United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

F-35 JOINT STRIKE

April 2019

FIGHTER

Action Needed to
Improve Reliability
and Prepare for
Modernization Efforts

GAO-19-341
 April 2019

F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

Action Needed to Improve Reliability and Prepare for
Modernization Efforts
Highlights of GAO-19-341, a report to
congressional committees

Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found

In 2018, DOD sent an F-35 aircraft to The F-35 program has made slow, sustained progress in improving the aircraft’s
its first combat mission and started reliability and maintainability (R&M). The F-35 aircraft (see figure) are assessed
initial operational testing. DOD now against eight R&M metrics, which indicate how much time the aircraft will be in
plans to spend over $270 billion to buy maintenance rather than operations. Half of these metrics are not meeting
more than 2,000 F-35 aircraft over the targets. While the Department of Defense (DOD) has a plan for improving R&M,
next 26 years. Since 2011, GAO has its guidance is not in line with GAO’s acquisition best practices or federal internal
found the need for more attention to control standards as it does not include specific, measurable objectives, align
the F-35’s R&M performance to improvement projects to meet those objectives, and prioritize funding. If the R&M
achieve an operationally suitable requirements are not met, the warfighter may have to settle for a less reliable
system. and more costly aircraft than originally envisioned.
The National Defense Authorization Image of F-35 Aircraft
Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a
provision for GAO to review the F-35
acquisition program until it reaches full-
rate production. This is GAO's fourth
report under this provision. This report
assesses, among other objectives, (1)
the program’s progress in meeting
R&M requirements (such as mission
reliability) and (2) its plans for spending
on new capabilities. GAO reviewed
and analyzed management reports and
historical test data; discussed key
aspects of F-35 development with
program management and contractor
officials; and compared acquisition
In 2019, the F-35 program will start modernization efforts—estimated to cost
plans to DOD policies and GAO $10.5 billion—for new capabilities to address evolving threats, without a
acquisition best practices. complete business case, or a baseline cost and schedule estimate. Key
documents for establishing the business case, such as an independent cost
estimate and an independent technology assessment, will not be complete until
What GAO Recommends after the program plans to award development contracts (see figure).
GAO is making five recommendations Key F-35 Modernization Business Case Documents to Be Completed After Contract Awards
to DOD, including that it identify
specific and measurable R&M
improvement objectives, align
improvement projects, and prioritize
resources to meet them. In addition,
DOD should complete its business
case for modernization before
beginning additional development
efforts. DOD did not concur with this
recommendation, but did concur with
the R&M recommendations and plans
Without a business case—consistent with acquisition best practices—program
to take action to address them.
officials will not have a high level of confidence that the risk of committing to
View GAO-19-341. For more information,
development has been reduced adequately prior to contract awards. Moving
contact Michael J. Sullivan at (202) 512-4851 ahead without a business case puts F-35 modernization at risk of experiencing
or [email protected] cost and schedule overruns similar to those experienced by the original F-35
program during its development.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents

Letter 1
Background 3
Operational Testing Has Started 7
The F-35 Program Is Still Not Meeting All Reliability and
Maintainability Targets 11
The F-35 Program Will Start Block 4 Modernization without a
Complete Business Case 16
The F-35’s Unit Cost Has Decreased and Its Production Rate Has
Increased 20
Conclusions 25
Recommendations for Executive Action 27
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 27

Appendix I Prior GAO Reports and DOD Actions 31

Appendix II Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 34

Appendix III Status of Selected F-35 Technical Risks 36

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense 40

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 43

Related GAO Products 44

Tables
Table 1: Planned F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program Cost and
Quantity, 2001–2017 5
Table 2: The F-35 Reliability & Maintainability Metrics’
Performance as of August 2018 12

Page i GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

 Table 3: Modernization Development Contracting Efforts Planned
for 2019 20
Table 4: F-35 Airframe 2012 and 2016-2018 Deliveries Increased
While Other Metrics Varied 24
Table 5: F-35 Engine 2012 and 2016-2018 Deliveries Increased
Though Other Metrics Varied 25
Table 6: Select Prior GAO Reports on F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
and Department of Defense (DOD) Responses 31

Figures
Figure 1: An Image of F-35 Aircraft 3
Figure 2: F-35 Planned and Actual Operational Test Schedule and
Delays Since 2012 7
Figure 3: 2018 Timeline of Major F-35 Events 9
Figure 4: Three Business Case Documents Will Not Be Ready
Ahead of the Planned Development Contract Awards 19
Figure 5: The F-35A Negotiated Price Per Aircraft By Production
Lot Is Decreasing 21
Figure 6: The Number of F-35 Aircraft in Each Phase of
Production 23
Figure 7: The F-35 Helmet Mounted Display 37
Figure 8: F-35B Aircraft Refuel from a KC-130 Aerial Refueling
Tanker Using Hose and Drogue Refueling Equipment 38
Figure 9: An F-35B on USS America 39

Page ii GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

Abbreviations

CAPE Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation

C2D2 Continuous Capability Development and Delivery
DOD Department of Defense
DOT&E Director, Operational Test and Evaluation
ORD Operational Requirements Document
R&M Reliability and Maintainability
RMIP Reliability and Maintainability Improvement Program

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Page iii GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

 Letter

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

April 29, 2019

Congressional Committees

In 2018, the F-35 Lightning II program—also known as the Joint Strike

Fighter—saw its first combat mission and began operational testing. The
Department of Defense (DOD) is now in its 18th year of developing this
family of fifth-generation strike fighter aircraft for the United States Air
Force, Marine Corps, and Navy, as well as eight international partners. 1
The F-35’s key capabilities include low-observable, or stealth technology
combined with advanced sensors and computer networking capabilities. It
is DOD’s largest acquisition program in U.S. military history, with total
acquisition costs expected to exceed $406 billion. Currently, the program
plans to acquire a total of 2,470 aircraft through fiscal year 2044.

Developmental testing for the baseline program is now complete, but the
F-35 is still facing affordability and reliability challenges. 2 We have
reported on the program’s challenges in the past and made
recommendations for improvement. DOD has taken action to address
some, but not all, of our recommendations. For a comprehensive list of
our recommendations and a summary of DOD’s actions in response, see
appendix I. In addition, a list of related GAO products is included at the
end of the report.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a
provision for GAO to review the F-35 program annually until the program

1
The international partners are the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey,
Canada, Australia, Denmark, and Norway. These nations contributed funds for system
development and all but Canada have signed agreements to procure aircraft. In addition,
Belgium, Israel, Japan, and South Korea have signed on as foreign military sales
customers.
2
The F-35 baseline program, or the baseline acquisition development program, began in
2001 with approval of its first cost and schedule baseline. Developmental testing is
intended to provide feedback on the progress of a system’s design process and its combat
capability as it advances toward initial production or deployment.

Page 1 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

reaches full-rate production. This is our fourth report under that
provision. 3 In this report, we (1) provide information on the program’s
progress toward completing testing of the baseline aircraft; (2) assess the
aircraft’s current Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) status; (3) assess
the program’s modernization efforts (to add new aircraft capabilities),
known as Block 4; and (4) provide information on the program’s
production costs and efficiency initiatives.

• To provide information on what progress the program has made in

testing, we reviewed test event status and schedules, program
briefings, and internal DOD briefings. We discussed key aspects of
the F-35’s test progress with DOD officials, contractor representatives,
and pilots.
• To assess the F-35’s R&M, we analyzed monthly contractor R&M
reports and compared these to program requirements. We also
interviewed DOD officials and contractor representatives.
• To assess the program’s modernization efforts, we reviewed
documents that should be completed prior to awarding a development
contract, according to weapon acquisition best practices identified by
GAO. 4 We interviewed DOD officials and contractor representatives
regarding the program’s modernization activities and future plans.
• To provide information on production progress, we collected and
analyzed production performance data from the program office, the
prime aircraft contractor, and the prime engine contractor.

We determined that all the data we used were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of our reporting objectives. For example, we collected and
analyzed the program’s R&M monthly data for calendar year 2018 and
corroborated these reports by interviewing contractor representatives and
DOD oversight offices such as the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation (DOT&E). In addition, we reviewed official program
documentation on the Block 4 efforts and corroborated these with

3
GAO, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Development Is Nearly Complete, but Deficiencies Found
in Testing Need to Be Resolved, GAO-18-321 (Washington, D.C.: June 5, 2018); F-35
Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Needs to Complete Developmental Testing Before Making
Significant New Investments, GAO-17-351 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 24, 2017); and F-35
Joint Strike Fighter: Continued Oversight Needed as Program Plans to Begin
Development of New Capabilities, GAO-16-390 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 14, 2016).
4
GAO, Weapon Systems Annual Assessment: Knowledge Gaps Pose Risks to Sustaining
Recent Positive Trends, GAO-18-360SP (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2018).

Page 2 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

 information officials across DOD involved in the effort, conveyed, such as
the Air Force Integration Office and the Naval Air Warfare Division
regarding Block 4. Appendix II contains a detailed description of our
scope and methodology.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2018 to April 2019 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.

DOD began the F-35 development program in October 2001 with plans to
Background produce next-generation aircraft to replace aging aircraft in the military
services’ inventories. Figure 1 shows the F-35 in flight.

Figure 1: An Image of F-35 Aircraft

The program has developed and is delivering three variants of the F-35
aircraft; the F-35A conventional takeoff and landing variant for the Air

Page 3 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

Force, the F-35B short takeoff and vertical landing variant for the Marine
Corps, and the F-35C carrier-suitable variant for the Navy. The
characteristics of the services’ variants are similar, but each service’s
variant also has unique operating requirements. For example, the Marine
Corps requires that the F-35B be capable of operating from aircraft
carriers, amphibious ships, and main and austere operating bases alike,
requiring the ability to conduct short take offs and vertical landings.

In March 2005, we found that the F-35 program had started development
without adequate knowledge of the aircraft’s critical technologies or a
solid design. 5 Further, DOD’s acquisition strategy called for high levels of
concurrency between development and production, which runs counter to
best practices for major defense acquisition programs. In our prior work,
we identified the F-35 program’s lack of adequate knowledge and high
levels of concurrency as the major drivers of the program’s significant
cost and schedule growth, and other performance shortfalls. 6

Since the development program began in 2001, it has been restructured

three times with revised cost and schedule estimates. The most recent
restructuring was initiated in 2010 when the program’s cost estimates
exceeded certain thresholds established by statute—a condition known
as a critical Nunn-McCurdy breach. 7 DOD subsequently certified to
Congress in June 2010 that the program was essential to national
security and needed to continue. DOD then established a new acquisition
program baseline in 2012 that added $162.7 billion to the program’s cost
estimate and extended the original delivery schedule by 5-6 years. Since

5
GAO, Tactical Aircraft: Opportunity to Reduce Risks in the Joint Strike Fighter Program
with Different Acquisition Strategy, GAO-05-271 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2005).
6
GAO-05-271; and Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Actions Needed to Further Enhance
Restructuring and Address Affordability Risks, GAO-12-437 (Washington, D.C.: June 14,
2012).
7
Section 2433 of title 10 of the United States Code, commonly referred to as Nunn-
McCurdy, requires DOD to notify Congress whenever a major defense acquisition
program’s unit cost experiences cost growth that exceeds certain thresholds. Significant
breaches occur when the program acquisition unit cost or procurement unit cost increases
by at least 15 percent over the current baseline estimate or at least 30 percent over the
original estimate. For critical breaches, when these unit costs increase at least 25 percent
over the current baseline estimate or at least 50 percent over the original, DOD is required
to take additional steps, including conducting an in-depth review of the program. Programs
with critical breaches must be terminated unless the Secretary of Defense certifies to
certain facts related to the programs and takes other actions, including restructuring the
programs. 10 U.S.C. § 2433a.

Page 4 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

 then, the program’s cost and schedule estimates, as well as the expected
number of aircraft to be delivered, have remained relatively stable, as
shown in table 1.

Table 1: Planned F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program Cost and Quantity, 2001–2017

October 2001 March 2012 Difference from December 2017 Difference from
initial baseline baseline 2001 to 2012 estimate 2012 to 2017
Expected number of aircraft
Developmental aircraft 14 14 0 14 0
Procurement aircraft 2,852 2,443 -409 2,456 13
Total aircraft 2,866 2,457 -409 2,470 13
Estimated key dates
a a b
Initial operational capability 2010-2012 Not determined Not determined 2015-2018 5-6 years
Full-rate production 2012 2019 7 years 2019 0 years
c
Cost estimates (then-year dollars in billions)
Development 34.4 55.2 20.8 55.5 0.3
Procurement 196.6 335.7 139.1 345.4 9.7
Military construction 2.0 4.8 2.8 5.3 0.5
Total program acquisition 233.0 395.7 162.7 406.1 10.4
c, d
Unit cost estimates (then-year dollars in millions)
Program acquisition 81 161 80 164.4 3.4
Average procurement 69 137 68 140.6 3.6
Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data. | GAO-19-341
a
When the baseline was finalized, DOD had not yet identified new initial operational capability dates
for the military services.
b
This is the difference from the October 2001 baseline to the December 2017 estimate.
c
Annual projected cost estimates expressed in then-year dollars reflect inflation assumptions. We did
not assess the reliability of the program office’s cost estimates. Amounts may not sum due to
rounding.
d
The program acquisition and the average procurement unit cost estimates are calculated by dividing
the total program acquisition amount by the total quantities and the procurement amount by the
procurement aircraft quantities, respectively.

Of the F-35’s $406 billion estimated acquisition cost, DOD needs a

majority of the funding ($270.3 billion) to purchase aircraft over the next
26 years. Of that future funding, the program plans to spend between
$9.6 billion and $14 billion each year through fiscal year 2031. In addition,
the program’s sustainment costs to operate and maintain the F-35 fleet
over the next 52 years are estimated to be $1.12 trillion.

Page 5 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

Though the program’s total planned quantities have been relatively
stable, the program’s timeframes for procuring these aircraft have
changed multiple times. Since the start of development, the program has
pushed the procurement of more than half of the total aircraft planned into
the future, mostly due to significant concurrency between development
and production. Specifically, the program office had originally planned to
procure almost 2,000 aircraft by fiscal year 2019. However, according to
the current plan, by the end of 2019, the program will have procured just
over 500 aircraft.

The F-35 baseline aircraft development program was complete in April

2018, when developmental testing concluded. As we reported in June
2018, the program office reported it had met all nine of its capability
thresholds—or the minimum acceptable value for each capability—and
delivered three of those nine capabilities. 8 However, we also reported that
the program has to complete operational testing before DOD can
determine if the six remaining capabilities have been delivered. The
purpose of operational testing is to assess the effectiveness, suitability,
survivability, lethality, and mission capability of the F-35, including the
information systems and the air vehicle, in an operationally representative
environment. Operational testing includes cyber security assessments,
some of which have been conducted.

Production of the F-35 began in 2007 while development was in its early
stages and before developmental flight testing had started. As a result of
this concurrent development, the 357 aircraft delivered through 2018 will
need retrofits to fix deficiencies and design issues found during testing. 9
The program’s total estimated cost of concurrency is $1.4 billion. 10 The
program office plans for over 500 aircraft to be procured by the time
operational testing is completed. Until operational testing is complete,
there is a risk that additional problems with the aircraft may be identified.
As a result, the concurrency costs of retrofitting delivered aircraft could
increase.

8
GAO-18-321. The F-35’s nine capabilities are force protection, net ready, radio frequency
signature, combat radius, mission reliability, logistics footprint, sortie generation rates, F-
35C recovery performance, and F-35B mission performance.
9
This number includes U.S., international partner, and foreign military sales aircraft.
10
This estimate includes deficiencies that may still be identified in operational testing.

Page 6 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

 The F-35 program started formal operational testing in December 2018
Operational Testing after a 3-month delay. This testing was delayed for two main reasons: (1)
Has Started to resolve critical deficiencies and (2) to accommodate an unexpected
grounding following the crash of an F-35B in September 2018. According
to a test official, the program expects to complete testing in December
2019, about three months later than planned due to delays with the
simulator that is used for more complex testing. Figure 2 shows the
program’s planned end to developmental testing and planned timeframes
for operational testing for 2012 and the past four years and the delays the
program has realized each year since the program was re-baselined in
2012.

Figure 2: F-35 Planned and Actual Operational Test Schedule and Delays Since
2012

The operational testing was delayed for the following two main reasons.

Resolution of deficiencies: First, before the program could begin

operational testing, it had to resolve critical deficiencies with the aircraft
that were identified during development testing. The program categorizes
deficiencies according to their potential impact on the aircraft’s
performance.

Page 7 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

• Category 1 deficiencies are considered critical and could jeopardize
safety, security, or another requirement.

• Category 2 deficiencies are those that could impede or constrain

successful mission accomplishment.

In January 2018, the F-35 program had 966 open deficiencies—111

category 1 and 855 category 2. At that time, the program planned to
move forward before resolving all of them. In June 2018, we
recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the F-35 program to
resolve all these deficiencies before the program’s October 2019 full-rate
production decision. 11 According to DOD officials, over the past year, the
program has made progress in reducing the number of open deficiencies
by resolving, re-categorizing, closing, or combining them. For example, in
2018, the program resolved nearly 50 category 1 deficiencies and re-
categorized over 50 others to category 2. As a result, the program
received approval from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
and Sustainment to begin formal operational testing with 13 category 1
deficiencies and almost 900 category 2 deficiencies. According to the
Program Executive Officer, none of the open category 1 deficiencies are
a safety of flight concern, and all of them have operational workarounds.

A current example of an open category 1 deficiency is with lines on the F-

35’s landing gear, which can rupture when a tire blows, potentially
causing loss of a major aircraft system such as the brakes. Such an event
requires some repair work to the landing gear, but contractor officials
explained that it is not a safety concern. According to the program office,
it is not a safety concern because the current workaround for this
deficiency is pilot training to avoid braking on the side of the blown tire.
Program test officials said that testing with deficiencies is not uncommon
and they will continue to work to address them, but some may not be fully
resolved for several years.

Unexpected grounding: In October 2018, the F-35 fleet was grounded

after the program identified a manufacturing fault with an engine fuel
tube—a component in the F-35 engine produced by Pratt & Whitney. The
fault was found in an inspection that stemmed from an F-35B crash in
September 2018. This was the first crash of an F-35. Of the 23
operational test aircraft, the program replaced the fuel tubes on 18 aircraft
11
GAO-18-321.

Page 8 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

by the start of operational testing in December 2018, which contributed to
the 3-month delay. This and other key technical risks are described in
more detail in appendix III.

In addition to starting operational testing and the unexpected grounding,

the program and the airframe contractor Lockheed Martin experienced
other major events over the past year, as shown in figure 3.

Figure 3: 2018 Timeline of Major F-35 Events

For example, the United States completed its first F-35 combat mission in
September 2018 when an F-35B successfully hit a target in Afghanistan.

The program took steps to mitigate delays to the start of operational

testing. For example, the program office, in coordination with DOT&E,
received approval to conduct some preoperational testing events starting
in January 2018, before the official start date in December. According to
DOT&E officials, the outcome of these preoperational test events should
count towards the completion of operational testing. This included cold
weather testing in Alaska, which took advantage of appropriate weather
conditions.

Page 9 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

Despite the 3-month delay, program officials stated that they consider the
F-35 operational test schedule to be adequate for addressing schedule
risks, which pertain to unresolved deficiencies and potential problems
with the availability of test and support aircraft, ground systems, test
ranges, and necessary test models and simulations. According to a test
official, as of April 2019, some of these risks have been realized, such as
the delay with the simulator, and as a result, the end of operational testing
is now planned for December 2019. In addition, there is the possibility of
new deficiencies emerging from operational testing.

• Unresolved deficiencies: Existing or new deficiencies could

negatively affect test results. According to DOT&E officials, since the
start of operational testing, four new category 1 deficiencies have
been identified, bringing the total to 17. According to DOD officials, it
would not be unexpected during the course of operational testing for
the program to discover additional deficiencies that may require
resolution and re-testing.
• Availability of test and support aircraft: According to test officials,
F-16s and F-18s are needed to represent adversaries during F-35
operational tests. These assets may not be available because they
also support other test programs. According to officials, the F-35
program does not have control over the availability of these aircraft
and must work with the Navy and Air Force to negotiate their use. In
addition, the limited availability of F-35 test aircraft, in part due to R&M
issues and shortages of replacement parts, may also pose a
challenge to completing test events, according to officials.
• Availability of ground systems: Ground systems required for
operational testing, such as the DOT&E developed Radar Signal
Emulators, are late in development and may not be available when
required. According to DOT&E officials, the emulators imitate modern
threat radar capabilities of adversarial nations but their integration with
the test range is approximately a year behind schedule. The program
is currently using other threat simulators. DOT&E officials stated that
they are working to have the radars ready by the spring of 2019, when
needed.
• Availability of test ranges: Test officials at Edwards Air Force Base
expressed concern about the availability of test ranges, which the F-
35 program shares with other programs. According to test officials, the
F-35 was the fifth in line, in terms of priority, to use the range at
Edwards Air Force Base, as of October 2018. DOT&E officials,
however, stated that they did not observe any range availability issues
during the F-35’s first month of operational testing.

Page 10 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

 • Availability of test models and simulations: According to program
officials, the program’s testing simulator, which runs the F-35’s
mission systems software and provides test scenarios that cannot be
replicated in a real-world environment, will not be complete until at
least November 2019. Completion of the testing simulator was
originally scheduled for the end of 2017.
Any additional delays in operational testing could affect another upcoming
program decision: DOD’s decision to begin full-rate production in
December 2019. 12 This decision is typically made after operational testing
is completed.

The F-35 program has made slow, sustained progress in improving the F-
The F-35 Program Is 35’s R&M. R&M determines the likelihood that the aircraft will be in
Still Not Meeting All maintenance rather than available for operations. Each F-35 aircraft
variant is measured against eight R&M metrics, four of which are in part
Reliability and of the contract. All F-35 variants are generally performing near or above
Maintainability targets for half of the R&M metrics while the other four are still falling
short, which is the same as last year. While the program is on track to
Targets meet the targets for half of the metrics, the program has not taken
adequate steps to ensure the targets for the others will be met. While
DOD has an action plan to improve R&M, its guidance does not define
specific, measurable objectives for what the desired goals for the F-35’s
R&M performance should be. Furthermore, the program office has not
prioritized funding for projects that will improve the R&M metrics that are
not meeting their targets.

The F-35 Program Is All F-35 variants are measured against eight R&M metrics’ targeted
Meeting, or Close to performance levels, and all variants are generally performing near or
above targets for four of the eight R&M metrics. 13 This represents little
Meeting, Half of Its Targets
change from their overall performance last year. All eight R&M metrics
are described in the program’s Operational Requirements Document
(ORD)—the document that outlines the requirements DOD and the

12
Full-rate production is a decision, following the completion of operational testing, to
scale up production.
13
According to officials, the current targets are where the program expects the metrics to
be based on the number of hours flown. The minimum target is the value each metric
should eventually meet by the time each variant has flown enough hours to reach
maturity.

Page 11 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

 military services agreed the F-35 should meet. However, in December
2018, DOT&E reported that, although performance for the four under-
performing metrics has shown slow growth over the years, none of these
metrics were meeting interim goals needed to reach requirements at each
variant’s maturity. 14 Each F-35 variants’ R&M performance against these
metrics’ targets is shown in table 2.

Table 2: The F-35 Reliability & Maintainability Metrics’ Performance as of August 2018

Contractually
a
Metric required F-35A F-35B F-35C

● ●
b
Mission Reliability —measures the probability of successfully completing
a mission of average duration ✔ —

Mean flight hours between failure (design controlled)—measures time

between failures that are directly attributable to the design of the aircraft ✔ ● ● ●
and are considered fixable with design changes
Mean time to repair—measures the amount of time it takes a maintainer
to repair a failed component or device ✔ ◓ ◓ ◓
Maintenance man hours per flight hour—measures the average amount
of time spent on scheduled and unscheduled maintenance per flight hour
✔ ● ◓ ●
Mean flight hours between maintenance events—also referred to as
the logistics reliability metric, measures time between maintenance,
c
— ○ ○ ◓
unscheduled inspections, and servicing actions, including consumables
Mean flight hours between removals—measures the time between part
removals from the aircraft for replacement from the supply chain
— ○ ○ ○
Mean flight hours between critical failure—measures the time between
failures that result in the loss of a capability to perform a mission-critical — ○ ○ ○
capability
Mean corrective maintenance time for critical failure—measures the
amount of time it takes to correct critical failure events
— ○ ○ ○
Legend:
●: Metric is at or above current targets
◓: Metric is at or above minimum targets
○: Metric is below minimum targets
✔: Metric is contractually required
—: not available
Source: GAO analysis of contractor data. | GAO-19-341

14
Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, Fiscal Year 2018 Annual Report (December
2019). The F-35 aircraft reach maturity when all variants have flown a combined 200,000
hours, with each variant flying at least 50,000 hours. The F-35A reached its planned
maturity in July 2018, but is still not meeting four of its eight metrics. The F-35B and C
variants have more time to meet their metrics before they reach their planned maturity in
2021 and 2024 respectively.

Page 12 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

a
Each metric is measured using a 3-month average and reported on a monthly basis; this table
summarizes the Joint Reliability and Maintainability Evaluation Team’s review of reliability growth and
maintainability improvement data from November 2009 through August 2018.
b
Mission Reliability is a key performance parameter. Mission reliability, as well as performance
against the targets related to all of these metrics, will be evaluated during initial operational test and
evaluation.
c
Consumable parts are nonrepairable items or repair parts that can be discarded more economically
than they can be repaired or that are consumed in use (such as oil filters, screws, nuts, and bolts).

Since the program began tracking R&M performance in 2009, the

program has seen small, annual improvements. Over the past year, all
variants showed a slight improvement in targeted performance levels for
one metric, the mean flight hours between failures (design controlled), but
saw little or no discernable improvement for the four metrics not meeting
targets. However, based on current performance, the program does not
expect to meet those targets by full aircraft maturity. According to F-35
program officials, the ORD R&M metrics should be re-evaluated to
determine more realistic R&M performance metrics, but they have not yet
taken actions to do so. Until it does so, the program office remains
accountable for ensuring those ORD R&M metrics are achieved.

In June 2018, we recommended that the F-35 program identify what

steps it needs to take to ensure the F-35 aircraft meet R&M requirements
before each variant reaches maturity and update its R&M Improvement
Program (RMIP)—DOD’s action plan for prioritizing and funding R&M
improvement projects—with these steps. 15 DOD concurred with our
recommendation but has yet to take substantive actions to address it. It
did, however, complete 16 improvement projects since we last reported
on this. Despite completing these projects, there were not significant
gains in the R&M metrics not meeting targets. Program officials advised,
however, that measurable improvements in R&M can take time to
manifest. To speed this process, the program is accelerating planned
upgrades to older aircraft where appropriate, which officials stated should
translate to an overall improvement in the program’s R&M performance.

15
GAO-18-321. The F-35 program began tracking its R&M performance in 2009 and
documented the RMIP’s approach in April 2014. In June 2018, we found that the F-35
program did not have a plan to ensure all R&M targets will be met by full aircraft maturity.

Page 13 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

The F-35 Program Office’s The F-35 program office has estimated that implementing all of the
Improvement Plan Does identified improvement projects currently contained in its RMIP could
result in potential life cycle cost savings of over $9.2 billion by improving
Not Address Under-
the F-35’s R&M. As of December 2018, the guidance the F-35 program
Performing Metrics office has used to implement the RMIP does not define specific,
measurable objectives for what the desired goals for the F-35’s R&M
performance should be or align improvement projects with R&M goals.
Furthermore, the RMIP has not been a funding priority.

Federal internal control standards state that programs should define

objectives when implementing programs such as the RMIP. 16 Although
the F-35 program RMIP’s guidance has a general goal of improving R&M,
it does not identify achieving the targets for the eight R&M metrics the
program tracks as an objective. Program officials acknowledged that the
RMIP’s guidance does not include such an objective. Instead, officials are
using the RMIP to prioritize and fund projects that will improve aircraft
availability and mission capability—neither of which are included in the
eight R&M metrics, but are necessary and important initiatives. 17 Officials
stated that by prioritizing these projects, they will eventually improve
performance under all R&M metrics, including the four that are not
meeting targets. The RMIP’s guidance, however, does not discuss these
priorities or align improvement projects with the eight R&M metrics.

In our prior work on weapon system acquisitions, we have identified a

number of best practices for improving program outcomes, such as
clearly establishing well-defined requirements and securing stable funding

16
GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government require agencies to
define measurable objectives when implementing programs. Agencies should also
consider requirements when defining these objectives. Objectives should be defined in
measurable terms so that performance toward achieving those objectives can be
assessed. Measurable objectives are generally free of bias and do not require subjective
judgments to dominate their measurement. Measurable objectives are also stated in a
quantitative or qualitative form that permits reasonably consistent measurement. GAO,
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G (Washington,
D.C.: September 2014).
17
Aircraft availability (also known as air vehicle availability) and mission capability both
measure the percentage of time during which aircraft are safe to fly, available for use, and
able to perform at least one tasked mission. The air vehicle availability metric assesses all
aircraft in the fleet, including those in the possession of the F-35 units and those at the
depots for modifications. The mission capability metric assesses only aircraft that are in
the possession of F-35 units.

Page 14 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

that matches resources to requirements. 18 The F-35 program office has
not prioritized or dedicated funding in its budget to improve R&M in part
because program officials explained that they have been focused on
initiatives intended to lower the cost of the aircraft. Further, any current
funding for R&M improvement projects comes from the program’s
operation and maintenance funds, which are only available for one fiscal
year. Officials further explained that, if such funding runs out or is used by
the program for other efforts, then R&M projects will go unfunded or be
suspended until new funding is available. In fiscal year 2018, for example,
while some R&M improvement projects were completed, several other
projects were suspended when that year’s funding ran out. According to
officials, these projects may not be started back up until fiscal year 2019.
In addition, most of the R&M improvement projects that were approved in
fiscal year 2018 were not funded. For example, as of December 2018,
according to a contractor representative, all of the identified improvement
projects currently unfunded in the program’s RMIP would cost about $30
million to implement, but are on hold and waiting to be funded.

Program officials stated that they are in the process of revising the RMIP
and have considered including more specific objectives, such as a focus
on improving aircraft availability and mission capability and a focus on
improving R&M performance where the ORD R&M metrics’ targets are
not being met. Additionally, in its 2019 annual lifecycle sustainment plan,
the program office noted that a dedicated annual budget for R&M
improvement projects would benefit the program. According to the
program, any revisions to the RMIP and changes to how it will be funded,
however, will not be complete until April 2019 or later.

Without defining measurable objectives in its RMIP guidance for meeting

all eight R&M metrics and aligning which improvement projects will
ensure those metrics are met, the program is at risk of not fully meeting
its R&M goals. Further, without prioritizing funding for improving R&M,
projects may continue to be either prematurely suspended or never get
underway. As a result, the warfighter may accept aircraft that (1) are less
reliable than originally described in the program’s ORD, and (2) have
operation and sustainment costs that may raise affordability questions.

18
GAO Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to Better
Weapon System Outcomes, GAO-01-288 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2001).

Page 15 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

 With development of the baseline program complete, the program is
The F-35 Program transitioning to early development and testing for modernization efforts
Will Start Block 4 known as Block 4, which are expected to cost about $10.5 billion. The F-
35 program plans to award Block 4 development contracts starting in May
Modernization without 2019, before completing a business case—a baseline cost and schedule
a Complete Business estimate to track the program’s performance going forward. In doing so,
the program will commit resources without adequate knowledge of Block
Case 4’s full cost, schedule, and level of technology maturity, putting Block 4 at
risk of experiencing cost and schedule overruns similar to those
experienced by the baseline program during its development.

The F-35 Program Is The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 required
Transitioning to Early DOD to submit a report containing certain elements of an acquisition
program baseline—in essence, a full program business case—to include
Block 4 Development and
the cost, schedule, and performance information for Block 4. In 2018, we
Testing found that DOD’s report to Congress was incomplete but included
information on some elements of the Block 4 acquisition program
baseline.19 In its report, DOD stated that the acquisition program baseline
would continue to be refined over the next year. As a result, we presented
a matter for congressional consideration to restrict Block 4 funding until
the program established a complete business case.

DOD’s report to Congress also outlined the F-35 program office’s new
development approach to deliver Block 4 capabilities—new requirements
beyond the baseline aircraft capabilities to address evolving threats. As
we reported in June 2018, this new approach, meant to deliver
capabilities to the warfighter faster, is referred to as Continuous Capability
Development and Delivery (C2D2).20 This approach consists of 6-month
development cycles in which small groups of capabilities will be
developed, tested, and delivered as they are matured.

In January 2018, the F-35 program started using this C2D2 approach to
develop and test software updates to address deficiencies identified
during testing. According to the contractor, the first two software updates
also established a foundation for new Block 4 capabilities to be fully
developed later. According to program officials, as of December 2018, the
program has executed contract actions valued over $1.4 billion to

19
GAO-18-321.
20
GAO-18-321.

Page 16 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

 establish testing facilities and support early Block 4 development of
capabilities the program plans to deliver through 2024. According to
DOD’s January report, results from this work will help the program inform
its Block 4 business case.

The F-35 Program Will The F-35 program plans to award Block 4 development contracts without
Start Block 4 Development knowledge of the effort’s full cost or the maturity of critical technologies.
Over the past year, the program has been working to complete its
without a Full Business
business case for Block 4, including incorporating Block 4 activities into
Case its acquisition strategy—which was approved in October 2018. However,
three key Block 4 business case documents will not be ready before the
program’s planned May 2019 contract awards for development efforts.

• Independent technology readiness assessment: Although the

contracts for Block 4 development efforts are planned to be awarded
in May 2019, the program will not conduct an independent technology
readiness assessment by that time. A technology readiness
assessment is a systematic, evidence-based process that evaluates
the maturity of hardware and software technologies critical to the
performance of a larger system or the fulfillment of the key objectives
of an acquisition program. According to a program official, the
program will conduct its own assessments on a rolling basis as initial
capabilities are developed. The official stated that technologies will
not be integrated into the aircraft until they are adequately mature.
The program office plans to conduct a partial assessment of initial
capabilities sometime between October and December 2019 with
additional assessments to follow. However, without an independent
technology readiness assessment, the program has not identified
potential critical technology elements and as a result, may be at risk of
delaying the delivery of new capabilities.
• Test and evaluation master plan: Although the F-35 program has
begun testing Block 4 capabilities, it does not have an approved test
and evaluation master plan. The test and evaluation master plan
documents the overall structure, strategy, and objectives of the test
program as well as the associated resources needed for execution. It
provides a framework for the program office to provide detailed test
plans and subsequently determine the resources needed. Test
officials have expressed concerns about the lack of an approved test
plan, uncertain funding, the number of test aircraft available, and the
draft test schedule, among other things. Officials were also concerned
as to whether the Block 4 test aircraft would be in the same
configuration as fielded aircraft, which are in earlier configurations

Page 17 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

 than the test fleet. Further, DOT&E stated in its annual report that it
considers the current Block 4 schedule to be high risk due to the large
amount of planned capabilities that will be developed and tested in 6-
month development cycles. 21 An approved, properly resourced test
plan is essential for planning and preparing for adequate testing of the
Block 4 capabilities. Without an approved test and evaluation master
plan, the F-35 program is providing the test authorities with
capabilities to be tested without giving them the necessary direction
on how to adequately prepare to conduct the tests. Specifically, test
officials stated the F-35 program office has not provided details on
which capabilities are planned for each testing development cycle
making it difficult to execute testing. While this is still a concern, F-35
program officials explained that over the past 3 months they have
been providing the test authorities with the direction needed to
conduct testing.
• Independent cost estimate: The Block 4 independent cost estimate,
which details the program’s total estimated life cycle cost, is not
complete. In August 2017, we reported that DOD estimated the
development funding needed for the first phase of modernization for
Block 4 to be over $3.9 billion through 2022. 22 Since then, the
program incorporated more scope and fidelity into the Block 4 cost
estimate, which has increased to $10.5 billion for Block 4 capabilities
planned through 2024. The program office has provided its Block 4
cost estimate to the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office
(CAPE) for an independent cost estimate. 23 According to CAPE
officials, they will provide the independent cost estimate between
October and December 2019 to support the program’s full-rate
production decision, but this would occur several months after the
program plans to award the Block 4 development contracts. Without
an independent cost estimate, Congress does not have insight into
the full potential cost of the Block 4 effort.

21
Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, Fiscal Year 2018 Annual Report (December
2018).
22
GAO, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: DOD’s Proposed Follow-on Modernization Acquisition
Strategy Reflects an Incremental Approach Although Plans Are Not Yet Finalized,
GAO-17-690R (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 8, 2017).
23
The Director of CAPE shall ensure that the cost estimation and cost analysis processes
of the DOD provide accurate information and realistic estimates of cost for the acquisition
programs of the Department of Defense including conducting independent cost estimates
and cost analyses for all major defense acquisition programs. 10 U.S.C. § 2334.

Page 18 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

The expected completion dates for these documents are between
October and December 2019, at the earliest. Figure 4 shows key Block 4
dates, the planned development contract awards, and planned
completion dates for the remaining business case documents.

Figure 4: Three Business Case Documents Will Not Be Ready Ahead of the Planned
Development Contract Awards

Major defense acquisition programs generally follow DOD acquisition

policy, which states that prior to the release of a development contract
request for proposal, program officials should have confidence that
program requirements are firm. Program officials should also clearly state
that the risk of committing to development has been reduced or will be
adequately reduced prior to contract award. According to best practices
identified by GAO, without several of the business case documents
completed, program officials cannot have a high level of confidence that
the requirements are firm and that the risk to committing an estimated
$10.5 billion in funding to Block 4 has been adequately reduced. 24

According to program officials, business case documents have not been

completed because they took a step back to re-examine their approach
and the cost estimate for Block 4 that DOD established in 2017. Counter

24
GAO-18-360SP.

Page 19 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

 to acquisition best practices, the program plans to initiate additional
development work before they acquire the requisite knowledge of the
necessary levels of technology maturity and funding. Program officials
have reported the planned modernization contracting efforts shown in
table 3.

Table 3: Modernization Development Contracting Efforts Planned for 2019

Contracting effort Planned award date

a
Development of the Dual Capable Aircraft for the F-35A May 2019
Development of early Block 4 capabilities for a systems May 2019
engineering review and activities associated with developmental
flight testing
Source: GAO presentation of F-35 program office information. | GAO-19-341
a
The Dual Capable Aircraft is funded separately from the F-35 program. DOD plans to integrate this
program into the F-35 Block 4. Dual Capable Aircraft refers to the capability to carry conventional and
non-conventional weapons.

If program officials move ahead with awarding Block 4 contracts without

gaining the knowledge that a full business case could would provide,
Block 4 modernization efforts will be at risk of experiencing the same kind
of cost and schedule growth the baseline development program
experienced.

With a few exceptions, the negotiated prices for all F-35 variants have
The F-35’s Unit Cost generally been decreasing with each production lot, and more aircraft are
Has Decreased and being procured in each lot. In particular, the F-35A’s price has decreased
in each subsequent production lot, with the most recent price per aircraft
Its Production Rate at $89 million in lot 11, as shown in figure 5 below.
Has Increased

Page 20 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

Figure 5: The F-35A Negotiated Price Per Aircraft By Production Lot Is Decreasing

In 2018, we reported that while the F-35 program faces affordability

challenges, it was investing in several projects to reduce production and
sustainment costs. 25 According to DOD, to improve production
affordability, the F-35 program office is continuing to make investments to
lower the price of an F-35A to below $80 million by lot 13. To realize this
goal, the F-35 program office and the prime contractor are increasing the
production rate and investing in various initiatives to lower production
costs. For example:

• According to the program office, it has invested a total of $320.3

million in efforts to improve manufacturing processes that it estimates
could result in up to $7.9 billion in savings over the life of the program.
In addition, the prime contractor has invested $90 million and plans to
invest an additional $25 million to lower its production costs.
• DOD issued a contract announcement for economic order quantity
purchases for use in production lots 13-14. This approach involves

25
GAO-18-321.

Page 21 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

 making large purchases of components that will be used across
multiple procurement lots of aircraft to reduce production costs by
buying components in bulk and achieving economies of scale. The
program had expected $1.2 billion in cost savings from this effort, but
according to estimates from the CAPE, cost savings will more likely
be $595 million.

In addition, according to program officials, once the program achieves

full-rate production, it plans to utilize a multi-year procurement strategy,
beginning in fiscal year 2021. This strategy is intended to have similar
benefits as the economic order quantity purchases by providing industry
with a stable, long-term demand. 26

According to Pratt & Whitney, the cost of the engine is also declining. For
example, the price of the F-35A and C engine dropped by $100,000 per
engine over the past year. The most recent negotiated price is $11.9
million per engine.

The F-35 airframe and engine contractors saw a significant increase in

their production rates in 2018, but faced some production challenges as
well. The airframe contractor—Lockheed Martin—increased its production
rate by 50 percent and delivered a total of 91 aircraft in 2018, with a total
of 267 aircraft on its production floor or in contract negotiations as of
December 2018, as shown in figure 6.

26
Multi-year contracting is a special contracting method to acquire known requirements, in
quantities and total costs not over planned requirements, for up to 5 years.

Page 22 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

Figure 6: The Number of F-35 Aircraft in Each Phase of Production

In addition, Lockheed Martin delivered more aircraft on time. In 2012,

none of the planned aircraft deliveries were on time whereas in 2018, 58
percent were on time. To incentivize the contractor to improve on-time
deliveries, the program office has added a performance incentive fee to
the lot 11 production contract. Table 4 shows some improvements in
Lockheed Martin’s production metrics since 2012 and over the past 2
years.

Page 23 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

Table 4: F-35 Airframe 2012 and 2016-2018 Deliveries Increased While Other Metrics Varied

Metric 2012 2016 2017 2018

Aircraft delivered 29 46 66 91
Aircraft delivered late 29 29 28 38
Percentage of aircraft delivered late out of total 100 63 42 42
Average labor hours per F-35A delivered 108,355 47,269 41,541 38,436
Average labor hours per F-35B delivered 107,998 61,928 57,152 55,266
Average labor hours per F-35C delivered NA 65,187 60,121 68,040
Average total hours for scrap, rework, and repair per F-35A 14,332 6,590 5,645 5,156
Average total hours for scrap, rework, and repair per F-35B 17,165 8,420 7,510 7,914
Average total hours for scrap, rework, and repair per F-35C NA 9,552 7,866 11,725
Source: Lockheed Martin data. | GAO-19-341

Between 2012 and 2017, Lockheed Martin saw some improvement for all
variants’ production metrics, with the F-35A showing improvements
through 2018. However, over the past year, several metrics for the F-
35Bs and F-35Cs saw a decline. According to Lockheed Martin, it faced
several challenges with the increased production rate which led to these
declines.

• For example, since January 2018, the contractor hired around 900
new personnel, nearly 30 percent of its workforce, all of whom needed
training. According to officials, this influx of new personnel led to an
increase in the average labor hours for the F-35C and the number of
hours required for scrap, rework, and repair of the F-35B and F-35C.
According to the contractor, as the newly hired personnel gain more
experience in the production processes, the average labor hours it
takes to build an F-35C should start decreasing again.
• The contractor faced several production quality issues and parts
delays, which it worked to address over the past year. For instance,
we reported last year that due to a fault in the production process,
Lockheed Martin halted deliveries after the Air Force identified
corrosion between the aircraft’s surface panels and the airframe
because Lockheed Martin did not apply primer when the panels were
attached. 27 The program office stated that Lockheed Martin and the F-
35 Program Executive Officer reached a mutual agreement on the

27
GAO-18-321.

Page 24 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

 cost to resolve this issue, the details of which have not been disclosed
publicly.
• With the production rate increase, the supply chain was strained to
deliver parts on time, which led to increases in material shortages for
key components, such as the radar.

Pratt & Whitney has also increased production over the past year and has
shown similar manufacturing performance for the F-35 engine as in past
years; however, it had fewer on-time deliveries in 2018 due to the
challenges it faced, including an increase in the average number of
quality issues per engine. Pratt & Whitney’s production rate increased by
10 percent over the past year, with 81 engines delivered in 2018. Table 5
shows the trends in Pratt & Whitney production metrics’ performance.

Table 5: F-35 Engine 2012 and 2016-2018 Deliveries Increased Though Other Metrics Varied

Metric 2012 2016 2017 2018

Engines under contract 35 60 73 107
Engines delivered 48 65 73 81
Engines delivered late 41 38 35 70
Percent of engines delivered late out of total 85 58 48 86
Average labor hours per engine 1,555 1,239 1,272 1,106
Average labor hours for scrap, rework, and repair per engine 449 183 228 198
a
Average number of quality notifications per engine 811 642 777 941
Source: GAO presentation of Pratt & Whitney data. | GAO-19-341
a
A small sub-set of parts drive a majority of Pratt & Whitney’s quality notifications per engine.

According to Pratt & Whitney, its late engine deliveries increased in 2018
partially due to a subcontractor that did not have all of the needed tooling
in place to produce more F-35B engines. To address this and other
issues causing the late deliveries, Pratt & Whitney is taking lessons
learned from its other production facilities and applying them to the F-35’s
engine production.

The F-35 program has overcome significant hurdles in its 18 years of

Conclusions development of the baseline aircraft, which was completed last year. One
recent hurdle that it overcame was resolving many critical deficiencies
found during developmental testing, which allowed the program to begin
operational testing this past December. Other hurdles remain, including
with the F-35’s reliability and maintainability (R&M). Four of the eight

Page 25 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

R&M metrics continue to fall short of meeting performance targets.
Program officials stated that the Operational Requirements Document
(ORD) R&M targets need to be re-evaluated to determine more realistic
R&M performance metrics but have not yet taken actions to do so. Until
the program re-evaluates the targets, it is accountable for achieving those
requirements.

Furthermore, funding improvement efforts have not been a priority for the
program. As a result, over the past year, some projects were started,
several were halted while underway, and others are on hold, waiting for
funding. As long as targets under all of the R&M metrics continue to fall
short, the U.S. military services and the taxpayer will have to settle for
aircraft that are less reliable and more costly to maintain than originally
planned. Also, with continuing concerns about the program’s long-term
affordability, the program is missing a prime opportunity to infuse
affordability into the aircraft’s future with better R&M performance. As the
program is considering revisions to its R&M Improvement Program
(RMIP), it is in a good position to clearly define and communicate its R&M
objectives for the aircraft to meet the targets under all of its eight R&M
metrics. Until it does so, the program office will not know whether the
steps it is taking now are sufficient to ensure each F-35 variant achieves
its R&M requirements in the future.

As we have reported in the past, the F-35 program started its

development before it was ready. It is now at risk of doing the same thing
with the Block 4 modernization effort. Since we last reported in June
2018, the program has still not established a solid business case to
commit funding and other resources to developing new capabilities for the
aircraft. This could result in the program delivering technologies late and
over cost estimates. Finally, the program has committed a significant
amount of funding to support Block 4, but it has not completed an
independent cost estimate of the life-cycle cost. Consequently, Block 4
may follow in the footsteps of the F-35’s baseline program which saw
significant cost and schedule growth during its development. This
approach leaves the F-35 program, DOD, Congress, and the U.S. military
services without key information to make decisions regarding Block 4.

Page 26 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

 We are making the following five recommendations to the Department of
Recommendations for Defense:
Executive Action
The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the F-35 program office
assesses whether the ORD R&M targets are still feasible and revise the
ORD accordingly. (Recommendation 1)

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the F-35 program office, as
it revises its RMIP, identifies specific and measurable R&M objectives in
its RMIP guidance. (Recommendation 2)

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the F-35 program office, as
it revises its RMIP, identifies and documents which RMIP projects will
achieve the identified objectives of the RMIP guidance.
(Recommendation 3)

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the F-35 program office
prioritizes funding for the RMIP. (Recommendation 4)

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the F-35 program office
completes its business case, at least for the initial Block 4 capabilities
under development, before initiating additional development work, to
include: an independent cost estimate; an approved test and evaluation
master plan which addresses resources, aircraft shortfalls, and funding;
and an independent technology readiness assessment.
(Recommendation 5)

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. Our
Agency Comments initial draft report contained only recommendations 2 through 5 above.
and Our Evaluation During the comment period, DOD officials provided additional information
about the program’s R&M performance concerning whether the ORD
targets continue to be feasible and should be re-examined. As a result,
we added our first recommendation above—that the F-35 program office
assess whether the ORD R&M targets are still feasible and revise the
ORD accordingly.

DOD provided written comments on our report, which are reprinted in

appendix IV. DOD concurred with our four recommendations on R&M but
did not concur with our last recommendation on the Block 4
modernization. DOD also provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.

Page 27 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

In concurring with our four R&M recommendations, DOD stated that it
would review its R&M requirements and possibly revise them, update its
RMIP guidance, and plan for R&M funding going forward.

DOD officials did not concur with our recommendation that the F-35
program office complete its business case before initiating additional
development work. DOD stated that the F-35 program office has
adequate cost, schedule, and technical maturity knowledge to begin the
development of initial Block 4 capabilities. DOD also outlined when some
of the remaining Block 4 business case documents would be complete.
As we stated in our report, these documents will not be complete until
after the contracts to initiate additional Block 4 development work will be
awarded. We maintain that completing its business case before initiating
additional development work would put DOD and the program in a better
position to effectively and successfully develop Block 4 capabilities.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional

committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Secretary of the Air Force, the
Secretary of the Navy, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. In
addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at
http://www.gao.gov.

Page 28 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-4841 or [email protected]. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this
report are listed in appendix V.

Michael J. Sullivan
Director, Contracting and National Security Acquisitions

Page 29 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

List of Committees

The Honorable James M. Inhofe

Chairman
The Honorable Jack Reed
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Richard Shelby

Chairman
The Honorable Richard J. Durbin
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable Adam Smith

Chairman
The Honorable Mac Thornberry
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

The Honorable Peter Visclosky

Chairman
The Honorable Ken Calvert
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

Page 30 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

Appendix I: Prior GAO Reports and DOD
Appendix I: Prior GAO Reports and DOD
Actions

Actions

Table 6: Select Prior GAO Reports on F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and Department of Defense (DOD) Responses

Estimated F-35
development costs,
development length,
Year, and aircraft unit Primary GAO DOD response
a
GAO report cost Key program event conclusions/recommendations and actions
2001 • $34.4 billion Start of system Critical technologies needed for key DOD did not concur with
GAO-02-39 • 10 years development and aircraft performance elements are our recommendation. DOD
demonstration approved. not mature. We recommended that did not delay the start of
• $69 million
the program should delay start of system development and
system development until critical demonstration stating
technologies are matured to technologies were at
acceptable levels. acceptable maturity levels
and that it will manage risks
in development.
2006 • $45.7 billion Program sets in motion The program was entering DOD partially concurred but
GAO-06-356 • 12 years plan to enter production in production with less than 1 percent did not delay start of
2007 shortly after first flight of testing complete. We production because it
• $86 million
of the non-production recommended that the program believed the risk level was
representative aircraft. delay investing in production until appropriate.
flight testing shows that the Joint
Strike Fighter performs as
expected.
2010 • $49.3 billion The program was Costs and schedule delays DOD continued
GAO-10-382 • 15 years restructured to reflect inhibited the program’s ability to restructuring, increasing
findings from a recent meet needs on time. We test resources, and
• $112 million
independent cost team and recommended that the program lowering the production
independent manufacturing complete a comprehensive cost rate. Independent review
review team. As a result, estimate and assess warfighter and teams evaluated aircraft
development funds initial operational capability and engine manufacturing
increased, test aircraft were requirements. We suggested that processes. Cost increases
added, the schedule was Congress require DOD to tie later resulted in a Nunn-
extended, and the early annual procurement requests to McCurdy breach. Military
production rate decreased. demonstrated progress. services completed the
review of capability
requirements, as we
recommended.
2013 • $55.2 billion The program incorporated The program was moving in the DOD agreed with GAO’s
GAO-13-309 • 18 years positive and more realistic right direction but needed to fully observations.
restructuring actions taken validate design and operational
• $137 million
since 2010, including more performance and at the same time
time and funding for make the system affordable. We
development and deferred did not make recommendations to
procurement of more than DOD in this report.
400 aircraft to future years.

Page 31 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

 Appendix I: Prior GAO Reports and DOD
Actions

Estimated F-35
development costs,
development length,
Year, and aircraft unit Primary GAO DOD response
a
GAO report cost Key program event conclusions/recommendations and actions
2014 • $55.2 billion The services established Delays in developmental flight DOD concurred with our
GAO-14-322 • 18 years initial operational testing of the F-35’s critical recommendation. On June
capabilities dates in 2013. software may hinder delivery of the 22, 2015, the Under
• $135 million
The Marine Corps and Air warfighting capabilities to the Secretary of Defense for
Force planned to field initial military services. We recommended Acquisition, Technology,
operational capabilities in that DOD conduct an assessment and Logistics issued a Joint
2015 and 2016, of the specific capabilities that can Strike Fighter software
respectively, and the Navy be delivered and those that will not development report, which
planned to field its initial likely be delivered to each of the met the intent of GAO’s
capability in 2018. services by their established initial recommendation.
operational capability dates.
2016 • $55.1 billion DOD planned to begin what The terms and conditions of the DOD did not concur with
GAO-16-390 • 18 years it refers to as a block buy planned block buy and managing our recommendation. DOD
contracting approach that follow-on modernization under the viewed modernization as a
• $130.6 million
was anticipated to provide current baseline could present continuation of the existing
cost savings. In addition, oversight challenges for Congress. program and the existing
DOD planned to manage We recommended that the oversight mechanisms,
the follow-on modernization Secretary of Defense hold a including regularly
program under the current milestone B review and manage scheduled high-level
F-35 program baseline and follow-on modernization as a acquisition reviews, would
not as its own separate separate major defense acquisition be used to manage the
major defense acquisition program. effort.
program.
2017 • $55.1 billion The DOD F-35 program Program officials projected that the DOD did not concur with
GAO-17-351 • 18 years office was considering program would only need $576.2 the first two
contracts for economic million in fiscal year 2018 to recommendations and
• $130.6 million
order quantity of 2 years’ complete baseline development. At partially concurred with the
worth of aircraft parts the same time, program officials third while stating that it
followed by a separate expected that more than $1.2 billion had finalized the details of
annual contract for could be needed to commit to Block DOD and contractor
procurement of lot-12 4 and economic order quantity in investments associated
aircraft with annual options fiscal year 2018. GAO with an economic order
for lot-13 and lot-14 aircraft. recommended DOD use historical quantity purchase and
However, as of January data to reassess the cost of would brief Congress on
2017, contractors stated completing development of Block the details, including costs
they were still negotiating 3F, complete Block 3F testing and benefits of the finalized
the terms of this contract; before soliciting contractor economic order quantity
therefore, the specific costs proposals for Block 4 development, approach.
and benefits remained and identify for Congress the cost
uncertain. and benefits associated with
procuring economic order
quantities of parts.

Page 32 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

 Appendix I: Prior GAO Reports and DOD
Actions

Estimated F-35
development costs,
development length,
Year, and aircraft unit Primary GAO DOD response
a
GAO report cost Key program event conclusions/recommendations and actions
2018 • $55.5 billion The program office The program office plans to resolve DOD concurred with both
GAO-18-321 • 18 years determined that it could not a number of critical deficiencies recommendations and
resolve all open after full-rate production. We identified actions that it
• $140.6 million
deficiencies found in recommended that the F-35 would take in response.
developmental testing program office resolve all critical The National Defense
within the development deficiencies before making a full- Authorization Act for fiscal
program, and they would rate production decision, and year 2019 included a
need to be resolved identify steps needed to ensure the provision limiting DOD from
through post-development F-35 meets reliability and obligating or expending
contract actions. DOD maintainability requirements before more than 75 percent of the
provided a report to each variant reaches maturity. We appropriations authorized
Congress outlining also suggested that Congress under the Act for the F-35
preliminary plans to consider providing in future continuous capability
modernize the F-35. It appropriations that no funds shall development and delivery
stated it planned to develop be available for obligation for F-35 program until 15 days after
a full acquisition program Block 4 until DOD provides a report the Secretary of Defense
baseline for the setting forth its complete acquisition submits to the
modernization effort in 2018 program baseline for the Block 4 congressional defense
and provide a report to effort to the congressional defense committees a detailed cost
Congress by March 2019. committees. estimate and baseline
schedule.
Source: GAO | GAO-19-341
a
The aircraft unit cost is the program’s average procurement unit cost estimate which is calculated by
dividing the procurement amount by the procurement aircraft quantities. This is different than the
negotiated price for F-35 aircraft, also reported above.

Page 33 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology

Methodology

The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2015 included a
provision for GAO to review the F-35 acquisition program annually until
the program reaches full-rate production. This is the fourth report under
that provision. In this report, we (1) provide information on the program’s
progress toward completing testing of the baseline aircraft; (2) assess the
aircraft’s current reliability and maintainability (R&M) status; (3) assess
the program’s modernization efforts (to add new aircraft capabilities),
known as Block 4; and (4) provide information on the program’s
production costs and efficiency initiatives.

To provide information on progress in the F-35’s development, we

reviewed the program’s costs, schedule, and performance plans and
compared the actual progress in each area with the goals established in
its 2012 baseline to identify any significant trends. We also reviewed the
F-35’s selected acquisition report and its fiscal year 2019 budget request.
To assess progress in testing, we reviewed test results and associated
reports, program briefings, and internal DOD program analyses. We
interviewed officials from the program office, military test authorities, and
contractors—Lockheed Martin (airframe) and Pratt & Whitney (engine)—
on key aspects of F-35 development progress, including flight testing,
future test plans, and recent findings from test events. We also
interviewed the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation office and F-35
program developmental and operational test pilots.

To assess the program’s progress in achieving its R&M targets, we

obtained and analyzed its monthly reports on R&M performance from
January 2018 through December 2018. We compared these to the
program’s R&M targets documented in the F-35 Operational
Requirements Document and the Joint Contract Specification. We
examined program data for the metrics’ performance across 12 months to
identify any trends. We assessed the reliability of this data by reviewing
supporting documentation and interviewing program office officials who
track reliability metrics and other knowledgeable DOD officials. We also
reviewed the program’s Reliability and Maintainability Improvement
Program’s guidance to determine if it contained specific and measurable
objectives and the projects needed to meet those objectives. We
determined that the R&M metric data were sufficiently reliable for our
purposes of determining whether the program will meet its targets.

To assess the program’s Block 4 modernization plans, we reviewed

documents that GAO best practices identify should be completed prior to
awarding a development contract. We interviewed DOD and program
office officials, and contractor representatives regarding the program’s

Page 34 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology

Block 4 activities to date and future plans. We compared the program’s

accomplishments over the past year and its future plans to the product
development best practices identified by GAO. We reviewed the fiscal
year 2019 budget request to identify costs associated with the Block 4
effort. We obtained contract documents for Block 4 activities between
March 2014 and December 2018 to determine the total amount of funding
that has been obligated to Block 4 and the scope of work that has been
contracted.

To provide information on ongoing manufacturing performance and the

program’s plans to achieve full rate production, we obtained and analyzed
the prime contractor’s production metrics and its aircraft delivery rates
and from 2012 through 2018. We compared this performance to the
program’s procurement plans from its selected acquisition reports since
2003. We reviewed metrics and briefings provided by the program office,
Lockheed Martin, Pratt & Whitney, and the Defense Contract
Management Agency to identify progress in improving manufacturing
processes. We analyzed changes in delivery dates for lot 10 aircraft
delivered in 2018. We discussed reasons for any delivery delays and
plans for improvement with officials from Lockheed Martin and Pratt &
Whitney. We obtained cost investment and savings estimates and
discussed cost and manufacturing efficiency initiatives, such as the
economic order quantity purchases, with the contractors and program
office officials to understand potential cost savings and plans. We also
obtained and analyzed metrics on parts and aircraft quality through
December 2018 and discussed steps taken to improve quality and
deliveries with Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney officials. We
determined that the contractor’s production metrics and delivery dates
were sufficiently reliable for our purposes of determining production
efficiency and deliveries.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2018 to April 2019 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Page 35 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

Appendix III: Status of Selected F-35
Appendix III: Status of Selected F-35 Technical
Risks

Technical Risks

The F-35 program continues to address technical risks discovered in

testing. Since our 2018 report, the program identified new risks with the
canopy, fuel tubes, and cockpit, described below. The program has also
incorporated design changes that have mitigated technical risks that we
previously highlighted. 1 The status of the Department of Defense’s (DOD)
efforts to address these issues follows.

Newly Identified Technical Canopy Coating De-laminations and Corrosions: The F-35 fleet has
Risks experienced approximately 20 incidents of the canopy transparencies
delaminating after less than 100 flight hours. The contractor is currently
testing numerous solutions for the de-laminations, with intentions of
completing testing by January 2019.

F-35 aircraft are also experiencing canopy corrosion resulting from

moisture intrusion due to the aircraft’s adhesive cracking under pressure
and insufficient tape adhesion. The program has identified the need to
modify over 173 canopies over 4 years. The contractor has begun to
incorporate alternative material and tape into production, and released
standardized repair procedures to mitigate this issue.

Engine Fuel Tubes: In September 2018, a manufacturing fault in an

engine fuel tube caused an in-flight failure, which resulted in an F-35B
crash. The investigation identified several other life-limited fuel tubes in
each F-35 variant. The fleet was grounded while all aircraft were
inspected, and any fuel tubes identified were replaced or will be replaced
by June 2019.

Cockpit Display: In November 2018, operational test pilots experienced

the cockpit display freezing and blanking, and identified the problem as a
category 1 deficiency. The display issues occurred after a software
update. The start of operational testing was delayed until the contractor
could provide a software update to correct the problem, which was
accomplished with a work-around in December 2018.

1
GAO-18-321.

Page 36 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

 Appendix III: Status of Selected F-35 Technical
Risks

Technical Risks Identified Helmet Mounted Display: During low-light flights, the Helmet Mounted
In Our Previous Reports Display’s technology cannot display pure black, causing a green glow on
the screen which makes it difficult to see the full resolution of the night
vision video feed. The contractor is developing a new system to avoid this
effect, and the contractor delivered this system to the test fleet in
September 2018 with final flight testing planned through January 2019.
Figure 7 is a photograph of the Helmet Mounted Display.

Figure 7: The F-35 Helmet Mounted Display

Aerial refueling probes: The F-35B and F-35C variants use a “hose and
drogue” system in which an aerial refueling tanker aircraft extends a long,
flexible refueling hose and a parachute-like metal basket that provides
stability, the receiving aircraft then connects to the drogue basket with its
extendable refueling probe, as shown in figure 8. The refueling probe tips
are meant to break in the event there is a stress occurring during
refueling. However, the breaking is occurring more often than expected.
Since April 2014, more than 20 incidents have occurred where the F-35’s
aerial refueling probes broke off while conducting aerial refueling, leading
to a restriction of aerial refueling operations.

Page 37 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

Appendix III: Status of Selected F-35 Technical
Risks

Figure 8: F-35B Aircraft Refuel from a KC-130 Aerial Refueling Tanker Using Hose
and Drogue Refueling Equipment

Tire service life: We reported in June 2018, the average service life of
tires on the F-35B is below 10 landings. 2 Lockheed Martin is currently
working with three tire manufacturers to develop a new design with the
goal of 20 landings. Testing of the new tires will occur throughout 2019.
Figure 9 shows an F-35B during a landing.

2
GAO-18-321.

Page 38 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

Appendix III: Status of Selected F-35 Technical
Risks

Figure 9: An F-35B on USS America

Life support system: The program has identified over 35 pilot

physiological events, of which nearly 30 occurred in-flight. An action team
made of government officials, contractors, and doctors completed their
work by May 2018. A root cause investigation did not identify any F-35
system deficiencies, but reported it was difficult to fully determine the
problem due to a lack of real-time data. Contracting officials stated that
this is partially because the technology has not yet been developed to
monitor pilot’s health in flight, in real time. The prime contractor continues
to try to develop a means to monitor pilot health.

Page 39 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

Appendix IV: Comments from the
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department
of Defense

Department of Defense

Page 40 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department
of Defense

Page 41 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department
of Defense

Page 42 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments

Acknowledgments

Michael J. Sullivan, (202) 512-4841 or [email protected]

GAO Contact
In addition to the contact named above, the following staff members
Staff made key contributions to this report: Justin Jaynes (Assistant Director),
Acknowledgments Jennifer Baker, Emily Bond, Brandon Booth, Erin Butkowski, Matthew T.
Crosby, Desirée E. Cunningham, R. Eli DeVan, Laura Jezewski, Jennifer
Leotta, Meghan Perez, Hai Tran, Abby Volk, Mary Weiland, Alyssa Weir,
and Robin M. Wilson.

Page 43 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Development is Nearly Complete, but

Deficiencies Found in Testing Need to Be Resolved. GAO-18-321.
Washington, D.C.: June 5, 2015.

Warfighter Support: DOD Needs to Share F-35 Operational Lessons

Across the Military Services. GAO-18-464R. Washington, D.C.: April 25,
2018.

F-35 Aircraft Sustainment: DOD Needs to Address Challenges Affecting

Readiness and Cost Transparency. GAO-18-75. Washington, D.C.:
October 26, 2017.

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: DOD’s Proposed Follow-on Modernization

Acquisition Strategy Reflects an Incremental Approach Although Plans
Are Not Yet Finalized. GAO-17-690R. Washington, D.C.: August 8, 2017.

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Needs to Complete Developmental

Testing Before Making Significant New Investments. GAO-17-351.
Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2017.

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Continued Oversight Needed as Program Plans

to Begin Development of New Capabilities. GAO-16-390. Washington,
D.C.: April 14, 2016.

F-35 Sustainment: DOD Needs a Plan to Address Risks Related to Its

Central Logistics System. GAO-16-439. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2016.

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Preliminary Observations on Program Progress.

GAO-16-489T. Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2016.

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Assessment Needed to Address Affordability

Challenges. GAO-15-364. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2015.

F-35 Sustainment: Need for Affordable Strategy, Greater Attention to

Risks, and Improved Cost Estimates. GAO-14-778. Washington, D.C.:
September 23, 2014.

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Slower Than Expected Progress in Software

Testing May Limit Initial Warfighting Capabilities. GAO-14-468T.
Washington, D.C.: March 26, 2014.

Page 44 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

 Related GAO Products

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Problems Completing Software Testing May

Hinder Delivery of Expected Warfighting Capabilities. GAO-14-322.
Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2014.

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Restructuring Has Improved the Program, but
Affordability Challenges and Other Risks Remain. GAO-13-690T.
Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2013.

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Current Outlook Is Improved, but Long-Term

Affordability Is a Major Concern. GAO-13-309. Washington, D.C.: March
11, 2013.

Fighter Aircraft: Better Cost Estimates Needed for Extending the Service
Life of Selected F-16s and F/A-18s. GAO-13-51. Washington, D.C.:
November 15, 2012.

Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Actions Needed to Further Enhance

Restructuring and Address Affordability Risks. GAO-12-437. Washington,
D.C.: June 14, 2012.

Joint Strike Fighter: Restructuring Added Resources and Reduced Risk,

but Concurrency Is Still a Major Concern. GAO-12-525T. Washington,
D.C.: March 20, 2012.

(102886)
Page 45 GAO-19-341 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
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