Rules of Interpretation

DR SARFARAZ AHMED KHAN

 Introduction
► “Interpretation of Statutes” implies the judicial process of determining, in accordance with
certain rules and presumptions, the true meaning of the Acts of the Parliament or State
Legislature
► The object of interpretation is to see what is intended by the words used by the lawmaker. But,
sometimes it is very difficult to understand the meaning without making further inquiry.
Therefore, it becomes necessary to find out the correct meaning by applying various rules of
interpretation.
► Since our legal system is, by and large, modelled on Common Law system, our rules of
interpretation are also same as that of the system.
► However, there is no hierarchy of one rule over the other. The Judge has to analyse which rule
has to apply after giving due consideration to the facts of the situation and intent of the statute.
 Literal
Construction

Rule of
Rules of The Mischief
Harmonious
Interpretation Rule
Construction

Rule of
Reasonable
Construction
 Literal Construction
► According to this rule, the words, phrases and sentences of a statute
are ordinarily to be understood in their natural, ordinary or
popular and grammatical meaning

► Unless such a construction leads to an absurdity or the content or

object of the statute suggests a different meaning
► The onus of showing that the words do not mean what they say lies
heavily on the party who alleges it.
DTC vs. Balwant Singh (2019) 18 SCC
126
► When the words of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, recourse to other principles of
interpretation other than rule of liberal
construction cannot be resorted to.
 Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust v. A. G. Syed
Mohideen & Others, 2010
► 6. It is now well settled that a provision of a statute should have to be read as it is, in a natural manner, plain
and straight, without adding, substituting or omitting any words. While doing so, the words used in the
provision should be assigned and ascribed their natural, ordinary or popular meaning.
► Only when such plain and straight reading, or ascribing the natural and normal meaning to the words on
such reading, leads to ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty, or absurdity which were not obviously intended
by the Legislature or the Lawmaker, a court should open its interpretation tool kit containing the settled
rules of construction and interpretation, to arrive at the true meaning of the provision. While using the tools
of interpretation, the court should remember that it is not the author of the Statute who is empowered to
amend, substitute or delete, so as to change the structure and contents.
► A court as an interpreter cannot alter or amend the law. It can only interpret the provision, to make it
meaningful and workable so as to achieve the legislative object, when there is vagueness, ambiguity or
absurdity. The purpose of interpretation is not to make a provision what the Judge thinks it should be, but to
make it what the legislature intended it to be.
Two basic rules of Literal interpretation
1. Every word in a statute to be given meaning.
2. The court cannot read anything into a statute or rewrite a
provision which is unambiguous

unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference

that the legislature intended something which it omitted to
express
 Presumptions in literal construction

► No word is unnecessarily used.

► One should not presume any omissions and if a

word is not there in the Statute, it shall not be given
any meaning
Mischief Rule

► When the material words are capable of bearing two or

more constructions the most firmly established rule for
construction of such words "of all statutes in general (be
they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the
common law)" is the rule laid down in Heydon's case
which has now attained the status of a "classic",
 Heydon’s Case, in 1584
► it was resolved by the Barons of the Exchequer “that for the sure
and true interpretation of all statutes in general four things are to be
discerned and considered:
(1) What was the Common Law before the making of the Act;
(2) What was the mischief and defect for which the Common Law
did not provide;
(3) What remedy the Parliament had resolved and appointed to cure
the disease of the Commonwealth; and
(4) The true reason of the remedy.
Rule in Heydon’s case is applicable only when the words in question are
ambiguous and are reasonably capable of more than one meaning.
(Sodra Devi’s case, 1957)
When the language is capable of bearing only one construction, the rule in
Heydon’s case ceases to be controlling and gives way to the plain meaning
rule.
The rule directs that the Courts must adopt that construction which “shall
suppress the mischief and advance the remedy”.
But this does not mean that a construction should be adopted which ignores
the plain natural meaning of the words or disregard the context and the
collection in which they occur. (Umed Singh v. Raj Singh, 1975)
Bengal Immunity Co v State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 661
► The rule was explained in the by SR Das, CJI as follows,
► It is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly established in England as
far back as 1584 when Heydon's case was decided that for the sure and true
interpretation of all Statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive
or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and
considered!
and then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction
as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress
subtle invention and evasions for all continuance of the mischief, and pro
privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy,
according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.
► The Supreme Court in Bengal Immunity Co's case applied the rule in
construction of Article 286 of the Constitution. After referring to the state of
law prevailing in the provinces prior to the Constitution as also to the chaos
and confusion that was brought about in inter-State trade and commerce by
indiscriminate exercise of taxing powers by the different provincial
Legislatures founded on the theory of territorial nexus SR Das, CJI, proceeded
to say:
► It was to cure this mischief of multiple taxation and to preserve the free flow
of inter-State trade or commerce in the Union of India regarded as one
economic unit without any provincial barrier that the constitution-makers
adopted Article 286 in the Constitution.
► The rule was again applied by the Supreme Court in similar context while
construing the changes brought about by the Constitution Forty-sixth
Amendment Act, 1982.
Eastman Photographic Materials Co v Comptroller
General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks, (1898) AC 571,
► In Earl Of Halsbury re-affirmed the rule as follows:
► My lords, it appears to me that to construe the Statute in question, it is not only
legitimate but highly convenient to refer both to the former Act and to the
ascertained evils to which the former Act had given rise, and to the later Act which
provides the remedy. These three being compared, I cannot doubt the conclusion.
► In the above mentioned formulations of the rule, as pointed out by Lord Reid, "the
word mischief is traditional". He expanded it to include "the facts presumed to be
known to Parliament when the Bill which became the Act in question was before it"
and "the unsatisfactory state of affairs" disclosed by these facts "which Parliament
can properly be supposed to have intended to remedy by the Act".
► The rule is more briefly stated by Lord Roskill [(Anderston vs. Ryan
(1985) 2 ALLER 355.],
► Statutes should be given what has become known as a purposive
construction, that is to say that the courts should identify the
'mischief' which existed before passing of the statute and then if
more than one construction is possible, favour that which will
eliminate the mischief so identified.
► In the words of Lord Griffith [Pepper vs. Hart, (1993) 1 All ER 42]:
► The courts now adopt a purposive approach which seeks to give
effect to the true purpose of legislation and are prepared to look at
much extraneous material that bears on the background against
which the legislation was enacted.
► When two competing Acts construed to further the purposes
behind them produce a conflict, the court may resolve the conflict
by taking into consideration as to which Act represents "the
superior purpose" in addition to other relevant factors.

► In applying a purposive construction a word of caution is

necessary that the text of the statute is not to be sacrificed and
the court cannot rewrite the statute on the assumption that
whatever furthers the purpose of the Act must have been
sanctioned.

► Therefore, the court cannot add to the means enacted by the

legislature for achieving the object of the Act.
RMD Chamarbaugwalla vs. UOI, AIR 1957 SC
628
► Construction of section 2(d) of the Prize Competitions Act, 1955.

► This section defines "Prize Competition" as meaning "any competition in which prizes are offered
for the solution of any puzzle based upon the building up arrangement, combination or
permutation of letters, words or figures".

► The question was whether in view of this definition, the Act applies to competitions which involve
substantial skill and are not in the nature of gambling. The Supreme Court, after referring to the
previous state of the law, to the mischief that continued under that law and to the resolutions of
various States under Article 252(1) authorising Parliament to pass the Act stated:

► “Having regard to the history of the legislation, the declared object thereof and the wording of the
statute, we are of opinion that the competitions which are sought to be controlled and regulated
by the Act are only those competitions in which success does not depend on any substantial
degree of skill.”
CIT VS. SODRA DEVI, AIR 1957 SC 628
► The construction of section 16(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
► The sub-section reads: "In computing the total income of any individual for the
purpose of assessment, there shall be included (a) so much of the income of a
wife or minor child of such individual as arises indirectly or directly-".
► The question before the Supreme Court was whether word "individual"
occurring in the aforesaid sub-section meant only a male or also included a
female. After finding that the said word in the setting was ambiguous,
Bhagwati J, observed:
► In order to resolve this ambiguity, therefore, we must of necessity have resort
to the state of the law before the enactment of the provisions, the mischief
and the defect for which the law did not provide; the remedy which the
Legislature resolved and appointed to cure the defect; and the true reason of
the remedy.
► After referring to these factors, Bhagwati J, proceeded to point
out:
► It is clear that the evil which was sought to be remedied was the
one resulting from the wide-spread practice of husbands entering
into nominal partnerships with their wives and fathers admitting
their minor children to the benefits of the partnerships of which
they were members. The evil was sought to be remedied by the
enactment of section 16(3) in the Act. If this background of the
enactment of section 16(3) is borne in mind there is no room for
any doubt that howsoever that mischief was sought to be
remedied by amending the Act, the only intention of the
Legislature in doing so was to include the income derived by the
wife or minor child, in computation of the total income of the male
assessee, the husband or the father, as the case may be, for the
purpose of assessment.
 Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC
2386
► Section 235(2) CrPC was to be construed.

► The section provided that "if the accused is convicted, the Judge shall hear the accused on
the question of sentence and then pass sentence on him according to law".

► It was held by the Supreme Court that the section was mandatory. It was not confined to
hearing oral submissions. The section also intended to give an opportunity to the
prosecution and the accused to place before the court, facts and materials bearing on the
question of sentence and in case either side contested it, to produce evidence to prove it.

► This conclusion by the court was reached with regard to the object of Parliament in
enacting Section 235(2), to bring the law in conformity with the modern trends in penology
and sentencing procedure.
 U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Braj Kishore,
AIR 1988 SC 2239
► In U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Samiti, the question was regarding interpre-tation
of expression "landless labourers" occurring in Section 14, U.P. Bhoodan
Yagna Act, 1953.
► The Act aimed at distribution of land to land-less labourers who were
versed in agriculture and who had no means of subsistence.
► It was held that the meaning of the above expression in Section 14, which
provided grant of land to landless labourers was limited to landless
labourers, as described above and did not include a land-less businessman
residing in a city. This interpretation was purposive and was in order to
help implement the Bhoodan movement.
 Mandal Revenue Officer v. Goundla
Venkaiah, AIR 2010 SC 744
► The interpretation of the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing Act, , 1982
was in question.
► it was held that since the basic objective of the Land Grabbing Act is
to free the public as well as private land from the clutches of
encroachers and unauthorised occupants, the provisions contained
therein are required to be interpreted by applying the rule of
purposive construction or mischief rule which was enunciated in
Heydon case and which has been invoked by the court for construing
different legislations.
 Where rule not applicable?
► The object-oriented approach, however, cannot be carried to the
extent of doing violence to the plain language used by rewriting the
section or substituting words in place of the actual words used by
the legislature. [CIT VS. N. C. BUDHARAJA & Co AIR 1993 SC 2529]
► Similarly, purposive construction need not be applied when the
relevant Act has been amended from time to time on the basis of
fresh needs and has, thus, not remained static. Dental Council of
India vs. Hari Prakash, AIR 2001 SC 3303.
 Where rule not applicable? CONT..
► It is, therefore, necessary to give full effect to the purport and object of the Act. However,
when the words of a statute frustrate its patent purpose, the courts are not bound to
accept the same. [Indian Handicraft Emporium vs. UOI, (2003) 7 SCC 589]

► In the guise of giving a purposive interpretation, one cannot interpret a section in a

manner which would lead to a conflict between two sub-sections of the same section.[ P.
S. Sathappan v. Andhra Bank Ltd. AIR 2004 SC 5152]

► Purposive construction need not be applied when relevant Act has been amended from
time to time on the basis of fresh needs and has, thus, not remained static. [ Dental
Council of India v. Hari Prakash, AIR 2001 SC 3303)

► The correct principle is that after the words have been construed in their context and it is
found that the language is capable of bearing only one construction, the rule in Heydon
ceases to be controlling and gives way to the plain meaning rule.
State of Karnataka v. B.V. Thimmappa, 1994
Supp (1) SCC 124
► In this case, the Karnataka Service Examinations Act, 1976
provided that non-passing of the prescribed examination by a
government servant would entail the consequences as
specified in the rules. The rules enumerated the
consequences. It was held that the court cannot infer any
additional consequence solely on the basis of the supposed
object and purpose of the rules.
Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. v. Hong Kong
and Shanghai Banking Corpn. (2009) 8 SCC 646
► Purposive construction is resorted to when or where doubt arises
on account of ambiguity. It is to be preferred when object and
purpose of the Act is required to be promoted. When Parliament
created tribunals with certain purpose and object, it does not
confer them another jurisdiction so that the High Court or the
Supreme Court could transfer cases from civil court to tribunal. This
doctrine cannot be extended where it leads to anomaly and
amounts to rewriting of a statute.
► DIRECTION However, we make it clear that having regard to the
pleadings of the parties as also the purpose and object for which the
Tribunal has been constituted, it should proceed to dispose of the bank's
claims expeditiously.
► We, however, have no doubt whatsoever in our mind that while
determining the respective claims of the parties and the nature thereof,
the tribunal shall comply with all the requirements of law. We, therefore,
are of the opinion that the transfer applications have no merit. They are
dismissed accordingly with the aforementioned observations.
 Rule of Harmonious Construction

► This rule is based on the Principle that A statute must be read as a whole and one
provision of the Act should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same
Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute.
► Such a construction has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either
within a section or between a section and other parts of the statute.
► It is the duty of the Courts to avoid “a head on clash” between two sections of the same
Act and, “whenever it is possible to do so, to construct provisions which appear to
conflict so that they harmonise”
(Raj Krishna v. Pinod Kanungo, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 202 at 203).
The court can do so either by

► Holding two or more apparently conflicting provisions as dealing with separate

situation, or
► Holding that one provision merely provides for an exception of the general rule
contained theirin.
K.M. Nanavati v. State of Bombay, 1960
SCC OnLine SC 31
The Question before the Supreme court
What is the content of the power conferred on the governor of the State under Article
161of the Constitution and Whether the order of governor impinges on the judicial
power of this court with particular reference to its power under Article 142
Both Article 72 and 161 give widest power to the President or Governor of state as
the case may be and there are no words of limitation indicated in either of the two
article
Article 142 Supreme Courts power to suspend the sentence or grant bail during
pendency of application for special leave
Court Uses the Rule of Harmonious
Construction
► Article 161 does not deal with the suspension of sentence during the time that
Article 142 is in the operation and the matter is sub judice in the Supreme Court
► The Power under Article 161 does not include the power to suspension and
execution of sentence during the period when any matter is sub judice in the
supreme court
► But It is open to the governor to grant full pardon under Article 161 at any time
even during the pendency of the case in supreme court.
► Therefore there is no conflict between
Prerogative power of the sovereign to grant pardon and
The Power of the Court to deal with a pending case judicially.
Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. The State of Mysore AIR 1958 SC
255

Facts of the case

The Appeal preferred by the Trustees of the ancient and renowned
temple of Sri Venkataramana of Moolky Petta, who were managing the
temple on behalf of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins
To remove the disabilities of Harijans from entering Hindu Public
Temples The Madras Temple Entry Authorization Act, 1947 was
enacted
 Argument by the Appellant

► The Temple is a Private one and therefore, outside the operation of the Act.
► The Act violates Article 26(b): Freedom to manage religious affairs by
every denomination or section thereof subject to Public order, morality and
health
► It is age-old practice of Gowda Saraswath Brahmins to conduct all the
rituals and ceremonies in relation to the temple. Therefore, the temple and
its devotees constitute a religious denomination and hence has
independence in religious administration which confer upon them the right
to decide who can enter the temple.
 Article 25. Freedom of conscience and free profession,
practice and propagation of religion

Article 25 (2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent
the State from making any law—
(a) Regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which
maybe associated with religious practice;
(b) Providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious
institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus.
The Act completely protect the right of every individual under Article 15 which
Prohibit discrimination on the basis of caste.
Issue before the Supreme Court

Whether the Right to manage religious affairs of a religious

denomination can be overridden by right to freedom of
religion under Article 25 of the Constitution
Court Apply the Rule of Harmonious
Construction
► A Complete exclusion of general Public will amount to
violation of Article 25
► But the temple authorities may be permitted to exclude
general public only in those ceremonies which are integral
in nature which performed by the members of Gowda
Saraswath Brahmins alone
 harmonious construction
► The foundation or substratum on which the principle of
harmonious construction stands is that the legislature never
intends to contradict itself by providing two repugnant
provisions in the same statute.
► A statutory provision, which in effect purports to negate
another provision in the same statute, must be
harmoniously construed unless such construction violates
the words of the provision or policy of the Act.
► Construction of a statute should be done in a manner which
would give effect to all its provisions.
► Harmonious construction makes the provision meaningful in the con-text.
► Principles of harmonious construction insist on a strict observance of the
particular provision, and above all, the general scheme of the other provisions
of which it forms a part.
► The purpose for which the provision is made, the object to be attained, the
intention of the legislature in making the provision, the serious inconvenience
or injustice which may result in treating the provision one way or the other,
the relation of the provision to other consideration which may arise on the
facts of any particular case, have all to be taken into account.
 District Mining Officer v. TISCO, AIR
2001 SC 3134
► A bare mechanical interpretation of words
and application of legislative intent devoid of
concept or purpose will reduce most of the
remedial and beneficial legislation to futility.
1. Avoidance of head-on clash.
► It is the duty of the courts to avoid a head-on clash
between two sections of the Act and to construe the
provisions which appear to be in conflict with each
other in such a manner as to harmonise them. A
statute must be reasonably interpreted to make it
workable. [State of Maharashtra vs. Swanstone
Multiplex Cinema (P) Ltd. AIR 2009 SC 296.
2. One section cannot defeat the other.

► The provisions of one section of a

statute cannot be used to defeat the
other provisions unless the court, in
spite of its efforts, finds it impossible to
effect reconciliation between them.
 3. Conflicting provisions.
► Courts have to bear in mind that when there
are two conflicting provisions in the Act
which cannot be reconciled with each other,
they should be so interpreted that, if
possible, effect should be given to both. This
is the essence of the rule of "harmonious
construction".
4. Ambiguities or obscurities.

► Courts should not be over zealous in

searching for ambiguities or obscurities
in words which are plain.[TCS VS. STATE
OF AP AIR 2005 SC 371]
 5. Dead letter effect.-
► An interpretation which reduces one of
the provisions to a "dead letter" or
"useless lumber" is not harmonious
construction. [ Anwar Hasan Khan vs.
Mohd Shafi, AIR 2001 SC 2984
6. True meaning.-
► To harmonise is not to destroy
any statutory provision, or to
render it otiose. [Sultana Begum
vs. Prem Chand Jain, (1997) 1 SCC
373.
 7. Incongruous results.-
► An interpretation giving rise to incongruous results must be
avoided. [Indian Banks’ Association vs. Devkala Consultancy
Service, (2004) 11 SCC 463.

► In A. Abdul Farook v. Municipal Council, Perambalur, (2009)

15 SCC 351, it was held that harmonious construction in
disregard of the doctrine of public trust and doctrine of good
governance, is not warranted.
 8. Harmonious construction.-
► For the purpose of harmonious construction, the entire
statute must be first read as a whole, then section by section,
clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. The
relevant provisions must, thus, be read harmoniously, and
effect of exemption clause must be borne in mind.
► While construing an exemption modification, not only a
pragmatic view is required to be taken but also its practical
aspect must be considered.
► Deewan Singh vs. Rajendra Prasad Ardevi, (2007) 10 SCC 528
 Raj Krushna Bose v. Binod Kanungo, AIR
1954 SC 202.
► In Raj Krushna, there was a conflict between two provisions, that is Sections 33(2)
and 123(8), Representation of the People Act, 1951.
► According to Section 33(2), a government servant may nominate or second, a
candidate seeking election. Whereas according to Section 123(8), a government
servant is not entitled to assist a candidate in an election in any manner except by
casting his vote.
► The court interpreting both the provisions harmoniously held that a government
servant was entitled to nominate or second a candidate seeking election to the
State Legislative Assembly.
► Thus, harmony was achieved by allowing a government servant to nominate or
second, a candidate as well as by allowing him to vote but he was forbidden to
assist a candidate in any other manner.
 Pallawi Resources Ltd. v. Protos Engg. Co.
(P) Ltd. AIR 2010 SC 1969.
► In Pallavi Resources Ltd., the interpretation of the provisions of sub-section (4-A) of Section 17, West Bengal
Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 was an issue.

► The question that arose for the court's consideration was whether the fair rent in respect of a tenancy,
which subsists for 20 years or more in respect of the premises constructed in or before the year 1984 and
used for commercial purpose, is required to be determined by the Rent Controller or whether the same
would stand automatically deter-mined under sub-section (4-A) of Section 17 read with Section 20, West
Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997.

► The court observed that a cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is that a provision in a statute must
be read as a whole and not in isolation ignoring the other provisions of that statute. While dealing with a
statutory instrument, one cannot be allowed to pick and choose. It will be grossly unjust, if the court allows
a person to single out and avail the benefit of a provision from a chain of provisions which is favourable to
him.

► Accordingly, it was held that it will not be appropriate to read sub-section (4-A) of Section 17 ignoring the
other relevant provisions. Sub-section (4-A) of Section 17 was not sought to be brought in by way of an
exception to the general rule of Section 17.
 Rule of Reasonable Construction
► It is based on the maxim “ut res Magis valeat Quam Pereat”
which means the words of a statute must be construed so as to
give a sensible meaning to them.
► A provision of law cannot be so interpreted as to divorce it
entirely from common sense
► Literally the maxim means to explain that "it may rather
become operative than null". Court would lean in favour
of the constitutionality of the statutory provision where
two constructions are possible. “Githa Hariharan v. RBI,
(1999) 2 SCC 228.”
► Exclusive reliance on the bare dictionary meaning of words’ may not necessarily assist a
proper construction of the statutory provision in which the words occur. Often enough
interpreting the provision, it becomes necessary to have regard to the subject matter of the
statute and the object which it is intended to achieve.
► The maxim says that provisions of a statute must be so construed as to make it effective
and operative on the principle that the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed.” 83.
“Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, AIR 1990 SC 123.
► In other words, it is better to validate a thing than to invalidate it [Sri Krishna Coconut Co. v.
East Godavari Coconut and Tobacco Market Committee, AIR 1967 SC 973].
► Thus the principle ut res magis valeat quam pereat implies that a statute must be read in
such a manner which would make it workable [M.P. Gopalakrishnan Nair v. State of Kerala,
AIR 2005 SC 3053].
► In doing so, humanist considerations, public policy and statutory purpose may provide
guidelines of construction within reasonable limits." [B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan, AIR 1975 SC
1146.]
“Welfare Assn. A.R.P. v. Ranjit P. Gobil, AIR
2003 SC 1266.

► There is a presumption that the legislature

does not exceed its jurisdiction. The maxim is
to be so interpreted that such a meaning
should be given to it as may carry out and
effectuate to the fullest extent the intention
of the parties.
 UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT:
APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE
► Full effect should be given to the legislative intent. A statute is supposed
to be an authentic repository of the legislative will and the function of a
court is to interpret it "according to the intent of them that made it".
► From that function, the court is not to resile. It has to abide by the maxim
ut res magis valeat quam pereat, lest the intention of the legislature may
go in vain or be left to evaporate into thin air. [CST v. Mangal Sen Shyam
Lal, AIR 1975 SC 1106.]
► A second consequence of this rule is that "a statute may not be extended
to meet a case for which provision has clearly and undoubtedly not been
made [Dhoom Singh v. Prakash Chandra Sethi, AIR 1975 SC 1012.]
► Where that intent is clearly expressed in the language of the Act, there is little
difficulty in giving effect to it.
► But where such intent is covert and couched in language which is imperfect,
imprecise and deficient, or is ambiguous or enigmatic and external aids to
interpretation are few, scanty and indeterminate, the court may, despite application
of all its experience, ingenuity and ratiocination, find itself in a position no better
than that of a person solving a cross-word puzzle with a few given hints and hunches.
► In such a situation, a mere reference to the High Court of a question for opinion may
not afford an adequate solution.
► Only legislative amendment may furnish an efficacious and speedy remedy.
 Corpn. of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema AIR
1965 SC 1107
► It was observed that a statute has to be read so as to make it valid and, if
possible, an interpretation leading to a contrary position should be avoided;
► it has to be construed ut res magis valeat quam pareat.
► It was concluded that the word "fee" in Section 548, Calcutta Municipal Act,
1951 should be read as meaning a tax.
► The reason being that the Act had made no provision for services to be
rendered; any other reading would make the section invalid.
► A construction producing that result has to be avoided. Since by reading the
word as referring to a tax, no violence would be done to the language used,
the said interpretation was given.
Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1965 SC 666
► The appellant was prosecuted for theft of electrical energy from the Punjab State Electricity Board
and was convicted. The point of law raised was that the conviction was illegal in view of Section 50
of the Act. The appellant contended that the prosecution was for an offence against the Act and it
was incompetent, as it had not been instituted at the instance of any of the persons mentioned in
Section 50.
► It was observed thus:
► The words of an Act of Parliament must be construed so as to give sensible meaning to them. The
words ought to be construed ut res magis valeant quam pureat. Section 39 does provide for a
punishment. It says that the dishonest abstract on of energy shall be deemed to be theft within the
meaning of the Indian Penal Code.
► The section, therefore makes something which was not a theft within that Code, a theft within it,
for if the abstraction was a theft within the Code, the section would be unnecessary. It follows from
this that the section also makes that theft punishable in the manner provided in it, for if the act is
deemed to be a theft within the Code it must be so deemed for all purposes of it, including the
purpose of incurring the punishment.
 Shanti Prasad Jain v. Director of
Enforcement AIR 1961 SC 1764
► It was contended that even if it be held that the appellant had made the deposits in
question in the Deutsche Bank as a customer, there had been no contravention of Section
4(1), Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947, as the prohibition enacted therein is only
against lending of foreign exchange by a person who is resident in India and that at the
time of the deposits in question, the appellant was not in India but in Germany.
► The court held that there is no substance in this contention since the intention of the
legislature was plainly to prohibit all transactions in foreign exchange by persons who are
residents of India whether such transactions take place during their actual residence in
India or during their sojourn in foreign parts.
► To hold that the prohibition under the Act does not extend to acts done outside India by
residents of India, it would inevitably lead to large-scale evasion of the Act, thereby
resulting in its object being defeated. A construction which leads to such a result must be
avoided. It was accordingly held that the expression "resident in India" is clearly used in the
sense "resident of India".
 ANZ Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Directorate of
Enforcement (2004) 6 SCC 331
► In, the issue was that since an offence had been committed by a company; and as in
terms of Section 56, Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, the punishment of
mandatory imprisonment had to be imposed; no criminal proceedings could be
initiated against the company and in that view of the matter, the company as well as
the person referred to in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 68 thereof cannot be
proceeded with.
► While applying the principle of ut res magis valeat quam pereat it was observed that
an attempt should be made to make Section 56 of the Act workable. Accordingly the
provisions of Section 56 ought to be read down to the effect that when a company is
tried for commission of an offence under the Act, a judgment of conviction may be
passed against it, but having regard to the fact that it is a juristic person, no
punishment of mandatory imprisonment can be imposed.
Johri Mal v. Director of Consolidation of
Holdings, AIR 1967 SC 1368
► The principle is that, if two constructions of a statute are
possible, one of which would make it intra vires and the
other ultra vires, the court must lean to that construction
which would make the operation of the section intra vires.
The reason is that no intention can be imputed to the
legislature that it would exceed its own jurisdiction. It is a
well-established rule that a statute has to be so read so as to
make it valid; it has to be construed ut res magis valeat
quam pereat.
 Freedom of Speech and Press
► By the 1st Amendment to the US Constitution Freedom of Speech and Press made absolute
► In India Such Freedoms are subject to the Reasonable Restriction
► in the interests ofthe sovereignty and integrity of India,
► Reasonable Restrictions on Freedom of Speech
► the security of the State,
► friendly relations with Foreign States,
► public order,
► decency or morality or in relation to
► contempt of court,
► defamation or
► incitement to an offence.
Cases where Supreme court applies the Rule of Reasonable
construction to protect Freedom of Speech and Expression

1) Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 124

(The madras government put ban on Circulation of Cross road publish in Bombay)

2) Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi AIR 1950 SC 129

The validity of order imposing pre-censorship on an English Weekly of Delhi, which directed the editor and
publisher of a newspaper to submit for scrutiny, in duplicate, before the publication.

3)Abbas ali v. Union of India (1970) 2 S.C.C. 780

(prior censorship fell within the reasonable restrictions permitted on free expression)
4) Bijoe
Emmanuel & Ors vs State Of Kerala & Ors (1987) AIR SC
748 (National Anthem Case)

5) Sakal Papers (P) Ltd., And Others vs The Union Of India 1962 AIR
305
(CG Policy on Price per paper to curb monopoly is Interference with the Circulation)

6) Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India 1972

(Newspaper Print Import Control Policy is Unreasonable Restriction)

7) Indian Express v UOI

8) Shreya Singhal v. Union Of India, AIR 2015 SC 1523
Where not applicable
► The principle also means that if the obvious intention of the statute gives rise
to obstacles in implementation, the court must do its best to find ways of
overcoming those obstacles, so as to avoid absurd results,
► Also, a construction should not be put on a statutory provision which would
lead to manifest absurdity, futility, palpable injustice and absurd
inconvenience or anomaly. The courts have to avoid a construction of an
enactment that leads to unworkable, inconsistent or impracticable results
since such a situation is unlikely to have been envisaged by the rule-making
authority. The rule-making authority also expects rule framed by it to be
made workable and never visualises absurd result [H.S. Vankani v. State of
Gujarat, (2010) 4 SCC 301].