would be
unjustly beneficial to the heirs of Narayani’s husband, who doesn’t have any direct relationship
with the acquisition of the property. They argued that this would be contrary to the principles of
justice and equity. They also mentioned precedents and legal principles that were in their favour,
Bhagat Ram (Dead) vs. Teja Singh (1999).

Respondent The respondents, who were the sons of Narayani Devi’s husband’s sister, argued
Section 15(1) of the Hindu Succession Act should apply to the issue at hand. They were strongly
asserting that the property of Narayani Devi must be devolved between the heirs of her husband
as per Section 15(1)(b).

Distinction between self-acquired and inherited property

In this case, the court interpreted the distinction between self-acquired and inherited property under
the Hindu Succession Act. While interpreting Section 15(2), they stated that the section deals with
inherited property and does not explicitly mention self-acquired property.

In this case, they also highlighted that Section 15(1), which applies to the devolution of female Hindu
property, does not differentiate between self-acquired property and inherited property when it
comes to absolute ownership. Therefore, the self-acquired property is treated as the absolute
property of the deceased female, so the general principle of succession under Section 15(1) will
apply. Determining the difference between self-acquired property and inherited property is one of
the essential key concepts during the devolution of property of Hindu females who died intestate.
This general principle upholds the idea that self-acquired property solely falls under the control of
the individual who acquired it, and it must be distributed according to the standard of rules unless it
is overridden by any other specific legislation.

The Doctrine of Proportionality

The doctrine of proportionality serves as a guiding principle to ensure that judicial decisions are fair,
reasonable, and based on evidence and objective criteria rather than emotional or sentimental
factors. In this case, this principle plays an important role in determining the inheritance dispute
between the parties. This case, which involves the interpretation of Section 15(1) and Section 15(2)
of the Hindu Succession Act, underscores the doctrine of proportionality to maintain a fair and
impartial approach in resolving the dispute.

Firstly, the doctrine of proportionality warns against decisions made solely by sympathy or
sentiment. It highlights that the legal judgement must be grounded in legal principles and legal
provisions rather than any personal sentiment or emotional appeals. These types of actions ensure
that the judgement is equitable and fair, regardless of the circumstances or personal sympathies
involved in the proceeding. In accordance with the case, where the court needed to determine the
devolution of the property of a Hindu female who died without writing a ‘will’, the doctrine of
proportionality led the way to adhere strictly to the statutory framework. In this case, the court
decided to stick with Section 15(1) for self-acquired property, regardless of arguments invoking
Section 15(2)’s non-obstante clause, symbolising this principle. In this case, the court upheld the
doctrine of proportionality by ensuring that the legal interpretations were in compliance with the
legal statute’s purpose and its objective standard.

Bhagat Ram (dead) vs. Teja Singh (1999)

Facts This case deals with the interpretation of ‘will’ and the devolution of property among the heirs.
The key issue was the application of the golden rule to understand the actual literal meaning of the
will’s terms.

Issue Whether the application of the golden rule of interpretation to understand the terms of the
‘will’ is considerable?

JudgementThe Supreme Court of India applied the golden rule of interpretation, following the
practice of the literal meaning of the word in the will and the statute. The court made the decision
that the will should be interpreted as written, without any addition of new meanings or unstated
intentions.

Judgement in Omprakash & Ors. vs. Radhacharan & Ors. (2009)

In the case of Omprakash vs. Radhacharan & Ors, the Supreme Court gave a landmark judgement
concerning the interpretation of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and its legal principles in the
inheritance of property.

During the examination of the case, the court first addressed the principle that judicial division must
not be influenced by any sentimental or sympathetic intentions; instead, it should strictly adhere to
the spirit of the law and its rules.

Based on the interpretation of Section 15(1) and Section 15(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, the
court ruled in favour of the respondent and dismissed the appeal as it did not have a standing.

Justice S.B. Sinha gave an opinion that the law is silent regarding the distribution of the self-
acquired property of a female Hindu dying intestate. He also highlighted that Narayani Devi’s
property was self-acquired and not inherited. Therefore, he suggested that Section 15(1) will apply
to this issue and that the property should be devolved among the legal heirs of Narayani Devi. The
judge underscored that even though she did not receive any help from her matrimonial house to
inherit the property, it will not convert the self-acquired property into an inherited property from her
parents’ side.
Uttam vs. Saubhag Singh & Ors pronounced by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2016.

The present case describes the rights of a grandson in the property of his grandfather after his
death.

Factual background of the case

Jagannath Singh, the grandfather of the plaintiff, died in 1973 while leaving behind his wife,
Mainabai and their four children, including the father of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff in the suit for partition claimed that 1/8th of the share in the suit property should be
given to him. He claimed that the suit property is an ancestral property, and being a coparcener, by
virtue of his birth, he had a right to the said property in accordance with the Mitakshara law.

On the other side, the four defendants jointly filed a statement and claimed that the suit property is
not ancestral and that there has been a partition in which the plaintiff’s father got separated.

Following issues were raised before the Hon’ble Supreme Court:

1. Whether the suit property continued to keep its character as a joint Hindu property?

2. Whether the appellant has right upon the suit property as a coparcener?

3. Whether the appellant has the right to file a suit for partition when his father, Mohan Singh,
who is a Class-I heir, is alive?

Hindu Succession Act, 1956

Section 4 of Hindu Succession Act This section deals with the overriding effect of the Act, wherein
the following things that were present prior to the commencement of the Act shall discontinue to
have effect on any matter for which provision is made in this Act:

It further provided that any other law that was in force prior to the commencement of the Act shall
not be applicable to Hindus if it is not in consonance with the provisions of this Act.

Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act

This section deals with the devolution or transfer of interest in the coparcenary property.

Section 6(1) of Hindu Succession Act

Section 6(1) provides for the provision with regard to a daughter of a coparcener who is a member of
a joint Hindu family and is dealt under the Mitakshara law from the commencement of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956.

 She shall become a coparcener by birth, similar to that of a son.

 She shall have similar rights and liabilities in the coparcenary property as that of a son.

The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 6 provides that this provision shall not affect or invalidate
any disposition or alienation, which includes partition or testamentary disposition, that happened
before December 20, 2004.

Section 6(3) of Hindu Succession Act

Section 6(3) deals with the provision with respect to the interest of a Hindu in a joint family property
dealt with by the Mitakshara law. If the person dies prior to the commencement of the Hindu
Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, then his interest in the coparcenary property shall be devolved
by the testamentary or intestate succession rather than by survivorship. The coparcenary property
shall be divided in a manner as if partition had taken place earlier.

Section 6(4) of Hindu Succession Act

Section 6(4) bars the jurisdiction of the court from recognising any right to proceed against the
following persons, namely, the son, grandson or great-grandson, for the purposes of recovering a
debt due from his father, grandfather or great-grandfather, on the ground that a sincere obligation
under Hindu law exists.

Section 6(5) of Hindu Succession Act

Section 6(5) simply states that this section shall not apply to the partition that took place prior to
December 20, 2004.

Section 8 of Hindu Succession Act

Section 8 deals with the general rule of succession in the case of males. It states that a Hindu male
who dies without making a will or intestate shall devolve or transfer the joint family property in
accordance with these provisions:

 Upon the Class I heirs specified in the schedule,

 In the absence of heirs in Class I, then upon the relatives specified in Class II of the schedule.

 In case of absence of heirs in the two above-stated classes, then upon the agnates of the
deceased,

 Lastly, in case of absence of the agnates, then upon the cognates of the deceased.

However, in cases where no cognates also survive the deceased, then in such cases escheat applies.
Under Hindu law, Section 29 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, provides the principle of escheat.
Section 29 deals with the failure of heirs, it provides that if a person has died intestate without
leaving any qualified heir to take care of his property, in that case the property shall be devolved on
the government in the same manner as it had been devolved to an heir with the same rights and
liabilities.

Section 19 of Hindu Succession Act

Section 19 deals with the mode of succession for two or more heirs. It states that if two or more
heirs succeed together in the property of an intestate, then they shall take the property in
accordance with per capita and not as per stripes and as common tenants, not as joint tenants.

Section 30 of Hindu Succession Act

This section specifically deals with testamentary succession and states that any Hindu, by way of will
or other testamentary disposition of property, may dispose of any property that is capable of being
disposed of by him in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 or in
accordance with any other law in force and applicable to Hindus.

Precedents involved in Uttam vs. Saubhag Singh & Ors. (2016)

Commissioner Wealth Tax, Kanpur & Others vs. Chander Sen and others (1986)
The Court agreed with the decision given by the High Court of Allahabad by stating that, as per
Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the legal position is that when a son is being devolved
with the property by intestate succession, it is to be assessed as individual property and not as the
property of a Hindu undivided family.

Judgement given by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court, in its judgement, dismissed the civil appeal filed by the appellant and held that
the ancestral property was devolved by succession after the death of Jagannath Singh as per Section
8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

After the death of Jagannath Singh in 1973, the ancestral property ceased to be a joint family
property, and Mainabai, the wife of the deceased (Jagannath) and the coparceners (defendants
herein), were the tenants in that property as common tenants and not as joint tenants. The
appellant, being born in 1977, said that the ancestral property ceased to be a joint family property;
therefore, the Apex Court stated that the suit filed by the appellant holds no value and is not
maintainable.

Rationale behind this judgement

The case of Uttam vs. Saubhag Singh is of utmost importance as it has paved the way for further
judicial decisions regarding the inheritance of joint family property under Hindu law. This case has
given a unique perspective with respect to the position of a son on his father’s property and his
rights on his grandfather’s property. The major focus of this judgement is upon the construction of
Sections 6, 8 and 19 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The Supreme Court, by relying upon its
earlier decisions, reiterated that on applying Section 8, if the succession is taking place in accordance
with the said provision, then the joint family property ceases to be a joint family property, and after
it ceases to be a joint family property, the persons who are holding that property shall be common
tenants rather than joint tenants. Therefore, it could be stated that this case is an important instance
in which the position of heirs in the joint family property under Hindu law is made clear by the Apex
Court in the case of an intestate death.

Conclusion

In a nutshell, it can be inferred from various verdicts of the Supreme Court on the same issue that
after the application of Section 8 or Proviso of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, by reason
of the death of a Hindu male, the property would be devolved by way of intestate succession rather
than by way of succession, which consequently led to the cessation of joint family property. Also, it
has been reiterated by the court in its various decisions. For instance, in Chander Sen’s case, in the
case of the death of a Hindu male that is dealt with by Mitakshara law, the self-acquired property of
the deceased would devolve to the Class-I legal heirs as their individual properties in their individual
capacities. If the deceased had any ancestral property, then there would be a notional partition, and
the share would be determined just before the deceased’s death.