ASSIGNMENT

Group member
1. SHAMITA S.R (23/839)
SOCIOLOGY DEPARTMENT

2. LOVISHA SHARMA (23/1067)

PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT

3. NAINA (23/560)
PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT

4. PREETI TIWARI (23/014)

PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT

5. SAMARA KHAN (23/474)

PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT

Course- Key Debates: Indian Constitution

(DSC)

Submitted to- Prof. Rajeev Yadav

Power, Provisions, and Policy: Rethinking
State and Local Body Relations

ABSTRACT:
This paper attempts to addressing question of voluntary provision to be replaced by mandatory
provision between states and local bodies, highlighted in Article 243 (G) of the Indian
constitution. It also includes analyzing and finding the possible benefits that arise out of
mandatory provision. At the same time, it seeks to make a critical review of the current status of
the constitutionalized local bodies i.e. Panchayati Raj institutions (PRIs) and Urban Local Bodies
(ULBs) as institutions of local self-government in India. The background of the “history and
evolution of local government” has been narrated in a nutshell to enable the readers to have an
idea of a conceptual and institutional framework of the local bodies, keeping the central
objective in the mind that this research paper focuses on the replacement of the voluntary
provision of transferring the subjects to local bodies and attempts to make an assessment and
suggesting way forwards for the future of these institutions. Reference has been made to the
experience of some of the other countries model as well as states model in order to support the
argument and observation. The paper argues that despite the constitutional amendment to
regenerate the local government bodies, there is still a lack of genuine and strong political
interest and bureaucratic support to fuel these institutions. Even after the amendments, state is
still acting as “absolute controller” instead to act as “monitor” for these local institutions. There
is need for another round of constitutional amendment coupled with continuous political and
administrative support to ensure steady growth of these local government bodies.

INTRODUCTION:
When S. Radhakrishnan said- "A nation’s greatness lies in its ability to allow
its citizens to grow, flourish, and contribute, which can only happen when
power is decentralized." He was directly indicating towards the idea of
democracy which defines it through the roots of decentralization. The word
decentralization has its own political history in India from “traditional system
of panch” to the latest “73rd and 74th amendment act of the constitution”.
The long history of establishment of the local government still doesn’t grant
it the autonomous power to govern and the defined set of roles and subjects,
Instead, the major step of 73rd and 74th amendment act of the constitution
i.e. the Article 243 clause (G) restrict the transfer of subjects to the local
government which are still subjected to the decision of State government
that is the major hurdle not only in governance but also in the development
processes of the country as a whole. This paper is proposed to address the
question of voluntary provision of transferring of subjects between State
government and the Local bodies.
This paper underscores the hypothesis as: - granting the mandatory
provision of transfer of subjects to the local bodies by the state government
which includes the possible benefits (either social, economic or
administrative) that will arise out of such mandatory provision. The voluntary
provision of transferring the subjects restricts the role of the local bodies as
the “followers” of the state government’s policies but not as the “actual
initiators” of the policies. Indeed, admitting the fact that there are many
other negative factors or loopholes in the governance of the local bodies but
that doesn’t imply to restrict their circle of independent roles and functions.
Instead, we can create a system that can check upon the activities of these
local governing bodies.

THE RISE AND EVOLUTION OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN

INDIA
The development of local government in India reflects a shift from early,
informal community-based governance to more formalized and
institutionalized structures. The earliest form of local governance can be
traced back to the Vedic period, we are told that panchayats existed since
Rig Vedic time where village assemblies, such as sabhas and samitis, played
a crucial role in decision-making, resource management, and dispute
resolution (R.C. Majumdar, in History of Local Self-Government in Ancient and
Medieval India, 1958). These assemblies were composed of influential
community members, such as elders, and reflected a decentralized,
participatory model of governance. This early structure was based on
communal autonomy and collective responsibility, with governance being
rooted in local needs and customs. These practices continued to thrive even
during the Mauryan and Gupta periods, though imperial rule introduced more
centralized oversight. Despite this, the local gram sabhas (village councils)
maintained a level of independence, particularly in areas like taxation,
justice, and land management.
The medieval period saw the development of more structured local
governance systems, particularly under the Chola Empire. The Cholas
introduced a sophisticated decentralized administration, where local
assemblies such as Ur, Sabha, and Nadu handled local governance, including
land distribution and irrigation (Majumdar, 1958). The Islamic period, while
marked by centralized rule, saw the continuation of local governance
systems, with urban panchayats and rural mohallas managing community
affairs, albeit with reduced autonomy (Majumdar, 1958).
M. Aslam also in his book ‘Panchayati Raj in India’ emphasized on evolution
of local government during The British colonial era, however, colonial era
severely restricted local governance, as the British prioritized centralized
control, only beginning to address local self-governance was through reforms
like the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. Sir Charles Metcalf, during his tenure
as the Governor-General of India (1835-36), famously referred to Indian
villages as "little republics," highlighting their inherent potential for self-rule
and local autonomy. This vision was further strengthened with the Mayo
Resolution of 1870, which laid the groundwork for local self-governance,
acknowledging the critical role of villages in the broader governance
framework. Post-independence, the idea of local governance gained new
momentum with the concept of Gram Swaraj proposed by Gandhi. Later, the
idea of Gandhi’s Gram Swaraj became the most important guiding force
behind the PRIs of today. For Gandhi, to borrow a phrase from E.F.
Schumacher,” small, was beautiful”. This could not be materialized
immediately after Independence as the state was more interested in
economic growth through centralized structure. However, there was also a
Community Development Program in 1952, which focused on local level
development. It failed miserably and led to introspection among policy
makers. Five years later, in 1957, a committee often called Balvantrai Mehta
Committee was formed. The recommendations of the committee gave, what
in today’s context, quite recognizable features of PRIs like a 3-tier structure
(village-block-district), transfer of power and devolution of human and
financial resources to PR, and active participation of people (gram samiti).
From 1959 to 1964, most states passed respective Panchayat Acts. PRI’s
heyday continued for five years as the government wanted to eliminate
poverty and food shortage through a strong centralized government
approach., the PR system stagnated between 1965 and 1969, and declined
from 1969 to 1977. Ashok Mehta Committee was formed in 1977 when the
government changed at the Centre and newer politicians wanted more
people-centric development. Many other committees were formed after
1977, and most of them tried to improve upon the earlier recommendations.
It was only on April 24, 1993 that the Constitution (Seventy-third
Amendment) Act, 1992 came into being. The key features of the Amendment
are powerful gram Sabha, a three-tier system, reservations of seats for SCs
and STs as per population and one third for women, five year terms, elections
conducted by State Election Commission, and matters of finance to be taken
care of by the Finance Commission in every State Despite these reforms,
challenges remain in fully realizing the goals of decentralization, as local
bodies often struggle with insufficient devolution of power, primarily due to
the apathy of state governments (Aslam). As the voluntary nature of
devolution under Article 243G has created significant implementation gaps,
leading to uneven empowerment of local bodies across states
The landmark Supreme Court judgment in the State of U.P. v. Pradhan Sangh
Kshetra Samiti & Ors. (1995) addressed the critical issue of power
distribution between the state and Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) under
the 73rd Amendment of the Indian Constitution. The Court emphasized that
the mere establishment of PRIs without devolving adequate powers and
resources is insufficient to fulfill the constitutional intent of decentralized
governance. It underscored that state legislatures must ensure effective
devolution of powers, functions, and financial autonomy to PRIs in
accordance with Article 243G. This judgment highlighted the significance of
empowering local bodies to function as genuine units of self-government,
marking an important step in reinforcing the principles of democratic
decentralization and strengthening the Panchayati Raj system. J.S. Mill’s
emphasis on active citizen participation highlights the gap between the
ideals of democratic decentralization and the challenges faced by PRIs. Like
the discretionary framework that has hindered true decentralization, as state
governments retain considerable control, leaving PRIs and ULBs dependent
on state-level political agendas. political centralization often supersedes
decentralization, with state-level politics infiltrating their functioning, this
dual challenge of decentralization and political centralization has been more
evident in states such as West Bengal. Further Studies by Nirmala Buch and
the PRIA team across states like Gujarat, Haryana, and Kerala reveal that
quorum is rarely achieved, and women and marginalized groups remain
underrepresented. Medha Kotwal Lele further notes that, while the
amendments aimed to bring marginalized groups into governance,
traditional power structures, such as gavkis in Maharashtra and khap
panchayats in Haryana, continue to influence local decision-making, limiting
the autonomy of elected representatives. similarly emphasizes that despite
the constitutional promise, the empowerment of marginalized groups
remains incomplete, stymied by local patriarchal norms and entrenched
social hierarchies
Now, as emphasized by scholars and authoritative reports like the Economic
Survey .The issue of financial autonomy is another critical challenge ,
Despite the significant judgment of supreme court In the case of Municipal
Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Kishore Shankar Bele (2002), where it
underscored the critical importance of granting urban local bodies the
autonomy necessary to carry out their functions and manage resources
effectively, as per the provisions of Part IXA of the Constitution. As while 73rd
and 74th Constitutional Amendments sought to empower PRIs and ULBs, its
financial dependency on state governments remains a significant challenge.
It’s been highlighted that state control over finances and the redirection of
funds, as seen in Andhra Pradesh’s Swarna Jayanti Gram Samriddhi Yojana,
undermine local autonomy. The absence of effective State Finance
Commissions (SFCs), further restricts resource flow, while weak tax bases
and poor property tax collection, as outlined in the 15th Finance Commission,
limit revenue generation. Advocates call for mandatory devolution, financial
independence, and stronger capacity-building to enhance local governance.
Furthermore, the Gram Sabha, intended to be the heart of participatory
democracy, faces significant challenges. The Ashok Mehta Committee
emphasized its role in engaging local populations in governance, but in
practice, the Gram Sabha’s potential remains largely unrealized. Reports
from the National Institute of Rural Development & Panchayati Raj (NIRD&PR)
and studies shows that meetings are often irregular, poorly attended, and fail
to meet quorum requirements. Despite these challenges, Kerala has
demonstrated the potential of the Gram Sabha, where accountability
mechanisms and community engagement have led to more active
participation and decision-making. However, such successes are exceptions
rather than the norm across India.
This vision of decentralized governance inspired the 73rd and 74th
Constitutional Amendments, which aimed to transform local bodies into
engines of grassroots democracy. These amendments promised to empower
rural and urban governments with autonomy, inclusivity, and direct citizen
participation. However, despite this bold vision, the transfer of powers and
subjects from state governments to local bodies remains largely voluntary,
as outlined in the XI and XII Schedules of the Indian constitution.

TRANSFER OF SUBJECT: MANDARTORY PROVISION?

J.S. Mill argues that the only government which can fully satisfy all the
exigencies of the state is one in which the whole people participate but the
challenges posed by the 73rd CAA raise important questions about
accountability and oversight in terms of idealistic thinking of J.S. Mill. Who
bears responsibility when state governments fail to empower PRIs as
mandated? Moreover, how can political interference at the grassroots level
be curtailed to ensure that PRIs fulfill their democratic potential?
The 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act (CAA) was a transformative step
aimed at empowering Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) as autonomous units
of local self-governance. However, its implementation reveals significant
structural and practical challenges that undermine the constitutional vision
of democratic decentralization. While the amendment delegated functions
and responsibilities to PRIs, it failed to secure their autonomy. Article 243G,
which states that state legislatures may endow PRIs with powers, leaving this
delegation contingent on the political will of state governments. This
discretionary nature results in inconsistent empowerment of PRIs across
states, making their authority subordinate to the states' interests.
Consequently, PRIs are often burdened with responsibilities without being
granted the corresponding authority to perform effectively.
Therefore, the first argument focuses on the critical challenge that arises
from the interface between democratic decentralization and
political centralization. Although PRIs are constitutionally envisioned as
grassroots institutions, state-level political dynamics frequently dominate
their functioning. Party politics, in particular, infiltrates local governance,
with panchayats often reflecting the agenda of ruling state parties rather
than serving as non-partisan self-governing bodies. This duality between
constitutional decentralization and political centralization dilutes the
autonomy of PRIs, with the latter often prevailing in practice. The case of
West Bengal serves as an illustrative example. Despite being lauded for its
pioneering efforts in establishing the Panchayati Raj system, the state's PRIs
frequently functioned as extensions of the Communist Party of India
(Marxist), aligning more with the principle of democratic centralism than with
constitutional decentralization. This resulted in the PRIs becoming
instruments of party control rather than platforms for participatory
governance.
Thus, when we look at alternative hope for this argument we derive at
Legislative Reforms
Amend Article 243G
 Replace the word "may" with "shall" in Article 243G to make it mandatory
for state legislatures to devolve powers and functions to panchayats. This
ensures that decentralization is not subject to political discretion.
 Define specific areas where PRIs must have exclusive authority, such as
primary education, basic healthcare, and local infrastructure.
Introduce a Model Panchayat Law
 Draft and adopt a model law outlining the minimum mandatory powers
and functions of PRIs across all states. States should have limited scope to
dilute these provisions.
 Include explicit safeguards to protect PRIs from undue state interference
Prohibition of Arbitrary Dissolution
 Restrict state governments from dissolving elected PRI bodies without
valid and judicially reviewable reasons.
 Ensure mid-term removal of PRI representatives occurs only through a due
process, such as a no-confidence vote by a two-thirds majority within the
body itself.
 Establish an independent Panchayat Tribunal at the state level to
handle disputes between PRIs and state governments or within PRIs
themselves. Ensure that decisions made by this tribunal are binding, with
appeals allowed only in higher courts.

COMPARATIVE MODEL ASSESSMENT

Let's look at these two alternatives with comparative examples from South
Africa and Brazil
South Africa’s Municipal Systems Act (MSA), 2000, serves as an excellent
model for empowering local governments. It operates under the framework
of cooperative governance outlined in the South African Constitution, 1996,
which recognizes municipalities as independent spheres of government
rather than subordinates to state or central governments. The MSA provides
a robust legal framework for municipal administration, governance, and
service delivery. It mandates that municipalities adopt Integrated
Development Plans (IDPs), ensuring that resources align with local
development priorities. The law also establishes mechanisms for public
participation, allowing communities to have a direct voice in planning and
budgeting processes. Furthermore, the Municipal Finance Management Act
(MFMA), 2003, complements this framework by ensuring municipalities have
access to predictable financial resources through revenue generation
mechanisms like property taxes, service charges, and equitable national
revenue shares. This comprehensive approach not only empowers
municipalities but also ensures that national and provincial governments
provide necessary support without interfering in local autonomy. India could
adopt a similar framework by creating a National Local Government
Framework Act to strengthen Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) with fiscal,
functional, and administrative independence, coupled with enforceable
safeguards against political interference.
Brazil’s Participatory Budgeting (PB) model, particularly as implemented in
Porto Alegre, provides a practical example of an effective redressal
mechanism for empowering local governance. This model incorporates
citizen participation in budgetary decisions while establishing a structured
system for resolving grievances. Public Grievance Committees at the
municipal level address complaints about fund misallocation, inefficiencies,
or corruption, ensuring transparency and accountability. Citizen Oversight
Forums further empower communities by allowing them to voice concerns
and priorities, with municipal bodies mandated to act upon feedback. A
dedicated Ombudsman Office, or Ouvidoria, handles unresolved complaints
and mediates disputes between citizens and local governments, ensuring
timely resolution and public accountability. Additionally, judicial and
administrative review mechanisms allow citizens to escalate issues if
necessary, creating multiple layers of redressal. For instance, if citizens in
Porto Alegre feel their neighborhood’s needs are overlooked, they can raise
complaints with grievance committees or the ombudsman, with outcomes
often resolved through public hearings. India could replicate this model by
establishing grievance committees at district and block levels, creating PRI-
specific Ombudsman Offices, and implementing digital grievance portals to
ensure transparent, accountable, and citizen-focused governance.
Building along first arguments let's look at the second critical aspect
regarding the functional domain of Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) under
the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act (CAA) wherein the functions listed in
the 11th Schedule of the Constitution, though considered a step toward
decentralization, are seen as merely illustrative and indicative, not
exhaustive. This points out that most states have primarily delegated
traditional civic functions, such as street lighting, sanitation, and rural roads,
rather than more developmental and empowering functions like education,
health, and employment generation. The gap between devolution of
functions and actual empowerment stems from the fact that the
functions are not accompanied by the transfer of necessary funds
and functionaries to make the panchayats fully effective in carrying out
these responsibilities. The crux of the problem is that fund allocation for the
panchayats does not match the breadth of their responsibilities. For instance,
if a function such as the construction of a tank is assigned to a particular
panchayat, only a small portion of the financial resources required for the
project is allocated to the panchayat. The bulk of the funding and execution
of the task remains with the line departments of the state government. This
results in a fragmented approach, where the panchayats are not truly in
control of the full range of activities associated with the functions they are
supposed to perform. This lack of autonomy in managing resources and
execution leads to inefficiency, delays, and ultimately, a failure to meet
local needs effectively. Furthermore, the core functions that historically
belonged to the panchayats, such as drinking water, rural roads, street
lighting, sanitation, and primary health, are increasingly being managed by
state government departments rather than by the panchayats themselves.
This leads to a paradox where the panchayats, despite being constitutionally
recognized as institutions of self-government, are relegated to peripheral
roles in governance. As a result, the per capita expenditure for panchayats
remains abysmally low in most states, with only a few exceptions such as
Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Goa, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra,
and Tamil Nadu, where there has been more effective devolution of powers
and resources.
Now let’s dwell to see the most important component of this whole
discussion i.e. the working provisions of gram Sabha in context of this
decentralization process. At the heart of this whole argument lies the
recommendation of The Ashok Mehta Committee which emphasized the
pivotal role of the Gram Sabha in activating grassroots democracy and
fostering a sense of community spirit. It recognized the Gram Sabha not only
as a tool for increasing political awareness but also as a mechanism for
enabling marginalized sections of society to assert their perspectives. This
makes the Gram Sabha indispensable as both a vigilance mechanism and
a means to restore the declining credibility of the panchayat system
in India. The Gram Sabha represents the foundational unit of direct
democracy, akin to the citizens’ forums of ancient Greek city-states. It
provides a platform for villagers to come together and deliberate on common
issues, making it a key mechanism for ensuring inclusivity and
representation. The forum brings villagers together to discuss development
plans, resource allocation, and social concerns. This active participation
fosters a sense of collective responsibility and enhances the accountability of
panchayats.
But reality is not as simple as the recommendations of any committee
because the constitution makes it mandatory to establish Gram Sabha at the
village level but it does not stipulate any details regarding the structure,
powers, and functions of this institution. In terms of Article 243G these
details are to be spelt out in the Panchayati raj legislations passed in each
state in compliance with the 73rd amendment of the Constitution.
Accordingly, all the state governments have provided for the institution of
gram Sabha in their respective panchayat legislations. There are variations
across the states with regard to composition, functions and other matters.
Thus, none of the State Acts empowers the Gram Sabha to have control over
the Gram Panchayat and to take final decisions in matters of village
development. Its role is only advisory. The accountability of the Gram
Panchayat to this body has also not been clearly spelt out in most of the
state legislations. In Kerala, however, it is obligatory on the part of the head
of the Gram Panchayat to explain to the Gram Sabha why a particular
decision or a set of decisions could not be implemented. In most of the states
the functional domain of the Gram Sabha is limited to discussions of annual
statement of accounts, administration report, and selection of beneficiaries
for anti-poverty programmes. Only in a few states like Haryana, Punjab and
Tamil Nadu the Gram Sabha enjoys the powers to approve budgets (Prabhat
Datta, (2003), Towards Good Governance and Sustainable Development, Das
Gupta & Co. Kolkata). The Gram Sabhas is yet to take off in almost all the
states. Reports from the states indicate that Gram Sabha meetings are not
being held regularly. Nirmala Buch conducted a study of Gram Sabhas in 11
Gram Panchayats in MP in December 1997(Cited by K. Jayalakshi in her
paper „Role of Gram Sabhas in Betul district in MP‟ presented at the national
conference on Gram Sabha held at NIRD, Hyderabad during July 28-29,
1999) and found that far from an adequate number of GS members
attending the meetings not even all the panchs were present. To cap it all,
there was no quorum of more than 50 per cent in the GS meetings. There is
a provision for mandatory attendance of one-tenth members in the Gram
Sabha. Women find it difficult to attend as the timing is sometime in the
forenoon i.e. between 11 a.m. and 1 p.m. Most of the women are not even
aware of the rudiments of the Gram Sabha. The issues discussed do not
seem to interest a large number of the villagers and hence, except careful
and knowledgeable stakeholders, others shy away from the Gram Sabha.
A study conducted in two Panchayats in Kerala has shown that the people
are in favor of expanding the role of the Gram Sabhas (John Oommen, “Gram
Sabhas: The Live Wire in the Planning Process in Kerala” Journal of Rural Vo
Development l. 18, No.2). They want the Gram Sabhas to give the final seal
of approval to the activities of the Gram Panchayat. The people interviewed
have suggested that the Gram Sabha will perform its duties in time provided
people are made aware of its role in development activities. Once their felt
needs are taken into consideration, they will automatically attend the
meetings in large numbers and participate effectively in the activities of the
Gram Panchayats.
The Participatory Research in Asia team studied the working of the Gram
Sabhas in Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala and Uttar Pradesh
(PRIA, ibid.) The team has noticed that although meetings are being held
almost regularly, a quorum is hardly achieved. Surprisingly, despite the lack
of quorum, the proceedings are prepared. The team is generally of the
opinion that there is a lack of awareness on the part of the members not only
about the time and venue of the meetings but also about the usefulness of
such meetings. The scholars observe that most of the heads of the
panchayats lack skills in conducting meetings in a manner that could
promote wider participation and discussion of the issues affecting the village.
Issues of social justice and internal dynamics of the village have rarely been
agenda items in the Gram Sabha meetings. An authoritative survey of
Panchayati raj by NIRD reports follows: almost all the State Acts have
provided for Gram Sabha but its functions have not been spelt out in detail.
Consequently, these institutions by and large continue to function
ineffectively, though the meetings are generally held as prescribed. The
purpose is hardly served in the absence of a clear and direct mandate. More
often, there is a tendency to conduct the meetings in a formal manner and
finalize the proceedings in haste. The prescribed quorum is also not given
due importance. The absence of women folk in the meetings has been a
common feature. The participation of the people belonging to the weaker
section has been marginal.
In rural India, traditional bodies such as gavkis in Maharashtra and
customary village councils (CVCs) in Karnataka often operate parallel to
the formal structures of village panchayats. Despite lacking any legal
authority, these traditional bodies wield significant influence, often
surpassing the power of elected representatives, particularly in
Maharashtra’s Konkan region and districts like Satara, Ahmad Nagar,
Nandurbar, and Raigad. Dominated by upper castes and elite landlords,
gavkis frequently issue judgments that are not only unlawful but also
oppressive, particularly against marginalized communities. Their rulings
include enforcing social boycotts, assigning punitive tasks such as cleaning
public latrines, or mandating community service like donating blood or
organizing social functions.
The detrimental impact of such judgments is exemplified by incidents such
as the 2013 honor killing of a pregnant woman from the Gosavi community,
carried out by her father under societal pressure after her marriage to a Dalit
man. Similarly, in 2005, Santosh Jadhav, a member of the Kunbi
community in Raigad, faced ostracization for defying a gavki diktat and
contesting for the sarpanch’s post. These instances highlight the oppressive
and regressive nature of traditional systems, particularly against women,
Dalits, and other marginalized groups.
The Prevention of Social Boycott Act of 2015
(SocialJustice&SpecialAssistanceDepartment,GovernmentofMaharashtra,
https://sjsa.maharashtra.gov.in/en/maharashtra-cm-devendra-fadnavis-
pushes-social-boycott-law-against-parallel-justice-system.) proposed by then
Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis, sought to address the excesses of this
parallel justice system. The law aimed to curb the power of gavkis,
particularly in enforcing discriminatory practices against inter-caste
marriages, non-conventional social practices, or even individual choices in
attire. The act underscored the need to dismantle such traditional power
structures that undermine constitutional values and perpetuate systemic
discrimination.
However, these observations also bring forth a critical question about the
coexistence of traditional bodies and elected panchayats. Scholar Lele
(Medha Kotwal Lele, op.cit. p:4703.) aptly noted that reservations intended
to empower marginalized groups in rural governance are often rendered
ineffective by the entrenched authority of traditional bodies. Despite their
flaws, traditional councils remain deeply ingrained in the social fabric of
many villages. Granting them a conciliatory role in resolving local issues,
while ensuring their accountability to constitutional principles, could promote
cooperation between traditional and formal systems. Such an approach
might mitigate conflicts between the two and ensure the intended objectives
of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act—to empower marginalized
communities and enhance democratic decentralization—are realized.
Balancing the roles of traditional bodies with the authority of elected
representatives is essential for fostering inclusive and equitable governance
in rural India.
The Khap Panchayats (KPs) serve as another prominent example of
traditional bodies exercising authority parallel to formal governance
structures, especially in Jat-dominated areas of North India such as Haryana,
Punjab, and the Meerut region of Uttar Pradesh. These extra-judicial entities
derive their power from deeply entrenched customs and traditions, often
pronouncing regressive and harsh punishments that contradict constitutional
values and modern judicial processes. A troubling example {Khaps say
marry them young, Cong sees conspiracy, The Indian Express
(Chandigarh),8th Oct.2012} of their influence occurred in Haryana when a
Dalit girl was gang-raped by four individuals. Instead of condemning the
heinous crime, the Khap Panchayat attributed the incident to societal issues
like delayed marriages. It issued a controversial diktat suggesting that early
marriages for girls would prevent such incidents, an approach that shifts the
blame onto victims rather than addressing the root cause of gender violence.
Tragically, the young victim later committed suicide, reflecting the
devastating psychological toll of both the crime and societal apathy. The
political response was notably weak: while Congress President Sonia Gandhi
visited the victim’s family to condemn the incident, she refrained from
criticizing the Khap Panchayat’s extra-judicial authority. Similarly, former
Chief Minister Bhupender Singh Hooda described Khaps as "social
institutions" and cautioned against taking hasty actions to curb their
influence, claiming it could destabilize law and order in the state. Such
appeasement by political leaders illustrates how Khap Panchayats continue
to thrive under a system reluctant to challenge their authority. The fear of
alienating influential rural constituencies often leads to a tacit endorsement
of these bodies, allowing them to persist in perpetuating regressive
practices. This inaction not only emboldens KPs to act more aggressively but
also undermines the constitutional framework intended to protect individual
rights and ensure justice. Addressing the Khap Panchayat problem requires a
multi-faceted approach. Strict legal measures must be enacted to prevent
KPs from delivering extra-judicial judgments. Simultaneously, efforts to
educate communities on constitutional rights and gender equality can
weaken the traditional hold of KPs over rural society. Politicians must
abandon appeasement policies and instead prioritize upholding the rule of
law, ensuring that no parallel system of justice operates outside the purview
of the judiciary. This balanced approach can help reduce the influence of KPs
while fostering democratic and equitable governance in rural areas.
So, what could be the best alternative to overcome these issues?
● Weekend or Public Holidays: Organizing meetings on days when most
villagers are free from work.
● Seasonal Planning: Avoiding agricultural busy seasons to ensure
maximum attendance. One of the first steps in empowering Gram Sabhas is
ensuring that meetings are scheduled at convenient times. This simple yet
effective measure can greatly increase participation. So, how can we make
this process more inclusive?
Widespread publicity is essential for ensuring that everyone is informed
about the Gram Sabha meetings. This can be achieved through:
● Traditional Methods: Using drums or public announcements in local
languages.
● Modern Channels: Leveraging mobile technology and social media
platforms for wider reach. Diverse participation is the lifeblood of a
successful Gram Sabha. Encouraging women, marginalized communities, and
youth to actively participate can lead to more equitable and representative
governance.
Strategies to enhance this include:
● Reserved Seats: Implementing reservation for women and marginalized
groups in leadership roles.
● Awareness Campaigns: Conducting targeted campaigns to educate
these groups about their rights and the importance of their participation.
Accountability is key to the success of any governing body. Making Gram
Panchayats accountable to Gram Sabhas ensures that decision-making
remains transparent and reflects the will of the people. This can involve.
● Regular Reporting: Mandating Gram Panchayats to present detailed
reports of their work and finances.
● Right to Recall: Empowering the Gram Sabha with the right to recall non-
performing representatives.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can play a pivotal role in
empowering Gram Sabhas by raising awareness and providing education on
governance. They can:
 Conduct Workshops: Organize training sessions on the rights and duties
of Gram Sabha members.
 Offer Resources: Provide materials and logistical support for better
meeting management.
Community-based organizations (CBOs) often have deep insights into local
issues. Their reports can provide valuable data and perspectives that can
enhance the decision-making process of Gram Sabhas. To integrate CBOs
effectively, efforts can include
● Formal Inclusion: Amending rules to include CBO inputs as a formal part
of the meeting agenda.
● Collaborative Projects: Partnering with CBOs for local development
projects
For Gram Sabhas to function effectively, they must be legally empowered.
This might include:
● Enhanced Powers: Amending laws to grant Gram Sabhas greater say in
local governance matters.
● Enforcement Mechanisms: Establishing systems to ensure the decisions of
Gram Sabhas are respected and enacted

LOCAL GOVERNANCE: FINANCE AND FUNCTIONARIES

Usually when it comes to the discussion about Local government, we should
discuss its capacity and efficiency under three aspects:
 Funds
 Functionaries
 Functions
As prescribed in the 11th and 12th schedule of constitution 29 subjects from
state list should be transferred to panchayat and 18 subjects from state list
should be transferred to Municipalities. Since as per constitution devolution
of powers to local government has been kept under voluntary provision and
DPSP, States do not fully transfer all powers to local bodies.
Issue: People themselves see local government as part of state
government and not as two different compartments.
1.Financial: (Issues)
 Rural Local governments: No proper collection of taxes and low
revenue generation
 State Finance Commission - not properly reconstituted in every state
after 5 years
 Insufficient funds - with local governments - mostly funds are tagged.
 Presence of market chain of: corruption, criminalization of politics and
party dominance.
 Widening of Fiscal deficit
 Constraints in expansion of tax base
 Revenue expenditure of ULB and RLB increased after the pandemic -
70%of ULB - decline in revenue and 71 % rise in expenditure.
 Local bodies: own revenue - only 47 % of total revenue, rest - 53 %
from Finance commission grants
 Property tax collection in India: lowest in the world; Reason: poor land
records and increase in tax evasion cases.
 Inadequate operations and maintenance expenditure by local
governments
 Low investment in infrastructure autonomously by the local
governments.
The possible way forward could be; - The local bodies must increase their
tax collection base. When taxes are imposed and collected the common
public would become more vigilant about the functioning of local bodies. In
order to increase their revenue source local bodies must invest in
infrastructure construction. Taking inspiration from the Kerala model local
bodies should receive 10 % share of total income tax collection of a city.
There should be specialized funding given to the local government for
disaster management during the times of emergency. Cities and villages
should experience holistic development and basic amenities must be
ensured.

2. Functionaries: (Issues)
 Functionaries and staff of local government: They are not given a
separate cadre; they are dependent on state government cadres only:
in matters of appointment, transfers and supervision, hence these
staffs are more loyal to the state than to the center.
 Local government cadre: even when it is there - no proper training
given (Mayors and Chairpersons)
 Only top-down planning and implementation of schemes: no
motivation for local government staff to work.
 Assigning of state department tasks to local government - leading to
increase in extra burden for local government functionaries.
 Increase in outsourcing of local body work to contractors - no proper
recruitment and training given to workers - mainly due to huge salary
burden (Revenue expenditure - salary payments) for local bodies.
The possible way forward could be; There should be establishment of a separate
specialized body for recruiting and giving training for the local government
functionaries. A separate local government cadre should be allotted and these
functionaries - their transfer, appointment and supervision should be taken charge
by the local government. Through skilling workshops in villages capacity building
efforts should become efficient. Local government functionaries should not engage
themselves with state government department tasks. Inter Competition between
panchayats would result in enthusiastic participation of Gram sabhas. Taking
inspiration from the Kerala model since local government functionaries could
connect well with people at grassroots level, they should be given the responsibility
of handling disaster management tasks.

3. Functions: (Issues)
 As per the 11th and 12th schedule of the constitution - out of 29 items
assigned to panchayats and 18 items assigned to municipalities - only
few basic and light subjects such as water supply, sanitation, roads,
communication, streetlight provisions etc. have been transferred by all
Indian state governments to their own respective local government
bodies. But other attractive subjects have been retained by the state
government only. Due to this local governments have less scope to
generate revenue.
The possible way forward could be; Firstly, our local government has to be fully
empowered, their financial autonomy and resource generation base should get
stronger. After attaining this, there has to be strict transfer of all the vital 29 and 18
subjects to the local bodies by the state government. Especially there should be
scope for exploring new areas like - climate crisis, disaster management,
sustainable development goals etc.

CONCLUSION
Decentralization is a cornerstone of democracy, yet India’s local
governments struggle with limited autonomy despite the 73rd and 74th
constitutional amendments. Democratic decentralization is hindered by
political centralization, requiring reforms like amending Article 243G,
adopting model laws, and drawing from global practices such as South
Africa’s Municipal Systems Act and Brazil’s Participatory budgeting.
Strengthening local governance requires a holistic approach that addresses
structural, financial, and functional challenges.
● The realization of true decentralization necessitates a paradigm shift in
the structure and functioning of local governance in India. Despite
constitutional safeguards, the autonomy of local bodies remains
constrained by voluntary provisions and political centralization.
Comprehensive reforms, including mandatory devolution of powers,
financial independence, and the establishment of dedicated local
 government cadres, are imperative to address these structural
inefficiencies.
● Strengthening institutions like the Gram Sabha and expanding the
functional domains of Panchayati Raj Institutions to encompass critical
areas such as climate resilience and sustainable development will
empower local governments as proactive agents of change.
By fostering accountability, transparency, and participatory governance,
India can unlock the transformative potential of decentralized administration,
ensuring equitable and inclusive development rooted in grassroots
democracy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
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