CONTEMPT OF COURT
Maninderjeet Singh Bitta v. UOI- delay in implementation of MV Act and order of govt to
implement HSRP by Haryana, Civil and Criminal Contempt, Intention, extention, dormant
and passive behaviour, PIL, object, inordinate delay, lackadaisical- fine, imp, exemplary
damages
1. R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court
Citation: (2009) 8 SCC 106
Facts:
This case arose out of a sting operation conducted by NDTV, which revealed that Senior
Advocate R.K. Anand and Special Public Prosecutor I.U. Khan were attempting to influence
a key prosecution witness (Sunil Kulkarni) in the BMW hit-and-run case. The footage aired
showed them engaging in a conversation with the witness, raising serious concerns of
professional misconduct and criminal contempt.
Issues:
Whether the conduct of R.K. Anand and I.U. Khan amounted to criminal contempt
of court.
Whether the High Court could take suo motu cognizance based on a media sting
operation.
Judgment:
The Supreme Court held that R.K. Anand was guilty of criminal contempt for
interfering with the administration of justice.
His designation as a Senior Advocate was withdrawn.
The Court emphasized that any act that interferes with judicial proceedings or
obstructs justice can be treated as contempt.
NDTV’s sting was upheld as a valid basis for the court to take action, as the footage
showed prima facie evidence of interference.
2. In Re Arundhati Roy
Citation: AIR 2002 SC 1375
Facts:
Arundhati Roy, a writer and activist, made critical remarks against the Supreme Court
following its judgment in the Narmada Bachao Andolan case. She published a statement
accusing the court of silencing dissent and favoring the rich. She was issued a contempt
notice and later submitted an affidavit that allegedly aggravated the contemptuous tone.
Issues:
Whether her statements and affidavit amounted to criminal contempt of court by
scandalizing the judiciary.
Whether the right to free speech under Article 19(1)(a) protected such criticism.
Judgment:
The Supreme Court held her guilty of criminal contempt for scandalizing the
authority of the judiciary and lowering its dignity.
She was fined ₹2,000 and sentenced to one day’s imprisonment.
The Court observed that while fair criticism is permitted, statements intended to
denigrate the judiciary are not protected under Article 19(1)(a).
3. Mrityunjoy Das v. Sayed Rahaman
SPL to challenge constitutionality of WBLRA Act and IA to maintain status quo granted,
State of WB and Revenue Authority initiate proceedings against 2 members of Sangha-
deliberate disobey of interim order?- Doubt, purpose, cautious, burden and standard of proof,
knowledge, benefit of doubt
4. In Re: Hon’ble Justice C.S. Karnan
Citation: AIR 2017 SC 3191
Facts:
Justice C.S. Karnan, a sitting judge of the Calcutta High Court, made several public
allegations against fellow judges, accused them of corruption, and passed suo motu orders
against the Chief Justice of India and Supreme Court judges. He refused to appear before the
Supreme Court when summoned.
Issues:
Can a sitting High Court judge be proceeded against for criminal contempt of court?
Does judicial independence include immunity from contempt proceedings?
Judgment:
The Supreme Court held Justice Karnan guilty of contempt of court for degrading
the judiciary, defying court orders, and obstructing justice.
He was sentenced to six months' imprisonment—the first time in Indian history a
sitting High Court judge was jailed for contempt.
The Court clarified that no one is above the law, not even a judge, and that
maintaining public confidence in the judiciary is paramount.
DEFENCES OF CONTEMPT
E.M.S. Namboodiripad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar
Facts:
E.M.S. Namboodiripad, the then Chief Minister of Kerala and a senior Communist
leader, gave a public interview to a newspaper in which he criticized the judiciary.
He stated that judges were class-biased, being part of a bourgeois setup, and
claimed that the judiciary favored capitalist interests over those of the common
people.
The statements were widely published and sparked controversy.
T. Narayanan Nambiar, a senior advocate and later a judge of the Kerala High
Court, initiated contempt proceedings against Namboodiripad.
⚖️Issues:
1. Whether the statements made by Namboodiripad in the interview amounted to
criminal contempt of court under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952.
2. Whether his position as a political leader and the ideological justification
(Marxist critique of institutions) could be a valid defense.
3. Whether freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) protected such statements.
🧑⚖️Judgment:
The Supreme Court held that Namboodiripad was guilty of criminal contempt.
The Court emphasized that freedom of speech is not absolute and must be balanced
against the need to maintain public confidence in the judiciary.
It ruled that:
“Judges and courts cannot be subjected to defamatory statements that lower their authority,
even if made by political leaders under ideological motives.”
The Court rejected the defense based on Marxist ideology, holding that personal
belief in a class-based theory does not justify contemptuous remarks against the
judiciary.
Punishment: A symbolic sentence of fine of ₹50, considering his status and the
nature of the offense.
📌 Significance:
Landmark case on criminal contempt of court in India.
Clarified that criticism of the judiciary that undermines public faith in the
judicial system amounts to contempt, even if it is ideologically motivated.
Reinforced that political ideologies cannot override the constitutional duty to
respect judicial institutions.
Often cited in discussions on the limits of free speech and protection of judicial
dignity.
The Law Commission of India Report No. 274 (April 2018) undertakes a focused review of
Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which defines civil and criminal contempt,
particularly examining whether the offence of criminal contempt—especially the clause
related to "scandalising the court"—should be retained. After analyzing legal precedents,
international practices, and stakeholder responses, the Commission concluded that the
offence remains necessary in the Indian context to uphold the authority and dignity of the
judiciary. The report highlights that in a country like India, where public respect for judicial
institutions is critical and legal literacy is relatively low, the provision acts as a vital
safeguard against unwarranted attacks that may erode public trust. Therefore, the
Commission recommended retaining the existing provisions of Section 2 without any
amendment.
The Law Commission of England and Wales Report – Contempt of Court: Scandalising the
Court (2012) critically evaluated the common law offence of scandalising the court, which
criminalized statements that could undermine public confidence in the judiciary. The
Commission found the offence to be vague, unnecessary, and incompatible with modern
principles of free speech and transparency in a democratic society. It noted that alternative
legal remedies, such as defamation and judicial review, were sufficient to address any real
harm caused by such criticisms. Citing the chilling effect on legitimate expression and the
lack of recent prosecutions, the report ultimately recommended the abolition of the offence,
which was later accepted and led to its formal repeal through the Crime and Courts Act,
2013.
ADVOCATES ACT, 1961
Case Summary: Indira Jaising v. Supreme Court of India and Others
Citation: AIR 2017 SC 5017
Bench: J. Chelameswar and Abdul Nazeer, JJ.
Date of Judgment: October 10, 2017
1. Facts of the Case:
Petitioner: Indira Jaising, a senior advocate and former Additional Solicitor General
of India, filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution.
The case challenged the lack of transparency and criteria in the designation of
Senior Advocates under Section 16 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and Order IV Rule
2 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013.
The petitioner argued that the existing process for designation was opaque,
arbitrary, and lacked objective standards, violating Article 14 (Right to
Equality).
She also contended that the entire process was handled in a non-transparent and
subjective manner, largely by judges alone without any accountability or objective
evaluation of merit.
2. Issues before the Court:
1. Whether the existing process for designating Senior Advocates in the Supreme Court
and High Courts violates Article 14 of the Constitution due to lack of transparency
and objectivity?
2. Whether the Supreme Court can lay down guidelines or framework for the
designation of Senior Advocates to ensure fairness and transparency?
3. Judgment:
The Supreme Court partly allowed the petition and laid down comprehensive guidelines for
the designation of Senior Advocates. Key points from the judgment:
A. Findings:
The Court recognized that designation of Senior Advocates has public importance,
and a more structured and transparent process is required.
Held that Article 145 of the Constitution, which gives the Supreme Court the power
to frame rules, does not prevent the Court from ensuring a transparent procedure
under Article 32 jurisdiction.
B. Guidelines laid down by the Court (as interim measures):
The Court established the creation of a Permanent Committee for Designation of Senior
Advocates. The composition:
The Chief Justice of India (Chairperson);
Two senior-most Judges of the Supreme Court;
Attorney General for India;
A member of the Bar (nominated by the above four members).
C. Procedure for designation:
1. Applications/Recommendations may be made by judges or by advocates
themselves.
2. The Secretariat of the Committee will collect data on the applicant’s:
o Number of years in practice (minimum 10 years);
o Reported and unreported judgments;
o Publications;
o Pro bono work;
o Awards and professional activities.
3. A point-based evaluation system was proposed, including:
o Judgments (reported/unreported) – 40 marks
o Publications, academic contributions – 15 marks
o Pro bono and legal aid work – 10 marks
o Interview/Interaction – 25 marks
o Overall reputation and integrity – 10 marks
4. After assessment, the names would be put before the Full Court for final approval.
D. Binding Nature:
The guidelines were made binding until suitable legislative or judicial intervention
took place.
4. Significance of the Judgment:
A landmark ruling in promoting transparency and accountability in the legal
profession.
Established a structured, merit-based approach to a process previously dominated
by judicial discretion.
Upheld constitutional principles of equality and fairness in professional
recognition.
Case Summary: Bar Council of India v. A.K. Balaji and Others
Citation: (2018) 5 SCC 379
Bench: Adarsh Kumar Goel and U.U. Lalit, JJ.
Date of Judgment: March 13, 2018
1. Facts of the Case:
The matter originated from a writ petition filed in the Madras High Court by A.K.
Balaji, an advocate, seeking action against foreign law firms and foreign lawyers
allegedly practicing law in India illegally.
The petitioner alleged that foreign firms were opening offices in India, advising
clients on foreign and Indian law, and participating in negotiations and
arbitrations without complying with the Advocates Act, 1961.
The Madras High Court held that:
o Foreign law firms cannot practice Indian law in India.
o However, they may fly in and fly out to provide legal advice on foreign law
on a temporary basis.
o Participation in arbitrations and BPO operations was not considered practice
of law in the traditional sense.
The Bar Council of India (BCI) challenged the High Court’s judgment before the
Supreme Court, seeking stricter enforcement of the Advocates Act against foreign
lawyers.
2. Issues before the Court:
1. Whether foreign law firms and foreign lawyers can practice law in India either on
the litigation side or non-litigation side (including advisory and transactional work)?
2. Whether foreign lawyers can fly in and fly out of India to provide legal services?
3. Whether foreign lawyers can participate in international commercial arbitration
held in India?
4. Whether LLPs and foreign law firms can operate Legal Process Outsourcing
(LPO) or BPO services from India?
3. Judgment:
The Supreme Court upheld the primary reasoning of the Madras High Court with
certain clarifications and emphases:
A. Practice of Law in India is Governed by the Advocates Act, 1961
Only advocates enrolled with a State Bar Council under the Advocates Act can
practice law in India (litigation and non-litigation).
Foreign lawyers or law firms cannot practice Indian law in India either on
litigation or non-litigation side.
B. Fly in and fly out permissible only in limited circumstances
Foreign lawyers may be allowed to enter India on a temporary basis ("fly in and
fly out") to provide legal advice to their clients on foreign law, but it cannot amount
to regular practice or establishment of an office.
C. International Commercial Arbitration
Foreign lawyers may not be debarred from appearing in international arbitrations
in India involving foreign clients, especially where foreign law is involved.
However, such participation should be regulated, and cannot bypass the Advocates
Act.
D. Legal Process Outsourcing (LPO) and BPO
Outsourcing services such as document review, legal transcription, and legal
research by foreign law firms is not per se prohibited under the Advocates Act,
provided they do not amount to practice of Indian law.
E. Policy Recommendation
The Court left it to the Government of India and Bar Council of India to frame
suitable rules or regulations if foreign lawyers were to be permitted in any form
under a regulated framework, especially in light of international obligations
under WTO and GATS.
4. Final Directions:
Foreign law firms or lawyers cannot open offices in India.
They cannot practice law in India in any form unless permitted by law or under
reciprocity provisions under Section 47 of the Advocates Act.
Fly-in-fly-out legal advice on foreign law is allowed on a temporary and casual
basis.
Participation in arbitrations and LPOs by foreign lawyers is not prohibited, subject
to Indian laws.
5. Significance of the Judgment:
Clarified the scope of "practice of law" under the Advocates Act, covering both
litigation and non-litigation work.
Reinforced the regulatory monopoly of Indian advocates over the Indian legal
profession.
Struck a balance between globalization of legal services and sovereign regulation
of the legal profession.
Set the groundwork for further discussion and potential liberalization under trade
agreements like GATS.
