Constitution of India II

LAW 123
Semester 4
2024-25
Case Study Presentation
On
Bobby Art International, Etc vs Om Pal Singh Hoon & Ors 1996
(AIR 1996 SC 1846)

By
Abhyuday Kumar

Submitted to
(Dr. Varun Srivastava)
Assistant Professor
Amity Law School, Noida

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 INDEX

Table of contents Page no.

List of abbreviations 3
List of cases 4
Statement of facts 5-6
Statement of issues 7
Legal Provisions 8-10
Analysis 11-13
Conclusion 14
Current relevance of the case 17-18
Bibliography 17-18

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 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation Expansion
AIR All India Report
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases

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 LIST OF CASES

Serial Number Case name Citation

1) Abbas v. Union of India (1970) 2 SCC 780

2) LIC of India v. 1992 (3) S.C.R. 595

Manubhai
3) Raj Kapoor v. State 1980 SCR (1)1081

4) Samaresh Bose v. AIR 1986 SC 967

Amal M,
5) State of Bihar v. AIR 1952 SC 329
Shailabala Devi
6) Sakal Papers v. Union AIR 1962 SC 305
of India

STATEMENT OF FACTS
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 In 1994, Bobby Art International, a film production company, made a
film titled “Bandit Queen” which was based on a true story about a
village girl who was raped and brutalized, and who subsequently became
a member of a violent criminal gang as a means of revenging herself
upon society. The film was based on the book about the incident written
by Mala Sen. The film contained explicit scenes of rape and nudity. In
July 1995, the Censor Board indicated that it would grant the film an “A”
certificate (films considered suitable for exhibition restricted to adults
only) in terms of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 (the Act) but only on the
condition that certain scenes were deleted or modified.

 The Act stated that “a film shall not be certified for public exhibition if,
in the opinion of the authority competent to grant the certificate, the film
or any part of it is against the interests of, inter alia, decency”. In
addition, in 1991 the Indian Government had issued guidelines in terms
of the Act which stipulated that film certification must ensure that
“artistic expression and creative freedom are not unduly curbed” and
that “certification is responsive to social change”. The guidelines also
obliged the Censor Board to ensure that “human sensibilities are not
offended by vulgarity, obscenity or depravity” and that “scenes involving
sexual violence against women like attempt to rape, rape or any form of
molestation or scenes of a similar nature are avoided and should be kept
to a minimum if absolutely necessary.”

 As a result of the condition that certain scenes be deleted or amended, the

order of the Censor Board was appealed to the Appellate Tribunal (the
Tribunal). The Tribunal held that the impugned scenes and the use of
vernacular slurs was permissible and added that “to delete or to reduce
these climactic visuals would be a sacrilege.” By a unanimous order of
the Tribunal, an “A” certificate was granted to the film without requiring
deletion or modification of any scenes.

 The film was first screened on August 31, 1995 at a film festival and was
opened for public viewing on January 25, 1996. Om Pal Singh Hoon, a
member of the specific community portrayed in the film, filed a petition
before the Delhi High Court seeking the quashing of the “A”
classification and a restraint on the exhibition of the film in India on the
grounds that the portrayal of the main character was “abhorrent and
unconscionable and a slur upon the womanhood of India.” He also
claimed that the film portrayed his community in a depraved way and

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 lowered his self-respect. Hoon submitted that his rights under articles 14
(right to equality), 19 (right to freedom of expression) and 21 (right to life
and personal liberty) of the Constitution had been infringed.

 The Court of first instance quashed the “A” classification, and ordered the
Censor Board “to consider the grant of an ‘A’ certificate to it after
excisions and modifications in accordance with his order had been
made”. In addition, the Court granted an injunction against the screening
of the film until a fresh certificate had been issued. Bobby Art appealed to
the Division Court which upheld the judgment of the Court of first
instance, holding that “the scene of violent rape was disgusting and
revolting and it denigrated and degraded women” and that the scenes of
nudity were “indecent”.

 Bobby Art then petitioned the Supreme Court.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

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 The first respondent, Om Pal Singh Hoon, filed a writ petition before the
Delhi High Court seeking to quash the certificate granted to the film and
to restrain its exhibition in India. He argued that the film was “abhorrent
and unconscionable and a slur on the womanhood of India”. He also
claimed that the film depicted his community, the Gujjars, in a depraved
way, particularly in the scene of rape by a character named Babu Gujjar.
He argued that the film violated his fundamental rights under Articles 14,
19, and 21 of the Constitution.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

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  Section 5B(1) of The Cinematograph Act, 1952
“A film shall not be certified for public exhibition if, in the opinion of the
authority competent to grant the certificate, the film or any part of it is against
the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India the security of the State,
friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or
involves defamation or contempt of court or is likely to incite the commission of
any offence.”

 Article 14 of Constitution of India

The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal
protection of the laws within the territory of India.

 Article 19 of Constitution of India

19. (1) All citizens shall have the right—
(a) to freedom of speech and expression;
(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms;
(c) to form associations or unions;
(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India;
(e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India;
(g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any
existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law
imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the
said sub-clause in the interests of 4 [the sovereignty and integrity of India,] the
security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order,
decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or
incitement to an offence.
(3) Nothing in sub-clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any
existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law
imposing, in the interests of 4 [the sovereignty and integrity of India or] public
order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said
sub-clause.
(4) Nothing in sub-clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any
existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law
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imposing, in the interests of 4 [the sovereignty and integrity of India or] public
order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred
by the said sub-clause.
(5) Nothing in 1 [sub-clauses (d) and (e)] of the said clause shall affect the
operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from
making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the
rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either in the interests of the general
public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe.
(6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any
existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law
imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the
exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, 2
[nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in
so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to,—
(i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any
profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or
(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the
State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion,
complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise].

 Article 21 on Constitution of India

No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to
procedure established by law.

ANALYSIS OF THE CASE

 Justice Bharucha J delivered the judgment of the two-judge bench of the

Supreme Court. The central issue before the Court was whether the

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 graphic nudity and obscenity in the film was a sufficient reason to justify
the infringement of Bobby Art’s freedom of expression.

 Bobby Art International argued that the Tribunal was the expert body in
this regard and had determined that the film was appropriate. The film
company emphasized that three of the four-member panel of the Tribunal
were women and that they had not found the film offensive.

 He submitted that the courts below had been correct in quashing the
certificate and prohibiting the screening of the film because the film was
abhorrent. He argued that the film violated his own freedom of speech
and expression.

 Justice Bharucha referred to the 1970 Indian case of Abbas v. Union of

India1 where the Chief Justice Hidayatullah held that “the standards that
we set for our censors must make a substantial allowance in favour of
freedom thus leaving a vast area for creative art to interpret life and
society with some with some of its foibles along with what is good”. In
that case, the Chief Justice had noted that it would be an error to conflate
sex and obscenity as “it is wrong to classify sex as essentially obscene or
even indecent or immoral.” He had noted that it was not the “elements of
rape, leprosy, sexual immorality” that should be censored but rather that
“how the theme is handled by the producer” determines the need for
restriction.

 He also referred to the 1980 Supreme Court case of Raj Kapoor v. State2,
the 1985 Supreme Court case of Samaresh Bose v. Amal M3, and the 1962
Supreme Court case of State of Bihar v. Shailabala Devi4 and noted that
these cases had emphasized that vulgar writing is not necessarily obscene
and that consideration must be given to the writing as a whole (rather
than isolated passages or scenes).

1
(1970) 2 SCC 780

2
1980 SCR (1)1081
3
AIR 1986 SC 967
4
AIR 1952 SC 329

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  With reference to the 1962 Supreme Court case of Sakal Papers v. Union
of India5 and the 1992 Supreme Court case of Life Insurance
Corporation of India v. Manubhai6, he stressed that the only permissible
restrictions to the right to freedom of expression protected by article 19 of
the Constitution are those permitted by article 19 itself. Bharucha
confirmed that the guidelines given to the Censor Board are “broad
standards” and that “where the theme is of social relevance, it must be
allowed to prevail”.

 In applying the jurisprudence and guidelines to the present case, he

commented that “Bandit Queen” “tells a powerful human story”. He held
that the scene in which the main character is humiliated by being stripped
naked and paraded around could not have had its intended effect in any
manner other than by explicitly showing the scene depicting her
humiliation. He added that, in this film, “[r]ape and sex are not being
glorified” but are used to focus on the “trauma and emotional turmoil of
the victim to evoke sympathy for her and disgust for the rapist”. In
addition, he noted that the expletives used in the movie were commonly
used and “no adult would be tempted to use them because they were used
in the film”.

 He referred with approval to the exampled provided by the Tribunal

which had compared this film to “Schindler’s List” in which nudity was
used to tell the story and demonstrate the stripping of the characters’
dignity.

CONCLUSION
5
AIR 1962 SC 305
6
1992 (3) SCR 595

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 In conclusion, Justice Bharucha held that the message of a serious film
should be recognized and the test to be applied was whether the
individual scenes advance the film’s message. If the scenes did advance
the message, he held that the scenes should not be censored and that a
certificate of an “A” rating would be sufficient caution as adult citizens
could be “relied upon to comprehend intelligently the message and react
to it”. He reiterated that “a film illustrating the consequences of social
evils must necessarily show that social evil”, and that “a film that carries
the message that the social evil is evil cannot be made impermissible on
the ground that it depicts the social evil”. The Judge also stressed that the
determination of whether the manner in which the social evil is depicted
is necessary to tell the story should be left to the experts within the
Tribunal.

 He acknowledged that in this case the majority of the Tribunal’s members

were women and that it should not be supposed that “three women would
permit a film be screened which denigrates women, insults India
womanhood or is obscene or pornographic”.

 Accordingly, the Court held that the Tribunal’s classification of the film
as “A” was appropriate and that the lower Courts did not adequately
consider that the use of nudity and expletives was simply to further the
telling of the story. The Court set aside the High Court’s order and
reinstated the Tribunal’s “A” classification.

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 CURRENT RELEVANCE OF THE CASE

 The case remains highly relevant today, especially in the context of

evolving societal norms and the rise of digital platforms like OTT
services, where debates around censorship and artistic freedom are
increasingly prominent. It is frequently cited in legal challenges against
CBFC decisions and in discussions about regulating films and digital
content.

 The judgment serves as a critical precedent for balancing creative

freedom with societal interests, reminding authorities that censorship
must be reasonable and justified.

 As India navigates new challenges in the digital age, including the

proliferation of independent content creators and diverse media, the
principles laid down in this case continue to guide courts, policymakers,
and filmmakers in ensuring that artistic expression is protected while
maintaining a balance with public morality and order.

 The case underscores the dynamic nature of "public morality" and

highlights the need for censorship norms to evolve with changing times,
making it a cornerstone of Indian jurisprudence on freedom of
expression.

 If a film or digital representation is intended to shed light on a social evil, raise

awareness about important societal issues, or depict a significant historical or
cultural event, it should not be subject to banning or censorship simply because
it challenges traditional standards of decency or morality.

 Art, in its various forms, plays a vital role in reflecting societal realities and
fostering meaningful discourse. Such works are often created to provoke
thought, challenge perceptions, and spark dialogue on issues that may be
uncomfortable but are necessary for social progress. While it is important to
ensure that content does not cross boundaries of harm or incite violence, the
value of artistic expression and its potential to drive positive change should not
be undermined by narrow definitions of morality.

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 BIBLOGRAPHY

1. Judgments

Bobby Art International, Etc vs Om Pal Singh Hoon & Ors 1996

2. Legislation

The Constitution of India

The Cinematograph Act, 1952

3. Reports and Papers

Bobby Art Int'l Etc. v. Om Pal Singh Hoon & Ors., (1996) 4
S.C.C.709(India), https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/
Bobby_Art_International_Etc_vs_Om_Pal_Singh_Hoon__Ors_on_1_Ma
y_1996-1.pdf.

4. Websites

https://www.manupatrafast.in/

https://ssc.gov.in/

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