CIVPRO 2 CASES

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Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. vs. Villareal (G.R. No. 181182)

Doctrine: The right to appeal is not an inherent right but a statutory privilege that requires strict
compliance with procedural rules.

Facts: Boardwalk Business Ventures filed a complaint for replevin to repossess a 1995 Toyota
Tamaraw FX from Elvira Villareal, who failed to pay a car loan. After the MeTC ruled in favor of
Boardwalk, the RTC reversed the decision. Boardwalk’s petition for review to the CA was
dismissed due to procedural errors, including improper filing and payment.

Issue: Whether the CA correctly dismissed Boardwalk’s petition for review due to procedural
lapses.

Ruling: The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, emphasizing strict compliance with
procedural rules. The failure to follow jurisdictional requirements like filing deadlines and proper
court filings made the RTC's decision final and executory.

Mandaue Realty and Resources Corp. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 185082)

Doctrine: When an appeal raises mixed questions of law and fact, it should be reviewed by the
Court of Appeals, not directly by the Supreme Court.

Facts: BSP filed a complaint for annulment and reinstatement of a property title against
Mandaue Realty, claiming that a previous court order restoring title to Mandaue was void.
MARRECO argued that the issue was res judicata, but the RTC dismissed the complaint, stating
that it interfered with a final judgment. BSP appealed to the CA, which ruled it had jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether the CA had jurisdiction over BSP's appeal or if it should have been brought
directly to the Supreme Court.

Ruling: The Supreme Court upheld the CA’s jurisdiction, ruling that the appeal involved mixed
questions of fact and law, which is within the CA’s purview. The Court clarified the correct appeal
procedure under Rules 41 and 45.

United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) vs. Spouses Uy (G.R. No. 204039)

Doctrine: Assignment of credit does not transfer the obligations of the original creditor; only the
right to collect payments is transferred.
Facts: The Uy spouses filed a complaint for refund against UCPB after PPGI failed to complete
a condominium project. UCPB had received payments after taking over PPGI’s receivables but
did not assume PPGI's obligations to complete the project.

Issue: Whether UCPB is liable for the full refund or only for the amount it received from the Uy
spouses.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that UCPB is liable only for the amount it received from the
spouses, not the full contract price, as it only assumed the right to collect receivables, not
PPGI’s obligations.

Mendoza vs. Bautista (G.R. No. 143666)

Doctrine: The right of first refusal under P.D. No. 1517 applies only to tenants who have built a
home on the land, not to lessees without such improvements.

Facts: Purita Bautista filed a complaint for annulment of sale and reconveyance after her
lessors sold the property without offering it to her first. She claimed the sale violated her right of
first refusal under P.D. No. 1517.

Issue: Whether Bautista was entitled to the right of first refusal under P.D. No. 1517.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that Bautista was not entitled to the right of first refusal
because she did not build a home on the leased land, which is a requirement under P.D. No.
1517.

Villanueva vs. Spouses Salvador (G.R. No. 139436)

Doctrine: Strict compliance with notice requirements under the Pawnshop Regulation Law is
necessary for the validity of auction sales of pledged items.

Facts: The Salvador spouses failed to redeem jewelry pledged to Ever Pawnshop. Ever
Pawnshop held an auction sale but did not comply with the required notice publication period.
The Salvadors sued for damages.

Issue: Whether the auction sale was valid, and whether the Salvadors were entitled to moral
damages and attorney’s fees.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the auction sale was invalid due to non-compliance with
notice requirements. However, it deleted the awards for moral damages and attorney's fees,
finding no basis for these awards.
Case Digest: Crisologo vs. Daray (A.M. No. RTJ-07-2036, August 20, 2008)

Doctrine:

Judges are immune from administrative liability for judicial acts unless done in bad faith.
Administrative complaints cannot be used to correct judicial errors, which must be remedied
through appeal or certiorari.

Facts:

●​ Two consolidated civil cases involving property ownership disputes led to a

Compromise Agreement among the parties.
●​ Complainants sought intervention, claiming co-ownership, but the judge denied it,
citing potential delays.
●​ Notices of denial and approval of the Compromise Agreement were sent to the wrong
counsel, preventing the complainants from timely responding.
●​ The complainants discovered the ruling after an execution motion was filed and
attempted to appeal.
●​ The judge later inhibited herself but did not act on the appeal. The Court of Appeals
later ruled in favor of the complainants, finding grave abuse of discretion in denying
intervention.

Issue:

Whether the judge committed gross misconduct and undue delay in handling the case,
justifying administrative sanctions.

Ruling:

●​ The denial of intervention was within judicial discretion and not a ground for
administrative liability.
●​ The failure to act on the appeal was excused as the judge had already inhibited
herself.
●​ Judicial immunity applies absent bad faith.
●​ Complaint dismissed due to lack of bad faith or gross misconduct on the judge’s
part.
Case Digest: Santos vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 114726, February 14,
1996)

Doctrine:

Failure to pay the appeal fee does not automatically result in the dismissal of an appeal. The
right to appeal should not be denied on mere technicalities.

Facts:

●​ The Municipality of Santa Cruz sued petitioners for unlawful detainer, claiming
ownership of land occupied by the petitioners.
●​ The MTC ruled for eviction, and the petitioners appealed to the RTC but failed to pay
the appeal fee.
●​ The RTC dismissed the appeal on this ground.
●​ The Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal, prompting petitioners to elevate the case
to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether failure to pay the appeal fee justifies the dismissal of the appeal.

Ruling:

●​ Filing a notice of appeal is sufficient to perfect an appeal from MTC to RTC.

●​ Payment of the appeal fee is not a prerequisite to appeal perfection; it is a
requirement but not an automatic ground for dismissal.
●​ Dismissal for non-payment of fees is discretionary, and courts must balance technical
compliance with substantial justice.
●​ The Supreme Court reinstated the appeal, allowing petitioners to pay the fee and have
their case heard on the merits.
Case Digest: Heirs of Garcia I vs. Municipality of Iba, Zambales (G.R. No.
162217, July 22, 2015)

Doctrine:

Strict adherence to procedural rules is necessary for the orderly administration of justice. Failure
to use the correct mode of appeal is fatal to the case.

Facts:

●​ Melecio R. Bueno, a tenant-farmer, owned agricultural land in Iba, Zambales.

●​ In 1983, the Municipality of Iba built a public market on a portion of the land without
consent.
●​ Bueno filed an ejectment case, and the MTC ruled in his favor.
●​ The Municipality’s appeal was denied, leading them to file a certiorari petition with
the RTC, which ruled in their favor.
●​ Bueno’s heirs appealed to the CA using Rule 42, but the CA dismissed the case,
stating that the proper mode of appeal was Rule 41.

Issue:

Whether the CA correctly dismissed the appeal for wrong mode of appeal.

Ruling:

●​ The RTC exercised original jurisdiction, so Rule 41 (ordinary appeal) should have
been used, not Rule 42 (petition for review).
●​ Compliance with the correct mode of appeal is jurisdictional.
●​ Procedural rules must be followed, and no compelling reason justified an exception.
●​ SC dismissed the appeal, upholding the CA ruling.

Case Digest: Heirs of Dimaampao vs. Alug (G.R. No. 198223, February 18,
2015)

Doctrine:

The principle of res judicata bars the relitigation of cases already decided by a competent
court. Actions based on a written contract must be filed within ten years, or they are barred
by prescription.

Facts:

●​ The heirs of Timbang Dimaampao claimed ownership of a 157,738 sqm land in

Marawi City, inherited from their grandmother.
 ●​ They alleged that in 1978, Cota Dimaampao (Timbang’s ex-husband) illegally sold the
land to respondents.
●​ A prior RTC case (Civil Case No. 2410) upheld the validity of the 1978 sale, and the
CA affirmed it.
●​ Petitioners, not part of that case, filed a new complaint in 2005, challenging the 1978
sale.

Issue:

Whether the petitioners’ claim was barred by res judicata and prescription.

Ruling:

●​ The previous case was final and binding, meeting all elements of res judicata.
●​ The 1978 sale was registered, serving as constructive notice to all, and the petition in
2005 was time-barred.
●​ Judicial stability prevents reopening of settled matters.
●​ SC upheld the prior decision and dismissed the case.

Magat Sr. vs. Tantrade Corporation (G.R. No. 205483, Aug 23, 2017)

●​ Doctrine: Courts may allow extensions for filing appeals when compelling reasons exist,
like financial hardship or death of a party.
●​ Facts: The heirs of Juliana S. Magat sought extensions to appeal a debt collection case
due to financial difficulties and Juliana’s death. The CA denied their motions, calling
them procrastination.
●​ Issue: Whether the CA erred in denying extensions for filing an appeal.
●​ Ruling: The Supreme Court reinstated the appeal, recognizing the heirs’ procedural
compliance and compelling circumstances. Justice is served by hearing cases on their
merits when good faith is shown.

Duty Free Philippines vs. Bureau of Internal Revenue

G.R. No. 197228 | October 8, 2014

●​ Doctrine: Appeals from CTA divisions must first be filed with the CTA en banc before
elevating to the Supreme Court. Procedural compliance is mandatory.
●​ Facts: Duty Free Philippines contested BIR tax assessments, claiming tax exemption
under E.O. No. 46. The CTA ruled it liable for taxes. Duty Free directly appealed to the
Supreme Court.
●​ Issue: Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the CTA division's decision
directly.
●​ Ruling: The Supreme Court denied the petition due to procedural defects, emphasizing
that appeals from CTA divisions must first go to the CTA en banc. The substantive tax
issues were not resolved.
St. Martin Funeral Home vs. National Labor Relations Commission

G.R. No. 130866 | September 16, 1998

●​ Doctrine: The proper remedy to challenge NLRC decisions is a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65, filed with the Court of Appeals, not the Supreme Court.
●​ Facts: Aricayos alleged illegal dismissal; St. Martin Funeral Home denied his
employment. The labor arbiter ruled no employer-employee relationship existed, but the
NLRC reversed and remanded the case. St. Martin sought certiorari with the Supreme
Court.
●​ Issue: Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over NLRC decisions and the correct
mode of judicial review.
●​ Ruling: The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals, holding that
NLRC decisions should be reviewed through certiorari under Rule 65 at the appellate
level, adhering to the hierarchy of courts.

Case Digest: Peñafrancia Shipping Corp. vs. 168 Shipping Lines, Inc. (G.R.
No. 188952, September 21, 2016)

Doctrine:

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that an aggrieved party must
first appeal to the highest administrative authority before seeking judicial relief. Direct resort to
the courts without completing the administrative process results in dismissal of the case.

Facts:

●​ 168 Shipping Lines, Inc. applied for a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to
operate a roll-on/roll-off vessel on the Matnog-Allen route.
●​ Peñafrancia Shipping Corp. and Santa Clara Shipping Corp. opposed the application,
citing regulatory non-compliance and overtonnage on the route.
 ●​ MARINA Regional Office V denied the application, but on appeal, the MARINA
Administrator reversed the ruling and granted the CPC.
●​ Petitioners appealed directly to the Court of Appeals (CA), bypassing the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and the Office of the President (OP).
●​ The CA dismissed the appeal, citing failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Issues:

1.​ Did petitioners commit forum shopping?

2.​ Was direct appeal to the CA proper without first exhausting administrative
remedies?

Ruling:

●​ No forum shopping: The moratorium petition and the appeal of the CPC involved
different causes of action and reliefs.
●​ Dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies: Petitioners should have
first appealed to the DOTC Secretary and then the OP before going to the courts.
Direct appeal to the CA was premature.

Key Takeaway:

Courts will not intervene unless administrative remedies are fully exhausted, ensuring that
agencies first resolve disputes within their expertise.

Case Digest: Suelo, Jr. vs. MST Marine Services, Inc. (G.R. No. 252914,
November 9, 2020)

Doctrine:

Procedural rules should be applied flexibly when strict compliance would result in injustice.
Courts should prioritize resolving cases on the merits rather than dismissing them on technical
grounds.

Facts:

●​ Seafarer Virgilio Suelo, Jr. was employed as Second Engineer but was medically
repatriated due to hypertensionand spinal issues.
●​ He sought disability benefits, alleging that his employer denied him access to a
company-designated physician and refused reimbursement for medical expenses.
 ●​ The Voluntary Arbitrators (VA) dismissed his claim, finding that he delayed seeking
treatment and failed to provide proof of medical expenses.
●​ The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed Suelo's appeal on technical grounds: it was
two days late and contained an error in the affidavit of service.

Issue:

Did the CA err in dismissing the appeal on procedural grounds instead of ruling on the
merits?

Ruling:

●​ Yes, the CA erred. The Supreme Court ruled that procedural rules must be interpreted
flexibly when no bad faith or prejudice is involved.
●​ The petition was filed within the proper period, and the affidavit error was a
harmless mistake.
●​ The Court remanded the case to the CA to be decided on the merits.

Key Takeaway:

Courts should not dismiss valid claims based solely on minor procedural defects—especially
in cases involving labor rights and social justice.

Case Digest: Yuchengco vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 165793, October 27,
2006)

Doctrine:

Procedural rules exist to serve justice, not to defeat it. Courts have discretion to relax
technical rules when substantial justice is at stake.

Facts:

●​ Yuchengco filed a defamation case against respondents for publishing articles

portraying him as a "Marcos crony" and a corporate raider.
●​ The RTC ruled in his favor, awarding damages.
●​ Respondents appealed to the CA, but their appeal contained procedural defects (e.g.,
incorrect brief format).
 ●​ Yuchengco moved to dismiss the appeal on procedural grounds, but the CA denied
the motion, citing substantial justice.

Issue:

Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the appeal despite
procedural lapses?

Ruling:

●​ No, the CA acted properly. The Supreme Court upheld the CA’s ruling, emphasizing
that technicalities should not defeat substantive rights.
●​ Procedural rules are meant to aid justice, not serve as rigid barriers.
●​ The appeal substantially complied with Rule 44, and no grave abuse of discretion
was committed.

Key Takeaway:

Courts may relax procedural rules when it serves justice, ensuring cases are decided on the
merits rather than dismissed on technicalities.

Case Digest: Lopez vs. Saludo, Jr. (G.R. No. 233775, September 15, 2021)

Doctrine:

An implied trust arises when a person pays for a property but registers it under another's
name. The true owner is the one who provided the purchase price, not the person holding the
title.

Facts:

●​ Saludo (respondent) entrusted Lopez (petitioner) with ₱15 million to buy two
properties, expecting them to be held in trust for him.
●​ Instead of reconveying the properties, Lopez registered them under her name.
●​ Saludo took possession, paid taxes, and spent ₱9 million on renovations.
●​ Lopez refused to return the properties, leading to a case for reconveyance and
damages.
 ●​ RTC and CA ruled in favor of Saludo, declaring him the rightful owner.

Issue:

Did an implied trust exist between Saludo and Lopez?

Ruling:

●​ Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s decision, recognizing an implied trust
under Article 1448 of the Civil Code.
●​ Saludo paid for the properties, making him the true owner, while Lopez merely held
legal title.
●​ Lopez failed to prove that the amount given was a donation, which requires written
proof for sums exceeding ₱5,000.
●​ Factual findings of the RTC and CA are binding, as no exceptions applied under Rule
45.

Key Takeaway:

Ownership is determined by who paid for the property, not just whose name appears on the
title. Trusts can be implied, preventing unjust enrichment.

Case Digest: Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa PICOP Resources, Inc.-SPFL vs.

Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 148839-40, November 2, 2006)

Doctrine:

●​ Grave abuse of discretion exists when a court or tribunal acts in a capricious,

arbitrary, or whimsical manner.
●​ Preliminary injunctions are discretionary, and courts should not interfere unless there
is clear abuse of discretion.
●​ A party cannot file petitions under both Rule 45 and Rule 65 simultaneously, as they
are mutually exclusive remedies.

Facts: PICOP, facing financial struggles, temporarily shut down operations in 1997,
leading to a strike by its labor union, NAMAPRI-SPFL. PICOP sought relief from the
NLRC and the Labor Secretary, leading to a return-to-work order.
 ●​ In 1998, PICOP permanently shut down its plywood plant, retrenching workers.
●​ The Labor Secretary upheld the retrenchment, ordering separation pay but rejecting
union demands.
●​ NAMAPRI-SPFL sought execution of the Labor Secretary’s ruling, leading to
garnishment of PICOP’s funds.
●​ PICOP obtained an injunction from the Court of Appeals (CA) to stop the execution.
●​ The union challenged the CA’s injunction before the Supreme Court (SC) via Rules
45 and 65.

Issues:

1.​ Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in enjoining the execution of the Labor
Secretary’s ruling?
2.​ Was the union’s simultaneous filing under Rules 45 and 65 proper?

Ruling: SC ruled against the union, holding that:

○​ The CA acted within its discretion in issuing an injunction.

○​ Preliminary injunctions are discretionary and should not be overturned absent
grave abuse of discretion.
○​ The union’s petition under Rule 45 was premature since the CA’s order was not
a final judgment.
○​ Filing under both Rules 45 and 65 was improper, as these remedies cannot
be availed of simultaneously.
○​ The case had become moot and academic after the CA’s decision nullifying
the Labor Secretary’s ruling was affirmed by the SC in a separate case.

Conclusion: The SC denied the union’s petition, upholding the CA’s injunction and
reiterating that procedural rules must be followed. The case was declared moot.

Case Digest: Quezon City vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. (G.R. No.
166408, October 6, 2008)

Doctrine:

●​ Tax exemptions must be explicitly and unambiguously stated in the law. They are
strictly construed against the taxpayer.
●​ The "in lieu of all taxes" clause is functus officio (no longer effective) when the
franchise tax it originally referred to has been abolished.
●​ Local government units can impose franchise taxes unless there is a clear statutory
exemption.

Facts:

●​ Quezon City imposed a local franchise tax under its 1993 Revenue Code.
 ●​ ABS-CBN, under its franchise (RA 7966), was subject to a 3% franchise tax “in lieu
of all taxes.”
●​ ABS-CBN paid but later claimed exemption and sought a refund of ₱19.9 million in
local franchise taxes.
●​ RTC and CA ruled in favor of ABS-CBN, holding that its franchise tax under RA 7966
was a special law that prevailed over the Local Government Code (LGC).

Issue:

Does the "in lieu of all taxes" provision in ABS-CBN's franchise exempt it from Quezon
City's local franchise tax?

Ruling:

●​ SC ruled in favor of Quezon City, reversing the lower courts.

●​ The "in lieu of all taxes" clause does not explicitly exempt ABS-CBN from the local
franchise tax.
●​ The franchise tax was abolished for companies with gross receipts over ₱10 million,
making the clause functus officio (inoperative).
●​ ABS-CBN is subject to VAT, not a franchise tax, and cannot claim an exemption.

Conclusion:

ABS-CBN must pay the local franchise tax, and its claim for a refund was denied. The SC
reaffirmed the rule that tax exemptions must be expressly granted.

Case Digest: Five Star Marketing Co., Inc. vs. Booc (G.R. No. 143331,
October 5, 2007)

Doctrine:

●​ Ejectment cases follow summary procedure, and failure to appear at the preliminary
conference allows the court to decide ex parte.
●​ Due process is not violated when a party fails to participate despite notice.
●​ Possession, not ownership, is the issue in unlawful detainer cases.

Facts:

●​ Five Star Marketing Co., Inc. owned a building where James Booc occupied space
rent-free.
●​ In 1999, Five Star revoked the rent-free privilege and demanded ₱40,000 monthly
rent or vacation of the premises.
 ●​ Booc refused to vacate or pay, prompting Five Star to file an unlawful detainer case
before the MTCC.
●​ Booc failed to appear at the preliminary conference, leading to an ex parte decision
in favor of Five Star.
●​ RTC reversed the MTCC ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Issue:

1.​ Was Booc denied due process when the MTCC ruled ex parte due to his absence?
2.​ Did the RTC err in remanding the case instead of deciding based on the record?

Ruling:

●​ SC ruled in favor of Five Star, reinstating the MTCC decision.

●​ Booc was not denied due process as he was given the opportunity to appear but
failed without justification.
●​ The RTC erred in remanding the case since ejectment cases must be resolved
summarily.
●​ Booc's possession was by tolerance, and Five Star had the right to terminate it.

Conclusion:

The MTCC ruling was reinstated, ordering Booc to vacate and pay rent. The SC emphasized
compliance with summary procedure and the distinction between possession and
ownership in ejectment cases.

Case Digest: Mackay v. Angeles (G.R. No. 144230, September 30, 2003)

Doctrine:

●​ Certiorari under Rule 65 may be treated as an appeal under Rule 45 in exceptional

cases where only questions of law are involved.
●​ A trial court may issue letters of administration pending appeal if justified by
discretionary execution under Rule 39.
●​ Failure to perform administrator duties warrants removal to prevent undue estate
settlement delays.

Facts:

●​ Arturo Mackay was appointed administrator of an estate but failed to submit

inventory and pay taxes for nearly two years.
●​ Antonio Mackay moved for Arturo’s removal due to inaction.
 ●​ Arturo opposed but failed to attend hearings.
●​ Trial court removed Arturo and appointed Antonio as administrator.
●​ Arturo’s appeal was pending, but the trial court still issued letters of administration to
Antonio.
●​ CA upheld the trial court’s ruling, prompting Arturo to file a petition before the SC.

Issue:

1.​ Did the trial court err in issuing letters of administration while appeal was pending?
2.​ Did the CA correctly apply the presumption of regularity in the trial court's decision?
3.​ Did the CA exceed jurisdiction by addressing issues not raised in the certiorari
petition?

Ruling:

●​ SC denied Arturo’s petition and upheld the CA decision.

●​ Trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing letters of
administration, as estate matters should not be unduly delayed.
●​ Discretionary execution under Rule 39 was justified to prevent the estate from
lacking an administrator.
●​ Certiorari under Rule 65 was improper as the case only involved legal questions fit for
an appeal under Rule 45.

Conclusion:

SC affirmed Arturo’s removal and upheld Antonio’s appointment as administrator. The

ruling emphasized proper application of certiorari, discretionary execution, and timely
estate administration.

RULE 47

1. Spouses Flores v. Spouses Estrellado, G.R. No. 251669, December 7, 2021

●​ Facts: Spouses Marcelo and Medelyn Flores obtained loans totaling ₱5,500,000 from
Spouses Leopoldo and Enriqueta Estrellado, secured by a mortgage on their property.
Despite agreements to defer interest payments, the Estrellados demanded payment
before the loans matured, leading to the foreclosure and auction of the mortgaged
property. The Floreses sought legal assistance to annul the foreclosure but later
discovered that their counsel was unauthorized to practice law.
​Jur+2Jur+2eLibrary+2Batas
●​ Issue: Whether the judgment obtained against the Floreses should be annulled due to a
violation of their right to due process, given that their counsel was not authorized to
practice law.​
 ●​ Ruling: The Supreme Court annulled the judgment, holding that representation by an
unauthorized counsel constitutes a violation of due process. The case was remanded for
further proceedings with proper legal representation. ​
●​ Doctrine: Representation by unauthorized counsel violates a party's right to due
process, warranting annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.​Batas

2. Ancheta v. Cambay, G.R. No. 204272, January 18, 2021

Facts:

●​ On June 12, 2003, Vivian Ancheta borrowed ₱25,000 from Mary Cambay, agreeing to a
10% monthly interest. To secure the loan, Vivian mortgaged a property co-owned by her
mother, Marylou R. Ancheta, and her mother's common-law husband, Ricardo
Dionila.​Digest+5Jur+5Scribd+5
●​ Vivian defaulted on the loan, prompting Cambay to file a judicial foreclosure case.​Jur
●​ Marylou claimed she was not properly served with summons and was unaware of the
foreclosure proceedings.​Jur

Issue: Was the service of summons to Marylou Ancheta valid, thereby granting the court
jurisdiction over her?​Digest+1Scribd+1

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the service of summons was invalid. Proper service is
essential for the court to acquire jurisdiction over a defendant. Since Marylou was not properly
notified, the court did not have jurisdiction over her, rendering the foreclosure proceedings void
as to her interest in the property.​

Doctrine: Proper service of summons is fundamental in civil proceedings. Without it, any
judgment or order against a defendant is void due to lack of jurisdiction.​

3. Heirs of Borras v. Heirs of Borras, G.R. No. 213888, April 25, 2022

Doctrine: A Regional Trial Court (RTC) cannot annul a judgment rendered by a court of equal
jurisdiction, such as a Court of First Instance (CFI). The appropriate remedies to challenge such
a judgment are either an action for reconveyance or a petition for annulment of judgment under
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. ​eLibrary

Facts:

●​ Procopio Borras owned Lot No. 5275 in Legazpi City, covered by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. (NA) 2097. Upon his death, his five children inherited the property.​
 ●​ In 1980, Eustaquio Borras, a grandson of Procopio, filed a petition for reconstitution of
the title. The CFI ordered the reconstitution of the OCT in Procopio's name and the
issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 21502 in Eustaquio's name.​Jur
●​ In 2004, the heirs of Procopio discovered the reconstituted title in Eustaquio's name and
filed an action for quieting of title before the RTC of Legazpi City.​Jur
●​ The RTC declared TCT No. 21502 null and void, reinstating OCT No. (NA) 2097 in
Procopio's name.​Jur
●​ On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC's decision, stating that the RTC
lacked jurisdiction to annul a judgment of a co-equal court (the CFI) and that the proper
remedies were an action for reconveyance or a petition for annulment of judgment under
Rule 47.​

Issue: Whether the RTC had jurisdiction to annul the CFI's judgment that led to the issuance of
TCT No. 21502 in Eustaquio's name.​

Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the CA's decision, holding that the RTC lacked jurisdiction
to annul the CFI's judgment. The Court emphasized that the proper remedies were an action for
reconveyance or a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. ​

Spouses Teano vs. Municipality of Navotas (G.R. No. 205814, February 15, 2016)
Doctrine:

●​ A petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 must strictly allege either extrinsic fraud or
lack of jurisdiction. Technical defects in the petition, such as failure to include required documents
or clear grounds, are fatal and justify dismissal.

Facts:

●​ Spouses Teano contested the Municipality of Navotas' real property tax collection, claiming:
1.​ Prescription for taxes from 1990 to 2000.
2.​ Exemption for 2001-2003 due to fire damage.
●​ The RTC ruled that taxes from 1990-2000 had prescribed but upheld the collection for
2001-2005. The public auction of their properties was deemed valid, but excess collections for
1990-2000 were ordered refunded.
●​ The spouses filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA, which dismissed it due to
technical defects (e.g., lack of clear grounds, missing documents).

Issue:

1.​ Whether a petition for annulment of judgment can be filed based on technical defects or must
strictly allege extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction.
2.​ Whether the CA’s dismissal based on procedural defects was proper.

Ruling:
 ●​ The Supreme Court upheld the CA’s dismissal. A petition for annulment of judgment must strictly
comply with Rule 47, requiring clear allegations of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction. The
spouses’ failure to meet these requirements and address procedural defects justified the
dismissal.

Key Points:

●​ Real property taxes are enforceable, but claims of prescription or exemption must be properly
substantiated.
●​ Technical defects in legal petitions, especially under Rule 47, are fatal and can lead to dismissal.
●​ Courts emphasize strict compliance with procedural rules in annulment cases.

3.Aquino vs. Tangkengko (G.R. No. 197356, August 24, 2016)

Doctrine:

●​ In custody cases, the best interest of the child is the paramount consideration. Parental
custody may be denied if the parent is deemed unfit due to abandonment or failure to
fulfill parental responsibilities. Procedural errors, such as failure to comply with rules for
filing petitions, can also bar relief.

Facts:

●​ Emilio Aquino (petitioner) sought custody of his minor son after his wife’s death. The child
was in the custody of his maternal grandmother, Carmelita Tangkengko (respondent).
●​ Aquino claimed he was unlawfully deprived of custody and filed a writ of habeas corpus,
which the RTC dismissed, citing the child’s best interest and Aquino’s alleged
abandonment of his family.
●​ Aquino filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47, but the CA dismissed it
for procedural defects (e.g., failure to allege extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction clearly).

Issue:

1.​ Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment based on
technical grounds.
2.​ Whether the RTC correctly awarded custody to the maternal grandmother instead of the
father.

Ruling:

●​ The Supreme Court upheld the CA’s dismissal. The petition for annulment of judgment
failed to meet the strict requirements of Rule 47, as it did not clearly allege extrinsic fraud
or lack of jurisdiction.
●​ The Court also affirmed the RTC’s decision to award custody to the maternal grandmother,
emphasizing the best interest of the child and Aquino’s failure to prove his fitness as a
parent.

Key Points:
 ●​ Custody disputes prioritize the child’s welfare over parental rights.
●​ Procedural rules, especially in petitions for annulment of judgment, must be strictly
followed.
●​ Allegations of abandonment or unfitness can disqualify a parent from gaining custody.
●​

Frias v. Alcayde, G.R. No. 194262, February 28, 2018

Facts: Bobie Rose D.V. Frias, represented by Marie Regine F. Fujita, leased a property in
Muntinlupa City to Rolando F. Alcayde starting December 5, 2003. By December 2005, Alcayde
had accrued 24 months of unpaid rent. Consequently, Frias filed an unlawful detainer case to
reclaim possession and recover unpaid rents. The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) ruled in favor
of Frias. However, Alcayde contested the decision, claiming improper service of summons. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) annulled the MeTC's judgment due to this procedural issue. Frias
appealed to the Supreme Court.​lawyerly.ph+2Batas+2Chan Robles Virtual Law
Library+2Jur+1Jur+1

Issue: Was the service of summons to Alcayde proper, thereby granting the court jurisdiction
over his person?​studocu.com+1Chan Robles Virtual Law Library+1

Ruling: The Supreme Court reinstated the MeTC's decision, emphasizing that Alcayde had
voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction by actively participating in the proceedings
without promptly objecting to the service of summons.This participation effectively cured any
defect in the service.​Jur+1Jur+1

Doctrine: A defendant's active participation in court proceedings, without timely objection to

jurisdictional defects like improper service of summons, constitutes voluntary submission to the
court's jurisdiction. This principle underscores the importance of promptly raising procedural
issues to avoid waiving one's rights.​

2. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) v. Kepco Ilijan Corporation, G.R. No. 199422,
June 20, 2016

Facts: Kepco Ilijan Corporation, engaged in power generation, filed a claim for a refund of
unutilized input Value-Added Tax (VAT) amounting to ₱449,569,448.73 for the year 2002. The
claim was based on VAT incurred from importations and local purchases related to its zero-rated
sales of electricity to the National Power Corporation. The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) did
not act on the claim, prompting Kepco to elevate the matter to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
The CTA ruled in favor of Kepco, granting the refund. The CIR sought to annul this decision,
arguing procedural lapses and invoking the principle of laches (unreasonable delay).​Batas
Issue: Was Kepco entitled to the VAT refund despite the CIR's claims of procedural deficiencies
and laches?​

Ruling: The Supreme Court upheld the CTA's decision, affirming Kepco's entitlement to the VAT
refund. The Court found that Kepco had complied with the procedural requirements for claiming
the refund and that the CIR's invocation of laches was unfounded.​

Doctrine: Taxpayers are entitled to refunds of unutilized input VAT on zero-rated sales, provided
they comply with procedural requirements. The government's inaction or delay does not negate
the taxpayer's right to such refunds, and claims of laches must be substantiated with evidence
of unreasonable delay causing prejudice.​

3. Baclaran Marketing Corporation v. Nieva, G.R. No. 189881, April 19, 2017

Facts: Baclaran Marketing Corporation (BMC) filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
Nieva, alleging unauthorized occupation of its property. The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
ruled in favor of BMC, ordering Nieva to vacate the premises. Nieva appealed to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), which affirmed the MeTC's decision.Subsequently, Nieva elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the lower courts' decisions, prompting BMC to seek
relief from the Supreme Court.​

Issue: Did the CA err in reversing the decisions of the MeTC and RTC, which favored BMC in
the unlawful detainer case?​

Ruling: The Supreme Court reinstated the MeTC and RTC's decisions, ruling in favor of BMC.
The Court held that BMC had sufficiently established its right to possession of the property and
that Nieva's occupation was without legal basis.​

Doctrine: In unlawful detainer cases, the plaintiff must prove prior physical possession and that
the defendant's possession became illegal upon the plaintiff's demand to vacate. Courts give
significant weight to the factual findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed by appellate
courts, unless there is a clear showing of error or abuse of discretion.​

These cases highlight the judiciary's emphasis on procedural compliance and the protection of
substantive rights within the framework of due process.​

Republic v. G Holdings, G.R. No. 220940, March 20, 2017

Note: The search results do not provide specific details about this case. However, based on the
case number and date, we can infer certain procedural aspects.​
Doctrine: This case likely involves procedural rules related to the annulment of judgments and
the jurisdiction of courts in handling such matters.​Batas+2Jur+2Jur+2

Facts: While specific facts are not available, the case number and date suggest it pertains to a
dispute where the Republic of the Philippines sought to annul a judgment involving G
Holdings.​Scribd

Issue: The central issue probably revolves around whether the annulment of the previous
judgment was procedurally proper and if the court had the jurisdiction to entertain such an
annulment.​

Ruling: In the absence of specific details, it's reasonable to assume that the Supreme Court
addressed the procedural propriety of the annulment and the jurisdictional authority of the court
that issued it.​

2. Charnnel Shane Thomas v. Rachel Trono and the Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No.
241032, March 15, 2021

Doctrine: This case underscores the importance of due process, especially the necessity of
notifying the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in proceedings involving
the nullity of marriages.​

Facts:

●​ Earl Alphonso Thomas (Alphonso), an American citizen, married Rachel Trono (Rachel)
on October 7, 1984.​Batas+2studocu.com+2Jur+2
●​ They had a son, Earl James Thomas, born on August 14, 1985.​Jur
●​ Alphonso filed a petition to declare his marriage to Rachel void due to his prior subsisting
marriage to Nancy Thomas.​Jur+1Batas+1
●​ On August 22, 1997, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City declared the marriage
void ab initio due to bigamy.​legaldex.com+2Jur+2Batas+2
●​ The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was not notified of these proceedings.​
●​ After Alphonso's death in 2011, his daughter from another relationship, Charnnel Shane
Thomas, discovered the 1997 decision and filed a petition to annul it, citing the lack of
OSG notification.​Batas

Issue: Whether the 1997 RTC decision declaring the marriage void ab initio is valid, given the
lack of notification to the OSG.​

Ruling: The Supreme Court granted Charnnel's petition, emphasizing that the State, through
the OSG, must be notified in proceedings involving the nullity of marriages. The lack of such
notification rendered the 1997 decision void. The Court reinstated the RTC's decision declaring
the marriage void ab initio. ​
Alaban v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156021, decided on September 23, 2005, the Supreme
Court addressed issues concerning probate proceedings and the remedies available to parties
contesting a will.​

Facts:

Soledad Provido Elevencionado passed away on October 26, 2000. Subsequently, Francisco H.
Provido filed a petition for the probate of her Last Will and Testament, claiming to be both an
heir and the designated executor. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo approved the probate
and issued letters testamentary to Francisco. Approximately four months later, petitioners, who
were nephews and nieces of the decedent, sought to reopen the probate proceedings. They
challenged the RTC's jurisdiction, alleging issues such as non-payment of correct docket fees,
defective publication, lack of notice to other heirs, forgery of the decedent's signature, improper
execution of the will, lack of testamentary capacity, and coercion. Their motion was denied,
leading them to file a petition for annulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals (CA), which
was also dismissed.
​studocu.com+3Batas+3Jur+3Scribd+5Jur+5Batas+5Batas+2studocu.com+2studocu.com+2Jur+
2studocu.com+2studocu.com+2

Issues:

1.​ Whether the petitioners were considered parties to the probate proceedings through the
publication of notice.​studocu.com+3Batas+3casedigestrequest.wordpress.com+3
2.​ Whether the petitioners employed the appropriate remedies against the RTC’s
decisions.​Batas+1studocu.com+1
3.​ Whether there was extrinsic fraud sufficient to annul the RTC’s judgment.​Batas
4.​ Whether the petitioners were guilty of forum-shopping.​Batas+1Jur+1

Ruling:

1.​ On the Status of Petitioners as Parties: The Court held that probate proceedings are
actions in rem. This means that jurisdiction is established over all interested parties
through proper publication of the petition, regardless of personal notice. Therefore, the
petitioners were deemed parties to the proceedings by virtue of the published notice,
even if they were not personally notified.
​studocu.com+2casedigestrequest.wordpress.com+2studocu.com+2
2.​ On the Appropriateness of Remedies: The Court noted that the petitioners could have
availed themselves of remedies such as a motion for new trial, reconsideration, or a
petition for relief from judgment. However, their motion to reopen the case was filed after
the RTC's decision had become final and executory, rendering it untimely.Consequently,
their subsequent petition for annulment of judgment was also inappropriate, as they had
failed to exhaust available remedies in a timely manner. ​studocu.com+1studocu.com+1
3.​ On Allegations of Extrinsic Fraud: The Court found no evidence of extrinsic fraud. The
petitioners were not prevented from participating in the probate proceedings; rather, they
failed to act within the appropriate timeframes.The lack of personal notice did not
 constitute extrinsic fraud, especially since the petitioners were not compulsory heirs
entitled to such notice under the rules. ​studocu.com+1studocu.com+1
4.​ On Forum-Shopping: The Court did not find sufficient grounds to hold the petitioners
liable for forum-shopping.However, this point became moot given the resolution of the
other issues.​

Doctrine:

In probate proceedings, which are actions in rem, jurisdiction over all interested parties is
acquired through proper publication of the petition. Personal notice to heirs, while a procedural
requirement, is not jurisdictional. Parties contesting a probate decision must utilize appropriate
remedies, such as motions for new trial or reconsideration, within the prescribed periods. Failure
to do so precludes them from later seeking annulment of judgment on grounds like extrinsic
fraud, especially when such fraud is not substantiated. ​

Heirs of Maura So v. Obliosca, G.R. No. 147082, January 28, 2008

Doctrine: This case underscores the principle that a petition for annulment of judgment cannot
be availed of when the petitioner has already filed an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. ​PDF Coffee

Facts: The dispute centers on a parcel of land in Cagayan de Oro City. An extrajudicial
settlement with absolute sale was executed between Maura So and the heirs of Jomoc.
However, Lucila Jomoc contested this transaction, leading to a series of legal battles over the
property's ownership. ​PDF Coffee+1Digest+1

Issue: Whether the petition for annulment of judgment is appropriate given the prior filing of an
appeal under Rule 45.​PDF Coffee+1Lexoterica+1

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the petition for annulment of judgment was not the proper
remedy since the petitioner had already sought relief through an appeal under Rule 45. The
Court emphasized that once an appeal is taken, the remedy of annulment is no longer available. ​

2. Leticia Diona v. Romeo Balangue, G.R. No. 173559, January 7, 2013

Doctrine: An unconscionable interest rate in a loan agreement violates due process and can be
annulled under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. ​Jur

Facts: Respondents obtained a loan of ₱45,000 from petitioner Leticia Diona, secured by a real
estate mortgage. Upon default, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) awarded a 5% monthly interest
rate (equivalent to 60% per annum). Respondents sought annulment of this judgment, arguing
the interest rate was exorbitant and violated their right to due process. ​Chan Robles Virtual Law
Library+4studocu.com+4Jur+4

Issue: Whether the 5% monthly interest rate is unconscionable and violates due process,
warranting annulment of the RTC's judgment.​

Ruling: The Supreme Court found the 5% monthly interest rate to be unconscionable and in
violation of due process. It upheld the annulment of the RTC's judgment under Rule 47,
emphasizing that such exorbitant interest rates are contrary to public policy. ​

3. Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals

Doctrine: The case highlights the importance of adhering to procedural rules in administrative
proceedings and the necessity of exhausting administrative remedies before seeking judicial
intervention.​

Facts: The Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines (IDCP) filed a petition questioning the
actions of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) regarding the halal certification process. The
IDCP alleged that the OSG overstepped its authority, leading to a legal dispute over
administrative procedures and the exhaustion of remedies.​

Issue: Whether the IDCP failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial
intervention.​

Ruling: The Court held that the IDCP did not exhaust all available administrative remedies
before filing the petition. It emphasized the necessity of following procedural rules in
administrative proceedings and dismissed the petition on these grounds.​

These cases collectively emphasize the significance of adhering to procedural rules, the proper
avenues for legal remedies, and the courts' stance against unjust or unconscionable contractual
terms.

Spouses Sanchez v. Vda. de Aguilar, G.R. No. 228680, September 17, 2018

Doctrine: This case emphasizes the principle that judgments rendered by courts with proper
jurisdiction cannot be annulled on the basis of intrinsic fraud or erroneous conclusions.
Additionally, it highlights that actions for annulment of judgment must be filed within a
reasonable time to avoid being barred by laches.​

Facts: On July 11, 2000, Spouses Francisco and Delma Sanchez purchased a
600-square-meter portion of Lot No. 71 in Lake Sebu, South Cotabato, from Juanito Aguilar. In
2004, the heirs of Aguilar fenced off an adjacent area, which the Spouses Sanchez claimed as
part of their property due to alluvium (the gradual accumulation of land). This led to a dispute
over the rightful ownership and possession of the contested
area.​studocu.com+5Batas+5eLibrary+5

The heirs of Aguilar filed a forcible entry case against the Spouses Sanchez before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Lake Sebu. The MCTC ruled in favor of the heirs,
declaring them to have prior possession of the disputed area and rejecting the claim of alluvium
by the Spouses Sanchez. This decision became final and executory.​eLibrary+5Jur+5Batas+5

Subsequently, the Spouses Sanchez filed a complaint for annulment of the MCTC's judgment
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), alleging that the MCTC lacked jurisdiction over the
subject matter and that the decision was obtained through fraud.​

Issue: Whether the RTC had the authority to annul the MCTC's judgment on the grounds of lack
of jurisdiction and fraud.​

Ruling: The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts, affirming that:​

1.​ Jurisdiction: The MCTC had proper jurisdiction over the forcible entry case, as it is
vested with exclusive original jurisdiction over ejectment cases, including forcible entry
and unlawful detainer.​Jur
2.​ Annulment of Judgment: The grounds for annulment of judgment are limited to lack of
jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud. In this case, the allegations pertained to intrinsic fraud
(fraudulent acts that could have been litigated in the original case), which is not a valid
ground for annulment.​
3.​ Laches: The action for annulment was filed four years after the MCTC's decision
became final. The Court held that this delay constituted laches, barring the Spouses
Sanchez from seeking annulment.​

Therefore, the MCTC's judgment remained valid and binding, and the complaint for annulment
was dismissed.​

2. Springfield Development Corporation, Inc. v. Presiding Judge, RTC of Misamis

Oriental, G.R. No. 142628, February 6, 2007

Doctrine: This case clarifies that Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) do not have the authority to
annul final judgments of quasi-judicial bodies like the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB). The proper remedy to challenge such decisions is through a
petition for annulment of judgment filed with the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court.​Batas+3LawPhil+3Jur+3

Facts: Springfield Development Corporation, Inc. and the heirs of Petra Capistrano Piit were
involved in a land dispute adjudicated by the DARAB, which rendered a decision unfavorable to
them. Alleging lack of due process, they sought to annul the DARAB's decision by filing a
complaint before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. The RTC dismissed the complaint, stating it
lacked jurisdiction to annul a final judgment of the DARAB. This dismissal was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.​LawPhil+2Jur+2lex-estudyante.blogspot.com+2

Issue: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to annul a final judgment rendered by the DARAB.​

Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' rulings, stating that:​

1.​ Jurisdiction over Annulment: The authority to annul final judgments or orders of
quasi-judicial agencies like the DARAB lies exclusively with the Court of Appeals, as
provided under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.​
2.​ Proper Remedy: Parties aggrieved by decisions of quasi-judicial bodies should file a
petition for annulment of judgment directly with the Court of Appeals, not with the RTC.​

Therefore, the RTC correctly dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.​

Conclusion: Both cases underscore the importance of adhering to procedural rules and the
proper hierarchy of courts in the Philippine judicial system. In Spouses Sanchez v. Vda. de
Aguilar, the emphasis was on the finality of judgments rendered by courts with proper
jurisdiction and the timeliness of actions seeking annulment. In Springfield Development
Corporation, Inc. v. Presiding Judge, RTC of Misamis Oriental, the focus was on the appropriate
venue and procedure for challenging decisions of quasi-judicial bodies, highlighting the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in such matters.​

Rule 57: Preliminary Attachment

Overview: Preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy that aims to secure the outcome of a
favorable judgment by placing the defendant's property under the court's custody. This ensures
that the plaintiff can recover the amount claimed or the value of the property in dispute if they
win the case.​LawPhil+3respicio.ph+3youtube.com+3

Grounds for Issuance: Under Section 1 of Rule 57, a writ of preliminary attachment may be
issued in the following instances:​respicio.ph+1LawPhil+1

1.​ In actions for the recovery of a specified amount of money or damages, other than
moral and exemplary, on a cause of action arising from law, contract,
quasi-contract, delict, or quasi-delict against a party who is about to depart from
the Philippines with intent to defraud creditors;​
2.​ In actions for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or
converted to his own use by a public officer, or an officer of a corporation, or an
attorney, factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his employment as such,
or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;​
3.​ In actions to recover the possession of property unjustly or fraudulently taken,
detained, or converted, when the property, or any part thereof, has been
 concealed, removed, or disposed of to prevent its being found or taken by the
applicant or an authorized person;​
4.​ In actions against a party who has been guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or
incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the performance
thereof;​
5.​ In actions against a party who has removed or disposed of his property, or is
about to do so, with intent to defraud creditors;​
6.​ In actions against a party who does not reside and is not found in the Philippines,
or on whom summons may be served by publication.​

It's important to note that the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment is a harsh remedy, and
courts require strict compliance with the rules to prevent
abuse.​respicio.ph+2respicio.ph+2LawPhil+2

Case Analyses:

1. Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108538, January 22, 1996

Facts: Lourdes A. Valmonte, residing in the United States, was sued in the Philippines for
partition of property. The summons was served on her husband in the Philippines. Lourdes
contested the jurisdiction of the court over her person due to improper service of
summons.​LawPhil+1Batas+1

Issue: Whether the service of summons on Lourdes' husband in the Philippines was valid to
confer jurisdiction over her, a non-resident defendant.​Batas

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that there was no valid service of summons on Lourdes. For
non-resident defendants, extraterritorial service under Section 17 of Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court is required. Since this procedure was not followed, the court did not acquire jurisdiction
over Lourdes.​

Relevance to Rule 57: This case underscores the importance of proper service of summons,
especially when seeking remedies like preliminary attachment against non-resident defendants.
Without valid service, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction to grant such remedies.​

2. Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93262, November 29, 1991

Facts: Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. (DLPC) filed a complaint against Spouses Court and
others for collection of a sum of money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment. The trial court issued the writ ex parte before acquiring jurisdiction over the persons
of the defendants.​

Issue: Whether a writ of preliminary attachment can be validly issued ex parte before the court
acquires jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants.​
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that a writ of preliminary attachment may be issued ex parte
even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The writ is intended
to seize the property of the defendant in anticipation of a favorable judgment for the plaintiff.
However, for the court to act on any motion related to the attachment, it must first acquire
jurisdiction over the defendant's person.​

Relevance to Rule 57: This case illustrates that while a writ of preliminary attachment can be
issued ex parte, the court must still acquire jurisdiction over the defendant's person to proceed
with the main case or any related motions.​

3. Bigtas v. Sterling Bank of Asia, G.R. No. 230804, March 24, 2021

Facts: Sterling Bank of Asia filed a complaint for sum of money against Bigtas, alleging that he
issued unfunded checks.The bank applied for a writ of preliminary attachment, claiming that
Bigtas was guilty of fraud in contracting the debt.The trial court granted the writ. Bigtas
contested the attachment, arguing that the bank failed to establish factual circumstances
constituting fraud.​

Issue: Whether the writ of preliminary attachment was validly issued based on the allegation of
fraud.​

Ruling: The Supreme Court found that the bank's allegations were insufficient to establish fraud
as a ground for preliminary attachment. Mere issuance of unfunded checks does not
automatically amount to fraud. There must be clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
had an intention to defraud at the time of contracting the obligation.Consequently, the writ of
preliminary attachment was lifted.​

Relevance to Rule 57: This case emphasizes that allegations of fraud must be substantiated
with specific factual circumstances to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
General allegations are insufficient.​

Conclusion: Rule 57 provides a mechanism for plaintiffs to secure their claims through
preliminary attachment. However, courts exercise caution in granting

Security Bank Corporation v. Great Wall Commercial Press Company, Inc., G.R. No.
219345, January 30, 2017

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Security Bank Corporation (Petitioner) and Great Wall Commercial
Press Company, Inc., along with its sureties Alfredo Buriel Atienza, Fredino Cheng
 Atienza, and Spouses Frederick Cheng Atienza and Monica Cu Atienza
(Respondents).​StudyLib
●​ Background: Security Bank extended a credit facility to Great Wall, secured by several
trust receipts and surety agreements. Great Wall defaulted on its obligations under these
trust receipts.​legresslounge.blogspot.com+1scribd.com+1
●​ Legal Action: On May 15, 2013, Security Bank filed a complaint for a sum of money
with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the
respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. The bank sought to
recover the unpaid obligations arising from the trust receipts and surety
agreements.​legresslounge.blogspot.com+1StudyLib+1

Issue:

Whether the writ of preliminary attachment was properly issued against the respondents based
on the allegations of fraud in the non-compliance with the trust receipts.​pdfcoffee.com

Ruling:

●​ RTC Decision: The RTC granted the writ of preliminary attachment in favor of Security
Bank, finding that the respondents' failure to comply with the terms of the trust receipts
constituted fraud.​
●​ Court of Appeals (CA) Decision: The CA reversed the RTC's decision, lifting the writ of
preliminary attachment. The CA held that the allegations of Security Bank were
insufficient to warrant the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment. l​awphil.net
●​ Supreme Court Decision: The Supreme Court upheld the CA's decision, emphasizing
that for a writ of preliminary attachment to be issued on the ground of fraud, the fraud
must be extrinsic or actual, not merely implied. The Court found that Security Bank failed
to provide sufficient evidence of actual fraud committed by the respondents in
contracting the debt or incurring the obligation. Therefore, the issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment was deemed improper.​

Doctrine:

The case underscores that the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment requires clear and
convincing evidence of actual fraud. Mere non-compliance with contractual obligations, such as
trust receipts, does not automatically amount to fraud sufficient to justify the issuance of such a
writ. The fraud must be extrinsic, involving deceit or trickery that induced the other party to enter
into the contract.​

2. Watercraft Venture Corporation v. Alfred Raymond Wolfe, G.R. No. 181721, September
9, 2015

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Watercraft Venture Corporation (Petitioner) and Alfred Raymond

Wolfe (Respondent).​scribd.com+4Digest+4Digest+4
 ●​ Background: Wolfe stored his sailboat, "Knotty Gull," at Watercraft's storage facilities
but failed to pay the storage fees. Consequently, Watercraft filed a complaint for a sum of
money with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment against Wolfe.​Course
Hero
●​ Legal Action: Watercraft alleged that Wolfe was about to depart from the Philippines
with intent to defraud creditors, justifying the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
The RTC issued the writ, leading to the attachment of Wolfe's properties, including a
Dodge pick-up truck. Wolfe contested the writ, arguing that Watercraft failed to show
evidence of fraud or intent to defraud creditors.​

Issue:

Whether the writ of preliminary attachment was validly issued based on the allegations that
Wolfe intended to defraud his creditors by leaving the country.​

Ruling:

●​ RTC Decision: The RTC denied Wolfe's motion to discharge the writ of attachment,
maintaining that the writ was properly issued.​Chan Robles Virtual Law Library+1Course
Hero+1
●​ Court of Appeals (CA) Decision: The CA reversed the RTC's decision, annulling the
writ of preliminary attachment. The CA found that Watercraft failed to particularly state in
its affidavit of merit the circumstances constituting intent to defraud creditors on the part
of Wolfe. ​Course Hero
●​ Supreme Court Decision: The Supreme Court affirmed the CA's decision, emphasizing
that for a writ of preliminary attachment to be validly issued, there must be a clear factual
basis demonstrating the defendant's intent to defraud creditors. Mere allegations without
concrete evidence are insufficient. In this case, Watercraft did not provide specific facts
showing Wolfe's intent to defraud, rendering the issuance of the writ improper.​

Doctrine:

This case highlights that the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment requires a clear factual
basis indicating the defendant's intent to defraud creditors. General allegations or assumptions
are inadequate; the plaintiff must present specific and concrete evidence demonstrating such
intent. Courts exercise caution in granting this provisional remedy to prevent potential abuse
and ensure that it is not unjustly applied against defendants without manifest grounds.​Batas

Conclusion:

Both cases emphasize the judiciary's careful scrutiny in granting writs of preliminary attachment.
The courts require plaintiffs to provide clear, specific, and convincing evidence of the
defendant's fraudulent intent or actions before issuing such writs. This approach ensures that
the provisional remedy of attachment is not misused and that defendants' rights are protected
against unwarranted claims.​
Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Villarin, G.R. Nos. 175727 & 178713, March 6, 2019

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Lorenzo Shipping Corporation (LSC) as the petitioner, and Florencio
O. Villarin, First Cargomasters Corporation, Cebu Arrastre & Stevedoring Services
Corporation, and Guerrero G. Dajao as respondents.​pdfcoffee.com+3Chan Robles
Virtual Law Library+3Course Hero+3
●​ Background: Villarin entered into a cargo handling contract with First Cargomasters
Corporation (FCC) and Cebu Arrastre & Stevedoring Services Corporation (CASSCOR)
for stevedoring and arrastre services. Villarin claimed that FCC and CASSCOR failed to
remit his rightful share from the earnings of the cargo handling operations.
Consequently, Villarin sought legal action to recover his alleged share.​
●​ Legal Proceedings: Villarin filed a complaint against FCC, CASSCOR, and Dajao for
the recovery of his share. He also included LSC as a nominal defendant, alleging that
LSC had knowledge of the cargo handling operations and the earnings derived
therefrom.​Digest+1scribd.com+1

Issue:

Whether LSC, as a nominal defendant, could be held liable for the alleged unpaid shares from
the cargo handling contract between Villarin and the other respondents.​

Ruling:

●​ Regional Trial Court (RTC): The RTC issued writs of attachment against the properties
of FCC, CASSCOR, Dajao, and LSC.​
●​ Court of Appeals (CA): The CA affirmed the RTC's decision, maintaining the writs of
attachment and the order for LSC to deposit certain amounts.​
●​ Supreme Court: The Supreme Court reversed the CA's decision concerning LSC. The
Court held that LSC, being merely a nominal defendant without any contractual
relationship with Villarin, should not be held liable for the obligations of FCC and
CASSCOR. The Court emphasized that the absence of a direct contractual tie between
Villarin and LSC negated any liability on the part of LSC.​

Doctrine:

A party that is merely a nominal defendant and lacks a direct contractual relationship with the
complainant cannot be held liable for the obligations arising from contracts to which it is not a
party. The liability for contractual obligations rests solely with the parties who have entered into
the contract.​
2. Revilla v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 218232, July 24, 2018

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Ramon "Bong" B. Revilla, Jr. (petitioner), the Sandiganbayan (First
Division), and the People of the Philippines
(respondents).​jur.ph+6legaldex.com+6lawphil.net+6
●​ Background: In 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Revilla, his former chief of
staff Richard A. Cambe, and businesswoman Janet Lim Napoles with plunder under
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080. The charges alleged that Revilla misused his Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) by diverting it to bogus non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) linked to Napoles, resulting in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth
amounting to at least ₱224 million.​jur.ph+5Batas+5elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph+5
●​ Legal Proceedings: Revilla filed a petition for bail, asserting that the evidence against
him was not strong. The Sandiganbayan denied his petition, leading Revilla to elevate
the matter to the Supreme Court.​

Issue:

Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Revilla's petition
for bail by determining that the evidence of guilt was strong.​

Ruling:

●​ Sandiganbayan: The anti-graft court denied Revilla's petition for bail, finding that the
evidence of guilt was strong.​
●​ Supreme Court: The Supreme Court dismissed Revilla's petition, upholding the
Sandiganbayan's decision. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Sandiganbayan in denying bail, as the evidence presented by the prosecution was
sufficient to establish a strong presumption of guilt for the crime of plunder.​

Doctrine:

In capital offenses or offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, the grant of bail is not a matter
of right but of judicial discretion. Bail may be denied when the evidence of guilt is strong. The
determination of whether the evidence is strong lies within the discretion of the trial court, and
such determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a clear showing of grave
abuse of discretion.​

Conclusion:

These cases highlight the importance of establishing direct contractual relationships to

determine liability and the stringent standards applied by courts in granting bail for capital
offenses. In contractual disputes, only parties to the contract are held liable for obligations
arising therefrom. In criminal proceedings involving capital offenses, bail is discretionary and
may be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong, with appellate courts deferring to the trial court's
discretion absent grave abuse.​

Yu v. Miranda, G.R. No. 225752, March 27, 2019

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Severino A. Yu, Ramon A. Yu, and Lorenzo A. Yu (petitioners) vs.
David Miranda and Morning Star Homes Christian Association, Inc.
(respondents).​scribd.com+2lawphil.net+2lawyerly.ph+2
●​ Background: David Miranda filed a complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Morning Star Homes Christian
Association, Inc. (Morning Star) due to unpaid construction materials. The court granted
the writ, leading to the attachment of a parcel of land registered under Morning Star.​
●​ Intervention Attempt: The Yu brothers claimed ownership of the attached property,
asserting that they had purchased it from Morning Star before the attachment. They filed
a motion to intervene in the case to protect their alleged ownership rights.​

Issue:

Whether the Yu brothers could intervene in the case after a final judgment had been
rendered.​jur.ph+3attyrobertdivinagracia.blog+3pdfcoffee.com+3

Ruling:

●​ Lower Courts: Both the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA)
denied the Yu brothers' motion to intervene, stating that intervention is not allowed after
a final judgment.​
●​ Supreme Court: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. The
Court emphasized that intervention is a remedy available only before or during a trial.
Once a final judgment has been rendered, the case is considered terminated, and
intervention is no longer permissible. The Court noted that the Yu brothers could pursue
a separate action to vindicate their claimed ownership rights.​

Doctrine:

Intervention cannot be allowed in a case that has already been terminated by a final judgment.
Parties claiming an interest in the subject matter of a concluded case must seek relief through
separate legal actions rather than attempting to intervene
post-judgment.​attyrobertdivinagracia.blog+1pdfcoffee.com+1

2. Tan v. Adre, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1898, January 31, 2005

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Charlton Tan (complainant) vs. Judge Abednego O. Adre of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88
(respondent).​lawphil.net+3jur.ph+3legaldex.com+3
●​ Background: A habeas corpus petition was filed by Rosana Reyes-Tan, the estranged
wife of Charlton Tan, seeking custody of their minor daughter, Charlene Reyes Tan.
Judge Adre issued a writ of habeas corpus, ordering Charlton to present their daughter
in court. Subsequently, Judge Adre granted provisional custody of the child to Rosana.
Charlton filed a motion for reconsideration, which was not immediately resolved, leading
him to file an administrative complaint against Judge Adre, alleging grave abuse of
authority and gross ignorance of the law.​jur.ph

Issue:

Whether Judge Adre committed grave abuse of authority and demonstrated gross ignorance of
the law in handling the habeas corpus petition and the subsequent custody order.​

Ruling:

●​ Supreme Court: The Court found that Judge Adre acted within his jurisdiction and in
accordance with the law. The issuance of the writ of habeas corpus and the grant of
provisional custody to the mother were appropriate actions to protect the welfare of the
minor child. The Court noted that while there was a delay in resolving the motion for
reconsideration, it did not amount to grave abuse of authority or gross ignorance of the
law. Consequently, the administrative complaint against Judge Adre was dismissed.​

Doctrine:

Judges are granted discretion in matters concerning the welfare of minor children, especially in
habeas corpus petitions involving custody disputes. Actions taken to protect the best interests of
the child, such as issuing writs and granting provisional custody, are within the judge's authority
and do not constitute grave abuse of authority or gross ignorance of the law.​

Conclusion:

These cases underscore important procedural principles in Philippine jurisprudence. In Yu v.

Miranda, the Court reinforced that intervention is not permissible after a case has been
concluded by a final judgment, directing parties to seek separate legal remedies for their claims.
In Tan v. Adre, the Court highlighted the discretionary power of judges in matters involving the
welfare of minor children, affirming that appropriate judicial actions in such cases do not equate
to administrative misconduct.​
Ching v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124642, decided on February 23, 2004, by summarizing
its doctrine, facts, issues, and ruling in a detailed yet understandable manner.​

Doctrine:

In the context of conjugal partnerships, obligations arising from contracts of suretyship or

guaranty entered into by one spouse do not bind the conjugal property unless it is proven that
the obligation redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The presumption is that
properties acquired during the marriage are conjugal, and the burden of proof lies on the party
asserting otherwise.​

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Alfredo Ching and his wife, Encarnacion Ching (petitioners), versus
the Court of Appeals and Allied Banking Corporation
(respondents).​jur.ph+3Batas+3lawphil.net+3
●​ Background: The Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained loans
from Allied Banking Corporation (ABC) totaling ₱22,000,000.00. To secure these loans,
Alfredo Ching, an executive of PBMCI, along with others, executed a continuing
guaranty in favor of ABC, binding themselves to jointly and severally guarantee the
payment of PBMCI's obligations.​scribd.com+4studocu.com+4LexPhil+4
●​ Default and Legal Action: PBMCI defaulted on its loan payments, prompting ABC to
file a complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment
against PBMCI and its guarantors, including Alfredo Ching. The trial court issued the
writ, leading to the attachment of 100,000 shares of Citycorp Investment Philippines, Inc.
(Citycorp) stock registered in Alfredo Ching's name.​Batas+3jur.ph+3studocu.com+3
●​ Motion to Quash Attachment: Encarnacion Ching filed a motion to set aside the levy
on attachment, asserting that the 100,000 shares were acquired during their marriage
using conjugal funds and thus constituted conjugal property. She argued that since the
obligation arising from the guaranty did not benefit the conjugal partnership, the attached
shares should not be held liable for Alfredo's personal obligation.​studocu.com+1jur.ph+1

Issues:

1.​ Whether Encarnacion Ching had the legal standing to file the motion to quash the
levy on attachment.​Batas
2.​ Whether the 100,000 shares of Citycorp stock were conjugal property and, if so,
whether they could be held liable for Alfredo Ching's obligation under the
continuing guaranty.​

Ruling:

●​ Standing to File Motion: The Supreme Court held that Encarnacion Ching had the legal
standing to file the motion to quash the levy. As a spouse asserting a claim over the
property alleged to be conjugal, she had the right to protect the conjugal assets from
being used to satisfy obligations that did not benefit the conjugal partnership.​
 ●​ Nature of the Property: The Court applied the presumption under Article 160 of the
Civil Code that properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to be conjugal
unless proven otherwise. Since the 100,000 shares were acquired during the marriage
and registered in Alfredo Ching's name, they were presumed to be conjugal
property.​jur.ph
●​ Liability of Conjugal Property: The Court found that the obligation arising from Alfredo
Ching's execution of the continuing guaranty did not benefit the conjugal partnership.
The guaranty was executed to secure PBMCI's loans, and there was no evidence that
the conjugal partnership received any direct advantage or benefit from this transaction.
Consequently, the conjugal property could not be held liable for Alfredo's personal
obligation under the guaranty.​

In conclusion, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated
the trial court's order lifting the levy on the 100,000 shares of Citycorp stock, thereby protecting
the conjugal property from liability for an obligation that did not benefit the conjugal partnership.​

Sources

Rule 58 Garcia v Honorable Clerk of Court, GR No. 248542, January 2, 2020 Australian
Professional Realty v Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas, GR No. 183367, March 14, 2012

1. Garcia v. Honorable Clerk of Court, G.R. No. 248542, January 2, 2020

Doctrine:

A party aggrieved by a writ of execution issued by a Regional Trial Court (RTC) must challenge
it through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals (CA)
lacks jurisdiction to entertain a petition for injunction against such a writ if the proper remedy is
not observed.​legaldex.com+1legaldex.com+1

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Atty. Dupil F. Garcia (petitioner) vs. Honorable Clerk of Court and
Ex-Officio Sheriff of Pasig City, and others
(respondents).​legaldex.com+2Digest+2legaldex.com+2
●​ Background: Atty. Garcia filed a petition against the respondents concerning the
issuance of a writ of execution by the RTC. Believing the writ to be improper, he sought
injunctive relief directly from the CA.​legaldex.com+1legaldex.com+1
Issue:

Whether the CA had jurisdiction to entertain a petition for injunction against a writ of execution
issued by the RTC without the petitioner first availing of the proper remedy under Rule
65.​legaldex.com

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that the CA's jurisdiction to grant a writ of preliminary injunction is
confined to actions or proceedings pending before it, as stipulated in Section 2 of Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court. If a party believes that the RTC abused its discretion in issuing a writ of
execution, the appropriate remedy is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.Since Atty.
Garcia did not follow this procedure and instead sought injunctive relief directly from the CA, the
CA correctly dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. ​legaldex.com+1legaldex.com+1

2. Australian Professional Realty, Inc. v. Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas, G.R. No.
183367, March 14, 2012

Doctrine:

A writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order (TRO) are injunctive reliefs and
preservative remedies designed to protect substantive rights and interests. An application for
such writs may be granted upon the filing of a verified application demonstrating facts that
entitle the applicant to the relief demanded.​lawreviewnotes.wordpress.com

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Australian Professional Realty, Inc. (APRI), Jesus Garcia, and Lydia
Marciano (petitioners) vs. Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas Province
(respondent).​scribd.com+2jur.ph+2scribd.com+2
●​ Background: In 1993, a fire destroyed the old public market of the Municipality of Padre
Garcia. The municipal government invited APRI to rebuild the public market and
construct a shopping center. On January 19, 1995, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
was executed between APRI and the Municipality, represented by then-Mayor Eugenio
Gutierrez and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan. Subsequently, disputes arose
regarding the implementation of the MOA, leading APRI to seek injunctive relief to
prevent the Municipality from actions that APRI claimed were prejudicial to its
interests.​jur.ph+1lawyerly.ph+1

Issue:

Whether APRI was entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction or TRO against the Municipality to
protect its rights under the MOA.​

Ruling:
The Supreme Court emphasized that injunctive reliefs like a writ of preliminary injunction and a
TRO are preservative remedies intended to protect substantive rights. To obtain such relief, the
applicant must file a verified application showing facts entitling them to the relief demanded. In
this case, the Court found that APRI failed to demonstrate a clear legal right that needed
protection through injunctive relief. Consequently, the Court denied APRI's petition, upholding
the lower courts' decisions. ​

Conclusion:

These cases highlight the importance of adhering to proper procedural remedies and the
stringent requirements for obtaining injunctive relief. In Garcia v. Honorable Clerk of Court, the
petitioner’s failure to utilize the correct procedural remedy led to the dismissal of his petition. In
Australian Professional Realty, Inc. v. Municipality of Padre Garcia, the petitioner's inability to
demonstrate a clear legal right precluded the granting of injunctive relief.​

Spouses Tumon v. Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc., G.R. No. 243999, decided on March
18, 2021, and then discuss scenarios where the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) or Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) is prohibited under Philippine law.​

Spouses Tumon v. Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc.

Doctrine:

This case emphasizes the importance of adhering to procedural rules in civil litigation,
particularly concerning the proper service of summons. It underscores that failure to comply with
these procedural requirements can lead to the dismissal of a case, regardless of its substantive
merits.​

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Spouses Tumon (petitioners) and Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc.
(respondent).​
●​ Background: The petitioners obtained a loan from the respondent, secured by a chattel
mortgage on their vehicle. Upon default, the respondent initiated a replevin suit to
recover the vehicle. The petitioners contested the suit, arguing improper service of
summons.​

Issue:

Whether the service of summons was properly effected, thereby granting the court jurisdiction
over the person of the defendants (petitioners).​
Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the service of summons was improper, as it did not comply with
the rules on substituted service. Consequently, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
persons of the petitioners, leading to the dismissal of the case. This decision highlights the
necessity of strict adherence to procedural rules to ensure due process.​

Cases When TRO/WPI Is Prohibited

Under Philippine law, there are specific instances where courts are prohibited from issuing a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI). These prohibitions
are designed to prevent undue interference with certain governmental functions and processes.
Notable examples include:​

1.​ Infrastructure and Natural Resource Development Projects:​

Republic Act No. 8975 prohibits courts, except the Supreme Court, from issuing TROs or
WPIs against government infrastructure projects, including those related to natural
resource development. This ensures that such projects are not hampered by legal
injunctions, facilitating continuous development activities.
2.​ Acts of the Philippine Competition Commission (PCC):​
Under Section 47 of Republic Act No. 10667, known as the Philippine Competition Act,
only the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court may issue a TRO, WPI, or Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction against the PCC in the exercise of its duties and functions. This
provision safeguards the PCC's mandate to promote fair market competition without
undue judicial interference.
3.​ Collection of Taxes:​
The National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, restricts courts from issuing
injunctions to restrain the collection of national internal revenue taxes. This limitation
ensures the uninterrupted collection of taxes, which are vital for government operations.
4.​ Labor Disputes Involving Strikes and Lockouts:​
Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, no TRO or injunction can be issued
by any court or entity against any duly registered labor organization or legitimate labor
activity, except when necessary to prevent grave abuse of discretion or when the public
necessity so requires. This provision protects the rights of labor organizations to engage
in lawful activities without undue judicial restraint.

These prohibitions reflect the legislature's intent to balance the judiciary's power to issue
injunctive relief with the need to prevent disruptions in essential governmental functions and
services.​

Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) v. TMA Group of Companies PTY, LTD,
G.R. Nos. 212143, 225457, 236888, August 28, 2019

Doctrine:
Government entities must adhere strictly to their statutory mandates and procurement laws.
Contracts executed beyond their legal authority or without following mandated procedures, such
as public bidding, are considered void ab initio.

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and TMA Group
of Companies PTY, LTD (now known as TMA Australia PTY, LTD) along with TMA Group
Philippines, Inc.
●​ Background: On December 4, 2009, PCSO and TMA Australia entered into a
Contractual Joint Venture Agreement (CJVA) to establish the first thermal coating plant
in the Philippines. This plant was intended to supply thermal paper for PCSO's lottery
operations, aiming to reduce costs and ensure a steady supply.

Issue:

Whether the CJVA between PCSO and TMA was valid and enforceable, considering PCSO's
statutory mandate and the procurement laws in place.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court declared the CJVA void ab initio, stating that it exceeded PCSO's statutory
authority and circumvented mandatory public bidding requirements. The Court emphasized that
government contracts must comply with procurement laws to ensure transparency,
competitiveness, and accountability. Consequently, any obligations arising from such a void
contract were unenforceable.

Source:

E-Library

2. Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) v. City Advertising Ventures Corp.,
G.R. No. 182944, November 9, 2016

Doctrine:

Government agencies must observe due process when exercising police power that affects
private property rights. The dismantling of structures deemed hazardous requires proper notice
and hearing to prevent arbitrary deprivation of property.

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and City
Advertising Ventures Corporation (CAVC).
●​ Background: CAVC, engaged in the advertising business, entered into a lease
agreement with MERALCO Financing Services Corporation in 2005 to use 5,000
 MERALCO lampposts for advertising banners. CAVC secured permits from local
government units, including Quezon City, for these installations. Following Typhoon
Milenyo in 2006, which caused significant damage due to fallen billboards, the
government heightened regulations on outdoor advertising structures. DPWH, invoking
police power and public safety concerns, dismantled CAVC's banners and fixtures
without prior notice, claiming they were hazardous.

Issue:

Whether DPWH's summary dismantling of CAVC's advertising structures without prior notice
and hearing violated CAVC's right to due process.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of CAVC, stating that while the government has the authority
to ensure public safety, it must exercise this power within the bounds of due process. The
DPWH's actions of dismantling the advertising structures without prior notice and hearing were
deemed a violation of CAVC's property rights. The Court emphasized that even under the guise
of police power, procedural due process cannot be disregarded.

Source:

ChanRobles Law Library

These cases underscore the judiciary's role in balancing governmental authority and private
rights, ensuring that state actions, even when rooted in public interest, do not trample upon
individual liberties without due process.

Municipality of Famy, Laguna v. Municipality of Siniloan, Laguna, G.R. No. 203806,

February 10, 2020

Doctrine:

In boundary disputes between local government units, historical legislative actions and official
records are pivotal in determining jurisdiction over contested areas.

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Municipality of Famy and Municipality of Siniloan, both in Laguna,

Philippines.
●​ Background: A century-old boundary dispute existed between Famy and Siniloan
concerning two barangays, Kapatalan and Liyang. The conflict originated from historical
legislative actions, including the incorporation of Famy into Siniloan in 1903 and its
 subsequent separation in 1909. Both municipalities claimed jurisdiction over the disputed
barangays, leading to conflicting administrative actions and legal proceedings.

Issue:

Whether the writ of preliminary injunction favoring Siniloan was proper, thereby preserving its
jurisdiction over the disputed barangays pending final resolution.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court upheld the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Siniloan, maintaining the
status quo and preserving its jurisdiction over the barangays Kapatalan and Liyang until a final
determination of the boundary dispute.

Source:

Lawphil

2. Novecio v. Lim, G.R. No. 193809, March 23, 2015

Doctrine:

In applications for a writ of preliminary injunction, the applicant is not required to present
conclusive evidence. It suffices to show an ostensible right to the final relief sought, and that
irreparable injury would result without the injunction.

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Petitioners Saturnino Novecio, Gavino Novecio, Anastacio Golez,

Abundio Sombilon, Berting Rodriguez, Meliton Catalan, and respondents Maria Carmen
J. Tuazon and Manuel V. Nieto, represented by attorney-in-fact Lope Durotan.
●​ Background: Respondents filed complaints for forcible entry with damages against
petitioners, alleging unlawful occupation of an eight-hectare land on February 15, 2004.
Petitioners contested, asserting prior possession and seeking a writ of preliminary
injunction to maintain the status quo pending litigation. The lower courts denied the
injunction, prompting the petitioners to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether the denial of the writ of preliminary injunction by the lower courts was proper,
considering the petitioners' claim of prior possession.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying the writ of preliminary injunction. The Court emphasized that in such applications, the
applicant need not present conclusive evidence but must demonstrate an ostensible right to the
relief sought and potential irreparable injury without the injunction. The petitioners had
sufficiently shown their entitlement to the writ to preserve their possession of the disputed land
during the pendency of the case.

Source:

Lawphil

3. Liberty Broadcasting Network Inc. v. Atlocom Wireless System, Inc., G.R. Nos. 205875
and 208916, June 30, 2015

Doctrine:

In cases involving contractual disputes over telecommunications services, the interpretation of

contract terms and adherence to regulatory standards are crucial in determining the rights and
obligations of the parties.

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Liberty Broadcasting Network Inc. (LBNI) and Atlocom Wireless
System, Inc. (AWSI).
●​ Background: LBNI and AWSI entered into agreements concerning the provision of
telecommunications services. Disagreements arose regarding the interpretation of
certain contract terms and compliance with regulatory requirements, leading to legal
disputes over alleged breaches and the validity of the contracts.

Issue:

Whether the contractual agreements between LBNI and AWSI were valid and enforceable,
considering the alleged breaches and regulatory compliance issues.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court analyzed the contract terms and the parties' compliance with regulatory
standards. The Court's decision hinged on the specific facts and evidence presented,
underscoring the importance of clear contractual stipulations and adherence to industry
regulations in resolving such disputes.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library

These cases highlight the significance of historical records, procedural due process, and
regulatory compliance in resolving legal disputes in the Philippines.
Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc. and Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Hon. Cesar G. Dy, et al., G.R. Nos. 170270 & 179411, April 2, 2009

Doctrine:

The arbitrary denial of permits to media entities, leading to the cessation of their operations,
constitutes a violation of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press.

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc. (Newsounds) and

Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS), both operating radio stations in Cauayan
City, Isabela; and Hon. Cesar G. Dy, the city mayor, along with other city officials.
●​ Background: Newsounds and CBS had been operating their respective radio stations,
DWNS and DWNC, in Cauayan City for several years. In 2002, upon applying for the
renewal of their mayor's permits, the city government required them to present proof that
the land on which their stations were situated had been reclassified from agricultural to
commercial use. Despite previous renewals without such a requirement, the lack of this
reclassification led to the denial of their permits, resulting in the closure of their stations.

Issue:

Whether the denial of the mayor's permits, based on the absence of land reclassification,
violated the petitioners' constitutional rights to freedom of speech and of the press.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Newsounds and CBS, stating that the denial of the permits
was arbitrary and constituted an impermissible restraint on freedom of speech and of the press.
The Court emphasized that the requirement for land reclassification was suddenly imposed
without prior notice and was not uniformly applied to other establishments. Consequently, the
closure of the radio stations was deemed unconstitutional.

Source: LawPhil

2. Philco Aero, Inc. v. Department of Transportation Secretary Arthur P. Tugade, et al.,

G.R. No. 237486, July 3, 2019

Doctrine:

Government agencies have the discretion to terminate negotiations and opt for public bidding in
line with policy shifts, provided such decisions adhere to legal standards and principles of due
process.

Facts:
 ●​ Parties Involved: Philco Aero, Inc. (Philco); Department of Transportation (DOTr)
Secretary Arthur P. Tugade; Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA);
Clark International Airport Corporation (CIAC); and Megawide-GMR Consortium.
●​ Background: Philco submitted an unsolicited proposal for the development of the Clark
International Airport's Passenger Terminal 2, leading to negotiations with CIAC. In 2011,
CIAC terminated these negotiations, citing a policy shift towards public bidding for
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects. Subsequently, the project was awarded to the
Megawide-GMR Consortium after a competitive bidding process. Philco challenged this
decision, alleging that the termination of negotiations and the subsequent bidding
process violated its rights.

Issue:

Whether the termination of negotiations with Philco and the awarding of the project to
Megawide-GMR through public bidding were lawful and in accordance with due process.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court upheld the actions of the government agencies, stating that the termination
of negotiations with Philco was lawful and aligned with the government's prerogative to adopt
public bidding as a policy for PPP projects. The Court found no violation of due process,
emphasizing that Philco had no vested right to the project absent a perfected contract.

Zuño v. Cabredo, 402 SCRA 75

Doctrine:

Judges must adhere strictly to administrative circulars and guidelines issued by higher courts.
Failure to do so, especially when it results in grave misconduct, can lead to administrative
sanctions, including dismissal from service.

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño, along with other
prosecutors, filed an administrative complaint against Judge Arnulfo G. Cabredo.
●​ Background: Judge Cabredo was accused of violating Administrative Circular No. 7-99,
which cautions trial court judges against issuing temporary restraining orders (TROs)
and writs of preliminary injunctions in cases involving government infrastructure projects.
Despite this, Judge Cabredo issued a TRO halting a government infrastructure project,
prompting the administrative complaint.

Issue:
Whether Judge Cabredo's issuance of the TRO constituted grave misconduct warranting
administrative sanctions.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court found Judge Cabredo guilty of grave misconduct for violating Administrative
Circular No. 7-99. The Court emphasized that judges are expected to exercise caution and
adhere strictly to guidelines when issuing TROs, especially in cases involving government
projects. As a result, Judge Cabredo was dismissed from service.

Source: Chan Robles Virtual Law Library

2. Bicol Medical Center et al. vs. Noe B. Botor et al., G.R. No. 214073, October 4, 2017

Doctrine:

For a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the applicant must demonstrate a clear legal
right to the relief sought. Mere allegations without substantial evidence do not suffice to
establish such a right.

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Bicol Medical Center (BMC) and the Department of Health (DOH) as
petitioners; Noe B. Botor and other private respondents.
●​ Background: BMC closed a road (Road Lot No. 3) within its compound to construct a
Cancer Center Building. This closure was contested by the City Government of Naga
and private respondents, who claimed that the road had been used by the public and its
closure constituted a public nuisance. The Regional Trial Court denied the application for
a preliminary injunction to reopen the road, but the Court of Appeals reversed this
decision, prompting BMC and DOH to elevate the case to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
reopen Road Lot No. 3.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of BMC and DOH, stating that the respondents failed to
establish a clear legal right to the use of Road Lot No. 3. The Court emphasized that for a writ of
preliminary injunction to be issued, there must be a clear and unmistakable right on the part of
the applicant. In this case, the respondents did not present sufficient evidence to prove such a
right, leading to the denial of the injunction.
Tantano v. Espina-Caboverde, G.R. No. 203585, July 29, 2013

Doctrine:

Receivership is an extraordinary remedy granted only when there is a clear necessity to protect
the interests of the parties involved, particularly when the property in question is at risk of being
lost, wasted, or impaired.

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Petitioners Mila Caboverde Tantano and Roseller Caboverde;

respondent Dominalda Espina-Caboverde (their mother).
●​ Background: The dispute arose over the ownership and management of certain parcels
of land originally owned by the petitioners' parents, Maximo and Dominalda Caboverde.
The petitioners sought the annulment of a deed of sale that transferred these properties,
alleging irregularities. During the pendency of the case, a Partial Settlement Agreement
(PSA) was executed, designating one of the siblings, Josephine, as the administrator of
the properties. However, conflicts persisted regarding the management and income from
these properties, leading to a petition for receivership.

Issue:

Whether the appointment of a receiver was justified to manage the disputed properties during
the litigation.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that receivership is a drastic remedy that should be granted only when
there is a clear showing of necessity to protect the parties' interests. In this case, the Court
found that the petitioners failed to demonstrate that the properties were in danger of being lost,
wasted, or materially impaired. Therefore, the appointment of a receiver was deemed
unwarranted.

Source: LawPhil

2. Enriquez v. The Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 210950, August 15, 2018

Doctrine:

In replevin actions, the surety's liability under a replevin bond extends beyond the expiration of
the bond's term, especially when the bonded property is not returned as ordered by the court.
The indemnity agreement between the principal and the surety obligates the principal to
reimburse the surety for any payments made under the bond.

Facts:
 ●​ Parties Involved: Petitioner Milagros P. Enriquez; respondent The Mercantile Insurance
Co., Inc.
●​ Background: Enriquez filed a replevin action to recover her Toyota Hi-Ace van, posting
a replevin bond issued by Mercantile Insurance. The court ordered the return of the van
to the defendant, Asuten, but Enriquez failed to comply. Consequently, the court
declared the bond forfeited and ordered Mercantile Insurance to pay Asuten ₱600,000.
Mercantile Insurance then sought reimbursement from Enriquez based on their
indemnity agreement. Enriquez contested, arguing that the bond had expired and that
she was not liable for the amount paid by Mercantile Insurance.

Issue:

Whether Enriquez is obligated to indemnify Mercantile Insurance for the amount paid under the
replevin bond despite the bond's expiration.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Mercantile Insurance, stating that the expiration of the bond
did not extinguish the surety's liability, especially since the bonded property was not returned as
ordered. The indemnity agreement explicitly required Enriquez to reimburse Mercantile
Insurance for any payments made under the bond. Therefore, Enriquez was held liable to
indemnify Mercantile Insurance for the ₱600,000 paid to Asuten.

Commodities Storage & Ice Plant Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125008, June
19, 1997

Doctrine:

The appointment of a receiver is an extraordinary remedy that should be exercised with caution
and only when there is a clear necessity to protect the interests of the parties involved.

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Petitioners Commodities Storage & Ice Plant Corporation and
Spouses Victor and Johannah Trinidad; respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company
(FEBTC).
●​ Background: In 1990, the Trinidad spouses obtained a loan of ₱31 million from FEBTC,
secured by a real estate mortgage on their ice plant property. Due to their failure to pay
the loan, FEBTC extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage, becoming the highest bidder at
the public auction. The certificate of sale was registered, and FEBTC took possession of
the property. The Trinidad spouses alleged that FEBTC took possession forcibly and
 negligently managed the ice plant, leading them to file an "Urgent Petition for
Receivership" to appoint a receiver to manage the ice plant during the litigation.

Issue:

Whether the appointment of a receiver was justified under the circumstances.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that the appointment of a receiver is a drastic remedy to be exercised
with caution. It is justified only when there is a clear necessity to protect the parties' interests,
particularly when the property is at risk of being lost, wasted, or materially impaired. In this case,
the Court found that the petitioners failed to demonstrate such necessity. Therefore, the
appointment of a receiver was deemed unwarranted.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library

2. Davao Sunrise Investment and Development Corporation and Spouses Robert Alan
and Nancy Lee Limso v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 158622, January 27, 2016

Doctrine:

In loan agreements, the imposition of interest rates must be mutually agreed upon by the
parties. Unilateral increases in interest rates by the lender, without the consent of the borrower,
are void for lack of mutuality.

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Petitioners Davao Sunrise Investment and Development Corporation

and Spouses Robert Alan and Nancy Lee Limso; respondent Philippine National Bank
(PNB).
●​ Background: In 1993, the petitioners secured a loan of ₱700 million from PNB, secured
by real estate mortgages on four parcels of land. Due to financial difficulties, they
defaulted on the loan. PNB initiated foreclosure proceedings, which the petitioners
contested, alleging that PNB unilaterally imposed exorbitant interest rates without their
consent. They sought to annul the foreclosure and reform the loan agreement.

Issue:

Whether PNB's unilateral imposition of increased interest rates was valid and whether the
foreclosure proceedings were proper.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that PNB's unilateral increases in interest rates were void for lack of
mutuality, as they were imposed without the borrowers' consent. However, the Court upheld the
foreclosure proceedings, stating that the petitioners' default justified PNB's action. The Court
ordered a recomputation of the interest based on the legal rate of 12% per annum.

Source: Chan Robles Virtual Law Library

These cases highlight the judiciary's cautious approach in granting extraordinary remedies like
receivership and emphasize the necessity of mutual agreement in contractual stipulations,
particularly concerning interest rates in loan agreements.

Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the
Monetary Board, G.R. No. 200678, June 4, 2018

Doctrine:

A bank placed under receivership can only sue or be sued through its appointed receiver,
typically the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). Any legal action initiated by the
bank without involving its receiver is subject to dismissal.

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Petitioner: Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco
Filipino); Respondents: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) and the Monetary Board.
●​ Background: Banco Filipino was initially ordered closed by the Monetary Board on
January 25, 1985. This closure was declared void by the Supreme Court on December
11, 1991, leading to the bank's reorganization and resumption of business. However, on
March 17, 2011, the Monetary Board again placed Banco Filipino under receivership due
to insolvency and unsound banking practices, appointing the PDIC as the receiver.
Banco Filipino filed a petition challenging this closure without including the PDIC as a
party.

Issue:

Whether Banco Filipino's petition challenging its closure is valid without including the PDIC, its
appointed receiver, as a party.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, emphasizing that a bank under receivership can
only engage in legal actions through its receiver. Since Banco Filipino filed the petition without
involving the PDIC, it lacked the legal capacity to sue, rendering the petition dismissible.

Source: Chan Robles Virtual Law Library

2. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. v. Alibudbud, G.R. No. 209011, April 20, 2016

Doctrine:

In cases where an employee avails of a car plan that includes a chattel mortgage agreement,
the employer's remedy upon the employee's separation and refusal to return the vehicle is to
initiate foreclosure proceedings, not a replevin action.

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Petitioner: Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. (Malayan); Respondent:

Diana P. Alibudbud.
●​ Background: Alibudbud, employed by Malayan as Senior Vice President for Sales,
availed of the company's car financing plan, leading to the issuance of a 2004 Honda
Civic sedan. She executed a promissory note and a deed of chattel mortgage, stipulating
that if she left the company within three years, she would refund Malayan's equity share
in the vehicle. Alibudbud was later dismissed due to redundancy but refused to return
the car. Malayan filed a replevin action to recover the vehicle.

Issue:

Whether Malayan's replevin action to recover the vehicle from Alibudbud was the proper legal
remedy.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that the appropriate remedy for Malayan was to initiate foreclosure
proceedings under the chattel mortgage agreement, not a replevin action. The Court
emphasized that a chattel mortgagee must follow the procedure outlined in the Chattel
Mortgage Law, which requires foreclosure to enforce the mortgage contract.

Source: LawPhil

These cases underscore the importance of adhering to procedural requirements in legal actions,
particularly concerning the capacity to sue and the appropriate remedies available under
specific contractual agreements.

Yang v. Valdez, 177 SCRA 141 (G.R. No. 73317, August 31, 1989)

Doctrine:
In replevin actions, the sufficiency of a replevin bond is determined at the discretion of the court.
Once approved, the bond's adequacy is generally upheld unless there is a clear showing of
grave abuse of discretion.

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Petitioner: Thomas Yang; Respondents: Hon. Marcelino R. Valdez

(Presiding Judge, RTC Branch XXII, General Santos City) and Ricardo and Milagros
Morante.
●​ Background: Thomas Yang served as the treasurer for the Morante spouses' corn
trading business. The Morantes claimed possession of two Isuzu cargo trucks, which,
although registered under Yang's name, were allegedly used in their business. They
accused Yang of unlawfully taking these vehicles and filed a replevin suit to recover
them. Yang contested the sufficiency of the replevin bond and the trial court's approval of
it.

Issue:

Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in approving the replevin bond
posted by the Morantes.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that the sufficiency of a replevin bond is primarily determined by the
trial court's discretion. In this case, the bond was secured by sureties who declared their
solvency through an Affidavit of Justification. The trial judge, after assessing the financial
standing of the sureties, approved the bond. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion in
this approval and upheld the trial court's decision.

Source: LawPhil

2. Navarro v. Escobido, G.R. No. 153788, November 27, 2009

Doctrine:

In legal actions involving sole proprietorships, the real party-in-interest is the individual owner of
the business. A sole proprietorship lacks juridical personality separate from its owner; therefore,
the owner must be the one to sue or be sued.

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Petitioner: Roger V. Navarro; Respondents: Hon. Jose L. Escobido

(Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City) and Karen T. Go, doing
business under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES.
●​ Background: Karen T. Go, owner of KARGO ENTERPRISES, filed complaints for
replevin and damages against Roger V. Navarro to recover two motor vehicles leased to
 him. Navarro contended that since the lease agreements were executed under the
business name KARGO ENTERPRISES—a sole proprietorship without juridical
personality—Karen Go was not the real party-in-interest. He also argued that the
complaints were premature due to the lack of prior demand for compliance with the lease
agreements.

Issues:

1.​ Whether Karen T. Go, as the owner of KARGO ENTERPRISES, is the real
party-in-interest in the replevin action.
2.​ Whether the complaints were premature due to the absence of prior demand.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that as a sole proprietorship, KARGO ENTERPRISES has no
separate juridical personality from its owner, Karen T. Go. Therefore, she is the real
party-in-interest and has the legal standing to file the complaints. Regarding the issue of prior
demand, the Court noted that Navarro failed to raise this matter at the earliest opportunity,
thereby waiving his right to contest on this ground. Consequently, the Court upheld the trial
court's decisions and denied Navarro's petition.

Fernandez v. The International Corporate Bank, G.R. No. 131283, October 7, 9

Doctrine:

A writ of replevin issued by a Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) is enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines, regardless of the value of the property involved. The jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the amount claimed in the complaint, not by the value of the property subject to
replevin.

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Petitioners: Oscar C. Fernandez and Nenita P. Fernandez;

Respondent: The International Corporate Bank, now Union Bank of the Philippines.
●​ Background: The Fernandezes purchased a Nissan Sentra Sedan through a financing
scheme from the International Corporate Bank. They defaulted on their loan payments,
prompting the bank to file a collection case with an application for a writ of replevin in the
MTC of Pasay City. The MTC issued the writ, and the vehicle was seized from the
Fernandezes' residence in Makati City. The Fernandezes contested the MTC's
jurisdiction, arguing that the value of the vehicle exceeded the court's jurisdictional limit.

Issues:
 1.​ Whether the MTC had jurisdiction to issue the writ of replevin considering the value of
the vehicle.
2.​ Whether the writ of replevin issued by the MTC of Pasay City could be enforced in
Makati City.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that the MTC had jurisdiction over the case because the jurisdiction is
determined by the amount claimed in the complaint, not by the value of the property subject to
replevin. Additionally, the Court ruled that a writ of replevin issued by an MTC is enforceable
anywhere in the Philippines, thus the enforcement of the writ in Makati City was valid.

Source: LawPhil

2. William Anghian Siy v. Alvin Tomlin, G.R. No. 205998, April 24, 2017

Doctrine:

In cases involving multiple sales of the same property, the person who first registers the
property in good faith acquires ownership. A writ of replevin is a provisional remedy to recover
possession of personal property, but the rightful owner must be established based on evidence.

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Petitioner: William Anghian Siy; Respondent: Alvin Tomlin.

●​ Background: Siy filed a complaint for recovery of possession with a prayer for replevin
against several individuals, including Tomlin, alleging wrongful detention of a 2007
Range Rover. Siy had entrusted the vehicle to Frankie Domanog Ong, who sold it to
Chris Centeno, who then sold it to John Co Chua, who finally sold it to Tomlin. Tomlin
registered the vehicle in his name. Siy claimed that the subsequent sales were
unauthorized and sought recovery of the vehicle.

Issue:

Whether Siy had the right to recover possession of the vehicle from Tomlin.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Tomlin, stating that he was an innocent purchaser for value
who had registered the vehicle in good faith. The Court emphasized that in cases of double
sales, ownership is acquired by the person who first registers the property in good faith. Since
Tomlin was the first to register the vehicle, he was deemed the rightful owner, and Siy's
complaint for recovery of possession was dismissed.

Source: LawPhil
3. Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz, G.R. No. 195450,
June 15, 2015

Doctrine:

The jurisdiction of the court over an appeal is determined by the nature of the action and the
amount involved. Rule 41 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure for appeals from the
Regional Trial Courts, specifying which appeals go to the Court of Appeals and which go directly
to the Supreme Court.

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Petitioners: Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro;
Respondents: Heirs of Alberto Cruz.
●​ Background: The case involved a dispute over a parcel of land. The Regional Trial
Court ruled in favor of the respondents. The petitioners filed an appeal, but the
respondents questioned the mode of appeal, arguing that the case should have been
appealed to the Court of Appeals instead of the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether the appeal was properly filed in accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, stating that the petitioners employed the wrong mode
of appeal. The Court clarified that under Rule 41, appeals from the Regional Trial Courts in
cases involving questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law should be brought to the
Court of Appeals, not directly to the Supreme Court.

Lim-Lua v. Lua, G.R. Nos. 175279-80, June 5, 2013

Doctrine:

In cases involving support pendente lite, the court may grant provisional support based on the
needs of the applicant and the resources of the person obliged to give support. The
determination of the amount is subject to modification upon final judgment.

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Petitioner: Juliet Lim-Lua; Respondent: Antonio Lua.

●​ Background: Juliet Lim-Lua filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against
Antonio Lua. During the proceedings, she sought support pendente lite for herself and
 their children. The Regional Trial Court granted the application, ordering Antonio to
provide monthly support. Antonio contested the amount, arguing it was excessive.

Issue:

Whether the amount of support pendente lite granted by the trial court was proper.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that the determination of support pendente lite is provisional and may
be adjusted based on the evidence presented. The Court found that the trial court had properly
considered the needs of Juliet and the children, as well as Antonio's financial capacity, in
determining the amount. Therefore, the grant of support pendente lite was affirmed.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library

2. Abella v. Cabañero, G.R. No. 206647, August 9, 2017

Doctrine:

In actions for support, the court may grant support pendente lite even when the paternity of the
child is in question, provided there is a prima facie showing of paternity. The welfare of the child
is of paramount consideration.

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Petitioner: Richelle P. Abella, on behalf of her minor daughter, Marl
Jhorylle Abella; Respondent: Policarpio Cabañero.
●​ Background: Richelle Abella filed a complaint for support against Policarpio Cabañero,
alleging that he fathered her daughter as a result of sexual abuse when she was a
minor. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint on procedural grounds, stating
that the child was not properly impleaded as a party. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal.

Issue:

Whether the dismissal of the complaint for support on procedural grounds was proper.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions, emphasizing that procedural rules
should not defeat substantive rights, especially when the welfare of a child is at stake. The
Court held that the child, as the real party-in-interest, should be properly represented in the
case. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the child's
entitlement to support.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library

3. Rule 61 of the Rules of Court: Support Pendente Lite

Overview:

Rule 61 of the Philippine Rules of Court provides for the provisional remedy of support pendente
lite, which allows a party to seek temporary support while the main action is pending. This rule
ensures that individuals entitled to support receive necessary assistance during the litigation
process.

Key Provisions:

●​ Application: A verified application for support pendente lite may be filed by any party
stating the grounds for the claim and the financial conditions of both parties.
●​ Hearing and Order: The court shall set the application for hearing and may grant the
support pendente lite based on the evidence presented. The order is immediately
executory and is not subject to appeal.
●​ Enforcement: The order for support pendente lite may be enforced in the same manner
as a final judgment for support.

Francisco v. Zulueta, 61 Phil. 752

Doctrine:

A judge may be disqualified from presiding over a case if there is a clear showing of bias or
prejudice that could affect the impartiality of the proceedings.

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Petitioner: Francisco; Respondent: Judge Zulueta.

●​ Background: Francisco sought the disqualification of Judge Zulueta from presiding over
his case, alleging bias and partiality. The specific details of the alleged bias were not
extensively documented in the available sources.

Issue:

Whether Judge Zulueta should be disqualified from presiding over Francisco's case due to
alleged bias and partiality.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that for a judge to be disqualified on the grounds of bias or prejudice,
there must be concrete evidence demonstrating such bias. Mere allegations without
substantiation are insufficient to warrant disqualification.
Source: LawPhil

2. Abella v. Cabañero, G.R. No. 206647, August 9, 2017

Doctrine:

In actions for support, the court may grant support pendente lite even when the paternity of the
child is in question, provided there is a prima facie showing of paternity. The welfare of the child
is of paramount consideration.

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Petitioner: Richelle P. Abella, on behalf of her minor daughter, Marl
Jhorylle Abella; Respondent: Policarpio Cabañero.
●​ Background: Richelle Abella filed a complaint for support against Policarpio Cabañero,
alleging that he fathered her daughter as a result of sexual abuse when she was a
minor. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint on procedural grounds, stating
that the child was not properly impleaded as a party. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal.

Issue:

Whether the dismissal of the complaint for support on procedural grounds was proper.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions, emphasizing that procedural rules
should not defeat substantive rights, especially when the welfare of a child is at stake. The
Court held that the child, as the real party-in-interest, should be properly represented in the
case. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the child's
entitlement to support.
RULE 62

1. Lui Enterprises, Inc. v. Zuellig Pharma Corporation and Philippine Bank

of Communications

G.R. No. 193494, March 7, 2014

Doctrine: A pending action involving similar issues does not automatically bar the filing of an
interpleader case, especially when the parties are not identical. Additionally, a party declared in
default must demonstrate excusable negligence to set aside the default order.​

Facts:

●​ On March 9, 1995, Lui Enterprises, Inc. (LUI) and Zuellig Pharma Corporation (Zuellig)
entered into a 10-year lease agreement over a parcel of land in Davao City, registered
under Eli L. Lui.
●​ On January 10, 2003, Zuellig received a letter from the Philippine Bank of
Communications (PBCOM), claiming ownership of the leased property and demanding
rent payments.
●​ Zuellig filed an interpleader complaint to determine the rightful recipient of the rental
payments.
●​ LUI filed a motion to dismiss, citing a pending nullification case in Davao RTC involving
the same property.
●​ LUI failed to file an answer within the reglementary period and was declared in default.​

Issue: Whether the pending nullification case barred the interpleader action and whether the
default order against LUI should be set aside.

Ruling:

●​ The Supreme Court held that the interpleader case was proper, as Zuellig was not a
party to the nullification case, and the issues were not identical.
●​ The Court found no excusable negligence on LUI's part to warrant setting aside the
default order.
●​ The Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, awarding the consigned rentals to
PBCOM and deleting the award of attorney's fees to Zuellig.
2. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Metro Container Corporation

G.R. No. 127913, September 13, 2001

Doctrine: An interpleader action becomes moot when a final judgment in a separate unlawful
detainer case determines the rightful possessor of the property and the recipient of rental
payments.​

Facts:

●​ Ley Construction Corporation (LEYCON) obtained a loan from RCBC, secured by a real
estate mortgage over a property in Valenzuela City.
●​ LEYCON leased the property to Metro Container Corporation (METROCAN).
●​ LEYCON defaulted on the loan, leading RCBC to foreclose on the property.
●​ RCBC demanded rental payments from METROCAN, who was still paying LEYCON.
●​ METROCAN filed an interpleader action to determine the rightful recipient of the rentals.
●​ RCBC filed an unlawful detainer case against METROCAN, which was decided in
RCBC's favor.​

Issue: Whether the interpleader action was rendered moot by the final judgment in the unlawful
detainer case.​

Ruling:

●​ The Supreme Court held that the interpleader action was rendered moot by the final
judgment in the unlawful detainer case, which determined RCBC's right to possess the
property and receive rentals.
●​ The Court emphasized that once a final judgment is rendered in a related case
determining the rights of the parties, any pending interpleader action becomes
unnecessary.​
Wack-Wack Golf and Country Club, Inc. v. Lee E. Won and Bienvenido A.
Tan

G.R. No. L-23851, March 26, 1976

Doctrine: An interpleader action is improper when a final judgment has already established the
rights of the parties involved, rendering the dispute res judicata.​

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Plaintiff: Wack-Wack Golf and Country Club, Inc.; Defendants: Lee E.
Won (also known as Ramon Lee) and Bienvenido A. Tan.
●​ Background: The Wack-Wack Golf and Country Club filed an interpleader suit to
resolve conflicting claims over Membership Certificate No. 201. Lee E. Won had
previously obtained a final judgment in Civil Case No. 26044, affirming his ownership of
the certificate. Despite this, the club filed the interpleader action, leading to the present
dispute.

Issue: Whether the interpleader action was proper given the prior final judgment establishing
Won's ownership of the membership certificate.​

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the interpleader action was improper because the issue
of ownership had already been conclusively determined in the prior case. The Court
emphasized that a final judgment precludes subsequent litigation on the same matter, rendering
the interpleader suit unnecessary.​

2. Makati Development Corporation v. Pedro C. Tanjuatco and Concrete

Aggregates, Inc.

G.R. No. L-26443, March 25, 1969

Doctrine: An interpleader action is not proper when the amount in controversy falls below the
jurisdictional threshold required for the court to exercise jurisdiction.​

Facts:

●​ Parties Involved: Plaintiff: Makati Development Corporation; Defendants: Pedro C.

Tanjuatco and Concrete Aggregates, Inc.
●​ Background: Makati Development Corporation withheld a final payment of ₱5,198.75
due to a dispute over unpaid bills between Tanjuatco and Concrete Aggregates. The
corporation filed an interpleader action to determine the rightful recipient of the payment.

Issue: Whether the interpleader action was proper given that the amount in controversy was
below the jurisdictional threshold for the Court of First Instance.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the interpleader action was improper because the
amount in controversy was below the jurisdictional threshold required for the Court of First
Instance to exercise jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that the jurisdiction of courts is
determined by the amount in controversy, and the interpleader action could not proceed under
the circumstances.​

Declaratory Relief vs. Clarificatory Judgment

Declaratory Relief:

●​ Purpose: To secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties
under a statute, deed, contract, or other written instrument.
●​ Requirement: Must involve an actual case or controversy.
●​ Timing: May be filed before a breach or violation occurs.

Clarificatory Judgment:

●​ Purpose: To remove ambiguity or clarify the true meaning of a judgment.

●​ Scope: Does not involve resolving new issues but addresses uncertainties in the
interpretation of a previous judgment.​

Court's Discretion to Refuse Declaratory Relief

Courts have the discretion to refuse to entertain an action for declaratory relief. They cannot be
compelled, by a writ of mandamus, to resolve the case. The decision to grant or deny
declaratory relief rests within the sound discretion of the court.

Non-Execution of Declaratory Judgments

While declaratory judgments have the effect of a final judgment, they are not self-executing.
Execution may be sought through appropriate legal processes. However, exceptions exist
where execution is not necessary, such as when the rights declared are already established and
no further action is required.
RULE 63

Meralco v. Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc.

G.R. No. 101783, January 23, 2002

Doctrine: A final and executory judgment, including those from administrative bodies like the
Board of Energy (BOE), cannot be overturned by a Regional Trial Court (RTC) through a
declaratory relief action. Such actions are barred by the principle of res judicata.​

Facts:

●​ Presidential Decree No. 551 (P.D. No. 551): Issued on September 11, 1974, it reduced
the franchise tax for electric companies from 5% to 2% and mandated that the savings
be passed on to consumers.
●​ Initial Petition: On February 5, 1982, the Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. (PCFI)
filed a petition with the BOE, seeking a refund of the tax savings retained by Meralco,
claiming they should have been passed on to consumers.
●​ BOE Decision: On November 25, 1982, the BOE dismissed PCFI's petition, affirming
that Meralco was authorized to retain the savings based on a prior BOE order.
●​ Supreme Court Resolution: On October 22, 1985, the Supreme Court dismissed
PCFI's petition for certiorari, upholding the BOE's decision.
●​ RTC Action: In 1989, PCFI and Edgardo S. Isip filed a petition for declaratory relief in
the RTC, seeking to overturn the Supreme Court's resolution.

Issue: Whether the RTC had the authority to overturn the Supreme Court's final and executory
resolution through a declaratory relief action.​

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the RTC had no jurisdiction to overturn its own final and
executory resolution. The Court emphasized that the principle of res judicata bars the relitigation
of issues that have already been conclusively resolved.​

2. Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan

G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014

Doctrine: Local government units (LGUs) have the authority to order the demolition of
structures built without the necessary permits, even if such structures are not classified as a
nuisance per se, under their police power and the general welfare clause.​

Facts:
 ●​ Construction Without Permits: Crisostomo B. Aquino, president and CEO of Boracay
Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc., constructed a three-story hotel in a "no
build zone" on Boracay Island without the required permits.
●​ Zoning Compliance Denied: On January 20, 2010, the Municipality of Malay denied
Aquino's application for zoning compliance due to the hotel's location within the
restricted area.
●​ Continued Operation: Despite the denial, Aquino continued the hotel's operation and
expansion.
●​ Executive Order No. 10: On June 7, 2011, the Mayor of Malay issued EO No. 10,
ordering the closure and demolition of the hotel.
●​ Partial Demolition: The hotel was partially demolished following the issuance of EO No.
10.

Issue: Whether the Municipality of Malay had the authority to order the demolition of the hotel
without a court order.​

Ruling: The Supreme Court upheld the local government's authority to demolish the hotel. The
Court ruled that the hotel constituted a nuisance per accidens, and the LGU acted within its
authority under the Local Government Code to issue the demolition order.​

Department of Finance v. Dela Cruz Jr.

G.R. No. 209331, August 24, 2015

Doctrine: A declaratory relief action is proper when it involves the validity and constitutionality
of a government issuance, and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has jurisdiction over such
matters.​

Facts:

●​ Executive Order No. 140 (EO 140): Issued on September 2, 2013, EO 140 created the
Customs Policy Research Office (CPRO) within the Department of Finance (DOF).
●​ Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 (CPO 189-2013): Issued on September 17,
2013, CPO 189-2013 detailed 27 Bureau of Customs (BOC) personnel to the CPRO.
●​ Respondents' Action: On September 30, 2013, the affected BOC personnel filed a
petition for declaratory relief with the RTC of Manila, questioning the validity of EO 140
and CPO 189-2013.
●​ RTC's Issuance of TRO: On October 1, 2013, Executive Judge Marino M. Dela Cruz Jr.
issued a 72-hour Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), which was later extended to 20
days by Presiding Judge Felicitas O. Laron-Cacanindin.​

Issue: Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief filed by the
respondents.​
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the RTC had jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory
relief, as the respondents raised issues concerning the validity and constitutionality of EO 140
and CPO 189-2013. The Court emphasized that such matters fall within the RTC's jurisdiction,
and the respondents had no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

2. Galicto v. Aquino III

G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012

Doctrine: A petition for certiorari and prohibition is not the proper remedy to challenge an
executive order that does not involve judicial or quasi-judicial acts; the appropriate remedy is a
petition for declaratory relief.​

Facts:

●​ Executive Order No. 7 (EO 7): Issued on September 8, 2010, EO 7 imposed a

moratorium on salary increases and suspended allowances for board members of
government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs).
●​ Petitioner's Claim: Jelbert B. Galicto, an employee of PhilHealth, filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition, alleging that EO 7 was unconstitutional and issued beyond the
President's powers.​

Issue: Whether the proper remedy to challenge EO 7 was a petition for certiorari and prohibition
or a petition for declaratory relief.​

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the proper remedy was a petition for declaratory relief, as
EO 7 did not involve judicial or quasi-judicial acts. The Court emphasized that certiorari and
prohibition are not appropriate for challenging executive orders that do not involve such acts.​

Spouses Sabitsana v. Muertegui

G.R. No. 181359, August 5, 2013

Doctrine: The registration of a sale does not confer ownership to the buyer if the seller had
previously sold the property to another party. Acts performed in bad faith, particularly by legal
professionals exploiting confidential information for personal gain, warrant disciplinary action
and do not merit legal protection.​

Facts:

●​ First Sale: On September 2, 1981, Alberto Garcia executed an unnotarized Deed of

Sale in favor of Juanito Muertegui over a 7,500-square meter parcel of unregistered land
in Dalutan Island, Biliran, Leyte del Norte.
 ●​ Second Sale: In 1991, Garcia sold the same parcel to Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr.,
who was the family lawyer of the Muerteguis. Atty. Sabitsana succeeded in registering
the land and obtained title.
●​ Dispute: The Muerteguis attempted to register the land but were opposed by Atty.
Sabitsana. The case was brought before the Supreme Court to resolve the ownership
dispute.​

Issue: Whether the registration of the second sale in favor of Atty. Sabitsana conferred
ownership over the disputed land, despite the prior unregistered sale to Muertegui.​

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the first sale to Muertegui was valid, and the second sale
to Atty. Sabitsana was void due to bad faith. The Court applied Act No. 3344, which protects the
rights of the first buyer in good faith. Additionally, the Court awarded attorney’s fees to Juanito
Muertegui.​

2. Gamboa v. Teves

G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011

Doctrine: The term "capital" in the 1987 Philippine Constitution refers exclusively to common
shares, excluding non-voting preferred shares. The national interest is best served by
maintaining Filipino control over public utilities, and foreign ownership should not exceed the
40% constitutional limit.

Facts:

●​ Background: In 1969, the Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation

(PTIC) acquired 26% of the common shares of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT). Over time, PTIC's shareholding in PLDT increased.
●​ Sale: In 2007, the Philippine government sold 111,415 shares of PTIC to Metro Pacific
Assets Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), an affiliate of First Pacific Company Limited.
●​ Challenge: Wilson P. Gamboa, a PLDT stockholder, filed a petition challenging the sale,
alleging it violated the 40% foreign ownership limit in public utilities set by the 1987
Constitution.​

Issue: Whether the sale of PTIC shares to MPAH resulted in foreign ownership exceeding the
40% constitutional limit in PLDT.​

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the term "capital" in the Constitution refers only to
common shares, excluding non-voting preferred shares. The Court emphasized the national
interest in maintaining Filipino control over public utilities and found that the sale did not violate
the 40% foreign ownership limit.​
In the Matter of Declaratory Relief on the Validity of BIR Revenue
Memorandum Circular No. 65-2012

G.R. No. 215801, January 15, 2020

Doctrine: A petition for declaratory relief is not the proper remedy to seek the invalidation of a
BIR Revenue Memorandum Circular.

Facts:

●​ BIR Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 65-2012: Issued on October 31, 2012, this
circular clarified the taxability of association dues, membership fees, and other
assessments/charges collected by condominium corporations. It imposed a 12%
Value-Added Tax (VAT) and a 32% income tax on these amounts, thereby also triggering
applicable withholding tax requirements.
●​ First E-Bank Tower Condominium Corp.: The petitioner, a condominium corporation,
filed a petition for declaratory relief seeking to declare as invalid RMC No. 65-2012,
arguing that the circular unlawfully imposed taxes on association dues and fees.​

Issue: Whether a petition for declaratory relief is the appropriate remedy to challenge the
validity of RMC No. 65-2012.​

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that a petition for declaratory relief is not the proper remedy
to seek the invalidation of RMC No. 65-2012. The Court emphasized that such challenges
should be addressed through other appropriate legal remedies.​

2. Heirs of Marcelino Doronio v. Heirs of Fortunato Doronio

G.R. No. 169454, December 27, 2007

Doctrine: A private, unregistered deed of donation propter nuptias is void if it violates the
legitime of compulsory heirs and lacks proper registration.​

Facts:

●​ Property Dispute: The case involved a familial dispute over a parcel of land originally
owned by the deceased spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante in Asingan,
Pangasinan, and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 352. Marcelino and
Fortunato Doronio, now deceased, were their sons, and the petitioners (heirs of
Marcelino) and respondents (heirs of Fortunato) are their respective heirs.
 ●​ Donation Propter Nuptias: The petitioners claimed that the land was donated to
Marcelino by his parents in 1919 through a private deed of donation propter nuptias.
However, the deed was unregistered and did not comply with the formal requirements of
the Civil Code.​

Issue: Whether the private, unregistered deed of donation propter nuptias is valid and
enforceable.​

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the deed of donation propter nuptias was void due to its
failure to comply with the formal requirements of the Civil Code and its violation of the legitime of
compulsory heirs. The Court emphasized that such donations must be registered and must not
prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs.

3. Chung v. Mondragon

G.R. No. 179754, November 21, 2012

Doctrine: In cases involving co-ownership, a party may seek partition to determine their share,
but the remedy is not available if the property is indivisible or if partition is not feasible.

Facts:

●​ Land Dispute: The petitioners, descendants of Rafael Mondragon through his first wife,
Eleuteria Calunia, claimed ownership of a parcel of land in Asingan, Pangasinan. The
respondent, Jack Daniel Mondragon, was a descendant of Rafael through his second
wife, Andrea Baldos. The petitioners alleged that the respondent's claim to the land was
unfounded.
●​ Partition Suit: The petitioners filed a suit for partition, seeking to divide the land among
the heirs. However, the trial court dismissed the case, stating that the land was
indivisible and that partition was not feasible.

Issue: Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the petition for partition.​

Ruling: The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision, ruling that partition was not
feasible due to the indivisible nature of the property. The Court emphasized that partition is not
available when the property is indivisible or when division would cause prejudice to the property.​
RULE 67

1. Republic v. Legaspi, Sr.

G.R. No. 177611, April 18, 2012

Doctrine:​
A court commits grave abuse of discretion when it arbitrarily denies expropriation without
providing clear factual and legal bases, especially after previously affirming the petitioner's right
to expropriate.

Facts:

●​ In December 1978, Rosalina Libo-on sold a 40,133-square-meter property in Miag-ao,

Iloilo, to the University of the Philippines Visayas (UPV).
●​ UPV took possession and began developing the property for educational purposes.
●​ In January 1980, Rosalina attempted to rescind the sale, claiming she no longer owned
the property due to a prior barter agreement with Rodolfo Legaspi Sr. and others.
●​ The property was subdivided and registered under different owners, prompting UPV to
file an expropriation case in 1991.
●​ The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially affirmed UPV's right to expropriate but later
excluded seven lots, including a beach resort, without clear justification.
●​ UPV filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which the Court of Appeals denied,
stating that the proper remedy was an ordinary appeal.

Issue:​
Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in excluding certain lots from expropriation
without clear justification, and was a Rule 65 petition the proper remedy?

Ruling:​
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion by arbitrarily
excluding certain lots from expropriation without providing clear factual and legal bases. The
Court emphasized that such actions violate the constitutional requirement for courts to clearly
and distinctly state the facts and law on which their decisions are based. Furthermore, the Court
ruled that a Rule 65 petition was appropriate in this case due to the RTC's grave abuse of
discretion.
2. National Power Corporation v. Spouses Malijan

G.R. Nos. 211731 & 211818, December 7, 2016

Doctrine:​
In expropriation cases, just compensation is determined based on the value of the property at
the time of taking or the filing of the complaint, whichever comes first. However, if the taking
occurred without formal expropriation proceedings, the value at the time of taking is used.

Facts:

●​ The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) sought to expropriate a

3,907-square-meter portion of land owned by Spouses Conchita Malapascua-Malijan
and Lazaro Malijan in Sto. Tomas, Batangas, for its Mak-Ban Geothermal Power Plant.
●​ The spouses did not object to the expropriation; thus, the only issue was the
determination of just compensation.
●​ NAPOCOR claimed it had taken possession of the property in 1972 and argued that just
compensation should be based on the property's value at that time.
●​ The RTC created a Board of Commissioners, which recommended a valuation of ₱3,500
per square meter based on current market value.
●​ The RTC adopted this recommendation, but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision,
directing the RTC to recompute just compensation based on the 1972 value.
●​ Both parties filed petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Issue:​
Should just compensation be based on the property's value in 1972, when NAPOCOR allegedly
took possession, or on the current market value at the time of formal expropriation proceedings?

Ruling:​
Yes. The Supreme Court held that just compensation should be based on the property's value in
1972, the time of taking, as NAPOCOR had already taken possession without formal
expropriation proceedings. The Court emphasized that when the government takes property
without initiating expropriation proceedings, the owner's right to just compensation arises at the
time of taking. However, the Court modified the Court of Appeals' decision by deleting the
awards of exemplary damages and attorney's fees, as there was no basis for such awards.
Republic v. Mupas

G.R. Nos. 181892, 209917, 209696 & 209731, April 19, 2016

Doctrine:​
In expropriation cases, just compensation is determined based on the value of the property at
the time of taking or the filing of the complaint, whichever comes first. However, if the taking
occurred without formal expropriation proceedings, the value at the time of taking is used.

Facts:

●​ The Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH), sought to expropriate a portion of land owned by Spouses Ildefonso and
Francia Regulto in Naga City, Camarines Sur, for the construction of the Naga
City-Milaor Bypass Road.
●​ The subject property originated from a 7,759-square-meter land granted by free patent
under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), which includes a reservation for a
right-of-way easement in favor of the government.
●​ The DPWH initially offered to pay ₱243,000.00 for the affected portion of the property
but later withdrew the offer, citing the existing easement and asserting that the
government was not obliged to pay for the land, only for improvements.
●​ The Spouses Regulto filed a complaint for payment of just compensation, arguing that
their property had become private and was no longer subject to the easement.
●​ The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of the spouses, ordering the government to
pay ₱243,000.00 as just compensation.

Issue:​
Is the government obligated to pay just compensation for the portion of the property affected by
the construction of the bypass road, considering the existing right-of-way easement under the
Public Land Act?

Ruling:​
Yes. The Supreme Court held that while the property was originally subject to a right-of-way
easement under the Public Land Act, the government's actions effectively resulted in the taking
of the property, entitling the owners to just compensation. The Court emphasized that the
existence of an easement does not negate the owner's right to be compensated when the use of
the property is substantially impaired.
RULE 68

Prudential Bank v. Alviar

G.R. No. 150197, July 28, 2005; 464 SCRA 353

Doctrine:​
A "dragnet clause" in a mortgage contract, which purports to secure all debts and obligations,
does not automatically cover subsequent loans unless there is clear evidence that the parties
intended the original mortgage to secure those additional loans.

Facts:

●​ On July 10, 1975, Spouses Don A. Alviar and Georgia B. Alviar executed a real estate
mortgage in favor of Prudential Bank to secure a ₱250,000 loan.
●​ The mortgage contained a "dragnet clause" stating it would secure all other obligations
of the mortgagors to the bank.
●​ Subsequently, the spouses obtained additional loans totaling over ₱2 million, each
secured by separate promissory notes and securities.
●​ Upon default, Prudential Bank initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the
mortgaged property, claiming the dragnet clause covered all outstanding obligations.
●​ The spouses contested the foreclosure, arguing that the original mortgage secured only
the initial ₱250,000 loan.

Issue:​
Does the dragnet clause in the original mortgage contract extend to cover the subsequent loans
obtained by the mortgagors?

Ruling:​
No. The Supreme Court held that the dragnet clause in the original mortgage did not
automatically cover the subsequent loans. The Court emphasized that while dragnet clauses
are valid, they must be construed strictly against the mortgagee. In this case, the subsequent
loans were secured by separate agreements, indicating that the parties did not intend the
original mortgage to cover these additional obligations. Therefore, the foreclosure could only
proceed concerning the unpaid balance of the initial ₱250,000 loan.
2. Philippine National Bank v. Heirs of Spouses Alonday

G.R. No. 171865, October 12, 2016; 805 SCRA 657

Doctrine:​
An all-encompassing or "dragnet clause" in a mortgage contract does not automatically secure
all debts unless the subsequent loans are clearly intended by the parties to be covered by the
original mortgage.

Facts:

●​ Spouses Benedicto and Azucena Alonday obtained an agricultural loan of ₱28,000 from
Philippine National Bank (PNB), secured by a real estate mortgage on their land.
●​ Later, they obtained a commercial loan of ₱16,700 from PNB, secured by a separate real
estate mortgage on a different property.
●​ The commercial loan was fully paid, but PNB foreclosed on the property mortgaged for
the agricultural loan, invoking the dragnet clause to cover the unpaid balance of the
agricultural loan.
●​ The heirs of the spouses contested the foreclosure, arguing that the dragnet clause did
not apply to the agricultural loan.

Issue:​
Can PNB validly foreclose on the property mortgaged for the commercial loan to satisfy the
unpaid agricultural loan, based on the dragnet clause?

Ruling:​
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the dragnet clause in the mortgage for the commercial loan
did not extend to cover the agricultural loan. The Court noted that the two loans were treated
separately, each secured by distinct mortgages on different properties. There was no clear
intention by the parties to have the mortgage for the commercial loan secure the agricultural
loan. Consequently, PNB's foreclosure on the property mortgaged for the commercial loan to
satisfy the agricultural loan was invalid.
Mahinay v. Dura Tire & Rubber Industries, Inc.

G.R. No. 194152, June 5, 2017

Doctrine:​
The one-year redemption period under Act No. 3135 for properties sold in an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale is fixed and non-extendible. Filing a case to annul the foreclosure sale does not
toll or suspend this redemption period.

Facts:

●​ A&A Swiss International Commercial, Inc. mortgaged a 3,616-square-meter property in

Cebu City to Dura Tire & Rubber Industries, Inc. as security for credit purchases made
by Move Overland Venture and Exploring, Inc.
●​ On June 5, 1992, A&A Swiss sold the mortgaged property to Makilito B. Mahinay. In the
Deed of Absolute Sale, Mahinay acknowledged the existing mortgage and held himself
liable for any claims Dura Tire may have against Move Overland.
●​ Due to Move Overland's failure to pay its credit obligations, Dura Tire initiated an
extrajudicial foreclosure. Despite Mahinay's protests, the Sheriff proceeded with the sale,
issuing a Certificate of Sale to Dura Tire after the public auction.
●​ Mahinay filed a complaint for specific performance and annulment of the auction sale,
claiming he was deprived of the opportunity to release the property from the mortgage.
●​ The trial court dismissed Mahinay's complaint, ruling that the one-year redemption
period had lapsed.

Issue:​
Does the filing of a case to annul the foreclosure sale suspend or extend the one-year
redemption period under Act No. 3135?

Ruling:​
No. The Supreme Court held that the one-year redemption period is fixed and non-extendible.
Filing a case to annul the foreclosure sale does not toll or suspend this period. Since Mahinay
failed to redeem the property within the one-year period, his right to redeem had lapsed, and the
foreclosure sale was upheld.
2. Gotesco Properties, Inc. v. Solidbank Corp.

G.R. No. 209542, July 26, 2017

Doctrine:​
In extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings under Act No. 3135, compliance with the notice and
publication requirements is essential. A writ of possession is a ministerial duty of the court once
the foreclosure sale is confirmed and there is no third party in possession of the property.

Facts:

●​ In 1995, Gotesco Properties, Inc. obtained a ₱300 million loan from Solidbank
Corporation, secured by a Mortgage Trust Indenture over several properties.
●​ Due to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, Gotesco faced difficulties in repaying the loan.
Solidbank demanded additional collateral, citing a reduction in the mortgaged property's
value.
●​ Gotesco failed to meet Solidbank's demands, leading to the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the mortgaged properties.
●​ Gotesco filed a complaint for annulment of the foreclosure proceedings, alleging lack of
notice and improper publication.
●​ The Regional Trial Court dismissed Gotesco's complaint and granted Solidbank a writ of
possession. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's decision.

Issue:​
Was the extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding valid, and was the issuance of the writ of
possession proper?

Ruling:​
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the extrajudicial foreclosure was valid, as Solidbank
complied with the notice and publication requirements under Act No. 3135. The publication of
the notice of sale in a newspaper of general circulation, even if not printed in the city where the
property was located, was deemed sufficient. Furthermore, the issuance of the writ of
possession was proper, as it is a ministerial duty of the court once the foreclosure sale is
confirmed and there is no third party in possession of the property.
RULE 69 CASES

Espinas-Lanuza v. Luna, Jr.

G.R. No. 229775, March 11, 2019

Doctrine:​
An oral partition among heirs is valid if no creditors are prejudiced and the heirs have taken
possession and exercised acts of ownership over their respective shares. Furthermore, laches
can bar an action to annul such partition when there is an unreasonable delay in asserting one's
rights.

Facts:

●​ Simon Velasco owned several properties, including a parcel of land covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 20630 in Namantao, Daraga, Albay.
●​ Upon Simon's death, his children—Heriberto, Genoviva, Felisa, and Juan—allegedly
orally partitioned his estate.
●​ Felisa and Juan sold their share (the subject property) to Leopoldo Espinas, Felisa's
son, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale dated May 14, 1966.
●​ In 2010, respondents (heirs of Heriberto and Genoviva) discovered the sale and filed an
action to annul the deed, claiming they were defrauded and excluded from the
settlement.

Issue:​
Was the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale executed by Juan and Felisa to Leopoldo
Espinas valid, considering the alleged exclusion of other heirs?

Ruling:​
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the oral partition among Simon's heirs was valid, as
evidenced by their respective possession and acts of ownership over their shares. The Court
found that the respondents' predecessors-in-interest had knowledge of and acquiesced to the
partition and subsequent sale. The 44-year delay in challenging the deed constituted laches,
barring the respondents from asserting their claim.
Diaz-Salgado v. Anson

G.R. No. 204494, July 27, 2016

Doctrine:​
A marriage celebrated without a marriage license is void ab initio, except in cases of marriages
of exceptional character as defined by law. In the absence of a valid marriage, properties
acquired during cohabitation are governed by co-ownership under Article 147 of the Family
Code.

Facts:

●​ Luis G. Anson and Severina de Asis cohabited and underwent a civil marriage ceremony
in 1966 without presenting a marriage license.
●​ Severina executed three Unilateral Deeds of Sale, transferring certain properties to her
daughter, Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado, and son-in-law, Dr. Gerard C. Salgado.
●​ Luis filed a complaint seeking the annulment of these deeds, claiming that the properties
were part of their conjugal partnership.
●​ The Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the validity of the
marriage and annulled the deeds, ruling that the properties were conjugal.

Issue:​
Was the marriage between Luis and Severina valid, thereby establishing a conjugal partnership
over the properties in question?

Ruling:​
No. The Supreme Court held that the marriage was void ab initio due to the absence of a
marriage license, and it did not fall under any exception for marriages of exceptional character.
Consequently, there was no conjugal partnership. However, under Article 147 of the Family
Code, a co-ownership existed over properties acquired during cohabitation. Therefore, the
properties were co-owned, and Severina had the right to dispose of her share without Luis's
consent.
2. Fajardo v. Cua-Malate

G.R. No. 213666, March 27, 2019

Doctrine:​
An oral partition agreement among heirs is valid and binding, even if not reduced to writing,
provided that it is made voluntarily and no creditors are prejudiced.

Facts:

●​ Ceferina Toregosa Cua died intestate, leaving several heirs, including her children.
●​ During mediation proceedings, the heirs agreed orally on the partition of Ceferina's
estate.
●​ A written Compromise Agreement was drafted, but one heir, Victoria Fajardo, did not
sign it, claiming she did not agree to the partition.
●​ Belen Cua-Malate filed a complaint for partition and accounting against her siblings,
including Victoria.
●​ The RTC upheld the oral partition agreement, and the CA affirmed the decision.

Issue:​
Is an oral partition agreement among heirs valid and enforceable even if not all heirs sign a
written agreement?

Ruling:​
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the oral partition agreement reached during mediation was
valid and binding among the heirs. The absence of Victoria's signature on the written
Compromise Agreement did not invalidate the oral agreement, as there is no legal requirement
for partition agreements among heirs to be in writing.
CONCEPTS

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case. It also
includes the power to enforce and execute its decisions once they become final.

General Rule

●​ Jurisdiction is determined by law and cannot be conferred by agreement of the parties.

●​ Once a case is filed, jurisdiction attaches to the court, not to the judge handling it.
●​ Even if a decision is wrong, as long as the court had jurisdiction, the decision is still valid.

Requisites for Jurisdiction

A court must have jurisdiction over the following:

1.​ The plaintiff (petitioner) – acquired when the plaintiff files the complaint or petition.
2.​ The defendant (respondent) – acquired through voluntary appearance or service of
summons.
3.​ The subject matter – conferred by law, not by agreement of the parties.
4.​ The issues of the case – determined by the pleadings or the parties' express/implied
consent.
5.​ The res (property/thing in dispute) – acquired through seizure, attachment, or when
the court has authority over the subject matter.
6.​ The remedy – determined by procedural law (Rules of Court).

Types of Jurisdiction:

1.​ Original Jurisdiction: The power of a court to hear a case for the first time (e.g., a trial
court).
2.​ Appellate Jurisdiction: The power of a court to review and correct errors made by
lower courts (e.g., Court of Appeals).
3.​ Exclusive Jurisdiction: A court’s exclusive authority to hear and decide cases in certain
matters (e.g., family courts).
4.​ Concurrent Jurisdiction: When multiple courts have jurisdiction over the same case.

Example: If a person files a case involving a family dispute, it may be under the jurisdiction of
the Family Court, while a criminal case may fall under the Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.
APPEALS

Concept of Appeal

An appeal is a legal process by which a party seeks a review of a decision made by a lower
court (trial court) by a higher court (appellate court). The purpose of an appeal is to correct any
errors that may have been made during the trial.

Nature of Right of Appeal

The right of appeal is a statutory right (meaning it exists because of the law) but it is not
absolute. A party can only appeal if there are valid grounds, such as errors in the application of
the law or factual findings.

General Rule: If the party wants to challenge the decision, they must appeal within the
prescribed period and follow the proper procedures.

Example: A person loses a case in the trial court and believes that the trial court made a
mistake in applying the law, so they file an appeal to the Court of Appeals.

Matters Not Appealable

There are certain cases that cannot be appealed, which are typically decided by higher courts
without the right to review by a lower court. These include:

1.​ Judgments by admission (when the defendant admits the claim).

2.​ Judgments in cases of conciliation.
3.​ Interlocutory orders (orders that do not dispose of the case entirely).

Example: If the trial court makes a temporary order during the case that doesn’t resolve the
final issue (e.g., an order granting a temporary restraining order), this cannot be appealed until a
final judgment is made.

Issues That May Be Raised on Appeal

The issues on appeal are typically limited to:

●​ Errors in law (e.g., the trial court misinterprets the law).

●​ Errors in fact (e.g., the trial court misunderstood the evidence presented).

General Rule: Only issues raised during the trial may be raised on appeal.

Exception: New evidence may be presented on appeal if it’s material to the case and could
change the outcome.

Example: If new documents appear after a trial showing that a key witness lied, that could be
presented on appeal as new evidence.
THREE MODES OF APPEAL
The Rules of Court provide three main modes of appeal:

1.​ Ordinary Appeal (Rules 40 and 41)

○​ Used for appeals from the MTC to the RTC (Rule 40) and from the RTC to the
CA (Rule 41).
○​ Based on questions of fact and law.
○​ How to appeal?
■​ Notice of Appeal (No need for court approval)
■​ Record on Appeal (Only required in specific cases, e.g., multiple
appeals)
2.​ Petition for Review (Rule 42)
○​ Used for appeals from the RTC to the CA when the RTC rendered a decision in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
○​ Based on questions of fact and law.
○​ How to appeal?
■​ Petition for Review (Filed with the CA within 15 days)
3.​ Appeal by Certiorari (Rule 45)
○​ Used for appeals from the CA, CTA, Sandiganbayan, or other quasi-judicial
bodies to the Supreme Court.
○​ Based on pure questions of law.
○​ How to appeal?
■​ Petition for Review on Certiorari (Filed with the SC within 15 days)
■​ Discretionary—the SC is not required to accept the appeal.

🔹 Comparison Between Ordinary Appeal and Petition for Review (Rule 42)
Ordinary Appeal Petition for Review

Appeal is a matter of right Appeal is discretionary

Filed through Notice of Appeal Filed through Petition for Review

 Based on questions of fact and Based on questions of fact and law
law

No need for court approval The CA may dismiss the petition if it is without merit

RESIDUAL JURISDICTION

Residual Jurisdiction refers to the limited jurisdiction that a trial court retains even after an
appeal has been filed.

General Rule: Once an appeal is perfected, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case.

Exception: Even after the appeal is perfected or the record on appeal is approved, the trial
court still retains its residual jurisdiction to perform specific functions, such as:

1.​ Issuing protective orders.

2.​ Approving compromises.
3.​ Ordering execution pending appeal.

Example: After a party files an appeal, the trial court can still grant a motion for a temporary
restraining order if the appellant requests one.

REVIEW OF JUDICIAL POWER AND JURISDICTION

Judicial power is the authority of the courts to adjudicate matters before them. It involves
interpreting laws and resolving disputes. Jurisdiction, as discussed above, is the court's
authority to hear specific types of cases.

RULE-MAKING POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT (SC)

The Supreme Court has the power to create and amend the Rules of Court (which govern
procedural matters in litigation). The SC can prescribe the rules for appeals and the procedures
followed by lower courts in cases.

Example: The Rules of Court dictate that an appellant must file a Notice of Appeal within 15
days of receiving a judgment. The SC has the power to modify these rules if necessary.

RULE 40

This rule deals with appeals to the Court of Appeals (CA). It governs the specific processes
and forms of appeal that need to be followed.

RULE 41 (MEMORIZE SECTION 1)

Rule 41, Section 1 specifically deals with the general procedure for appeals in civil cases,
particularly by Notice of Appeal.

It lays out that an appeal is perfected when the appellant files:

1.​ A Notice of Appeal within the prescribed period (usually 15 days).

2.​ The appellant must also pay the docket fees as required.

General Rule: Filing a notice of appeal and paying the required fees is necessary to perfect the
appeal.

SUBSTANTIVE LAW vs. REMEDIAL LAW

Substantive Law Remedial Law

 Creates, defines, and regulates rights Provides the method to enforce rights and obtain
and duties that give rise to a cause of redress for their violation.
action.

Vested rights may attach to substantive No vested rights attach to procedural law.
law.

If a law takes away a vested right, it is If a law merely provides the method of enforcing a
substantive and generally cannot be right, it is procedural and can be applied
applied retroactively. retroactively to pending cases.

Enacted by Congress. Promulgated by the Supreme Court.

🔹 Example:
●​ A law granting a new right to appeal (e.g., allowing an additional level of appeal) is
substantive because it creates a right that did not exist before.
●​ A law changing the time to file an appeal from 15 to 30 days is procedural because it
only modifies how a right is enforced.

📌 General Rule: Procedural laws apply retroactively because no one has a vested right in
📌 Exception: If a procedural rule affects substantive rights, it cannot be applied retroactively.
procedural rules.​