Lecture 9: Institutions of War and Peace
Noel Anderson
POL209H5F
Department of Political Science
University of Toronto Mississauga
16 November 2021
Motivation
photo: OpenCanada
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Motivation
• A recurring concept we have seen in this class: anarchy
I The absence of a central authority capable of policing states
and guaranteeing their security and interests
• Different theories highlight different ways states seek to protect
their interests under anarchy, whether by building alliances or
working cooperatively via international organizations
• But how do these institutions work? And how do they affect
interactions between states on issues of war and peace?
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Outline
1 Alliances
2 Collective Security Organizations
3 A Brief Summary
4 Looking Ahead to Next Week
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Outline
1 Alliances
2 Collective Security Organizations
3 A Brief Summary
4 Looking Ahead to Next Week
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Alliances
Alliances: “Institutions that help their members cooperate militarily
in the event of a war” (Frieden, Lake, Schultz 2019: 189)
• States form alliances when they have compatible interests in
bargaining against some adversary
• Just like other institutions, alliances specify standards of
behavior and identify expectations of their members
• Can be defensive, offensive, or both
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Alliances
• Alliances codify bargains between members over contributions
and distributional issues
• They can be symmetric, but also asymmetric (ex. US alliances
with Japan, S. Korea)
• They can also serve as the basis for a “deal” of some kinds (ex.
defense in exchange for basing rights)
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Alliances
Source: The Guardian (2017)
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Alliances
• Alliances can form given common interests in security and fear
of domination
• A balance of power ensures that no state or coalition can
dominate all others
• In this view, alliances form when states need to combine their
capabilities to counter threats to their security; in this sense,
they tend to be defensive
I Expectation is that states will prefer to join the weaker side;
war-winning alliances will quickly fracture
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Alliances
• Alliance can also form given common interests in potential
gains
• Bandwagoning occurs when losing or weak states join the
stronger state or coalition in an attempt to share in the spoils
of conquest
• Bandwagoning alliances are usually offensive alliances
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Alliances
Other considerations of importance for alliances:
• Ideological and cultural similarity
• The “balance of threats” (Walt 1987)
I Aggregate strength
I Geographic proximity
I Offensive capabilities
I Offensive intentions
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Alliances
Alliances also entail costs:
• Commitment of blood and treasure to defend another state
• Must be upheld to be credible, even if defeat is likely
• Limits freedom (consultation necessary before taking action)
• Risk of entrapment: an ally can cause a crisis that you would
otherwise like to avoid
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Alliances
• How can we conceptualize the role of alliances in IR?
• Generally speaking, alliances alter bargaining dynamics
I They affect the likely outcome and costs of war
• As a result, we can once again return to the bargaining model
to understand how alliances affect strategic interactions
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Alliances and Bargaining
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Alliances and Bargaining
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Alliances and Bargaining
• Alliances can also affect the likelihood of bargaining failures if
there is incomplete information about whether a third party will
actual join in the fighting in the event of war
• Alliances can be costly and there are incentives to
misrepresent to try to trick an opponent into believing that an
alliance is very strong and defense is certain, even when it is not
• There are also incentives to leave commitments purposely
ambiguous to limit commitments and avoid entrapment
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Alliances and Bargaining
Illustration by Michelle Christensen
Example: US-Taiwan relations and strategic ambiguity
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Alliances and Bargaining
• There is also a credible commitment problem: how can allies
credibly commit to defend their friends?
• In the past, states cemented relationships with marriages
between royal families
• Today, states use other techniques...
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Alliances and Bargaining
photo: Associated Press
(Public signing ceremonies)
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Alliances and Bargaining
photo: Gordon Welters/NYT
(Joint military exercises)
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Alliances and Bargaining
photo: U.S. Department of Defense
(Joint commands)
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Alliances and Bargaining
“The garrison in Berlin is as fine a collection of soldiers as has ever
been assembled, but excruciatingly small. What can 7,000 American
troops do [...]? Bluntly, they can die. They can die heroically,
dramatically, and in a manner that guarantees that the action
cannot stop there. They represent the pride, the honor, and the
reputation of the United States government and its armed forces;
and they can apparently hold the entire Red Army at bay.”
-Schelling 1966: 47.
(Stationing troops on each other’s soil)
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Alliances
Do alliances matter?
• Yes, but they matter in different ways
• Effect on the probability of onset of militarized interstate
disputes depends on the type of alliance
I States with defensive alliances are less likely to be targeted by
militarized actions, suggesting a deterrent effect
I But states with offensive and/or neutrality alliances are more
likely to initiate militarized actions, suggesting an
emboldenment effect
I See Leeds (2003)
• The failures of alliances to keep the peace during the first half
of the twentieth century propelled a different idea to the fore...
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Outline
1 Alliances
2 Collective Security Organizations
3 A Brief Summary
4 Looking Ahead to Next Week
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Collective Security Organizations
Collective security organizations: “Broad-based institutions that
promote peace and security among their members” (Frieden, Lake,
Schultz 2019: 205)
• Examples: League of Nations (1919); United Nations (1945);
African Union (2002)
• Form when states have common interests in preventing war and
accept the view that the security of one is the concern of all,
regardless of who the victim and/or aggressor might be
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Collective Security Organizations
What collective security organizations do:
• Internally: forbid military force by one member against another;
aim is to resolve disputes peacefully
• Externally: collective response mechanism—an attack on one is
an attack on all
I Members can respond with economic sanctions up to full-scale
military intervention (deterrent)
I Can also provide for mediators/peacekeepers to help states
identify mutually beneficial bargains or monitor/enforce
agreements
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Collective Security Organizations and Bargaining
Three effects on bargaining:
1 Can ensure challenges to status quo are almost certain to fail
(high cost of war for challengers)
2 Can help enforce agreements; overcome credible commitment
problems
3 Can serve as neutral observers and peacekeepers
I Increase costs of a resumption in fighting (diminished first strike
advantages, increased diplomatic costs)
I Monitor compliance, reassure both sides about each others’
intentions
I Provide local mediation, dispute resolution, and prevent
escalation
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Collective Security Organizations
Challenges: the collective action problem
• Collective action problems arise when there are incentives to
cooperate, but each actor expects that others will pay the
costs of cooperation
• Members of collective security institutions can enjoy the
benefits of security whether or not they contribute troops,
funding, equipment, and so on
• Each state therefore has an incentive to “free ride”: to not
contribute to the public good of collective security while
benefiting from its provision by others
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Collective Security Organizations
Challenges: the joint decision making problem
• Complicating things further, the membership of collective
security organizations is often diverse and includes states with
conflicting interests
• It can therefore be challenging to find consensus on questions
of: what constitutes a threat; which state should be deemed an
“aggressor”; how the organization should respond
• Example: During the Cold War, both the US and Soviet Union
were members of the UN!
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
An Example: The UN
photo: Deco/Alamy
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
An Example: The UN
• UN Security Council: has authority to identify threats to
international peace and security; decide organization’s response;
authorize use of economic and/or military sanctions (Chapter
VII of UN Charter)
• 5 permanent members, 10 non-permanent members
• The permanent states (“the P5”) enjoy veto power to prevent
the passage of a measure at the Security Council
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
An Example: The UN
• For a vote to pass, you need at least 9 of 15 council members
and all of the P5
• Pros:
I Small group of decision makers makes it easier to arrive at
consensus in UN (imagine if all 193 members got a vote)
I Reduces collective action problem by ensuring consent of
strongest members with resources to contribute
I Actions won’t be opposed by any of the most powerful members
• Cons:
I Policing power wielded unevenly (helps those with “friends in
high places”)
I Permanence of P5 means UNSC’s veto powers do not reflect
changes in distribution of power
I Unanimity difficult to achieve, and veto can lead to paralysis
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
An Example: The UN
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
The UN and Collective Security
The UNSC can authorize two types of military operations:
• Peacekeeping: the deployment of troops, police, and/or
observers to monitor a ceasefire or peace agreement
I Three basic principles:
1 Consent of the warring parties
2 Impartiality
3 Non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of a
mission’s mandate
• Peace enforcement: the application of coercive measures,
including military force, to make and/or enforce peace among
warring parties
• Do peacekeeping and peace enforcement work?
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
The UN and Collective Security: Successes and Failures
photo: Christophe Simon/AFP
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
The UN and Collective Security: Successes and Failures
photo: United Nations
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
The UN and Collective Security: Successes and Failures
photo: Getty Images
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
The UN and Collective Security: Successes and Failures
photo: AP Photo/Sayyid Azim
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
The UN and Collective Security: Successes and Failures
photo: Michael Büker
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
The UN and Collective Security: Successes and Failures
• The presence of peacekeepers reduces the probability of
cease-fire breakdown by ∼85% (interstate), ∼60% (civil war)
(Fortna 2004, 2008)
• UN deployments can also reduce violence in conflict zones
I Function of deployment capacity and constitution
I See Hultman et al. (2014)
• On the other hand, the UN is “remarkably ill-suited” to peace
enforcement strategies involving the strategic employment of
coercive force (Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 185)
• Without compelling national interests, member states are often
reluctant to pay the costs of stopping aggression and ending
humanitarian crises
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Outline
1 Alliances
2 Collective Security Organizations
3 A Brief Summary
4 Looking Ahead to Next Week
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
A Brief Summary
• Alliances and collective security organizations are important
institutions of war and peace
I Alliances: created to facilitate cooperation for the purposes of
influencing bargaining with outsiders
I Collective security organizations: form around common interests
shared by all members in promoting peace, preventing war
• The track record of both types of institutions is mixed
I Alliances: most effective when allies share an interest in each
other’s security and can credibly signal this interest to an
adversary
I Collective security organizations: most effective when leading
states perceive common (and compelling) interests in stopping
aggression
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Outline
1 Alliances
2 Collective Security Organizations
3 A Brief Summary
4 Looking Ahead to Next Week
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
Looking Ahead
Next week:
• Topic: Civil War and Counterinsurgency
• Readings:
I Kalyvas, Stathis. 2011. “The Changing Character of Civil Wars,
1800-2009,” in Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers (eds.), The
Changing Character of War (New York, NY: Oxford University
Press): 202-219.
I Thomas, Jakana; Kanisha Bond. 2012. “Women’s Participation
in Violent Political Organizations,” American Political Science
Review 109 (3): 488-506.
Alliances Collective Security Organizations Summary Looking Ahead
