Municipality of Cavite v.

Rojas
30 Phil. 602

Doctrine:
Article 424 (1). Property for public use in provinces, cities, and municipalities, consist of the provincial
roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for
public service paid for by provinces, cities, or municipalities.

Facts:
Defendant secured a lease from plaintiff municipality to occupy a parcel of land that forms part of the
public plaza (Soledad). However, plaintiff demanded defendant to vacate and deliver the possession of the said
land as it is an integral portion of a public plaza of public domain.

Issue:
Whether the lease contract is valid.

Ruling:
MUNICIPALITIES; LEASES OF PUBLIC PROPERTY BY. — A municipal council cannot sell or lease
communal or public property, such as plazas, streets, common lands, rivers, bridges, etc., because they are
outside the commerce of man; and if it has done so by leasing part of a plazas the lease is null and void, for it is
contrary to the law, and the thing leased cannot be the object of a contract. (Civil Code, arts. 344, 1271.)
.; ID.; RESTORATION BY LESSEE. — On the hypothesis that such a lease is null and void for the
reason that a municipal council cannot withdraw part of a plaza from public use, the lessee must restore
possession of the land by vacating it and the municipality must thereupon restore to him any sums it may have
collected as rent. (Civil Code, art. 1303.)

Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic

G.R. No. 179987. September 3, 2013

Doctrine:

Regalian Doctrine
- A legal concept introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the
Royal Cedulas
- All lands of the public domain belong to the State.
- The State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and is charged with the conservation of
such patrimony.
- All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.

Alienable and Disposable land Category:

1. Patrimonial lands of the State
2. Agricultural lands of the Public Domain

Facts:
Mario Malabanan, who had purchased a property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land
registration covering the purchased parcel of land, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and
disposable land of public domain. The trial court approved his application for registration upon presentment of a
certification verifying the said land to be alienable and disposable, issued by Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR. The Defendant Republic appealed the judgment arguing that
Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. The CA ruled in favor of the Republic citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto which declared that
Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of the
land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the
period of the possession.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in CA, his heirs elevated the CA’s decision to
the Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari. The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic
v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit (Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property
involved is agricultural land. Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as
alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under the
Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration Decree. They point out that the
ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of the application for registration as
alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945, or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum
considering that the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio for lack
of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. to support their argument that the
property had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years. According
to them, what was essential was that the property had been "converted" into private property through prescription at
the time of the application without regard to whether the property sought to be registered was previously classified as
agricultural land of the public domain.
Issue:
Whether the subject land is alienable and disposable, thus can be registered.

Ruling:
The petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession
— possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier — the
land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as
alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible
for registration under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for
land registration under Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President
issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth.

Exit ticket:
As regards to ownership, land can be classified as either of public dominion or private. The land is of public
dominion when such is intended for public use, or when it belongs to the state and is intended for public service or for
the development of national wealth. The land will form part of the patrimonial property of the State or the ownership by
the State in its private capacity, when the land is no longer intended for public use, for public service, or for the
development of national wealth. All other lands of public domain/dominion, except agricultural lands, shall not be
alienated as stated under section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. However, the other lands of public domain such
as forest or timber mineral, and national parks may be reclassified into agricultural land, only if there is a positive act of
the Government regarding the conversion and reclassification. The prerogative to decide on such manner is vested in the
Executive department, and not in courts. If in case the land is classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public use, public service or for the development of the
national wealth, or when it does not form part of the patrimonial property of the State, a declaration of such conversion
must be made in the form of law duly enacted by Congress or by Presidential proclamation in cases where the President
is duly authorized by law to that effect. Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or
reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public
service or for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.

Chavez v. Public Estates Authority

On Reconsideration: Chavez v. Public Estates Authority
Usero v. CA
Manila International Airport Authority v. CA