UNSC

UNSC
UNSC

Conference
Background
Guide
-Advanced English Committee-

"The Situation of Afghanistan"

MDMUN 2023
2023 Mingdao Model United Nations (MDMUN) Background Guide (BGG)

Committee: United Nations Security Council UNSC

Issue: Situation In Afghanistan

Chair: Sam Chen

Co-Chairs: Haley Lin, Christopher Wang

Letter from the Dais Team

Greetings, delegates! On behalf of our lovely, hard-working co-chairs Haley and

Christopher, I shall welcome you to MDMUN 2023. As someone that has participated in 20+
conferences, let me share some of that old-man-story with you.

I started participating in MUN ever since I got into highschool, the challenge and
excitement provided by MUN propelled me to dive deeper and deeper into this rabbit hole. I
really mean every single word when I say “MUN has so much to offer.” From public-speaking to
knowledge-acquiring to friend-making, there is so much opportunity hidden in every chance you
decide to take. That is, if and ONLY IF you take these chances. Seizing the opportunity is
absolutely crucial in MUN. No matter how much I praise the values of MUN here, you’ll
experience none of that if no chances are taken. As I’ve mentioned in the chair introduction,
“There’s eternal value in our endeavors.” From raising your placard to initiating a DR, endeavors
demand courage, but courage will always be rewarded with growth.

It would be our utmost honor to aid you in acquiring a fine taste for knowledge and skill.
The topic this year should not be strange to anyone, yet there is so much of that foggy unknown
to uncover and learn. The only thing I request of you, is for you to understand that you are here
to learn; the formidable yet rich depths of knowledge lie in front of you, and it’s time for your
endeavor to take the leap.

Best Wishes,

Sam Chen.
Topic Introduction

“15 August 2021, those who once came, had returned.”

Years apart from the Taliban’s previous takeover of Afghanistan, they managed to seize
the region anew in 2021. To this day, the situation in Afghanistan seems far from stable.

The international society does not recognize the legitimacy of the Taliban due to the
challenges it poses to democratic values. One example can be the Taliban’s women-oppressing
policies. Women are prohibited from major forms of education; without a male guardian, they
are forbidden to travel of their own accord. Women’s rights to access public places and work are
also widely restricted. Despite the undermining of basic human rights, the restriction on working
forces also leads to difficulties in the reconstruction of the war.

Amid the interplay between international relations and its own policies, two-thirds of its
population’s living rely on humanitarian assistance, and 20 million people are undergoing food
insecurity crises. Although international aid has resumed since 2022, the impact brought still
takes a toll on the nation's economy and people’s livelihood.

In this year’s MDMUN advanced committee, delegates shall traverse through the thick
fog of international politics, hone their understanding of the world we live in, look beneath the
superficial, and seek the resolution blanketed under the mist.
Committee Introduction

After the atrocious tragedy of World War II (WWII), the victors proposed the
establishment of a new international organization, one that will soon be known as the United
Nations (UN). In an attempt to restore peace and replace the futile League of Nations, the UN
was established in hopes that it could realize “the birth of a new world, in which peace would
now at last be more effectively safeguarded.” (Luard 15) Among various sub-organs that were
created, one particular council stood out as it carried the responsibility and authority to safeguard
peace. The Council in question is one of the six main organs of the UN, the Security Council
(SC), established as the UN Charter was signed in 1945. (Security Council Report, 1)

Up to this date, there are a total of 15 seats in the SC, consisting of “5 permanent and 10
non-permanent members.” (“What is the Security Council?”) Every year, 5 of the non-permanent
members would be elected, and each of them would serve for two years once they are elected.

As the only UN organ with the power to impose “binding obligations,” (Haass) UNSC
sits at the top of the power structure of the UN. Its influence has been present ever since the
inception of the UN, from the long-ended Korean War all the way to ongoing Russo-Ukrainian
war. Its veto feature, which enables its five permanent members (P5) -the United States, People’s
Republic of China, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, and France- to rule out
decisions with one single vote, has also long been one of the most controversial facets of the UN.

Contrary to the common belief that “nations should all be treated equally,” the
composition of the Council is greatly tilted towards the interests of the superpowers due to the
existence of permanent members and their rights to veto. This structure reflected the political
landscape of the post-WWII period, and has profound impacts in modern politics even as the
landscape has shifted.

Function and Power

“In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members
confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security
Council acts on their behalf.” (“UN Charter”) - The UN Charter
 The quote above is taken from article 24 of the UN Charter. It is clear that the SC was
meant to play a central role in the maintenance of peace. A broad range of measures could be
brought forth to achieve this goal, ranging from the establishment of certain working groups to
the imposition of sanctions. (“UN Charter”) While the SC could make binding decisions under
certain conditions, one should not claim that all its decisions are legally binding. It “depends on
the terms of the decision and the language used.” (Security Council Report, 13) Non-binding
recommendations that serve as a manifestation of the collective interest of the Council also work
in tandem with binding ones, which shall be approached with caution considering the
consequences that might ensue. (Security Council Report, 13) More precise descriptions of the
power and function are all listed in Article 23~54 of the UN Charter. We would strongly
recommend delegates to check out the Charter, as proposing a solution the committee does
not have a mandate to execute is a common rookie mistake in MUN conferences.

As mentioned above, there is a broad range of actions the Council could take, here we
will outline some of them that are more directly connected to the issue at hand: it has the
responsibility to investigate international disputes that might threaten international security. It
could even take actions to prevent activities that have the potential to harm international stability.
To mark out some of the more important powers of the council, these actions could include:
calling upon member states to conduct economic sanctions or other measures not involving the
use of arm force, taking military action against an aggressor, setting up sub-organs or committees
regarding the dispute, and to recommend possible solutions regarding the dispute. It should be
noted the harsh punishments such as employing the military or imposing sanctions are not
common practice within the SC considering its severe consequences. Most of the time, the SC
only outlines general directions it wishes the UN and the international society to be guided
towards.

Now, let’s see these functions and powers work in practice.

Past Resolutions

We’ll start with Resolution 2681 (2023), one of the most recent ones. In this resolution,
the UNSC responded to Taliban's decision to ban Afghan women from working for the United
Nations in Afghanistan. It asked the Taliban to “swiftly reverse its policies and practices
restricting women and girls’ enjoyment of their human rights and fundamental freedoms.” It
should be clear that the UNSC resolutions could serve as a means for the SC members to unite
and voice their collective demands. This and various other aspects of the meeting should
showcase how the Security Council focuses not only on military actions but also relevant human
rights concerns. Although it could sometimes become a political bargain for nations to sneak in
their interests, the SC still holds the sacred mission of maintaining international order. In the
beginning of Resolution 2681, part of the preamble mentioned the importance of “Afghan-led
and Afghan-owned determination of country’s political future and development path,” this
should be a demonstration of how the Security Council utilizes its influence in outlining major
directions of UN policies. In this case, emphasizing the importance of self-determination.

“ Expressing deep concern that the recent decision by the Taliban to ban Afghan
women from working for the United Nations in Afghanistan (...) and recalling in this regard
Article 8 of the Charter of the United Nations,”

- Resolution 2681 (2023)

“ 4. Stresses the urgent need to “continue addressing the dire economic and
humanitarian situation in Afghanistan, and the lack of essential services to the Afghan
population and economic and social conditions that can lead to self-reliance and stability in
Afghanistan, and recognizes the need to help address the substantial challenges facing
Afghanistan’s economy,” including through efforts to enable the use of assets belonging to
Afghanistan’s Central Bank for the benefit of the Afghan people;”

- Resolution 2681 (2023)

Other than that the Security Council also mentioned the earlier restrictions and how it
affects the Afghanistan women and girls. Further down the line it is mentioned that there shall be
more substantial actions in hopes of revitalizing the economic situation of Afghanistan.
 “ Recognizing the need to address the multifaceted challenges faced by Afghanistan,
including but not limited to, humanitarian, economic, and social challenges, development,
security and terrorism, narcotics, dialogue and engagement, governance and the rule of law,
as well as human rights and especially the rights of women and girls, religious and ethnic
minorities,”
- Resolution 2681 (2023)

Here it should be clear that the mission of the Security Council is not only limited to
traditional security. When matters are under consideration of the SC, there should be an
extensive array of aspects involved. (“Security Council Condemns Decision by Taliban to Ban
Afghan Women from Working for United Nations in Afghanistan, Unanimously Adopting
Resolution 2681 (2023) | UN Press”)(“ODS HOME PAGE”). It should also be noted that the SC
does not give a detailed step-by-step plan for its executive bodies to carry out. Instead it is
responsible for determining the general direction and scope of these operations. The real work,
and all the arduous planning, should be dealt with by executive bodies such as the UNAMA1.

Other strategies commonly used by the SC include condemning actions that do not align
with international law, and making recommendations based on their decisions. Considering that
the SC is already sanctioning the Taliban (see more in Statement of the Problem), it will also be
of consideration whether or not the SC should lift the sanctions against it.

Background

Early History

Afghanistan, the heart of Asia, has a tempestuous nature rooted in its geography and
history. As a mountainous land, rural and urban areas in Afghanistan are divided by
geographical gaps. The separation foreshadows instability in Afghanistan’s modern history.
Afghanistan’s strategic importance lured great empires in the distant past to fight to acquire it-
Babylonia, Macedonia, etc (Salahi). In this section of the background guide, we’ll go through the

1
More about the UNAMA in the Past Actions.
turbulence of Afghanistan, and bring about the country we see and know nowadays
(“Afghanistan Turbulence”).

The turbulence in Afghanistan can be traced back to 1965 when the communist People’s
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was secretly formed. The PDPA eventually brought the
Soviet Union's influence into Afghanistan, along with chaos and militias. Five years after
Afghanistan transformed from a monarchy into a republic, the PDPA initiated the Saur
Revolution, a coup in April 1978 that overthrew the monarchy government at the time.
Afghanistan thereby became a socialist country (“Communist Regime”).

At the time, most supporters of the communist government resided in the major cities,
while the rural areas were governed by tribal leaders. This gap made it troublesome for the
government to seize power over the whole country. When the communist government in Kabul
decided to implement social reforms, they faced resistance posed by rural Afghanistan. As the
situation deteriorated, they requested the Soviet Union’s assistance to stabilize the country
(“Communist Regime”).

In December 1979, one year after the PDPA’s acquisition of power, the Soviet troops
entered Afghanistan. However, the invasion of the Soviet army and social reforms that
undermine Islamic values enraged Afghanistan’s rural population. Furious civilians thus formed
guerillas that opposed the socialist government known as Mujahideen2. As fights between the
government and militias began, Muslims from around the world along with countries in
opposition to the Soviet Union began supporting the Mujahideen (“Soviet Invasion”). This
rivalry between Mujahideen groups and the Soviet Union was named the Afghan War, which
caused massive casualties and an influx of refugees pouring into neighboring countries. The
prolonged conflict destabilized the political landscape and created extremist groups within the
country’s rural area, contributing to the rise of al-Qaeda and the Taliban (“The Afghanistan
War”). The sudden disappearance of Soviet and PDPA authority also created a power vacuum in
the country leading to a civil war that largely degraded civilian lives, leaving people in fear and
agony (“Humanity Denied”).

2
Mujahideen, people who contribute to the sacred effort.
Attack of the Taliban

As endless conflicts between Mujahideen groups kept disrupting and threatening people’s
lives, the situation ultimately led to people’s revolts. In 1994, people from the Kandahar province
turned to mullah3 Muhammed Omar, a religious scholar of a local madrasa and once a jihadist4
militant against the Soviet Union. The group led by the mullah swiftly pacified local warlords
and finally seized the whole Kandahar province with locals’ support. This group gradually
gained influence in southern Afghanistan and was later known as the Taliban, which means “the
Students ” in Pashto (Johnson and Mason).

As the nascent Taliban gained increasing influence within the region, nearby countries
cooperated with the Taliban to gain influence in Afghanistan — including Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Pakistan (“Recognition of Taliban”). Saudi Arabia and UAE
funded the Taliban for their strict interpretation of Sunni Islam. Pakistan, on the other hand,
supported the Taliban as there were major concerns regarding state security. As former Afghan
regimes usually would unite with the Indian government to reduce interference from Pakistan
within the border, the Taliban, however, promised a pliant order in Kabul, thus becoming
especially favorable. It’s notable that these allies later became the only three countries in the
world that recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan (Pakistan
Relationships).

While the acquisition of the South was smooth; the North was not quite. It wasn’t until
1998 that the Taliban finally seized Kabul. By then, the Taliban had dominated 90% of
Afghanistan and left only a loose coalition of Mujahideen groups in the north known as the
Northern Alliance (“Northern Alliance”).

Even with such progress, they did not start building a constitutional government. Instead,
they prioritized eliminating resistance forces and expanding their territory, asserting it was the
only means to establish a “true” or "pure" Islamic order. Struggling to build bureaucratic
frameworks and run state institutions, the Taliban claimed the irrelevance of any state-enacted
laws or constitution, contending that the Islamic religion can provide all guidance (Bashir et al.).

3
Mullah, traditional religious instructor of Islam.
4
Jihad stands for struggle or effort in Arabic, hereby referred to a sacred fight.
This made Afghanistan’s judiciary full of vagueness and ambiguity, leaving matters to be judged
by the dichotomy of either being Islamic or unIslamic (Bashir et al.). They also justified
themselves with this logic, claiming that they were devoted followers of Allah who practiced
Jihad authorized by God against Mujahideen who strayed from Islam and schemed to gain
wealth (Lombardi).

In order to create a Quranic society, they referred to their interpretation of the medieval
shura5 of Islam and structured a highly centralized authoritarian government, in which the
highest authority Amir has unlimited power over the judiciary and any decision-making.
Absolute obedience to Amir is morally, lawfully, and religiously required, anyone who stood
opposed could be sentenced to death (Bashir et al.).

A New Hope

Al-Qaeda, an ally of the Taliban, had had a close bond with Afghanistan. In late 1979, the
founder of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, started funding Islamic fighters battling the Soviets with
his wealth. As Soviet troops withdrew in 1989, bin Laden took the event as an inspiration and
created the militant group al-Qaeda which continued jihadist actions against those they deemed
unIslamic regimes in Islamic lands, including some Mujahideen groups and foreign parties such
as the United States (“bin Laden”). It was one of the closest comrades of the Taliban in their
legacy to enforce Islamic order on the land. however, brought about the termination of the first
Taliban emirate due to its reckless misbehaving against the Western world, rousing an eagle they
couldn’t subdue (“Osama bin Laden — FBI”).

Al-Qaeda, as they strengthened within the area, became known worldwide. They
antagonized Western countries, especially the United States for the alleged degradation of
Islamic lands and suppression of Muslims. The leadership of al-Qaeda, however, had a
misperception of the United States deriving from their several withdrawals at the time. They
contended that the United States was a “Paper Tiger,” and can be paralyzed with one strike (“bin
Laden”).

5
Stands for consultation in Arabic.
 On September 11th morning, al Qaeda launched the world’s most notorious terrorist
attack in the United States. Four aircraft were hijacked soon after their takeoff and were
redirected to crash into buildings located in dense population areas including both towers of the
World Trade Center, and speculatively the Pentagon and the White House (“Osama bin Laden —
FBI”).

The United States of America, after the 911 attack, swiftly responded with the bombings
on locations where the Taliban allegedly hid al-Qaeda members. Many might interpret the
counter-attacks as actions based solely on the rage of the people of the United States; some
political scientists, however, deemed these actions were done, not only to appease the anger of
the public but also to demonstrate power and solidify its image of being the world’s only
superpower at the time (Afghanistan and the War on Terror).

“The [George W. Bush] Administration needed to convince both the American domestic
population and any likely perpetrators of such attacks that, far from being rendered immobile
and defenceless, it would act decisively. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the
Iron Curtain, the USA stood as the world's only superpower and it was inevitable that it would
use its military might to pursue Al-Qaeda.”(Afghanistan and the War on Terror)

The United States commenced its counter-attack on October 19th after failing
negotiations with the Taliban The anti-Taliban forces led by the United States soon emerged
triumphant and captured Kabul easily (“U.S. Rejects New Taliban Offer”). As the Taliban
members fled into rural areas, Afghanistan was, once again, left ungoverned.

In 2001, in order to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan, a conference staged by the

Security Council was held in Bonn, Germany. The conference produced the Agreement on
Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent
Government Institutions, which is also known as the Bonn Agreement (Oliver). The agreement
established an interim government in Afghanistan, officially named as Afghan Interim Authority
(AIA) (“Bonn Agreement”).

In order to defuse ethnic tensions, Hamid Karzai established a cabinet that consisted of
representatives from different regions and many ethnic groups, many of whom are warlords,
local strongmen, or militia leaders (“Who's Who”). As administrative power was divided into
factions, the central government was unable to pose comprehensive control and thereby was
uninfluential. Although this highly fragmented government was not considered an effective one,
Karzai’s attempt to harmonize the country was seen as rather positive for avoiding conflicts in
the post-Taliban era (Mukhopadhyay).

"Given Afghanistan’s history of weak central power and its limited resources, the form of
governance represented by warlord-governors may be the best compromise at present in
Afghanistan.” (Mukhopadhyay)

- Warlords As Bureaucrats: The Afghan Experience

During this stage, the United States greatly funded the government, and closely
collaborated with local administrations. The result, in spite of the massive sum of money
invested, was ineffective. A big portion of the money was embezzled. Therefore, although an
increasing amount of funds was sent to Afghanistan, the quality of infrastructure in many places
was not notably improved (Mukhopadhyay).

The Taliban Struck Back

In the post-Taliban era, the United States and Afghanistan became closely bonded as the
interim government’s dependence on the United State’s country-building assistance remained.
However, this situation did not last long. In 2003, the United States and its allies committed
themselves to the Iraq War, which aimed to eliminate the weapon of mass destruction Iraq
allegedly own (“Timeline: Iraq”). This resulted in a diversion of resources and manpower
provided by the United States and thus a decline in defense. With people enraged by the Western
powers’ ruthless airstrikes on their side, the Taliban seized this opportunity and gradually
regained influence in the rural areas (Byman).

As the Taliban strengthened over time, the United States realized that the interim
government was threatened and hence recommitted to Afghanistan. In 2009, former President of
the United States Barack Obama announced the Surge which was “an additional 30,000 troops to
Afghanistan.”(“Obama Speech 2019”) They staged military campaigns that expelled the Taliban
forces within urban areas but were still unable to eradicate those in the rural regions (MacAskill).
The prolonged fight thus extended and gradually intensified. The United States also rerouted its
main course in Afghanistan into assisting the training of the Afghanistan army to build capacity
and eventually handing the responsibility to the local force (“Obama Speech 2019”).

In 2011, the United States successfully neutralized its primary object- Osama bin Laden
in Pakistan (Phillips). A withdrawal of the United States troops dispensed as per the Surge was
announced consequently and the remaining forces were scheduled to retreat. The United States
further gravitated its mission from “from combat to support” (“Obama Speech 2011”).

During the process, the United States sought conversations with the Taliban in pursuit of
a stable environment; however, the process had been little. As the volatile situation between the
forces went on, they started to gain progress since 2019 (“Timeline: Afghanistan”). And
eventually, the Doha agreement between the United States government and the Taliban was
established. The agreement guaranteed the United States’ withdrawal, the prevention of Afghani
land used for terrorist purposes and offenses toward the Western forces, and a ceasefire of
intra-Afghan negotiations (“Doha Agreement”).

As it was announced, by September 11th, 2021, the United States administration would
retreat the remaining troops and guarantee their noninterference regardless of how the history
unfolded. On August 15th, the Taliban attacked Kabul. With the interim government surrendered,
they faced no resistance. Soon after seizing the capital, the Taliban announced the establishment
of the country “Islamic Emirate.” The Age of the Taliban thus began (“Timeline: Afghanistan”).
Statement of the Problem

Ever since the Taliban takeover in 2021, the international community has considered
numerous questions from the newly formed government. We have divided the question into four
for delegates’ reference: Human Rights, Food Security and Humanitarian Crisis, Sanction and
Economy, and Security and Terrorism. Delegates are encouraged to conduct brief research on
their delegation’s general focus and interest in Afghanistan. Some countries might be more
interested in human rights topics. Others might look more carefully into economic issues or
security due to its geopolitical position and economic interest. With said pieces of information,
the delegates can scrutinize the following text more critically according to their national interest.

Human Rights

“The de facto authorities have effective control over the country and therefore are
responsible for fulfilling the obligations emanating from the international human rights and
humanitarian treaties to which Afghanistan is a party, regardless of whether there is recognition
of a formal change of government.” (A/HRC/51/6, 19)

- Report of Rapporteur

From the quote above, we can see that at least, by the common practice of international
law and from the perspective of the UN, the de facto authorities, the Taliban government, have
the obligation to abide by international treaties into which the previous Afghanistan government
has entered. In a meeting of the authorities with the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of
Human Rights in Afghanistan (hereafter Rapporteur), the authorities recognized these claims on
human rights (A/HRC/51/6, 20). They recognized that most international human rights norms
align with their interpretation of Sharia6. However, the UN still recorded multiple human rights
violations that will be laid out in this section.

6
The Sharia Law is an Islamic Law followed by many Islamic countries such as the Taliban authority, Saudi Arabia,
Iran, etc. There are multiple different version of interpretation that were applied to different countries. Sometimes,
even various versions for different counties. The delegate must note that Taliban is not panticularly special in terms
of their position in Sharia Law. And the Sharia Law must be respected throughout the conference.
Women’s Rights

“Afghan Women know what it means to be resilient and strong, we have endured pain
and hardship for years during the conflict, we have buried our sons and daughters, but the pain
and fear we feel today for ourselves and our daughters’ futures, while feeling forgotten by the
international community, is a pain much worse.” (A/HRC/51/6, 21)

- An Afghan Women to the Rapporteur

The authorities have devastated the realization of women’s rights in Afghanistan. In

December 2020, the Taliban suspended university education for women until the “right Sharia
environment” was established. Furthermore, “Afghanistan is now the only country in the world
where it is illegal for girls to attend school past sixth grade,” reported by a U.S.-funded
investigation (SIGAR, 38). The Rapporteur (A/HRC/51/6, 29) warned that such discrimination
against the right to education violates the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, article 10) and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, article 13).

Women’s right to work formulated in ICESCR (article 6) was violated. Women have to
stay home if they lack a justifiable cause. By March 2022, 61% of women have lost their
position and were unavailable for economic activities. This caused an estimated $600 million to
$1 billion (in USD, approximately 3 to 5% of GDP) of financial loss (A/HRC/51/6, 38). Women
are banned from working for Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), further causing logistic
problems for the delivery of humanitarian aid. The ban has even triggered an “operational review
period” from April 11th, 2023, to May 5th, when the UN Assistance Mission In Afghanistan
(UNAMA) operations are mostly suspended (UNAMA).

The authorities also imposed other institutional discriminations against women.

Hijab-wearing becomes mandatory, a ban for women to enter parks… Numerous sexual
discriminations were reported. According to the authorities, women are essentially affiliated
under men's supervision. Restrictions are cast upon the right to travel without the accompany of
a close male family member (mahram). Male family members may even be penalized for
“violations” in women’s conduct, further aggravating the society’s limitations of women’s
freedom .
 One of the main missions of the UNAMA is to advocate women’s rights. Alongside UN
Women, the UNAMA convened the Country-Wide Women’s Consultation to compensate for the
authorities’ lack of effort to include women in their decision-making process. The local Afghan
women's representatives deemed the re-initiation of women’s access beyond primary education
and sought recognition from regional and Muslim countries. They also requested UNAMA to
increase women's political participation with the authorities through negotiations and dialogues
(S/2022/916, 43). With this spirit and the facilitation of UNAMA, the authorities established the
Human Rights and Women’s International Affairs Department within the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to address recommendations made by the UN (A/HRC/52/84, 13). However, we’ll have
to see future reports from the UNAMA to examine the effectiveness of the measure, as the
department was newly established.

Freedom of Speech and Assembly

“Freedom of speech and access to media does not exist in Afghanistan (…) The safety of
journalists and media workers needs to be prioritized and when people disappear, someone
should be held to account.”

- A Journalist told the Rapporteur

Afghanistan is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

(ICCPR), where the right to hold opinions and the freedom of expression (to seek, receive, and
impart information) are guaranteed (ICCPR, 19). OHCHR reported that “(…) the authorities
have repeatedly stressed their commitment to guaranteeing freedom of expression, considering
Islamic principles, Sharia, and national interest.” However, in May 2022, the World Press
Freedom Index ranked Afghanistan 156th out of all 180 countries, descending from 122nd in
2021 (Reporters Without Borders). The authorities have not yet fulfilled their obligation, and
Afghanistan's overall freedom of expression has worsened.

On September 19, 2021, the authorities announced the “11 Journalism Rule,” setting a
tone for the Taliban’s effort to restrict freedom of expression in forthcoming months. The rules
banned “criticism of government officials without proof, spreading false news and rumors and
dissuading the media to avoid interviewing individuals who are critical of the authorities.”
(A/HRC/52/84, 71)
 Journalists and human rights activists have suffered intimidation, violence, surveillance,
and unlawful detention. Robespierian atmosphere has been cast upon the Afghani. Since the
takeover, 245 cases against media freedom have been recorded, with 130 cases of detention,
physical violence, ill-treatment, and torture. (A/HRC/52/84, 69) Journalism in Afghanistan
shrunk dramatically. 40% of media outlets have shut down, and 60% of journalists went
unemployed (A/HRC/52/84, 72). The Taliban claims many of their reports contradict the
“Islamic values and national interest,” therefore, have to be restricted.

The situation for the right to peaceful assembly is no better. More than half of protests
documented in the last Rapporteur reporting period resorted to excessive power against
protesters, including beating. The authorities have banned the protest, and those participating in
civil activities will be arbitrarily arrested and detained. Interrogation and coerced confession
were frequently documented. There is no due process in Afghanistan (A/HRC/52/84, 67).

Rule of Law and Inclusive Governance

Rule of law and equal representation in political positions descended in Afghanistan after
the coup. The authorities abolished the 2004 constitution. Both houses of the parliament and the
Electoral Commission were shut (A/HRC/52/84, 11). There is no standardized procedure for
police and judge to follow in Afghanistan. The only law the authorities followed seems to be the
Sharia law of the Islamic Hanafi school. Notably, many other Islamic countries codified Sharia
into their law. However, Sharia in Afghanistan is not codified and is up for many interpretations
and speculations (A/HRC/52/84, 50).

A legal review process is conducted by legal experts and the Ulema Council, composed
of Islamic scholars. However, the review has no component of involvement of the society nor
recommendations from outside legal scholars. This could lead to a code incompatible with
domestic or international expectations (A/HRC/52/84, 56).

Other parts of the Taliban’s government were also registered to lack public participation.
The authorities’ cabinet is composed chiefly of Pashtun, with only five out of thirty members of
other races. Violating the principle of inclusive governance is against the Declaration on the
Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities. The
authorities also replaced multiple ministers at provincial and state levels, hinting at a
“progressive shift in decision-making from Kabul to Kandahar,” described by the Rapporteur
(A/HRC/52/84, 10).

Conclusion

In this section, we have reviewed multiple human rights violations observed by the UN in
Afghanistan. Women’s rights, freedom of speech, and inclusive governance are common values
many council members share. The Taliban also demonstrated some positive attitude toward
changes by establishing the Women’s International Affairs Department and their constant
discussion with UN officials. The delegate must ask themselves: how can the UN use its
existing resources, such as the UNAMA, to advocate for more progressive governance in
Afghanistan?

Food Security and Humanitarian Crisis

Afghanistan depended mainly on international aid, with an estimated 75% of its economy
relying on foreign assistance before 2021. This outside aid supports citizens’ income and many
essential state infrastructures. However, after the coup, things turned down fast with the
withdrawal of foreign aid. A report from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (UNOCHA) estimated that in 2023, 28.3 million people will require urgent humanitarian
assistance to survive. That is, two-thirds of the country’s population is at the edge of dying
without international support. The number is still climbing year to year (OCHA, 11).

Food Security

“Sometimes I have tea and some bread for breakfast, but most days I come to school
without eating anything. I am hungry. And it is difficult for me to concentrate on what the
teacher says when I have eaten nothing.” (WFP)

- A sixth-grade girl to World Food Program (WFP)

Afghanistan “continues facing the highest prevalence of insufficient food consumption

globally,” according to the World Food Program (WFP). The lack of foreign support (see
Liquidity and Economy), compounding widespread unemployment, the international increase of
food prices brought about by the Russo-Ukrainian War, and three years of consecutive drought,
the food security crisis has worsened since the Taliban takeover.

General food costs around 60-70% of Afghani income for those of lower socio-economic
status. In 2022, almost 20 million people, that is half of the population, are classified under
level-3 “crisis” or level-4 “emergency” acute malnutrition based on WFP’s International Food
Security Phase Classification (IPC, a 1-5 points index with one being the mildest). The figure is
expected to grow in 2023, even considering planned humanitarian assistance (OCHA, 36).
Projecting 46% of the population will suffer level-3 and up malnutrition crisis. Moreover, in
2020, WFP recorded tens of thousands of people suffering level-5 “famine” in Ghor province
(WFP).

The proportion of dwellers of Afghanistan who adopted negative coping mechanisms

incorporating food insecurity rises (OCHA, 41). In the urban area, 13% spent their savings, 32%
sold household assets, and 43% delayed education or health expenses. When people lose access
to food, they sacrifice other life-supporting mechanisms, therefore, leading to greater suffering.

The situation in Afghanistan begs for international help. However, as estimated by the
OCHA, only 23% of the population was covered with humanitarian food assistance (HFA) in
2022. The fundamental reason for insufficient international aid is because of the sanction on
Taliban officials and the blockade of assets imposed by the US (see Liquidity and Economy).
Before the coup, 75% of Afghani economy relied on foreign assets. Now, 75% of the economy
disappears, hence leaving great suffering to the Afghani people. Delegates must remember that
to solve the dire humanitarian situation, the political debate of lifting sanctions must be
directly confronted.

Counter-Narcotics

“Afghan farmers are trapped in the illicit opiate economy, while seizure events around
Afghanistan suggest that opiate trafficking continues unabated.” (UNODC)

- Said the Executive Director of the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

The international community is disturbed by the rise of opium production in Afghanistan.

The Afghanistan Opium Surveys conducted under the UN Office of Drugs and Crime’s
(UNODC) Illicit Crop Monitoring Program (ICMP) found that Afghanistan supplies 80% of the
world’s opiate demand. The 2022 opium cultivation increased by 32% compared to last year.
Farmers' income from opium production tripled, worth $1.4 billion in total in 2022. That is, 29%
of the entire agricultural sector in 2021 (UNODC).

The production only consists of around 25% of the opium industry. Instead, the
well-structured drug transportation network in Afghanistan generates the majority of revenue.
The whole industry combined contributes more than 9-14% of the country’s GDP. Note that the
GDP calculation only consists of domestic production and trafficking. Experts expect to record a
more considerable sum and profit beyond the supply chain in Afghanistan (UNODC).

The authorities announced a ban on the cultivation of opium in April 2022. However, the
execution is uneven across different provinces. Moreover, more factors should be considered
when casting an abrupt ban on the industry. Opium has become a significant pillar of the
economy of Afghanistan. Not only farmers but the livelihood of those who distribute and process
opium will be destroyed.

Without parallel humanitarian efforts and viable economic alternatives, those workers
might turn towards other illicit activities, causing further problems and deterioration of the
humanitarian situation. Again, the problem of opium production can be linked back to the
question of sanctions. Afghanistan heavily relies on foreign aid, therefore, without international
support, the livelihood of Afghani cannot be guaranteed.

Conclusion

The case of humanitarian aid in Afghanistan is not a problem, per se, but a natural
outcome of overall macro conditions such as the economic and liquidity crisis introduced in the
next section. Aside from thinking about which UN body could come to the rescue, delegates
must engage in the underlying mpolitical debate regarding withdrawing foreign aid due to
imposed sanctions. When 75% of the capital circulation of a country abruptly ceases, the
economy and the social welfare system will collapse. Without solving the underlying problems
of sanctions, a truly prosperous Afghanistan can never be achieved.
Sanctions and Economy

The economy is declining in Afghanistan. In 2021-2022, a 30-35% drop in GDP was

documented. Inflation and the price of livestock are mounting. Wheat and flour are 26% more
expensive. Fertilizers increased by 49%. Diesel fuel with a staggering 76% increase (OCHA,
18).

The authorities advocated for “self-reliance and promoted domestic production,

prioritizing trade, agricultural, mining, and industrial and infrastructure projects through
interaction with the private sector.” However, the private sector is facing a meltdown. Many
people face unemployment, businesses close down, and investors leave due to insecurity and
lack of the rule of law. Household income declined by 17%. The average per-person daily
income is registered to be less than half of the poverty line. The economy decline, same with
other aforementioned issue, are all consequence of sanctions.

Sanctions

The relevance of sanctions and the situation of Afghanistan cannot be overstated, as the
delegates have observed in the Statement of Problem. Therefore, this section is probably the
most important section of the entire Background Guide, marking the root of all debates to
come in the conference. Please pay special attention.

UN Sanctions
Acting in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter, for the purpose of containing act of
aggression, the UNSC may “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail,
sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of
diplomatic relations.” (UN Charter, 42) In this section, we’ll review specifically on the
“interruption of economic relations,” however, relevant sanctions on travel ban or military
embargo7 was also implemented by the UN.

Under Article 42 of the UN Charter, the UNSC have decided to ban all direct or in-direct
financial transactions of any sorts with the Taliban:

7
See S/RES/1333 (2000) Article 5, among other resolutions
 “Freeze funds and other financial resources, including funds derived or generated
from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban, or by any undertaking
owned or controlled by the Taliban, (...) and ensure that neither they nor any other funds or
financial resources so designated are made available (...) to or for the benefit of the Taliban or
any undertaking owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Taliban, except as may be
authorized by the Committee on a case-by-case basis on the grounds of humanitarian need;”

(S/RES/1267 (1999), 4-b)

In short, every financial assets directly or indirectly owned or benefiting the Taliban
should be frozen. Moreover, financial transactions is banned, as long as it is benefiting the
Taliban.8 Furthermore, the aforementioned sanctions in S/RES/1267 and S/RES/1988 are not
lifted after the Taliban takeover, according to S/RES/2665 (2022).

“Decides that all States shall continue to take the measures required by paragraph 1 of
resolution 2255 (2015)9”

(S/RES/2665 (2022), 1)

There are no sanctions against “Afghanistan” or “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,” but

only sanctions against the “Taliban,” the “terrorist” group. However, as the Taliban has become
the de facto authorities of Afghanistan, many, if not all, of the international aid could be seen as
“[for the benefit of the Taliban] or by persons acting on their behalf or at their direction”
(S/RES/1998 (2011), 1-a). Moreover, despite that humanitarian aid were permitted under UNSC
sanctions, many banks were deterred and hesitant to operate in Afghanistan as the relevant
procedural cost and risk were higher in Afghanistan. To consider the question of sanction,
therefore, does not necessarily mean to lift the sanctions (while it shall be one of the viable

8
See S/RES/1988 (2011) for more information regarding specific criterias
9
The “paragraph of resolution 2255 (2015)” is a similar statement with S/RES/1267 (1999), 4-b that we
have introduced, only a bit more specific
options), but to examine and facilitate humanitarian aid under the limitation of existing
sanctions.

Sanctions from Countries

The specifics of the sanctions will be reviewed later (see Major Actor). To briefly
summarize, the U.S. and European central banks froze Afghanistan's $9 billion foreign reserve
after the coup. Notably, $1 billion of the frozen assets belong to the private sector, harming
business and household savings (Human Rights Watch). Under the US supervision (Human
Rights Watch), funds from the World Bank Group (WBG), among others, are suspended, while
Afghanistan’s central bank was cut out from the international banking system, such as SWIFT.
Recently, some the US and other countries gradually move to de-frozen funds necessary for
humanitarian operations, however, not many funds have actually been released (see Major
Actor).

Liquidity Crisis

“People have nothing to eat. You may not imagine it, but children are starving (…) The
situation is dire, especially if you go to the villages (…) A functioning banking system is an
immediate and crucial need to address the humanitarian crisis.”

- An Afghan humanitarian official told Human Rights Watch

One of the interesting phenomena for Afghanistan’s economy is that the overall
availability of generic products was on par with September 2021 (i.e., pre-coup) standard, only
pricier. Economists classify this situation as stagflation. Stagflation is an event with high
inflation alongside high unemployment and occurs typically due to a supply shock (a decrease in
supply). In the case of Afghanistan, the supply shock is caused by political instability, a general
reduction in economic activity. These aside, the main reason of stagflation is due to the
abrupt cut of international aid. When 75% of the economy is gone, the economy will suffer.

The banks in Afghanistan remain malfunctioning without liquidity, which, in this context,
refers to the quantity of banknotes in circulation. With an overall AFN 4 billion (the Afghan
currency) in the economy, only 0.5 billion is in circulation. Due to the sanction on international
transactions, the central bank of Afghanistan, Da Afghanistan Bank, lacks both U.S. and Afghani
banknotes. Thus, the Taliban imposed a 5% withdrawal limit for all bank accounts (International
Council of Voluntary Agencies 16), which induced a lack of access to capital. Without capital,
there’s no saving, borrowing, or investment. Transactions for essential livestock, such as food
and medicine, are also subjected to the liquidity crisis. The real shortage is not any of the
commodities but the instruments for trading.

Aid Delivery and Non-Governmental Organizations

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the UN are subjected to a lack of liquidity

induced by relevant sanctions and the abolishment of the international digital transaction
framework, such as the SWIFT. Only 5% of NGOs report having a functional transferring
system. NGOs rely on billions of dollars to sustain their normal operation (Norwegian Refugee
Council). However, NGOs in Afghanistan have little access to banknotes for transactions such as
salary payments or humanitarian aid.

Currently, a money transferring scheme called hawala is widely adopted by NGOs in

replacement of the formal banking system, as an alternative to normal electronic transfer (such as
SWIFT). In November 2021, approximately $1 million was transferred through the hawala. The
hawala scheme required at least two licensed and trustable “hawaladar.” The NGOs first
electronically transfer the money through the standard procedure to a hawaladar overseas. Then,
the second hawaladar in Afghanistan will deliver physical banknotes to local NGO operations.

The hawala scheme has several problems (Norwegian Refugee Council). First, the lack
of transparency and legal framework. Reportedly, the electronic transfer to the first hawaladar
was often blocked due to money laundering concerns. Moreover, the in-transparency of hawala
implies its instability, as you are essentially wiring money to a stranger without verification.
Second is its high transaction cost. The 8-15% transaction fee greatly hindered the efficiency of
humanitarian aid. Thirdly, the capacity of the hawala is constrained by the liquidity of money. If
there’s no money circulation, the hawaladar cannot provide more banknotes than the market.

The Taliban also actively tries to interfere with NGO operations. Almost 500 instances of
bureaucratic impediments were recorded in the last four-month report period. Most cases
involved authorities pressuring NGOs to sign memorandums of understanding (MOUs) (SIGAR,
7). The MOUs often require NGOs to share information and coordinate with the Taliban
regarding the planning and implementation of humanitarian operations. Thus, as Taliban
gradually interferes with NGO operations, concerns that such interference might “[limit] the
ability of these organizations to provide needed services to the Afghan people” were raised
(SIGAR, 7).

The NGOs in Afghanistan were exposed to financial and political risks. Overall, the
hawala is only a short-term solution. Electronic transaction is required to sustain humanitarian
aid at this scale. Moreover, special care towards the liquidity problem is required to solve aid
delivery for NGOs.

Conclusion

The economy of Afghanistan continues to suffer from the compound effect of a lack of
liquidity, inflation, and a decline in economic activity. Moreover, the work of NGOs was deterred
by the Taliban and the lack of access to funding. Many questions were due to international
sanctions, including cutting foreign aid and access to the international banking transaction
system. Whether to loosen the sanction should be a major dispute in this conference. The
dilemma of avoiding direct funding the authorities due to the condition of human rights
and security or ending sanctions remains an essential question for the international
community to debate.

Security and Terrorism

“[Taliban] negates the group’s numerous assertions that Afghanistan’s soil will not be
used for carrying out attacks against other countries. The relationship between the Afghan
Taliban and TTP, like the Taliban’s relationship with Al-Qaida, is tightly bonded and unlikely to
dissipate.” (S/2023/370, 27)

- 1998 Sanction Council Report S/2023/370

The authorities have repeatedly promised that “Afghanistan’s soil will not be used for
carrying out attacks against other countries.” However, approximately 20 terrorist groups based
their operation in Afghanistan (S/2023/370). Moreover, Member States doubt the reliability of
the Taliban’s counter-terrorism commitment as their definition and recognition of terrorist groups
might not align with international standards.

One notable example is Al-Qaeda, which carried out the 911 attack. As a long-time
partner of the Taliban, the authorities offered Afghanistan as a logistic hub for Al-Qaida’s
propaganda and recruitment (see History). Taliban continue to have a strong bond with Al-Qaida.
Approximately 400 Al-Qaida jihadists were reported to reside in Afghanistan (S/2023/370, 41).
Moreover, many Al-Qaida’s senior officials have been appointed to take advisory or
administrative roles in the Taliban’s government.

Operations conducted by terrorist groups closer to the Taliban were often constrained by
the authorities under the principle of not harming international recognition of the Taliban.
However, groups such as Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TPP) have launched more than 100 attacks
in Pakistan, harming the public image of the authorities. Some terrorist groups take an opposition
position against the Taliban, including the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan
(ISIL-K). ISIL-K has conducted multiple attacks against multiple high-profile Taliban and
foreign officials, undermining the security and public perception of the authorities. With
estimates of 4000-6000 personnel, they claimed responsibility for over 190 suicide bomb attacks,
causing 1300 people dead or injured (S/2023/370, 44).

The leftover weapons of the U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) further
raise concerns regarding arm regulation and embargo10. The coalition left half a million pieces of
ammunition, 350,000 automated weapons, and 20 aircraft in Afghanistan (S/2023/370, 68). The
authorities have retained most of the weapons and re-distributed them locally for loyalty. For
example, “Taliban district-level commanders were allowed to keep 20 per cent of weaponry
captured during insurgent attacks as war spoils” (S/2023/370, 69). The TTP have also received
weapons from the Taliban in support of their operation. The leftover arms are distributed at local
level and terrorist groups, harming the integrity of UNSC imposed military embargo.
Furthermore, it could possibly incite “local warlords'' that could harm the stability of
Afghanistan and neighboring countries.

10
See S/RES/1333 (2000) Article 5, among other resolutions
Conclusion

The international community worries that Afghanistan could be a source of regional or

even international insecurity. Taliban has failed to honor its promise that “Afghanistan’s soil will
not be used for carrying out attacks against other countries.” Moreover, the leftover arm of the
American allies generates more doubt regarding the weapon embargo in the region.
Past Action

This chapter will mainly be about the past actions related to the United Nations,
especially the Security Council. When examining the past actions, please keep in mind that these
are all real-world solutions that have already been implemented and put to the trial of time. Three
questions should be asked when viewing each of these past actions: 1) How could one learn from
its success and failure? 2) How does it demonstrate the mandates, powers, and level of
interference our committee typically exercises on such matters? 3) What has or hasn’t been
done? 4) What possible solutions would best manifest your country’s interest?

The past example could serve as your solid underpinning when proposing solutions. A
resolution that merely conservatively replicates the past actions couldn’t make any progress; but
a resolution that deviates too far from the established path is also doomed to fall. These are what
you’d have to consider when approaching the following chapter.

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)

“Endorses the establishment, for an initial period of 12 months from the date of
adoption of this resolution, of a United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)”
(“Resolution 1401 (2002)”)

- S/RES/1401(2002)

“Stresses the critical importance of a continued presence of UNAMA (...) to ensure the
safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel
throughout the country;” (“S/RES/2678 (2023)”)

- S/RES/2678 (2023)

The two quotes above, respectively, portray the origin and the status quo of UNAMA.
Established in 2002 after the collapse of Taliban, UNAMA was meant to facilitate the
implementation of Bonns Agreement to reestablish a stable government in Afghanistan.
(“Mandate | UNAMA”) Bonns Agreement was an agreement signed in the absence of an
internationally recognized government, with the aim to reconstruct Afghanistan and “end the
tragic conflict in Afghanistan and promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and
respect for human rights in the country.” (“Bonn Agreement”)

Since then, the difficulties faced by Afghanistan have changed drastically, but the
influence of UNAMA remains present. As of now, UNAMA has become one of the major
windows through which the UNSC interacts with the situation of Afghanistan. In the ten most
recent SC resolutions on the situation of Afghanistan, five of them are regarding the mandate and
importance of the work of UMAMA. (“UN Document on Afghanistan”)

Its mandate, after multiple revisions, now puts an emphasis on “coordinat[ing] and
facilitat[ing], (...) humanitarian assistance and financial resources to support humanitarian
activities.” (“S/RES/2626 (2022)”) Additionally, it is also dedicated to “providing good office”
and “promoting responsible governance and the rule of law” (“S/RES/2626 (2022)”) of
Afghanistan’s government. UNAMA provides good office via means of fostering dialogue
between the authority and other stakeholders, with an aim to enhance its governance and prevent
conflict. (“Good Offices | UNAMA”)

Integrated Mission

In 2008, UNAMA was reshaped into an integrated peacekeeping mission. (“About |

UNAMA”) In other words, “Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) functions
are part of the peacekeeping mission.” (challengesforum) For instance, what the UNAMA has
done include collecting intel regarding the humanitarian condition and hosting consultations with
the local authorities. Contrary to the common belief that peacekeeping operations are just
standard military operations conducted by the UN, cases like the UNAMA really shows the
flexibility of those missions. The fact that peacekeeping operations are the only instance the
United Nations could deploy troops often makes people overlook their extensive array of means
through which they could assist regions of instability.
Challenges

While the importance of the mission is seldom questioned, there are still multiple aspects
of the mission where the effectiveness and direction of its current mandate asks for further
consideration. Under this context, a roundtable discussion on the matter was arranged by the
International Peace Institution, with UN officials and independent experts involved. We will now
briefly summarize the results of the discussion.

The various restrictions imposed by the de facto authorities -Taliban- and the escalating
political tension has caused troubles for UNAMA to adequately execute its mandate. Although
most participants of the discussion believe the current mandate puts sufficient emphasis on the
humanitarian and gender-mainstreaming aspect of the mission, specifically how this mandate
shall be carried out is left uncertain. While some would like to see UNAMA more publicly and
unyieldingly express its dissatisfaction with the restrictions imposed by the authorities, others
noted that such manifest opposition could hamper the relationship between UNAMA and local
authorities, further damaging the chances of fruitful dialogue and mutual trust. (International
Peace Institute 2)

Another thing unresolved is the extent to which UNAMA shall engage with local
authorities. Though the crucial role UNAMA could play in bridging the gap between the
international community and local authorities was not at all neglected, some would question
whether continued engagement with Taliban “runs the risk of crystallizing their modus
operandi.” (International Peace Institute 3) In other words, it may solidify their ways of working
by giving them undeserved recognition. This strategy of slowly opening dialogue also faces the
doubt of being ineffective, considering that little to no meaningful compromises are granted by
the local authority.

Conclusion

As an integrated special political mission, UNAMA holds the potential to greatly reduce
barriers when it comes to enhancing dialogue with the de facto authorities and other
stakeholders. The possibility of utilizing the influence of other regional parties, such as other
Islamic nations, to further engage with the authority was also highlighted. (International Peace
Institute 4)
 When approaching possible revision of the mandate, delegates should ask whether
UNAMA should increase or lower its level of engagement, and whether or not its priorities
should be altered given the recent development in Afghanistan.

Further Readings: Prioritization and Sequencing of Security Council Mandates: The Case
of UNAMA (ipinst.org)
Major Parties Involved

This section aims to guide delegates in their preparation and understand the concerns and
interests of all relevant actors. If you would like to further inquire what your country has said and
done in actual Security Council meetings, we would strongly encourage delegates to check out
the following meeting record:
S/PV.9354: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/s-pv-9354.php

Taliban

“Why is the world interfering in our affairs?...They say ‘why don’t you do this, why don’t
you do that?’ …Thank God, we are now an independent country. [Foreigners] should not give us
their orders, it is our system, and we have our own decisions.”

- The Supreme Leader of Afghanistan

“The Taliban itself has not come out with anything close to a ‘white paper’ on foreign
policy and documented statements on the subject are sparse.” (PRIO, 2021) However, despite the
ambiguity of their diplomacy, two major principles can be summarized.

The Taliban wish not to be in the center of geopolitical conflict, especially surrounded by
China, Russia, and India. Therefore, they are committed to maintaining their neutrality with
low-security force and building peaceful relations based on mutual benefits with all powers near
home and beyond (PRIO, 2021).

The second priority of the authorities is to gain international recognition and build a
self-sustaining economy through international cooperation. The Taliban wish not for foreign
intervention but for cooperation on mutual interests. Therefore, they hold constant meetings with
foreign ministers of Asia and beyond. The topic of discussion with different countries are
flexible as well. For example, most recently, they met with the Norwegian delegates with the
agenda of humanitarian situation, counter-narcotics, and women’s right. The authorities also
have multiple meetings with China and Russia in which they discuss regional cooperation in
more practical details, such as the One Belt One Route initiative and tariff and visa benefits.
Despite most delegations come to seek mutual benefit, only three islamic countries formally
recognize the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

We have introduced many human rights violations and humanitarian deterioration in

Afghanistan, directly or in-directly caused by the Taliban authorities. However, delegates should
not regard that the UN consultation with the authorities is not useless. For example, they have
established the “Human Rights and Women’s International Affairs Department,” an
inter-ministerial technical and coordination committee, tasked to address recommendations made
by United Nations human rights mechanisms (A/HRC/52/84). The Taliban still, for the sake of
international recognition, considers the voice of the UN to a certain extent.

United States (US)

Counter-Terroism Concerns

Anyone that has read the history section should be able to observe that US involvement is
entangled in the history of Afghanistan. Strategically, Afghanistan is a major target in the “War
on Terror” originated from the 911 incident. (“Timeline: The U.S. War in Afghanistan”) Simply
put, counter-terrorism is one of the political focal points of US policy on Afghanistan
(“Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy”), so much so that the original peace agreement
between the US and Taliban in 2020 -the one that ultimately led to the withdrawal of US troops-
was base on the following premise:

“Guarantees and enforcement mechanisms that will prevent the use of the soil of
Afghanistan by any group or individual against the security of the United States and its allies.”
(“Doha Agreement”)

- Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan

Political Engagement: From negotiation to reluctance

The US isn’t entirely avoidant when it comes to political engagement. It desires a “a

credible process to form an inclusive government” (“U.S. Relations With Afghanistan”) from
Taliban, and engages with Taliban for that very purpose. However, as time passes and Taliban
has shown little to no willingness in fulfilling its promises of inclusive government, women
rights, and counter-terrorism, this will to engage is being challenged, (DeLaurentis) and it now
seems unlikely for the US to cooperate with the Taliban. (Boot and Maizland) In the current dire
humanitarian crises, the US also asked for other countries such as the Russian Federation to “step
up” (DeLaurentis) and provide aid.

Economic Engagement: Aids, sanctions, and frozen assets

The US is “the largest international donor” (Thomas 12) of Afghanistan, largely due to its
active involvement in Afghanistan. However, many of the US policies also pose hurdles when it
comes to assisting the recovery of Afghanistan, namely those of “sanctions and the ongoing U.S.
hold on Afghanistan’s central bank reserves.” (Thomas 12) For one, US sanctions targeting the
Taliban have caused difficulties for aids to be delivered without violating the sanction policies.
For another, the 7 billion US-based assets currently gridlocked by the US is one of the root
causes of the liquidity crisis mentioned in the Statement of Problems. (Thomas 13) Although
president Biden has already made plans to release half of these properties (Savage), only little
substantial progress has been made in this regard, (Thomas 13) and these assets remain out of
reach for the Afghans in need.

Accountability

“President Biden’s choices(...) were severely constrained by conditions created by his

predecessor [Trump]” (Miller and Merchant) -Biden Administration

“Biden is responsible, no one else!” (Miller and Merchant) -Donald Trump

One other concern that largely influences US policy is the question of accountability. In
other words, it is yet to be determined to what extent the US should be responsible for the current
chaos in Afghanistan. The two quotes above should show that this has turned into a messy
finger-pointing game in America, with both presidents attempting to direct the blame off
themselves.

Internationally, the US’s inaction in the aftermath of its withdrawal was widely criticized,
notably by China, which claimed that the US is “the biggest external factor that hinders
substantive improvement in the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan.” (“China's Position on the
Afghan Issue”)
 All in all, the stance of the US should be determined by its multifaceted interest in
Afghanistan, its reluctance in benefitting the Taliban, and international pressure. Although it did
promise to assist, there has been little substantial proof that it is willing to reduce sanctions or to
release the frozen assets.

Russia

Diplomatic Engagement

For so long Russia has alway shown interest in diplomatic support for the Afghanistan
government. In recent years, Russia has hosted many rounds of peace talks with the Afghan
government’s officials as well as representatives of the Taliban (“Afghanistan and Its
Neighborhood: A Stocktaking of Regional Cooperation since the Taliban Takeover”). The
Russian Federation also cooperated with regional initiatives around Afghanistan, notably the
Heart of Asia - Istanbul Process. These initiatives demonstrate the potential of utilizing the
regional influence Russia possesses to engage with the Taliban. Russia has raised many plans for
Afghan issue at the United Nations Security Council as well as on other international platforms
(“Security Council Condemns Decision by Taliban to Ban Afghan Women from Working for
United Nations in Afghanistan, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2681 (2023) | UN Press”).
During these meetings and showups, the country emphasizes and urged the international
community to support Afghanistan in this act. And in many times publicly stated it’s stance
concerning the situation, as in the following:

Counterterrorism

The Russian government offered training programs and capacity building to support the
Afghan security forces when it comes to counterterrorism, mainly for the purpose of border
control and sharing intel. Russia hopes by maintaining the sharing of their disruption it can lower
the activities of terrorist groups and hoping throughout these projects Afghanistan can gain
experience. Yet after the former government of Afghanistan collapsed, Russia believes the
situation can be dangerous to be involved (Massicot). And on August 24, 2021 Putin stated how
the terrorist growth in Afghanistan is starting to give “direct threat to our country, our allies.”
Clarified Russian will not be involved with Afghanistan military again (Massicot). Yet Russian
still want to give support to Afghanistan's situation in this case, with Russia entering with a new
approach.

“However, Russia is the active regional influencer in the unfolding crisis, given its
decades-old experience and networks in Afghanistan.”

- Dara Massicot

This time the Russian government purposely points to the action of “sharing of knowledge” as
they believe shared experience can help straighten countries without being overly involved
military-wise.

China

Economic Support

China has made investments in Afghanistan's infrastructure via “China's Belt and Road
Initiative. (BRI).”

“ China and Pakistan have agreed to extend the Belt and Road Initiative into Afghanistan,
potentially drawing in billions of dollars to fund infrastructure projects in the sanctions-hit
country,”

- Silk Road Briefing Officials

They took action in the funding of $60 billion US dollars to the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC) for Taliban ruled countries (Silk Road Briefing). Projects like this show the
effectiveness of reconstruction and how it affects the long-term stability of Afghanistan’s
development (“Silk Road Briefing”). These projects help open up opportunities for Afghanistan's
future.

“The two sides agreed to continue their humanitarian and economic assistance for the Afghan
people and enhance development cooperation in Afghanistan, including through extension of
CPEC to Afghanistan.”

- Pakistan’s foreign ministry

Both Chinese and Pakistani officials have opened up the topic on the improvement of projects to
Afghanistan. With response from the Taliban government expressing its participation in projects
as well as the prospect of getting infrastructure investment (Silk Road Briefing

As China wishes to treat Afghanistan as one of its economic partners, political and
economic stability of Afghanistan would be especially of concern.

Diplomatic Engagement

China has made significant efforts to promote peace and stability from regional bonding
and publicly announcing the action they will be taking in order to improve the situation between
activities with the Afghan government and the Tali In Security Council meetings, China is also
one of the few nations that refers to the Taliban as the “interim government.” This marks a higher
willingness for China to engage with the Taliban.

“It is a shared view of regional countries that the military interference and ‘democratic
transformation’ by external forc[the US] S] in Afghanistan over the past 20-odd years have
inflicted enormous losses and pain on Afghanistan.“

- China

Regarding the current situation of Afghanistan, China heaped most of the blame on the
US and their previous intervention in Afghanistan. It also asks the US to release assets currently
held by it and lift the sanctions to facilitate the development of Afghanistan.(“China’s Position
on the Afghan Issue”).

Regional engagement

The Chinese government has also expressed concerns about the potential spillover of
terrorism from Afghanistan into regional countries (“China Opposes Terrorism”). So the
Chinese government had also cooperated with the Afghan government in counterterrorism plans,
where China showed a very strong interest in supporting the Afghan government security-wise
(Murtazashvili and Murtazashvili). China promoted cooperation with initiatives in order to
address the situation in Afghanistan and engaging with neighboring countries and regional
organizations like SCO (shanghai cooperation organization) (Murtazashvili and Murtazashvili).
These actions can be seen in the recent year of 2021, where a meeting was held with
Afghanistan's neighboring countries for the purpose of “stability within the region”.

Pakistan

Pakistan is arguably one of the most influential countries in Afghanistan. Their destiny is
bonded by geological and cultural proximity; their flourish and doom are intertwined. They had a
long alliance which is mostly based on country security concerns; in recent years, this
relationship, however, has been deteriorating (Khunte).

Pakistan had been supportive since the initial of the Taliban (Pro-Taliban Policy). This
friendly relationship continued until the 911 attack triggered the United State’s War on Terror.
With the United States’ unyielding attitude, Pakistan turned to the side of the United States and
become a vital part of the counter-terrorism coalition. Bonded with the Western forces, Pakistan,
however, had been accused of secret financial support for the Taliban. This allegation became
more concrete after the Prime Minister of Pakistan at the time congratulated the Taliban for their
takeover of the country in 2021 (“Pakistan Supports the Taliban”).

“When you adopt someone’s culture you believe it to be superior and end up becoming a
slave to it. It is more difficult to free your mind from slavery. Afghans have broken the shackles of
slavery.” (“Shackles of Slavery”)

- Former Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan

In recent years, however, the relationship between Pakistan and the Taliban
administration has been increasingly tense, due to a terrorist group Tehreek-e-Taliban (Pakistani
Taliban) escalating its actions in Pakistan (Bilal). They perform terrorist attacks within Pakistan,
aiming to replace the current Pakistani government (“Pakistani Taliban”). When the de facto
government of Afghanistan regained power in 2021, Pakistan anticipated them to help slacken
down the violence of the Pakistani Taliban. This request was, however, not met with adequate
response (“Pakistan's Latest Threat”).

Frustrated and infuriated by the Taliban administration’s impunity and inactivity, Pakistan
launched an airstrike on April 16, 2022. This attack is considered a counteracting to the Pakistani
Taliban right in their hideout and also a warning to the Taliban administration that they will no
more endure the Taliban’s permissiveness to their subsidiary group (Goldbaum).
Questions to Consider

Congratulations! You have now finished 35 monstrous pages of the BGG. You shall now
be able to organize your country’s stances and commence with your own research. Here we have
a few major directions for you to consider.

1. Does your nation want a “stable Afghanistan” or a “legitimate Afghanistan?”

Although not a single nation would like to encourage actions violating human rights, your
approach may differ drastically according to this answer. Nations that prioritize stability would
likely be more willing to engage with and provide aid to the de facto authorities.

2. Is your nation willing to lift the harsh sanctions against Afghanistan?

As should be rather obvious in the BGG, the question of lifting sanctions should be the
underlying theme of the conference. Sanctions directly affect both the distribution of
humanitarian resources and the recovery of the economy. However, lifting sanctions may also be
regarded as conceding and recognizing the Taliban for certain nations.

3. How should the Security Council utilize the resources available to improve the situation
of Afghanistan?

After all, the resolutions shall be deemed useless if the proposed actions are out of the
means of the SC. When considering our topic, you should bear in mind that it’s not just the
“situation of Afghanistan,” instead you should consider “the situation of Afghanistan, discussed
in the SC, and with the stance of the nation I’m representing.”

4. What are the subtopics for our discussion?

We deal with all large topics of debate the exact same way we eat an elephant: by cutting
it into pieces. Identifying not just the overarching topic but also the sub-discussions under it can
give you more organized directions for your research and aid your discussion in the conference.
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