1

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Understanding
U.S. Strategy:
A Reader
Based on the
Ninth National Security Affairs Conference
October 8-9, 1982

Cosponsoredby the
National Defense University

and the

Office of the Assistant Secretary of

Defense for InternationalSecurity Affairs

Edited by
Terry L. Heyns

1983

National Defense University Press

Fort Lesley J. McNair
Washington, DC 20319
 Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or
implied within are solely those of the authors, and do not necessari-
ly represent the views of the National Defense University, the
Department of Defense, or any other Government agency or private
organization.

Portions of this book are copyrighted and may not be reprinted,

reproduced, or extracted without specific permission of the copy-
right proprietors.

The final manuscript of this book was copyedited under con-

tract DAHC32-M-83-0120 by William R. Mizelle, Washington, DC.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 83-600578.

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1 int:e 11m111
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GoWnine nti i(11O1:ffic ashh fon, Dda401 csi
copies may be purchased from the following agencies: Registered
users should contact the Defense Technical Information Center,
Cameron Station, Alexandria, Virginia 22314. The general public
should contact the National Technical Information Service, 5285
Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161.

First printing, October 1983

Second printing, March 1985

iv
 Contents

F o rew o rd ....................................................... ix
P re fa c e ......................................................... xi

Chapter

1. Introduction to Key Issues in

N ational S trategy .......................................... 1
Lieutenant Colonel Terry L. Heyns, USAF

2. Keynote Address: Evolving Strategies

for a C hanging W orld ...................................... 15
Dr. Harold L. Brown

3. Evolving a National Strategy .............................. 27

Panel S um m ary ............................................ 29

Dr. Samuel F. Wells, Chairman
Colonel Thomas J. Kennedy, USA. Rapporteur

National Interests and National Strategy:

T he N eed for Priority ...................................... 35
Dr. Donald E. Nuechterlein

Fragmegrative Challenges to National Strategy ........... 65

Dr. James N. Rosenau

4. National Security Strategies for the

U se of S pace .............................................. 83

Panel S um m ary ................................. .......... 85

Mr. Norman R. Augustine, Chairman
Lieutenant Colonel Gunter H. Neubert. USA, Rapporteur

The High Frontier Study: A Summary ..................... 93

Lieutenant General Daniel 0. Graham, USA (Ret.)

A Bold Two-Track Strategy for Space:

Entering the Second Quarter-Century ..................... 119
Dr. Barry J. Smernoff

V
5. Alternative Strategies for the Defense
of W estern Europe ......................................... 135

Panel S um m ary ............................................ 137

Mr. Phillip A. Karber, Chairman
Dr. Raymond E. Bell, Jr., Rapporteur

Developing Alternative Strategies for the

Defense of Western Europe: The Neglected
Triad and Its Implications for Long-Range
Theater Nuclear Forces .................................... 143
Dr. Edward A. Kolodziej

Alternative Strategies for the Defense

of W estern Europe ......................................... 175
Representative Newt L. Gingrich
Dr. Albert S. Hanser

6. Comparing United States and Soviet

N ational Strategies ........................................ 197

Panel Sum m ary ............................................ 199

Dr. Samuel P. Huntington, Chairman
Mr. John A. Baker, Rapporteur

Assessing Soviet National Security Strategy .............. 203

Dr. Dimitri K. Sir.es

US Strategy for National Security ........................ 221

Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

7. Reorganizing the United States System for

Developing Strategy ....................................... 241

Panel Sum m ary ............................................ 243

Dr. Albert C. Pierce, Chairman
Lieutenant Colonel Louis J. Moses, USAF, Rapporteur

Impediments to Department of Defense

R eorganization ............................................ 247
Dr. Archie D. Barrett

vi
 Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change ............... 307
General David C. Jones, USAF (Ret.)

.. .. .. .. .. .. ..
The JCS-How Much Reform Is Needed? ... 327
General Edward C. Meyer, USA (Ret.)

Navy, Marines Adamantly Oppose JCS

Reforms Most Others Tell Congress
A re Long O verdue ......................................... 347
Ms. Deborah M. Kyle
Mr. Benjamin F. Schemmer

E n d n o tes ..................................................... 36 1

Biographical N otes ........................................... 377

G lossary of Abbreviations .................................... 407

vii
Figures and Tables
Figure

7-1 Basic Organization Model of the Department

of D efense ...................................... ... 252
7-2 Legislative Organization Model of the Department
of D efense .......................................... 270
7-3 Integrated DOS 77-80 Critique Model of the
Organization of the Department of Defense ........ 274

Table

3-1 National Interest Matrix ............................. 41

3-2 US National Interests in North America ............. 43
3-3 US National Interests in Western Europe ........... 46
3-4 US National Interests in the Soviet Union .......... 49
3-5 US National Interests in East Asia .................. 51
3-6 US National Interests in South America ............ 55
3-7 US National Interests in the Middle East ............ 56
3-8 US National Interests in Southern Africa ........... 60
3-9 The United States in a Fragmegrated World ........ 69
3-10 Three Foreign-Policy Belief Systems Currently
Held by US Leaders ................................. 75

7-1 Staff Strengths Projected for the

End of Fiscal Year 1979 ............................. 254
7-2 Institutional Roles Under Three Options ............ 335
7-3 Major Studies on Reorganization of the
Joint C hiefs of Staff ................................. 336

viii
 Foreword

The Ninth National Security Affairs Conference, cosponsored

by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs and the National Defense University, provided a
forum in which officials from throughout Government discussed
important aspects of US national security with prominent leaders
from the private sector. The papers presented to stimulate discus-
sions at the conference, as well as summaries of those discussions,
make up this volume.

This year's conference, "Evolving Strategies for a Changing

World," addressed the problems of devising a coherent US national
security strategy to meet the challenges of international turbulence.
Five topics were addressed: evolving a national strategy, strategies
for Western Europe, strategies for the use of space, comparing US
and Sovietstrategies, and the US system for developing strategy.
Our distinguished authors and panelists raised fundamental
strategic issues which will continue to confront US national security
policymakers in the years ahead. Because the issues are of abiding
concern to scholars and to an informed American public, we have
departed somewhat from our "Proceedings" format of past years
and have designed this 1982 NSAC report as a reader in national
security. We feel it will serve the defense and academic communi-
ties even better in this format, while still furnishing an accurate
account of the conference events.

The National Defense University has noted a growing use of its

publications in college courses throughout the country. This unan-
ticipated but most welcome benefit has emerged from the com-
bined efforts of those many individuals who have participated in our
University's educational and research activities over the years, to
each of whom we express our deep appreciation. I am confident that
in keeping with their legacy and with the tradition of past National
Security Affairs Conferences, this report will generate valuable
insights into the serious security challenges which face our Nation.

JOHN S. PUSTAY
Lieutenant General, US Air Force
President, National Defense
University
ix
 Preface

As the United States approaches the 21st Century, American

defense interests and requirements are being discussed more
widely and seriously than ever before. National strategy to meet the
challenges of the future is certainly a key consideration in any
discussion about future security interests and needs. This volume,
which is the result of the Ninth National Security Affairs Confer-
ence, is meant to contribute to the dialogue on America's defense
interests by focusing on the concept of "strategy." The distin-
guished authors and panelists who gathered to debate US strategy
in its various manifestations all contributed valuable insights to
many of the questions facing the United States in the 1980s, the
1990s, and the early part of the next century.

As editor of this volume, I attempted to organize the conference

papers and summaries in a format that accurately reflects the major
themes and in a way that is most useful for the general reader. This
accounts for the somewhat different appearance of this book from
previous NSAC Proceedings. Although this volume in every sense
still represents the proceedings of the 1982 conference, the papers
have been edited for publication and the order of the papers has
been revised. The intent was to blend the NSAC material into a
"reader" on US national security strategies. Because the confer-
ence organizers put such careful thought into selecting and defin-
ing the topics of discussion, this task was an enjoyable one.

In addition to use as a reader, this book can be seen as a

companion volume to previous National Defense University publi-
cations, in particular, Evolving Strategic Realities: Implications for
US Policymakers,edited by Franklin D. Margiotta; and PlanningUS
Security, edited by Philip S. Kronenberg. Also, the proceedings of
the Seventh National Security Affairs Conference, Rethinking US
Security Policy for the 1980s, and the Eighth NSAC, The 1980s:
Decade of Confrontation?are both highly relevant to many of the
issues raised in this book. Taken together, these publications pro-
vide important perspectives which are deeply involved in any dis-
cussion of US strategy and national security.

The introductory chapter briefly summarizes the most impor-

x1
tant points made by each of the authors. The reader must remember,
however, that no summary can adequately portray the complex
ideas carefully developed by an author, who has brought both
serious scholarship and years of experience to his work. For this
reason, it is best to read the paper itself and not rely on any
substitute.

Preceding each set of papers is a summary of that particular

panel's discussion. Each panel chairman, assisted by the rappor-
teur, has prepared a synopsis of the key points made by the authors
to the panel and also the key points that emerged during panel
discussions. These panel summaries are especially valuable in that
they represent the reactions and informed views of the participants
themselves-government policymakers, scholars, and members of
the media and business communities. In some cases, the issues
raised in the panel discussions were especiaply contentious and
difficult to deal with in any decisive way. In edi*,ng ihis reader, there
was certainly no attempt to favor one point of view over another;
disagreements will clearly come through. Indeed, the stimulation of
a number of different points of view was encouraged. In this way,
the conference directly supported the kind of creative thinking that
is fundamental to the mission of the National Defense University.

The Ninth National Security Affairs Conference was the result

of cooperation among many agencies and individuals. The Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
and the National Security Affairs Institute of the National Defense
University cosponsored the event. The Honorable Francis J. West,
Jr., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs,
and Lieutenant General John S. Pustay, President, National Defense
University, deserve special recognition for their efforts on behalf of
the conference. We were especially fortunate to have had a man
with the experience of Dr. Harold Brown to deliver the keynote
address to the conference. Special thanks must also be given to Mr.
John P. Merrill, the Director of Policy Research, Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Colonel Frank Margiotta,
Director of the National Security Affairs Institute, who jointly coor-
dinated the conference.

In addition, many others worked on behalf of the conference

and publication of this reader. The entire staff of the Research
Directorate pitched in wherever needed to ensure the many details

xii
were attended to in timely fashion; Mr. George Maerz and Ms.
Rebecca Miller provided editorial support for the various confer-
ence publications. Finally, Ms. JoAnne Lewis, the Executive Secre-
tary of the National Security Affairs Institute, deserves a strong
"well done" for her careful planning and thorough work in adminis-
trative support of this major event.

The real credit for a successful conference, however, belongs

to the participants and authors who gathered to raise, discuss, and
consider important issues of US strategy. It is to them that we all
offer a special thank you.

TERRY L. HEYNS
Burke, Virginia
March 1983

xiii
 Chapter 1

Introduction to Key Issues

in National Strategy
 Chapter 1
Introduction to Key Issues in National Strategy

Lieutenant Colonel Terry L. Heyns, USAF

National Defense University

Strategy has varied and flexible definitions. A standard diction-

ary definition is as good as any to start with. The Webster's New
Collegiate Dictionary, for example, defines strategy as

the science and art of employing the political, economic, psy-

chological, and military forces of a nation or group of nations to
afford the maximum support to adopted policies in peace or war.

This definition includes the political, economic, and psycholog-

ical forces of a nation with its military forces, but leaves out the
nation's technological forces. In the future, the ability of a nation to
use its technological capacity for adopted policies in peace or war
will be extremely important. If these technological forces are added
to the above definition, then, we have a good starting point for
coming to grips with the idea of strategy, and that in part is the
purpose of this volume. Assembled here is a selection of papers
dealing with US national security strategy, written by highly quali-
fied authors whose perspectives are based on years of research and
practical experience in and out of government. None of them would
claim to prescribe permanent solutions for US strategy, but together
their papers provide a unique set of well-informed views regarding
US strategy.

In addition to the authors who contributed to these proceed-

ings, the Ninth National Security Affairs Conference was fortunate
to have Dr. Harold Brown as a speaker. Dr. Brown, who has held
high positions in education, business, and government, typifies the
multidiscipline perspective which the conference attempted to fos-
ter. Not surprisingly, his address (chapter 2 of this volume) contains
some key insights into this complex question of strategy. Indeed,
Dr. Brown argues that social welfare programs, budgetary policy,
productivity, and even the social policy of a nation such as the
United States should receive some consideration as inputs into
national strategy. Dr. Brown establishes a three-fold interaction

3
Key Issues in Strategy

linking international security, domestic economic matters, and

international economic questions. He further suggests that those
who up to now have been mainly concerned with international
security questions, must also be concerned with how domestic
economic matters fit with the other two legs of the tripod to support
a stable national strategy.

Dr. Brown goes on to provide some specific points which illus-

trate these key relationships. He concludes that the task of factoring
these domestic and economic matters into a broad and comprehen-
sive strategy will not be easy, but will still be a necessary task if a
national security strategy is to have any chance of success.

The complexity of formulating a national strategy is also

addressed in the papers of Dr. Donald E. Nuechterlein and Dr.
James N. Rosenau. Dr. Nuechterlein believes that the United States
must clearly distinguish and identify truly vital national interests in
formulating a strategy. He suggests that a starting point for apprais-
ing US objectives might be four basic "national interests": defense
of the homeland, economic well-being, favorable world order, and
the promotion of American values. He then assembles a matrix for
assessing the degree of national interest, ranging from survival
through vital interest on downward in intensity to major and peri-
pheral interest. Using this matrix, he investigates US interests in the
various regions of the world. Neuchterlein 4concludes that the
United States in the 1980s is overcommitted and must align national
priorities with needs, costs, and capabilities. He further states that
no nation, no matter how wealthy, can ignore the changing interna-
tional conditions which will continually be involved in this process
of prioritization.

Dr. James Rosenau's paper specifically addresses this diffi-

culty of formulating a viable strategy in the face of a complex and
ever-changing domestic and international setting. For Rosenau, the
problem is to identify the obstacles to an effective strategy and to
seek ways to work around these obstacles and achieve defined
goals. Rosenau sees four basic elements in a US national strategy: a
clear conception of goals and priorities among these goals; a design
for achieving these goals or countering threats to their attainment
with available resources; a societal consensus which will support
the strategy; and a worldwide reputation for adhering consistently
to the strategy. But Rosenau then goes on to ask if such a strategy is

4
 Key Issues in Strategy

even possible in today's international and domestic environment. In

answering, he coins the word "fragmegration" to designate the
forces of "fragmentation" and the forces of "integration" which are
so prevalent in the modern world. Being both simultaneous and
contradictory, these processes have become typical in today's
world as a whole and also in distinct regions of the world. Rosenau
argues that fragmegration, in fact, has become fundamental. Given
this all-pervasive fragmegration, a consistent national strategy at
the global level is impossible. This is especially true, he says,
because fragmegration also is characteristic of the Nation's domes-
tic sector. This results not only from the difficulties that the United
States is facing in its economy, but also from its Constitutional
form of government.

Rosenau sees no easy way out of the problem of fragmegration

for a policymaker striving for a coherent, balanced, and consistent
strategy. He believes that accepting a pragmatic incrementalism
may be the best approach that a policymaker might take in dealing
with the realities of the contemporary scene. Not only would this
serve US interests better than the fruitless efforts of constructing a
broad-based and general strategy, but viewing international events
in pragmatic, incremental terms would help lessen the rivalries that
are so common to the US policymaking system.

Both Dr. Nuechterlein and Dr. Rosenau discuss national strat-

egy in terms of global politics and the complexities typical of the
global political milieu. The next set of papers, however, deals with
the technological aspects of a national strategy. Lieutenant General
Daniel 0. Graham, USA (Ret.) calls for the United States to replace
the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and to use super-
ior space technology to escape the balance of terror. After review-
ing the threat the Soviet Union poses for the United States, a threat
which he considers substantial and growing, General Graham
outlines a program which he believes could nullify the Soviet threat,
replace MAD, and provide the United States with the necessary
security. General Graham sees the new frontier of space as similar
to the old frontier of the American West in that exploration, trans-
portation, and security can be followed by economic advances. An
advance into this new frontier would also restore the military ethic
of defense of one's country, and would not require a technological
breakthrough, because options are viable with today's technology.

5
Key Issues in Strategy

General Graham believes that the United States should set out
to construct a layered protective defense system. One layer would
be in near space with an orbital spaceborne ballistic missile defense
system constructed with off-the-shelf hardware. Other layers would
use ground-based intercept systems combined with an active civil
defense program. General Graham declares that such layered
defense would be workable even though it couldn't be designed to
meet a standard of perfection. He further holds that this proposal,
while not a panacea to solve all national security problems, would
mean that a disarming nuclear first strike would be much less likely
and that a more stable world would result.

Dr. Barry Smernoff would agree with General Graham that

space technology is the US strong suit. In light of this advanced
technology, Dr. Smernoff outlines several possible options for the
United States: To keep space a sanctuary; to seek to negotiate to
prevent an arms race in space; to prepare to deny the Soviets an
advantage; to compete to achieve superiority; or, to seek to blend
technology and politics in such a way as to exploit the US edge and
nuclear deterrence through MAD. Smernoff favors this last option.
He sees space as tailor-made for facilitating a transition from
nuclear offense to non-nuclear defense. He admits that a "zero-
leak" space defense system is not attainable, but also believes that a
low leak rate is acceptable, especially when combined with reduc-
tions in the number of warheads on both the US and Soviet sides. If
such a condition could be achieved, both sides would be in a
sounder security position and not have to rely on the mutual hos-
tage relation which exists at present. Thus space offers splendid
opportunities for shifting from nuclear offense to a safer and more
sustainable non-nuclear defense.

Dr. Smernoff believes that a blending of the political compo-

nents of arms control and diplomacy with the US technological
advances in space into a "two-track strategy" is a very achievable
goal. Indeed, he points out several developments-the formation of
a new Space Command, the attention being paid to laser weapon
development, and the 20 percent real annual growth in DOD space
funding-as evidence that the United States is moving to space
superiority in the 1990s and beyond. The two-track strategy also
has implications for US force structure. Space is seen as a military
force multiplier which can augment the blue-ocean fleet and an
atmospheric "stealth" fleet. But a move into space is more than a

6
 Key Issues in Strategy

mere multiplier. Space also represents a gradual nuclear deempha-

sis and the expansion of the politico-military emphasis of the United
States beyond Western Europe and NATO.

Alternative strategies for the defense of Western Europe, in

fact, were the focus of another set of conference papers presented
by Dr. Edward Kolodziej and jointly by Congressman Newt Ging-
rich and Dr. Albert Hanser. Dr. Kolodziej discusses the question of
detente and deterrence in Europe from the viewpoint of the long-
range theater nuclear force (LRTNF) discussions and the resultant
issues raised by those discussions. At present, any satisfactory
resolution of LRTNF is doubtful. Not only are funds to pay for such
weapons scarce, but there are serious differences over LRTNF
roles, to say nothing of the lack of any theory of nuclear or conven-
tional deterrence accepted by the allies. Nonetheless, LRTNFs can
be of some use in controlling hostilities once the nuclear threshold
is crossed. LRTNFs are not hair-triggerable; they are accurate,
calibrated to limit civilian destruction, and able to reduce risk of
accidental war. If LRTNFs were invulnerable, they might be able to
define a mutually acceptable level of capabilities needed to stabilize
detente.

In addition to resolution of the LRTNF issues, however, NATO

needs a stable alliance consensus. Dr. Kolodziej suggests that if a
stable alliance consensus were achieved, a predictible outcome on
military policy and arms control could result. This policy should
survive the change of governments. Dr. Kolodziej seems to agree
with Professors Rosenau and Nuechterlein, for he also concludes
that internal politics in democratic countries can affect the credibil-
ity of a foreign policy. The proposals for deploying US Pershing II
and cruise missiles in Western Europe are designed to assure the
NATO European allies of US nuclear commitment. But in fact, the
deployment proposal seems to be adding to their fear. Dr. Kolodziej
believes that a sea-based system tied to the US Single Integrated
Operational Plan (SLOP) could resolve come of the current difficul-
ties involving LRTNF weapons systems. The sea-based system
would neither complicate arms control nor decrease deterrence,
and it would dampen incentives to launch on warning. In addition,
he points out that the British and French also can supply LRTNFs to
NATO. Alluding to Clausewitz, Dr. Kolodziej concludes by stating
that the political message sent by a weapons system is more impor-

7
Key Issues in Strategy

tant than the military medium the weapon takes. This applies to
allies and adversaries alike.

Congressman Newt Gingrich and Dr. Albert S. Hanser also

address the important process of political communication. They
begin by highlighting the differences in outlook between the United
States and its NATO allies on the meaning of deterrence, the idea of
massive retaliation, and the idea of flexible response. These differ-
ing views have existed in the alliance for some time, but never before
has NATO been confronted with the condition of strategic nuclear
parity between the United States and the USSR and with superior
nuclear and conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact on the conti-
nent. Congressman Gingrich and Professor Hanser believe that this
state of affairs renders deterrence no longer viable and dims the
prospect of victory should deterrence ever fail.

The conventional aspect of this state of affairs, however, is

being addressed by measures such as the US Army's "Airland
Battle" doctrine and the "Army 86" force modernizations. If these
developments are successful, for the first time, the NATO side will
have the capability of stopping a Warsaw Pact conventional attack
without resorting to nuclear weapons, a capability unprecedented
in NATO history. As a result, the Pact forces might be tempted to
engage in the first use of nuclear weapons to achieve a break-
through. Therefore, NATO still faces the task of maintaining a cred-
ible nuclear deterrent.

Gingrich and Hanser believethat NATO can maintain a credible

nuclear deterrent by relying on Pershing II and cruise missiles. In
addition, the authors propose that other tactical nuclear weapons in
Europe be removed, such weapons being more of a disadvantage
than an advantage on the battlefield. By relying on the Pershing II
and cruise missiles and upon a strong conventional deterrence,
supported by nine specific principles which they believe underlie
such a conventional deterrent, NATO can still be a working alliance
in the next century. The authors are under no illusions that such
conventional and nuclear deterrence will be easy to achieve. They
cite the need for supplies, problems involving reserve forces, and
the fact that the European allies must demonstrate that they are
willing to make the necessary sacrifices to defend themselves. The
authors conclude that NATO is in an especially dangerous period,
for the allies now face a Soviet state which has serious internal
strains and an enormous military capability.
 Key Issues in Strategy

This question of the military capability of the Soviet Union is a

disturbing one. The mere fact that the USSR has such an enormous
military machine is in itself cause for concern. What do the Soviets
intend to do with this enormous capability? Involved in these ques-
tions is also the relationship of the United States and the USSR. The
nature of the relationship between US and Soviet strategy is the
subject of the next set of papers by Dr. Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and
Dr. Dimitri Simes.

Dr. Simes begins by reminding us that the Soviet Union has a

cultural, historical, and psychological perspective of the world that
differs radically from the Western outlook. It is not possible to view
events in the Soviet Union and draw conclusions by the criteria of
Western countries whose historical heritage and democratic politi-
cal tradition are far removed from those of the USSR. To those in the
West who point to the enormous economic difficulties of the
Soviets, Dr. Simes counters that the USSR is not on any disaster's
edge; the Soviet growth rate is equal to the US rate. In addition, the
Kremlin has defuzed dissident elements in Soviet society, has
lowered some of the friction with China, has avoided the worst so far
in Poland, has Eastern Europe under control, and is building the
new natural gas pipeline. The Soviet regime's difficulties are real. to
be sure, but do not threaten imminent collapse.

Dr. Simes also believes that the Soviets do dream of world

domination, but do not operate in terms of a master plan. Rather, the
Soviet leadership responds to targets of opportunity and takes
advantage of US lapses. This is different from the adventuristic
streak and missionary zeal characteristic of regimes such as Nazi
Germany. He, however, does believe that Moscow is clearly inter-
ested in changing the international status quo at the expense of the
United States,

Dr. Simes is of the opinion that the Soviets do have an important

set of objectives which they pursue in the worldwide competition
with the United States, even if they have no grand strategy. Indeed,
such lack of strategy allows greater operational flexibility. Soviet
objectives include maintaining their own security and that of their
empire; preventing a new encirclement and blockade; reshaping the
world order; and attaining legitimacy in terms of detente, especially
in US recognition of the USSR as a superpower. In addition, the
Soviets are improving their own military capabilities for offensive

9
Key Issues in Strategy

purposes aimed at stopping counterrevolution and supporting

"national liberation movements." The Kremlin wants to ensure that
in any international crisis, the Soviet point of view will be taken into
account. The Soviet leadership also desires military power suffi-
cient to allow the USSR to act unilaterally in worst-case scenarios.

Moscow does not always have smooth going in pursuing these

objectives, however. Dr. Simes points out that theSoviets do overin-
tellectualize some of their loosely connected tactical steps. For
example, the Soviets calculated that the present correlation of
forces in the world favorable to the USSR made detente an irrevers-
ible phenomenon-a calculation which has been proven inaccu-
rate. The Soviets had misread the US public mood. The Soviet
situation in the Third World has also had mixed results. Some f the
expected benefits have not materialized from Soviet interventions in
certain areas. Thus, Dr. Simes concludes that there may be anti-
interventionist elements in the Kremlin that might be encouraged if
Americans can avoid the impression of trying to stop the Soviets
everywhere.

Also from the US perspective, the paper of Dr. Robert Pfaltz-

graff investigates possible American strategy in the face of this
Soviet challenge. He first reviews some general requirements of
strategy. A successful strategy should be coherent and consistent
and integrated into the diplomatic, military, and economic aspects
of policy. A clearly defined set of objectives is necessary to show
how to move from one place to another. US strategy thus far has
been to deny the Soviets alignments or alliances with as many states
as possible along the rimlands of Eurasia. The Soviets, on the other
hand, have been trying to leapfrog, circumvent, and break out of the
rimland.

Dr. Pfaltzgraff believes that US global strategy now calls for

building a strategic consensus. The dilemma now is to maintain
regional alliance cohesion in the face of US global strategic
requirements. Two contrasting approaches are possible. One
would pursue a peripheral strategy with power projection based
upon strategic nuclear forces, air power, and maritime supremacy,
with burden-sharing by allies (NATO and Japan). A second ap-
proach would maintain a continental strategy to balance force pos-
tures and maintain ground forces in Europe and Asia so that deter-
rence can be preserved.

10
 Key Issues in Strategy

The strategy for the 1980s, Pfaltzgraff reasons, must still be

based upon denial of core areas and the periphery, but the United
States must work with its allies where possible, while acting alone in
circumstances where policies are irreconcilable or where burden-
sharing is not feasible. The US aim should be to foster democratic
infrastructures and take advantage of those areas where the Soviets
are vulnerable, such as in the economic realm and in Eastern
Europe. The United States could call for a concerted action of those
states that share a common interest and common security objec-
tives, as well as exploit the US lead in space and technology. In such
a way, the United States could evolve a global strategy designed to
exploit the "contradictions" evident within the Soviet orbit.

We have now investigated strategy from a variety of perspec-

tives, but an important issue remains, and this is just how the US
system for developing strategy can be organized. Colonel Archie
Barrett, USAF (Ret.), provides an excellent review of some of the
current issues involved in the discussions of limitations to the pres-
ent Joint Chiefs of Staff system and of proposals to improve the
Joint Staff procedures. Colonel Barrett first explains the present
organizational structure, discusses some of the criticisms of the
way the present structure operates, and then analyzes the obstacles
which stand in the way of any reform. The present arrangements of
the Defense Department reflect the US pluralist tradition. There are
many constituent interests involved in any kind of reorganization.
Before reform can occur, these varied interests must all be satisfied,
if not totally, then at least to an acceptable level. If any of the
constituent interests feels that there will be an erosion of its status
and influence, that interest will oppose a reorganization. This is
what makes genuine reorganization so difficult. In addition, many of
the impediments to reorganization have been around for the last 25
years and are deeply entrenched-formidable obstacles to any
proposals aimed at substantially changing the system.

Colonel Barrett reviews some of the current reorganization

proposals and outlines their possible implications. The suggestions
of Generals Meyer, Jones, Allen, and Taylor are discussed, as are
some of the provisions in HR 6954, the bill which calls for changes to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff system. Colonel Barrett provides an excel-
lent analysis here and we profit from the insights he has gained by
virtue of his membership on the House Armed Services Committee
Staff. While opinions vary on the pending legislation, Barrett feels

11
Key Issues in Strategy

that it does promise at least to investigate the shortcomings of the

present system.

Also included in this chapter are three articles which have been
reprinted with the kind permission of the Armed Forces Journal
International.The articles by General David C. Jones, USAF, (Ret.)
and by General Edward C. Meyer, USA (Ret.) outline specific cri-
tiques of the present system from the perspective of leaders who
have had to work within the present system. General Jones believes
that the challenges faced by the United States today require a
greater integration of military service efforts than at any other time
in our history. He calls for all involved in theJCS process to find the
middle ground of reform needed to strengthen the system and make
it more responsive to challenges the United States now faces. Gen-
eral Meyer agrees that there must be a better way to provide the best
military advice possible to our national leaders. He also believes
that reform of the mechanism which provides such advice is
overdue. The last article, written by Deborah M. Kyle and Benjamin
F. Schemmer, provides additional commentary from some of the
important decisionmakers who have had long experience with the
present system. This commentary is well worth receiving, for its
provides a diversity of viewpoints on this important issue.

At the beginning of this chapter, we attempted to define the

term "strategy." After reviewing the thoughts and ideas contained in
the papers in this reader, however, it is clear that no simple defini-
tion adequately addresses the complexity involved in piecing
together the constituent elements of national strategy.

Certainly, several key elements have emerged from the issues

raised in the papers and panel discussions, but I would like to men-
tion only one. The United States is a truly pluralistic society which
operates under a unique Constitutional arrangement. The United
States also faces the challenge of furthering its own and its allies'
interests in a world characterized by rapid change and almost anar-
chic turmoil. To evolve a national strategy that is coherent and
consistent; to use the technological capabilities of the present and
future to further such a strategy; to include the interests of NATO

12
 Key Issues in Strategy

and other allies; to counter the challenges implicit in a Soviet stra-

tegy; and to organize effectively the US system for developing
strategy-are all tasks that await US strategists as the nation moves
toward and into the 21st Century. The challenges facing makers of
US strategy are complicated by the very factors that make our
nation strong-our pluralism, our Constitution, our democratic
traditions.

Perhaps the first step toward understanding US strategy should

be the realization that it can never be a static set of objectives, but
must involve a dynamic process of defining, evaluating, and inte-
grating the diverse interests and values of the American people. As a
result, there may never be a definitive resolution. Instead, issues will
continue to assert themselves; problems will be dealt with, but
rarely will they be solved with finality. Accordingly, US policymak-
ers will have to reflect on possible courses of action given a certain
set of events and circumstances. This continual review and willing-
ness to be open to new challenges will be dominant characteristics
of future strategy formulation, and will be necessary for the United
States to chart a safe path through an ever-changing and perilous
world of the future.

13
 Chapter 2

Keynote Address:
Evolving Strategies for a
Changing World

15
 Chapter 2
Keynote Address: Evolving Strategies
for a Changing World

Dr. Harold L. Brown

School of Advanced International Studies
The Johns Hopkins University

To build upon the theme of this conference-Evolving Strate-

for the
gies for a Changing World-some of the elements necessary
evolution of a national strategy should be identified.
be
But first, how broadly can the term "national strategy"
broadly than it is
defined and construed? Surely rather less
beyond strategy
construed by some, although certainly it should go
many
in the purely military sense. Already and it seems correctly,
to take in military-
have expanded the boundaries of the term
and even
political considerations including diplomacy, foreign aid,
international economics.

Pertinently, this conference's program has gone into military-

extended
political aspects in the defense of Western Europe. It has
space. And the
technologically, reaching out into the dimension of
into economic
session on US-Soviet national strategies has gone
and geopolitical as well as military matters.

Most would probably agree that the ingredients of a national

call for
strategy should include at least those elements. Some would
much broader inputs, including domestic concerns almost without
limit. But sounder judgment would exclude many domestic matters
a far
from the scope of national security, and would thus derive
more useful definition.

of
For example, calls are heard to include in the formulation
national security strategy matters ranging from crime in the streets
and school prayer to the creation of a national health insurance
these
system. An informed majority would surely say that each of
goes beyond what should normally enter into the national security
equation.

17
Strategies for a Changing World

Yet the formulation of a national strategy should admit into

consideration some domestic factors beyond just the need for a
strong economy. At least some weight should be given to social
welfare programs, budgetary policy, productivity, and even social
policy, to name a few such factors.

What leads to this conclusion?

To begin with a clear example, domestic as well as international

economic conditions determine the resources upon which the
nation, or an allied group of nations, must depend to support for-
eign and military policy. Parenthetically: into foreign and military
policy must go elements such as military capability, alliance rela-
tions, arms control, foreign aid, and the like. Beyond the purely
economic question of the production of the necessary resources
lies the reality that a consensus is required to make those resoures
available in support of foreign and military policy, at least in demo-
cratic countries-or at the very least in the United States.

Indeed, consensus seems more important to a nation's security

policy than to its domestic policy. Traditionally, this concept has
been expressed in the saying that politics should end at the water's
edge. It hasn't and doesn't. But it is evident thAt the nation can
probably stand an imperfect consensus on domestic matters rather
better than on national security matters. A failure in domestic con-
sensus, or failure in domestic programs, can cause us a great deal of
unhappiness, of malaise, and of pain-but a sufficiently bad failure
in national security policy can kill us.

It is thus important to have such a security consensus. More-

over, the degree of consensus on domestic issues will determine to
a substantial extent how difficult or easy it will be to achieve con-
sensus on foreign and military policy.

In the future, it appears that the leaders of the industrialized

democracies will have to demand of their people difficult sacrifices
for the long-run improvement of their domestic condition-
economic, social, and political. And for improvement of the world
economic system, which is now extremely shaky. Leaders will have
to demand of their populations the postponement of gratification.
That will also be needful for the production of a satisfactory, effec-
tive national security policy for their countries.

18
 Strategies for a Changing World

Unless the fragmentation of the domestic political and social

structure in the industrialized democracies can be reduced, it's not
going to be possible to get that kind of sacrifice from their respec-
tive publics. If the domestic, economic, and political-social scene is
perceived as unfair-as it is seen to be by a broad spectrum of the
US public in terms of age, race, economics, status or geography-
those sacrifices will be very hard to extract. That is particularly so
where such unfairness is felt by those on both sides of the divisions
between these population groups: where older people feel that they
are treated unfairly, for instance, while younger people see their
own treatment as unfair.

That kind of division prevents a favorable response to appeals

for sacrifice domestically. Still less is it receptive to sacrifice for
some particular foreign and military policy, even though strategists
may recognize that policy as vital to the survival of the United
States. In fact, the public at large may tend to regard defense as
most regard insurance when the events that it is to guard against
don't happen-as an unnecessary luxury.

Thus it may be said that a threefold interaction links interna-

tional security, domestic economic matters, and international eco-
nomic questions. And it is notable that 10 percent of the US gross
national product is involved in foreign trade, with one out of every
three acres ot tarmland and one out of every six of the remaining
industrial jobs in this country producing for export.

Any national security has to be built on all three legs of that

tripod. Inseparable from this domestic economic leg is the question
of slicing up the pie-domestic social welfare programs, productiv-
ity, capital investment, and social cohesion. We who are or have
been professionally concerned principally with one of the legs,
international security, need to think more about how that fits
together with the other two legs to produce a stable national strat-
egy, and out of it a national policy.

This, my fundamental thesis, provides the basis for several

illustrations. These follow, in sketchy, abbreviated outline.

The first involves the relation between economics and security

policy. Allegations are often heard that defense expenditure is
somehow responsible for economic damage to the country. Promi-

19
Strategies for a Changing World

nent legislators, journalists, professors, and others have often said

that military expenditures are wasteful because they don't produce
anything that anyone can consume. That they produce tanks which
you can't eat, fighter aircraft that you can't live in, and so forth. This
assertion is uncritically accepted by a wide spectrum of the US
public.

Defense expenditures do, however, like other government

expenditures, spread out through the economy with a certain mul-
tiplier effect, and thus have a role in stimulating the economy. That
is what Secretaries of Defense mean if they point out that cutting
defense expenditures reduces the number of jobs in the US.

In fact, adding a million dollars to defense expenditures affects

the economy in much the same way as adding a million dollars for
income transfer to shore up Social Security. Military, civil service,
and contractor personnel are paid out of the million that goes into
the defense budget; they don't produce consumer goods. But then
the Social Security recipients don't produce consumer goods in
return for their checks either; nevertheless, they spend that money,
and it gets spread through the economy.

In either case, a million dollars has little inflationary effect; it

does add to the GNP, however, in both cases, through secondary
expenditure.

In each case, something is bought with the expenditures: they

provide for the common defense in one case, and promote the
general welfare in the other.

At some point, if defense procurements go up very rapidly,

bottlenecks are created in critical materials and in skills, which can
produce a special inflation in costs of defense hardware. If that
effect grows large when the rest of the economy is operating at
nearly full capacity, it can spill over into the rest of the economy. But
so of course can social welfare expenditures at a high-enough level.

Neither sort of expenditure produces bottlenecks at low values

because they are spread very widely among the population. But at a
high-enough level they contribute to general inflation. For example,
at the moment, producing tanks at a higher rate would be unlikely
to run prices up by overloading our steel industry, since it is operat-

20
 Strategies for a Changing World

ing now below 40 percent of capacity.

In short, in most defense production, we are not now nearing

problems of inflationary spillover into the rest of the economy.

The more of us that take the trouble to recall this and explain it,
the more likely it is in time to penetrate with some effect on public
understanding. Clearly, it is imperative to lay to rest this mistaken
view that defense expenditures per se are wasteful. Or that they are
to blame for such things as the loss of US preeminence in automo-
bile manufacture, under the misapprehension that all our brilliant
auto-bumper engineers are now being used in the defense industry
and so are not available to outdesign the Japanese.

A third category of public expenditure competes with both

defense spending and Social Security-style income transfers, and
probably can make a better claim to adding to the US gross national
product ten years hence. That category is public spending on
infrastructure-on dams, bridges, roads, water supply, sewers, and
the like. The same applies to expenditures on schools, which are an
investment in human capital. Many such expenditures are by local
government, and therefore are not in immediate competition with
Federal spending. They are also, by and large, considerably smaller
than either military expenditures or income transfers. They do,
however, contribute to productivity in the long run.

Future debate may turn to the question of how Federal expendi-

tures shall be divided between such capital expenditures (which are
for future productivity), expenditures for various kinds of interna-
tional stability (and defense expenditures are for that), and expendi-
tures for domestic stability (which is in essence the aim of at least
some income transfers).

Beyond all of these considerations, we must remember that the

productive sector in our economy is the private sector, not its public
sector. And Federal policies-on encouraging investment, on anti-
trust as this may affect productivity, and so forth-can have a
greater effect indirectly than some of these Federal expenditures
can have directly on investment. Notably, a Federal policy change
altering private-sector productivity by 10 percent has a much
greater effect than direct Federal capital investment. But however
powerfully government may affect productivity, because ours is a

21
Strategies for a Changing World

relatively free market rather than a centrally planned economy, it

does so indirectly.

Another element related to the strategy-supporting tripod is

energy policy. Clearly, energy policy influences our national secur-
ity, influencing our ability to remain a productive and effective
society. To be held hostage by having to import even 30 or 35
percent of our oil-it used to be 50 percent-with part of that com-
ing from a particularly unstable geographical region like the Middle
East is a source of great vulnerability. Thus a sensible energy policy
is a vital part of the tripod's national security element, as well as of its
domestic eonomic leg.

A further issue, tax cuts, is currently prominent in the domestic

economic picture. Clearly, the 1981 decrease of taxes by $750
billion below the previous five-year projections (since adjusted by
tax increases in 1982 by about $99 billion for three years or about
$140 over the four remaining years of the five), and a five-year
projected increase of defense expenditures calculated at $150 bil-
lion, leaves some $750 billion less in the Federal coffers over the five
years. This works out at about $150 billion less a year. This is the
origin of most of those projected $200 billion yearly deficits that
have proven so frightening to the financial community.

It is also clear that interest rates, now falling because capital-

investment borrowing has practically disappeared, will rise again
when the economy starts to recover. But recovery is likely to be
aborted unless this $200 billion yearly projected deficit can be
reduced believably to something under $100 billion as it was in the
past.

How can this be done? Ideas usually combine the good luck of a
windfall improvement in the economy to generate more revenue
with sacrifice by somebody else. The somebody else nominated,
depending on the nominator's political views, is usually the "welfare
wastrel" or the "military wastrel."

None of these prescriptions is going to work. Another which I

will describe may well be politically unfeasible. But it does serve as
an example of the kind of compromise needed to produce interac-
tion among the three elements-those considerations of national
security, international economics, and domestic social, economic,

22
 Strategies for a Changing World

and political considerations-underpinning a genuine national

strategy.

Problem: Where can $120 billion a year be found? Focusing on

the year 1985, a source that many outside this room would start with
would be diversion from defense spending. How much less can we
spend for defense in 1985 than is now projected? The amount that I
come up with is $25 billion, which is a great deal of money. Defense
critics who would focus first, last, and only on this item for reduc-
tions in the national budget might say not $25 billion but $50 or $75
or $100 billion.

There really are only two other viable sources, but they can
provide considerably more money. One is tax increases, from which
I would seek some $50 billion more for 1985. One obvious approach,
not too painful but politically very difficult, would be by decontrol-
ling natural gas and imposing a windfall profits tax, or "wellhead"
tax. This would yield perhaps $15 billion a year.

I would also tax imported oil $10 a barrel, which would yield
another $15 billion a year. Now is probably the best time for this
step, as there is not now any great petroleum shortage. Such a tax
now would prompt a significant but not runaway increase in retail
petroleum product prices.

Then I would take a more politically controversial action by

perhaps postponing the third-year tax cut and certainly by eliminat-
ing tax indexing. This would yield another $30 billion. Let us say that
all those together produce not the $60 billion they add up to, but $50
billion.

The other major viable source is transfer payments. Not much is

left to take out of genuine means-tested welfare programs. In fact,
my own judgment is that over the next year or two some of that will
be restored. The welfare programs that are really a source of poten-
tial savings are not those, but the ones that go to us, the middle
class-specifically, Social Security and Medicare.

Taxing Social Security would not touch those with very low
incomes but those of us who have higher incomes. An alternative
would be to tax half of Social Security income, since no tax was paid
on the portion, about half, contributed by the employer. The aver-
age payback time for Social Security recipients, if memory serves, is

23
Strategies for a Changing World

20 months. That is, 20 months after the employee retires, he or she

has recovered what both the employee and employer paid in. Tax-
ing Social Security should bring in perhaps $25 billion. Put another
way, this step would reduce transfer payments by that much.

By reducing the indexation of Social Security to match the

per-capita GNP increase, or the average wage increase, we would
by 1985 extract probably another $20 billion yearly out of the sys-
tem. Medicare could become the source of another $10 billion in
savings. The sum of $25 billion from defense, $50 billion from taxes,
and $50 billion from transfer payments could reduce deficits below
$100 billion-especially as interest rates and federal interest pay-
ments also fall in consequence of a corresponding conviction in
financial markets that inflation will not reignite.

This combination of steps would shrink our annual deficits to

manageable proportions. These steps will probably not be taken,
but they mark a direction in which we must proceed to arrive at
anything that deserves the name of a national strategy. And in the
kind of compromises required, defense, which in my judgment
should be a modest element, is nevertheless a key element.

Everyone involved is going to point to someone else and say,

Take it from him. Defense, because its importance is underrated
and because of the misconception that it affects the rest of the
economy adversely, is a principal whipping boy. Indeed, with the
disappearance of a consensus for defense, next year may see an
attempt to take as much as possible of the necessary $120 billion out
of defense. Or we may see a bid to take all that can be taken out of
defense and leave other activities untouched.

It therefore seems to me important as part of a national strategy

to cast defense in the role of political key to the rest. Compromise
must be negotiated as a package, for a unilateral concession will
probably be pocketed and unreciprocated, with the rest of the
political deal falling apart.

National leadership needs to think more than it has in the past

20 or more years about a national strategy that includes all of these
interacting elements. It cannot concentrate solely on the domestic
side as some administrations have done, hoping that interaction will
take care of itself. Nor can it concentrate on the international scene

24
 Strategies for a Changing World

as others have done with the thought that if performance in that

sphere is good enough the difficult domestic decisions will take
care of themselves.

We need, and soon, a turnaround in productivity. We have the

technology, but we need new industrial plant and a return to the
work ethic. These won't be developed easily.

We need also very substantial improvement in cohesion across

generational, geographical, and racial lines, cohesion across the
spectrum of economic status, and cohesion across differences in
education. I am not sure this can be achieved; certainly the record of
the past two decades is not encouraging in this respect.

Unless the elements of this kind of broad strategy interact, no

single element is likely to succeed. They are too closely interrelated,
and in a world where communication is instantaneous and interde-
pendence is strong and deep, isolated successes are much less
frequent than they used to be.

I am sure any two of us would differ upon the details of a broad,

comprehensive national strategy. But I do believe one combining
these elements in a coherent way is needed. In my judgment, it is
also feasible. I am not optimistic that it will be easy. But I do think we
must try, and that if we try hard enough, we have a fair chance for
success.

The important, indeed critical, national security elements of

any national strategy must be seen in this broad context. On those
considerations I have spent most of my own career, and intend to
continue. For unless we see national security in this broader con-
text, and accept that it must be a part of a national strategy, I doubt
that we can devise a national security policy or a national security
strategy that has any chance of success.

25
 Chapter 3
Evolving a National Strategy

Panelists were challenged to address the following charter:

"This panel will address the design of a coherent nationalstrategy

to meet America's security needs. The papers and discussions
might review the evolving role of the United States in a changing
world and the major security interests, objectives, strengths, and
constraints that will set prioritiesfor a US nationalstrategy.Alterna-
tive national strategies will be proposed and the panel might con-
sider the advantages and disadvantages of adopting a worldwide
counter-Soviet strategy, an essentially maritime strategy, a Euro-
centered strategy,and a PersianGulf-weighted strategy. The panel
will address the strategicconcepts of "horizontal" and vertical esca-
lation, their applicability, and their potential contribution to US
security. The group will examine the implications of their discus-
sions for US alliance systems and defense budgeting and force
structures."

27
 Panel Summary

Dr. Samuel F. Wells, Chairman

Smithsonian Institution

Colonel Thomas J. Kennedy, USA, Rapporteur

National Defense University

Panel deliberations began with consideration of two clear and

incisive papers by Dr. Donald E. Nuechterlein and Dr. James
Rosenau which, in very different ways, sparked the panel to deal
with the elements of the highly complex problem of evolving a
national strategy.

Dr. Nuechterlein proposed a useful definition of the national

interest, established levels of interest, and proposed priorities
among them. He then focused on the necessity for tough-minded
discrimination among US national interests by a broadly-based
political process in order to identify those vitally necessary to the
US. Among his more provocative points were the arguments that
the foremost interests of the US lie in North America (in this case
extending south through Colombia and Venezuela); that the United
States is overextended in Western Europe, Korea, and the Indian
Ocean, and should reevaluate its interests in those areas; and that
the United States has no vital interests in the Persian Gulf and
should not fight to protect the flow of oil there, unless the Soviet
Union were to intervene with military force in order to deny that oil
to the industrial nations. In view of these considerations the United
States should evaluate its commitments in the harshly realistic fight
of what the public would sacrifice to protect each one and then
make appropriate commitment reductions. His own priorities, pre-
sented for the purposes of illustration and stimulation of panel
discussion were:

1. North America (including Middle America and northern

South America)
2. Western Europe (plus Israel and Egypt from the Mediterra-
nean area)
3. The Soviet Union

29
Evolving a National Strategy

4. Eastern Asia and the Pacific (excluding Korea)

5. South America
6. Middle East-Persian Gulf
7. Africa

Dr. Rosenau took a very different approach to the topic. Based

on the sharp divisions among our allies and within US leadership, he
contended that policymakers will have a nearly impossible task in
formulating and implementing a viable national strategy. He pointed
out that recent research indicates American leadership groups are
divided into three distinct and mutually exclusive belief systems
which make consensus-building virtually impossible. These belief
systems are those of: cold war internationalists, post-cold war
internationalists, and neoisolationists. To describe the simultane-
ous and contradictory processes of integration and fragmentation
of views occurring globally and within individual societies, Rosenau
has coined the special term "fragmegration."

He concluded that American policymakers had to approach

their work with an appreciation of these severe constraints to devel-
oping consensus and that, short of the most dramatic and catalyz-
ing external events, they should not attempt the impossible. While
one apparent alternative might be to adopt an exclusively military
strategy, Rosenau insisted that would be insufficient to meet the
national needs and that any strategy adopted must include eco-
nomic, social, and political elements. In the absence of meaningful
national consensus, he suggested that only by "muddling through"
pragmatically could US leadership provide direction in the near
term.

These two provocative positions generated considerable debate

among panel members for the remainder of the day. However, the
breadth of discussion, the profound nature of the topic, and the
relatively short time available precluded a firm polling on each issue
and the results noted below reflect impressions and judgments
about points of general synthesis and disagreement. They are not
presented as clear consensus views, and any panel member might
take exception to a particular position or concept presented.

The panel agreed that a national strategy must be inclusive, that

it must include economic, political, and diplomatic aspects and not
be limited (as is too often the case) to its military elements. All these

30
 Evolving a National Strategy

aspects must be well integrated, yet all panel members acknowl-

edged the difficulty in achieving a viable strategy that was both
inclusive and fully integrated.

The panel also agreed that a national strategy must be balanced

with available resources at all stages of development and must be
persuasively presented to both the public and Congress. Members
frequently referred to the need for public understanding and sup-
port of a national strategy to outlast successive national political
administrations. The difficulty of achieving such wide support was
generally acknowledged, but the necessity for that support was
accepted. The group also examined the need to make the general
international community, friends as well as adversaries, aware of
our strategic concepts. The implicit theme of overcommitment of
resources also ran through all discussion. The group agreed that
the United States suffers too often from excessive resource com-
mitments, exacerbated by the rapid rise and fall of budget levels.
Consequently, there is a clear need for steady, long-term policies
and programs to match the political and economic realities facing
this Nation.

The panel agreed that high levels of rationality and clarity could
even be a handicap in policy formulation and public presentation
because they too often lead to oversimplification. Most members
accepted the benefits of ambiguity in implementing policy, but
insisted that we should seek much higher clarity in our language
and analysis of strategy. Instead of using terms like policy and
strategy in multiple meanings, we would do better to use more
precise words such as goals, means, and resources. Yet the concept
of ambiguity remains useful, panelists felt, as long as that ambiguity
is employed tactically, allowing flexibility of response and reaction,
but never as a policy in itself.

The panel disagreed over whether to begin development of a

national strategy with a definition of national interests in geograph-
ic terms. Many believed that a geographic approach could lead to
imprecise comparisons and artificial estimates of value.

Some tangible thoughts developed:

* One panelist insisted that strategists should separate items

of intrinsic importance (e.g., integrity and independence of

31
Evolving a National Strategy

Western Europe) from valuable instruments (e.g., Dew Line

or bases in Iceland).

The panel's one geographic case study was a discussion of

whether the United States has interests worth using military
force to defend in the Gulf and Southwest Asia. One paper
contended we do not have such interests. Panelists argued
this with some vigor, generally concluding that the Gulf as
an isolated economic interest is not vital. But when threa-
tened by the Soviet Union (a threat raised by the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and the chaos in Iran), the region's
importance rapidly escalated and it became vital. Thus its
value is scenario-dependent.

In dealing with the issue of the level of preparation to make

for defending US interests in the Gulf, the panel made no
specific judgment. But it seemed to accept the chairman's
statement of limits, i.e., that the United States should not
prepare to resist a massive Soviet invasion, but should be
ready to send naval and air power and up to perhaps 30,000
troops in a major show of determination.

e The panel discussed the importance of the Soviet threat in

creating a consensus regarding action both within the
government and among the public.

* While Afghanistan lacks basic strategic value for the United

States, it did represent a significant departure in Soviet
policy. This, on top of the chaos in Iran and the uncertainty
about where the Soviet invasion would stop, justified a
sharp change in US policy for the region.

In discussing the nature of a visible national strategy, the panel

members agreed that specific prescriptions could not be laid out for
all contingencies. That was the foundation of individual "if-then"
contingency plans. Instead, we felt that a national strategy should
be a clear, consistent, and comprehensive set of guidelines along
the order of the framework outlined below (not all would agree with
these specifics, but supported the structure):

o The Soviet Union poses the main threat to US interests.

32
 Evolving a National Strategy

"* Western Europe would remain our top priority outside of

continental homeland defense.

" The United States must have the capability to protect the
Persian Gulf against attacks from local powers such as Iran,
or low-level probes by the Soviet Union.

" The United States will avoid being the first to use military
force.

"* The American public must be kept informed about the

Nation's basic strategic goals, and their support is essential
to an effective strategy.

The panel had no solutions to the problems of how to integrate

all these elements or how to implement the strategy through the
bureaucracy and the Congress. It did emphasize the necessity of
the President's involvement and support in addition to the value of
working in small groups under top conceptual direction. Yet in the
face of a governmenta( structure with an adversary process, wide
media access, frequent elections, a divided public, and declining
American relative power to achieve our goals singlehandedly, sev-
eral panelists expressed despair for the successful adoption of a
c-mprehensive strategic approach in the near term.

33
 National Interests and National Strategy:
The Need for Priority

Dr. Donald E. Nuechterlein

Federal Executive Institute

In the summer of 1982, a year and a half after taking office, the
Reagan Administration had not yet publicly enunciated a clear set
of priorities regarding US national interests for the 1980s, or a
strategy to defend and enhance them. In the absence of a well-
defined statement of what he believed US vital interests to be,
President Reagan ran considerable risks that his foreign and
national security policies would be misunderstood by the American
public and that they could prove confusing, even dangerous, to our
friends and adversaries abroad.

Two statements by the President's closest advisers on national

security affairs illustrate the ambiguity that existed about US
national interests. Speaking to the American Bar Association in
New Orleans on 11 August 1981, the then Secretary of State, Alex-
ander Haig, asserted: "A working relationship with the Soviet Union
depends on a balance of alternatives and our ability to communi-
cate to Moscow that such alternatives exist. We must indicate our
willingness to reach fair agreements that speak to the legitimate
interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States. But we
must also be prepared to defend our interests in the absence of such
agreements." [Emphasis added.]'

The President's National Security Adviser, William Clark, told

an audience at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and
International Studies on 21 May 1982:

Our interests are global and they conflict with those of the
Soviet Union, a state which pursues worldwide policies, most
[of them] unfriendly to our own.... It's a given that, of course,
we have vital interests around the world, including maritime sea
lanes of communication. The hard fact is that the military power
of the Soviet Union is now able to threaten these vital interests
as never before.,

35
Evolving a National Strategy

In neither case did these senior Administration officials spell out

what they or the President believed these vital areas of interest to be.
Judge Clark nevertheless went on to assert that the United States
"cannot reject in advance any options we might need to protect
these same vital interests. To do so is to invite aggression, under-
mine our credibility and place at risk all global objectives." In short,
he claimed that although the Administration had established priori-
ties for strategic planning purposes, it would not make them public
because it wanted US intentions to remain ambiguous. The danger
is that an absence of clarity hinders the American public's under-
standing of what the United States is committed to abroad and may
result in its being unwilling to support the President when he
decides that US forces must be used to defend vital interests.

Another problem with the Reagan approach to strategic plan-

ning is that it assumes regional conflicts can and should be subor-
dinated to a "strategic consensus," that the overriding threat to
international security is the Soviet Union. Thus, local conflicts such
as El Salvador, Lebanon, and Namibia must be seen primarily as
part of the East-West struggle for world power, not the result of local
antagonisms and historical factors. This globalist approach to
international relations is underscored by the Administration's deci-
sion to support a "horizontal" rather than "vertical" escalation con-
cept in strategic planning, making clear that Soviet escalation of
conflict in one part of the world would not limit the US response to
that area and might result in US escalation elsewhere. Judge Clark's
remarks on this aspect of strategic planning are instructive:

Thus, global planning is a necessity. This does not mean that

we must have the capability to successfully engage Soviet for-
ces simultaneously on all fronts. We can't, simply can't. What it
does mean is that we must procure balanced forces and estab-
lish priorities for sequential operations to insure that military
power would be applied in the most effective way on a priority
basis. It is in the interest of the United States to limit the scope of
any conflict. The capability for counteroffensives on other
fronts is an essential element of our strategy, but it is not a
substitute for adequate military capability to defend our vital
interests in the area in which they are threatened. On the other
hand, the decision to expand a conflict may well not be ours to
make. Therefore, U.S. forces must be capable of responding to
a major attack with unmistakable global implications early on in
any conflict.'

36
 Evolving a National Strategy

The strategy for defending US interests seems clear, but the

definition of what US vital interests are remains ambiguous. Until
the two concepts are tied together in a meaningful way, suspicion
grows that the Administration will decide what US interests are
whenever a crisis arises. Without a clear idea of what those vital
interests are, this Administration may blunder into another Vietnam-
type situation and find that the public and Coniq r.ss simply will not
support either its view of what is vital, or the means to deal with a
threat somewhere in the world.

A third problem concerns the organization of the government's

national security decisionmaking machinery. Mr. Reagan entered
office in January 1981 emphasizing the "team" approach to national
security affairs. Within a month, the Secretary of State was quarrel-
ing with the White House staff over "turf," specifically over who
would run the crisis management committee of the National Secur-
ity Council. Once that issue was resolved in favor of the Vice Presi-
dent, the Secretary of State became embroiled in controversy with
the Secretary of Defens~e and the President's National Security
Adviser. By the end of the first year, the President decided to replace
his Security Adviser in order to reduce the "guerrilla warfare" that
existed between him and the Secretary of State. But the internecine
conflicts continued, and by the summer of 1982 the President
decided to replace his Secretary of State with a "team player."
Although the key players have changed, the question remains
whether the new Reagan team is any closer than the old one to
defining what it is that the United States will and will not defend in an
increasingly complex international environment.

The purpose of this paper is to be provocative, to question

assumptions on which US foreign policy has been based for 30
years, to stimulate discussion about where we should be going in
the next 20. The views expressed here are those of one scholar who
has spent the past 10 years trying to find a better method for
defining US national interests. For me, formulating a national strat-
egy must follow from a clear perception of what the United States
should stand for in the world, what issues are truly vital national
interests, and which ones are not. The following discussion of US
interests in the 1980s represents subjective judgments on my part,
yet ones that are based on a conceptual framework that provides a
useful tool of analysis for strategic planning. Specifically, the points
where US interests are placed in the matrices shown in this paper

37
Evolving a National Strategy

represent my judgment of the level of interest the United States has

in various parts of the world today. These are not stated as a fact, but
as the considered views of one scholar. Obviously, policymakers
and other scholars will have different perceptions of what US inter-
ests should be. The essential point here is that decisions about what
is in the US national interest are the product of discussion among
political leaders who ultimately must decide whether an issue is
"vital"-whether it is so important that it must be defended
by force
if necessary. As scholars, our job is to insure that these political
judgments are based on clear analysis and an appreciation of the
cost/risk factors that are involved. Decisions about national strat-
egy should flow from prior political decisions concerning the inten-
sity of a specific national interest. It is therefore essential that our
discussion of a national strategy for the 1980s should begin with a
debate about what constitute US interests at this point in our
history.

BASIC US NATIONAL INTERESTS

A starting point for reappraising US objectives in the world is a

careful look at four basic national interests which undergird all US
foreign and national security policies. These are: defense of home-
land (North America), US economic well-being, favorable world
order (international security), and promotion of American values
4
(ideology).

Defense of Homeland

This is a narrowly defined interest which many scholars (but

not military planners) take for granted. It is primarily concerned
with defense of North America and with the strategic balance of
power between the Untied States and the Soviet Union. The security
of Canada's territory and airspace, as well as peace and stability in
the Caribbean, Mexico, and Central America are integral parts of
this interest. Talks with Moscow on a strategic arms limitation
agreement is also a crucial part of the US defense interest because
of the Soviet Union's capability to inflict massive destruction on the
United States. International terrorism targeted against Americans
living abroad, including attacks on American embassies, is part of
this defense interest, as is externally supported terrorism within the
United States. The flow of millions of illegal laborers across the US
border with Mexico is a defense interest if it poses a security threat

38
 Evolving a National Strategy

within the United States.

Two key questions must be addressed here: How much addi-

tional attention and resources should the US government give to the
political, economic, and security problems of countries close to US
borders? To what extent will greater attention to these issues divert
public attention and resources from crucial problems elsewhere in
the world? Looking back, it is now clear that the United States
neglected its own neighborhood during the past 20 years as it
pursued a global role that sapped its human and material resources.
The internal divisions within Canada, a potential revolution in Mex-
ico, Cuba's continuing drive to subvert Central American and
Caribbean states, and the inability of the United States to protect its
own borders against narcotics smuggling and illegal aliens point to
the need for much greater attention by policymakers to the serious
problems of North America.

US Economic Well-being

This basic interest includes a wide range of international eco-

nomic issues, such as: the value of the dollar, the US standard of
living, the ability of American firms to trade and invest overseas, the
impact of international currency transfers, as well as the "dumping"
of foreign products in the US market. The economic well-being
interest requires that policymakers appreciate the trade-off between
a liberal international economic policy, on the one hand, and the
severe domestic dislocations that result from the flourishing of this
policy. Clearly, the United States in 1982 is approaching the cross-
over point where massive unemployment caused by growing
imports-automobiles and steel being the best examples-threatens
to diminish congressional support for the free-trade policies. Being
mindful of the domestic environment in which foreign policy is
formulated, policy planners must be realistic in dealing with these
danger signals and not simply hold up free trade as the overriding
economic national interest.

Favorable World Order

This basic interest encompasses US alliances, US security

assistance agreements with countries outside North America, con-
flicts between noncommunist countries, Soviet support of national
liberation forces, world hunger and population problems, and

39
Evolving a National Strategy

international terrorism. Emphasis on this category of interests

expanded greatly after World War II and has resulted in considera-
ble controversy within the United States. US involvement in the
Vietnam War is the best example of the ambiguity in defining these
interests correctly, and of the penalties of poor judgment.

Few persons doubt that Western Europe and Japan remain vital
world-order interests of the United States in the 1980s because they
contribute to international stability and their political and economic
power is essential in balancing the growth of Soviet world influence.
A key issue, however, is why many NATO countries and Japan do
not share the US perception of world-order interests and the need
for tougher policies to protect themselves against Soviet encroach-
ments. In short, to what extent are Europe's and Japan's national
interests divergent from our own? Clearly, there is considerable
difference in views between Western Europe and the United States
about Soviet intentions in the Middle East, in Africa, and East Asia.
The unwillingness of some West European countries, particularly
West Germany, to abandon detente with Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union will continue to trouble NATO relationships. This calls
into question whether so much attention should be accorded Euro-
pean views in deciding US policies. Similarly, Japan's reluctance to
devote a significant share of GNP to building up its naval and air
defense causes serious questioning about whether the United
States should maintain large armed forces in Northeast Asia to
protect Japan's interests.

Promotion of American Values Abroad

This basic interest includes the American set of values and the
desirability of exporting them to other countries. It includes the US
constitutional system and its emphasis on individual rights and
freedoms, the rule of law, and a sense of social justice. The key issue
is the extent to which American values should influence US rela-
tions with other countries. For example, President Carter's empha-
sis on human rights antagonized many traditionally friendly coun-
tries in Latin America and in Asia. The American people support an
ideological component of foreign policy, and Congress has man-
dated that the State Department report regularly on how other
countries are dealing with human-rights issues. This basic national
interest also affects US relations with the Soviet Union and the East
European countries, and it has been given far greater attention by

40
 Evolving a National Strategy

the Reagan Administration than was the case during the previous 20
years.

The policymaker's job is to identify which of these basic

national interests is heavily affected by an international event or
trend and then assess the intensity of that interest; i.e., the US stake.
To assess the US stake in a specific issue, four levels or intensities of
interest are suggested: survival interests, when the very existence of
a country is in jeopardy as the result of an overt military attack, or
threat of attack if an enemy's demands are rejected; vital interests,
when serious harm likely will result unless strong measures, includ-
ing the use of conventional military forces, are employed to counter
an antagonist's provocative action; major interests, when a coun-
try's political, economic, and social well-being may be adversely
affected by external events or trends; peripheralinterests, when a
nation's well-being is not adversely affected by events and trends
abroad, but when harm may be sustained by private US companies
with overseas operations. The task of the country's political leader-
ship is to distinguish between those issues which are vital interests,
and those that are major, These judgments are the result of a
political process in which decisionmakers must address this crucial
question: "Is the issue at hand so important to the well-being of the
United States that the President must be prepared to use force if all
other efforts fail to resolve the problem?" If the policymaker
believes the United States cannot tolerate a developing threat, the
level of national interest for him is vital; if, however, he concludes
that the issues involved can and should be compromised, even
though the result may be painful, the interest is major.

The utility of these categories of national interest is apparent,

when they are assembled in a matrix configuration, as shown in
table 3-1.5

Table 3-1: National Interest Matrix

Basic Interest Intensity of Interest

at Stake Survival Vital Major Peripheral
Defense of Homeland
Economic Well-being
Favorable World Order
Promotion of Values

41
Evolving a National Strategy

This matrix may be used to assess the national interests of the

United States as well as other countries having a stake in a specific
international crisis. The Cuban Missile Crisis, the Suez Crisis, the
Falkland Islands Crisis, to name a few, should be analyzed in terms
of the interests of all the principal players, and this is true also for
potential crises. A rule of thumb is that if a country has one or more
vital interests at stake, it will probably use force if necessary to
protect them; if it has no vital interests at stake, it will probably
compromise and seek a negotiated settlement of the dispute. Most
wars occur when two or more countries each have at least one vital
and/or survival interest at stake and are therefore willing to fight
rather than compromise.

VITAL US INTERESTS IN THE 1980s

At the beginning of the 1980s, the United States again runs the
risk-as it did in the 1960s-of defining its vital interests so broadly
that it may be unable or unwilling to defend all of them if put to the
test. It is therefore imperative that policymakers approach the job of
defining US vital interests-those which are so important that they
could involve the nation in war-with a healthy respect for both the
costs and benefits of defending a specific country or area in the
world. To assume that the United States is a global power and
therefore has vital interests everywhere is dangerous thinking. What
follows, therefore, is an attempt to put US national interests in
priority order, in terms of geographic areas and specific countries,
using the national-interest matrix as a guide.

North America

Canada, Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean Islands

constitute the American heartland, the Monroe Doctrine defense
zone. A direct military threat to countries in this area will be viewed
as a vital, perhaps even a survival, US defense interest. The Cuban
Missile Crisis in 1962 demonstrated that the United States would
react with vigor to a Soviet military threat so close to American
borders, and might even employ nuclear weapons if US territory is
threatened. This area is to the United States what Eastern Europe is
to the Soviet Union: a vital defense zone which it will not permit to be
turned into a military base of operations by a hostile power. This
level of interest also applies to a surrogate for the Soviet Union,

42
 Evolving a National Strategy

specifically, Cuba: the introduction of Cuban troops, volunteers or

otherwise, into a Caribbean or Central American country would be
considered a threat to vital US interests because no one doubts that
Cuba undertakes dangerous adventures abroad only with strong
Soviet support.

Table 3-2: US National Interests in North America

Basic Interest Intensity of Interest

at Stake Survival Vital Major Peripheral
Defense of Homeland X
Economic Well-being X
Favorable World Order X
Promotion of Values X

In economic terms, Canada is by far the most important trading

partner of the United States and accounts for nearly $40 billion in
US private investments. Northern and northeastern American states
are heavily dependent on Canadian energy resources, particularly
natural gas and hydroelectric power (in the east). No two other
major countries have such close economic relationships, and Can-
ada must therefore be considered a vital economic as well as stra-
tegic interest of this country. To the south, Mexico is the third most
important trading partner of the United States, and its exports to the
United States have risen rapidly in the past few years. Mexican oil
and gas have assumed an increasing importance to the US econ-
omy in reducing US dependence on Persian Gulf oil. The large
number of Mexican workers who cross the US border each year in
search of jobs is both a threat and a boon to the US economy and
contributes to making Mexico a vital economic interest of the
United States. If trade barriers were raised on either the Canadian or
the Mexican border, serious economic dislocations in the US econ-
omy would result. Venezuela (treated here as part of North America)
is another important importer of US products and is a source not
only of energy resources, but also iron ore and other minerals
needed by US industry. Although not as economically vital as Can-
ada and Mexico, Venezuela constitutes an important economic
interest of the United States. Colombia is in a similar position
because of its geography and influence in the Caribbean Basin.

In ideological terms, the United States has a vital interest in

43
Evolving a National Strategy

promoting moderate, representative government in the North Amer-

ican area. With Canada included, the region has two of the world's
leading democracies, totaling a quarter of a billion people. To the
south Venezuela, Costa Rica, Colombia, and Jamaica are truly
democratic states; the remainder are one-party governments or
highly authoritarian regimes backed by military forces. Because
North America constitutes the United States' "neighborhood," it is
not enough for Washington to show only economic and political
leadership: it should also promote the principles embodied in the
Declaration of Independence and the US Constitution. Although
human rights has been reduced as a foreign-policy theme by the
Reagan Administration, it is nevertheless important that Washing-
ton continue to press its neighbors to move in the right direction of
democractic government and to show respect for human rights.

It is the world-order interest that entails the greatest ambiguity

in defining US interests in North America. Although an outside
attack would clearly be a vital interest, or higher, it is less clear how
the United States should respond to revolutionary change in coun-
tries such as Nicaragua and El Salvador and to the spread of Marxist
political influence throughout Central America. Some contend that
internal political change in this region should be viewed as a major,
not a vital, US interest and that Washington should not use Ameri-
can military forces in what are essentially civil wars. This was the US
response to the case of Nicaragua, where the middle class joined
the Sandinists in 1979 to oust the hated dictator, Anastasio Somoza.
El Salvador is a somewhat different situation because the Duarte
government sought to steer a middle way between fascists on the
right and Communists on the left. Others contend that the US stake
in this area is so vital that political, economic, and military, tools
are required to support it. These considerations will apply if Marxist
revolutions should spread to such countries as Guatemala, Hondu-
ras, and Costa Rica: If the United States cannot tolerate Marxist
regimes in Central America, the US world-order interest is then
vital; if we can live with them, the world-order interest is major.

Cuba is the most difficult North American political problem

facing US policymakers, and six Presidents have had differing views
of the level of US interest it comprises. Deposing Fidel Castro
became a vital interest of the Eisenhower Administration in 1960,
after it naively paved the way for him to come to power in 1959 in the
expectation that he would modify his radical ideas after he was in

44
 Evolving a National Strategy

charge. Eisenhower then set in motion the Bay of Pigs operation

which proved disastrous when implemented by John Kennedy in
April 1961. Thereafter, Kennedy put Cuba into the major interest
category, until October 1962 when Soviet missiles were discovered
on the island. The US interest then quickly escalated to the survival
level, and an invasion of Cuba would have been ordered had Mos-
cow not decided to remove the missiles. In 1975, Cuba sent its
troops to Angola to help the Marxist faction win the civil war, and
President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger sought unsuccess-
fully to convince Congress that a vital US interest was at stake.
Jimmy Carter viewed Cuba as a major interest and sought to renew
diplomatic relations with Havana; but Castro was unwilling to cease
his African adventures or tone down his drive to undermine US
influence in the Third World.

The Reagan Administration seems to vievw the presence of

Cuban troops outside Cuba as a serious threat to US interests in
Africa, the Middle East, and the Caribbean. Although some of his
campaign oratory indicated that he viewed Fidel Castro's foreign
policy as intolerable, Mr. Reagan's first 18 months in office sug-
gested that so long as C'uban troops are not used to spread Com-
munist ideology in North America, Washington will not use force
against Fidel Castro's regime.

In sum, North America is the most important area of US inter-

ests in terms of defense, economic, and ideological interests, and it
borders on a vital world-order interest as well. President Reagan
underlined this deep interest by meeting during 1981 with the Cana-
dian Prime Minister Trudeau and Mexican President Lopez Portillo
on several occasions, and by attending summit conferences with
other heads of government in Ottawa, Canada, and in Cancun,
Mexico. The President's sponsorship of a new economic plan for the
Caribbean Basin, in cooperation with Canada, Mexico, Colombia,
and Venezuela, is further evidence of the high priority he accords
North American relationships.

Western Europe

The political, economic, and social viability of Western Europe's

working in relative harmony with the United States has been a vital
world-order interest of this country since France fell to German
armies in June 1940. At that time the US government concluded that

45
Evolving a National Strategy

US security was so deeply bound up with the independence of

Great Britain and France that it would be intolerable if Hitler's Reich
dominated the entire European continent. It was therefore only a
matter of time until the United States went to war; and in the mean-
time, President Roosevelt started the program of lend-lease to
Great Britain and carried on clandestine cooperation with Prime
Minister Churchill in order to aid Britain's desperate effort to sur-
vive. After the war, President Truman reaffirmed that Europe was a
vital interest by proposing the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic
Pact, both of which were approved by Congress after lengthy
debate. Since 1950 powerful US military forces have been stationed
in Western Europe, equipped with nuclear weapons, to warn the
Soviet Union that the United States will fight to protect this vital area
against attack or intimidation.

Table 3-3: US National Interests in Western Europe

Basic Interest Intensity of Interest

at Stake Survival Vital Major Peripheral
Defense of Homeland X
Economic Well-being X
Favorable World Order X
Promotion of Values X

Although it has been a historically vital interest, Western

Europe is not equivalent to North America in terms of its strategic
and economic importance to the United States. It remains a vital
world-order interest because of balance of power considerations,
and probably a vital ideological interest because of its shared values
with the U nited States. But Western Europe is not a vital defense-of-
homeland interest for the United States: neither West Germany nor
France is as important to US strategic and economic interests as
Canada or Mexico, even though the latter are far smaller countries
in terms of military forces and GNP. To assert this truth is ,iot to
denigrate the vital role of the European NATO allies, but rather to
put their importance in perspective in terms of other US inter -:ts.

Western Europe is crucial to the United States for balance-of-

power reasons, and all Presidents and Congresses since Truman
have reaffirmed that it must not fall under the political domination of
Moscow. Even though the United States is not crucially dependent

46
 Evolving a National Strategy

on West European territory or the European Common Market for

defense of American territory and economic well-being, Western
Europe constitutes a vital factor in the relations between the United
States and the Soviet Union. Its absorption into the Soviet sphere of
influence would be an intolerable blow to US world-order interests,
and that is why the NATO commitment remains firm.

The question of defense burden-sharing within NATO is a con-

tinuing problem, however, particularly as the Reagan Administra-
tion launches the Nation's largest peacetime rearmament program.
President Reagan's decision in August 1981 to produce neutron
weapons for use against massive numbers of Soviet tanks in a
European war offers a relatively inexpensive means of countering
the Soviet advantage in conventional forces; the same is true of
deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe,
scheduled for 1983. But European public opinion is deeply divided
on the value of these weapons because it is feared they will increase
the likelihood of a theater nuclear war in which European territory
would be devastated. President Reagan has insisted that since the
defense of Western Europe is a vital American interest, US forces
should not be denied the weapons needed to deter the large Soviet
superiority in conventional forces; but in November 1981 he offered
to cancel deployment of US intermediate-range missiles if Moscow
dismantled the Soviet SS-20s.

European reluctance to defend Middle East oil, on which most

West European countries are far more dependent than is the United
States, is a further example of US interests in conflict with European
views of their interests. With the exception of the French, West
Europeans generally believe that protecting Persian Gulf oil sup-
plies is an American responsibility because only the United States
has sufficient military power to deter the Soviet Union in that area
and reassure the Saudis and other insecure Arab states that they
need not fear intimidation. Nevertheless, Europeans would protest
strongly if the United States decided to reduce its troop strength in
Europe or redeploy large parts of the Sixth Fleet from the Mediter-
ranean to the Indian Ocean in order to increase the credibility of its
commitment to defend the Persian Gulf.

The most serious current issue affecting relations between the

United States and its European allies is their divergent views on
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Following the declaration of

47
Evolving a National Strategy

martial law in Poland in December 1981, President Reagan imposed

economic sanctions against Poland and the Soviet Union and
vowed not to relax them until Polish authorities eased internal
security measures. West European governments, particularly West
Germany, are reluctant to lose the fruits of detente policies that
prevailed in the 1970s, and they have pressured the United States to
lift economic sanctions against Eastern Europe even though Polish
authorities have not modified martial law restrictions. The sanctions
issue that has triggered the most emotion in Europe is Mr. Reagan's
decision in 1982 to cancel American participation in the Soviet gas
pipeline construction project. For the United States, the issue was a
vital world-order interest, preventing the NATO allies from becom-
ing dependent on Soviet energy resources and depriving Moscow
of about $10 billion per year in hard-currency revenues. To West
Europeans the issue approached a vital economic interest because
of their need for an alternative source of energy to offset Arab oil,
and also their desire to provide jobs for workers producing materi-
als for the pipeline. Many Europeans, particularly in West Germany,
also see a major world-order interest at stake in keeping open trade
ties and lines of communication to the East, in order to reduce
tensions and the risk of war with the Soviet Union. The gas pipeline,
along with the issue of placing the Pershing IIs and cruise missiles
in Central Europe, have the potential of splitting the NATO alliance.
The Reagan Administration believed that the risk was worth taking
because it thought that relenting on the pipeline issue would frac-
ture NATO in stages ratherthan abruptly. In December 1982, Presi-
dent Reagan decided to remove the pipeline sanction.

In sum, West Europeans-particularly Germany, Belgium and

Holland-seem to want it both ways: to keep the United States
involved militarily in Europe but to maintain trade ties and close
political links to Eastern Europe. The US vital interest in defending
Western Europe should therefore be balanced against the rising
costs of doing so. If some European governments do not see a vital
interest in strengthening their defense capabilities and reducing
their economic ties with the East at the expense of social programs,
the United States may be forced to ask whether their continued
membership in NATO is warranted.

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

US relations with the Soviet Union is one of the few national

48
 Evolving a National Strategy

interests that currently approaches the survival level, as defined

earlier, and must therefore be given a high priority by policymakers.
The USSR is the only nation capable of inflicting massive damage
on the US homeland, even though the United States has the retalia-
tory capability of destroying the Soviet homeland. Therefore the US
President has the responsibility to prepare for nuclear war with the
Soviet Union and at the same time negotiate arms agreements that
reduce the possibility of mutual annihilation. The Reagan Adminis-
tration decided early that it would not engage in new strategic arms
negotiations with the Soviets until it had bolstered toth the US
conventional and nuclear arms capability. Convinced that the SALT
II treaty negotiated by the Ford and Carter Administrations could be
dangerous for US security, the Reagan foreign-policy team con-
cluded that this danger would be reduced if the US were to expand
its military power and then enter negotiations. President Reagan's
offer on 9 May 1982 to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on
strategic arms reductions (START) set in motion a concerted effort
to engage the Kremlin leadership in discussions on how to reduce
the awesome number of nuclear weapons, not just to put limits on
future production of therm,.

Table 3-4: US National Interests in the Soviet Union

Basic Interest Intensity of Interest

at Stake Survival Vital Major Peripheral
Defense of Homeland X
Economic Well-being X
Favorable World Order X
Promotion of Values X

Although the United States has a survival interest in preventing

war with the Soviet Union because of the likelihood of its escalation
into nuclear war, this country has only a peripheral economic inter-
est in the Soviet Union because it has little to sell the United States
and because it is a poor market for private foreign investment. Some
analysts think that providing financial credits for the Soviet Union to
buy goods in the United States is a major economic interest
because they hope it would induce a moderating effect on Soviet
political behavior. This "linkage" idea was tested during the period
"ofdetente in the 1980s and, in the view of Ronald Reagan, was an
erroneous assumption.

49
Evolving a National Strategy

The United States has a major, bordering on vital, world-order

interest in the Soviet Union. It is in the US national interest to
persuade the Kremlin leadership to stop supporting revolutionary
groups in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but not to the extent of
drawing the United States into local wars, as occurred in Vietnam.
The US also has a major ideological interest in keeping the Soviet
Union on the defensive regarding human rights; for example, on its
role in the suppression of freedom in Poland and Afghanistan, and
its poor record in abiding by the terms of the Helsinki Agreements
on the flow of information. However, placing US world-order and
ideological interests with the Soviet Union at only the major-interest
level runs counter to the views of hard-line American conservatives
who believe that these matters are of vital concern and that the
President should take much stronger action, including military
risks, to confront Moscow on its support of revolutions around the
world. That is a minority view, however.

By 1982, it was clear that the United States and its NATO allies
were not willing to use strong measures to counter a Soviet-inspired
suppression of freedom in Poland, or any other Eastern European
country. This is because what happens within Eastern Europe is a
major, not a vital, interest of NATO. Economic sanctions against the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are consistent with a major inter-
est, however, and were imposed on Poland by President Reagan
after the suppression of civil liberties.

The degree of US national interest in arms control with the

Soviet Union depends, as it has from the beginning of such negotia-
tions in the late 1940s, on Washington's assessments of Soviet
military intentions and Moscow's willingness to abide by agree-
ments. Some policymakers assume that the Kremlin's leaders are
moving inexorably toward war with the United States and believe
that arms-control negotiations are not in the US interest. This view
holds that US capability to wage war against the Soviets in the
Middle East or Europe, or both, is a vital interest of this country and
must be given top priority. Other policymakers are not convinced
that the Soviets are bent on war with the United States and argue
that arms control must be pursued vigorously and a new Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement reached soon in order to
stop the momentum toward war. In this view, the United States has a
survival interest in preventing a nuclear war. Instead of choosing
between these conflicting views of the national interest, President

50
 Evolving a National Strategy

Reagan's decisions early in 1982 showed that he intends to pursue

both policies for the time being.

In sum, the United States has a survival interest in seeking

accommodation with the Soviet Union to reduce nuclear weapons
and avoid war; but this interest must be balanced against a major
and perhaps vital interest in preventing the spread of Soviet influ-
ence in the world.

East Asia

The Far East, as it was known until the 1960s, was an important
economic, but never a vital political or strategic interest of the
United States until World War I1. Japan's rise as a major power
during the early part of this century was not seen by US policymak-
ers as a serious threat to US interests as long as Japan confined its
ambitions to mainland Asia. Consequently, the United States
acquiesced in Japan's invasions of China in 1931 and 1937 and even
its occupation of North Vietnam in 1940. Only after the Japanese
invaded South Vietnam and Cambodia (then part of French Indo-
China) in July 1941 did President Roosevelt heed Churchill's warn-
ing that the Japanese were bent on attacking southward into
Malaya, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies. Thereupon Roose-
velt decided to ban oil shipments to Japan and freeze its assets in
the United States. These decisions represented an upward move-
ment in the US interest from major to vital, and the two powers went
to war in December 1941.

Table 3-5: US National Interests in East Asia

Basic Interest Intensity of Interest

at Stake Survival Vital Major Peripheral
Defense of Homvland X
Economic Well-being X
Favorable World Order X
Promotion of Values X

In the early post-World War II period, the United States again

concluded that it had no vital interests at stake on the mainland of
Asia. Therefore, it acquiesced in the Communist takeover of China
in 1949 and withdrew its occupation forces from Korea. Until 1950

51
Evolving a National Strategy

American vital interests in the Far East were based, as both General
MacArthur and Secretary of State Dean Acheson asserted, on the
islands off the Asian mainland: Japan, the Philippines, and Austra-
lia. North Korea's attack on South Korea in June 1950 changed that
perception, and within a few hours President Truman decided that
the United States could not tolerate North Korean plans to unify
Korea by force. He therefore sent US forces into battle and the US
commitment to defend South Korea remains intact thirty years
later.

But is Korea a vital interest in the 1980s? When Harry Truman

made his unexpected decision to intervene in Korea, China and the
Soviet Union were allies, Japan was weak and only beginning to
recover from World War II, and South Korea had no real defense
capability. This situation has changed dramatically in thirty years:
China is hostile to Russia, Japan is one of the world's leading
economic powers and has a respectable self-defense force, and
South Korea possesses a large and well-equipped army. Is is neces-
sary, then, for the United States to continue basing 40,000 ground-
force personnel in South Korea in the 1980s? Why should not Japan
and China, Korea's two closest neighbors and the countries most
affected by events in Korea, take over responsibility for defending
respectively North and South Korea and eventually bringing about
peaceful unification?

In Southeast Asia, President Kennedy determined late in 1961

that South Vietnam was a vital US interest and had to be protected
against a Communist takeover through the use of American military
power. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution, passed by Congress in August
1964, declared all of Southeast Asia to be a vital defense interest of
the United States and gave President Johnson the legal basis for
military intervention to prevent South Vietnam's collapse. Today,
however, few Americans believe that Vietnam or any other part of
the Southeast Asian mainland was, or is, a vital US interest. US
economic and military aid to Thailand may be warranted because
the Manila Pact of 1954 remains in effect; but US military forces are
not, and should not be, based in the region again. The Philippines is
a different case: its strategic location, its long political association
with the United States, and the availability of two key US naval and
Air Force bases continues to make those islands a vital world-order
interest. This is also true for Australia which is allied with the United
States in the ANZUS Pact. In addition to its strategic location and

52
 Evolving a National Strategy

the military facilities Australia provides the United States, the two
countries share a common language, culture, and political institu-
tions. New Zealand, also allied with the United States in the ANZUS
Pact, qualifies as a vital world-order interest because of the location
in and influence upon the island countries of the South Pacific.

Japan and China, the two most important East Asian countries,
present real dilemmas for US interests. Japan has been a vital
American interest since the end of World War II, and on economic
and world-order grounds, it remains valid. Japan is the United
States' second most important trading partner, it exercises great
economic and political influence throughout East Asia, and it is one
of the few functioning democracies in that part of the world. On the
military side, however, Japan spends relatively little on defense, and
it has refused to increase significantly its military contribution to
defense of Northeast and Southeast Asia. This imbalance in
priorities-booming exports to the United States and refusal to
expand its defense role in East Asia-has caused many Americans
to question whether Japan 'should continue to be a high priority in
US national interests. If the alliance is based on a mutual assess-
ment that each country is a vital interest of the other, why should
Japan expect the United States to provide the overwhelming pro-
portion of naval and air power in the Western Pacific and Southeast
Asia while Japan continues to provide only for "self-defense"? If
Japan's reluctance to assume a larger military role is based on
doubt about the Untied States' long-term commitment to support
and defend it, there is little the Reagan Administration can do to
reassure Japan except to be steadfast elsewhere in upholding US
commitments. If, however, Japan's reluctance to increase its
defense contribution in the Western Pacific is based on an assump-
tion that the United States will always provide military protection
regardless of what Japan does, then it is time for a serious reas-
sessment of whether Japan should continue to be a vital interest of
this country.

China is a different issue. Historically, it never was a vital

national interest of this country, even though certain US political
and missionary groups tried to make it so during the early 20th
century. From 1949 to 1969, China was an implacable enemy of the
United States in Korea, and in Vietnam. The thaw in Sino-US rela-
tions that occurred in the 1970s was based on a mutual perception
that China and the United States needed each other to contain the

53
Evolving a National Strategy

growing power and aggressiveness of the Soviet Union in Asia. But

does that make China a vital interest of the United States today?
China has little economic or defense-of-homeland value to the
United States, and it continues to be ruled by a totalitarian govern-
ment that has relaxed internal controls only marginally during the
past decade. China's value to the United States is its balance-of-
power (world-order) role vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, but one can
argue that today China needs the United States for protection more
than the United States needs China. Even though there is strategic
value in having China tie down many Soviet divisions in Central
Asia, this is hardly sufficient reason to put China into the vital
category.

In sum, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia are the only East
Asian countries that constitute vital interests for the United States in
the 1980s. After two major wars on the Asian continent during the
last 30 years, the United States shotld now accept that its vital
interests are what Secretary Acheson declared them to be in Febru-
ary 1950: they lie offshore in the Western Pacific.

South America

This continent historically has been considered a vital interest

of the United States, dating from the Monroe Doctrine declaration in
1823. The commitment was reaffirmed in the Rio Pact of 1947, the
first US alliance in the post-World War II period. Originally intended
as a means of preventing Spanish and Portuguese recolonization in
the Western Hemisphere after defeat of Napoleon's France, the
Monroe Doctrine eventually became a cover for North American
economic exploitation of these newly independent states. Although
the doctrine's legacy hangs over the American perception of its
interests, a case can be made that nothing in South America except
Venezuela and possibly Colombia is a vital interest of the United
States in the 1980s. This is not to say that Brazil, Argentina, Chile,
Ecuador, and Peru-to name the major states-are not important
trading partners of the United States or that they have little world-
order value; it is simply to recognize that this vast area, mostly south
of the equator, is not so important to the United States that it should
use US military forces in case one of the countries is attacked.
Economic and military aid would be warranted, however. Strategi-
cally, economically, and ideologically South America constitutes a
major US interest today.

54
 Evolving a National Strategy

Table 3-6: US National Interests in South America

Basic Interest Intensity of Interest

at Stake Survival Vital Major Peripheral
Defense of Homeland X
Economic Well-being X
Favorable World Order X
Promotion of Values X

Because South America shares a Western cultural heritage with

the United States, the US Government should continue to press
these countries to move toward democratic governments and to
improve their record on human rights. Washington should also
encourage good trading and cultural relations, as well as a conti-
nuation of close links between the US military services and those of
major countries of the continent. This is consistent with a major
interest and is particularly important in the case of US Navy ties with
its Brazilian, Argentinian, and Chilean counterparts. It is important
to the United States that the sealanes off Brazil's and Argentina's
coasts be protected, that their ports be open to US ship visits and
replenishing, and that they continue to be receptive to US invest-
ment and trade; but this in itself does not make Brazil or Argentina a
vital interest of the United States.

The reality of South America's being a major but not vital inter-
est of the United States was illustrated clearly in the Falkland
Islands war in the spring of 1982. Argentina, with a historical claim
to the Falklands (Malvinas), decided to use force to gain control of
the British colony rather than continue to pursue fruitless negotia-
tions with London. The Reagan Administration tried valiantly for
several weeks to prevent open war between its two friends, one an
ally in NATO and the other a less-staunch ally in the Rio Pact. When
it was clear that Argentina would not evacuate the islands unless its
sovereignty over them was guaranteed, President Reagan decided
to support the British position. In so doing he implicitly concluded
that Great Britain is a vital interest of the United States and that
Argentina was not. Much of Latin America criticized Washington for
choosing Britain's side in this conflict, but the Reagan decision was
evidence that the US alliance with Great Britain has a higher priority
for the United States than the Rio Pact commitment to Argentina
when the two interests are in conflict. A Soviet threat to South

55
Evolving a National Strategy

America, however, would be a different matter and would no doubt

precipitate US military action under the Rio Pact.

Middle East

The greatest foreign-policy dilemma for American policymak-

ers and Congress today is deciding whether anything in the Middle
East and Indian Ocean area is so crucial to the US well-being that it
must be given the status of vital. Consider these past and potential
US commitments in the area: President Jimmy Carter said in his
State of the Union Message in January 1980 that the Persian Gulf
region is a vital US interest and would be protected by American
arms if necessary; all Presidents since Harry Truman have reaf-
firmed an American commitment to defend the state of Israel if it is
attacked; Iran under the Pahlavi Dynasty had a special relationship
with the United States, and in the 1970s President Nixon provided
the Shah with the most advanced US military equipment in return
for his playing the policeman's role in the Persian Gulf; Saudi Arabia
today remains the largest foreign supplier of oil to the United States,
and it has the decisive voice in OPEC pricing policy; Egypt under
Anwar Sadat turned away from military dependence on the Soviet
Union, and it now offers the United States facilities from which to
deploy military power into the Persian Gulf area. Yet which of these
cases constitutes a truly vital US interest in the 1980s?

Table 3-7: US National Interests in the Middle East

Basic Interest Intensity of Interest

at Stake Survival Vital Major Peripheral
Defense of Homeland X
Economic Well-being X
Favorable World Order X
Promotion of Values X

The Middle East has never been an area of Military military

involvement, even though the Eisenhower Administration sup-
ported the "northern tier" alliance system with countries south of
the Soviet border. A major reason why the United States could avoid
becoming involved in the Middle East with its own forces during the
1950s and 1960s was that Britain exercised an important security
role in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. But when London

56
 Evolving a National Strategy

announced in 1968 that it would withdraw from "east of Suez" by

1971, Washington had to choose whether it would fill the role itself
or permit a power vacuum to develop. President Nixon decided
against a US military buildup in the Indian Ocean but approved
expanding US naval facilities on the British-owned island of Diego
Garcia. Nixon also concluded an agreement with the Shah of Iran to
take over Britain's role in the Persian Gulf-one he played with
considerable success for eight years. With Britain and the Shah
gone, and the Russians in Afghanistan, does the United States now
have a vital interest in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf?

There are two possible grounds on which the United States may
have vital interests at stake in the Middle East: (1) to ensure the
continued flow of Persian Gulf oil to world markets, unimpeded
either by outside interference or by conflicts within the region; (2) to
prevent the Soviet Union from increasing its influence in the Middle
East and challenging the world balance of power

The uninterrupted flow of Persian Gulf oil is certainly an impor-

tant interest of the United States, as well as of Western Europe and
Japan; but for oil to be considered vital, one must prove that a
disruption of tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, or the
cutoff of supplies from any state in the Gulf, would be an economic
disaster for the Free World. When Saudi oil to the United States was
embargoed in 1973, it proved painful but bearable. President Nixon
did not resort to military force or to other means of retaliation
against the Arab oil producers and the United States managed with
less gasoline. Britain today is self-sufficient in oil, and Germany,
France, and Japan are moving to reduce their dependence on Mid-
dle East oil by developing other sources of energy, particularly
nuclear power. Even if a major Persian Gulf producer-Kuwait, for
example-were prevented from exporting oil, the world could cope
with that loss, just as it coped with the vast reduction in Iranian
exports after the demise of the Shah's regime, and as it did after Iraq
went to war with Iran in 1980. The world has learned to live with
uncertain Persian Gulf oil supplies, and other sources of crude oil
(Mexico, for example) are reducing the previous large Western
dependence on Arab oil. For the United States, Persian Gulf oil is at
present a major national interest, not a vital one.

Preventing Soviet expansion into the Middle East is a more

serious matter. In terms of worldwide balance-of-power considera-

57
Evolving a National Strategy

tions, the United States may have a vital interest in putting sufficient
military power into the Middle East to make the costs of a Kremlin
military adventure there too high. If the Soviet leadership assumed
that with the Shah gone and the Saudi leadership on shaky political
ground, it could risk American displeasure over installing a pro-
Moscow government in Iran, that action might trigger a US military
response. But should it? A crucial question here is whether the US
President could convince Congress and the public that American
troops should be used to defend Iran against a Soviet-supported
leftist takeover. In light of the imprisonment of American diplomats
in Tehran for over a year and the unremitting hostility of the
Khomeini regime, a US government decision to help Iran resist
Sovietization seems unlikely.

Saudi Arabia is a different matter. Not only are Western Europe

and Japan heavily dependent on its oil, the Saudi government has
been a moderating influence within OPEC in keeping world oil
prices lower than they might otherwise have been. The United
States probably has a vital world-order interest in seeing the Saudi
Arabia's oil exports to world markets are not subjected to either
Soviet or Iranian intimidation. To protect Saudi Arabia against such
outside pressures, the United States requires Egypt as a working
partner, if not as an ally. For this reason, and because of its influence
on other Arab states, Egypt must be included along with Israel as
part of a new security zone in the Eastern Mediterranean. Following
the war in Lebanon in 1982 and President Reagan's dispatch of US
Marines as peacekeeping forces there, Lebanon must also be
included in this Near East security zone.

The US interest in promoting Arab-Israeli peace has undergone

significant change in the past eight years. Since the October War of
1973, it is clear that Israel cannot have peace unless it it willing to
give up territories occupied during the 1967 War, and to live next to
some kind of autonomous Palestinian entity. The Camp David
Accords were a first step in this direction, but the Israeli govern-
ment's subsequunt actions suggested that after peace with Egypt
was secured, Jerusalem planned to annex the remaining occupied
lands. Its annexation of the Golan Heights in December 1981
seemed to confirm this intention. Whereas before 1973 US interests
in the Middle East were based primarily on preserving the state of
Israel, after 1973--particularly after Egypt's decision to oust Soviet
military advisers and seek close ties with Washington-the US

58
 Evolving a National Strategy

interest has been enlarged to include the defense of Egypt and

Saudi Arabia as well.

Israel's invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 in pursuit of

PLO forces, and its brutal bombardment of Beirut, caused its
government to encounter serious difficulties with the Reagan
Administration. Whereas President Reagan desires to build good
relations with the Arab countries, particularly Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
and Jordan, Israel's military actions in Lebanon made achievement
of this objective more difficult. The unwillingness of the Begin
government to show restraint in the use of US-supplied military
equipment caused many American political leaders to question
whether the United States should maintain a close relationship with
the Begin government. At issue is the determination of the Reagan
Administration to foster closer ties with moderate Arab countries in
order to reduce the risks of a wider war in the Persian Gulf area. The
Begin government sees Israel's interests as being jeopardized by an
evenhanded American policy and has made it increasingly difficult
for Mr. Reagan to pursue his goal of a "strategic consensus."
Whether a closer relationship between Israel and the United States
can be restored following the Lebanon war will depend on how the
Begin government deals with the Palestinian homeland issue. It
may not be possible for the current Israeli government to meet
President Reagan's requirements, outlined in his 1 September 1982
speech in Los Angeles, for a solution to the Palestinian question,
and the relationship will therefore be strained so long as Mr. Begin
remains in power.

The United States has only a peripheral ideological interest in

the Middle East because it is not in the US interest to turn Moslem
countries into Western-style democracies, or to impose Western
values on a wholly alien culture. The risk of doing so was highligh-
ted in Iran in 1979 when a violent reaction to Western institutions
and culture was exploited by the new Islamic revolutionary govern-
ment that succeeded the Shah's regime. Supporting democratic
government in Israel, however, is a major US interest.

In sum, the overall US national interest in the Middle East is a

major one, although US interests in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel
approach the vital level. This means that Washington should be
willing to sell or grant large quantities of military equipment to
friendly countries in the area to help them resist Communist and

59
Evolving a National Strategy

other pressures. The United States should certainly continue its

mediation efforts to work out a peace settlement between Israel and
its neighbors, and it should keep a naval presence in the Indian
Ocean. But it is questionable whether the United States should
establish bases in or make binding defense commitments to any
country in the region.

Africa

Strategically and politically, Africa should be divided into sub-

Saharan Africa, populated almost totally by blacks, and North
Africa, which is inhabited primarily by Arab-speaking peoples
whose religion and cultural ties are Moslem. (Egypt, although
located in the African continent, is usually considered part of the
Middle East.) North Africa is more important strategically to the
United States than southern Africa because it borders the Mediter-
ranean and is therefore closely associated with US interests in
Europe and Turkey, which constitute the NATO area. However, it is
difficult to make a case that the North African states constitute more
than a major economic or world-order interest of the United States.

Sub-Saharan Africa gained considerably in US interests after

decolonization took place in the 1960s and 1970s. This resulted
partly from Soviet penetration of Africa (Angola and Ethiopia) with
arms aid, and partly from the new awareness of the American black
community of its historical roots and the need to speed the demise
of white racism in Rhodesia and South Africa.

Table 3-8: US National Interests in Southern Africa

Basic Interest Intensity of Interest

at Stake Survival Vital Major Peripheral
Defense of Homeland X
Economic Well-being X
Favorable World Order X
Promotion of Values X

Although no country in Africa should be considered a vital US

national interest today, a number of them fit the "major" category:
Nigeria because of its large population, oil production, and stra-
tegic location; South Africa and Zaire because of strategic locations

60
 Evolving a National Strategy

and large production of key minerals; Angola because of oil. Furth-

ermore, Kenya and Somalia in East Africa have gained importance
because of the US Navy's need for support facilities for its Indian
Ocean fleet. All of these countries are important to the United States
and Washington wishes to retain or build good relations; but none
of them today should be considered in the vital category. Some
Pentagon planners believe that the US interest in Somalia, Kenya,
and South Africa is vital because the United States needs iheir naval
facilities, but that is highly questionable; in fact, US military bases
ought not to be established in any country which has little morethan
its land to contribute to an alliance relationship, because the politi-
cal commitment to US objectives will usually be marginal and sub-
ject to sudden shifts whenever a government changes hands.

If the raw materials of certain African countries are a major

economic interest of the United States and the existence of stable,
friendly governments is a major world-order interest, it must be
emphasized that these interests probably are not sustainable unless
the United States also supports the African nations' sense of justice.
The "human rights" compohent of American foreign policy is an
essential ingredient in this regard, and US efforts to resolve the
Rhodesia and Namibia issues constitute reassurance to African
states that US policy is not based simply on exploiting their natural
resources or obtaining access to military facilities. Except for this
aspect, however, the US interest in the promotion of US values and
its system of government in Africa is at the peripheral level.

CONCLUSIONS

This assessment of US national interests in the world today

suggests the following priorities in terms of geographic location,
and thus strategic importance:

Geographic area Level of Interest

North America vital

Western Europe vital/major
Soviet Union major/vital
East Asia and Pacific major/vital
South America major
Middle East major
Southern Africa major/peripheral

61
Evolving a National Strategy

It also means that US vital interests-those for which the country

should be willing to engage in warfare, if necessary-remain essen-
tially what they were in the 1950s: areas contiguous to the United
States in North America, Western Europe, and the island nations of
the Western Pacific. It includes the Soviet Union as a potential
survival interest because of that country's unique capability for
destroying large parts of the US homeland. Areas not included as
vital interests-South America, the Middle East, and Africa-
continue to be regions of major concern to the United States and
some countries there should receive considerable amounts of eco-
nomic and military assistance as well as diplomatic attention; but in
the absence of a clear Soviet military threat, the United States
should not contemplate using its own military power to influence
the outcome of events or trends and should rely instead on eco-
nomic, political, and covert actions. Nor should the United States
establish permanent military bases in the Middle East, Africa, or
South America because the presence of large military forces in a
region increases the potential for US involvement in local conflicts
and for escalating the level of national interest.

A conclusion to be drawn from this analysis of US interests and

military commitments is that the United States in the 1980s is an
overcommitted giant that needs to get its priorities in line with its
capabilities, and with its willingness to uphold them. North America
in the 1980s remains the clearest vital interest of the United States,
and the Reagan Administration has accorded a high priority to
improving US relations and security arrangements in this region. In
East Asia, only Japan, the Philippines, and Australia are vital US
interests. Western Europe remains a vital interest so long as these
countries want to be protected against the Soviet Union and are
willing to contribute a substantial portion of their GNP to the collec-
tive defense; but neutralism and pacifism are likely to increase in
Western Europe, and the point may be reached during the 1980s
when several countries will elect to leave NATO. The US commit-
ment to defend Europe must always be commensurate with Europe's
willingness to defend itself, and Washington should not hesitate to
make its conditions for future membership known to alliance
members. The danger for the United States in the Middle East is that
Washington is inexorably being committed to defend any states in
that region without a formal alliance system or a clear understand-
ing by the American people of the military implications of the com-
mitment. Persian Gulf oil is not something for which the United

62
 Evolving a National Strategy

States shou~d be willing to go to war, and yet US military forces are

being positioned so that they can intervene in local wars in that
region. The Reagan Administration attitude toward the Persian Gulf
area in 1982 is not unlike the Kennedy Administration's view twenty
years ago regarding Southeast Asia; and the danger is that history
will repeat itself in the 1980s if Congress and the public prove
unwilling to use US forces in the Middle East and Indian Ocean-
where US interests appear ambiguous and where US military capa-
bilities will remain limited.

No great power, regardless of its wealth, can afford to ignore

changing international conditions, and it must adjust its evaluation
of national interests to new realities Whether the United States
remains a superpower into the 21st century depends in large mea-
sure on how it decides its international priorities in this decade and
how it marshals its resources to defend them. Reducing the range
and cost of worldwide commitments is long overdue, and the
Reagan Administration should not flinch from making the hard
decisions to do so.

63
Fragmegrative Challenges to National Strategy

Dr. James N. Rosenau

University of Southern California

The recurring calls for an overall national strategy to guide the

US in world affairs that have been voiced with increasing frequency
in recent years, along with a seemingly pervasive frustration over
the elusiveness of such a strategy, suggest there may be some virtue
to stepping back from day-to-day developments and focusing on
the decade-to-decade trends that may hinder the formation of a
viable strategy.' Such a perspective is not easily achieved. In this era
of investigative journalism and extensive news leaks there is a ten-
dency to assume that close proximity to the policymaking process,
its hard data and its word-of-mouth information, offers the best
route to comprehending the dynamics of global politics. At times
though, the opportunities perceived in this assumption appear as
limitations, as blinders that obscure the larger contours of the world
scene, as if the very proximity to policymaking so exaggerates
immediate and transitory problems as to confound the broader
outlines of global structure. At such times, then, there are advan-
tages to distance, to being long on global perspectives and short on
up-to-date information and inside knowledge.

Perhaps this conclusion is merely an excuse for the fact that

what follows lacks familiarity with the current Washington scene, its
personality clashes and its bureaucratic rivalries. On the other
hand, I like to think that a lack of information conduces to a readi-
ness to be playful, to theorize anew, which may prove useful in the
search for a comprehensive national strategy appropriate to an
increasingly "fragmegrated" world. (The term -fragmegration" is
explained later in this paper.)

Viewed from a decade-to-decade perspective, a growing gap

between a number of emergent global and societal structures
stands out as inhibiting, if not prohibiting, the design of a viable
national strategy for the United States. Stated more directly, even if
the problems of personnel turnover (Kirkpatrick's complaint), pol-
icy inconsistency (Haig's lament), fractious bureaucratic machin-
ery (everybody's grievance), and the many other microfactors cited

65
Evolving a National Strategy

as explanations for the lack of a national strategy could somehow

be resolved, the macrodynamics of global life in the waning years of
this century would remain. And, as such, they are likely to under-
mine, even preclude, the formation of a viable and comprehensive
strategy.

In short, the problem is not that of clearing away the under-

brush so that an underlying, coherent, and compelling national
strategy will reveal itself and serve to guide the nation effectively
through the thickets of world politics. Rather the problem is to
identify the obstacles to a viable strategy, acknowledge their dura-
bility, and then seek ways of working around them so that goals can
be realized and challenges met. Such is the purpose of the ensuing
analysis.

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF A NATIONAL STRATEGY

To assess whether and how a viable national strategy can

bridge the growing gap between global and societal structures, we
need first to outline both the requirements of such a strategy and the
nature of the structures for which it is designed. I have pieced
together the following conception of an effective strategy from
many of the wistful pleas that one be developed. As I understand it,
these yearnings derive from a sense that the capacity of the United
States to manage its external affairs has not kept pace with changes
unfolding abroad and that therefore it is desirable, even vital, that
the Nation's goals and capabilities be brought together into a
coherent design for coping with (rather than simply reacting to) a
fast-moving world. Equipped with such a comprehensive strategy, it
is felt, the United States would act consistently and its friends and
foes abroad would know what to expect in diverse situations and, at
the same time, the policymaking process at home would be founded
on the strategy and thus more immune to the vagaries of style and
personality that have plagued it for so long. Consequently, with
coherence of purpose and consistency of action, the nation will be
able to protect its interests and maximize its influence over the
course of events. That is what happened in the 1950s, the argument
stresses, when the country did have an overall strategy, that of
containment, which was widely supported at home and clearly
recognized abroad as the basis for American foreign and military
policies and which thus enabled the country to move effectively in
world affairs. To be sure, Stalin miscalculated in Korea, but the

66
 Evolving a National Strategy

viability of the strategy was reaffirmed and strengthened by the

successful American response to the miscalculation. And that is
what is neded today, an overall perspective that can be translated
into specific responses to external challenges even though, admit-
tedly, the world has become more complex and thus may require a
more elaborate strategy than that of containment.

In sum, the yearned-for national strategy is conceived to con-

sist of four basic elements: (1) a clear and coherent conception of
the Nation's external goals and tne priorities among them; (2) a
design for moving toward these goals or countering threats to them
consistent with the resources available to sustain the movement
and counter the threats; (3) a widespread societal consensus in
support of the strategy so that it can be effectively implemented;
and (4) a global reputation for consistently adhering to the strategy,

CHANGING EXTERNAL STRUCTURES: THE FUNDAMENTALS

OF A FRAGMEGRATED WORLD

Assuming this is a reasonable assessment of what those who

long for a comprehensive strategy are calling for, the test of its
viability lies in whether or not it can serve as a bridge between the
changing structures of global and national life. A diagrammatic
summary of some of the more salient foreign and domestic struc-
tures is presented in Table 3-9, and here the enormous bridging
tasks of an effective strategy can be seen in their juxtaposition. That
is, the changing external structures listed on the left side of the
table, each of which reinforces the others, have combined to render
the global environment less stable for all states, while the changing
internal structures listed on the right, each again reinforcing the
others, have interacted to make the United States an increasingly
vulnerable great power. And as can be seen in the center column of
the table, the interface of these two conditions poses a number of
troubling questions as to what may be required if the country is to
adapt its internal structures to its external circumstances, including
the question of whether a viable national strategy can at least do
part of the job.

Stated differently, as indicated by the multiple entries in the

center column, a national strategy is one of several mechanisms
through which the adaptation of the United States to a fast-moving
world can be accomplished. 2 Given the magnitude of the other

67
 Evolving a National Strategy

mechanisms, it seems clear that the obstacles to a viable strategy

are considerable and that, in any event, the formulation of such a
strategy would have to be accompanied by a number of other devel-
opments for it to be effective. Indeed, viewed in this way, Table 3-9
suggests that a viable strategy may not be achievable unless and
until the American people evolve a broad and solidly based consen-
sus that, in effect, is founded on a new social contract, redefined
priorities, a new lifeboat ethic, a clearer conception of the national
interest, and/or other economic value changes.

Before analyzing the prospects for developing a domestic con-

sensus wide and deep enough to render a national strategy viable,
let us assume that such a consensus exists and briefly consider the
obstacles located abroad to the formation of a national strategy.
One useful way to conceive of these obstacles is to posit global
structures as having undergone a vast transformation in recent
years, a transformation that makes them much more complex than
was the case in the early postwar years when the strategy of con-
tainment proved so viable. The wellsprings of this transformation
can be analyzed in terms of five underlying dynamics (the major
headings listed on the left of Table 3-9). Elsewhere I have examined
the sources and consequences of these dynamics at some length,
but for present purposes it suffices to emphasize that all five con-
tribute to and sustain two interactive, simultaneous, and contradic-
tory global processes, those of integration and disintegration, of
centripetal forces that are making groups and nations more and
more interdependent even as centrifugal forces are increasingly
fragmenting them into subgroups and subnations. 3 To highlight the
importance of the simultaneity and contrariety of these two primary
processes, one can think of their interaction as forming a fragme-
grative process and to use the label of fragmegration for the global
structures to which their interaction has given rise. In my view the
concept of fragmegration, embracing as it does both fragmentation
and integration, facilitates a more incisive understanding of the
changing world scene than does the concept of interdependence.
The latter concept is plagued with ambiguity over the hierarchical
relations among groups and states, whereas fragmegration by-
passes the problem by assuming that both hierarchy and autonomy
are at work as groups and states concurrently fragment and inte-
grate in response to declining resources, weakened governments,
and new challenges and issues that span and violate their long-
4
standing political and legal boundaries.

68
 Evolving a National Strategy

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Evolving a National Strategy

Being both simultaneous and contradictory, fragmegrative

processes are marked by tension and upheaval even as the resulting
structures become regularized and institutionalized features of
world affairs. Seven recent "international" crises, those in Iran,
Poland, Central America, Mexico, Afghanistan, the Falkland Islands,
and Lebanon, offer vivid insights into the global scope of fragme-
gration. The integrative forces of the Iranian revolution swept
through the American Embassy in Tehran and upended the most
elemental premises of international law even as the disintegrative
energies it unleashed have rent Iran's society, stalemated its econ-
omy, and spread fear and uncertainty throughout the Arab world. In
Poland the centrifugal forces that created Solidarity clashed head-
on with the centripetal structures of the Soviet empire and the
financial links of Western and Eastern banking institutions. In Cen-
tral America the simultaneity of integrative and disintegrative
dynamics is poignantly evident in the large extent to which its guer-
rilla wars have become a regionwide conflict, spreading across and
obfuscating traditional boundaries as both governments and rebel
groups coordinate their actions with their counterparts in the
region. Hardly less conspicuous an illustration of fragmegration
was evident in Mexico's near-collapse into insolvency and the integ-
rative response of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan may at first seem a more conven-
tional instance of hierarchical power politics, but on closer inspec-
tion the flight of insurgent groups into Pakistan and their subse-
quent difficulties in consolidating their efforts suggest the presence
of multiple fragmegrative processes. Likewise, while the Falkland
crisis may appear as a classic case of one state invading another
and then being repulsed by a counterattack, its origins and dynam-
ics lay in the simultaneity of disintegrative tendencies in the Argen-
tine economy and the British polity and integrative processes
inherent in both Argentine and British nationalism. And with four
armed services having been at war in Lebanon and five negotiating
teams having sought to end the conflict, what could be a better
example of the vigor and ubiquity of fragmegration!

Viewed from this perspective, the worldwide flow of refugees

seeking new homelands, the flow of currencies seeking higher
interest rates, the flow of acid rain spread by the winds far beyond
their origins, the diffusion of unemployment across national boun-
daries and the disruption of trade flows between them, the flow of
terrorists, former CIA agents, and carriers of stolen computer tech-

70
 Evolving a National Strategy

nology seeking to defy national structures on behalf of subnational

or personal aspirations, and a host of other new patterns are also
part of a larger, unfamiliar encompassing global structure that has
emerged in the last couple of decades. Such diverse patterns can be
viewed as cumulating into a more encompassing structure because
they commonly derive from the dynamics noted in Table 3-9 and thus
overlap, forming a circuitous and complex chain of causal connec-
tions whereby the centripetal and centrifugal forces at work in the
global system become functions of each other. It may not always be
easy to trace the overlap and the causal links, but the patterned
occurrence of the various fragmegrative processes suggests the
presence of an underlying and all-encompassing global structure.

Indeed, the structure of fragmegration is so encompassing that

its scope is not confined to the commingling of integrative and
disintegrative processes within and between states. It is also opera-
tive on a regional scale, thereby further confounding the tasks of a
viable national strategy. The crises in the South Atlantic and
Lebanon are both illustrative in this regard. Just asthe conflict over
the Falkland Islands precipitated both centripetal forces within
Latin America and Western Europe and centrifugal forces between
the two regions, so did the Israeli attack on the PLO intensify (at
least initially) a sense of common cause within the Arab world and
deepen the rift between it and Israel's friends in the West. As a
consequence, in both crises the United States was compelled to
make choices that were regional in scale, between NATO and the
Organization of American States in the one case and between the
moderate Arab world and Israel in the other. And in both instances it
was a no-win choice. To support the centripetal forces on one side
of the conflict was to offend those on the other side, while the
avoidance of choosing between the regions was to offend both
sides and to allow for a further deepening of the centrifugal forces
dividing the regions. Little wonder, then, that in both crises the
United States postponed the choice as long as possible by under-
taking a mediating role in the hope of promoting any nascent cen-
tripetal forces that may have been operative between the regions.

In short, the variety and scale of the world's fragmegrative

processes are so great that it would be a grievous error to view their
emergence as part of a transitional realignment or as a temporary
phase in international history. For if fragmegration has become a
fundamental global structure, founded on all the habituation and

71
Evolving a National Strategy

routinisation that undergirds any social structure, then it may well

be a permanent feature of world affairs. It may well be, in other
words, that what presently appear to be ungainly asymmetries in the
state system have in fact become its symmetries. In any event,
whether fragmegration is in the long run transitory or enduring, its
pervasiveness on the current scene is too great not to be treated as a
major obstacle to (and thus as a central focus of) any national
strategy the United States may evolve for the foreseeable future.

And why do the processes of fragmegration pose serious, if not

insurmountable, challenges to those who would draft a national
strategy that coherently specifies external goals, the priorities
among them, and the actions required to move toward them con-
sistently? Answered most simply (and still assuming that a widely
shared domestic consensus exists or could be fashioned around
some basic propositions that accord the United States an active-as
distinguished from an isolationist-role in world affairs), because
some of the external goals inherent in the role of a superpower will
best be served through supporting the centrifugal forces at work
within and among states and other goals are likely to be best served
by favoring the centripetal forces; and to be aligned simultaneously
with these contradictory forces is to be, inevitably, committed to
inconsistent courses of action.

That is, it will be difficult to frame a set of basic propositions that

summarize the nation's international role because global fragme-
gration does not lend itself to broad strategic principles that have
universal relevance. To cope with fragmegrative processes is to
have to direct action simultaneously at substantial, national, and
supranational actors abroad, and the norms, aspirations, capabili-
ties, and maneuverability underlying the responsiveness of the
actors at each of these levels will normally be so different (and often
so mutually exclusive) that no set of strategic principles could
possibly be effective at all the levels. As indicated in the Polish
crisis, for example, the principle of freedom of assembly may serve
worthy goals and evoke desired responses at the subnational level,
but it may also evoke undesirable responses at the national level
because it conflicts with the principle of nonintervention in the
internal affairs of another state. Similarly, fragmegrative processes
can differ as greatly across situations as within them, thus confront-
ing policymakers with the necessity of applying some principles in
one situation and negating them in others. This is why, presumably,

72
 Evolving a National Strategy

the United States found the principle of opposing the first use of
force as an instrument of foreign policy compelling in the recent
case of Argentina but unwise in the even more recent case of
Honduran incursions into Nicaragua.

In sum, it is reasonable to assert that each increment of global

fragmegrationreduces by a comparabledegree the capacity of any
state to develop and maintain an internally consistent global
strategy. If this is so, it follows that those who call for a national
strategy seem likely either to be ever more frustrated or to turn away
from internationalist orientations that posit the US as having
worldwide interests.

CHANGING INTERNAL STRUCTURES: THE FUNDAMENTALS

OF A FRAGMEGRATED AMERICA

But the dynamics of global fragmegration are not only external

to the United States. As indicated on the right side of Table 3-9, they
are also at work within the country and they pose equally serious
challenges to the prospects for evolving a viable national strategy.
Most notably, these prospects become even more questionable
when the assumption of a broad national consensus is relaxed. The
findings of a long-term inquiry into the underlying attitudes of 4,783
American leaders conducted by Ole R. Holsti and myself has
yielded clear-cut evidence of deep cleavages within the American
leadership community over the goals and role of the United States
in the world. 5 That is, not only did we fail to turn up any signs of a
global perspective widely shared by leaders in all walks of American
life, but we also uncovered a series of patterns which greatly reduce
the likelikhood of such a consensus either evolving slowly or being
mobilized by a charismatic leader, a political party, and/or a severe
crisis: (1) the "containment" consensus of the 1950s has given way
not to confusion or ambiguity with respect to the country's role in
the world, but to at least three highly structured and mutually exclu-
sive belief systems; (2) the replacement of the consensus with these
belief systems was in good measure (though not entirely) a product
of the trauma of Vietnam; (3) each of the belief systems is so
internally consistent that those who hold them are likely to interpret
the course of events reinforcing their beliefs, thereby perpetuating
the cleavages that divide the society; (4) no foreseeable interna-
tional crisis short of an attack comparable to Pearl Harbor and an
ensuing global war is likely to serve as the basis for a new society-

73
Evolving a National Strategy

wide consensus, or at ieast our evidence plainly indicates that

neither the Iranian hostage crisis nor the Soviet invasion of Afghan-
istan gave rise to any reduction in the gaps that separate the three
belief systems; (5) while there are some connections between a
leader's belief system and his or her occupation and political ideol-
ogy, all three belief systems prevail in every subsection of the
leadership ".ommunity, including both major political parties and all
the institutions and agencies of the Federal Government; and (6) the
prevalence of three mutually exclusive, internally consistent belief
systems in all walks of American life, combined with the decentral-
ized character of the country's policymaking machinery, can thus
be viewed as a prime source of the inconsistency and vacillation
that has marked American foreign policy since the war in Vietnam.

Table 3-10 outlines the three foreign-policy belief systems, which

we have labeled Cold War Internationalism, Post-Cold War Interna-
tionalism, and Neo-lsolationism, and here the internal consistency
of each can be readily discerned through glancing down the
columns, and their mutual exclusivity is no less evident through
comparing across the rows. Since an elaborate discussion of the
differences depicted in Table 3-10 has been presented elsewhere,
here it suffices to address the question of whether any of the three
belief systems is susceptible to transformation into a national stra-
tegy appropriate to coping with a fragmegrated world. 6 The answer,
of course, depends partly on one's belief system. Analysis commit-
ted to any one of them are likely to argue that it is sufficiently
coherent and comprehensive to serve as the basis for ordering
priorities and resolving hard choices among policy alternatives.
And certainly it is clear from Table 3-10 that each system is founded
on general principles as to the underlying structure of the global
system and what should be done about it.

Viewed from the perspective of the dynamics inherent in the

processes of fragmegration, however, each of the belief systems
would appear to be wanting. This is readily apparent with respect to
Cold War Internationalism and Neo-Isolationism: as indicated in
Table 3-9, global fragmegration derives from a number of diverse
and diffuse sources besides those originating in the Communist
world, and many of these link the United States to a number of
situations abroad that cannot be reasonably ignored. Thus a strat-
egy founded on containing the Soviet Union would be seriously out
of phase with many of the centripetal and centrifugal forces at work

74
 Evolving a National Strategy

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Evolving a National Strategy

in the world, and the same would be said of an isolationist strategy

that fails to account for the myriad ways in which fragmegrative
structures at home respond to patterns unfolding abroad. Similarly,
precisely because Post-Cold War Internationalism com<'s some-
what closer to recognizing the diversity and diffusion of fragmegra-
tive processes, it is conspicuously lacking in several kinds of overall
principles (particularly those pertaining to the question of when to
employ force and the problem of how to balance conflicting chal-
lenges from the Third World and the Soviet Union) that are essential
to a viable strategy. The indecisiveness and incoherence that
marked the conduct of American foreign affairs during the Carter-
Vance years is a poignant reminder of the difficulties inherent in
transforming Post-Cold War Internationalism into a national
strategy.
In short, none of the three belief systems seem appropriate to a
fragmegrated world and thereby capable of bridging the changing
structures of global and national life. And this would appear to be
especially the case when the findings relevant to the distribution of
the three systems throughout the national leadership community
are recalled. Whatever potential each system may be assessed to
have as national strategy, none is likely to emerge as the basis of a
nationwide consensus. Indeed, the complexity and solidity of the
cleavages which presently mark American society is probably much
greater than Table 3-10 suggests. For there are strong indications
(partially derived from systematic evidence) that the leadership is
also divided by three domestic-policy belief systems, no less mutu-
ally exclusive or internally consistent than their foreign-policy
counterparts.7 A comparison of the two sets of belief systems is
likely to yield the conclusion, discussed at length elsewhere, that
there are few if any philosophical links between the two sets, all of
which suggests that efforts to mobilize a broad consensus behind a
particular national strategy are likely to founder because of division
over its domestic as well as its foreign-policy implications.,

It follows that the problem of American inconsistency in world

affairs goes far deeper than the absence of a national strategy or the
personality and bureaucratic clashes among policymakers in the
White House, the State Department, the Defense Establishment, the
Congress, and the many other agencies with some responsibility for
the society's adaptation to its external environment. The problem is
rooted in underlying value divisions that are independent of particu-
lar individuals or units of government. Neither the last-minute shift

76
 Evolving a National Strategy

of a US vote at the United Nations by the Reagan Administration

during the Falklands war nor a virtually identical event in 1979 under
the Carter Administration over the Middle East-to take two of
innumerable examples of inconsistency that could be cited-
occurred mainly because the Secretary of State, the US Ambassa-
dor to the United Nations, and/or the Presidential Assistant for
National Security Affairs were competing for jurisdiction or other-
wise rubbing each other the wrong way. Such events occur, rather,
largely because there is no one-to-one relationship between the
recruitment process and the belief systems held by the occupants of
high office, with the result that at any moment in time adherents of
all three belief systems are scattered somewhat randomly through-
out the decentralized machinery for adapting the society to its
external environment. Hence at any moment in time one or another
official, each performing his or her share of the policymaking
responsibility as seems best in the light of his or her belief system, is
asserting or adopting policy positions that may vary from, even
contradict, the positions articulated by other top officials whose
responsibilities and belief systems are of a different kind. It was not
so much Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski who clashed across
institutional lines-to cite one of the more conspicuous policymak-
ing rivalries-as it was a conflict between Post-Cold War Interna-
tionalism and Cold War Internationalism. This multiplicity of voices
that articulates and sustains the vacillation built into American
foreign and defense policy seems destined to persist as long as the
policymaking organization is widely decentralized and the core
values of the society are widely discrepant.

ALTERNATE ROUTES TO A STRATEGIC DESIGN

Two lines of argument might be advanced to demonstrate that

the foregoing grossly exaggerates the external and internal obsta-
cles to a national strategy. One would be that such a strategy need
only be capable of coping with military challenges and can thus
leave to the makers of foreign policy the task of responding to the
socioeconomic and political challenges inherent in fragmegration.9
A second would be a national-interest argument, in which a clear
and pragmatic conception of the Nation's underlying interests in
the diverse situations of global politics is conceived to be capable of
identifying and clarifying a viable strategy for coping with both
military and nonmilitary challenges.1 0

77
Evolving a National Strategy

It is tempting to posit the problem of national strategy as simply

one of framing an overall military posture toward the world. For
surely it is much easier to calculate where and how force should be
used in support of national goals than to devise principles that also
govern when political, economic, and diplomatic instruments
should be used on behalf of the goals. Framing an overall military
posture, while not free of difficulties and controversy, involves
assessing where unacceptable threats to the status quo may occur
and then planning the force levels and tactics necessary to contest
them. However, whatever might be the organizing premises of
such a posture, whether they focus on seapower and mobile marine
units or on troops and airbases located abroad, it would be bound to
fall short of infusing coherence and consistency into the Nation's
efforts to adapt to a fast-moving world. For as the processes of
fragmegration widen and deepen, more than ever do unacceptable
changes abroad derive from nonmilitary sources, from dynamics
that cannot be contained or channeled through the application of
force. Any national strategy does, to be sure, require a military
posture and planning for the circumstances when combat units
should be employed, but such a posture can only provide physical
security for American interests. It cannot promote the social, eco-
nomic, and political institutions abroad that are no less necessary to
the Nation's welfare. Recent events vividly demonstrate this point:

For what is the lesson of the past few months if not the near-total
irrelevance of American military power? Irrelevant in the Falk-
lands dispute, irrelevant in Poland and Afghanistan. and now
irrelevant in Lebanon. Of what practical use is all that military
powe, all those billion-dollar aircraft carriers and the tens of
thousands of atomic weapons? In what way have they influ-
enced the course of events in these critical areas of the world?
Their only use, as should long ago have been obvious, is to
deter the other muscle-bound nuclear Gulliver: the Soviet
Union, whose paralysis is of the same order of magnitude."

Stated differently, the more fragmegratedthe world becomes, the

less meaningful become the distinctions between foreign, military,
and domestic policy. A military posture can only be effective if a
government is seen as ready to use force and its people ready to
supply the human and nonhuman resources necessary to fight, all
of which means that military, foreign, and domestic policy form a
seamless web and any effort to design a national strategy for only
one of these dimensions is destined to founder. In the case of the

78
 Evolving a National Strategy

United States, for example, there are ample reasons to presume that
the American people will not support military actions abroad except
under extreme circumstances, and any national strategy that
ignores these constraints is bound to be short-lived.

The argument that a national strategy can be constructed out of

a clear-cut conception of the Nation's interests in the various
regions of the world also suffers from major insufficiencies. One is
that a multiplicity of interests are operative in any situation, and
even to categorize them, say, as survival, vital, major, and peripheral
interests is not necessarily to fashion them into a coherent design
and thereby achieve a workable set of priorities among them. 2 No
matter how pragmatic the calculation of national interests may be.
the inconsistencies inherent in the simultaneity and ubiquity of
fragmegrative processes will remain to confound the task of setting
priorities. Secondly, for all the intellectuality and rationality involved
in the assessment and categorization of national interests, the task
is profoundly and ultimately a sorting out of values, a making of
judgments about what is good and bad, and there is no way that a
hardnosed, pragmatic approach to such judgments can render
them into empirically objective truths."3 Thus what one observer or
policymaker assesses as a survival interest may only be a vital
interest to another, with the result that any strategy founded on aq
articulation of national interests is bound to be as viable as the
degree of value consensus within the society will allow. As already
noted, present circumstances in the United States do not offer
much hope that viability can be achieved through this method of
formulating a comprehensive strategy. 4

CONCLUSION: COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIES OR

MUDDLED INCREMENTS?

If the dynamics of fragmegration have cut off all the easy routes
to a national strategy, and if none of the three foreiqn-policy belief
systems is likely to be up to the challenges of fragmegration or to
serve as the basis of a nationwide consensus, what then? Are there
no general principles to which top officials can resort when critical
decisions have to be made? Or are they forever destined to proceed
pragmatically from situation to situation and from crisis to crisis,
treating each as a challenge to somehow muddling through, keep-
ing losses to a minimum and, where possible, incrementally regis-
tering gains on behalf of whatever values and interests may be

79
Evolving a National Strategy

widely shared? In the absence of a consensual national strategy, is

the United States fated only to react to external stimuli? Or can the
obstacles to a national strategy be at least minimally circumvented?

I know of no magical answers to these questions. Beyond the

widely held belief in the desirability of controlling the nuclear arms
race, and aside from the very abstract proposition italicized below, it
is difficult to conceive of any general principles that can serve as
guides for American policymakers. Less because of the limits of
imagination and more because of the nature of fragmegration, it
does seem likely that pragmatic muddling through is the only way in
which a bridge between the changing structures of global and
national life can be effectively sustained. But does pragmatic mud-
dling imply a future of confusion and inconsistency? Not necessar-
ily. To muddle pragmatically is to acknowledge that regions, states,
and subnational groups abroad are both cohering and breaking
down, to recognize the constraints imposed by similar dynamics at
home, and to respond to the simultaneity of these contradictory
processes through policies and actions that are founded on multi-
level calculations-that self-consciously and simultaneously seek
to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs at every system
level abroad by taking into account the consequences for each of
the other levels.

And how to take account of multilevel consequences? The

answer here is as close as I can come to a genuine guideline for
framing a viable strategy. It can be called the fragmegration guide-
line: in order to muddle consistently from one situation to another,
the United States should found its conduct abroad on the presump-
tion that any and all disintegrative forces comprising subsystems
within a system are legitimate(and thus not to be contested)as long
as they allow for the perpetuationof the integrativeforces compris-
ing the system and that the system is legitimate (and not to be
contested) as long as it allows for the perpetuationof any and all of
its subsystems.

Such a guideline combines, on the one hand, a respect for the

sovereignty of states and the integrity of of regions (system perpe-
tuation) and, on the other, a readiness to align the US on the side of
change and democratic values within states and regions (subsys-
tem perpetuation). Indeed, this guideline is precisely the basis on
which the US has supported Solidarity (which accepted the legiti-

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 Evolving a National Strategy

macy of Poland) and opposed the PLO (which has yet to accept the
legitimacy of Israel). And at first glance it also seems suitable as a
foundation for clear and consistent responses to the Iraq-Iran War,
the issue of arms to Taiwan, the conflicts in Central America, the
situations in Southern Africa, and a host of other current problems.
Or, to make the case in negative terms, it is precisely the violation of
the guideline on the issue of sanctions designed to inhibit construc-
tion of the natural-gas pipeline across Eurasia-the ignoring of the
integrity of integrative forces within and between European coun-
tries in an attempt to promote disintegrative tendencies within the
Soviet Union and Poland-that has fostered disarray in the Western
alliance and intensified concern about consistency in American
policy.

In sum, there are reasons to conclude that if top officials

employed the fragmegration guideline and repeatedly and publicly
affirmed that it lay at the core of American policy, the country's
interests would be well served without conveying the appearance of
indecision and vacillation. And conceivably, too, it would help make
the world safer for diversity and enhance any other benefits that
may be inherent in fragmegrative processes.

Again, of course, there is no magic here. The overlap and clash

of integrative and disintegrative forces will still be chaotic and, as
such, they will foment controversy and confusion among officials
over whether particular systems and subsystems in particular situa-
tions allow for the perpetuation of each other. Yet, muddled as the
making and summing of such multilevel calculations may be, pre-
sumably they will also be more in touch with the predominant
structures of world affairs and thus will be more rather than less
practical as mechanisms for adapting an increasingly vulnerable
United States to its increasingly less stable external environment.

Disappointing as it may be to accept that in the present circum-

stances a viable national strategy cannot otherwise be developed,
there is some virtue in such a conclusion. Or at least something
important might be gained if the necessity of accepting pragmatic
incrementalism and suppressing the need for general principles
were to become widely shared. A consensus around this conclusion
might go a long way toward rechanneling energy to the tasks at
hand and away from the rivalries that are inherent in a decentralized
policymaking system and a set of mutually exclusive belief systems.

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I

Evolving a National Strategy

Surely, too, a recognition of the limits of general principles will

lessen the fruitless, even counterproductive, arguments that have
ensued over the merits of such vacuous concepts as detente, neo-
conservatism, and ultraliberalism. And less rivalry and contention
among top officials would, doubtless, contribute to a global reputa-
tion for consistency and reliability.

82
 Chapter 4
National Security Strategies for
the Use of Space

Panelists were challenged to address the following charter:

"The group will review the potential of space technologies to alter

the security environment on the earth. This panel will examine the
role that space might play in future US military efforts and will
suggest potentialstrategies to ensure that US space efforts proceed
toward desired security objectives. Recommendations might be
made about the prioritiesfor future US militaryspace programsand
about arms control in space."

83
 Panel Summary

Mr. Norman R. Augustine, Chairman

Martin Marietta Denver Aerospace

Lieutenant Colonel Gunter H. Neubert, USA, Rapporteur

National Defense University

The role of space in affecting national security is a timely topic.

Although the subject was considerably narrower than those ad-
dressed in th3 other panels, it proved to be no less challenging and
contentious, surfacing some thorny problems and generating some
lively debate. Most of the views discussed did not elicit unanimous
support of the panelists, but all did enjoy some form of consensus.

It has been almost 25 years since Sputnik I was first placed in

orbit, ushering in the space age. Space activities have exploded
since that time: there are some 4,700 man-made objects being
tracked in space; shuttle operations have devolved from the spec-
tacular to the routine so that the flight announced for 11 November
1982, at 0719 hours, will very likely take place on 11 November at
0719 hours; the shuttle tank is large enough to contain the trajectory
of the first and most famous flight of the Wright brothers: some
dozen Americans have walked on the moon; and Russian cosmo-
nauts, almost unnoticed by the American public, are continuing.
even as we must, to circle the globe, adding an interesting challenge
to US security concerns. With this proliferation in mind, trying to
address future security issues provided a decided challenge to the
imagination.

It was felt by the panel that the United States is at a crossroads

in its space program. Past eras have been centered upon a major
goal: In the fifties, the US goal was the placement of an artificial
satellite in orbit around the earth; in the sixties, the Appollo program
provided the major challenge; and the space shuttle program
received major emphasis in the seventies. What about the eighties?
There appears to be no single, center-stage, national space objec-
tive. Panel reaction to the present national space policy, as recently
announced by the President, was mixed. There were those who felt
the policy does indeed set the framework for maintaining leadership

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Strategies for Space

in space, as well as strengthening national security. Others felt that

the pronouncement was too vague, offered no blueprint for the
Nation's progress in space, and will result in a "Band-Aid" approach
to the national strategy for the development of space. This seeming
lack of a single direction may in fact be no more than a sign of the
maturity of the space program, where the many missions that can be
accomplished are much more routine than spectacular, and sup-
port economic and military objectives more than political objectives.

A definite change in the composition of the US space program

from a NASA-oriented toward a Defense-oriented program was
noted by some panelists. Today, for the first time, the Defense
budget for space equals the civilian budget. This shift may well be
designed to try to redress past US-Soviet asymmetric efforts in
space. The Soviets traditionally have had a strong military space
program. Since 1977 some 33 Soviet cosmonauts have accumu-
lated four man-years of experience on orbit, performing surveil-
lance, repairs, and positive command and control functions, as well
as possibly developing techniques for targeting, and providing
warning of attack. Today they have the only space weapon in the
world, which they have tested some 20 times. In contrast, the United
States has only accumulated some 39 man-days of orbital expe-
rience, and has no space weapons.

The ability of the Soviets to track the US fleet using radar

satellites is of particular concern to the United States. Over the past
decade the Soviets have launched four to five times as many satel-
lites as the United States (with 70 percent of the launches being
strictly military). Last year alone, they launched about 75 military-
related satellites, as compared to eight US launches. But, as pointed
out by some panelists, given the superior reliability and capability of
the US efforts, the United States still has a stronger space program.
at this time. The US program was felt by the panelists to have a
decided edge by virtue of the shuttle and the lead in miniaturization
capability. However, it was noted that the United States has no new
defense initiatives planned until 1983, the implication being that this
makes us vulnerable to possible Soviet breakthroughs.

There is today a definite change in the character of the US

space program. From the earlier missions of strategic warning and
intelligence, there appears to be a shift toward enhancing the tacti-
cal warfighting capability of US forces. These forces are increas-

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 Strategies for Space

ingly dependent on the capabilities offered by space assets. Some

commanders have voiced concern about the fact that space assets
are not at present under their control (and thus are subject to being
diverted at the most inopportune times in war), and that these assets
are very vulnerable to Soviet intervention. The following initiatives
were identified to address the latter concern:

1. Add sensors to satellites to confirm/report attack.

2. Harden satellites against EW (electronic warfare soft kill),

nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP), and against conven-
tional intercepts.

3. Build in redundancy (to enhance capability for restoration).

4. Add maneuver capability to evade killer satellites.

5. Develop a U.S. ASAT capability (as a deterrent and as a

bona fide warfighting device).

The panel felc that, unless there is an improvement in the sur-

vivability of US space vehicles and hardware, the military space
program could actually see a decline in the future. Since the Soviets
presumably would attempt to eliminate/neutralize US space assets
even in conventional warfare, it was the view of the group that the
United States must develop an antisatellite program on a high-
priority basis, with an immediate capability against spacecraft in
near-earth orbit. It was felt that the development of a technology
base to address requirements for an antisatellite capability in geo-
synchronous orbit should be sufficient for the near future. It was
noted that space assets are actually only part of the overall space
system, and that the associated ground stations, control links, and
data processing equipment, as well as launch facilities, must also be
hardened.

The panel concluded that over-the-horizon (real-time) target-

ing against surface ships, aircraft, and ground vehicles, using space
as a link in the targeting, represents the premier opportunity for the
United States to reap major benefits, and thus should be pursued on
a priority basis. The United States already has the capability of
targeting individual elements with high precision, but not with rapid
time-lines. This latter aspect is the key to increasing the effective-

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Strategies for Space

ness of many weapons systems which are limited not by intrinsic

capabilities but by means of target acquisition.

Historically, the United States has relied principally on an

offensive doctrine in the strategic arena. In fact, since the late
sixties, it has been argued that more emphasis on strategic defense
would be destabilizing. The panel concluded, however, that the
dramatic change in space technology (and other factors) has
changed the environment, and that the United States would be well
advised to adopt a policy that would be more balanced between
strategic defense and strategic offense. Indeed, it was felt by some
members of the panel that space offers the United States the oppor-
tunity to attain a strong strategic defense. This could potentially be
achieved in terms of conventional kill mechanisms, explosives, and
kinetic energy, although this point was much disputed.

The most publicized (and scrutinized) program. though,

involves the high-energy laser. The United States and the Soviet
Union both have active programs in this area. Although the panel
generally agreed that the United States should conduct research on
a high-energy laser potentially applicable to space missions, most
of the panelists argued that the technology was not sufficiently
developed to determine at this time whether the large investment of
national assets would in fact yield a productive defense system. On
the other hand, the panel believed that a vigorous program to inves-
tigate technology and operational feasibility was indeed in order. In
the final analysis, it was concluded that the problem was one of
insufficient data, and that it was important for the Unitad States first
to close this data gap, in order to make an intelligent decision on the
future of this program.
Man in space! Should this program be the key to US space
policy? The answer to this question also proved to be elusive. The
present US manned space program is somewhat low-key-although
many argued that the shuttle represents a man-in-space program
which is by no means low-key. It was generally agreed that the
,,viets certainly seem to think that the manned space program is
important, and that the United States would be well-advised to
understand why. Although the panel wasn't prepared to identify the
manned space station as the key ingredient of US national strategy
in space, several possible near-term missions for a permanently
manned space station were identified, including surveillance, tar-
geting, providing precise command and control, logistic support

88
 Strategies for Space

(e.g., repairing, as well as constructing, space assets), and provid-

ing unambiguous warning of strategic attack. The United States
may indeed be passing up the chance for making major discoveries
in technical and other arenas-discoveries that might well rank with
historically important (and accidental) discoveries such as penicil-
lin, x-rays-and America.

Sanctuary in space! This concept, more than any other, gener-

ated some heated debate. It was generally agreed that nuclear
weapons should be barred from space (although the question of
verification may be insoluble). However, after a thorough discus-
sion, it was quite apparent to all that the issue of conventional
weapons in space was indeed very complex and intractable. The
following factors were identified as being relevant:

1. The present space treaty, (barring the deployment of wea-

pons of mass destruction from space) was generally viewed as a
positive measure, of benefit to the United States. However, curtail-
ment of deployment of other weaponry, both offensive and defen-
sive, received close attention, and elicited some vociferous discus-
sion. On the issue of expanding the terms of the existing space
treaty, two diametrically opposed positions emerged. On the one
hand, some panelists maintained that, since the United States
derives more benefit frcm its space program than does the Soviet
Union from its own, it would be to our advantage to secure an
agreement with the Soviets that would attempt to guarantee nonin-
terference with our space assets.

On the other hand, the majority of the panel felt that, since we
are ahead in space activities, any agreement on constraining these
efforts would most likely work to our detriment, and asymmetrically
"favor the Soviets--basically freeze our efforts, while the Soviets
caught up. (It should be noted that all panelists agreed that the
United States did indeed enjoy a lead in space-the disagreement
concerned the mechanism for assuring the future of that lead.)

2. The use of space for strategic defense was felt to be critical

to future US national security. It was generally conceded that stra-
tegic and tactical aid to military operations on earth through the
medium of space was indeed appropriate and important, and that
the location of sensors in space was probably stabilizing in most
applications. This is where agreement ceased Some members felt

89
Strategies for Space

that space inevitably should, and will, be the next arena for military
combat, and that the United States should pursue a vigorous pro-
gram to attain a comprehensive capability in this medium. The
sanctuary advocates would bar all weapons from space. These
advocates felt that competition should be shifted from the military
to the technological and scientific areas, that military competition in
space would ultimately lead to escalation, and prove unprofitable to
all sides.

3. The provisions of any agreement on a space sanctuary would

be extremely hard to verify and enforce, would apply primarily
during peacetime, and could put the United States at a disadvan-
tage in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. If the Soviets
prepared for war surreptitiously (which could easily go undiscov-
ered by the United States), and abrogated the treaty in de facto
fashion by using its space weaponry at the onset of hostilities, the
result could prove of major impact on the United States' military
capability.

4. Space is no longer the exclusive preserve of the United

States and the Soviet Union. It is being accessed by an ever-
increasing number of nations. Thus, attempts to establish space as
a sanctuary would require multinational agreement by principals
who are generally at cross purposes over national objectives/inter-
ests, as well as the means of achieving them.

A few words on organizing the US effort to exploit the perceived

US lead in space are in order. The close coupling between NASA
and DOD was greeted positively by the group; formation of the Air
Force's Space Command was also viewed as a good first step. The
formation of a future Joint Space Command was felt to be an even
more effective step. Formation of a US Space Force, at this time,
was viewed by most panelists as being diversionary. A few others
felt that the present space program is somewhat disjointed, pre-
cisely because there is no real advocacy. And that, until a US Space
Force is activated, Service rivalries and competition for assets
within DOD will hamper the efficient development and implementa-
tion of an effective US space program.

The panel voiced some concern that the Soviet Union was
posturing for another space spectacular (a la Sputnik). The nature
of this planned coup was not apparent, but there appears to be

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 Strategies for Space

considerable eviaence that the ingredients are coming together.

This raised the question of the proper US response-or better,
"anticipatory position." Although the panel did not arrive at
an
answer, it concluded that the United States could largely neutralize
the impact of such an event by maintaining a positive, vigorous,
publicly-supported program of its own.

In summary, space was indeed felt to be the high ground for the
decades ahead, and it was felt to be crucial that the United States
make space assets and their ground-supporting assets survivable
in war. While the military must continue to ferret out new missions,
particularly missions that will maximize use of present capabilities,
the United States, as a whole, must continue its efforts to expand
and strengthen its presence in space.

91
 The High Frontier Study:
A Summary

Lieutenant General Daniel 0. Graham, USA (Ret.)

High Frontier

The United States is faced with an historic, but fleeting, oppor-

tunity to take its destiny into its own hands. The ominous military
and economic trends which today beset the peoples of the Free
World can be reversed, and confidence in the future of free political
and economic systems can be restored.

To accomplish this, we need only take maximum advantage of

one priceless legacy handed down to us by those free institutions-
superiority in space technology. We can escape the brooding
menace of "balance of terror" doctrines by deploying defensive
systems in space. We can ccnfound the prophets of doom by open-
ing the vast and rich High Frontier of space for industrialization.

If we are to seize this historic opportunity, we must first muster

the political will to discard without qualm the failed doctrines of the
past, to attack without quarter the bureaucratic impediments to
action, and to meet without flinching the wave of indignation from
outraged ideologues at home and abroad. The technology is availa-
ble, the costs are reasonable, and the alternatives are not promising
solutions to our security problems.

THE OBJECTIVE

The objective of the High Frontier Study is to formulate a

national strategy option which would make maximum use of US
space technology to accomplish the following goals:

* Nullify the present and growing threat to the United States

and its allies which is posed by Soviet military power.

Copyright c 1982 High Frontier, Washington, DC. Reprinted by Permission.

93
Strategies for Space

"* Replacethe dangerous doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruc-

tion (MAD) with a strategy of Assured Survival.
"* Provide both security and incentive for realizing the enor-

mous industrial and commercial potential of space.

This objective must be met with recommendations that are:

o Militarily sound.

* Technologically feasible.

* Fiscally responsible.

o Politically practical.

THE THREAT IMPERATIVE

The High Frontier effort has iocused primarily on countering

the Soviet military threat, which is ominous and growing. This threat
is the result of determined efforts by the Soviet Union to establish
global military dominance-efforts that have been abetted by
poorly conceived US security policies such as MAD. The Soviet
military buildup coupled with US military neglect has created these
alarming conditions:

o There is a serious and growing Soviet advantage in strategic

nuclear power which cannot be countered by the unde-
fended United States except by a threat of retaliation that
involves national suicide.

o The preponderance of Soviet conventional power vis-a-vis

the United States and its allies is also severe and growing. It
can no longer be counterbalanced, as it has been in the past.
by a credible threat to bring higher-technology US weap-
onry to bear.

* The Soviet Union is increasingly successful in the use of

propaganda and the application of direct or indirect military
power to disrupt our alliances and to force the conversion of
underdeveloped nations to Marxism. This Soviet success

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 Strategies for Space

now threatens the continuing availability of raw materials

which are critical to the industrialized West.

e The West is dangerously dependent on diminishing crude-

oil supplies located in areas threatened by Soviet military or
manipulative political power.

The US alliance system is in serious disarray. It suffers a

lost sense of purpose and a perception of a decline in US
power and leadership. The Soviet propaganda offensive
against US nuclear weapons, designed to persuade Euro-
peans to become neutrals, is increasingly effective.

The Soviets are engaged in a costly and all too successful effort
to cap their current strategic advantages-in their terms "a favora-
ble correlation of forces"-with Soviet domination of near Earth
space. The Soviets have the only tested space weapon on either
side, an antisatellite system. They have orbited nuclear reactors.
They have a manned space station in orbit and are expanding it.
Almost all Soviet space activity has a distinct military flavor. The
essence of the Soviet military space threat was included in the 1981
Department of Defense publication Soviet Military Power (pages
79-80):

The Soviets have a vigorous and constantly expanding military

space program. In the past ten years they have been launching
spacecraft at over 75 per year, at the rate of four-to-five times
that of the United States. The annual payload weight placed into
orbit by the Soviets is even more impressive-660,000 pounds-
ten times that of the United States. Some, but by no means all,
of this differential can be accounted for by long-life U.S. satel-
lites using miniaturized high technology components. Such an
activity rate is expensive to underwrite, yet the Soviets are
willing to expend resources on space hardware at an approxi-
mate eight percent per year growth rate in constant dollars.

We estimate that 70 percent of Soviet space systems serve a

purely military role, another 15 percent serve dual military/civil
roles, and the remaining 15 percent are purely civil. The Soviet
military satellites perform a wide variety of reconnaissance and
collection missions. Military R&D experiments are performed
onboard Soviet manned space stations, and the Soviets con-
tinue to develop and test an ASAT antisatellite co-orbital
interceptor.

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Strategies for Space

The Soviets appear to be interested in and possibly developing

an improved ASAT. A very large space booster similar in per-
formance to the Apollo program's Saturn V is under develop-
ment and will have the capability to launch very heavy payloads
into orbit, including even larger and more capable laser weap-
ons. This booster is estimated to have six-to-seven times the
launch weight capability of the Space Shuttle.

Soviet space research and development, test, production, and

launch facilities are undergoing a continuing buildup. The new
booster will be capable of putting very large permanently
manned space stations into orbit. The Soviet goal of having
continuously manned space stations may support both defen-
sive and offensive weapons in space with man in the space
station for target selection, repairs and adjustments and posi-
tive command and control. The Soviets' predominantly military
space program is expected to continue to produce steady gains
in reliability, sophistication and operational capability.

The Soviets consider space a perfect environment in which to

exercise their long-standing doctrinal and operational preferences
in warfighting-unconventional "first moves," preemptive attacks
or "decapitation attacks" against vital targets such as strategic
communications, "combined-arms" moves (as are possible with
shiptracking satellites), and other elements of their well-stocked
repertoire. The Soviets integrate military space operations into their
strategic thinking. They see space in straightforward terms, as an
operational or combatant theater, whereas we see it-given our own
strategic culture-as a "sanctuary" where "support forces" for ter-
restrial military forces can operate permissively.

If Moscow achieves its aims, we will be faced with a new era of

Pax Sovietica in which Soviet space power dictates Free World
behavior. We believe that the High Frontier of space provides us
with the opportunity, perhaps our only opportunity, to frustrate
Soviet power ambitions and at the same time open up a new era of
hope and prosperity for the United States and the Free World.

THE HISTORICAL IMPERATIVE

The immediate threat impels us to exploit our space technol-

ogy, but there is also an unavoidable historical imperative to move
vigorously into that arena. Throughout man's history, those nations
which moved most effectively from one arena of human activity to

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 Strategies for Space

the next have reaped enormous strategic advantages. For instance,

when man's activities moved from the land to the coastal seas, the
Vikings established an extraordinary dominance by excelling at
sailing those seas.

After the epic voyages of Columbus and Magellan, Spain and

Portugal dominated the world through military and commercial
control of the new arena of human activity-the high seas. Later
England with her powerful fleet of merchantmen and men-of-war
established a century of Pax Britannica. When the coastal seas of
space-the air-became a new sphere of human activity, the United
States gained great strategic advantages by acquiring the most
effective military and civilian capability in aviation. Today, after epic
manned and unmanned exploration of space, we shall see which
nation puts the equivalent of the British merchantmen and men-of-
war into space. We dare not let it be our adversary.

THE MILITARY DIMENSION

We cannot reverse the ominous trends in the military balance if

we adhere to current strategy and try to compete with the Soviets in
piling up weapons of current technology. Even if Congress were
willing to appropriate unlimited funds for procurement of these
weapons (and it is not), our defense production base is in such a
sorry state that it could not compete with the Soviet arms produc-
tion base which is today operating at very high levels. Our best hope
is to change our strategy and to move the key competition into a
technological arena where we have the advantage.

A bold and rapid entry into space, if announced and initiated

now, would end-run the Soviets in the eyes of the world and move
the contest into a new arena where we could exploit the tech nologi-
cal advantages we hold. This is far preferable to pursuing a numbers
contest here on Earth, which will be difficult if not impossible for us
to win.

THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE OPTION

When we look to space for the technological end-run of the

Soviets, we find all factors call for an emphasis on strategic defense.
First, defensive systems hold the only promise to break out of the
Mutual Assured Destruction doctrine. Second, defense is the only

97
Strategies for Space

sound alternative to costly "racetrack"-type options to protect our

deterrent systems. Third, our current and crucial heavy military
investment in space is also vulnerable to attack. Fourth, available
technology favors defensive space systems. Last, there are severe
political constraints and some technical-military reasons inhibiting
the deployment of offensive weapons in space.

For these reasons the military side of High Frontier emphasizes

the resurrection of a long neglected aspect of our security-
protective strategic defense. We visualize a layered strategic
defense. The first layer would be a spaceborne defense which would
effectively filter a Soviet missile attack in the early stages of flight.
The second layer would be a broader space protection system,
perhaps using advanced beam weaponry to further reduce the
effectiveness of a missile attack and to defend other space assets
from a variety of attacks. The third layer would be a ground-based
point defense system capable of removing any Soviet assurance of
success of a first strike against our missile silos-even before a
space system is deployed-and of intercepting Soviet missiles
which later might leak through the space defenses. A passive fourth
layer would be civil defense, which becomes a valuable aspect of
strategy in conjunction with these active defense layers.

We can get a point defense within two or three years which

would be adequate to protect our ICBMs in silos and avoid the
high-cost deployment modes for MX. An initial spaceborne global
ballistic missile defense (GBMD) can be acquired in five or six years
given adequate priority. A second generation general space defense
using advanced technology can probably be achieved in the early
1990s.

In proposing such strategic defenses, one invariably encoun-

ters the shibboleths that have plagued consideration of strategic
defensive options in the past. It has been an article of faith in the
offense-only, Assured Destruction school of thought that strategic
defenses in the nuclear era are useless unless they are impermeable
or not subject to attack and/or that they are impossibly expensive.
These are false premises.

With regard to impermeable or invulnerable defenses, there

never has been norever will be a defensive system which could meet
such criteria. Such perfectionist demands ignore the purposes of

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 Strategies for Space

defenses and the effects of strategic defense on deterrence.

Defenses throughout military history have been designed to make
attack more difficult and more costly-not impossible. Defenses
have often prevented attack by making its outcome uncertain. Gen-
eral Grant put a cavalry screen in front of his forces not because the
cavalry was invulnerable to Confederate bullets or because he
thought it could defeat General Lee, but because he did not want the
battle to commence with an assault on his main forces or his
headquarters.

It is this same military common sense that must prevail in our

approach to strategic defenses today. Given the drastic conse-
quences of a failed nuclear attack on an opponent, the critical
military task is to keep a potential aggressor uncertainof success if
not certain of failure. In the absence of defenses the Soviet military
planner has a rather straightforward arithmetic problem to solve to
be quite sure of the results of a disarming strike against all locatable
US strategic weaponry-ICBM sites, airfields, and submarine bases.
His problem is simply to ensure that he can deliver two warheads of
current size and accuracy against each such target. If, on the other
hand, the Soviet planner must consider the effects of a strategic
defense, especially a spaceborne defense which destroys a portion
of the attacking missiles in the early stages of their trajectories, he is
faced with a problem full of uncertainties. He does not know how
many warheads will arrive in the target area and-even more
crucial-which ones will arrive over which targets. This changes the
simple arithmetic problem into a complex calculus full of uncertain-
ties. Such uncertaintiesare the essence of deterrence.

Strategic defenses are eminently practicable and by no means

impossibly expensive if the programs involved are not required to
meet unrealistic standards of perfection or incredible postulated
threats. A cursory review of combinations of spaceborne defenses.
land-based ABMs, and civil defense-while by no means definitive
as to costs-indicates that a defense system of decisive strategic
importance can be devised which is relatively inexpensive when
compared with some previously proposed offensive systems.

SURVIVABILITY

One issue which must be carefully addressed is that of space

system survivability. While space systems are nearly invulnerable to

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a large array of threats with which terrestrial systems must cope

(e.g., bombs and bullets) they have some unique vulnerabilities to
threats which can be posed by a technologically advanced adver-
sary. An examination of this problem leads to several conclusions:

"* As with all systems, no space-based system can be envis-

aged which is invulnerable to all postulated threats.

" Vulnerability of current US space assets (intelligence and

communications satellites and the shuttle) sharply increases
the imperative for an effective spaceborne defensive system
which can defend itself, reduce the threat to other space
systems, as well as defend ground targets against hostile
objects transiting space, e.g., ICBMs.

"* Defensive systems employing large numbers of less sophis-

ticated satellites are far less vulnerable than those employ-
ing small numbers of more sophisticated satellites.

"* An ability to provide mutual warning and protection among

satellites in a ballistic missile defense is very important to
survivability.

" The sooner a spaceborne ballistic missile defense system

can be deployed, the better its survivability (long lead time
systems are susceptible to long lead time Soviet counter-
measures-real or postulated).

" Future US deployment of more sophisticated beam weap-

onry military satellites may be dependent for survivability
on protection provided by a lower-technology defensive
system already deployed.

Given the characteristics of currently operating US space sys-

tems, one can readily postulate ways for the Soviets to attack them,
ranging all of the way from throwing sand in their paths to burning
them out of space with futuristic beam weapons. Such attack modes
fall into two basic categories, peacetime attack and wartime attack.

Most current Soviet capabilities to attack US space systems are

applicable in the peacetime attack category. These include attack
with non-nuclear direct ascent missiles, the current Soviet antisatel-

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 Strategies for Space

lite system, and current power-level Soviet lasers. However, these

attack modes presuppose Soviet willingness to risk the grave con-
sequences (including war) of attacking our space systems in time of
peace or crisis. While such Soviet action cannot be totally ignored,
most experts on Soviet behavior find this possibility extremely
remote.

The second class of threat-wartime-is more serious. In this

situation nuclear weapons could be used to destroy or disable our
space systems using radiation effects. (Blast effects are of little
effect outside the atmosphere.) There are technical means of reduc-
ing the vulnerability of space systems to these effects, but a capabil-
ity of a defensive system to intercept hostile objects directed at it is
the best counter to such threats.

The Soviets may develop laser-beam weaponry of such power

that satellites passing over them could be destroyed with a single
burst of energy. It is doubtful, however, that such systems could, in
the foreseeable future, successfully attack satellites coming over
the horizon toward the Soviet Union where they would be shielded
by much more of the Earth's atmosphere.

Probably the most important factors in the survivability pro-

gram are military rather than technical. Survivability is sharply
increased by the ability of space vehicles to destroy threatening
objects launched at them, or at other US space vehicles. Even
should the Soviets eventually create the means to attack a space-
borne defense system successfully in order subsequently to launch
a strategic missile attack, all chances of destroying the US deterrent
on the ground would be lost. In these circumstances, launch on
warning or launch under attack become both credible and feasible
options for the United States. The Soviets could not expect, after the
attack in space, that the US President would hesitate to respond to
sensor warnings that a missile attack had been launched from the
USSR. This fact alone would make a spaceborne defense of great
strategic value.

NONMILITARY DIMENSION

Space holds out the promise of a new era of economic expan-

sion. The unique environment of space-zero gravity, near-perfect
vaccum, unlimited heat absorption, and sterile conditions-opens

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up a broad range of industrial/commercial possibilities. Space also

contains inexhaustible supplies of minerals and solar energy. The
economic potential of space is already being tapped in the com-
munications industry. As the cost of space transportation is
lowered, the industrialization of space will burgeon. However, the
capital investment in space industries will be quite large and
unlikely to be undertaken if space installations are unprotectable
from hostile attack. For this reason, military capabilities in space are
critical to space-based economic growth.

We should harbor no illusions that space can be limited to

"peaceful uses" any more than could previous arenas on land, sea,
or in the air. Indeed, most current space assets, US and Soviet, are
partially or entirely military-and the most destructive of all weap-
ons, strategic ballistic missiles, must transit space en route to their
targets.

The government's role in opening up the High Frontier of space

for economic exploitation is basically the same as it has been with
the opening of frontiers of the past: exploration, transportation
systems, and security. These functions translate to these specifics:
scientific research, improving the space shuttle, and providing
spaceborne defenses.

Both the military and nonmilitary uses of space depend on the

continued efforts in certain core technologies: improvements in
space transportation to reduce the cost-per-pound of materials in
orbit, and the creation of permanent, manned space stations at the
"terminals" of the space transport system.

While these efforts are primarily the responsibility of govern-

ment, they should be undertaken in cooperation with private indus-
try and with support from other nations which would benefit.

With a proper combination of space technologies we can

sharply improve the security of the US and its Free World allies, and
at the same time restore confidence in the ability of Free World
economies to meet the challenges of the future.

The urgency here is far greater than many people in this coun-
try appear to recognize. Following the successful US moon landing
the Soviets made it clear that, while intending first and foremost to

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develop maximum possible military capabilities in space, they

expect also to achieve dominance with respect to the economic
exploitation of space opportunities. In 1964, Brezhnev spoke of
these plans, and Soviet specialized literature has gone into great
detail concerning concrete possibilities. Further, all phases of
ongoing Soviet space activities that aim at strategic objectives also
serve as stepping-stones to the USSR's preeminence in the space
environment for military as well as nonmilitary purposes.

THE URGENT REQUIREMENTS

In order to fulfill the objectives of the High Frontier concept,

including the rapid closing of the "window of vulnerability," creat-
ing the concrete basis for a new strategy of Assured Survival, and
opening space for economic growth, the following list of urgent
requirements is presented. It should be noted that these require-
ments, when met, will not solve all urgent military problems facing
the United States, let along all economic problems.

The urgent requirements for military systems to implement the

High Frontier concept are these:

1. A pointdefensefor US ICBM siloswhich, within twoorthree

years, at a cost less than that of superhardening, can destroy
any confidence the Soviets might have in a first strike
against our deterrent.

2. A first-generation spaceborne ballistic missile defense.

deployable in five or six years at a cost not exceeding that of
the original MX-MPS system, and capable of significant
attrition of a Soviet strategic missile attack in the early part
of trajectory.

3. A second-generation space defense system, deployable

within 10 or 12 years and capable of attacking hostile
objects anywhere in near Earth space with advanced-
technology weaponry.

4. A utilitarian manned military space control vehicle, deploy-

able within the next six to eight years, and capable of
inspection, on-orbit maintenance, and space tug missions
wherever satellites can go.

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Strategies for Space

5. A civil defense program of sufficient scope and funding to

take advantage of the proposed active strategic defenses
and thus add to US deterrent strength.

The primary urgent requirements in core space technology and

nonmilitary applications are:

1. Improved space transportation, designed to lower the cost-

per-pound in orbit to under $100.

2. A manned space station in low Earth orbit as soon as practi-

cable. It would allow low cost, efficient development and
testing of both civilian and military system elements, and
constitute a first step toward a similar manned station at
geosynchronous orbit.

3. Development work on reliable, high-capacity energy sys-

tems in space, initially to power other space activities, and
eventually to provide electrical power to any spot on Earth.

4. Preparatory development of a selected number of promis-

ing commercial business opportunities. Government efforts
should focus on encouraging the transformation of these
"seed" effots into independently viable commercial opera-
tions as soon as possible.

CAN WE DO IT?

All these requirements can be met, some of them with technol-

ogy already in hand, with components already tested. None of these
requirements demand technological "breakthroughs" or a com-
mitment to mere scientific theories. There are in fact a variety of
viable options available to meet each of the requirements of High
Frontier. Thefollowing is a description of one set of programs which
could do so. Each is described in some detail in the main body of
this study. The costs estimated for these programs are in constant
dollars. The costs and times indicated are based on a management
system which minimizes bureaucratic delays.

Quickly Deployable Point Defense

A partially tested system exists that could meet the requirement

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 Strategies for Space

to destroy Soviet confidence in a first strike against our silos. It is a

very simple system which fires a large number of small conventional
projectiles which form a barrier against a warhead approaching a
US missile silo at about one mile from the target. It could be des-
cribed as "dynamic hardening" instead of as an antimissile system.
If deployed to intercept only the first Soviet warhead approaching a
silo, it would cost $2-3 million per defended silo. If it is to intercept a
second .warhead, the costs increase to about $5 million per silo.

First-Generation Spaceborne Defense

The requirement for an initial spaceborne ballistic missile

defense system can be met by using off-the-shelf hardware to
create a multiple-vehicle orbiting system. This system would deploy
nonnuclear kill vehicles to destroy Soviet missiles in the early phase
of trajectory. Enough weapons carrying satellites would be orbited
to ensure continuous coverage of Soviet ballistic missile trajecto-
ries, including those of SS-20 Eurostrategic missiles and submarine-
launched missiles. This system could provide protection to the
allies as well as to the United States.

The multiple satellite deployment permits one satellite to

defend itself and several others from hostile attack. It also has the
potential for forming the basis of a highly effective and secure
command, control, and communications (C3) system. Since the
system makes maximum use of off-the-shelf space hardware com-
ponents, it may be the cheapest and quicklest available option. This
system could start deployment in perhaps as little as three years and
be fully deployed in five or six years at a cost of some $10-15 billion.

Second-Generation Spaceborne Defense

The most promising possibility for a second-generation space-

borne defense is product improvement of GBMD I. With the addition
of advanced infrared sensing devices the first generation can be
made capable of attacking individual warheads throughout their
trajectory up to reentry into the atmosphere. This system could be
ready for deployment in 1990 at a cost of about a $5 billion add-on to
GBMD I costs.

The requirement for higher-technology space defense systems

might also be met by a high-powered laser system on the ground

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Strategies for Space

with redirecting mirrors on satellites or by beam weapon systems

deployed in space or in pop-up installations on the ground. These
systems are currently being researched. Costs to continue research
should probably be increased by about $100 million per year.

High-Performance Spaceplane

There is an urgent need to develop a multipurpose, military,

manned space control vehicle to perform a wide variety of space
missions such as inspection of friendly or suspect space objects,
satellite and space-station protection, and adjustment or retrieval of
satellites. One such vehicle is the high-performance spaceplane, or
one-man "space cruiser," which utilizes available space hardware
components and technology and which could be operating in sev-
eral years for less than $500 million in cost. It is now under active
consideration in the Department of Defense.

Civil Defense

Civil defense is a multifaceted endeavor, the utility and cost-

effectiveness of which sharply increase when considered in con-
junction with active defenses. This study concludes that increased
funding for civil defense is required for the near term but that over
the longer term the active defenses of High Frontier would reduce
the requirement for resource expenditures on civil defense. The
impact of these conclusions on priorities and costs of current civil
defense programs has not been analyzed in this study.

Improved Space Transportation

The immediate answer to improved space transportation is an

upgrade of the current shuttle program to improve turnaround time
and to create an umanned cargo-only version. At the same time.
development work should begin on a much higher-load-capacity
vehicle. These programs would cost an estimated $6 billion over a
10-year period.

A Manned Low Earth Orbit Space Station

The currently proposed military Space Operation Center should

be given high priority and expanded in concept to include provision
for "fly-along" industrial/commercial space installations. The space

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 Strategies for Space

station should be equipped to receive power for operations from a

prototype solar power satellite. A 10-year program to deploy this
space station should cost about $12 billion.

A Space Power System

This requirement can be met by a proposal using known tech-

nology which would place in geosynchronous orbit a solar power
satellite and place on Earth a microwave receiving antenna and
conversion system providing 500 megawatts of continuous electri-
cal power. This pilot system. modified to include a capability to
provide power to a space station with laser transmission, would cost
about $13 billion.

Space Industrial Systems Research and Development

The costs of R&D for industrial space applications would prob-

ably be borne almost entirely by interested private enterprise, with
no more than $50 million per year in government support.

COSTS

The total costs of the High Frontier concept over the next five or
six years in outlays of constant dollars might be on the order of $24
billion. Through 1990 the total costs in constant dollars would
probably be about $40 billion-a figure that compares favorably
with what would have been the total cost of MX-MPS in its original
configuration. It also compares favorably with the Apollo moon-
landing program, and strikingly so if the inflation rate of the past 12
years is considered.

If one considers possible tradeoffs in programs no longer

needed or lowered in priority by the existence of an effective stra-
tegic defense, the real costs of the High Frontier programs are even
lower. For instance, the billions now earmarked for superhardening
of existing missile silos and for deploying more complex point
defenses need not be expended. There are other possible tradeoffs
such as repositioning of SAC airfields, reducing the urgency of
theater nuclear force upgrade in Europe, C 3 improvements, and so
forth.

Finally, there is a reasonable chance for sizeable cost offsets

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Strategies for Space

from industry and allied participation in the most expensive aspects

of the High Frontier effort-nonmilitary applications. This is espe-
cially true if a vigorous effort to tap solar energy is emphasized.
Several nations have already stated their willingness to assist in
such an effort. Such nongovernment support would further reduce
the real costs of the concept.

In any case, costs to the US taxpayer of implementing High

Frontier will certainly be lower than those involved in other
approaches to solving urgent security issues, e.g., MX-MPS. The
High Frontier approach, therefore, cannot be characterized as
unrealistically expensive.

IMPACTS

The mere announcement of a bold new US initiative along the

lines of the High Frontier concept would have beneficial impacts at
home and abroad. The fulfillment of the urgent requirements noted
above would have even more far-reaching impacts.

Military Impacts

On the purely military-strategic side, we would be moving away

from the unstable world of terror balance to one of Assured
Survival-a much more stable condition. We would provide answers
to US and allied security problems not involving the amassing of
ever larger stockpiles and ever more expensive deployments of
nuclear weapons.

By creating a proper balance between strategic offense and

strategic defense we broaden the options for strategic retaliatory
systems. A great deal of the counterforce, damage-limiting function
of our strategic forces can be shouldered by the defensive systems.
Cruise missiles become a more attractive option in a new strategic
setting that includes defenses against ballistic missile attack.

Perhaps most important to our military efforts as a whole, the

High Frontier concept would restore the traditional US military
ethic. The military man's role as defender of the country has always
been the tie that has bound him to the supporting citizenry. Strate-
gies of the recent past, such as MAD, which deny that role have
seriously weakened that bond. A commitment to a new strategy

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 Strategies for Space

which is consistent with the military rationale of the average US

citizen could greatly ease problems in all facets of US security
efforts.

Political Impacts

The potential for public support of this concept is enormous. If

the military and nonmilitary aspects of High Frontier are effectively
harnessed together, broad segments of the US body politic are
likely to rally in support. Recent elections have demonstrated the
widespread desire for improved defenses. There is a remarkably
large support base, primarily among younger people, in the form of
space enthusiasts. And there is general public disillusionment with
the doctrines and strategies of the past.

The High Frontier concept would even convert or confuse some

of the conventional opponents of defense efforts and technological
innovations. It is harder to oppose non-nuclear defensive systems
than nuclear offensive systems. It is impossible to argue effectively
for a perpetual balance of terror if it can be negated by new policies.
It is hard to make environmentalist cases against space systems.

Even those naysayers whose basic concern is disarmament will

be hard pressed to make a case against High Frontier, the ABM
Treaty notwithstanding. It is not necessary to abrogate the ABM
Treaty to commit to High Frontier programs.

The High Frontier spaceborne defensive systems fall into the

category described in the treaty as "systems based on other princi-
ples" which are "subject to discussion" with the Soviets. Point
defense systems can be selected which are so different from ABM
systems as defined in the treaty that they too could be considered as
outside the treaty. Indeed, some silo defense systems can be con-
sidered "dynamic hardening"-a substitute for reinforced concrete-
rather than an ABM. Further, the current ABM Treaty is scheduled
for review in 1982, and the United States could propose any
amendments deemed necessary to accommodate strategic defen-
sive decisions.

A US commitment to the High Frontier concept does not neces-

sitate rejection of arms negotiations with the Soviets. It does, how-
ever, mean that future negotiations would proceed on a different

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Strategies for Space

philosophical basis. Rather than continue to pursue agreements

which attempt to perpetuate a balance of terror and MAD, our
negotiating efforts would be dedicated to achieving a stable world
of Mutual Assured Survival.

Economic Impacts

There can be little doubt that a strong commitment by the

United States would have highly beneficial economic impacts.
Some of these impacts will affect the US economy in the near term,
primarily through the stimulus to investment in high-technology
sectors of industry and a probable upswing in confidence generally.
An increase of 200,000 jobs in the near term as a result of a strong
commitment to space has been estimated. Longer-term impacts will
depend on the rate at which industrial applications are realized and
on unpredictable technological spin-offs from the space effort.

One area of commercial space application is already paying its

way very well. Space communications is a $500 million-per-year
enterprise and is growing rapidly. By 1990 it should become a
multibillion dollar-per-year industry.

As other industrial applications in space are realized, the total

revenues from space industries might reach levels of several tens of
billion dollars per year by the year 2000.

Some of the most beneficial economic impacts of a strong High

Frontier effort are indirect and unquantifiable. The demand for
highly skilled workers is certain to have an impact on the education
system and on the labor market. New products, tools, and services
will be required by an expanding space effort. Research efforts will
intensify.

Overall, the economic benefits of a strong US commitment to

the exploitation of space for both security and industry are poten-
tially very great, but they are no more predictable today than were
the future economic benefits of aviation in the 1920s.

Foreign Impacts

The positive political effects in the United States will probably

be reflected overseas among our allies. The announcement of a

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 Strategies for Space

commitment to the High Frontier concepts could have a strong

counter-effect on the current highly disruptive, "antinuclear," or
"peace" movements in Europe. A bold US strategic initiative would
certainly bolster the morale of pro-US elements. The High Frontier
concept can become a new cement for Free World alliances, making
them global rather than regional.

A shared US-allied commitment to the harnessing of solar

power from space could have highly beneficial impacts on foreign
relations. If the prospects were good for future supplies of energy
independent of the geographical location of fossil fuels, the over-
dependence of the industrialized West on oil- and gas-producing
countries could be rectified. Further, the prospects for overcoming
the intractable problems of the underdeveloped nations could have
a beneficial impact on the attitudes of the Third World.

As for the Soviets, their reaction is easily predictable as hostile.

They have already moved to counter the US potential to adopt
available military space options. They have introduced in the United
Nations (and garnered some support for it among our allies) a new
treaty which would ban all (not just nuclear) weapons in space.
Meanwhile, evidence mounts that they are already in violation of
their own cynical proposition. We can expect an extraordinarily
strong Soviet propaganda effort against a US commitment to the
High Frontier concepts, including threats of counteraction. How-
ever, in both particulars Moscow will find, for substantive reasons,
an attack on the High Frontier concepts much more difficult to
conduct than past anti-US campaigns.

MANAGEMENT

Time is critical in any commitment to the High Frontier, espe-

cially with regard to the military systems. If we cannot change the
adverse trends in the military balance quickly, we may not be able to
change them at all. If we do not move quickly to secure space for
promising industrial development, we may later be denied the
opportunity.

There are no technical obstacles to meeting the military and

nonmilitary objectives of High Frontier. We can close the window of
vulnerability in two or three years and negate the brooding menace
of Mutual Assured Destruction in five or six years. We can lower the

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Strategies for Space

costs of men and materials in space, establish a permanent manned

presence in space, and open the door to enormous economic
advantages in 10 years. However, this can be done only by initially
selecting systems using to the maximum off-the-shelf technology
and by instituting special management and procedural arrange-
ments for their rapid acquisition and deployment. By using known
and tested technology we can avoid the long delays imposed by
research and development. By special management arrangements
we can avoid the bureaucratic hurdles which have been inserted
into our weapons acquisition processes over the past 15 years. Time
is money, and literally billions can be saved by cutting acquisition
times.

In 1956, President Eisenhower gave the go-ahead on a concept

for a ballistic-missile-firing submarine. That concept involved far
more technological unknowns than do the High Frontier options. In
1960, 47 months later, the first Polaris put to sea. In 1962, President
Kennedy announced the objective of landing a man on the moon.
Seven years later this astonishing feat was accomplished.

Today, even a new fighter aircraft takes 13 years or more from

concept to acquisition, and decades of delay are predicted for
space developments. Such protracted processes cause costs to
soar astronomically. This sad state of affairs exists not because
Americans have become technologically inept but because we
have, over the years, constructed a complex and multilayered
bureaucratic system in the Executive Branch and in the Congress
which simply cannot produce quick results. In order to take advan-
tage of the opportunities available to us on the High Frontier, we
must-at least for a few years-find a way to short-circuit the
bureaucratic institutions and procedures.

The first step is to select-and select quickly-those systems

which will meet the urgent requirements of the High Frontier con-
cept. This should be done by a Presidential Systems Selection Task
Force composed of prominent and properly qualified individuals.

To provide overall guidance to the High Frontier effort, a

National Space Council should be appointed with representation
from the involved departments and agencies of the Executive
Branch, the Congress, and industry. Its function would be to ensure
full cooperation and fast action by all branches of government and

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 Strategies for Space

of private industry involved in the effort. Its chairman should be the

Vice President.

The actual coordinating and expediting of the programs

selected to meet the High Frontier requirements should be the
responsibility of a chief operating officer heading up a Consoli-
dated Program Office. This officer should be assisted by special
project officers within the departments and agencies charged with
acquiring the first generation of High Frontier systems. The man-
agement system should ensure individual rather than committee
responsibility for decisions, a minimum of Executive and Congre,
sional staff review, and specified or "fenced" funding for High Fron-
tier programs.

This management system should be unequivocally temporary.

It should go out of existence upon achievement of its objectives of
first-generation system acquisition. As results are obtained, all
responsibility for the operations, maintenance, and further growth
of space systems should return to the cognizance of the appropriate
agencies--Defense and'NASA. There is no need to create a new
permanent layer of bureaucracy.

These are the essentials of the High Frontier concept. They are
discussed in much greater detail in the main body of the study. We
believe that the change of strategy recommended in this study
supports a US policy statement as follows:

PROPOSED STATEMENT OF US POLICY

The United States and its allies now have the combined techno-
logical, economic, and moral means to overcome many of the ills
that beset our civilization. We need not pass on to our children the
horrendous legacy of "Mutual Assured Destruction," a perpetual
balance of terrorthatcan but favor those most inclined to use terror
to bring down our free societies. We need not succumb to ever
gloomier predictionsof diminishingenergy, raw materials,and food
supplies. We need not resign ourselves to a constant retreat of free
economic and political systems in the face of totalitarianaggres-
sions. The peoples of the Free World can once again take charge of
their destinies, if they but muster the will to do so.

In April of 1981, the Space Shuttle Columbia made its dramatic

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Strategies for Space

maiden voyage into space and back safely to Earth. This event was
not merely anotheradmirablefeat of American space technology. It
marked the advent of a new era of human activity on the High
Frontier of space. The space shuttle is a development even more
momentous for the future of mankind than was the completion of
the transcontinentalrailway, the Suez and Panama Canals, or the
first flight of the Wright brothers. It can be viewed as a "railroadinto
space" over which will move the men and materials necessary to
open broad new fields of human endeavor in space and to free us
from the brooding menace of nuclear attack.

This is an historic opportunity-historyis driving us to seize it.

A few thousand years ago, man's activities-hiswork. his com-

merce, his communications, all of his activities, including armed
conflict-were confined to the land.

Eventually man's technology and daring thrust his activities off

the land areasof the continentsand into the coastalseas. His work.
commerce, communications, and military capabilities moved
strongly into this new arena of human activity. Those nations that
had either the wit or the luck to establish the strongestmilitary and
commercialcapabilitiesin the new arena reapedenormous strategic
advantages. For example, the Vikings, although never a very
numerous people, became such masters of the coastal seas that
their power spread from their homes in Scandinavia over all the
coasts of Europe and into the Mediterranean Sea, up to the very
gates of Byzantium.

At the beginning of the 16th century, after the epic voyages of

men like Magellan and Columbus, human activity surged onto the
high seas. Once again, the nations that mastered this new arena of
human activity reaped enormous strategicrewards. FirstSpain and
Portugal utilized their sea power to found colonies and to solidify
their strength in Europe. Later, Great Britain, with an unsurpassed
fleet of merchantmen and fighting ships, established a century of
relative peace which we remember as Pax Britannica.

In the lifetime of many of us, man's activity moved strongly into

yet another arena, the coastal seas of space-the air. And once
again the nations which quickly and effectively made use of this new
arena for commerce and defense gained great advantages. As

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 Strategies for Space

Americans we can take pride that the greatest commercial and

military successes in aviation have been achieved by our nation.

But today, following the epic voyages of our astronautsto the

moon and our unmanned explorer satellites to the rings of Saturn
and beyond, we find man's actvities moving strongly into yet
another new arena-the high seas of space. Already the United
States and other major nations, including the Soviet Union, are
making huge investments in space. Much of our communications,
intelligence, weather forecasting. and navigation capabilities are
now heavily dependent on space satellites.And, as history teaches
us well, those nations or groups of nations that become preeminent
in space will gain the decisive advantage of this strategic "high
ground."

We must be determined that these advantages shall accrue to

the peoples of the Free World: not to any totalitarianpower. We can
improve the shuttle, our railway into space. placing space stations
at its terminalsand sharply reducing the cost-per-poundof material
put into space. We can thus open the doors of opportunity to
develop entire new space based industries,promising new products
and new jobs for our people on Earth. We can eventually create the
means to bring back to Earth the minerals and the inexhaustible
solar energy available in space. By doing so, we can confound the
gloomy predictions of diminishing energy and material resources
availablehere on Earth. This will not only enhance the prosperityof
the advanced,industrializednations of our Free World, but will also
provide the means to solve many of the hitherto intractableprob-
lems of the developing countries.

Further, we can place into space the means to defend these

peaceful endeavors from interference or attack by any hostile
power. We can deploy in space a purely defensive system of satel-
lites using non-nuclear weapons which will deny any hostile power
a rationaloption for attacking our currentand future space vehicles
or for delivering a militarily effective first strike with its strategic
ballisticmissiles on our country or on the territoryof our allies, Such
a global ballistic missile defense system is well within our present
technological capabilities and can be deployed in space in this
decade, at less cost than other options that might be available to us
to redress the strategic balance.

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Strategies for Space

We need not abrogate current treaties to pursue these defen-

sive options. A United Nations treaty prohibits the emplacement of
weapons of mass destructionin space, but does not prohibit defen-
sive space weapons. The ABM Treaty requires discussion among
Soviet and US representatives of any decision to proceed with
defensive systems "'basedon other principles"such as space sys-
tems. We should initiatesuch discussions and propose revisions, if
necessary, in the ABM Treaty, which is scheduled for review this
year.

Essentially, this is a decision to provide an effective defense

againstnuclear attack for our country and our allies. It represents a
long, overdue concrete rejection by this country of the **Mutual
Assured Destruction" theory which held that the only effective
deterrent to nuclear war was a permanent threat by the United
States and the Soviet Union to heap nuclear devastation on the
cities and populations of each other. The inescapable corollary of
this theory of MAD (perhaps the most apt acronym ever devised in
Washington) was that civilian populationsshould not be defended.
as they were to be considered hostages in this monstrous balance-
of-terror doctrine. The MAD doctrine, which holds that attempting
to defend ourselves would be "destabilizing"and "provocative,"has
resulted not only in the neglect of our active military and strategic
defenses and our civil defense, it also has resulted in the near-total
dismantlement of such strategic defenses as we once had.

Foryears, many of our top militarymen have decried the devas-

tating effect the MAD theory has had on the Nation's security. In
fact, our military leadershave, over the years, denied its validity and
tried within the limits of theirprerogativesto offset its ill effects. But
those effects are readily evident. The only reponse permitted under
MAD to increasednuclearthreats to the United States or to its allies
was to match these threats with increased nuclear threats against
the Soviet Union. Further,a US strategy which relied at its core on
the capabilityto annihilateciviliansand denied the soldierhis tradi-
tional role of defending his fellow citizens has had a deleterious
effect on the traditionalAmerican militaryethic, and on the relation-
ship between the soldierand the normally highly supportive public.

This legacy of MAD lies at the heart of many current problems

of US and allied security. We should abandon this immoral and
militarily bankrupt theory of MAD and move from "Mutual Assured

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 Strategies for Space

Destruction"to "Assured Survival. "Should the Soviet Union wish to

join in this endeavor-tomake Assured Survival a mutualendeavor-
we would, of course, not object. We have an abiding and vital
interest in assuring the survival of our Nation and our allies. We have
no interest in the nuclear devastation of the Soviet Union.

If both East and West can free themselves from the threat of
disarmingnuclear first strikes, both sides will have little compulsion
to amass ever largerarsenals of nuclear weapons. This would most
certainly produce a more peaceful and stable world than the one we
now inhabit.And it would allow us to avoid leaving to future genera-
tions the horrendous legacy of a perpetual balance of terror.

What we propose is not a panacea which solves all the problems

of our national security. Spaceborne defense does not mean that
our nuclearretaliatorycapabilitiescan be abandonedor neglected.
The United States would still maintain strategic offensive forces
capable of retaliation in case of attack. The Soviets, while losing
their advantage in first-strike capabilities, would still be able to
retaliate in case of attack. Nor does our approach to the strategic
nuclear balance eliminate the need to build and maintain strong
conventional capabilities.

We Americans have always been successful on the frontiers; we

will be successful on the High Frontierof space. We need only be as
bold and resourceful as our forefathers.

117
 A Bold Two-Track Strategy for Space:
Entering the Second Quarter-Century

Dr. Barry J. Smernoff

B.J. Smernoff Associates

The second 25 years of the space age began on 4 October 1982.

When Sputnik I was launched by the USSR, few observers dared to
guess the large number and broad variety of US space systems that
would follow, with such telling impact on civilian and military activi-
ties and even on how we view our home planet Earth. Only dreamers
talked about extensive constellations of communications satellites,
bringing live television into homes around the world, or photore-
connaissance platforms overhead (revealed officially to the Ameri-
can public by President Carter in 1978) to verify arms-control
agreements as well as to collect intelligence imagery with startling
detail, or meteorological satellites capable of providing synoptic
photographs to which weathermen could key their daily forecasts,
or the thunderous elegance of a space shuttle as it was launched
into the depths of space, only to glide back quietly to an aircraft-like
landing for piggyback flight and re-use. By 1980, the biggest tourist
attraction in Washington had become the National Air and Space
Museum-not the White House or US Capitol.

There is no doubt that the second quarter-century of the Amer-

ican space program can produce dazzling technological advances
comparable in quality and novelty to those noted above. Space
technology, most definitely, is America's strong suit. As President
Reagan recently reaffirmed in his July 4th, 1982, speech after the
fourth Columbia landing that ended preoperational testing of the
space shuttle, the United States has made a firm national commit-
ment to remain the world leader in space technology. In some
surprising sense, then, the technical side of the American space
program is easiest to deal with, notwithstanding the problems and
cost overruns that beleaguered the shuttle (and every other serious
development program), and the competing priorities and bureau-
cratic conflicts that laced media reports.

What has been missing from the US space program are compel-
ling answers to the essential and central questions of where, what,

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Strategies for Space

and why. Where are we headed, what important national goals

should we be pursuing in our space program, and why are they of
such critical significance? Do we have a workable and coherent
national strategy for "getting from here to there," with strategic
milestones and goals that must be achieved along the way?

One of the critical tasks of political leadership in the United

States has been to mobilize the American people behind goals that
lie clearly in the national interest. The second quarter-century of the
American space program presents such important and intriguing
opportunities for meeting key national needs that we would be
extraordinarily remiss to ignore or reject them. On the other hand.
national policy in certain areas either does not exist or is contrary to
the kind of bold and clearly articulated policy guidance needed to
take advantage of these opportunities for exploiting outer space.
Consequently, it is not surprising that coherent and practical
strategies are totally lacking for pursuing goals in space which
virtually everyone, if given the chance, might agree are both impor-
tant and feasible to achieve.

Meeting such strategic goals in space, however, will demand

much more than development of the appropriate technology, and
merely technical solutions to the problems associated with these
goals are neither feasible nor desirable. Bold and forward-looking
two-track strategies will be required to blend the relevant political
components, such as arms-control diplomacy, with promising
technological advances, such as space-based laser weapons.

Accordingly, one must explore the assumptions and hypo-

theses that are linked with this central theme. One can then develop
the rudiments of a national security strategy for moving boldly into
the second quarter-century of the space age that blends competi-
tion and cooperation, technical nerve and political imagination,
physical strength and moral courage. This period takes us foward
into the long-range future, through the year 2000 into the new
millenium, with all of its chiliastic overtones.

NET ASSESSMENT OF US AND SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS

A review of space history suggests strongly that the United

States holds a clear and compelling edge in demonstrated space
technology, scare stories about the 12-foot-tall Soviet spacemen

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 Strategies for Space

notwithstanding. Specific cases in point are easy to find. Whereas

American satellites carrying infrared sensors constitute the primary
means of providing warning of ballistic missile attacks to the
National Command Authority (and have been operational since the
early 1970s), as of 1981 the USSR had deployed no effective early-
warning system in space-and not for lack of trying.' Russian cos-
monauts may have spent more time in long-duration space mis-
sions than American astronauts, but the Soviet space program never
completed its development of a large Saturn-class launch vehicle
(reported to have failed catastrophically in several tests beginning
in the late 1960s) and never landed men on the moon. While this
large Soviet space booster reportedly "will have the capability to
launch.. .even larger and more capable laser weapons" into orbit.
it is generically more than a dozen years overdue-and counting.
The 120,000 to 250,000 kilogram size of the large manned space
platform under development Ly NASA for possible launch in the
next seven to ten years suggests that the Soviet Union may be
hard-pressed to keep pace with ambitious American plans in this
area-supposedly that of uniquely Russian advantage over the US
space program.

Admittedly, space spending in the Soviet Union does appear to

be growing more rapidly than overall defense spending. Highly
publicized Soviet statements regarding the desired demilitarization
of space contradict the consistently heavy military emphasis of the
Soviet space program, which currently expends about $17 to $18
billion per year compared to the annual US level of about $14 billion
for fiscal 1983.3 Such comparisons can be deceptive, however, since
the USSR launches annually four to five times as many spacecraft
as the United States-dozens of which are short-lived photorecce
birds and analysts believe that fully one-third of the Soviet total is
spent on spacecraft placed in orbit.' Moreover, substantial US
spending on classified programs may not be included in "total" US
space outlays.

During the past several years, the pace of American spending

on military activities in space has accelerated sharply, with real
growth rates approaching 20 percent per year. In fiscal 1982, DOD
spending on space programs exceeded NASA's budget for the first
time since 1960 as US military forces become increasingly depend-
ent upon space capabilities to accomplish many basic support
functions such as precise navigation, long-haul communications.

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Strategies for Space

meteorology, and surveillance. The sharp acceleration of US space

spending led by DOD programs suggests that the USSR may be
playing catch-up, both qualitatively and quantitatively, in the near
future and that the American space lead will widen, perhaps
markedly, by the late 1980s. Recent establishment of the Air Force
Space Command will reinforce the trend towards rapid growth of
US military activities in space.f

WHAT SHOULD THE US DO WITH ITS LEAD IN SPACE?

Given the clear US lead in space technology and emerging US

edge in space spending over the Soviet Union, how can/should
these definite advantages be exploited to serve US national inter-
ests and goals? Five generic options have been identified, three of
which can be quickly rejected as non-starters.' Brief characteriza-
tions of these basic options are:

1. Do Nothing, for fear of destroyiný, the "sanctuary" of space

2. Negotiate, to prevent an arn,s race ;r-, -pace

3. Prepare, reactively, to deny the Soviet Union any major

advantage

4. Compete, vigorously, to achieve US superiority in space

5. Blend technology and politics, to exploit the clear US edge

in space during an "age of obligatory arms control" and
thereby achieve strategic goals more in keeping with deeply
rooted American values than mutual assured destruction
(MAD) forms of nuclear deterrence.

This section will examine these policy alternatives: since the first
three can be discussed and rejected quickly as nonviable options,
the "compete" and "blend" options will receive more attention.

1. Do Nothing

Quite clearly, this option has been overtaken by events, deci-

sions, and steeply rising budgetary trends. The US has moved into
space for military purposes with increasing vigor, and for good
reason: space systems can be potent force multipliers.' There are

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 Strategies for Space

unique advantages to be gained from basing increasingly powerful

communication, navigation, meteorological, warning, surveillance.
and otherfunctions (eventually including non-nuclear weapons) on
space platforms that have global and synoptic coverage. As a high-
level defense official stated recently:

Hopes for demilitarization are only realistic in areas with no

military worth; space is emphatically not one of these. While
there are undoubtedly well-intentioned people who decry what
they regard as the "militarization" of a pristine frontier, history
teaches us that each time a new medium is opened up to man it
is exploited to gain a military advantage. The course of world
affairs has repeatedly been altered by the nation which first
grasped the advantages offered by developing the military
potential of the newest medium.,

In a more pragmatic tone, Colin Gray writes that:

In a global war it would be no more feasible to retain space as a

privileged sanctuary than it would be to preclude military action
in any other geographical dimension ....
Space cannot be isolated from the earth with reference to armed
conflict.'

Perhaps. in the absence of a large and growing Soviet threat to US

vital interests, the option of "doing nothing" about military activities
in space would appear more desirable. The rather Hobbesian nature
ot the existing international scene has made this option infeasible
as well as undesirable. It is inconsistent with the American "can-do'
style of technological development to think that doing nothing in
military space could ever be a practical alternative, especially given
our unambiguous edge in this key arena (and the obvious parallel of
airpower development).

2. Negotiate

During the Carter Administration, three rounds of US-Soviet

talks were held during 197 8 -1979 on the matter of developing arms-
control constraints for antisatellite (ASAT) weapon systems. The
guiding policy for these negotiations was summarized as follows:

The United States finds itself under increasing pressure to

field an antisatellite capability of its own in response to Soviet

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Strategies for Space

activities in the area. By exercising mutual restraint, the United

States and the Soviet Union have an opportunity at this early
juncture to stop an unhealthy arms competition in space before
the competition develops a momentum of its own .... While the
United States seeks verifiable, comprehensive limits on antisa-
tellite capabilities and use, in the absence of such an agree-
ment. the United States will vigorously pursue development of
its own capabilities.'O

Although this expressed preference for arms control designed to

preserve space as a sanctuary is widely acknowledged, the practical
feasibility of negotiating an even-handed and verifiable agreement
banning ASAT capabilities appears virtually nil. After all, super-
power arms control has suffered generally from the severe erosion
of political relations following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
late 1979and the subsequent demise of SALT II, not to speak of the
"yellow rain" and Bulgarian connection problems. There will always
be well-intentioned groups believing that the strategic arms race
must not be extended into outer space and that "time is running out"
for banning the testing and deployment of antisatellite weapons.

3. Prepare

Once doing nothing and unadulterated arms control have been

dismissed as serious policy options for guiding US military activi-
ties in space, one is faced with the "reactive option of hedging
against Soviet technological surprises by increasing our own activi-
ties through an emphasis on moderately aggressive R&D programs.
To a large degree, this alternative is most consistent with Air Force
thinking up to a few years ago. Now there is a clear shift toward
more vigorous exploitation of space as the new blue-suit Space
Command-perhaps the organizational precursor to a future US
Space Force-becomes fully operational and the steep upward
ramp of DOD space spending produces increasing policy interest in
this area.

Primai• y reactive moves are out of keeping with the character-

istic American pursuit of action-oriented solutions to pressing prob-
lems, once the essential nature of any new frontier situation has
been clearly understood. The US space shuttle was not developed
during the 1970s simply to deny major political and military advan-
tages to the USSR or to preserve the US lead in applied space
technology. It was developed because enough American leaders

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 Strategies for Space

understood that the exploration and exploitation of space is of

sufficient strategic significance that more routine (and hopefully
cost-effective) transportation systems for launches into near-earth
orbit would be required before fuller use of space systems could be
possible. Perhaps, in the absence of a Soviet threat perceived to be
growing both in scope and intensity, a purely reactive space policy
would be in the cards. Since there is an ever-stronger consensus
that military space programs are much too important to be shaped
solely as responses to Soviet actions and decisions, this policy
option falls into the same category as the first two-nonviable.
Furthermore, America traditionally has wanted to control its own
destiny, especially in frontier settings.

4. Compete

The strategic vision of a technologically dynamic America,

seizing the ultimate high frontier (and high ground) of space to
acquire clear-cut space superiority and provide unambiguous
politico-military advantages to the United States, has captured the
minds of many in recent years. 12 Post-Sputnik literature reflects the
underlying feeling that the US must obtain control of space first,
and the sooner the better. As we bask in the national afterglow of the
first five space shuttle missions during 1981-82, it is hard to dispute
the increasingly prevalent view that, as the world's preeminent
spacefaring nation, the US must exploit its inherent technical and
political advantages to achieve a clear and durable position of space
superiority-unilaterally, without attempting to use diplomatic or
other kinds of cooperative "crutches." In a very fundamental sense,
space has become a critical new arena for the American people,
now that scientific research has become the leading edge of Amer-
ica's frontier tradition:

A major world power such as the United States has to pioneer in

those areas of life which are historically relevant and crucial. To
the extent that ours is a scientific age, the failure of the United
States to push beyond existing frontiers-and space offers a
very dramatic challenge-would mean the loss of a major
psychological motivation for innovation."

Indeed, national resolve to reach beyond the ordinary is per-

haps the essence of our topic, and it has several extremely impor-
tant implications. On one hand, many would agree with Lieutenant

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Strategies for Space

General Kelly Burke's recent statement that space weapons "have a

transcendental flavor, a little like gunpowder. We ignore them at our
peril."" Hence the threat to use space as a warfighting medium,
beyond its historical supporting role, comes naturally. On the other
hand, there is little doubt that Americans are searching actively for
what Fred Ikle (now Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) termed
"a new path into the twenty-first century" insofar as strategic think-
ing is concerned.' 5

There is little doubt that the US could achieve durable space

superiority-assuming that the Soviet Union would not rock the
boat by undertaking preemptive attacks on, say, laser-bearing
spacecraft thought to have BMD capabilities which the US might
deploy in the 1990s and beyond.' 6 Advanced space technology such
as space-based laser weaponry is opening attractive opportunities
for constructing effective layered defensive systems capable of
destroying attacking strategic bombers and missiles.'- Accord-
ingly, space-related systems eventually could provide for the
"common defense" in quite a direct manner-beyond the belea-
guered concept of nuclear deterrence-and this alone would con-
stitute sufficient motivation for aggressive US competition in the
fourth arena of space. Rather than focusing upon business-as-
usual with only evolutionary improvements of existing functions.
the United States must continue to develop qualitatively new func-
tions, such as spaceborne ocean and air surveillance systems and
lasers, to take full advantage of space for meeting critical national
needs. This point is even more valid now that the surprisingly rapid
spread of the antinuclear movement in the US has created a host of
seemingly intractable problems for sustaining the so-called defense
consensus. Many Americans feel increasingly uncomfortable about
the mutual-hostage relationship between the US and the Soviet
Union. Others, in massive ignorance of current strategic realities,
tend to assume that the US is defensible and (partly) defended at the
present point in time.

5. Blend Technology and Politics

It is precisely for these reasons, transcending the more obvious

politico-military and technical imperatives for moving into space
much more aggressively, that the fifth option has become so essen-
tial: in contemporary terms, we have moved into "the age of obliga-
tory arms control."' 8 Whereas the a priori negotiability of practical

126
 Strategies for Space

agreements which could have substantial influence on reshaping

the nuclear mutal-hostage relationship is certainly very difficult to
estimate, arms control has become an important part of the political
scene. Although the future of formal arms-control limitations is in
severe doubt, increasingly powerful domestic and European group-
ings embrace the theoretical ideals as necessary concomitants of
growing defense expenditures-the now-traditional two-track
approach.

This fifth space policy option is a deliberate attempt to blend

the physical power of advanced US military technology-led by the
sharp thrust of the two key technologies of microelectronics and
lasers,"9 especially applied to emerging and new space systems-
with the political/psychological power of bilateral arms-control
diplomacy. The essential policy objective is to shift the balance of
strategic military power from a clear emphasis on nuclear offense
toward non-nuclear defense grounded in weapons of self-protec-
tion. To be sure, the technical prospects seem brightest for non-
nuclear defensive weapons when concepts are synthesized using
space-based laser systems aided by various CGI systems (many of
which themselves would be based in space), and other defensive
layers such as exo/endoatmospheric non-nuclear kill-vehicle sys-
tems and advanced sensors under active development in the large
and growing Army BMD program.

In his San Francisco speech to the editors of UPI announcing

the Johnson Administration's Sentinel ABM deployment decision,
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara stated that

it is important to understand that none of the (ABM) systems at

the present or foreseeable state of the art would provide an
impenetrable shield over the United States. Were such a shield
possible, we would certainly want it-and we would certainly
build it .... If we could build and deploy a genuinely impenetra-
ble shield over the United States, we would be willing to spend
not $40 billion (in 1967 dollars!) but any reasonable multiple of
that amount that was necessary. The money in itself is not the
problem: the penetrability of the proposed shield is the
problem.,",

Thus, defensive emphasis would be preferable to the existing moral

nuclear-hostage relationship between the superpowers." The prob-
lem does not seem to be money but leakage! If a perfect "astro-

127
Strategies for Space

dome" could be developed and built to protect the United States

from "all" nuclear weapons deliverable by traditional means (not
counting covert/clandestine emplacement by proverbial oxcart),
and if everyone agreed that this were the case, defensive emphasis
could clearly carry the day. Unfortunately, perfectionist demands
for zero leakage will remain always unfulfilled, and it goes without
saying that the best is the enemy of the good enough.

Apprehensions about unacceptable leakage through a future

nationwide defensive shield could be reduced greatly if the overall
size of the Soviet nuclear threat were reduced greatly. Indeed, deep
cuts could reduce the thousands of existing strategic nuclear-
delivery vehicles to hundreds on each side of the balance. The BMD
problem could thereby become much less demanding, and the
chances for building affordable defenses to protect cities with
acceptably low leakage rates would become correspondingly
larger. The rub would be to sustain the political credibility of nuclear
deterrence during any extended transition toward defensive
emphasis, and even beyond. as last-resort deterrence of large-scale
central war through the threat of using whatever nuclear weapons
are left after deep arms-control cuts.

This, then, is the pragmatic reason for justifying the critical

significance of arms control. In his Eureka speech of May 1982, on
the occasion of his 50th college reunion, President Reagan affirmed
his goal of achieving deep reductions in strategic offensive forces
(SOF) through negotiated arms-control agreements. It is now
widely believed that the importance of finding a home for the hap-
less MX ICBM (which has tried multiple protective shelters, fixed
silos, and most recently closely-spaced/densepack basing modes
to no avail) is to create negotiating leverage and provide Soviet
leaders with clear incentives to make deep cuts in their SOF, and
particularly in their heavy MIRVed ICBMs such as the SS-18s.,'-"

THE BOTTOM LINE: NEW GOALS AND STRATEGIES FOR

DEFENSIVE EMPHASIS

Where are we going in space during the 1980s and beyond, in

pursuit of what goals, and why? The answers to these basic ques-
tions are unclear, largely because Americans tend to explore and
exploit new frontiers by doing rather than thinking. It is within a fluid
and somewhat confusing strategic context that the core questions

128
 Strategies for Space

of where, what and why-in connection with the US military space

programs-must be addressed. If Americans are to exploit space for
sound reasons, then new and more appropriate goals must be set
before authentic strategic approaches can be conceived and
implemented to reach them. As implied by the previous section,
space is tailor-made for facilitating a transition from nuclear offense
toward non-nuclear defensive emphasis where advanced systems
(such as mosaic sensors and space lasers) will play a critical role in
defending against external threats without utter reliance upon
nuclear deterrence, an aging strategy of declining political credibil-
ity and dubious ethical content, as the principal method for secur-
ing America from its enemies P While the United States cannot (and
should not) pursue unilateral approaches to nuclear arms control,
any strong American thrust toward serious arms control in an
attempt to "cooperate" militarily with the USSR will complement the
even stronger American thrust into space for competing with the
Soviet Union. The combination could produce a new strategic con-
text in which national se curity-for both the US and USSR could be
placed on a much sounder, safer, and more sustainable basis over
the long haul.

The launch of Sputnik I by a Soviet ICBM in 1957 heralded the

twin emergence of the space age and long-range ballistic missiles
capable of delivering nuclear warheads to targets across the planet.
Now, in the early 1980s, American entry into the second quarter-
century of the space age is beginning with sharply accelerated
spending, important organizational changes, and numerous refer-
ences to the advent of beamed weapons in space. The latter will
have very long lethal reach and "transcendental flavor"' the most
mature type is the high-energy laser that ironically is similar (in
aerodynamic operation) to the powerful rocket engines that propel
ICBMs and space shuttles. Given this history, it is important that
Americans continue to explore and exploit the high frontier of space
by doing and thinking.

Accordingly, new strategic goals must be developed to reflect

the felt need for making a timely transit from nuclear offense
toward defensive emphasis. In the spirit of exploiting the traditional
US edge in military technology, it is fortunate that such a strategic
transition can be based largely upon advanced space technology-
with microelectronics, lasers, and other basic R&D areas leading
the way toward increasingly powerful new mosaic sensors and

129
Strategies for Space

beamed weapons overhead. However, realistic understanding of

what such an ambitious transition will involve implies that arms
control must also play a central role, with technology.

Too often, Americans have relied on blind faith in technology,

under the mistaken assumption that technical solutions can resolve
virtually all major issues facing the United States. The primacy
of human factors in international politics means that there is no
purely technical (competitive) solution to the problem of defending
America against nuclear attack.

Conversely, there is no purely political (cooperative) solution

for doing so. Workable approaches will contain a strong blend of
both tracks-technical and political components, competitive and
cooperative elements-working together. For this fundamental rea-
son, "proper" American entry into the second quarter-century of the
space age is of extraordinary importance.

The 'compete" option for achieving unilateral space superior-

ity could (and probably should) be employed by the United States
as effective bargaining leverage for pursuing arms-control objec-
tives such as deep SOF cuts, in order to reach the preferable "blend"
path. If prospects for serious arms control become even bleaker
than they currently are, the stage would be set for unilateral pursuit
of space supremacy that would serve the United States well if an
unremitting, all-out arms competition with the Soviet Union became
inevitable.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Rather than provide a normative list of specific technological

thrusts that might be planned and programmed, with highly uncer-
tain estimates of costs and schedules, the concluding section will
attempt to indicate important goals and directions for the American
space program during the next 25 years. In this regard, it is
extremely useful to recognize that developing technology for its
own sake is not the proper policy for guiding this program, or any
other with high national priority. While technology clearly is the
organizational essence of the US Air Force, which will continue to
play the leading institutional role in military space activities (unless
a US Space Force is established soon after Space Command
becomes a unified command), human and political factors are criti-

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 Strategies for Space

cal to both defining and achieving important goals.

Indications are clear that the United States is moving toward

space superiority in the 1990s and beyond; 20 percent real annual
growth in DOD space spending, formation of the new Space Com-
mand, and widespread attention of the brightening prospects for
MAD-busting space laser weapons support this conclusion. Our
past track record suggests that the US can achieve a relatively
durable form of space superiority, just as we have sought and
sustained naval, air, and technological superiority in the past, each
of which appears to be "getting ragged at the edges." The surprising
implication is that achievement of US space superiority would help
greatly to restore each of these traditional forms of military super-
iority to their old levels. It is this general potential that gives military
activities in space their authentic meaning as a "force multiplier" in
the strategic sense of that phrase.

Two examples are useful to illustrate this point. Infrared and

radar ocean/air surveillance satellites which may become opera-
tional by the early 1990s could place Soviet surface ships and
(high-altitude) aircraft at risk from missiles and other long-range
weapons.'- First-generation space laser weapon systems that might
become available somewhat later (but probably before the end of
the century) could place many types of missiles and aircraft (not to
say spacecraft) at risk. Together, these advanced sensors and
weapons could produce the kind of space superiority which would
restore naval and air superiority to the United States in a manner
that exploits traditional American advantages, but without spend-
ing tens of billions of dollars on ever-smaller numbers of expensive,
complex, and vulnerable ships and aircraft.

This kind of emphasis on space could produce a modern US

advantage in spacepower that dovetails with and enhances the
traditional American advantages in seapower and airpower, giving
rise to three great fleets: one sailing on and especially under the
blue-water oceans, another orbiting Earth in the black depths of
space, and the third flying (as stealthily as possible) in the coastal
seas of space-the atmosphere. Technological superiority would
enable each of these fleets to maintain a qualitative edge over
adversaries. The purpose of attaining clear-cut space superiority
would be twofold.

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Strategies for Space

First, there is not doubt that eventually the United States must
move beyond NATO in its politico-military emphasis. Steps toward
establishing the Central Command for dealing with Persian Gulf
and other nonstandard crises, and increasing American unwilling-
ness to spend many tens of billions of dollars each year to sustain
our large and visible troop presence in Europe and Asia, constitute
clear signs that we will eventually move beyond NATO, and perhaps
sooner than we think. In this context, a relatively persuasive case
can be made for turning (back) to our natural advantage in sea-
power." A similar case can be made for complementing traditional
forms of seapower with modern spacepower as the keystone of a
new US strategy for defending America as an island continent (but
not a "Fortress America") having vital interests around the globe.

Just as important -. strategic goal as moving beyond NATO is

the gradual achie~e ent of nuclear deemphasis in which the now-
dominant role -f nuclear weapons will be substantially diminished
through a jtdcious combination of technology and politics. Hence
the second critical task for emerging US space superiority: to exert
effectiv', bargaining leverage on the Soviet Union so that deep cuts
in SOF levels can be made (and made to stick), and the strategic
balance can be moved firmly toward defensive emphasis, away from
its historical essence of nuclear MADness. In effect, the United
States would be applying its strong technological leverage in spacc
to encourage a superpower competition in non-nuclear defensive
weapons, thereby forcing a concomitant reduction in spending and
policy attention regarding the nuclear component of the competi-
tion, for which the entire international community would be much
better off in the long run. By moving the strategic competition into
space within a context of deep SOF reductions, the software of
arms-control diplomacy could suppress the offense-defense arms
race that defensive hardware would otherwise trigger.

Hence the answers to our original questions have brought us to

the point of beginning to understand what the future holds for US
military activities in space. Military space is much morethan simply
a "force multiplier"-it is a potential restorer of traditional forms of
US military superiority. Military space will not be a quick fix for
resolving the problem of nuclear war once and for all, but it could go
a long way toward reducing the awesome role that nuclear weapons
and the unprecedented threat of nuclear holocaust have played in
postwar history. If spacefaring Americans develop and build large-

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 Strategies for Space

scape space structures for collecting and beaming solar energy

down to Earth, such solar power satellites in the deep future would
join the growing constellations of communication, navigation, sur-
veillance, meteorological, and other spacecraft that ply Earth-
centered orbits. But most of all, a forceful and thoughtful blend
between space technology and arms-control politics could prove to
be of lasting significance for the long-range security of the United
States.

133
 Chapter 5

Alternative Strategies for the

Defense of Western Europe

Panelists were challenged to address the following charter:

"This panel will examine alternativestrategies for defense of West-

ern Europe that might result from changing miltiary, political, and
social realities. The panelistswill examine such issues as the future
of flexible response in Central Europeandefense, NA TO policy and
debate on first use of nuclear weapons and theater nuclear force
modernization, suggestions to emphasize maneuver warfare, and
adoptionof an offensive strategy after attack. The panel will exam-
ine pressuresand strategies that might make a lowered US military
profile in Europe appropriateand feasible should the United States
need to allocate its resources to other military contingencies."

135
 Panel Summary

Mr. Phillip A. Karber, Chairman

National Defense University

Dr. Raymond E. Bell, Jr., Rapporteur

National Defense University

The paper by Congressman Newt L. Gingrich of Georgia and

Dr. A. Steven Hanser of West Georgia College provided an excellent
discussion framework to the panel assembled to examine alterna-
tive ,strategies for the defense of Western Europe. The authors
argued for an "honest" approach to defending Western Europe
which entails taking war seriously.

The means required to ". . .achieve this goal was to provide the
basis for a new and more powerful NATO alliance" by upgrading
NATO conventional forces, adopting Airland Battle doctrine, with-
drawing all tactical nuclearweaponsfrom European soil and estab-
lishing thereon a new theater deterrent force consisting of Pershing
II and cruise missiles.

ihe panel members agreed that there are no fundamentally

new and overwhelmingly attractive alternative strategies for NATO.
but that there is nevertheless a wide range of options to pursue
within the framework established by the Gingrich/Hanser paper.

The panel began its deliberations by examining the back-

ground of the current situation in Western Europe and reviewing
where NATO stands with respect to doing battle on the Central
Front. While there are alternate strategies which can be pursued in
defending the Free World, the imperatives of the Central Front
cannot be ignored, nor is there a peripheral strategy which can
replace these imperatives. Furthermore, now that the use of tactical
nuclear weapons has become a cause celebre, or more realistically.
because we have increasingly noted the inherent changes in the
escalation ladder, we must look to working with our allies along new
lines. This means fundamentally that a Central Front focus must be
maintained and that conventional forces have greatly increased in
importance, that is, we are going to have to meet Soviet conventional

137
capability with our own conventional capability-that we make a
believable attempt to put an enemy victory in strong doubt and be
able to stop the Soviets from driving the United States from the
European continent.

The question of enhanced conventional warfighting capability

brought the whole matter of deterrence to the forefront. It was
pointed out that the Europeans see deterrence as an end unto itself.
The problem here is that once the first tank crosses the border, the
policy immediately becomes bankrupt. We have always thought in
terms of deterrence, yet it is absolutely necessary, as some recog-
nize, that we be prepared to go beyond that. We can have no
illusions that to do so will require more: more money, manpower.
and resources, especially if nuclear weapons are not used.

The use of nuclear weapons came under scrutiny because it

was asserted that they will not do much for NATO, the Soviets have
a better nuclear capability, and that the US nuclear capability is
vulnerable. Disagreement with this perception centered on the need
to hit Western Russia from Western Europe effectively and that to
withdraw the nukes requires giving up an option, one that shows we
are serious about enforcing the peace But it was reld that any
greater reliance on nuclear weapons would be unrealistic and that
what is required is a doctrine that is believable which will, in fact,
enhance our actual warfighting capability.

One proposed approach to developing a realistic warfighting

capability was advanced in the Airland Battle concept, which was
taken as a serious option for the future, though there was a number
of questions about whether or not the burdens placed on the con-
cept are too heavy or whether present force configurations will even
permit it.

The Airland Battle doctrine has stirred excitement, although

doctrine is not the complete answer. The doctrine does not consider
mobilization nor take into account readiness and Reserve forces. In
addition, the Europeans have not accepted the doctrine since they
may not be able to accomplish it, and there is a fear that the very
technology necessary for a NATO Airland Battle concept if availa-
ble to both sides may provide the Warsaw Treaty Organization with
enhanced preemptive options.

138
 The Europeans also have concerns over American conven-
tional emphasis and are concerned that the United States may
become decoupled from the present strategy. It was also felt that
"decoupling" panics our German allies and that any changes must
be evolutionary. Such evolutionary changes are also necessary in
dealing with the nuclear pillar upon which the present strategy
rests. It was pointed out that there is a "knee-jerk" reaction against
anything new in nuclear warfare. This means that not only can a
large reaction to the introduction of new nuclear weapons be
expected but to take them out of Europe may be also considered a
radical destabilization of the current "comfortable" modus vivendi.

This panoply of concerns led the panel to focus on four themes:

how can the status quo in Central Europe be defended? what is the
significant threat? what is the nuclear situatior., and what are the
Soviet perceptions of the US alternate strategies?

The defense of the status quo in Central Europe was addressed

initially from a Soviet perspective. An interesting picture of how the
Soviets in the Kremlin could conceivably see the situation in Europe
was portrayed. The view from the Kremlin was that invasion of
Western Europe might be a necessary but not inherently attractive
course of action. The Soviets see the cost of even a limited war as
high. Many panelists felt that the United States may underrate West
European defense efforts, and that NATO's forward deployed
forces look stronger to the Soviets than is perceived in the United
States. And if the United States is concerned about its allies, how do
the Soviets' allies appear to them? Half of the Warsaw Treaty Organi-
zation's divisions are not Soviet. The question, as stated previously,
is just how reliable these formations are. They may be trustworthy
on the offense, but what about on the defensive?

The belief that the Warsaw Pact has potential weaknesses was
counterbalanced by the panel's recognition of NATO's vulnerability
to short-warning attack-where the element of time for defensive
preparation is critical. NATO loses the day the war begins if it has
not mobilized. Reserves being available is crucial. If the defense
density is not high, then the Soviets will be able to move quickly
against NATO due to its overcommitted air defense, vulnerability of
command and control elements, and poorly deployed ground for-
mations. The intensity and high rate of advance to positions deep
into NATO's rear areas not only threaten the viability of a success-

139
Strategies for Western Europe

ful conventional defense, but also the credibility of effective nuclear

escalation options.

The panel's examination of nuclear options argued against

viewing the role of nuclear weapons as limited to only one overly
simplistic concept. A closer examination revealed several options,
each balancing nuclear posture vis a vis declaratory policy.

The first nuclear weapons option is the status quo; that is,
continuing to stand on present policies. The second option is to
adopt a declaratory nuclear posture and deploy a much heavier
nuclear component in Europe than currently envisioned. A third
option is to declare a "no first use" policy, and not touch the present
deployment of forces. A fourth option, and one not eliciting much
support, is to declare "no first use" and remove the nuclear weap-
ons from the continent. The fifth option is to raise the nuclear
threshold, downplaying but not denying the first-use option,
expanding conventional capabilities and then withdrawing some of
the short-range weapons.

The panel evaluated the pro's and con's of unilateral withdrawal

of short-range systems, the one point of the Gingrich-Hanser paper
producing the strongest debate. There was clear appreciation of the
military difficulties inherent in a tactical nuclear warfighting posture
and of the political advantages in symbolic removal. However,
detailed discussion also illuminated military disadvantages in pre-
cipitous withdrawal: massive Soviet expansion and modernization
of chemical and/or nuclear artillery and tactical SSMs would catch
NATO without counterthreat means of inhibiting their first use:
while yielding escalation dominance to the Warsaw Pact would
undermine the viability of enhanced NATO conventional-force
capabilities and the deterrent link vis a vis long-range theater and
strategic systems.

This examination led the panel to set forth a number of possible

alternatives and come to some significant conclusions. Seven
broad strategies were recognized. First was the option of increasing
nuclear dependence, which elicited little support. Second was to
increase conventional defenses, which was the most viable of those
considered-but also the most expensive.

There were a variety of European unilateral options. These

140
 Strategies for Western Europe

comprised (third) for the United States to pull out of NATO with
NATO disappearing. (fourth) for the British and French to go it
alone with a nuclear deterrent, and (fifth) the Europeans' going it
alone conventionally within NATO. A sixth option would be to play
the China card, which raised questions as to whether the card was
an "ace" or a "joker," and who would play it. Finally, the option of
horizontal escalation was discerned, but it was difficult to find a
place in the world where it would be possible to put sufficient
pressure on the Soviet Union. The sum of the options was that there
are not really many easy alternatives and that the most productive
effort for NATO should be toward improving capabilities under the
existing strategy of "flexible response."

From the panel discussion emerged several significant conclu-

sions. First, the focus must be maintained on the Central Front. One
can do a number of different things on the northern and southern
flanks, but if the center is not strong, what happens on the flanks is
irredeemable. It is questionable, however, just how strong the cen-
ter is. The military balance was seen as at a margin. That is, the
Soviets pose a considerable threat if they should attack with little
warning and with Eastern European allies. On the other hand. the
defense is closer on the margin if NATO gets sufficient lead time,
troops can get into position, and the French can be brought into the
battle. There was a desire to increase the survivability of the nuclear
deterrent but it was also seen as necessary to decrease dependence
on nuclear weapons and make conventional defense more viable. It
was considered that what we need are more conventional forces to
offset the declining credibility of first use. This points to a policy of
flexible response with an increased conventional defense and a
nuclear deterrent that is still viable. It was agreed that to sell this
program, even to explore these options, would require strong US
leadership. As has been seen in recent developments, the Soviets
have been particularly adept at exploiting both American and Euro-
pean public longing for detente. The Soviet propaganda campaign
has already started to have an impact on the options NATO can
pursue. Thus in the final analysis the panel's conclusions are irrele-
vant if the required US leadership is lacking and it cannot sell its
program to its NATOallies-a successful program being one which
would have strong resemblance to that put forth by Congressman
Gingrich and Professor Hanser.

141
 Developing Alternative Strategies for the
Defense of Western Europe: The Neglected
Triad and Its Implications for Long-Range
Theater Nuclear Forces
Dr. Edward A. Kolodziej
University of Illinois

The success of any alternative to present European defense

policy, like the NATO decision of December 1979 to deploy
American-controlled long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF) in
Europe, depends on reconciling such proposals with differing and
often conflicting criteria at three separate but interdependent levels
of decision. The first has to do with the development and deploy-
ment of military forces and weapons systems and the articulation of
strategic and tactical doctrine to guide their threat or use. The
second, prompted by the costs and risks of modern warfare, particu-
larly those involving nuclear weapons, focuses on arms control and
limits on conventional and nuclear arms. Both of these levels aim at
shaping an adversary's behavior, or that of allies, in ways that meet
the differing and sometimes contending security prospectives,
interests, and values of alliance members.

For an effective deterrent and defense posture, decisions about

threat, use, control, and limitations of arms must also be legitimated
and supported by the ruling coalitions of member states-in most
states of the Western alliance majority coalitions-which are
expressed through separate, authoritative political processes and
institutions. Within open societies, deterrence and defense are not
abstract issues, accessible only to experts and elites, but matters for
public debate, group pressure, and electrical confirmation. The life
chances of nations depend on the prescient and pudent threat and
use of military force. The quality of the lives enjoyed by their citizens
is also a function of the control that can be reasonably exercised in
maintaining peacetime military establishment-now at costs un-
matched in history-whose continuing demands, if fully met, would
bankrupt the member states of the alliance and undermine the open
social and political institutions that they are supposed to protect.

Over the past half decade, American, NATO, and European

national security policies have often failed to keep these levels of
security policy in proper balance. The LRTNF issue illustrates the

143
Strategies for Western Europe

point. Adjustments at one or the other level have, alternately, been

sometimes too slow or too rapid for stable and effective policymak-
ing: too slow, as suggested by the decision to deploy LRTNFs in a
basing mode that has proceeded largely without heed to the debate
over the vulnerability of stationary land-based nuclear forces; or too
rapid, as implied by the volatility of popular support for alliance
LRTNF policy in the United States and in Europe. United States
inconstancy has also been confusing. Complacency during the
1970s about its ability to meet NATO requirements from its stock-
pile of strategic nuclear weapons, and its interest in stabilizing the
global strategic balance with the Soviet Union through a SALT
accord, gave way during the early Reagan administration to official
and public demands for more mlitary spending and preparedness.'
But even this latter position appears now to be in doubt as the
pendulum moves back toward cuts in defense spending. If the
December 1982 rejection of the "dense pack" basing mode for the
MX missile is any indication, Congress is reluctant to approve addi-
tional increases in defense spending beyond those which have been
already authorized and the Pentagon, like other agencies, is
expected to slow the rate of its previously authorized programmed
expenditures.

European worries about the decoupling of the American and

NATO deterrents were first voiced by then Chancellor Helmut
Schmidt of Germany in the fall of 1977.2 These concerns have been
supplanted by fears that the United States is preparing to fight a
limited nuclear war, with Europe as the battleground, while preserv-
ing the United States as a sanctuary. This reversal or roles is also
expressed in other ways. Europeans forget that they initially forced
the LRTNF decision on Washington and now accuse the Reagan
administration of highhandedness in forcing the issue while a pre-
viously reluctant Washington currently identifies its success or fail-
ure as a leader of the alliance with its ability either to deploy all of the
572 cruise and Pershing II missiles that have been proposed, or to
impose a zero option on the Soviet Union.'

Alliance policy has also reflected ill-timed and misinformed

stances by alliance members. Ill-timed (as viewed in European
capitals) were the statements of President Reagan when he
observed at an October 1982 news conference that the use of
nuclear weapons in a war with the Soviet Union might be confined
to Europe. These remarks fueled the worst fears of alliance suppor-

144
 Strategies for Western Europe

ters of NATO's LRTNF decision. 4 Misinformed (as perceived in

Washington) was the insistence of European decisionmakers that
the political dimensions of deterrence be stressed to the exclusion
or slight of the military and hardware requirements of a credible
deterrent posture. Previous administrations bear some responsibil-
ity for the current impasse. The Carter administration's interest in a
SALT accord deflected attention from European security concern
for NATO nuclear modernization and for an effective alliance
response to the Soviet nuclear buildup commenced in the later
1970s. In compensation for this lapse, Washington and its European
allies tied themselves to a questionable deployment mode for 464
cruise and 108 Pershing II missiles before the full dimension of the
Soviet armament effort was fully known or the vulnerability of
ground-based systems was fully appreciated.'

At the outset it should be conceded that, for reasons to be

developed below, no Western government could have escaped
these lines of criticism no matter what it did alone or in concert with
its alliance partners on the LRTNF issue. However, one should
expect that Western security analysis, governmental decisionmak-
ers, and those members of the interested public who have taken the
time to inform themselves about the complexity of the security
problems facing NATO might have developed a clearer set of
shared criteria. Such shared standards could guide decisions on
military force levels, weapons systems, and strategy, on arms con-
trol and disarmament issues, and on what policymaking procedures
might be most appropriate to ratify alliance security policies and to
generate public support for them. One should also expect govern-
mental experts to be alert to changes in the military, technological,
and political environment affecting Western security policies and to
be quick to adjust to them or to create and exploit opportunities as
they arise to enhance Western security or, at least, to minimize the
cost and risks of security efforts to core values and national
interests.

While the two-track approach, linking American and European

decisionmakers concerned with military strategy and arms control.
remains one of the most innovative developments in European-
American security policymaking since World War II, there is con-
siderable room for improvement.' The discussion below attempts to
clarify the conceptual framework within which NATO LRTNF
policy-or any weapons decision within NATO-must be resolved

145
Strategies for Western Europe

and the political process by which it must be articulated and

approved if it is to make a contribution to alliance deterrence and
defense missions and win the support of alliance members. Part one
sketches the political assumptions and the key operational criteria
and political norms that are applicable to decisions about weapons
and the strategies of use and control appropriate to them. For
illustrative purposes, part two applies these criteria to NATO's
LRTNF decision and argues that a sea-based deterrent, comple-
mented by improved central strategic nuclear systems of Western
alliance powers (France, Great Britain, and the United States). is
better calculated than the current NATO deployment proposal to
meet the requirements of effective security policy and policymaking
within the Atlantic Alliance in the 1980s.

ASSUMPTIONS GUIDING EUROPEAN DEFENSE POLICY

The unknowns surrounding issues like conventional forces and

LRTNFs and the inevitable differences of perception and interest
about them, between the United States and its European allies (and
among the latter as well), imply that a fully satisfactory resolution of
these problems is highly problematic. Doing nothing about them is
no recipe for alliance cohesion or effectiveness since these issues
refuse to go away. Even their management, if not resolution,
demands action. These dilemmas arise from the constraints that
proponents and opponents of alternative arms postures and strate-
gies confront in deciding these issues, constraints that are not likely
to be overcome very easily in the near future. Among the most
important are those associated with the limited resources that will
be available to allied military establishments. During the 1970s,
defense expenditures, as a percentage of GNP, experienced a
gradual downward slide. Between 1972-1976, US spending aver-
aged 5.9 percent of GNP. In the middle 1970s, US expenditures fell
to a low of 5.1 percent of GNP but are expected to climb to 6.6
percent in 1982. The Reagan administration's increase in defense
spending will certainly augment NATO's rate of spending, but it is
difficult to see how it will much surpass current averages even if
Congress appropriates all of the funds requested by the administra-
tion, hardly a certainty given competing defense and welfare claims
and the need to spur the growth of the civilian sector of the economy
through increased investments.
The European states have simply not responded to repeated
American calls for more outlays and greater burden sharing.

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 Strategies for Western Europe

Throughout the 1970s, NATO European defense expenditures

remained annually at approximately 3.7 percent of GNP. The pros-
pect that military spending will increase is slight whatever the
United States does. The economic depression gripping the Western
powers, with large-scale unemployment approaching 1930s levels,
provides little hope that they will be able to increase defense spend-
ing even if they were inclined to do so.

Military personnel remain at about the 1976 level, consisting of

5.5 million for NATO, of which 3.3 million are personnel of NATO's
European members and 2.2 million are those of the United States.
Spending on equipment as a percentage of overall military expendi-
tures has increased somewhat since the 1970s, but not at a rate to
meet the requirements set by military planners.- The major states of
the alliance are falling short of projected plans. Britain must recoup
its losses of the Falkland Islands war; France has recently an-
nounced cutbacks in conventional arms spending.8 West Germay,
with mounting economic problems including high unemployment,
trade deficits and a lowered rate of production, plans no apprecia-
ble increase in defense spending and actually decreased spending
slightly in 1981: to 3.4 percent of GNP, slightly below the average for
the early 1970s. 9

What these figures signify is that the Western allies face hard
choices at several levels of military spending and between defense
and civilian expenditures. The high costs of nuclear systems force
choices among weapons systems, including missiles and bombers.
and their ground, sea, and air basing modes. Britain has already
opted for the Trident submarine and the Tornado. France has large-
ly abandoned construction of more land-based systems in favor of a
seventh nuclear submarine. The composition of American strategic
nuclear forces after the setback on MX will remain unclear for some
time. Growing deficits, estimated at over $200 billion, increase pres-
sures to cut governmental expenditures, including those for the
military. LRTNF capabilities must therefore compete for scarce
dollars with other strategic nuclear systems. Pressures rise to apply
common measures to these competing systems. Their worth
depends on what each contributes to the coverage of Warsaw Pact
and Soviet targets, to global .and regional defense and deterrence,
to the prospects of arms control and disarmament, and to the
strengthening of public support for Western security policies.

147
Strategies for Western Europe

Choosing between nuclear systems on the strength of uniform

measures of strategic, economic, and political value lends addi-
tional urgency to the growing claims for more spending either for
conventional arms or for civilian purposes and welfare. The inability
or unwillingness of European states, especially West Germany, to
spend more on defense means that the United States cannot count
on its NATO allies to supply increased conventional forces for
European missions. NATO's ability to hold its defensive line
against a major Warsaw Pact conventional attack beyond two
weeks, based on current estimates, is not likely to be improved in
the near future."0 Funds are in short supply to buy more conven-
tional arms to forestall early resort to nuclear weapons. British and
French determination to give priority to nuclear weapons over con-
ventional forces makes more urgent the need to husband scarce
resources for conventional missions when faced with a large and
growing menu of nuclear options in the hands of the Soviet Union.

In addition, the United States cannot depend on its European

allies to support military preparation efforts beyond Europe-for
example, in the Middle East or the Persian Gulf-in support of
Western security interests. They are neither prepared to assume
these burdens nor to run the risks of nuclear war arising from local
conflicts elsewhere. Witness European reticence during the Yom
Kippur War in 1973 and the reservations expressed over tough
American policy over Afghanistan and the Iranian hostage issue.
Temptations grew, too, among Western states to assume greater
security risks in light of spreading economic dislocation and social
unrest and to shift priorities from defense to internal economic
development and welfare. The margins for error in choosing
between nuclear and conventional systems are, consequently,
narrowed.

A second assumption on which American-European security

policy and, specifically, the LRTNF decision must be based con-
cerns the structural differences separating the United States from
its European allies over the role of nuclear weapons, the require-
ments of deterrence and defense, the terms and likelihood of
genuine arms control and disarmament, and the prospects of
detente policies to relax East-West tensions. Short of political
union, the members of the Western alliance on both sides of the
Atlantic and within their continental spheres, however much they
may be similar or share a common interest in balancing Soviet

148
 Strategies for Western Europe

power, are still separated by geography, history, language, eco-

nomic interest, political institutions and values. It is not surprising,
therefore, that they would disagree in their perception of the Soviet
threat and the appropriate military response to meet it.

Since the formation of NATO, and particularly since the adop-

tion of the flexible response strategy by the Kennedy administration
and subsequent American regimes, Europe has been concerned
about the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee either out ot
fear that Washington could not be relied upon to defend Europe if it
risked its own destruction or, paradoxically, out of fear that the
United States might precipitately use its military might and drag
Europe into an unwanted war which would devastate the continent.
The Sputnik scare and the missile gap controversy of the 1950s
which led to the now-defunct proposal to create a multilateral
nuclear force (MLF) to assuage European concerns parallels cur-
rent fears that led to the proposal to deploy cruise and Pershing
missiles in Europe to assure the Europeans that the American
nuclear guarantee remains viable. The neutralist and pacifist
movements that coursed through Europe in the 1950s are similar to
the antinuclear and freeze campaigns today. These similarities,
however, do not suggest that because these problems were man-
aged before, they will again be successfully resolved or that the old
solutions will apply to a new technological environment or political
landscape. The magnitude and complexity of the issues leave little
room for complacency. American-European differences over mil-
itary policy and doctrine are endemic to the alliance. The best one
can expect is that means will be found to relax, if not resolve, the
tensions arising from the dilemma which permanently confronts the
alliance members.

NATO Europeans consistently prefer deterrence to defense.

Visible troop concentrations and nuclear deployments in Europe
are given greater weight than the word of passing American Presi-
dents. Europeans remain skeptical about the costs and effective-
ness of conventional forces and their impact on Warsaw Pact behav-
ior. Because of the lower risks run by Moscow in using conventional
forces, principal reliance by NATO on nonnuclear capabilities to
defend Europe is viewed as an invitation to the very attack that the
organization of NATO seeks to avoid. The British and, more point-
edly, the French nuclear deterrents are insurance policies against
the possibility of a breakdown in the American guarantee. These

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Strategies for Western Europe

differences, elsewhere developed at greater length than need to be

rehearsed here," extend to European resistance to American tend-
encies to use trade and technology transfers, like the recent pipe-
line controversy with the Soviet Union, as a policy lever or to link
Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe and in other regions to American
and NATO interest in advancing detente in Europe.

The German case deserves special attention since the tensions

between American and European views over deterrence, defense,
and detente are most acutely felt in Bonn. It is no accident that
German political leaders should be at odds among themselves over
the LRTNF issue, having first pressed the United States to confront
growing Soviet capabilities in the two-track decision only to back
away from this initiative as the domestic peace movement grew,
catalyzed partly by the Reagan administration's rearmament pro-
gram.' 2 The LRTNF issue reflects the structural dilemmas inherent
in postwar German foreign and security policy. German aspirations
for unification cannot be realized without the consent of its allies
and the Soviet Union; meanwhile, West German security depends
on NATO and, specifically, on the United States.

Since the FRG has had to renounce the unilateral use of force in
pursuing its national objectives as well as the development and
possession of nuclear weapons, any Bonn government must
simultaneously strive to shape NATO and American military policy
to serve its foreign and security objectives while assuring the Soviet
Union (and important segments of domestic and allied opinion) that
it does not seek a military solution to its unrequited needs. Hence
the elaborate set of rules imposed by Bonn on itself as conditions for
its participation in the LRTNF program that it was principally
responsible for initiating: (1) that NATO's deployment decision
would be made unanimously (principle of equal sharing of risk); (2)
that at least one other continental nonnuclear state would accept
American nuclear missiles (principles of nonsingularity); (3) that the
Federal Republic remain a nonnuclear power (principle of renunci-
ation); and (4) that nuclear systems on German soil, capable of
hitting the Soviet Union, remain under American control (principle
of NATO and American dependency).' 3

Germany's approach to deterrence and detente in relations

with its European allies and the United States within NATO must
inevitably be ambiguous: one of "get away closer." NATO (and the

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 Strategies for Western Europe

Warsaw Pact) has helped resolve the German problem that plagued
Europe for almost a century and provides a framework (like the
Warsaw Pact) of moderating European quarrels which have been
the bane of the European state system since the 17th century. On
these scores the superpowers and theirallies, including preponder-
ant opinion in West Germany, share a common interest. In respond-
ing to the Soviet and Warsaw Pact, these important objectives
should not be overlooked or denigrated just because they are
achieved quietly and unobtrusively relative to the external impera-
tive of meeting the Soviet challenge. The LRTNF issue and asso-
ciated differences over conventional arms and strategy should be
understood within this larger political framework. Pressures to
reduce the alliance to any one military problem, even so important a
one as LRTNF, should be resisted, if the alliance is to survive and the
gains that have been made in European security are to be
4
preserved.'

A third assumption on which the LRTNF decision must rest is.

curiously enough, uncertainty. There exists no universally accepted
theory of nuclear (much less conventional) deterrence. Deterrence
theory is at the stage of pre-science, involving more art and guess-
work than precise calculation to guide decisions despite impressive
efforts to place deterrence policy on a more solid theoretical and
empirical footing.15 We still know very little about the consequences
of operational and announced nuclear policies on adversary or
allied behavior. We are no less certain about the behavior of the
deterrer when confronted by a challenge. Witness the improvisa-
tions characterizing the Cuban missile crisis and other postwar
cases of deterrence failure and success.IO Theory remains partial
since there is no agreement on what factors to apply to explain and
predict behavior: whether personality and individual or group per-
ceptions,' 7 rational decisionmaking,' 8 organizational or bureau-
cratic constraints,' 9 regime behavior,2 0 or systemic determinants.2 '
Theorists are also partial to different schools of thought that often
hide rather than clarify their value preferences.

The significance of the uncertainties surrounding deterrence,

the discord among defense experts, and the often skewed and
partial character of their evaluations mean that proposals for or
against different conventional or nuclear weapon systems, includ-
ing their size, composition, basing, and use, are bound to be contro-
versial and inherently suspect to rival decisionmakers. To sort out

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these claims posits the need for criteria, however provisional, that
will discipline the raw political process by which decisions on deter-
rence will be settled. It prompts a need for clear criteria for choice
that can command as wide a consensus as possible among
governmental leaders, experts, and the ruling majorities of alliance
members.

CRITERIA TO GUIDE NATO: ACQUISITION, THREAT, AND

USE OF MILITARY FORCE

Several criteria appear particularly pertinent as guides for

NATO policy. First, to deter war and to control escalation if war
erupts, military capabilities should be developed that maximize
incentives for an opponent to keep hostilities at the lowest levels
possible. Deterrence operates as a consequence of an opponent's
estimate of what his adversary will do if the latter or his allies ortheir
vital interests are attacked. This implies the existence of real and
credible military capabilities that can and will be used if deterrence
breaks down. Ideally, capabilities should be sufficient to deny an
opponent dominance at all levels of military conflict and to impose
successively higher costs and risks on an adversary if he chooses to
escalate hostilities in scope or intensity. Implied by these circum-
stances are three conceptually distinct, if operationally melded,
forms of deterrence. These are deterrence by denial, deterrence by
prospective punishment, and, beyond these two calibrated attempts
to rationalize and control the threat and use of force, deterrence that
leaves something to chance.

NATO's flexible response strategy tends to obsure the distinc-

tion between the first two forms of deterrence. Some advocates of
nuclear modernization in Europe have seized on Soviet deployment
of SS-20 and Backfire bombers to justify LRTNFs as a response to
the growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities stationed in Europe rather
than confront the modernization problem directly and the short-
coming of NATO's current TNF deployments. 22 Fearing domestic
opposition, some LRTNF proponents have projected the view that a
LRTNF for NATO would preserve the military balance in Europe
although the LRTNFs that have been proposed are, by themselves,
incapable of matching, much less of eliminating, the Soviet military
threat. Their principal utility is not in being able to disarm the Soviet
Union of its theater nuclear forces, though they might well play
some role in targeting these systems. Their effectiveness as a deter-

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 Strategies for Western Europe

rent and as a control on escalation stems primarily from their pre-

sumed capacity to hit military and civilian targets in Eastern Europe,
and, especially, in the Soviet Union. That is, they can inflict costs
and impose risks on the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact out of
proportion to the political gains that may be anticipated in attacking
the West. LRTNFs raise the stakes for Moscow more through deter-
rence by the prospect of punishment than by denial.

The heightened costs and risks of escalation implied by nuclear

weapons raise another problem for an adversary: the threat that
leaves something to chance. Since we have no reliable experience
with nuclear weapons, no one can predict the outcome of a nuclear
strike and subsequent exchanges. Wars rarely assume expected
form. There is little assurance that in the heat of battle, a nuclear war
will remain limited or be amenable to control. Soviet military doc-
trine pointedly rejects this projected vision of how a nuclear
exchange will develop even while it develops a wide range of con-
ventional and nuclear capabilities that appear to seek dominance,
not merely deny it to an opponent, at all levels of armed hostilities. If
sufficient nuclear capabilities can be developed and deployed to
survive a first strike at successive levels of military conflict in order
to nullify or blunt an adversary's attack, there exists some hope of
deterring the outbreak of hostilities and of generating incentives to
maintain it at low levels of intensity.

So long as an opponent cannot be disarmed or can be disarmed

only at unacceptable costs to one's own society, the probability is
low that an attack will be launched. Not only does deterrence by
denial and punishment conspire to affect the behavior of a calculat-
ing opponent but the inability of nuclear adversaries to be able to
guarantee control of their own forces or their exchange during war
reinforces deterrence. Uncertainty about the outcome of a nuclear
exchange bolsters fears of the certainty of large. though unpredic-
table, damage and dislocation. A threat that leaves something to
chance makes nuclear deterrence more robust than is contem-
plated by those who characterize the balance of terror as delicate.
What is needed is the survival of a sufficient level of nuclear military
capabilities, including their control systems, in the wake of an
attack to punish an aggressor's first strike. The requirements for
such a level of survivable nuclear weapons, capable of being relia-
bly delivered against a wide array of targets, while clearly larger
than advocates of minimum deterrence would admit, are lower than

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advocates of a nuclear war-winning strategy would want.

If the object of preparing for war is first to deter it and, if

hostilities should erupt, to deny an adversary the military and politi-
cal fruits of his resort to force, while limiting the destructiveness of a
military clash, what is needed is a clearly demonstrated escalatory
ladder, constructed from the total stock of the alliance's conven-
tional and nuclear capabilities. A strategy of flexible response has,
in theory, sought to supply this spectrum of capabilities, but it has
fallen short of this objective for some of the reasons discussed
earlier. European and American analysts have also compounded
the problem by emphasizing a distinction between global and
regional forces available to alliance members, a distinction sure to
break down rapidly in the event of war in Europe. The distinction
between NATO and American missions or between military capabil-
ities needed for both sets of objectives is to a substantial degree
artificial. For there can be no theater balance in Europe at the
conventional and, especially, at the nuclear level-given the long-
range striking power of the latter-that excludes two essential ele-
ments: (1) the military weight of the superpowers that can be
brought to bear in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict; and (2) the deter-
rent postures of both alliances and their major protector powers.

It follows from the first criterion noted above that conventional

forces should be used initially in any alliance military confrontation.
Also, it follows that, to the extent that resources permit, conven-
tional arms should be substituted for missions now earmarked for
nuclear weapons. It is by no means clear that the NATO alliance,
even under current resource strictures, cannot continue to improve
its conventional force posture and strengthen its ability to withstand
a major nonnuclear Warsaw Pact attack.-' At a minimum. it should
be capable, if mobilized in timely fashion, to afford the West approx-
imately two weeks of respite before nuclear weapons have to be
considered."' Most Western observers agree with the estimate of the
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) that the conven-
tional alliance, measured in static forces, has progressively tipped
in favor of the Eastern bloc. In several categories, particularly in
tanks, artillery, heavy armor, and surface-to-surface (SS) and
surface-to-air (SAM) missiles, the Warsaw Pact is approaching or
exceeds the three-to-one advantage that is widely used as a rough
measure of what is sufficient to overcome the defending force in a
major conventional attack. Moreover, the West has steadily lost its
technological edge as the quantity and quality of Soviet and Pact

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 Strategies for Western Europe

arms have risen. Despite these trends, there is agreement within

IISS circles and in the NATO community that. as the latest IISS
Military Balance concludes, "the overall balance continues to be
such as to make military aggression a highly risky undertaking ....
There would still appear to be insufficient overall strength on either
side to guarantee victory. The consequences for an attacker would
be unpredictable, and the risks, particularly of nuclear escalation,
incalculable."-"
The Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact forces face formidable
problems: Western leadership, training, and equipment are still
better; the use of precision guided missiles (PGMs), while useful to
aggressor or defender alike, potentially pose greater problems for
an attacker than a defender. 2 French and Spanish forces and terri-
tory are likely to be available in the case of extended hostilities.- 9
The economic resources of the West, including links to other indus-
trial countries, are still vastly superior to those of the Soviet Union.
Non-Soviet Pact forces are of doubtful reliability. 30 Moreover, the
Soviet Union faces threats all along its borders, not simply those on
its Western front, including a Chinese force composed of an army of
3.9 million men grouped in 128 divisions and supported by over
5,000 combat aircraft. Over five divisions and almost 3,000 addi-
tional combat aircraft, based in the United States, are available for
rapid reinforcement of the European Theater. Traditionally neutral
states, like Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland, which have impres-
sive military forces, might well side with the West in the face of a
massive Soviet attack.31

This guardedly optimistic assessment provides a sufficient

basis on which to argue for an announced NATO policy of "no early
first use" of nuclear weapons. Such an orientation, if linked to a
LRTNF, can ease some of the concern of those who want no weak-
ening of American and NATO announced policy to use nuclear
weapons-first if need be. 32 It should also relieve those who argue
for a doctrine of "no first use.'"33 A "no early first use" policy
increases Soviet and Pact incentives to keep war at a conventional
level. 34 It also helps to guard against rapid and precipitate escalation
in case of an accidental or misguided attack. Conventional forces
buy time to negotiate an end of hostilities. A gain of an additional
day may make the difference between an admittedly costly war and
a nuclear holocaust. Whether pressures to escalate to nuclear levels
will actually surge or recede under these circumstances is impossi-
ble to predict.

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Strategies for Western Europe

However decisionmakers i.i Western capitals react to a conven-

tional war in Europe, it is still sensible to buy options that may limit
damage, since the possibility of escalating to nuclear levels, given
the invulnerability of central nuclear forces on each side, continues
to act as a deterrent against an adversary's expansion of a military
clash. What is critical is the development of military capabilities that
afford mutual incentives for restraint. To minimize the risks of
nuclear suicide, alliance members, especially those armed with
nuclear weapons, are logically led to develop military capabilities
that avoid as long as possible a choice between national extinction
and military defeat.

With obvious stops and starts, the operational military policies

of the superpowers have reflected a concern for avoiding this intol-
erable choice. This is true despite the pronouncements of the Soviet
Union that it refuses to distinguish between the rungs of an escala-
tion ladder leading from conventional engagements to nuclear
demonstrations, limited strikes, and eventually to mutual assured
destruction (MAD). How else can one fully explain the Warsaw Pact's
sustained modernization of its conventional forces, the develop-
ment of new and impressive middle- and short-range nuclear sys-
tems (Backfire, SS-20, SS-21, SS-23), and continued qualitative
development of central strategic forces, if they are not related to
some notion of escalatory control and counterforce balance?

Controlling hostilities in Europe oncethe nuclear threshold has

been crossed poses the most serious challenge to American and
European planners. There is a NATO and American requirement to
develop a spectrum of nuclear capabilities that provide a wide
number of targeting possibilities beyond population and industrial
centers whose destruction is likely to prompt similar calamitous
attacks against Western cities. A key determinant of the utility of
LRTNFs is their contribution to an integrated targeting plan, not
simply what they contribute to NATO capabilities. These latter
cannot reasonably be evaluated for effectiveness in isolation from
American strategic doctrine, central nuclear weapons, or conven-
tional forces. A proper mix of LRTNF characteristics is critical if the
alliance is to grope toward a nuclear posture that reduces, if not
resolves, some of the problems associated with its force structure,
particularly its current deployment of theater nuclear weapons.

To be consistent with American efforts to develop a calibrated

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 Strategies for Western Europe

denial and punishment strategy, NRTNFs should combine several

characteristics. Most important, they should be as invulnerable to a
first strike as possible. Otherwise, they invite hair-trigger use to
prevent destruction or preemption. Moreover, in a postattack envir-
onment, they should be capable of being reliably fired and of pene-
trating alerted enemy defenses. Quick reaction to destroy enemy
systems is a desirable quality but only if such a decision is informed
by sound intelligence and strategic need, not forced by a concern to
avoid a disarming preventive or preemptive strike. To these charac-
teristics should be added accuracy, flexibility, quick reprogramma-
ble target selection, calibrated destructive power to limit damage to
defined military and civilian targets, and reload capability.

For the United States and its NATO allies to be able to conduct a
limited war in Europe, to deter war through denial, and, failing that,
to deter the expansion of hostilities and to compel their swift cessa-
tion through threatened punishment requires that nuclear systems
be centrally controlled. The NATO LRTNF proposal, partly at Ger-
man insistence, acknowledges the need for an American-controlled
system and for American responsibility, with European consulta-
tion rights, over nuclear arms control reflects a complex comprise
of American and European (and especially German) expectations
these should be recognized lest one be tempted to exaggerate or
downgrade the utility of the LRTNF proposal: for the Americans in
NATO's LRTNF keeps new nuclear forces under Washington's con-
trol to reduce possible European triggering of American nuclear
forces; for Europeans it clearly links American NATO and central
strategic forces to bolster the credibility of the American deterrent:
for the Soviet Union the LRTNF is essentially an extension of Amer-
ican central strategic forces.

On the other hand, the horizontal proliferation of nuclear sys-

tems within the Western alliance precludes total American control.
France remains adamant on retaining its nuclear independence, an
affirmation that enjoys a wide spectrum of political support from the
right to the left. Everyone, as Charles de Gaulle predicted, is now
Gaullist 7 • The British nuclear deterrent, dependent on American
sale of Trident submarine and missile technology, is susceptible, as
before, to American and allied overtures to joint planning within the
Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) of the alliance, but remains, when
needed, under British control.

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Strategies for Western Europe

CRITERIA FOR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

A second general criterion to apply to any NATO arms proposal

is its contribution to arms control and disarmament. Does it create,
dampen, or nullify incentives in three critical areas: Does it control
the risks and costs of the arms races? Does it reduce the probability
that war will erupt as a result of accident, inadvertence, or miscalcu-
lation? And does it promote detente between the two blocs and the
superpowers? Progress on these three fronts critically affects, as
discussed below, the cohesion of the alliance and the domestic
support that can be generated among the allies for alliance military
strategy.

The invulnerability of LRTNFs is vital to arms control negotia-

tions. A system vulnerable to a disarming attack, ipso facto, does
not give an adversary pause. The controversy over land-based sys-
tems largely turns on the capacity to deploy weapons capable of
disarming an opponent's ground systems in a first strike at a faster
rate than such fixed systems can be installed, even in decoy modes
like the Carter administration's race-track proposal. Achieving a
viable arms-control accord in such an unstable environment is
highly improbable.

Much of the incentive for the antiballistic missile (ABM) ban of

SALT I lay in the inability of ABM technology in the early 1970s to
3 6
protect superpower cities and strategy. If LRTNFs are invulnera-
ble, negotiations are encouraged to define a mutually acceptable
level of capabilities that can stabilize deterrence between the blocs
and the superpowers, since increasing nuclear arms will not
improve an opponent's position. There is also reason to believe that
if these weapons are also upgraded in their ability to reach enemy
targets and deliver their ordnance in limited and controlled strikes.
both sides will have incentives to keep the number of these systems
low. This would avoid needless duplication, conserve resources for
other military and civilian purposes, and set the stage for additional
reductions.

Regarding invulnerable NATO LRTNFs and American central

strategic systems as parts of one overall nuclear striking force
should reduce the probability of war through accident, inadver-
tence or miscalculation. Responsibility can be more clearly fixed
than might be the case with a separate NATO multilateral force, like

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 Strategies for Western Europe

the MLF unsuccessfully launched by the Kennedy administration in

the 1960s. There is. of course, always the possibility that French or
British systems might be employed. However, these are currently
designed as city-busting systems and are ill-suited for hard or
semihard military or civilian targets. A LRTNF, capable of selec-
tively hitting Warsaw Pact and Soviet military targets and support
facilities (which do not involve major population or industrial cen-
ters), can leave a clear signature, because of its accuracy and
calibrated firepower, to distinguish NATO and American use of
conventional and nuclear weapons from those that might be
employed by France or Britain. Building these distinctive features
into a NATO LRTNF could strengthen superpower control of the
escalatory process.

The unity of American command of all nuclear forces under

Washington's control as well as the integrated targeting plan
implied by these weapons argue for parallel integration of American
arms control and disarmament policy and negotiation strategy. The
division between the START talks and the LRTNF deliberations has
the ironic effect of emphasizing the difference between American
nuclear weapons earmarked for central strategic missions and
theater missions--precisely the kind of distinction that is of concern
to European allies. There may have been some initial justification
for having kept the LRTNF and START talks separate-including
insulating both from nuclear and forward-based systems and NATO
European nuclear forces-but these considerations are less per-
suasive than they were before. They make little sense from the
perspectives of either superpower: the US is logically led to rational-
ize use of its nuclear forces in Europe with its Single Integrated
Operational Plan (SlOP) preparations, and the Soviet Union must
defend against American and designated NATO nuclear forces as
different aspects of a single strategic problem. European expecta-
tions that a Soviet attack on American-controlled nuclear forces
stationed in Europe will engage the future panoply of American
nuclear power are essentially rooted within the same conceptual
framework although for political and psychological reasons it has
been convenient to make distinctions that progressively evidence
no difference.

The integration of the SALT and LRTNF talks would have sev-
eral positive effects. First, NATO European allies would not only
have rights of consultation for the latter but also for the former.

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Strategies for Western Europe

Second, negotiators would be given a greater degree of flexibility.

They could swap and trade among all systems capable of hitting the
territories of the superpowers. Dubious distinctions between the
lethality of weapons as a function of their range would be finessed.
The stage would be set to review the full spectrum of Soviet nuclear
modernization in Europe that has been lost from view in the narrow
focus on LRTNF. Soviet SS-21, -22 and -23 weapons, replacing
older Scud and Scaleboard systems, could be brought within arms
control talks. British and French capabilities could also be submit-
ted to appropriate counting rules and their alliance and national
roles more clearly defined. Forward-based systems as part of
NATO's first line of defense might also eventually be included in the
talks, but only after progress had been made in stabilizing the
strategic nuclear environment, comprising central nuclear forces
and LRTNFs.37

The operational deterrence posture and arms control negotiat-

ing position outlined above are calculated to address a number of
conflicting military, strategic, and political expectations on the part
of the superpowers and the NATO European allies. Meeting all of
these expectations, at least in part, is a precondition for an advance
fo detente, if the experience of the postwar period is any guide. First,
there is no incentive to negotiate if any of the superpowers or the
principal European allies perceive that they are at a military disad-
vantage in entering negotiations that promise to consolidate an
opponent's position. Nor is there much weight in the argument that
one can gain at the bargaining table what has not already been
implicitly achieved in actual or threatened military preparations.
Between competitors who share much in common, such an optimis-
tic expectation may be reasonable. Where the differences between
rivals are profound, the prospects of regaining a lost parity through
bargaining is less promising. Reliance primarily on bargaining skill
against an implacable and a militarily stronger opponent has not
enjoyed much success in achieving a stable peace in this century.
Nor have many governments been attracted to such risk-taking.
Once ahead, an opponent is not inclined to concede military gains
to a weaker adversary; the latter strives to buy time to rearm.

Much of the lack of movement on mutual and balanced force

reductions may be attributed to Warsaw Pact conventional super-
iority. Perceived parity has also been the touchstone of the SALT
process. Witness the Jackson amendment on parity accompanying

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 Strategies for Western Europe

the signing of SALT I. Note, too, the circumstances surrounding the

rupture of the SALT process and its rebaptism as START as a
consequence of the Reagan administration's assumption of Ameri-
can strategic inferiority as its point of departure in justifying an arms
buildup prior to negotiations with the Soviet Union. Similarly, the
NATO allies agreed that LRTNFs should go forward while negotia-
tions for their limitation were pursued in order to give the Soviets an
incentive to come to the bargaining table.

It follows from these considerations that some rough concep-

tion of military balance or parity must be mutually perceived as the
basis for a viable arms control accord. Moreover, parity must be
achieved at several escalatory levels if progress in limiting arms is to
be made. Imbalances at one level are not easily compensated for at
another whether in the form of increased military spending (a self-
defeating arms race tends to be the result) or in mutually acceptable
arms limitation agreements. Progress in relaxing political tensions
(detente) is also hostage to an agreed-upon balance and on rules for
systematic and ordered modernization of military weapons as
scientific and technological advances prompt innovation and reno-
vation. Detente between bitter foes is not facilitated by military
imbalance and arms control agreements are no substitute for
detente beyond perhaps initial low-risk confidence-building mea-
sures or limited proposals for graduated reductions in tensions.-'
Once a military balance is achieved that is reasonably stable and
also consistent with arms limitation and disarmament accords.
detente can rest on a firm foundation, and through feedback, bols-
ter a mutually assuring system of military security.

DEMOCRATIZATION OF DEFENSE, DETERRENCE, AND

DETENTE

If complementary military strategic and arms control policies

are to be effective they must not only meet the criteria sketched
above but they must also rest on a stable alliance consensus that
has the support of the public opinion of the member states. Defense.
deterrence, and detente, including arms control accords, have been
democratized in two senses. First, opinion supportive of govern-
mental policy in a democracy must, as always, rest on some form of
majority rule. Democratic norms insist upon a political process that
assures open debate and free election of competing elites, largely
working through mass parties, who assume responsibility for

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Strategies for Western Europe

governmental policies. Military policy is, however, only one issue

area. It must be aggregated with others by a party in presenting
itself for election. The ruling majority is inevitably a flawed coalition
composed of different and even divergent interests, many of which
may be far removed from immediate strategic considerations. This
feature of democratic decisionmaking tends to destabilize a military
consensus based on a shifting coalition of interests. The consensus-
building process is obviously compounded in an alliance of
members whose governments depend for survival on the patchwork
of democratically based coalitions which support them. The require-
ment of constructing a stable, predictable consensus on military
policy and arms control from a coalition of coalitions is an inherent
weakness within the Western decisional process which improved
consultation and information flow among allies can help to alleviate
but which can never be fully overcome.

The problem of alliance consensus is further compounded by

the divergent values and outcomes expected by domestic political
opponents from different military, arms control, and detente poli-
cies to be followed by a government as a member of an alliance. All
of the Western democracies are divided against themselves on
security policy by rival groupings, sharpened further by extreme
elements within them. If the British Labour Party overturns the
Conservative government, its leader is on record favoring aban-
donment of Britain's nuclearforces and of its commitment to station
NATO LRTNFs on British soil. The Green Party in the Federal
Republic has expressed similar views as have important segments
of the SDP support. As the past decade has shown, American
security policy is also susceptible to rapid change and oscillation.
Given these structural and continuing divisions within Western-
style politics, alliance security policy is highly vulnerable to domes-
tic influence. How else to explain the "zero sum" option adopted by
the Reagan administration and the "no early first strike" proposal by
NATO if not as attempts to assuage the demands of the peace
movement, which enjoys wide support in several member states?
Democratic-backed alliance policies are similarly subject to exte-
rior influence, as is shown by the fact that recent Soviet overtures to
"freeze" European theater nuclear forces, to redeploy them out of
range of European cities, or to sign nonaggression pacts with the
West have received a positive reception in some official Western
quarters. Whatever their intrinsic merit, these initiatives inevitably
prompt divided Western responses. These weaken a common

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 Strategies for Western Europe

Western front to Warsaw Pact or Soviet threats and blandishments

and drive a wedge between the United States and its NATO allies.

There is another dimension to the democratization of defense,

deterrence, and detente (D3) that strains the normal consensus
process within an open society. Domestic conflict over D 3 problems
now assumes the character of a mass movement divided into
broadly based popular groupings holding sharply clashing and
increasingly inflexible policy views and preferences on these vital
issues. Debate moves from legislative, bureaucratic, and media
forums to mass assemblies and even to the street. Techniques
appropriate to the mobilization of mass opinion and to public dem-
onstrations gradually tend to overwhelm the decision process.
Groups for and against new weapons proliferate and establish a
network of ties that becomes institutionalized. Sustained pressures
are brought to bear on alliance governments, whether on the right
or left; to accede to these demands. Issue voting hardens political
battle lines and diminishes opportunities for compromise. Political
leaders have incentives to posture for domestic support and media
attention in lieu of probing debate and study of complex security
issues. Much less have they an incentive to assume unpopular
positions on security and arms control issues. As these issues
become increasingly entangled in the intricacies of democratic
politics within the nations of the alliance and, subsequently, within
the NATO policy process, their management becomes at once more
tenuous and simple: tenuous since fixed negotiation positions vis-
a-vis the Soviet Union are made more difficult; simple in that the
complexities of strategic and arms control problems are glossed
over under the pressure of a perpetual political tug-of-war aimed
more at the domestic struggle for power than at favorably influenc-
ing an adversary's behavior.

Democratic governments face a dual problem in legitimizing

their security policies. They must contend with the normal push-
and-pull of democratic politics, difficult under any circumstances,
as de Tocqueville recognized long ago, and they must now conduct
their affairs under volatile conditions that destabilize the super-
power bargaining process and discourage efforts to define viable
arms control and limitation accords. Under these circumstances,
the arms accords that are struck are robbed of much of their credi-
bility and legitimacy; but accords that cannot be kept undermine the
minimal conditions of mutual confidence needed between adver-

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Strategies for Western Europe

saries in risking the signature of arms limitation agreements.

THE NEGLECTED TRIAD AND LONG-RANGE THEATRE

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The decision to deploy 464 cruise and 108 Pershing II missiles

was a right step in several wrong directions. It was a right step to
assure Europea i allies of the American nuclear commitment and to
define a role, however circumscribed, for the European states to
play in superpower strategic arms limitation talks. However, the
circumstances surrounding the two-track decision and its subse-
quent management leave something to be desired. In the initial
SALT negotiations European concerns were not given much
weight. The draft treaty bartered European concerns over the
development of the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber for Soviet con-
sent to a SALT accord.

European concern deepened further when the United States

consented to temporary limits on the transfer of cruise missile
technology and deployments (supposedly equal roughly to the time
that would have been needed to develop the missiles to a deploy-
ment stage anyway). The obsolescence of NATO TNFs gave impe-
tus to the search for new nuclear systems to offset growing Soviet
superiority. Parity under SALT between the superpowers appeared
to widen a deterrence gap between European-based conventional
and nuclear forces and American central strategic forces) 9 An
unsettling view spread through policy circles that the United States
might be self-deterred if the Soviet Union launched a major surprise
attack against NATO forces. 4 0 The SS-20, with three nuclear war-
heads of 150 kt. strength, could destroy all of NATO's nuclear forces
in a first strike. These are estimated at 70 major nuclear theater
targets in peacetime and no more than 200 to 300 in war.,' Under the
pressures of these concerns, arrival at some decision-any decision-
on deployment of American-controlled LRTNFs appeared to many
Europeans as important as the decision on what specific systems
would be deployed. This led to the first wrong step. It led to the
proposal for the creation more of a target than of a deterrent vis-a-
vis the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Emphasis was placed on
the need for a visible system under clear American control to link
the European theater weapons to US central strategic forces. While
this line of reasoning was consistent with over two decades of
European thinking, it failed, ironically, to give sufficient attention to

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 Strategies for Western Europe

the possibilities afforded the Soviet Union as a consequence of new

nuclear capabilities in Europe despite the ostensible purpose of
responding to this threat. A sea-based deterrent was specifically
rejected because it did not identify American nuclear weapons with
the defense of European soil. It was plausible to argue that the
Soviet Union might be deterred from launching an attack on Europe
and NATO forces if the Soviet homeland could not be preserved as a
sanctuary. But why an American President would be more inclined
to risk American cities because a handful of nuclear weapons bases
were destroyed than in response to an attack against American
ground and air forces in Europe was never made clear.

Nor were the arms control problems posed by the ground-

based system fully explored. As a vulnerable target, the ground
LRTNFs invited preemptive or preventive attacks. To protect these
exposed systems they also put pressures on Supreme Allied Com-
mand, Europe (SACEUR) to use its weapons before they were
destroyed. Instead of buying time to bargain with the Soviet Union
and to terminate a conflict before escalation enlarged, the ground-
based system encouraged more, not less, devastation. Meanwhile,
preponderant Soviet nuclear capabilities were not really offset
since the reaction time of the bulk of the weapons proposed by
NATO, principally cruise missiles, did not seriously threaten Soviet
nuclear capabilities. These latter, being mobile, with reload capabil-
ity, remained invulnerable to a disarming attack by NATO forces.
NATO's ground-based system, therefore, created the worst of all
possible worlds. It offered no appreciable gain in deterrence that
could not already be attributed to American troops (dependents,
and American civilians) in Europe or to central strategic forces; the
capabilities that were proposed were vulnerable to attack; crisis
management was weakened as hair-trigger reactions were encour-
aged on both sides if hostilities erupted; and the decoupling of
American and European security interests that the LRTNF posture
was supposed to forestall was unwittingly accentuated.

The very visibility of the ground-based system was also an

invitation to heightened domestic opposition in Europe. What may
have been assuring to European NATO security planners had the
opposite effect on domestic opponents of NATO's nuclear policy.
The war-fighting rhetoric of the Reagan administration's nuclear
strategic buildup, on one hand, and the vacillating behavior of the
Carter administration on defense policy, its wavering response to

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Strategies for Western Europe

Soviet expansion in the Third World and mismanagement of SALT,

on the other, tended to bolster the commitment of groups, variously
inclined toward unilateral initiatives in nuclear and conventional
disarmament, toward neutrality in the superpower struggle, or
toward political accommodation of the Soviet Union, to press their
views forward. Partly in anticipation of such opposition and to
forestall demonstrations against LRTNFs moving through the
European countryside, largely existing or new fixed NATO installa-
tions are to receive cruise and Pershing missiles. The infrastructure
of Pershing I is to be adapted to the Pershing II. However, the same
concerns expressed by residents in Utah and Nevada in opposition
to the race-track MX system, tentatively advanced by the Carter and
Reagan administrations, have been raised by European groups in
opposition to LRTNF deployments. This opposition, as suggested
above, was likely to have crystallized no matter what deployment
mode was adopted. However, the vulnerability of the ground-based
system encourages a hawk-dove alliance that erodes elite and pop-
ular support for the current NATO LRTNF posture. This alliance
reportedly emerged to defeat the Reagan administration's "dense
pack" proposal as military analysts interested in increased strategic
military capabilities tacitly joined forces, like oligopolists, with their
rivals, who were committed to decreased spending on nuclear weap-
ons or to a freeze or even to cutbacks on all defense spending. The
incentives bringing these otherwise opposing groups together arise
partly from the inherent vulnerabilities and threatening character of
land-based nuclear weapons.

A second misstep associated with ground-based cruise and

Pershing missiles derives from the isolated and insulated character
of the decision. The NATO proposal was isolated from the evolu-
tionary development and modernization of American strategic
forces, begun during the 1970s and signaled by NSDM-242 signed
by President Nixon in 1974; it was also insulated, as already sug-
gested, from the majorthrust of United States strategic arms limita-
tion talks in the form of two parallel negotiation forums dealing
essentially with a single, albeit complex, problem of controlling
nuclear arms.

A case can be made for the modernization of NATO long-range

nuclear forces but only if they are fitted into an overall plan that is
consistent with the development and modernization of central
strike forces in the United States. These forces, and those that will

166
 Strategies for Western Europe

be coming on-line in the 1980s, are able to discharge most, if not all.
of the missions that might be assigned a NATO force. First, there
exists no way for the Soviet Union to prevent destruction of its
population and industrial centers if it launches a disarming first-
strike attack, even if all of America's land-based systems were wiped
out in a surprise assault. While approximately 50 percent of Ameri-
can strategic nuclear launchers are in ICBMs, only 24 percent of its
warheads or throw-weight are assigned to these systems. Destruc-
tion of these systems would still leave 7,000 warheads at the dis-
posal of American SLBMs with 2,000 equivalent megatons available
for retaliatory action. A suicidal attack against Soviet cities of 400
equivalent megatons has been calculated to produce more than 70
million deaths and to destroy three-quarters of the Soviet Unions
industrial capacity. Additional strikes would not substantially add to
these disastrous levels of destruction. 42 Half as many equivalent
megatons would promptly kill a fifth of the Soviet population (or
more than 50 million) and destroy almost as much of its industral
4
capacity as a strike two times as powerful. ,

The modernization programs commenced during the 1970s.

and stepped up since, increase the risk to the Soviet Union that a
disarming strike would be possible, and would leave American
nuclear planners with sufficient survivable capabilities to meet
NATO needs. These measures are detailed elsewhere, but some
highlights here underline the point that LRTNFs are useful as a
supplement but cannot be justified apart from American nuclear
strategy and capabilities. The modernization of C31 systems, includ-
ing the Command Data Buffer System, the Airborne Command
Program, and Air Force Satellite Communications (AFSATCOM)
links, inter alia, have greatly improved the survivability and reliabil-
ity of American nuclear strike forces and have forged closer links
with systems deployed in Europe. These improvements reduce the
need to hold back warheads from NATO support missions under
attack conditions, since rapid retargeting is unlikely.4

Planned increases in American capabilities also spell serious

problems for Soviet decisionmakers even though the Soviet Union
may possess, with its SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs, the ability to destroy
one of the three legs of the American triad. Surviving Minuteman III
missiles will possess improved CEPs of 200 to 400 meters; Mark 12
warheads will increase yields of 300 of 550 missiles from 170 to 335
kt.; and single-shot kill probabilities are estimated to rise to 0.83.-

167
Strategies for Western Europe

The range of Poseidon submarines will increase 10-fold with the

introduction of the Trident I or C-4 missile. On these, circular error
probably will be improved to 1,000 feet and kiloton yield for 8
reentry vehicles (RV) will more than double, from 40 to 100 kt. Also,
flexibility in targeting against semihardened and industrial targets
will be enhanced. Attack submarines are being armed with sea-
launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). B-52G and H series bombers,
with improved avionics, will be able to penetrate Soviet defenses
with standoff air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and short-
range air missiles (SRAM). Some F-111 bombers will also be
upgraded with similar equipment.

Over the horizon, even if a new land-based system is not

installed, Trident submarines, armed with the new D-5 missile, will
enter the American inventory in the late 1980s. The D-5 will increase
the throw-weight, range, accuracy, and retarget flexibility; and it
will also increase RV carrying capacity for each sea-launched sys-
tem launcher from 8 to 14. These missiles with hard target capability
will reduce the need to rely on vulnerable ground systems, like fixed
ICBMs, or base facilities for bombers or ground-launched cruise
missiles (GLCMs). Either the B-i, the Stealth, or both new bombers
can also be expected to expand the American inventory and the
number of launchers and warheads that can be directed at Soviet
and Warsaw Pact targets. Barring a major expansion of Soviet
nuclear capabilities and a breakthrough in detecting or destroying
these newer systems or the command, control, communications
and intelligence (C,11) systems that direct them, the Soviet Union
cannot enhance its current strategic posture and very well may find
itself at the end of the decade, measured in static terms of warheads,
launchers, and equivalent megatons, in an inferior position in any
nuclear exchange. 46 This evolution bodes ill for the Soviet Union
which has concentrated its strike forces in ICBMs. In 1980, while 56
percent of Soviet launchers were ground-based ICBMs, 75% of its
warheads and 70% of its throw-weight were committed to these
systems. Despite increased hardening, perhaps as high as 5,000 psi,
Soviet strategic systems were more vulnerable than those of the
United States. However much proponents for an expansion of
American nuclear forces may have worried about growing Soviet
capabilities, none was prepared to advocate swapping American
systems for their Soviet counterparts.

There are grounds for agreeing with the conclusion of one

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 Strategies for Western Europe

well-informed observer, following analyses conducted late in the

Carter administration, that "even afteran all-out Soviet attack on US
ICBM[s] and a US response in kind, we could carry out extended
deterrence options involving several thousand weapons while pre-
serving at least three times the number of warheads required for the
civil-economic recovery targets in the SlOP assured destruction
option." 47 Moreover, British and French nuclear forces would be
available for strikes against the Warsaw Pact. These include on the
British side Polaris A-3 submarines and Vulcan, Buccaneer, and
Jaguar attack planes. On the French side the Soviet Union faces 18
S-3 IRBMS, Mirage Il1, IV, and Super Etendard aircraft, and five
nuclear submarines. Meanwhile, the French plan to deploy the
Hades tactical nuclear weapons system and work on enhanced
radiation weapons in support of its ground troops.

If, indeed, NATO LRTNFs are needed, they cannot be easily

defended in isolation of American strategic capabilities and a strat-
egy of limited strike options nor insulated from American arms
control policy. To do so, as has been the case so far, has two
unintended and perverse effects. On the one hand, the European
theater is implicitly decoupled from American strategic planning by
stressing the deterrent (actually lightning-rod) qualities of ground-
based systems. If installed, the United States would still have every
incentive to keep a nuclear exchange limited to Europe and of
signaling the Soviet Union that preference-precisely the kind of
decoupling that the LRTNF deployment is supposed to prevent. On
the other hand, a vulnerable system throws doves and hawks
together in opposition to NATO policies and gives the Soviet Union
new openings to divide NATO Europe from the United States.

The "zero option" negotiating position adopted by the Reagan

administration also exposes it to the charge that it is at best unrealis-
tic about what can reasonably be expected from the Soviets in the
way of concessions or at worst willfully obstructive. It does not
appear plausible to expect the Soviet Union to deal constructively
with theater nuclear weapons unless it has some notion of their
implications for strategic nuclear arms talks. This follows from what
has already been said about the essential unity of planning and
targeting between central and theater nuclear forces under Ameri-
can control. Meanwhile, Moscow is able to cast the United States as
the principal obstacle to an arms accord on LRTNFs. Whatever the
merit of this charge, it has been given wide currency in European

169
Strategies for Western Europe

public opinion and governmental circles. 48 The inflexibility of the

American position is also held hostage to Soviet initiatives such as
the Andropov suggestion that Soviet SS-20 missiles on Russia's
western front be reduced to levels equal to British and French
nuclear capabilities.

If by some chance the Soviet Union were to accept the "zero

option," which it has consistently rejected, this would do little to
check the growth of Soviet military capabilities in other vital areas.
The missteps arising from the LRTNF negotiations have also led
NATO planners and political leaders away from giving full attention
to halting or slowing Soviet modernization of short-range nuclear
systems, and, most importantly, to upgrading NATO conventional
capabilities.

NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons, however well the moder-

nization of its forces is managed, raises serious doubts in the minds
of experts and laymen as to whether nuclear weapons would best
serve European interests if deterrence in Europe should break
down. This is especially true of short-range systems, many of which
are obsolete, vulnerable, and error-prone. LRTNFs partly compen-
sate for some of the shortcomings of these systems, but excessive
focus on the need for their deployment neglects the liabilities occa-
sioned by the vulnerability of NATO's short-range TNFs. They invite
preemption and elicit little support in European circles as the basis
for a viable defense posture. European political leaders are hardly
inclined to authorize use of these weapons. The reduction of 1,000
of these weapons in Europe, accompanying NATO's 1979 proposal
for LRTNF, was sensible since NATO was already overarmed with
such systems. There seems also little justification to stockpile so
many weapons which, if used, threaten Europe's civilian popula-
tions. They offer little assurance, moreover, that, in light of Soviet
modernization, NATO forces will be at an advantage in an exchange
of tactical nuclear weapons limited to Western territory. Further
reductions of these weapons might well be contemplated as part of
an arms control package offered the Soviet Union to limit deploy-
ment of these weapons. Meanwhile, more attention might be given
to reducing threatening modernization of conventional forces while
pressures could be brought to bear on the Soviet Union to reduce its
conventional forces or lower the rate of their modernization. These
possibilities have lately been ignored as the alliance has concen-
4
trated its political and military eggs in the LRTNF basket. 9

170
 Strategies for Western Europe

A sea-based system, specifically dedicated to NATO missions

but one that is an integral part of an American controlled SIOP, can
relax, if not resolve, many of the problems associated with the
current NATO proposal. Such a shift would not necessarily add new
and formidable obstacles to striking a more nearly optimal balance
among strategic, arms control, and domestic consensus factors
that must be integrated into NATO planning if a viable solution to
the LRTNF issue is to be found. Such a system, particularly if
submarine based, would be less vulnerable, dampening incentives
for the US to launch on warning of an attack or for the Soviet Union
to preempt. Deterrence would not necessarily be decreased by
going to sea since a mixed force of cruise and ballistic missiles
would presumably be employed in accord with plans discussed and
decided upon within NATO's Nuclear Planning Group or other
NATO bodies created for this purpose. Here is a surer mechanism.
than exposed nuclear systems tO link the United States and Euro-
pean security interests more closely together. A sea-based system
also projects a more credible threat to the Soviet Union.

A sea-based deterrent, closely integrated with other American-

controlled nuclear weapons, promises also to be a more reliable
instrument to control escalation than other systems. That such
systems have previously been associated with American strategic
forces should make them more, not less, attractive to European
planners if deterrence is uppermost in their minds. The problems of
command and control posed by sea-based systems, while not neg-
ligible, are on the way to solution. The alleged greater C-'I reliability
of ground-based systems is far from convincing since they have not
been battlefield tested. Progress has been made in solving the C'I
problems of sea-based systems, and there is no reason to believe
that these will not be further advanced. The development of the C-4
and D-5 missiles suggest that sea-based systems are fast approach-
ing the targeting selectivity and flexibility of land-based counter-
parts.

There is nothing except political inertia preventing NATO

planners from adopting a sea-based system in lieu of the previously
announced cruise and Pershing II proposal. For those segments of
European opinion worried about an American and NATO response
to Soviet theater modernization, a sea-based system would consti-
tute a bona fide response. It is also conceivable that European
officers could be seconded to serve with these American-controlled

171
Strategies for Western Europe

systems in a liaison role in order to tighten even further NATO and

American targeting and planning. Since these systems will be at sea,
they are less likely than stationary systems or those roving through
the countryside to attract attention and to upset local populations.
The composition, size, and characteristics of such a force, whether
surface or submarine, would depend on intraalliance discussion
and the outcome of Soviet-American missile talks. What is impor-
tant to recognize at this point is the superiority of a sea-based
system in meeting the criteria for an effective and publicly sup-
ported LRTNF policy.

CONCLUSION

How to think about European defense is as important as what to

think about it. The NATO two-track decision was a marked
improvement over previous efforts in meeting NATO's nuclear
needs. It reflected a notable advance in integrating strategic, arms
control, and consensus-building requirements. However, NATO
planners did not go far enough and the specific steps that were
taken were not always calculated to move NATO policy in the right
directions. The integration of American strategic and arms control
policy with the LRTNF proposal has not gone very far. Planning for
American central and the theater systems which have been pro-
posed isolates one from the other and weakens the credibility of
additional capabilities to NATO's deterrent forces on which Ameri-
cans and Europeans can rely. Fully closing this alliance credibility
gap does not seem realistic in the short run. Nevertheless, more
progress can be realized than has been the case so far by hewing
more closely to the criteria sketched above for shaping and sizing
American nuclear capabilities assigned to NATO. The American
arms control approach of dividing the START and LRTNF talks
further insulates European-American policymaking and reinforces
the decoupling tendencies evident in NATO policymaking.

The strategic and arms control elements of the policy triad have
not always been skillfully related to domestic consensus building
within the alliance. Credibility, like charity, begins at home. The
vulnerability of fixed land-based ballistic missile systems and their
dubious strategic and political future requires a reexamination of
the December 1979 proposal and an equally serious reconsidera-
tion of a sea-based option. It would be unfortunate if a specific
weapon system were confused with the standards of evaluation of

172
 Strategies for Western Europe

the system-or of any system to be deployed in Europe. This form of

reductionism can only be harmful to long-run efforts to reduce the
military confrontation in central Europe, to adapt military strategy
and nuclear and conventional arms to new political and technologi-
cal conditions, and to relax the political tensions and disputes
dividing the continent without jeopardy to core values. Weapons
proposals which are insensitive to these larger considerations will
ultimately lack credibility vis-a-vis a determined foe or an anxious
ally or a skeptical public.

If force or its threat still has some sense today, it is as a medium

of communication and exchange between allies and adversaries
whether governments, competing specialists, or interested publics.
As Claisewitz suggested long ago, the political messages that they
wish to send to each other are still more important tha the military
meditum they use. Weapons have an inner logic appropriate to the
narrow. military functions for which they are designed but they
conv -. no intrinsic political sense except what a nation and its
leade, hip-civilian or military-imputes to them. These political
messajes will be louder and clearer and more likely to elicit the
desired allied and adversary responses if the triad of strategic. arms
contr(,;, and consensus-building criteria, outlined above, inform
and fashion the military medium of communication and exchange.
Othel Nise, the medium becomes the message.

173
 Alternative Strategies for the
Defense of Western Europe

Representative Newt L. Gingrich

United States Congress

Dr. Albert S. Hanser

West Georgia College

In his penetrating study of the first 25 years of NATO, British

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Peter Hill-Norton described the Military
Committee as having enshrined in 1967 "the doctrine of deterrence.
forward defense, flexible response with detente which is unchanged
(and highly unlikely to be changed) to this day." When written in
1978, that analysis presented an accurate summary of NATO
doctrine.

Today, only four years later, al( of the elements of that doctrine
as originally understood are subjects, at least on this side of the
Atlantic, of considerable discussion and no little challenge. To
understand the terms of that discussion it is useful to examine how
each of these elements evolved and how it was and is understood
both by the United States and by its European alliance partners.

During the first 15 years of the alliance, deterrence had a simple

and easily understood meaning. The Soviet Union was to be dis-
couraged from using its massive conventional military forces
against Western Europe. Initially this was to be accomplished by the
creation of a multinational conventional force equal or superior to
that of the Soviet Union and its allies. Political and economic con-
siderations on both sides of the Atlantic soon combined to cause
abandonment of that idea. Instead, America's nuclear arsenal was
to serve as the dissuader. Massive retaliation against the Soviet
homeland would be the price of any military aggression against
Western Europe. The North German plain and Fulda Gap would be
defended from Omaha, Nebraska. The role therefore of NATO's
conventional forces was not to fight and win in the event of war but
simply to serve as a tripwire.

That original relegation of NATO conventional forces to the

status of tripwire has had important long-term consequences for

175
Strategies for Western Europe

the alliance and for the national military forces that make it up.
Since conventional force was not to be the means of winning it was
not necessary to match Soviet strength in Europe. NATO therefore
accepted Warsaw Pact conventional military superiority as a given.
Alliance ground and air forces were only there to assure that war
with its terrible nuclear destruction did not begin by error. Any
aggression which touched off a conflict so deadly and destructive
must be clear and unambiguous. The Soviets were to be permitted
to strike the first blow, giving them not only the advantage of greater
strength but also that of the initiative, Equally, there must be no
question of provocation. Therefore NATO f,,ces were to be purely
defensive in character, word, and action. Their sole purpose was to
prevent a war, not to fight it.

While the United States with its worldwide commitments and

the experiences of Korea and Vietnam never accepted totally this
consequence of massive retaliation and the tripwire, some of our
European allies did and still do. As late as April of this year, one of
the authors of this paper was told by a colonel of the West German
General Staff that our discussions of possible military options in the
event of war were purely theoretical as the Bundeswehr was not
permitted to discuss how they hoped to defeat the enemy. Their
only permissible function was to deter war, not to win it Of course
this conversation may have reflected the caution of a professional
soldier speaking to a foreigner at a moment when his Social Demo-
cratic government was dealing with a very active peace movement
and a revolt of left-wing elements within the party. Nonetheless, it is
indicative of a firmly established mindset within the political and
military leadership of some of our allies. Much of the nervousness
displayed by our European allies in reaction to the United States
Army's new Airland doctrine can be traced to this mindset.

The doctrine of massive retaliation was one within which the

European members of the alliance felt very comfortable. For them it
represented the best of all possible worlds, since it allowed them to
purchase security at a very modest political and economic price.
For the allies the key feature of the doctrine, the automaticity of the
US nuclear response to the Warsaw Pact aggression in Europe, was
guaranteed by the presence of large numbers of American troops
and their dependents in Germany. By the same token the Euro-
peans were protected from possible US adventurism by those terms
of the alliance which restricted it to Europe and which required

176
 Strategies for Western Europe

unanimous decision before action could be taken. They were there-

fore less than enthusiastic when in the early 1960s the United
States, through its energetic Secretary of Defense Robert McNam-
ara, began urging-nay demanding-their agreement that massive
retaliation be replaced by flexible response.

Flexible response as a concept contained many pitfalls for the

NATO alliance in that each side of the Atlantic evolved a different
understanding of it. The concept was driven by the growing stra-
tegic nuclear capability of the Soviet Union, which increasingly
guaranteed that massive retaliation would be a two-way street. That
growing Soviet nuclear strength was already causing American
nuclear analysts to formulate their new strategic doctrine of mutual
assured destruction. Flexible response seemed to the United States
a necessary step to raise the nuclear threshold. Reaching that
threshold now for the first time presented a genuine threat to the
continental United States as well as tQ the Soviet Union, thus plac-
ing the deterrent effect of massive retaliation in doubt. It seemed
therefore clearly in the interest of the United States that there
should be created some intermediate steps-a ladder of escalation-
between the opening shots of a conventional war in Europe and the
homeland nuclear exchange which was to be the final product of
mutually assured destruction.

It was not nearly as clear to our allies that those intermediate

steps on the ladder would be in the best interests of Europe. Those
steps, while short of Armageddon, would be very destructive indeed
and would be taken on European soil. It was entirely possible that
even if the escalation ladder worked as designed and a massive
strategic nuclear exchange between the superpowers were pre-
vented, it might well be at the cost of the total destruction of Europe.
By creating doubts about the automaticity of an American nuclear
response to Soviet aggression in Europe, the US had reopened
painfully for Europe the whole question of deterrence.

Attempting to assuage those European fears, the US tried to

interest its allies in some form of nuclear sharing. We first sought to
create the MLF, or Multilateral Force, an attempt which failed dis-
mally. Next came the NPG, or Nuclear Planning Group. which
appeared to succeed with everyone but France. Despite the failure
of the US to institute any form of nuclear sharing with our allies,
flexible response was adopted as official NATO doctrine because

177
Strategies for Western Europe

of: (1) the stationing in Europe of massive numbers of tactical

nuclear weapons, (2) the development of the French force de frappe
and the British Polaris program as part of a credible theater nuclear
capability, and (3) the tacit acceptance by the United States and
Europe of differing concepts of what first deterrence and then
detente were all about.

Within the framework of flexible response, deterrence has been

for the United States a movable and progressive concept. Ameri-
cans believe of course that it is highly desirable that war itself be
deterred and that every effort should be directed to that end. How-
ever, should war break out in Europe, it is equally important to deter
escalation to the next steps upwards on the ladder. The conven-
tional phase should be prolonged as long as possible before resort-
ing to tactical nuclear weapons. That phase should be extended as
far as possible before resorting to theater weapons. Ultimately the
last and most destructive phase, that of homeland strategic
exchange, should only occur as an absolutely last resort. Every
effort must be made to avoid any miscalculation by either side
which might lead to a premature and unnecessary move to a higher
and more dangerous level of conflict. To that end each element of
defense escalation must be as strong as possible in order to deter
enemy action without recourse to the next higher element. Above
all, the conventional element must be strengthened in order to
prevent that first step on the ladder of escalation-the use of tactical
nuclear weapons.

Over time it was this logic which led to the recent American
determination to improve our conventional forces, to develop a
doctrine which would permit us to fight and win a conflict on the
lower end of escalation ladder, and to pressure our NATO allies to
spend the money necessary to upgrade their own conventional
capabilities. However, for political and economic reasons, the
alliance still has not devoted the resources required to make deter-
rence on the conventional level a credible policy.

To Europe deterrence was quite another matter. It has been

first, foremost, and always designed to prevent the outbreak of war.
since even a victorious war would result in the devastation of the
continent. The thousands of tactical nuclear weapons now in place
were, along with theater weapons, seen as a replacement for the
threat of that massive retaliatory strike which had served so well to

178
 Strategies for Western Europe

prevent war in the fifties and sixties. If these weapons were to be

used at all in a conflict then they should be employed as early as
possible so as to minimize damage of Western Europe and to reach
the stage of threatened strategic exchange between the United
States and the Soviet Union at the earliest possible moment. This
would either end the conflict through a negotiated peace or at least
minimize the nuclear damage suffered by Europe at the expense of
the two superpowers.

When the authors of the this paper were in Western Germany in

1977 it was striking how similar were the views expressed by Ger-
man soldiers, politicians, and journalists. All saw the certainty of the
earliest possible use of strategic nuclear weapons by the United
States as the best possible deterrent against a Soviet attack as well
as the only way of terminating a conflict initiated by such an attack.
All refused to consider the possibility and consequences of a more
protracted war in which no such use of strategic weapons was
made. That some at least in Germany are now considering that
possibility helps in part to explain the power of the peace movement
there.

For the Federal Republic of Germany, agreement by its allies to

the concept of forward defense has been a vital and necessary
factor in its acceptance of flexible response. By meeting a Warsaw
Pact assault as far forward as possible the Germans intend to limit
the loss of life and property during what they hope will be a short
conventional phase of conflict. More importantly they view it as a
guarantee that the use of tactical nuclear weapons which must
clearly take place on German soil will occur before the large popula-
tion centers are reached by advancing Warsaw Pact forces. Forward
defense indeed only makes sense if it is assumed that both the
conventional and tactical nuclear phases of a Central Front war are
of the shortest possible duration. Nothing could better illustrate the
tenacity with which West Germany clings to its original view of
deterrence under the old massive retaliation doctrine. Nor could
anything better illustrate how far from the American view of flexible
response NATO has come. From a purely military standpoint for-
ward defense as it is understood at present is a suicidally danger-
ous strategy if one wishes to fight an extensive conventional war,
since it would have to be fought without meaningful operational
reserves against an opponent whose known doctrine is one of deep
thrust and rapid exploitation. It would well be a repeat of the Polish

179
Strategies for Western Europe

campaign of 1939-but this time with Germany on the receiving

end.

If the combination of forward defense and flexible response

was flawed from the beginning as NATO doctrine because of differ-
ing national interpretations and the failure of the Westei n alliance to
create a conventional force strong enough to provide by itself a
credible deterrent, it nonetheless could and did remain a useful
policy as long as NATO maintained a convincing tactical and
theater nuclear superiority over the Warsaw Pact. In the 1980s that
has ceased to be the case. In addition to its overwhelming superior-
ity in conventional ground forces the Soviet Union now possesses
more tactical weapons than NATO. Moreover, these weapons have
greater range and a more powerful throw weight than their Western
equivalents. If the thousands of tactical nuclear artillery shells and
short-range missiles the United States had stationed in Europe
presented a credible deterrent in the past, they no longer can be
viewed as doing so. Indeed deterrence may not be on the other side.
Soviet tactical nuclear options are so much more powerful than our
own that it may be too dangerous to use our own lest we invite a
more dangerous retalation on their part.

We therefore find ourselves as an alliance in a situation in which

the Warsaw Pact has achieved strategic nuclear parity on a global
level while with its tactical nuclear weapons and new SS-20 missiles
it has acquired a clearly superior theater nuclear capability. When
this is combined with that conventional superiority and military
initiative which the Warsaw Pact maintained since the earliest
period of NATO's existence, it is clear that Western deterrence in
either its American or European versions is no longer a viable
long-term policy. It is equally clear that should the West be forced
actually to fight a Central Front conflict under these conditions,
prospects for victory are not good.

It was to address the conventional level of this dilemma that the

United States Army developed its new Airland doctrine. Recogniz-
ing that neither our own government and people nor those of our
allies were likely to approve the enormous economic and political
costs of matching man for man, tank for tank, and missile for missile
the huge conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact, the Army set out
to devise a method by which we could fight outnumbered and
outgunned and still win. It is believed that when the transition to

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Airland Battle doctrine and Army 86 force modernizations are com-

plete the United States and its allies will have achieved that end. If
the belief in Airland is correct, and we believe it is, then the West will
have acquired a meaningful conventional deterrent capability for
the first time in the history of NATO.

It is not our purpose to examine here the Airland Battle and

Army 86 in any great detail. It will be sufficient to note that Airland
Battle, by reorganizing the structure and thinking of our military,
will permit it to exploit enemy vulnerabilities as never before. The
new battlefield as envisioned will be nonlinear and expanded geo-
graphically far into enemy's rear areas. There in his vulnerable rear
areas high-priority targets will be identified and destroyed. His
timetables will be disrupted, his follow-on echelons threatened, his
command and control disorganized even while his forward ele-
ments are locked in close combat with our own forces. By using the
indirect approach, seizing and maintaining the initiative and making
use of our greater speed and flexibility, it should be possible for our
forces to thwart the enemy's intentions while savaging his forces.

If, as we believe, our conventional forces, using this new doc-

trine, can successfully halt an attack by the Warsaw Pact on the
European Central Front, then it is the Soviets, not the Americans,
who will be first tempted to use tactical nuclear weapons. It is
indeed probable that they will have already resorted to chemical
weapons. The West must therefore have an effective means of
deterring such action on the part of the Pact so we can keep any
conflict at the conventional level.

The need to create such a deterrence is based on four assump-

tions. The first of these is that the United States would gain nothing
if it achieved a conventional war-winning ability at the cost of
increased danger of escalation toward a homeland nuclear ex-
change with the Soviet Union. The second is that our European
allies would be less than enchanted at a conventional victory whose
predictable price would be total destruction of much of their conti-
nent. The third assumption is that, given the greater number, range,
and power of Soviet weapons, our own tactical nuclear force could
hardly be expected to deter Soviet use of theirs. Finally, it is
assumed that any effort to deter the use of tactical nuclear weapons
by directly threatening the Soviet homeland would be counterpro-
ductive since it would only tempt the Soviets to escalate imme-

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diately to a homeland exchange phase of conflict. What is needed

therefore is either the total elimination of superpower nuclear weap-
ons from European soil as President Reagan suggested last year or
a specific nuclear threat which is directed against targets in the
territory of Russia's Warsaw Pact allies but not against the Soviet
Union itself.

The targets chosen should have an important and obvious

bearing on the outcome of the war and should if at all possible not
be located in heavily populated areas. Forthis purpose both the new
Pershing II and our sea-, land-, and air-launched cruise missiles
should be highly suitable. In view of these considerations, it is our
view that all of those tactical nuclear weapons now on European soil
should be removed. Once the conventional military forces have
been upgraded and have adopted Airland doctrine, such weapons
will no longer be needed to compensate for our conventional weak-
ness. Since they no longer match their Soviet opposite numbers
thei- utility as a deterrent is, as has already been demonstrated,
highly questionable. More importantly, in the nonlinear battlefield
of the future, forward-based, short-range nuclear weapons will be
more of a liability than an advantage to either side. They would be
difficult to move quickly and impossible to defend on a battlefield
with no ,,qf rear area. Since it is known that both Soviet doctrine
and our own single out nuclear facilities as high- priority targets. if
is clear ti at in future conflicts such weapons can only be an einbar-
rassment to the side which deploys them.

In addition to these military considerations there are consider-

able political benefits which will accrue to the United States through
a unilat'-ral withdrawal of all American tactical nuclear weapons
from European soil. One. it would enable the United States and its
NATO partners to renounce first use of nuclear weapons. It is only
our conventional inferiority - A, the perceived need for tactical
nuclear weapons to redress that inferiority which have in the past
made it impossible for us to renounce first use. No one will have to
be reminded how well the Soviets have used our refusal to do so for
propaganda purposes. Second, it will allow us to begin reversing
the widely neld assumptlon in Europe that the United States can
only help defend its allies by threatening the nuclear destruction of
Centra: Europe. That assumption is one of the cornerstones of the
present European peace movement and one of the principal rea-
sons for its largely anti-American tone, Third, by voluntarily giving

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 Strategies for Western Europe

up our artillery and Lance nuclear capability while at the same time
specifically focusing world opinion on the fact that our Pershing II
and cruise missile weapons were to serve a purely deterrent pur-
pose, we would both reassure our allies and mark the Soviet Union
as that sole true threat to world peace and instrument of nuclear
destruction it has so long in fact been.

In summary, by upgrading our conventional forces, persuading

our European allies to do the same, adopting Airland doctrine,
voluntarily withdrawing all of our tactical nuclear weapons from
European soil, and leaving in Europe only a new theater deterrent
force consisting of Pershing I! and cruise missiles, we can provide
the basis for a new and more powerful NATO alliance-one better
designed to deter war, but one capable of winning that war should it
occur. At the same time we can demonstrate to a doubting world
that the United States is the true champion of peace and the Soviet
Union the true threat to that peace.

However, our new strategy of deterring war by increasing

Soviet doubt of victory will only work if it is based on realistic
preparations. The real target of deterrence is the mind of the Soviet
military analyst. It is the professional military advisers in Moscow
who must believe that the West could win a conventional war if that
war is to be avoided. Having the New York Times or any number of
US Senators believe in our military capabilities is not only irrelevant.
it could in fact be dangerous if the Soviet military doesn't see hard
evidence that we can carry out what we promise.

Changing our doctrines so that our force structure, training,

and equipment secure deterrence through effective and credible
capabilities will prove a hard challenge to the NATO nations. The
real difficulties are more than budgets and politics. The reality is
that the professional military bureaucracies have relied on deter-
rence for two generations. Hard questions of training, of ammuni-
tion supplies, of equipment have simply been brushed under the
rug. It should alarm every citizen that there have been no war games
involving a conflict lasting more than thirty days in which the West-
ern allies win a Central Front war. It should concern all of usthat no
serious training exists for dealing with Red forces inside th? Warsaw
Pact borders even after war breaks out. It is as though the Israelis
had planned to defend Tel Aviv inside its suburbs instead of on the
Golan Heights.

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Strategies for Western Europe

NATO will face serious problems in convincing its civilian sec-

tor to increase budgets adequately to support true war-winning
capability. It will face equal difficulty in convincing its citizens to
sustain an adequate Reserve trained well enough to fight a long war.
However, even those achievements will matter little if the profes-
sional military in all NATO countries does not develop a more
rigorous standard of intellectual honesty. One reason many civilian
politicians regard much of the military bureaucracy's arguments and
requests with disdain is the poor quality of argumentation. Self-
serving approaches to force structure, mission assignments, and
the protection of existing service structures and habits are all too
common in all Western nations. If the career military doesn't take
war seriously enough to alter the routines of its defense ministries,
higher headquarters, and established services, why should they
expect politicians to do more? Thus the prerequisite to a successful
NATO deterrence through adequate and demonstrable conven-
tional capacity is to develop an officer corps that believes war is
possible and that is determined to be tough-minded enough to
insist on the arguments and changes necessary to win that potential
war. As politicians see the quality of professional arguments and
professional plans improve it is likely that there will be a corres-
ponding increase in the seriousness with which the political world
examines the real cost of deterrence.

There are nine specific principles which have to underlie any

United States program for an adequate conventional deterrence:

1. We must understand that war is possible.

2. We must understand that losing such a war is unacceptable.

3. We must understand that the interests and views of our

allies are just as important to them as ours are to us.

4. We must understand that military goals must be realistic

and precise.

5. We must understand that NATO conventional forces must

be alert enough to win a short war that begins with a surprise
Soviet attack and must have enough reserves to fight a long
war.

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 Strategies for Western Europe

6. We must understand that no peripheral strategy works if

NATO loses on the Central Front.

7. We must understand that other members of the alliance

must take on greater global responsibilities if the United
States is to remain a primary partner for them in Europe.

8. We must understand that NATO must dominate every rung

of the escalation ladder beginning with the conventional.
Every phase must be made unprofitable for the Soviets.

9. We must understand that ultimately a secure military

alliance must rest on the base of a stable political-economic-
cultural alliance.

These nine principles are the intellectual key to designing a

NATO alliance which will still be working in the year 2015. Only by
developing a stable nonmilitary alliance can we sustain the military
effort. Only by involving Western Europe in the Third World as is
further expounded below can we continue to justify an American
focus on the Central Front. Only by establishing a conventional war
capability while simultaneously making the escalation ladder un-
profitable can we minimize the Soviet Union's options while maxim-
izing our own. Only by making these steps so real that Soviet
intelligence and military analysts believe in them can we deter major
war.

While each of these nine principles is interdependent and all

must work if deterrence is to be assured, it is worth taking a moment
to examine each principle in more detail, since they form a frame-
work for measuring current plans against future dangers.

First, we must recognize that war is possible. As Harry Sommers

notes in his book, On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, our
own Pentagon is dominated by thinking geared to war preparation
rather than warfighting. War preparation for two generations has
been dominated by bureaucratic and political rather than by battle-
field and military considerations. The other Wectern democracies
have made the same error. The result is a state of mind which has
infected the career military, the professional civil service, the politi-
cians, and the news media of all our countries.

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Strategies for Western Europe

NATO is in grave danger of playing the role played by France in

the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. Our plans tend to be dominated by
bureaucratic and budgetary considerations. German farmers' local
interests block moving our forces out of obsolete casernes. The
sociology of the American military blocks development of an ade-
quate air-ground tactical support doctrine. The President's per-
sonal prejudices stop us from planning an adequate Reserve and
National Guard force based on some form of conscription. In
numerous ways we avoid confronting the reality that war may come
and its fiery blast will annihilate the petty institutions and personali-
ties that now avoid taking it seriously.

Second, wars are real. There is a decisiveness to major wars

which changes history fundamentally. The Russian experience with
the Mongol yoke is a revealing example of the way in which cultu-
rally advanced societies (in this case Kievan Russia) can be totally
altered by a confrontation with a more primitive but militarily domi-
nant society. There is a tendency in the West to regard war as an
aberration which can be magically overcome if it does occur. Deter-
rence has been such a magic word. It has allowed both the civilian
and military parts of Western society to avoid confronting the very
real dangers of the Russian Empire. If we don't have enough artillery
shells, don't worry about it because we will have gone nuclear by
then anyway. If our armored personnel carriers are obsolete. prone
to breaking down, and wholly ineffective on a modern battlefield,
don't worry about it because that is the politicians' fault and anyway
we are only a large tripwire. At every level of both military and
civilian society there is a tendency to forget that maneuvers are
make-believe but war is real.

NATO needs a much more rigorous commitment to profes-

sionalism on the part of its career military. Politicians may well
decide to ignore professional advice and professional assessments
but they should at least hear the unvarnished truth as measured
against potential battlefields. All too often NATO politicians are
hearing only from political generals and political staffs. They rely on
reassuring data that simply has no relevance to wartime reality. The
time to know how weak you are is when there is still a chance to
remedy that weakness. We need descriptions of grim reality now
rather than apologies for defeat after the fact. It may make some
generals and admirals unpopular with their national press and
national politicians but then that mayweil be the price for building a

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true deterrence.

For 37 years the West has accepted grave risks and weaknesses
in its conventional forces because it felt comfortable relying on its
nuclear deterrent. When in doubt Western governments almost
always have decided in favor of less preparedness. War games
made assumptions favorable to the Blue teams and unfavorable to
Red teams. When possible the odds were always bent. For the next
generation we must learn to do just the opposite. A true war-
preventing deterrent will require that we give Red forces the advan-
tage in our war games and maneuvers. We will have to learn to take
seriously slightly more alarmist analyses and tend to do a little too
much rather than a :ittle too little. This new state of mind can only
make sense if we keep reminding ourselves that war is real.

Third. our allies must be taken as seriously as we take our-

selves. For a generation after World War II, Americans had the
advantage of being able to use their allies as living hostages to
deterrence. Since we possessed an overwhelming preponderance
of nuclear force our allies could get freedom on the cheap and we
could lead with little dissent. Today all that has changed. As our
allies contemplate the weakening nuclear deterrent they begin to
assess the costs of its possible use. The implications of flexible
response strategy for West German survival make Finlandization a
real alternative for national citizens. Continuation of a nuclear bat-
tlefield approach to deterrence will increase the stress on all Euro-
pean governments as their citizens think realistically about the
collateral damage and the annihilation of their towns and country-
side.

If NATO is to survive in an era of relative Soviet-American

military equality we are going to have to accept the equality of
interest of our allies. West Germans will come to regard a heartland
exchange as involving Fulda or Hamburg equally as much as Chi-
cago or Atlanta. That will signal the end of any usable nuclear
first-strike threat even at the tactical level.

NATO's deterrence problems are compounded by the desirable

but difficult reality of a free and increasingly universal press in the
NATO countries. There simply cannot be two strategies in the 1980s
and 1990s as there were in the 1960s and 1970s. The news media
and left-wing politicians will make sure that the citizens involved

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Strategies for Western Europe

know about their alliance's schizophrenia. It will be necessary to

have one strategy articulated in clear, forthright language so that
citizens can debate it in all NATO countries simultaneously. That
will require military bureaucracies and their civilian heads to think
and speak much more precisely and carefully. A successful articula-
tion of a strategy in politically defensible language is the basic
requirement for all military systems in free societies. It is not only
guerrillas who must be fish in the sea of people. It is also the
professional military leaders of free societies.

NATO strategy for the next generation must begin with an

understanding that the inter-German border has to be as sacred as
the American. The use of nuclear weapons in Europe has to be as
unacceptable to the United States as would be the use of them on
American soil. Our goal is not to recover West German territory after
the first month of the war but to avoid losing West German territory
in the first place. We must learn to offer the prospect of future peace
and security even if deterrence should fail. Otherwise we will con-
tinue to witness an erosion of support for NATO as more and more
citizens contemplate the currently grim plans for their lives and
coLintry if war comes.

This new emphasis on the importance of our allies' lives and

territories will require that Soviet military aggression in Europe be
met by a forward defense capable of defeating Soviet forces on
Warsaw Pact soil. There must be only minimum penetration of West
Germany or other NATO countries.

Fourth, military goals must be realistic and precise. Far too

much of our current military planning is just pie in the sky with no
real relationship to budgetary force structure, or military realities.
The very language of a great deal of NATO and US planning is so
ambiguous and filled with bureaucratic verbiage that it is impossi-
ble to understand clearly what it means. As S.L.A. Marshall once
said: "Battles are won through the ability of men to express concrete
ideas in unmistakable language. All administration is carried for-
ward along the chain of command by the power of men to make their
thoughts articulate and available to others." That standard must
once against be applied to all military planning and implementation.

Our overall goals should be simple, understandable, and objec-

tively measurable. We should plan to deter by having adequate

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forces at such a level of training that Soviet analysts doubt their own
ability to win a conventional war on the Central Front. We on the
other hand should recognize that it is possible any time in the next
30 years that the Russian Empire and NATO will have a test of will in
which no deterrents or negotiation offers will have any effect. In that
setting we must be prepared to defeat Soviet forces decisively
before they can penetrate significantly onto West German soil.

Focusing on the destruction of Soviet forces while they are still

in Warsaw Pact territory will have three salutary effects on NATO.
First, it will reassure our own allies and especially the Germans that
they are being defended and can live in safety. Second, it will
reassure the Soviets that any test of will can be resolved outside
their national boundaries. They will therefore have no need to resort
to weapons of mass destruction. This narrow focus on a decisive
NATO victory in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslo-
vakia thus maximizes the reassurance to our own allies that they will
suffer little collateral damage while minimizing threats to the
Soviet's political stability at home. Third, the prospect of themselves
being the battlefield will increase pressure from the Warsaw Pact
members on Moscow to avoid war. If the Polish. Hungarian, East
German, and Czechoslovakian governments believe the war will not
be a romp in the West with little risk to them but instead will resem-
ble a Lebanon in their own countries they may well bring maximum
pressure to bear on the Soviets to avoid war.

The operational concept of achieving victory in the Warsaw

Pact area can be turned into specific plans, realistic maneuvers.
purposeful force structures, and real budget requirements. Such a
budget, offering security and victory, should prove far more accept-
able politically than do present budgets which offer neither security
nor victory.

Fifth, conventional forces must be alert enough to win a short

war that begins with a Soviet surprise attack yet have enough
reserves to fight a long war. One of the amazing features of current
NATO planning is that it can neither win the most likely short war or
the more likely long war The only war NATO is currently designed
to fight is a brief war with adequate warning time which is either
negotiated or escalated just before NATO runs out of ammunition.

Modern military history is filled with examples of successful

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Strategies for Western Europe

surprises, Yom Kippur in 1973 being the most recent and involving
the surprise of an Israeli Army that has been legendary for its
alertness and its intelligence capabilities. It is at least plausible that
the Soviets might at some point conclude that a standing-start war
would be a reasonable risk. Given the current NATO force disposi-
tions, the locations of many units, and the number of dependents
and civilians likely to get in the way, it is hard to see how NATO
could do anything in its current posture except fall apart if hit with a
successful surprise assault. It is therefore clear that the next genera-
tion of deterrence will require turning NATO's standing forces from
garrison into field armies so that the initial thrust of a surprise
assault would be blunted and turned without losing half or more of
Western Europe.

Assuming NATO does not get surprised in the short run it is

certain that in its current force posture it can simply be outlasted in
the long run. There are no provisions for a serious war in Central
Europe lasting much beyond 30 days. Therefore a relatively low-risk
Soviet strategy would be simply to keep slugging it out somewhere
along the inter-German border until the NATO forces began to run
out of men, equipment, and ammunition. In some ways the NATO
forces are prepared for a gigantic repetition of Isandhlwana, where
British forces in 1879 stood off the Zulu as long as they had ammuni-
tion but were massacred when the available supplies ran out. Sim-
ilarly, it is conceivable that NATO will be able to stand off the
Russians while the supplies last but will be annihilated when insuffi-
cient preparation presents its bill. A realistic long-war strategy will
require massive reserves on the Israeli or pre-1914 Imperial German
Army model. That will require either universal military training or a
very large draft. The reserves will have to be oriented to fighting.
They must be realistically exercised every year, with their weekend
sessions devoted to preparation for real fighting. In addition to
increasing manpower reserves the NATO countries will have to
expand tl-,ýir mobilization base dramatically with more factories
prepared to produce war materials and with more ammunition and
other supplies in reserve.

Sixth, no peripheral strategy works if NATO loses on the Cen-

tral Front. There has been a great deal of talk about a maritime
strategy which will somehow allow the United States to defeat the
Soviet Union without having to invest massively on the Central
Front. Unfortunately it just can't be done. Clausewitz was right in

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 Strategies for Western Europe

insisting that winning the central battle of annihilation makes the

secondary skirmish irrelevant. The side which wins the main battle
has the capacity to turn and mop up the victorious secondary forces
of the opposition.

Western theorists who look at Pitt the Elder's maritime strategy

or the Peninsular Campaigns of Wellington misunderstand the real-
ity of power in the late 20th century. There is no Frederick the Great
and Prussian Army capable of balancing off the Soviets while the
United States wins the peripheral war. There is no Russian empire to
drain the enemy's strength while an American Wellington wins a
secondary campaign, It is inconceivable that any collection of Eur-
asian powers will balance off the Soviets in the next generation
without a massive infusion of American ground fighting power.
Therefore we are bound to maintain a massive military commitment
to Europe as long as we think the freedom of Western Europe is a
matter of significant importance to us.

Seventh, the reality of our need to remain deeply committed in

Europe means that we will have to think through our own and our
allies' global role. Those analysts who argue that the United States
cannot afford to balance the Soviet Union in Europe while policing
the entire Third World are correct but come to the wrong conclu-
sion. We must recognize that if our allies are in fact morally our
equals (principle three) then our allies are going to have to learn to
help maintain our mutual interests around the planet. In fact the
French have done a remarkably good job with very limited resour-
ces of playing a serious role in much of Africa and the Middle East.
There is reason to believe that other of our allies could play much
larger roles than they currently do in virtually all of the Third World.
If we were to assess our relative contributions to the alliance by
adding both our defense and foreign-aid commitments asa percent
of gross national product we could set goals for even our most
pacifist allies that would increase the relative influence of the
alliance in the Third World at little cost to the United States and
which would redistribute the burden of common survival so that the
American economy would be bearing only its fair share.

There simply has to be a new equation in the American and

Western European commitment to each other. If the Western Euro-
peans want us to remain on their continent helping them defend
themselves, something which is in our national interest but far more

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Strategies for Western Europe

in theirs, they are going to have to shoulder more of our foreign-aid

burden and more of our Third World intervention burden. If they
seek to beggar us by insisting that our economy bear a vastly
disproportionate share of the common defense burden, as it has
since 1945, then we will inevitably have to confront the fact that
while we want to help Europe we must help America first. Such a
decision is not in our interest and is still less in theirs.

This strategic approach to global problems as an alliance is not

as drastic a departure as some might suggest. In fact the last several
years have seen the development of de facto NATO naval efforts in
the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean area. There have been a number
of non-United States NATO warships in the area ensuring that
various countries knew NATO intended to keep open the oil supply
lines. Similarly, the use of American airlift to deliver French and
Moroccan troops to Zaire was a model of multinational cooperation
to achieve mutually desired goals. Once American planning is inte-
grated into a NATO approach to the entire planet our unique
requirements to build one force for Central Europe and an entirely
different force for the Third World will diminish. That will bring
some sense of proportion into military requirements which are
currently absurd in terms of our real ability to develop a two- or
three-war capacity in peacetime. At the present time we have used
that slogan because we have deceived ourselves about the cost of a
real conventional deterrent in Europe. We have also deceived our-
selves about our real ability to project power in the Third World. The
United States cannot possibly do both. NATO as an alliance can.
That has to be our goal.

Eighth, we must regain control of the escalation ladder by

making it unprofitable for the Soviets to climb the rungs. Possibly
the most frightening single development of the last decade has been
the methodical, calm, professional manner in which the Soviet mil-
itary has addressed the problem of weapons of mass destruction.
The Soviets have concluded that it is possible that these weapons
will be used and have decided to ensure that they will win any
exchange at any level.

This response to weapons of mass destruction is appropriate to

a country which in this century has witnessed the horrors of major
war being fought on its own soil. Soviet leaders know that millions
can die and yet a nation continue to fight because they have per-

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sonally experienced that reality. They also know that the world is
dangerous since they themselves have lived through surprise
attacks and because of that surprise have seen their cities de-
stroyed. From their perspective being prepared to climb the escala-
tion ladder is prudent, not aggressive behavior.

The Western response to weapons of mass destruction has till

now been to recoil in horror and emphasize the destabilizing
aspects of their possible use. Such reactions are fine if the only
possible first-user is the West. Moral revulsion might block us from
ever using such weapons. However, moral revulsion seldom helps
the victim if the aggressor doesn't share that feeling. Given Soviet
use of biological and chemical weapons in Southeast Asia and their
present use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan, there is every
reason to believe that the Soviets will use whatever weapons they
think will help them. The more serious the conflict the more likely
they are to be willing to risk escalation.

In this setting the West cannot simply plan to win convention-

ally and then rely on Soviet morality or common sense to avoid
escalating. Indeed, Soviet doctrine implies that a Western conven-
tional victory would lead to a Soviet escalation in an effort to regain
the initiative and open up the chance of victory. Therefore the West
must be prepared at each rung of the ladder to trump the Soviet
card. We must be capable of causing them so much damage at each
level that there is no profit to the Soviets in looking fora new level of
violence in order to avoid defeat at a lower level.

This capacity for overtrumping on the escalation ladder has to

be real because again it is the Soviet intelligence officer and military
analyst who has to be our target if deterrence is to work. Ultimately it
has to be the military committee in the Kremlin which advises the
political leadership to negotiate instead of escalating. Only by con-
vincing them that no increase in violence will work will we be able to
force them to a negotiating table once war has begun.

Ninth, a military aiiance can be secure only if it is based on a

stable political-economic and cultural alliance. For over a genera-
tion NATO has existed largely as a negative, defensive alliance
against the Soviet Union. That initial impulse born of fear and
insecurity is gradually ebbing. The once-passive and insecure
Europeans now have their own strengths, their own agenda, their

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own interests. If the alliance continues to be narrowly anti-Soviet it

will become increasingly unstable. The fact is that Western Europe
and the United States have many interests beyond avoiding war
with the Soviet Union. As George Ball explained in his parable of the
society that built a dam to avoid flooding and then as flooding
ceased grew less interested in maintaining the dam because there
was no longer any proof of its value, the longer war is avoided the
harder it will be to take it seriously at a political level.

NATO must develop a positive new agenda for its citizens and
societies to work on. Peace, freedom, and prosperity are possible
on this planet in the next century if the free peoples of the West
decide to encourage market economies, spread the advantages of
high technology and education, and develop global institutions
capable of securing prosperity and freedom for most human beings.
Revolutions in biology, space, and information technologies will
make it possible for the West to offer the Third World advances in
the quality of life, in information, and in new ways of feeding and
healing people that will simply eliminate the Communist Bloc from
competition. A concerted effort by NATO to develop industrial
projects in space, information technology, and biology that tran-
scend national boundaries and draw all the West together could
create such a momentum of human energy that NATO's military
alliance would survive as a by-product of the interaction of the rest
of the NATO nations' civilian population.

In closing it should be noted that taking war seriously is more

important for the United States and its NATO allies now than at any
time in the past two generations. Not only is our nuclear deterrence
fading, but the strains and stresses on the Soviet Union are increas-
ing. At a time when our ability to deter war is decaying, the pros-
pects of the Soviet Union becoming desperate are increasing. We
have not faced as dangerous a period as the near future since Adolf
Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia.

The West is winning the war for the human spirit across the
planet. By any reasonable standard the West is also winning the
geopolitical war as Egypt, India, China, and others turn away from
the Soviet Union. The West is also clearly winning the economic
competition despite our current unemployment and inflation prob-
lems. The only conflict we are in danger of losing with the Soviet
Union is war itself. If we fail to take war seriously and fail to prepare

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for it professionally and rigorously, we may well see a thousand

years of darkness fall across Europe and from there across America
itself. If that happens it will not be a Soviet success, it will be a
Western failure. It we are willing to face the danger forthrightly and
respond honestly to the challenge, nothing can threaten us. If we
are unwilling to do so, nothing can save us. That is what is at stake.

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 Chapter 6

Comparing United States and

Soviet National Strategies

Panelists were challenged to address the following charter:

"This panel and papers will seek to identify the key elements in both
US and Soviet national long-term strategies. An attempt will be
made to compare the geopolitical, economic, and military strate-
gies of both nations and to analyze how much each government's
strategies seem to be reactive or opportunistic versus calculated
and long-term. The group will try to assess what weaknesses and
vulnerabilities might be exploited in the other country's strategies
and where contending strategies might lead to direct or indirect
conflict."

197
 Panel Summary

Dr. Samuel P. Huntington, Chairman

Harvard University

Mr. John A. Baker, Rapporteur

Department of State

The panel had a first-rate start with two first-rate papers. One,
"Assessing Soviet National Security Strategy," was presented by
Dimitri K. Simes. The other. "U.S. Strategy for National Security,"
was given by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff.

With the stimulation of these two excellent papers, the panel

began its discussion with some of the basic elements of strategy. For
a definition, we drew on what Bob Pfaltzgraff raised in his paper.
This is that the essence of strategy is goals and the coordinated and
consistent utilization of the elements of statecraft to achieve those
goals. Having a strategy means having a hierarchy of objectives and
making choices to achieve them.

The panel members agreed that there is a relationship between

the relative power of a nation and its need for a national strategy.
The elimination of post-World War II power disparity means that
having a national strategy is even more important for the United
States. As for the question of whether or not the United States
currently has a national strategy, since January 1981, there does
seem to be one. Although the panel members would not necessarily
agree with either the goals that have been established or the choices
that have been made to achieve those goals, the United States has
the basic elements of a strategy. As for the Soviet Union, the panel
was led by Dimitri Simes's paper and his conclusion that it finds
itself without a long-term strategy and without even clear and firm
assumptions about the international situation.

As one would expect, with the diversity of backgrounds repres-

ented on the panel, there was not total agreement on any one of the
issues discussed. There were, however, many interesting points

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Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

raised by the panel members, points which underlined both the

need for and the difficulty of achieving a national strategy. The best
way of summarizing these points would be to put them into four
categories: (1) Soviet and United States goals, (2) the threats to
each country, (3) the capabilities of each, and (4) the dilemmas.

GOALS

Although the Soviet Union may lack a clear national strategy,

there seems to be a consensus on its objectives. The priority of
these objectives is also fairly clear.

1. Security of the regime. This is first and foremost. And, as

Dimitri Simes pointed out, this means that the Soviet Union will not
favor detente at the risk of internal order.

2. Security of the Soviet Empire. This is second but not totally

separate from the first.

3. Avoid encirclement. This is a strong and historical goal and is

reflected in historic Soviet policies toward the Federal Republic of
Germany and China.

4. Displace and replace the United States as the major world

power.

During the discussion of United States goals, a panel member

pointed out that there has been confusion between goals and
means. He used the example of containment. It most often is viewed
as a goal, an end in itself, when it should be viewed as a means.
There were three United States goals discussed. The difficulty the
panel had in defining these goals suggests the difficulty of setting a
national strategy.

1. Favorable distribution of power. This means favorable to the

United States.

2. An international system favorable to United States values.

3. An international environment in which United States inter-

ests may be safeguarded.

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 Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

THREATS

The Soviet Union sees itself as being highly vulnerable. It is

threatened by the sheer existence of the outside world. Whatever
real threat the United States may pose to the Soviet Union is com-
pounded by this view of the international environment. In addition,
saying that the Soviets have this view does not suggest that it would
not be possible to assuage the fear by certain actions.

The panel discussed the reasons for the deep insecurity of the
Soviet leaders. It was suggested that they may be found in the lack
of legitimacy of succession. Detente is not working. The economy is
not working. And their adversary is rebuilding its strength.

The Soviet Union is not alone in its distortion of reality. The

United States has had a historical fear of the Soviet Union. The
record suggests that this fear often has been unreal, divorced from
reality. There was the scare of 1919; there was the McCarthy period;
and there was NSC-68. NSC-68 was described by one panel
member as a lantasy document.

While the Soviet Union represents the major threat to the Uni-
ted States, the panel member pointed out that it is not the only
threat. The United States must be concerned about threats from
other areas and the national strategy needs to reflect these.

CAPABILITIES

The relative capabilities of both superpowers is declining.

Neither can control the chessboard as before-or as they thought
they could before. There was some discussion, for example, that it
was just as difficult for the United States to control its allies in the
1950s as it is today. Different views were presented on exactly how
successful the Soviet Union has been over time in controlling its
allies.

On the question of economic capabilities, the discussion high-

lighted the relative weakness of both countries. As for the specific
condition of the Soviet economy it was described in various terms
from "not as bad as the Administration would have us believe" to
"absolutely awful."

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Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

DILEMMAS

Neither country is without its strategic dilemmas. For the Soviet

Union there is the serious problem of balancing resources between
needs. There is the question of economic reforms. there is the
question of how to handle detente, as defined from the Soviet point
of view. Beyond these, there is Afghanistan. It was argued that the
Soviets probably cannot win that war continuing as they are and
that victory would require taking over the war completely and going
after sanctuaries in Pakistan. On the other hand, it was suggested
that the Soviet Union might find it desirable to use some form of
settlement in Afghanistan as a means of improving relations with
China.

As for the United States, high on the list of dilemmas is strategic

arms. The problem is one of continuing competition with the Soviet
Union while at the same time working toward an arms-control
accord. There was almost complete agreement on this second ele-
ment. It is viewed as a must for a new administration. There must be
an arms-control position early. and it must show progress. The
current administration suffers from not having done that.

The United States has the problem of setting realistic goals. It

also has the problem of deciding how those goals are going to be
achieved. Will it be done with a unilateral strategy or a muitilateral
strategy? Will it be reactive or activist? There seemed to be general
agreement that the United 3,tates cannot adopt a unilateral strategy
and most seemed to favor being activist rather than just reactive.
These two positions, however, further underscore the dilemmas
because, as was pointed out, the greater the number of actor', in the
process, the more difficult it will be to be activist.

202
 Assessing Soviet
National Security Strategy

Dr. Dimitri K. Simes

The Johns Hopkins University

Americans have traditionally had difficulty analyzing the Soviet

Union's long-term strategy. Wide zigzags in US perceptions of the
Russians' international behavior can be only partially explained by
shifts in the Kremlin's approach to the world. Factors for which the
Soviets can be only remotely responsible and which sometimes lay
completely outside their control have on many occasions gredtly
influenced America's images of its principal rival. Robert Kaiser has
wisely cautioned observers "..to keep in mind that the Soviet
Union does not exist in American, or British, or German terms. It
exists in Russian terms, in a unique setting and cultural environ-
ment unlike anything we know. Comparisons are inevitable, but
usually irrelevant. Russians could not live like Englishmen or Ameri-
cans even if they wanted to, which they don't. They must live like
Russians which means they cannot turn their society into a copy of
ours."•

AMERICAN IMAGES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Neither can the USSR, even if it was interested, conduct a

foreign policy which would be a mirror image of the way the United
States conducts itself in the international arena. Moscow looks at
the world through a different cultural, historical and psychological
prism. It responds to different challenges and perceives different
opportunities. Its policy is formulated through different channels
and according to totally different procedures than in the American
case. Finally the Soviet Union goes through its own states of devel-
opment, experiences its own periods of fear and hope-periods
which more often than not are not synchronized with the historical
cycles evolving in the United States.

Because of these numerous and serious disparities, American

thinking regarding what the Russians are up to in international

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Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

affairs, how well they are doing for themselves and in what way their
successes and failures affect US interests, has, at best, suffered
from a tendency to draw premature conclusions and, at worst, has
been ethnocentrically divorced from reality and occasionally com-
pletely off the mark.

A newly fashionable school of thought, particularly strong

among influential sectors of the Reagan Administration, assumes
that the Soviet empire is declining. It still represents a considerable
threat and is responsible for a lot of global mischief, but to paraph-
rase Soviet propagandists talking about imperialism, while its
nature has not changed, its opportunities are now severely limited.
In short, the USSR is perceived as decaying. but deadly.

Certainly, during the last ten years, the aging Brezhnev leader-
ship has encountered a number of serious difficulties both at home
and abroad. Still, is there credible evidence that we are dealing not
with a temporary Time of Troubles, but with a fundamental systemic
crisis? The answer is far from obvious. First, economically the
Soviets, despite their growing shortcomings, are not at the edge of
disaster. They are still the leading oil, coal, steel and concrete
producer and their output of electricity and especially of natural gas
is growing quickly. Their declining growth rates have not been any
lower during the last two years than those in the United States. In
fact, Soviet rates have kept pace with American ones throughout the
whole of the 1970s.

Second, the Soviets have managed to deal successfully with the

troubling wave of dissent which swept the USSR during the high
days of detente. In 1977, the regime began systematically arresting.
imprisoning and/or deporting anyone involved in dissenting activi-
ties considered by the authorities to represent a challenge to the
system. The crackdown was so thorough and so effective that
Andrei Sakharov's wife, Elena Bonner, was recently forced to dis-
band the last of the Helsinki monitoring groups, the organizations
which had provided a rallying point for much of the dissent appear-
ing during the 1970s. Thus, the Soviet leadership has demonstrated
the clear ability, and determination, to contain political dissatisfac-
tion within the narrow limits it finds acceptable.

Finally, there is a consensus among Western students of Soviet

affairs that the Brezhnev regime is increasingly inept, out of steam

204
 Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

and indecisive. It has difficulty defining priorities, making tough

choices and introducing innovations. It would be a fair guess that if
this kind of leadership style were to continue indefinitely, the Soviet
Union would indeed find itself in a major crisis. But the Brezhnev
regime will not last forever, the General Secretary's periodic recov-
eries from ailment not-withstanding. One is obliged at least to
entertain the possibility that Brezhnev's heirs will act with greater
boldness and imagination. We simply do not know whether domes-
tic constraints on their freedom of maneuver would outweigh an
apparent desire among the elite, particularly among its younger
generation, to see things moving again. Neither do we know to what
extent carefully calibrated reforms can allow the system to modify
itself without a radical overhaul.

In the international arena, the last several years have clearly

provided Moscow with ample grounds for concern and frustration.
But Soviet foreign-policy setbacks should not be overstated. Basic
Russian military capabilities have improved during the 1970s and
provided the Kremlin with both rough strategic parity with the
United States and a new conventional global reach. These capabili-
ties, at the disposal of a leadership more inclined to take risks and
more sensitive and sophisticated in local situations, may allow a
number of major new openings for Russian geopolitical advances.

In the Third World, the Soviets overextended themselves and

their positions in a number of important areas, such as the Middle
East, and appeared to be considerably weaker than conventional
wisdom had previously suggested. But here the problem may have
been more with American conventional wisdom than with the
Soviets' relative strength. What, after all, were the USSR's realistic
options for helping its allies and clients during what the Israelis have
called the Peace for Galilee operation? Vadim Zagladin, a CPSU
Central Committee member and First Deputy Chief of the Central
Committee's International Department, addressed this question in a
recent television interview. Asked why the USSR permitted an
Israeli victory allegedly backed by the US, Zagladin responded:

What do you have in mind with this "permitted or not permit-

ted"? Well, what has happened? There is a war between Israel
and one of the Arab countries, aggression against an Arab
country. Under these circumstances what can the Soviet Union
do? Should it attack Israel? This is a rather impossible situation.

205
Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

By the way, no one here has raised this question, or could

anyone have raised it. When it comes to support due our friends,
the Syrians and the Palestinian patriots, we have done every-
thing, in the political and diplomatic spheres, in the United
Nations, in the course of our negotiations with the United States
and the Arab countries. We made up all the losses they suffered
in the first few days of the fighting. Our Syrian comrades say
they are now much better equipped than before.

Zagladin also raised the question of "what did the other Arab
countries do?" His clear message was that Moscow could not and
moreover was not supposed to, do more for the Arabs than they
were willing to do for themselves. Such a frank admission may be
interpreted as a sign of impotence, but it is not the first time either
the US or the Soviet Union has encountered situations beyond their
power to affect. Not to engage in bluffs and pitiful grandstanding
may sometimes be not an admission of weakness, but an indication
of prudence and common sense.

In relations with China, the Soviets failed to achieve a real

reconciliation, but are surely happy to witness new Sino-American
friction and particularly the tentative indications of Peking's (Beij-
ing's) interest in reactivating contacts with Moscow. That is much
less than the Kremlin wants and there is a real possibility that the
Chinese are just playing the Russian card to pressure Washington.
Nevertheless, Brezhenev's successors may seriously consider mak-
ing some concessions to Chinese demands (such as thinning
troops on the border, withdrawing from Mongolia and Afghanistan
and abandoning support of the Vietnamese occupation of Kampu-
chea) in order to restore a more favorable relationship with Peking
(Beijing). None of the possible concessions really affects funda-
mental Soviet interests and while a resumption of genuine Sino-
Soviet friendship is probably out of the question, the Soviets may
have some real opportunities further to neutralize America's ability
to play the China card in its geopolitical competition with the USSR.

In Poland, the Soviet Union has, perhaps just temporarily,

avoided the worst. There are no new difficulties with the Kremlin's
relations with other East European allies. And some former difficul-
ties, most notably with Romania, are more or less under control. As
far as Western Europe is concerned, the USSR is still on the offen-
sive hoping to preserve and enhance a separate detente with the
Europeans and to undermine their willingness to follow US leader-

206
 Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

ship.' At this point, as the pipeline dispute and continuing pressures

from Western Europe's antinuclear movement suggest. Soviet
hopes are not entirely without foundation.

In short, while the Soviet Union is going through a difficult

time, both domestically and internationally, it may be dangerous
to assume that the West is dealing with a paper tiger, or even with a
desperate giant, bound-if only the NATO allies persevere in
squeezing a little harder-to surrender or to collapse. The Russians
went through an assertive phase in the middle 1970s and it is
traditional for them to take a pause and regroup before proceeding
with a new offensive. Moreover, their long-term future remains
uncertain. And Brezhnev's successors are not out of options to put
their act together both at home and abroad.

Thus, the Soviet situation looks so desperate primarily because

of our earlier fears that the'Russians were on the march. They were
about to exploit an alleged window of vulnerability. They were
planning to cut off Western oil supplies by moving to the Persian
Gulf through a landlocked, rebellious Afghanistan. They were plot-
ting to use their new Marxist friends in Angola and Mozambique to
deny the West access to South Africa's strategic minerals. They
were manipulating an arc of instability running from Mogadisho
through Tehran to Islamabad and Kabul. And finally, they had
developed nothing but contempt for the United States' will and
power and were prepared to disregard America's growing warnings
even when US vital interests were at stake.

Those who write science fiction in the field of international

relations are always entitled to say that it was their vigilance and
alarms that avoided the worst. Still, the easiest strategy to defeat is a
strategy which never existed in the first place. And Soviet successes
and failures today must be evaluated not on the basis of yesterday's
exaggerated fears, but rather on the basis of actual Soviet capabili-
ties, actions and intentions, Inevitably, the exposure of the United
States to international traumas, such as Vietnam orthe Iran hostage
crisis, and changes in Americn domestic currents, cannot fail to
have an impact on US perceptions of the other superpower. But as
long as Washington persists in the habit of thinking about the Soviet
Union primarily in American, rather than Soviet terms, there are
bound to be serious miscalculations concerning Soviet foreign-
policy behavior and, equally inevitably, periodic reappraisals of US

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Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

policy as American politics enter new phases or old dogmas are

proven false.

WHITHER SOVIET LONG-TERM STRATEGY?

Does the Soviet Union seek world domination or does it simply

want to become America's equal in global affairs? This highly
unprecisely formulated and politically irrelevant question somehow
managed to surface as the principal issue in debates about policy in
the Soviet Union in the late 1970s. Let us assume for argument's
sake that Moscow is interested in dominating the world. What does
this really tell the West about the Kremlin's motives and policies?
Actually, very little. The Soviets may dream of world domination,
but what aie they willing to risk? What sacrifices are they prepared
to make in pursuit of it? Where does world domination stand on their
priority list in relation to other more defense-oriented objectives?
Does the USSR have any approximate timetable and a coherent
strategy to accomplish it? On the other hand, is the statement that
the Soviet leadership will be satisfied with military parity and equal
status in world affairs any more sound? How do the Soviets define
parity and global equality? Do they believe that they already have
them or are they convinced that obtaining them would require a
further "shift in the correlation of forces" in the Russians' favor?
Does equality with the United States mean that the superpowers
would act in condominium, or conversely, would the Soviet Union
be entitled to seek new global positions at the expense of the United
States and in a fashion reminiscent of American behavior in the
days of US preponderance?

As Vernon Aspaturian correctly observes:

Actually, Soviet policy amounts to something less than a master

plan (grand design) or a five- or ten-year plan (global strategy),
yet it is something much more than a sequence of responses to
targets of opportunity ... The Soviet Union responds to targets
of opportunity, it often creates its own opportunities, and it
4
behaves in the absence of opportunities.

Indeed, during the Brezhnev era, the Soviet Union has failed to
develop a truly coherent and realistic foreign-policy strategy. The
very nature of the mandate of the post-Khrushchev regime with its
emphasis on continuity, stability, prudence, conservatism and
bureaucratic consensus has discouraged daring schemes and

208
 Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

long-term planning. As Harry Gelman points out: "... despite the

obligatory obeisance all Soviet institutions must make to paper
plans, the practical decisionmaking horizon of the Soviet leader-
ship, particularly in foreign affairs, is remarkably short.",

Tired of Stalin's purges and Khrushchev's harebrained experi-

mentation, the Brezhnev elite has abovp all yearned for reliability.
pragmatism and steadiness as central elements of the post-
Khrushchev leadership style. Leonid Brezhnev has been extremely
careful to appear the champion of these yearnings. In the early
seventies, the General Secretary began to act with greater confi-
dence and even occasional flamboyance. But just at the time when
Brezhnev was probably secure enough to initiate policies sure to be
considered controversial among some segments of the establish-
ment, his ailments started to interfere with his ability to offer deci-
sive leadership. The General Secretary's failing physical health
could not but affect his political health as well. His personal position
did not appear to be challenged. As a matter of fact, a number of
aging Politburo members had reason to feel more comfortable with
a less assertive, somewhat handicapped leader. Still, even with his
staying power intact, Brezhnev lost an important opportunity to
make critical foreign-policy choices without which no strategy
worth the name could be shaped. There is a possibility that the
Politburo could have scored reasonably well if the international
environment would have favored the policies the Soviets already
had in place. But the progressive decline of detente with the United
States, the erosion of Soviet influence in the Middle East and the
emergence of tempting new opportunities in Africa and Asia called
for a serious reassessment of earlier assumptions.

Such a reassessment was apparently beyond the Politburo's

conceptual and organizational reach. The Brezhnev leadership's
course became increasingly reactive and eclectic. On the surface,
the General Secretary and his associates may have seemed to be on
a worldwide offensive. In reality, they were probably politically and
intellectually confused as they attempted simultaneously to pursue
a variety of mutually contradictory policies: they refused, for exam-
ple, to recognize that in the long run tough choices could not be
avoided between expansion and detente, between preventing Sino-
American rapproachment and engaging in activities which both
Peking and Washington viewed as threatening, and between encou-
raging a split between America and her European allies and deploy-

209
Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

ing SS-20 missiles despite the explicit warnings of Chancellor

Schmidt.

Of course, the absence of a true grand design has its positive

side. Too well defined a master plan may undermine one's ability to
deal with international complexities. A lack of strategy allows
greater operational flexibility and prevents the commission of
costly errors in the pursuit of a vision. And the USSR's principal
rival, the United States, was hardly capable of sustaining a steady
and calibrated line in world affairs following the collapse of Nixon's
imperial presidency. Thus, the Politburo's opportunistic behavior
did not prevent Soviet foreign policy from retaining its effective-
ness, at least as long as there was no urgent necessity for the
leadership to determine priorities. And the Politburo was spared
this necessity because for the time being the Soviet superpower was
the new boy on the block and benefited from the perception of many
postcolonial nations that the Kremlin merely sought to restrict the
"imperialists' " freedom of maneuver. In addition, the United States,
recovering from its Vietnam-Watergate trauma, was unwilling to go
beyond empty rhetoric in challenging Soviet geopolitical advances.

There is no reason to pity the poor Russians. Nor should one

underestimate the threat opportunistic Soviet assertiveness poses
to the credibility of the United States' global role. The point is that
the USSR under Brezhnev hardly represents Hitler's Germany, Nor-
man Podhoretz notwithstanding. 6 Moscow has been clearly inter-
ested in changing the international status quo and doing so at the
United States' expense. But the Politburo lacks the Nazis' adventur-
istic streak. their sense of urgency, their missionary zeal, and,
finally, their readiness to risk the very survival of the regime in the
name of the cause.

Instead of a grand design, the Politburo has a pattern of interna-

tional behavior which seeks to accomplish a number of remarkably
constant objectives and which is based on several evolving assump-
tions about the opportunities and dangers provided by the outside
environment. At the top of this list of objectives is the security of the
regime.

It is important for those dealing with the Soviet Union to under-

stand this. The Politburo is most reluctant to engage in activities
which can invoke a real threat to the Communist system. The Soviet

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 Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

leadership is not about to threaten its domestic hold by pushing so

hard internationally that Russia itself becomes the target of power-
ful counteraction. Nor is the Kremlin inclined-almost no matter
what the potential foreign-policy benefits-to display any but a
marginal flexibility on the issue of internal controls. Giving the
domestic situation unquestionable priority means in practical terms
that the Kremlin does not want to test whether it can fight and win a
nuclear war. It also means that Soviet rulers were bound to react
harshly to Western, especially American, efforts to use detente as
leverage to achieve internal liberalization in Russia.

Another priority is maintenance of the Soviet empire. The

empire is much more central to Soviet thinking than it was in the
case of the United States, Britain, France, Spain, Portugal and even
the Ottomans. Since the overthrow of the Mongol yoke, Russia has
never existed as a true nation state. It has always been a multina-
tional entity. And the prospect of the empire's unraveling has always
invoked great fears that disintegration would become uncontrolla-
ble and lead to a collapse of Russian statehood. Moreover, whatever
the Soviet leadership declare publicly regarding the "unbreakable
unity of the socialist community," deep in their bones they probably
know that without Russia's armed forces and coercion their hold not
only over Eastern Europe, but also over some areas of the Soviet
Union (most notably the Baltic states) would be short-lived.

Events in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland probably per-

suaded the Kremlin that it is its military power, not the alleged
irreversibility of Communist totalitarian controls, that keeps the
Soviet empire intact. Moscow is too unsure of its clients' loyalty to
risk war in Europe, even if it could be restricted to conventional
weapons (something not taken for granted by the Soviet high com-
mand). But for the same reason the Russians become highly ner-
vous when East-West accommodation provides the context for their
allies to forge independent political and economic ties with the
capitalist world, especially the United States. In short, concern for
the safety of the empire makes the Politburo simultaneously less
prone to dangerous adventures and less likely to undertake genuine
and comprehensive accommodation with the West.

Of almost equal concern with maintenance of the empire is the

Soviet desire to prevent a new encirclement by hostile powers. The
fears of encirclement -or, as the Soviets sometimes call it,

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Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

blockade-has traditionally been an important consideration in the

USSR. And the fear has stayed alive despite the Soviets' accretion of
global power. At the same time Sino-Soviet skirmishes took place
on the Ussuri River in March 1969, the West German Bundestag was
called into session in West Berlin to elect a new president. The
Soviet media were quick to charge that "it was no accident" that the
two events took place almost simultaneously. If there was no actual
coordination between Bonn and Peking, then they were at least
implicitly reinforcing each other. West German revanchists were
allegedly violating the status of West Berlin and the Chinese were
attempting to use force to revise the "sacred" borders of the Soviet
Union.'

Prevention of a new encirclement was to a considerable extent

behind the unsuccessful trip Soviet Council of Ministers Chairman
Aleksei Kosygin paid to Peking in September 1969. It also added
urgency to concluding the 1970 agreements between the two Ger-
manies and the Quadripartite Agreement regulating the status of
West Berlin. The fear of encirclement clearly contributed to the
emergence of a near consensus in Moscow-despite the United
States' continued involvement in Vietnam-in favor of normalizing
relations with the US. In the early eighties, when Washington
adopted a more antagonistic attitude to the Soviet Union, the Polit-
buro predictably responded by reactivating efforts, on one hand, to
promote a separate detente with the West Europeans, and on the
other hand, to proceed with an improvement in Sino-Soviet
relations.

Further down in the hierarchy of objectives held by the Brezh-

nev leadership was the temptation to reshape the world order While
not as crucial as the three defensive objectives mentioned above.
the commitment to change the international status quo is, for a
variety of reasons, important to the Politburo. First. Soviet ideology,
which predicts the eventual victory of Soviet style Communism,
requires constant reaffirmation by deeds. As the Soviet economy
deteriorates, corruption flourishes and the regime fails to display
anything even remotely resembling charismatic and confident lead-
ership, there will be a growing need to use foreign-policy successes
for domestic legitimation purposes.

The search for legitimacy through international advances does

not limit the Soviets only to Third World geopolitical exploits.

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 Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

Detente with the United States, which the Soviets have interpreted
as recognition by the US of the USSR's new superpower status,
could also be used by them to demonstrate that the "correlation of
forces" was shifting in Moscow's favor. Nevertheless, it is doubtful
that detente with the West-and any benefits which could be
derived from it-could, in Soviet eyes, completely eliminate the
need to demonstrate from time to time that, in accordance with
Lenin's prophecies, imperialism was gradually losing its interna-
tional positions.

Second, even today the Soviet Union perceives itself as an

underdog in the global competition with the United States. Extend-
ing the Soviet geopolitical presence into new regions not only
appeals to Kremlin machismo, it is also seen as a good security
investment. It allows the USSR to threaten adversaries; it dissuades
opponents from interfering in the Soviet sphere of influence; and it
positions the Kremlin to pressure competitors to defer more and
more to the upcoming Soviet superpower. Finally, there are eco-
nomic interests involved. In terms of its foreign-trade structure, the
Soviet Union is still a developing country. Thus, it is not illogical for
Moscow to support Third World raw-material producers to demand
a redistribution of international wealth. With a chronically ailing
agricultural sector and stagnating oil production, the USSR has a
vital interest in steadily growing oil and mineral prices. Without
such increases, Russia would have tremendous difficulty buying
grain and machinery in the West.

A further Soviet foreign-policy objective requiring attention is

the Politburo's interest in obtaining the fruits of international eco-
nomic cooperation. The Soviets are especially hungry for Western
credits and technology. Their failure to undertake meaningful eco-
nomic reforms coupled wth their reluctance either to cut defense
spending or to squeeze the Soviet consumer harder encouraged the
Politburo to look for politically acceptable shortcuts. Economic
cooperation with the West looked promising and the initial enthusi-
asm of the Western business community over the prospects of large
new Eastern markets reaffirmed Soviet inclinations in this direction.

Last, but definitely not least, the Soviet regime is absolutely

determined to improve its military capabilities. Possessing military
power which is not just second to none, but which is capable of
dealing with a potential coalition of enemies, is viewed as an abso-

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Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

lute security requirement. The Soviets probably do not believe that

they already have military superiority over the United States. But in
any case they are likely to perceive their legitimate defense needs
quite differently than the West. As long as diplomatic
arrangements-whether with allies or opponents-do not funda-
mentally alter Soviet convictions that they require sufficient military
power to act unilaterally in the face of a variety of real and imaginary
worst-case scenarios, the Soviet arms buildup will remain unaccept-
able to the West.

Furthermore, Soviet military might has been increasingly used

by the Soviets for offensive purposes. The expansion of Soviet
influence through ideological appeal and economic assistance, as
projected by Khrushchev, has turned out to be a big disappoint-
ment. And the Brezhnev leadership has resorted increasingly to the
one instrument at its disposal which has seemed to work best-
namely, military muscle, and more specifically, arms sales, security
assistance, the use of surrogates, and ultimately. in the case of
Afghanistan, direct reliance on Soviet ground forces. As the last
Soviet Minister of Defense Andrei A. Grechko explained:

At the present stage, the historic function of the Soviet Armed

Forces is not restricted merely to their function of defending the
Motherland and other socialist countries. In its foreign policy
activity, Soviet state policy actively, purposefully opposes the
export of counterrevolution and the policy of oppression, sup-
ports the national liberation struggle. and resolutely resists
imperialist aggression in whatever distant region of the planet it
may appear.'

Grechko's statements, combined as they are with Soviet Minis-

ter of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko's regular assertions that no
international crisis can henceforth be settled without Soviet invol-
vement and approval, have an ominous ring.

These principal objectives of Soviet foreign policy have

remained fairly constant through the Brezhnev era. What has under-
gone change has been the relative priority the Kremlin has assigned
to them and also the assumptions regarding how most effectively to
pursue them in the international environment.

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 Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

CHANGING SOVIET ASSUMPTIONS

The greatest shifts in Soviet thinking probably took place in

Soviet assumptions regarding relations with the United States. In
the late sixties, the Brezhnev regime was simultaneously furious
with the United States for American involvement in Vietnam (invol-
vement which included bombing a Soviet ally) and delighted to
witness the way in which the war gradually eroded US domestic
cohesion, American willingness to maintain other global commit-
ments and US international prestige. Later, however, the logic of
detente with Western Europe, the slpit with China, US disengage-
ment from Vietnam and the Nixon Administration's formidable
image persuaded Moscow to accept normalization with the United
States. Not unlike the Americans, the Soviets have a tendency to
make a virtue out of a necessity and to practice ex post facto
overintellectualizations of what are essentially a series of loosely
connected tactical steps.

The Brezhnev leadership, encouraged by the excessive optim-

ism of Moscow's America watchers, managed to persuade itself that
detente was irreversible. US willingness to accommodatethe USSR
was, it was believed, based on a new correlation of forces. This
correlation of forces was supposed to continue shifting in the
Soviets' direction and the "realistic elements" more and more domi-
nant in American ruling circles would increasingly recognize that
their own best interest lay in not challenging what the Soviets called
the "new international reality."

As subsequent events demonstrated, this was both an

extremely comforting and an extremely misleading assumption on
Msocow's part. It was comforting because it presented the oppor-
tunity to boast about having been accepted as a legitimate equal by
the other superpower. Similarly, there was the expectation of siza-
ble economic and political dividends. And since detente was not a
temporary development, but a response to long-term objective con-
ditions, there was no need to make hard choices to placate the
Americans. Their narrowly defined vital interests in Europe, the East
and to a lesser degree the Middle East, had to be respected or at
least not assaulted too boldly. But everywhere else it was open
season. And the US was not expected either to resist or even to get
particularly upset if the Kremlin on occasion picked up an addi-
tional piece of real estate here and there.

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Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

This, of course, was a profound misreading of the American

public mood. Nobody knows what the Soviets would have done in
Angola if they had not miscalcualted the US reaction. But the
miscalculation contributed to the apparent ease with which the
momentous decision to intervene by proxy was made.

The outcry the Soviet-Cuban role in Angola caused in the

United States perplexed and annoyed the Soviets. But they failed to
see the writing on the wall. The Politburo refused to accept that the
moment of truth had come and that a choice had to be made
between detente with the United States and meddling in the Third
World in pursuit of questionable and marginal advantages. Con-
fronted with the message that sacrifices had to be made, thL K-"rem-
lin preferred to do nothing. The Brezhnev leadership reacted to
Kissinger's warnings by on one hand issuing appeals for continued
improvements in relations and on the other hand exploiting new
hotbeds of international instability, as in the Somali-Ethiopian
conflict.

In trying to justify this apparent inconsistency, Soviet officials

and analysts suggest in private conversations that Moscow's policy-
makers were not completely blindfolded. Rather, they hoped that a
combination of cautiously avoiding challenges to really vital Ameri-
can interests, indications of good will, and demonstrations that
greater Soviet involvement in the Third World was a fact of life and
had to be accepted, would sooner or later cool off the indignation in
the United States. If such an interpretation represents more than a
belated rationalization it indicates that having persuaded them-
selves regarding the irreversibility of detente, Brezhnev and his
colleagues had great difficulty changing gears and responding
promptly and in an informed fashion to a growing body of evidence
that Washington was unprepared to accept the Soviets' right to use
military instruments in Third World areas.

By the early eighties, the Soviet Union reached the tentative

conclusion that the American ruling classes, not just Presidents
Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, were unprepared to treat the
Soviet Union as a second superpower, or to use the Soviet formula-
tion, they were unprepared to deal with the USSR according to the
"principle of equality and equal security." Without completely giv-
ing up hope that there may be some improvement in the relationship
and reluctant to substantiate US charges by behaving and sounding

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 Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

like warmongers, Soviet policymakers have come more or less full

circle and have returned to their assumptions of fifteen years ago-
that the United States is the principal threat to Soviet security and a
main obstacle to Soviet global ambitions. The name of the game has
become to neutralize the United States, to prove that the Americans
lack the ability to succeed in their anti-Soviet crusade. From detente
with the United States, Soviet foreign policy has shifted its objective
to detente despite and against the United States-detente with the
West Europeans and, if possible, the Chinese to isolate the US
adversary.

Soviet treatment of opportunities in the Third World represents

another example of changing assumptions in Moscow. Nikita
Khrushchev argued that so-called national liberation movements
would develop into a powerful ally of the Soviet bloc and the work-
ing class of capitalist countries in a historic struggle against impe-
rialism. The expectation was that these movements would perceive
the USSR as a natural ally against their former (and in some cases
still current) colonial masters. It was understood that despite
Khrushchev's occasional bluffing Russia did not have the capacity
to assist its friends militarily in regions far from Soviet borders.

But Soviet assumptions gradually changed on both counts.

Moscow lost confidence that developing nations would, according
to the logic of history, choose a noncapitalist path of development
and appeal for Soviet friendship. The Politburo discovered, as
Academician Evgeny Primakov, director of the prestigious Institute
of Oriental Studies, commented, that there was not just one but
rather "two diametrically opposed trends" in developing countries:
radicalization in some and conservative, pro-Western shifts in oth-
ers.9 In sum, history on its own could no longer be assumed to take
care of Soviet interests. Concurrently with this reassessment, the
USSR developed force projection capabilities which enabled it to
give history a shove in the right direction. Opportunities and inten-
tions represent a two-way street. In 1961, the Kremlin could do next
to nothing to help Patrice Lumumba in Zaire (then Congo Kin-
shasa). In 1975. the Soviets were in a position to mount a major airlift
and sealift to assist the MPLA in Angola. And the Kremlin also got a
convenient and presumably willing surrogate in Cuba.

By the end of the late decade, however, the Soviet Union began
to realize that reliance on military muscle also had considerable

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Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

costs and was not altogether effective. In addition to damaging the

East-West relationship, Soviet Third World exploits failed to deliver
some anticipated tangible geopolitical and economic benefits.
Soviet clients such as Angola, Ethiopia and Vietnam were unwilling
to pay for Soviet assistance with a major increase in the USSR's
military presence. Some landing rights for reconnaissance aircraft
and some port privileges for naval vessels were essentially the limit
of the advantages the Soviets were ableto derive from their commit-
ments. This is in addition, of course, to the satisfaction of receiving
support for Soviet positions at the UN on issues which did not
involve client nations' own interests. Politically, states like Angola,
Ethiopia, and Vietnam tend to guard their independence and are not
beyond probing for possible ways to improve relations with the
West, including the United States.

On balance, the Soviet Union still appears proud of its new

global status. But as recent Soviet passivity during the Lebanon
crisis indicates, the aging Soviet leadership is becoming more dis-
criminating in its willingness to take a stand on behalf of friendly
Third World forces. And there is evidence of a growing sentiment
among the Soviet elite that the USSR has few genuine friends in the
Third World, that most of them are demanding and unreliable allies
of convenience, who ask for too much and are prepared to pay too
little.

CONCLUSIONS

As the Brezhnev era comes to an end, the Soviet Union finds

itself not only without a long-term strategy but without even clear
and firm assumptions about the international situation and how to
cope with it. It is going to be up to Brezhnev's heirsto makeanother
effort to shape a coherent and effective foreign policy. Obviously, a
succession period is not the easiest time for radical policy depar-
tures impossible without alienating some bureaucratic constituen-
cies. And yet in 1953-1956, before Khrushchev had managed to
consolidate his personal power, a consensus among the Presidium
(as the Politburo was called at the time) allowed several important
changes in the direction of the USSR's foreign policy. They ranged
from reconciliation with Yugoslavia to a peace treaty with Austria
and from a declaration that war could be avoided to the new policy
of forming an anti-Western assertive alliance with Third World radi-
cal forces.

218
 Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

Those who are interested in trying to influence Soviet succes-

sion choices would be wise to assess realistically how much the
West can affect Soviet international behavior. Chances are that no
feasible Soviet government would be willing to make significant
concessions when the security of the regime and of its empire are
involved. If there are voices of moderation among the Soviet elite
arguing for turning inward and taking at least a pause in global
expansionism, the surest way to silence them is to create the
impression that the United States is seriously committed to putting
Communist Russia on the ash heap of history. Few regimes are
prepared to cooperate in their own annihilation and the Soviet
regime is not one of them.

As far as Soviet exploits in the Third World are concerned, there

may be much greater flexibility in Moscow. A feeling of being
overextended, according to private information from a number of
well-informed Soviet sources, is increasingly shared by the Soviet
elite. If the United States on one hand demonstrates the power and
will to challenge Soviet expansionism on the ground and on the
other hand avoids treating containment as a strait jacket designed
to stop the Russians everywhere, there may be a real opportunity to
reinforce existing antiexpansionist sentiments in Moscow. This
would not make the Soviet superpower a comfortable partner in
world affairs. Russian military might, the USSR's fundamentally
antagonistic attitude to the West and what it stands for, as well as
Moscow's notorious insensitivity and self-righteousness are not
going to disappear. The Soviet Union is going to remain an adver-
sary, but the specific mix of policies it opts for makes a difference to
the United States and will, one way or another, be influenced by its
actions, regardless of whether American policymakers expressly
seek to exercise such influence.

219
 Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

US Strategy for National Security

Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

ELEMENTS OF STRATEGY

To an extent without historic parallel, the security of the United

States, together with that of allied and friendly states, depends upon
the fashioning of an effective American global strategy. The
essence of such a strategy lies in the achievement of coordination,
coherence, and consistency in planning for the utilization in inte-
grated fashion of all of the elements of statecraft-diplomacy, mil-
itary force, economic strength, science and technology,
psychological-moral elements, political will and leadership-for the
attainment of vitally important objectives. A global strategy is
necessarily dependent upon the ability of strategic planners, with
adequate levels of public support in a pluralistic society, to view
each specific issue in a broad context-one that takes account of
relationships between, and among, seemingly discrete, but never-
theless closely linked, functional categories such as technological-
industrial strength and military power. Seemingly isolated events in
geographically remote parts of the world become part of a pat-
terned sequence in which the policies of an adversary can be ana-
lyzed in a strategic framework and one's own global strategy can be
developed. A strategic world view, necessarily multidimensional, is
deeply rooted in an understanding of the relationship between
geography and technological-political-economic-psychological
factors in national security. A global strategy relates means to ends
based upon an assessment of the capabilities and objectives of an
opponent compared to one's own.

To think strategically is to link the present to the future, for any

strategy has as an essential characteristic a set of clearly defined
objectives that lie beyond the immediate issues of the day. In fact, a
strategy posits goals, sets forth concepts for their attainment with
due consideration for timing and phasing, develops necessary
capabilities, and relates the shorter to the longer term. The greater

221
Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

the timespan between the present and the future within the strategy,
the more general and simple are likely to be its basic elements.
Conversely, the shorter the time between the present and the envis-
aged goals, the more concrete and detailed the planning must
become. All grand strategies, however elegant in their simplicity.
depend for their realization upon the development of specific plans,
priorities, and tactics. On a day-to-day basis thetactics in support of
strategy call for planning related to the posited long-term strategic
objectives adapted to take advantage of opportunities that become
available and to overcome the obstacles of the moment. In the
United States, the postulated requirements of a global strategy con-
front the realities not only of a pluralistic society with the contend-
ing pressures and interests of major constituencies, but also the
complexities of decisionmaking in a large bureaucratic structure,
which in itself may place a heavy burden upon the formulation of a
coherent, consistent global strategy.

To recognize the importance of strategy is to take cognizance

of the inevitable constraints upon available resources, which must
be used as efficiently as possible in support of national security
policy. Like the roadmap, strategy indicates the most effective way
to move from one place to another. If you do not know where you are
going, according to the old adage, any road will take you there.
Similarly, without a strategy, no amount of capabilities would be
sufficient to provide for the common defense, to safeguard the
security of the United States and allied and friendly nations. If all
states neglect strategy to their peril, for weaker members of the
international community a strategy for maximizing the effective-
ness of limited capabilities becomes necessary to survival. If the
margin for error narrows as it has for the United States in the 20th
century, the need for a strategy is more imperative than ever. even
though the sheer abundance of national resources never provided
an alternative to a strategic approach to national security. To face as
the United States does, an adversary that has measurably superior
military capabilities in many categories is to place a greater pre-
mium than in the past upon a strategy which relates all relevant
capabilities to a clearly stated set of objectives sustained by a
national consensus.

A US STRATEGIC WORLD VIEW

In the 20th century the strategic interests of the United States.

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 Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

and hence the conceptual basis for an American global strategy.

have been clearly defined in spite of the historic isolationist-
internationalist debate and the periodic clashes between propo-
nents of world-order politics and advocates of balance of power.'
American foreign policy has been based upon a quest for a favora-
ble distribution of power, together with the evolution of domestic
political structures as compatible as possible with US values and a
global system within which American interests can be adequately
safeguarded. The strategic interests of the United States formed the
basis for American military intervention in two World Wars, and
subsequently for the formation under US leadership of the alliances
and other associations that emerged in the almost two generations
that have passed since World War II. In the absence of such stra-
tegic interests, a policy of American isolationism would have suf-
ficed, for under circumstances in which we were not dependent
upon international trade or in which we were immune to the foreign
policies and values of totalitarian states which might have been
placed in permanent control of Europe and Asia, the United States
could have survived in a world without allies in those continents.

Thus the interventionist-isolationist debate of the earlier years

of this century represented essentially a clash between two con-
tending views of the strategic importance of Eurasia to the United
States in which the concepts of historic American isolationism were
shown to be fallacious. In the final analysis the United States fash-
ioned, in the containment policy of the late 1940s and in NCS-68
between 1950 and 1953, a global strategy which recognized the
enduring interests and goals that had led to our entry into two World
Wars. In "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," which established the
conceptual basis for our postwar relationship with the Soviet Union,
George F. Kennan posited that

the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet
Union must be that of a long-term patient but firm and vigilant
containment of Russian expansive tendencies.. .The Soviet
pressure against the institutions of the Western world is some-
thing that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant applica-
tion of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting
geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts
and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be talked or
charmed out of existence.,'

According to NSC-68, it was necessary to prevent the hostile domi-

223
Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

nation of Europe and Asia in order "to create conditions under

which our free and democratic system can live and prosper." NSC-
68 postulated the achievement of a balance of powerthat would halt
the growth of Soviet hegemony, for "any substantial further exten-
sion of the area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the
possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with
greater strength could be assembled." For this purpose NSC-68
emphasized the need for the defense of all points on the perimeter
of the Free World. This called for a strategy encompassing the
political-diplomatic, military, and economic means of statecraft to
combat the Soviet Union "by all means short of war to (1) block
further expansion of Soviet power, (2) expose the falsities of Soviet
pretensions. (3) induce a retraction of the Kremlin's control and
influence, and (4) in general, to foster the seeds of destruction
within the Soviet system so that the Kremlin is brought at least to the
point of modifying its behavior to conform to the generally accepted
international standards."-3 Therefore, it was posited in the decade
after World War II that the United States needed to maintain, with
other friendly states and allies, overall superiority in power, espe-
cially military capabilities.

Although the United States might have remained physically

intact in a hostile world dominated by one or more Eurasian states
aligned with each other, the minimum price would have been the
creation of a garrison state with attendant consequences for per-
sonal liberties, levels of prosperity, an amounts of armaments. The
idea of such a Fortress America could not provide an acceptable
alternative to a world in which as many other states as possible
shared with the United States as many compatible values, objec-
tives, and social-political-economic structures as possible. For this
purpose, it was held to be necessary for the United States to help
build a balance of power, first by means of US military power
projection in a coalition or Grand Alliance in the two World Wars
and subsequently by the fornation of multilateral alliances of which
NATO became the most important, and by means of a series of
bilateral security ireaties, especially in the Asian-Pacific area. By
the 1960s the United States, it will be recalled, was the leader of
a group of nations termed the Free World. Although not a few were
less free in their domestic political structures than the United States
and their motives for association with the United States were not
always the same, the Free World represented a manifestation of
American global strategy.

224
 Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

Thus the continuity of US strategic interests is evident, for the

problems confronting the United States in the 1980s, although more
complex, require the fashioning of a strategy which, in many of its
basic elements, resembles that of nearly two generations ago, but
which encompasses security issues and regions that were not of
principal concern to the United States in the decade after World War
If.

THE GLOBAL STRATEGIC MAP

In the broadest sense, the global strategic map from an Ameri-

can perspective has encompassed in this century a struggle
between land powers-first Nazi Germany and later the Soviet
Union-and maritime powers-first Britain and subsequently the
United States-with West European allies and the United States
linked in a transatlantic security framework, just as Britain had once
formed coalitions in order to 'prevent the hostile domination of
continental Europe. In Asia, Britain's empire in the Indian subconti-
nent formed a counterpoise to Russian expansion from the north.
The rise of Japan as a maritime state helped to check Tsarist expan-
sion in East Asia. As recognized in the Containment Docrine enun-
ciated in 1974, the immediate problem for the United States, as for
Britain in the preceding era, was to counter the efforts of the Soviet
Union to press its outer zone of influence into states and regions on
the rimlands of Eurasia and into adjacent territories and oceans.

In global geostrategic terms, the struggle of our age between an

historically land-locked state, the Soviet Union, and a maritime
power, the United States, remains for control, or denial of control,
over territories extending from Northwestern and Central Europeto
the Middle East-Persian Gulf-Africa area to Northeast Asia.'
Because the sealanes and the airspace above them constitute the
internal lines of communication between the United States and the
peripheral states of Eurasia, their control is indispensable to Ameri-
can global strategy, just as their denial to the United States has
become a crucially important component of the Soviet global stra-
tegic perspective. In contrast to those of the United States, the
internal lines of communication of the Soviet Union extend across
the land spaces of Eurasia, impenetrable by the United States
except perhaps under wartime conditions. Control of the peri-
pheral, rimland regions of Eurasia by the United States would not be
synonymous with control of the world, although it has been argued

225
Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

correctly, in geostrategic analysis, that such domination would be

indispensable to, and a prelude to, Soviet global hegemony. Hence
the enduring importance for the United States of the development
of a global strategy whose major component is the denial of Soviet
dominance in such territories. In the final analysis, an American
global strategy includes alliances or alignments with as many states
as possible on the rimlands of Eurasia, just as Soviet strategy is
designed to undermine, divide, leapfrog, and circumvent such
groupings of states and to break out of the inner reaches of the
Eurasian landmass.

THE GLOBAL POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND US STRATEGIC

INTERESTS
It has proven far easier to set forth the strategic interests of the
United States than to develop in all of its dimensions a strategy to
ensure their security. In fact, the strategic problems confronting the
United States have grown in magnitude and complexity with the
passage of time. In the first generation after World War II. the
formation of alliances under American leadership provided a secur-
ity framework in which economic growth and political pluralism
flourished at a time of US strategic and commercial-technological
supremacy. The diminution in American power militarily with
respect to the Soviet Union and economically in comparison to
allies in Europe and Japan has taken its toll on alliance cohesion
and upon the global stability fashioned by American coalition lead-
ership in the generation after World War II. The pursuit of various
forms of detente with the Soviet Union in the last decade by alliance
members has produced in NATO a crisis that at worst threatens its
survival and at least diminishes its utility to the security of states on
both sides of the Atlantic. A reconciliation between the exigencies
of alliance cohesion and relations with the Soviet Union has eluded
successive American administrations. A decade ago, the United
States attempted to call into existence a multipolar world. with
partnerships between itself and a unifying Western Europe and a
strengthened Japan, together with an emergent de facto alignment
with China, as the foundation for an American global strategy. Such
an approach, based upon various forms of surrogates, represented
an effort to find a means for more equitable burden-sharing with
other states. Well before the end of the last decade, the inherent
limits of such a strategy were apparent. The coincidence of interests
among allies did not translate easily into necessary capabilities or
even into similar approaches to important issues. West European

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 Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

allies and the United States were sharply divided on policies toward
the Soviet Union, and on issues in the Third World, from Afghanis-
tan to the Middle East to Central America. A global strategy provid-
ing for partnerships with allies and with other states assuming
greater security burdens in itself was not compatible with an
America-centered alliance decisionmaking structure. Nor was the
greater independence and flexibility of diplomatic action that char-
acterized American foreign policy then and now necessarily in
keeping with alliance cohesion.

Fundamentally important to American global strategy, for more

than a decade, has been the perceived need to form a de facto
alignment with China. The Sino-American relationship was
founded a decade ago upon a strategic consensus that stopped far
short of an alliance and, on many issues, such as the US relationship
with the Republic of Korea, Beijing (Peking) and Washington con-
tinue to hold substantially different positions. In fact, the PRC
periodically links the United States and the Soviet Union together as
superpowers whose "hegemonism" must be countered by a coali-
tion of states encompassing China and the Third World. At other
times, and especially between the late 1970s and the beginning of
this decade, China called for a United Front including the United
States, Western Europe, and Japan, in addition to the PRC itself, to
oppose the Soviet Union.

In a quite different way than with allies in Western Europe and

with Japan, the United States, in its relationship with China, con-
fronted a dilemma that has yet to be fully resolved between what-
ever parallel strategic interests exist with the PRC and a residual
American commitment to an erstwhile ally, Taiwan, which both the
United States and the PRC, since the Shanghai Communique of
February 1972, as well as the government in Taipei, have recognized
as forming a part of China. The global strategy of the United States
calls necessarily for the building of what has been termed a stra-
tegic consensus with as many states as possible in opposition to the
Soviet Union. A generation ago, the formation of a strategic rela-
tionship and the establishment of alliances were coincidental. Tai-
wan was clearly part of a strategic consensus in which the alliances
for the containment of communism extended from Europe to East
Asia. By the 1970s, not only had allies in Western Europe. in some
cases, manifested greater independence in their own relations with
the Soviet Union, but the United States itself had embarked upon a

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Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

diplomacy, especially in the Nixon Doctrine, characterized by flexi-

bility, maneuver, and surprise. In the 1980s the United States faces
the difficult task of reconciling its interests as a superpower in a
global strategy with the regional and more local preoccupations of
allies and friends. This proposition is abundantly evident in the
Sino-American relationship in which the United States has sought
with only limited success to subordinate the Taiwan question to a
broader strategic interest with the PRC against the Soviet Union.

In the Middle East and Latin America, respectively, recent

American diplomacy has faced equally difficult problems with
states whose interests are, first and foremost, grounded in their
respective regions, rather than in forging the strategic consensus
sought by Washington to contain Soviet expansionism. Nowhere
has this problem been more apparent in recent years than in the US
relationship with Western Europe, where the requirements for
alliance cohesion have clashed with the creation by the United
States of policies based upon strength to challenge Moscow's glo-
bal strategy and the demands of West European allies for various
forms of detente with Moscow.

The result has been to create in the United States a formidable

problem in forging a global strategy based upon cooperation with
allies and other friendly states. If the price of alliance cohesion were
to become the adoption of policies of appeasement toward the
Soviet Union, the security organizations of the last two generations,
and especially NATO, would have outlasted their usefulness as the
framework for a global strategy of the United States. An Atlanticist
approach to American foreign policy would have become incom-
patible with the necessary means to achieve the global strategic
goals of the United States. Under such circumstances, the United
States would seem to have as its principal alternative the adoption
of a unilateralist approach to foreign policy, in which American
national interest would be asserted even over the objection of allies,
as in the present American opposition to West European participa-
tion in the building of the natural-gas pipeline. Thus, the dilemma
between alliance cohesion and a global US strategy against the
Soviet Union has grown in magnitude in the last decade. In the
absence of allies willing to assume the burdens envisaged in the
strategy of the Nixon Doctrine, the United States faces the need to
rely upon its own means and, when necessary, even to oppose the
initiatives of allies whose policies are incompatible with its own. In

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 Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

the early 1980s, the transatlantic relationship has come close to

such a situation.

Thus American global strategy in the early 1980s retains ele-

ments of the Atlanticism forged in the mid-20th century, together
with an emergent nationalist, or unilateralist, approach to strategy
and foreign policy providing where necessary for principal empha-
sis upon American capabilities that will be strengthened in the years
ahead. Paradoxically, if the first generation after World War II fur-
nishes a guide, the rebuilding of American strength in the context of
a global strategy, even though the relative power position enjoyed
at that time by the United States cannot be restored, is indispensa-
ble to enabling Washington to regain a measure of lost coalition
leadership. The greater the decline in American capabilities in sup-
port of its national strategy-relative both to allies and to the Soviet
Union-the more difficult it becomes to assert American global
leadership. If allies were not prepared to strengthen their own capa-
bilities as surrogates for the weakened America of the 1970s, the key
to US global strategy in the 1980s would seem clearly to lie in the
building of greater American capbilities in support of commitments.
Such a strategy must provide for the more equitable sharing among
allies of the burdens of collective defense. This is the approach that
American policy correctly has assumed in the early 1980s, although
the gap between a global strategy and what is needed in its support
remains wide. Taken together and viewed in the context of the
continuity of US strategic interests in the 20th century, the official
statements of the Reagan Administration yield the basic concepts
of American global strategy for the 1980s. Such a strategy has not
only military components but also political-ideological-economic
content. The United States seeks to confront the Soviet Union by
emphasizing the dynamic values of the open societies of the West
contrasted with the monolithic, closed systems of the Soviet Union
and its allies. In an address on 21 May 1982, William P. Clark
sounded such a note when he called for an American strategy that
would force the Soviet Union "to bear the brunt of its economic
shortcomings," and set forth the view that "our strategy must be
forward-looking and active .... To secure the America we all want
and the global stability and prosperity we all seek, we cannot sit
back and hope that somehow it will happen. We must believe in what
we are doing. That requires initiative, patience, and persistence. We
must be prepared to respond vigorously to opportunities as they
arise and to create opportunities where none have existed before."

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Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

Thus the contemporary debate about American strategy for the

late 20th century relates more to means than to objectives: how to
prevent the Soviet Union from achieving its strategic objectives in a
world in which Soviet military capabilities, relative to those of the
United States and allied and friendly states, have grown on a vast
scale during the last decade, with abundant evidence of the failure
of American approaches to detente and arms control as a substitute
for adequate defense capabilities set within a multifaceted global
strategy. At the time of the formation of the Atlantic alliance the
strategic debate in the United States revolved around the question
of the type of US commitment that would be necessary to deter any
possible Soviet attack against Western Europe. Initially, the United
States extended to its European allies an American nuclear guaran-
tee with the expectation that the principal ground forces would be
raised in Western Europe. To be sure, the land defense capabilities
on the NATO Central Front have been largely West European
although, after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the Atlantic
alliance evolved a forward defense posture with substantial
increases both in European and American forces. In the Atlantic
Treaty ratification debate in the United States Senate the question
of the type and level of American commitment arose: was it to be
based upon nuclear forces and maritime capabilities or. in addition.
the stationing of ground forces in Western Europe?5 In this sense the
American debate of the early 1980s about alliance burden-sharing
has an antecedent that is nearly two generations old, although the
United States must forge in the 1980s a global strategy based upon
greater commitments in support of vital interests but with increased
constraints upon resources.

CONTRASTING APPROACHES TO US GLOBAL STRATEGY

In the quest for a US global strategy, essentially two contrasting

approaches have asserted themselves: the first calls for power pro-
jection capabilities based principally upon strategic-nuclear forces,
air power, and maritime supremacy as its principal military compo-
nents, with a heavy emphasis upon the assumption of greater
burdens by allies. Although its proponents do not ignore the need
for the maintenance of a balance of power, they posit that in an
equitable sharing of defense, the United States should focus its
resources outside Western Europe. In this perspective, NATO allies
and Japan, within their respective regions, should take on substan-
tially greater responsibility. Hence, this approach may be termed a

230
 Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

Peripheral Strategy. The second approach. called here the Contin-

ental Strategy, posits the continuing need for the United States,
with a balanced-force posture, to maintain ground forces in place
both in Western Europe and Northeast Asia as a means of counter-
ing superior numbers of mobilized Soviet capabilities and preserv-
ing deterrence based upon an escalatory link with the US nuclear
deterrent.6

The Peripheral Strategy is derived from certain of the premises

which informed the Nixon Doctrine a decade ago in which allied
burden-sharing was a central element. Because the United States is
constrained in its capacity to project military power simultaneously
to all theaters or vital interest, it must outain from other states
sharing compatible interests, values, and goals a greater commit-
ment to defense. The Continental Strategy holds that, however
desirable the objective of such burden-sharing may be. the growth
of Soviet capabilities makes necessary a commensurate increase in
the military forces of the United States and the continuation of a
forward defense-in-place. The withdrawal of American ground for-
ces from Western Europe, in this perspective, would not necessarily
be offset by a growth in Western European capabilities. In fact, it is
suggested, an irreversible erosion of political will and defense com-
mitments might take place. Western Europe would then become the
object of increasing Soviet political pressure and influence as the
military balance, both in conventional and nuclear forces, shifted
toward Moscow. The Peripheral Strategy, moreover, calls for the
United States to furnish increased capabilities to counter security
threats emanating from outside the North Atlantic area and the
Western Pacific. In this perspective, both Western Europe and
Japan should assume a greater portion of the burden of defense
within their immediate geographic regions in order to enable the
United States to focus its defense energies on other regions such as
the Persian Gulf, in which West European and Japanese interests
are deemed to be at least as great as those of the United States. If the
Soviet Union is principally a Eurasian land power, all of whose
capabilities the United States cannot match because we are not also
such a power, we must maximize the advantages that allegedly
accrue from our status as a maritime nation separated from Europe
and Asia by two oceans. According to this approach, a rational
division of labor would provide for modernized European ground
forces and a substantial increase in Japan's self-defense forces.
The capabilities of the Atlantic alliance would continue to be based

231
Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

on nuclear deterrence. There would be a shift in US military priori-

ties toward a larger navy and srengthened nuclear capability,
together with greater mobility and firepower for remaining land
forces.

The Continental Strategy calls for the more efficient utilization

of existing land armies. This approach has, as one variant, the idea
that nuclear forces, at all levels, must bestrengthened as a means of
enhancing deterrence through assured escalation and that the
presence of large numbers of American ground forces at the point
of potential conflict represents an indispensable ingredient for this
purpose. In a second variant, the modernization of US and West
European conventional forces committed to NATO is deemed to be
essential to alliance security. Represented principally by a recent
study published by Senator Nunn, this approach, in rejecting the
withdrawal of US forces, asks rhetorically the following question
based upon a critique of the Peripheral Strategy: "Those who sug-
gest that Europe alone has the resources to muster a viable conven-
tional defense-while this has considerable theoretical long-term
appeal-should first answer a parallel question: Can an Alliance
without American conventional forces be expected to provide a
credible conventional defense when the Alliance with American
forces thus far has failed?"' Instead, this variant embraces the "Air-
land Battle" concept providing for a military doctrine based upon
the utilization of existing forces with new technologies and tactics
designed to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities, and calling for the des-
truction of Soviet-Warsaw Pact echelons before they would reach
the inter-German border to reinforce front line units. A European-
NATO defense-in-depth would be based upon expanded and mod-
ernized reserves and territorial forces. NATO would eschew any
no-first-nuclear-use declaration until adequate conventional forces
were available. At that time, according to this approach, it would be
possible for the alliance to withdraw, as part of negotiated arms
reductions, several thousand of the battlefield nuclear weapons
now stationed in Europe. It lies beyond the scope of the present
analysis of US global strategy and its requirements to enter into a
detailed examination of NATO flexible response, or of the no-first-
use of nuclear weapons proposal. Suffice it to say here that nuclear
weapons have formed, and must continue to form, an essential
component of any deterrent relationship between the United States
and the Soviet Union. Although neither the United States nor its
allies plan to launch an attack upon the Soviet Union, we have

232
 Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

properly reserved the right and sought to maintain the necessary

means to retaliate against a Soviet attack at whatever level, includ-
ing nuclear, that we might deem to be appropriate. In short, we have
already embraced no-first-use, for NATO nuclear and conventional
forces. and the flexible response doctrine as the term itself con-
notes, are based uon the notion of defense after a Soviet-Warsaw
Pact attack.

The Continental Strategy rejects the notion that, without forces

in Europe, the United States would be able more easily and at lower
cost to maintain its security commitments elsewhere, unless we
could be certain that allies would fill the gap left by the withdrawal of
US ground forces and the potential psychological effect of a decou-
piing of US strategic forces. The inability, or unwillingness, of allies
to redress the imbalance resulting from withdrawal of ground for-
ces, called for in a phased 15-to-20-year period in this approach.
would strengthen greatly the Soviet power projection capability
elsewhere. The result would be a neutralized Western Europe,
which would be subject to greater pressure not only to help subsid-
ize the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries by means of
low-interest loans and high-technology transfers, but also to
acquiesce in other Soviet initiatives. With its Western front more
secure, the Soviet Union could reposition military capabilities to
other theaters of direct importance. These would include not only
the Sino-Soviet frontier, where approximately 25 percent of Mos-
cow's forces are already deployed, but also those points of strategic
interest to the United States for which the advocates of the Peri-
pheral Strategy argue that the United States should design its future
force posture. Under such circumstances, the Soviet Union, already
enjoying the advantage in many cases of greater geographic prox-
imity, would confront the United States with an even greater dispar-
ity in power projection capability than now exists, At the same time
the United States would have greatly diminished its residual influ-
ence in Western Europe, which remains, in global strategic terms.
the principal prize for the Soviet Union. In this view, a Peripheral
Strategy, in place of a Continental Strategy, would have created for
the United States a series of formidable, and perhaps insurmounta-
ble, problems on the Eurasian periphery, while the core area of
American strategic interest outside the Western Hemisphere. West-
ern Europe, would have been lost.

It follows that a global strategy for the United States in the

233
Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

1980s must be based upon the denial to Soviet and other hostile
influences, of both the core area, especially Europe, and the mari-
time periphery. Although the United States is a maritime state, the
possession of forces for control of the seas and the adjacent air-
space and for power projection is a necessary, but not sufficient,
condition for the conduct of a global strategy. An American global
strategy must contain as its principal elements the means for deny-
ing Soviet or other hostile forces control of the rimlands and for
exerting countervailing political pressure upon the Soviet Union.
For this purpose, the global strategy of the United States must be
based upon elements of both the Peripheral and Continental Strate-
gies. For example, American global strategy continues necessarily
to rest formally upon the alliance infrastructure forged in an earlier
day. In William P. Clark's words: "Ours must be a coalition strategy.
We, together with our friends and allies, must pull together. There is
no other way. We must achieve an even closer linkage with regional
allies and friends." With the present deeply rooted divisions
between the United States and certain of its NATO allies, however,
alliance cohesion on some security issues must remain more a goal
than a reality. In the absence of adequate levels of consensus
among allies, the United States will have no real alternative to
pursuit of a unilateralist approach, unless it is prepared-as it
should not be-to alter substantially its global strategy to conform
with the divergent interests of allies. Given its worldwide interests,
capabilities and commitments, contrasted with the regional per-
spectives of the allies on many issues, the United States will continue
to confront the need to balance alliance cohesion with. where
necesary, the pursuit of unilateralist policies. Thus, an effective
American global strategy will contain elements of both approaches:
to work with allies where possible while acting alone in circumstan-
ces where policies are irreconcilable or when burden-sharing with
other alliance members is not feasible.

TRENDS IN US NUCLEAR STRATEGY

Since 1945, the United States has relied heavily upon nuclear
capabilities as a central element of global strategy. Although we
cannot be certain that the United States and the Soviet Union would
have gone to war with each other in the absence of nuclear wea-
pons, the fact remains that for almost two generations (1945-
1983) -nearly twice as long as the interval between the two World
Wars (1918-1939)--there have been no military hostilities despite

234
 Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

the deeply rooted tensions and periodic crises with the Soviet Union
and the numerous wars using conventional weapons within, and
among. Third World states. None of these military conflicts have
escalated to the superpower level. There is a valid presumption that
nuclear weapons have played an important, and perhaps indispen-
sable, role in US global strategy.

American nuclear strategy in the 1980s differs from that of a

decade ago. Such changes take account of the altered circumstan-
ces of the strategic-military environment as a result of a greater
American understanding of Soviet military doctrine and require-
ments imposed for deterence by the growth of the capabilities of
the Soviet Union. By the middle of the last decade. evidence had
mounted that Soviet and American concepts for nuclear warfare,
and for deterrence of such conflict, were different in fundamental
respects. In the 1980s, American nuclear strategy has embraced
more explicitly than previously the idea that the deterrence of
nuclear conflict may depend upon a capability to fight a protracted
war beyond a single exchange of nuclear weapons. The nuclear
strategy of the present Administration goes substantially beyond
Presidential Directive 59 issued by President Carter in 1980, which
focused upon attack against specific military and political targets in
the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, present US nuclear strategy dis-
plays continuity extending over successive Administrations and
reflecting the view that the United States must possess more than
simply the means to deter a nuclear attack by threatening to inflict
unacceptable levels of damage upon enemy cities and populations.

The nuclear strategy of the Reagan Administration is said to

call for the deployment of American forces able to destroy the Soviet
military and political power structure, as well as nuclear and con-
ventional military forces and vitally important industry.8 An empha-
sis is placed upon strikes against Soviet political and military
leadership and its ability to communicate with other elements of the
forces of the Soviet Union. Although by no means new in many of its
elements, current American nuclear strategy has been represented
by certain of its critics as constituting evidence of a willingness by
the United States to fight a nuclear war as an alternative to deterring
such a conflict. Instead, the nuclear strategy of the early 1980s
should be viewed as reflecting an altered American official concep-
tion of what is needed to enhance deterrence. Why should the
United States not seek to be prepared to "win" a nuclear war as the

235
Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

basis for deterring its outbreak? There is a logical inconsistency in

the notion that deterrence is undermined by a strategy based upon
the "winnability" of nuclear war. Strategic deterrence depends upn
the ability of the United States to ensure that the Soviet escalation of
a political crisis with the United States to the level of nuclear warfare
would result in defeat, not victory, for Moscow. If the Soviet Union
posits that its postattack survival and recovery capabilities exceed
those of the United States to such an extent that, in the event of
nuclear war, a US defeat could be assured, the consequences for
strategic stability would be highly disadvantageous to American
interests. Despite the apparent and understandable reluctance of
the American official policy community to confront critics on the
nuclear war winnability issue, US nuclear strategy has moved
steadily toward a concept of deterrence whose basis lies properly in
assuring that the means available to the United States will be ade-
quate for sustaining a protracted exchange of nuclear strikes and
conducting other kinds of military operations against the Soviet
Union.

PREREQUISITES FOR A COMPREHENSIVE GLOBAL STRATEGY

Because the United States might face the threat of simultane-

ous war in several parts of the world, the American response would
be not to strike everywhere at once but instead "in sequence from
one target to another." In this respect, the Reagan Administration's
approach appears to emphasize, on the one hand, that a conflict
with the Soviet Union could expand to the global level while, on the
other hand, that the United States will not necessarily ever be able to
engage such forces on all fronts at once. Instead, the United States
should have available balanced forces, together with established
priorities for military operations. Similarly, because the United
States has an interest in limiting the scope of any conflict, it must
have both a capability for counteroffensives on other fronts and the
means to defend vital interests where they are attacked. Because
the decision to enlarge a conflict may be made not by the United
States, but instead by its adversary, forces must be available for
immediate response.

It must be presumed that the makers of American global stra-

tegy regard its other elements in similar perspective. Undoubtedly
in recognition of the need for such an approach to strategy, Presi-
dent Reagan has called for the strengthening of the "infrastructure

236
 Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

of democracy-the system of a free press, unions, political parties,

universities-which allows a people to choose their own way, to
develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences
through peaceful means." This would encompass competition in
ideas in a "plan and a hope for the long-term-the march of freedom
and democracy which will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap
of history as it has left other tyrannies which stifle the freedom and
muzzle the self-expression of the people..."9 It is to be expected that
such a comprehensive approach to strategy would make use of
available political-diplomatic and commercial-economic instru-
ments of statecraft which would be utilized at the points of an
adversary's weakness. If the strength of theSoviet Union lies almost
exclusively in military capabilities, it follows that Soviet vulnerabili-
ties are to be found in the nondefense sectors. Within the Soviet
Union, and within the territories under Moscow's hegemony,
Marxist-Leninist ideology, together with political institutions and
economic systems, face formidable, and perhaps insurmountable,
structural problems. The points of vulnerability lie within the geo-
graphic zone under direct Soviet domination, and especially in
Eastern Europe. Here the contrast between the global strategy of
the Soviet Union and that of the United States and its allies becomes
sharply delineated. One of the great paradoxes of our age is that the
political-ideological-military b'-tleground of the second half of the
20th century has been located largely outside Moscow's direct
sphere of influence. Instead, the great conflicts of our era have been
waged in the contested Eurasian rimlands and in countries and
regions in the third World, many of which are fraught with potential
instability and a legacy of Western colonialism and beset with a host
of socio-economic problems ripe for exploitation by the Soviet
Union and its surrogates. Not only has the United States proven
unable to develop, as part of a global strategy, the means to thwart
major Soviet-sponsored and other hostile interventions, as in the
Caribbean-Central America region, but the very growth of such
forces has provided the basis for further disagreement between the
United States and certain of its allies concerning an appropriate
response, which seems only to be exceeded by differences related
to the means to be used by the West to lessen Moscow-supported
political suppression in Poland.

Ideally, a coherent and consistent US global strategy, in coop-

eration with allies, would call for common actions not only to thwart
Moscow's extension of influence into the disputed Eurasian rim-

237
Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

lands and beyond, but also for concerted Western action to exploit
Soviet vulnerabilities within its zone of direct influence and, specifi-
cally, in Eastern Europe. It would summon states sharing common
interests and security objectives to join together, formally or infor-
mally, for concerted action to exploit the vulnerabilities of the Soviet
Union. A global strategy for the United States, conceived in such
terms, may lie beyond the capacity of pluralistic political systems or
coalitions based upon such states. Under such circumstances, the
United States must evolve, without full support from allies, a global
strategy which provides for the exploitation of the perceived "con-
tradictions" within the orbit of the Soviet Union

CONCLUSION

In the next-to-last decade of this century, the focus of US global

strategy remains the development of the means within the approp-
riate framework to combat an adversary who seeks control of the
Eurasian landmass and beyond. This geostrategic focus of Ameri-
can national interest, and of foreign policy, is likely to remain vitally
important, even though the future holds the prospect that space will
become another crucial arena for civilian and military competition
with the Soviet Union. There has always been an inextricable rela-
tionship between technology and the utilization, both for military
and civilian purposes, of the maritime and land surfaces of the earth,
as well as the surrounding atmosphere. Therefore, it seems obvious
that the existence of technologies for the transport of formerly
earthbound objects-human and manmade-into outerspace holds
important implications for civilian and military activities at least as
great as those changes which accompanied the major technologi-
cal innovations of the past. Under such circumstances, the concept
of global strategy, especially for the United States, but also for the
Soviet Union, will be broadened to include additional objectives.
interests and exoatmospheric dimensions. 11'Inevitably, a global stra-
tegy for the United States will give to extraterrestrial space a place
of prominence that extends far beyond existing national security
activities such as command, control, communications. surveillance
and verification.

As in the past, the development of strategy will be closely linked

both to the exploitation of opportunities afforded by technology for
the projection of power, broadly defined, into strategically impor-
tant environments, and the integration of all of the elements of

238
 Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

policy and statecraft into a framework for the attainment of national

security objectives.

239
 Chapter 7

Reorganizing
the United States System
for Developing Strategy

Panelists were challenged to address the following charter:

"This panel will discuss recent suggestions about improving

nationalsecurity policymaking and organization. The papers might
examine the contraintsimposed by current and proposedorganiza-
tions and examine the impact such constraintsmight have on future
US strategy planning. The panel will evaluate the adequacy of the
current legislated organization for developing strategy and recom-
mend possible alternatives that might be more effective.

241
 Panel Summary

Dr. Albert C. Pierce, Chairman

National Defense University
Lieutenant Colonel Louis J. Moses, USAF, Rapporteur
National Defense University

The panel considered recent proposals for organizational

reform to improve national security policymaking. Our work was
aided greatly by papers prepared by the former Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones, USAF; General Edwin
C. Meyer, Chief of Staff, US Army: and Colonel Archie D. Barrett,
USAF (Ret.), House Armed Services Committee Staff. The papers
by Generals Jones and Meyer previously appeared as journal arti-
cles and were largely responsible for stimulating the current inter-
est in JCS reform. Both General Jones and General Meyer describe
problems in the current JCS system and offer remedies for improv-
ing the quality and timeliness of JCS advice. The Barrett paper
similarly criticizes the existing JCS system, and additionally and
usefully describes impediments to change and the means for over-
coming this resistance.

A word about the panel composition is in order. Unfortunately.

we were unsuccessful in getting many opponents of JCS reform to
attend the conference. Thus, our discussions and our conclusions
were somewhat skewed. But, it should be noted, a majority of the
panel members were aware of the arguments against change and
had taken them into account in their own thinking.

The panel established three questions intended to bound the

discussion. We asked: (1) What is it that we expect of our civilian and
military leaders?; (2) What is it about the current system that doesn't
work? and (3) What can be done-particularly in view of the obsta-
cles to the proposals for reform?

The panel members were in general agreement regarding the

proper roles of civilian and military defense leaders. Civilian control

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The US System for Developing Strategy

is essential, and civilian leaders should develop and articulate over-

all policy guidance and direction. Drawing upon their professional
experience and judgment, senior military officers should provide
integrated advice on matters of strategy, as well as on how to
maintain, deploy, and employ military forces. One panelist, asenior
retired military officer, argued that military adviceto civilian leaders
generally has not been as good as it should have been and that
civilian leaders generally have not listened as well as they might
have. Another retired general officer put forward the case for
greater civilian control, noting that (except for the last two Presi-
dents) civilians have tended to exercise too much control in opera-
tional matters and not enough in aggregating and rationalizing
Service programs. There was a strong consensus within the panel
that, on the broadest level, policy guidance has been relatively clear
and consistent over the years.

The panel then turned to an analysis of what is wrong with the

current system. The Barrett paper identified major weaknesses and
elaborated the various impediments to reform and reorganization,
noting in particular the tendency of the Services and other bureau-
cratic entities to become discrete organizations unto themselves,
pursuing their own objectives relatively independently of, and at
times in opposition to, the overall goals of the Department of
Defense or national policy. As the Services pay most attention to
their own priorities, certain key areas-the so-called "orphan
missions"--receive scant attention' they include airlift, sealift, read-
iness, unconventional warfare, and communications, command,
and control.

Because the Services pick and choose their own priorities, the
sum of their programs is not synchronized and rationalized into a
coherent whole. There is a serious disconnect between the provid-
ers (the Services) who are developing long-term strategies for pro-
curement and the users (the unified commanders) who must use
today's forces to meet today's threats under the framework of
today's political leadership. The result has been a sizeable mismatch
between strategy as declared in national policy and the forces on
hand to implement that strategy.

To the extent that it is done at all, strategy is developed quite

independently of force development. There is simply no mechanism
to rationalize combined military objectives and to use them to

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 The US System for Developing Strategy

inform and guide the programmatic process. What is missing is an

effective link between broad goals and objectives, on the one hand,
and resources and forces, on the other. That missing link is strategy,
which, within resource constraints, calculates how to reach goals
and objectives to the greatest degree possible. Effective strategy
would inevitably involve a significantly greater emphasis on joint
planning and operations.

On the question of what is to be done, a majority of the panel

agreed on several propositions and conclusions.

First, there was widespread pessimism about the prospects for

significant congressional action. Attendance at and interest in hear-
ings on the subject were both notably low. The Senate seems less
likely to act than the House. The (by some) anticipated connection
between DOD organizational issues and congressional review of
the DOD budget never materialized. Further, congressional action
is considerably less likely in the absence of executive branch
leadership.

Second, some changes are occurring in the system, largely

because the issue has been raised at such high levels, i.e.. Jones
and Meyer. Many improvements can be made from within the sys-
tem without legislation, and some are already underway.

Third, senior civilian defense officials should establish objec-

tives and priorities in the field of national security, informed by and
in consultation with the considered judgments of senior military
officers, who should speak with a more unified voice. This is an
iterative and simultaneous, indeed continuous, process.

Fourth, there should be a single source of unified military

advice to the National Command Authorities, although thereshould
always be a right of reclama for Service Chiefs.

Fifth, serious doubts remain as to whether senior civilian lead-

ers are ready, willing, and able to accept good military advice and
seriously incorporate it into their decisionmaking.

Sixth, the operators-the heads of the Unified and Specified

Commands-must be linked more systematically to the guidance.
strategy, and procurement processes. The CINCs are the ultimate

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The US System for Developing Strategy

consumers of what DOD produces, and they must execute the

strategies that are handed down. They must become more inte-
grally tied to the system.

Seventh, the Chairman should be strengtened with a deputy

and greater staff resources. Only then can he play a more effective
and much-needed role in cross-Service and functional issues. A
strengthened Chairman could bridge the gaps that now separate
the Services, CINCs. and the NCA, and he could maintain more
effective linkage between joint planning and Service planning.
particularly in regard to the "orphan issues."

Eighth, the attentive public will continue to ask questions of

accountability-how is our tax money being spent, and is it being
spent wisely? Confidence in the soundness of the decisionmaking
system is the key ingredient in sustained public support for the
defense budget.

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 The US System for Developing Strategy

Impediments to
Department of Defense Reorganization

Dr. Archie D. Barrett

House Armed Services Committee Staff

I. INTRODUCTION

In a 16 August speech to the House of Representatives support-

ing the Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1982, House
Armed Services Investigations Subcommittee Chairman Richard C.
White summarized the concerns which prompted his bill:

Serious organizational flaws mar the performance of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff As a result, our highest military body might fail
to function adequately in case of war. And, as was the case
during World War II, World War I. and as far back as the
Spanish-American War, we would be faced with the necessity of
making fundamental changes to our military organization in the
midst of a crisis. The most casual observer must realize that
there may not be time for such a realignment in a future conflict
Equally important in a continually threatening peacetime envir-
onment. timely. clear-cut, realistic, feasible, and prudent pro-
fessional military advice is often not available to civilian
leaders. Consequently, the influence of the military in civilian
counsels has diminished over time and, because decisions
must nevertheless be made, has often been overshadowed by
civilian analysts,'

Chairman White explained that his disquiet stemmed from a

recently completed series of hearings on Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
reorganization conducted by his subcommittee. Those hearings
were prompted by incumbent JCS Chairman David C. Jones
unprecedented announcement in February 1982 that he was con-
cerned about basic defects in the JCS organization. General Jones
further stated his intention to recommend proposals to correct
those shortcomings and to work for their acceptance during the
remaining months of his term as Chairman and thereafter when he
retired.

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The US System for Developing Strategy

JCS Reorganization Proposals

The Jones Reorganization Initiative. General Jones found four

major problems with the present organization: (1) diffused respon-
sibility and authority: (2) inadequate JCS corporate advice-not
"crisp. timely, very useful or very influential: (3) dominance of the
JCS by individual service interests: and (4) basic contradictions
between the two roles of each service chief, as a JCS member and as
head of a service: a built-in conflict between service and broader
defense interests: and incompatible demands on each Chief
because he is called on to perform two full-time jobs.

To overcome these problems General Jones recommended

that the JCS Chairman be strengthened. The Chairman would
replace the JCS in the chain of command and as the principal
military adviser to the President, National Security Council. and
Secretary of Defense. The Chairman would also assume full author-
ity over the Joint Staff which would be made directly responsible to
him. Also, a newly authorized four-star deputy would assist the
Chairman. The JCS, diminished in stature, would advise the Chair-
man and render corporate advise to the President on subjects
referred to it by the White House. Additionally. each service chief
would have the right to submit recommendations directly to the
Secretary of Defense, and to the President as appropriate.'

Subsequent Proposals. Events following General Jones' initia-

tive added momentum to the reform movement. Army Chief of Staff
General Edward C. Meyer, in an action as extraordinary as that of
General Jones, announced that he believed the Chairman's reor-
ganization proposals had not gone far enough. General Meyer
proposed ending the "dual-hatting" of Service chiefs by creating a
National Military Advisory Council (NMAC) to replace the JCS. The
NMAC would consist of four-star officers headed by a chairman.
The members would have no service responsibilities and would not
return to their services. The NMAC would assume advisory func-
tions comparable to those of the present Joint Chiefs of Staff. But
the Chairman would be the principal military adviser, as in General
Jones' proposal. The Service chiefs would devote themselves to
their service responsibilities.'

General Maxwell D. Taylor, the former Presidential adviser,

JCS Chairman, and Army Chief of Staff, weighed in with an even

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 The US System for Developing Strategy

more scathing indictment and a correspondingly more far-reaching

reorganization proposal. He stated during his appearance before
the Investigations Subcommittee that the "weaknesses of the pres-
ent system... are so fundamental as to negate any hope that a little
organizational tinkering will be enough to set things aright." He
recommended dissolving the JCS organization and creating a "Mil-
itary Staff. National Command Authorities" headed by a Chief of
Staff who would be "the principal military adviser on matters related
to current military policy, strategy and major DOD programs." To
provide advice on "future national and military policy and strategy,"
General Taylor recommended creating a National Military Council
somewhat analogous to General Meyer's concept.'

During the Investigations Subcommittee hearings a distin-

guished group of more than forty witnesses elaborated positions
along a spectrum defined by the status quo at one extremity and
General Taylor's proposal at the other. With few exceptions wit-
nesses agreed that the JCS organization has significant
weaknesses.

The JCS Reorganization Act of 1982. In early August the Inves-

tigations Subcommittee reported a bill, H.R. 6954, which subse-
quently received House Armed Service Committee endorsement
and passed the House of Representatives. The House bill, though
not as far-reaching as any of the major proposals, nevertheless
addresses most of the major weaknesses identified in the testimony.
It would strengthen the JCS Chairman by making him an adviser in
his own right, giving him greater control over the Joint Staff, creat-
ing a Deputy Chairman, and allowing the Chairman to use the Joint
Staff to assist him in carrying out his responsibilities. The bill also
contains several provisions designed to make the Joint Staff more
independent-the author of its own work rather than a secretariat
for the service staffs.
On the other hand, the JCS remains the principal military
adviser and the Joint Staff remains responsible for assisting it as
well as the Chairman. Also, the House bill includes provisions
obviously intended to accommodate the concerns voided by oppo-
nents of reorganization: a provision establishing the right of any
chief who disagrees with the advice of the JCS or the Chairman to
submit his views to the Secretary of Defense and, as appropriate, to
the President; and a guarantee, subject to guidelines established by
the Secretary of Defense, that service chiefs and unified and speci-

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The US System for Developing Strategy

fled commanders can append their views to Joint Staff papers so

that the JCS will have before it the full range of positions on issues it
considers. Finally, reflecting the suggestions of Generals Meyer,
Taylor, and others, the bill establishes a Senior Strategy Advisory
Board to fill the void in reflective thinking on national military
strategy.

The Unlikelihood of Reform

Despite the outpouring of criticism, if the past is any guide, it is

doubtful much will come of the current movement for reform. The
National Security Act which created the Department of Defense was
adopted in 1947. Subsequently, it was revised three times-in 1949.
1953, and 1958. Since 1958 no significant restructuri:g of the
Department has taken place.

The slackening of structural change has not occurred because

the organizational defects of the Department of Defense went unno-
ticed for 24 years until they were discovered and publicized by
General Jones. Government studies and academic treatments in
the years since 1958 have consistently criticized the structure and
recommended changes, many similar to those advanced by Gener-
als Jones, Meyer, and Taylor, to the basic framework of defense
organization.

The history of the issue, then, suggests the existence of power-

ful and persistent obstacles to Department of Defense reorganiza-
tion which have more than matched the efforts of proponents of
reform over the years. The most obvious obstacle with respect to
JCS reorganization at the moment is the legislative process.
Though more progress has been made this year than at any time
since 1958, it has probably not been made soon enough. It is
unlikely that the Senate will act in the three remaining months of the
97th Congress. Consequently, the proponents of reform will have to
start over in the 98th Congress. And, because of their near success
this year, they will undoubtedly encounter even stronger efforts to
block their path in the future.

This would appear to be a paticularly appropriate time to con-

sider the impediments to Department of Defense reorganization.
Though the press of legislative business and the timing of the
political calendar have become major obstacles this year, the legis-

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 The US System for Developing Strategy

lative process per se is neither the only nor the most formidable
barrier to reform. In fact, considering the events of 1982, the legisla-
tive branch might be considered a catalyst for reform. In an, case,
many other obstacles have inhibited DOD reorganization over the
years. If they are not successful in 1982, those who would reform the
JCS will probably face them again next year. And those who agree
with past studies that many other parts of the Department should be
restructured will continue to face them. Consequently, attention to
the impediments to Department of Defense reorganization is of
more than academic interest at this time.

Because I recently completed an analysis of Department of

Defense organization based on the Defense Organization Study of
1977-1980 (DOS 77-80),' the Director of the National Security
Affairs Institute requested that I apply the results of my research to
the subject of impedimerits to reorganization.* Upon examination,
my work, though concerned with appraising alternative ways to
organize the Department, did include material relevant to the
subject.

This paper presents these insights on impediments to Depart-

ment of Defense reform. The next section examines institutional
impediments to DOD reorganization, both internal and external.
The third section dramatizes the obstacle created by the gulf
between the DOD organization intended by the framers of the
National Security Act and the actual organization in operation, as

"The Defense Organization Study of 1977-1980 (DOS 77-80) was

initiated by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in response to a memoran-
dum of 20 September 1977 from President Carter which called for a search-
ing organizational review of the Department of Defense. The study
eventually included five separate, independently prepared and published
study reports which are cited fully in the endnotes. They address: depart-
mental headquarters, the national military command structure. resoL'rce
management (the planning, programming, and budgeting system: acquisi-
tion: logistics; personnel career mix; and medical care), defense agent es.
and training. The DOS 77-80 effort consisted of more than the production of
these five reports, however. All five final study reports were circulated
among senior decisionmakers in the Office of the Secretary of Defense: the
Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Joint Chiefs of Staff: the
defense agencies: the Office of Management and Budget: and the National
Security Council. Extensive comments were exchanged as a result of these
reviews.

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The US System for Developing Strategy

pictured by the DOS 77-80. Though their "ideal" organization of the

Department may vary, the legislative model used in this section is
meant to serve as a more or less accurate surrogate for reformers'
composite objective. The fourth section discusses the implications
of the interplay of conflict and cooperation in DOD for reorganiza-
tion. Disagreement or misunderstanding of this aspect of the nature
of DOD organization serves as a major impediment to meaningful
reorganization. Finally, the last section provides some observations
on the relevance of the foregoing to the current organizational
proposals.

II. INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES TO DOD REFORM

The Internal Structure: Basic Organization Model

Considered in its most abstract form, the Department of

Defense (DOD) consists of four basic elements that are responsible

PRESIDENT

SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE OSDO

<0

JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
MIL ITARY 1JCSI
DE PART MENT,
JOINT STAFF

Figure 7-1: Basic Organization Model of the Department of Defense

252
 The US System for Developing Strategy

for the two principal functions of the Department, as depicted in

figure 7-1. Each element contains one or more large subelements of
the Department; for example, the four services are a part of the
military department element. Also, the two functions, maintaining
and employing, subsume a large number of subsidiary functions.
The maintaining functions include recruiting, training, research
and development, procurement, administration, logistical support.
maintenance, and medical care. The employing functions are per-
formed consequent to providing military advice to civilian authori-
ties and directing the operations of combat forces in peacetime and
wartime. These functions include assessments of enemy threat and
friendly warfighting capability, strategic, operational, and logistical
planning, and command and control arrangements.

Several aspects of the basic DOD structure are relevant to

questions concerning reorganization. First, the Pentagon houses
the central management of three of the four elements. Their close
proximity contrasts markedly with the worldwide dispersal of the
unified and specified commands. This undoubtedly weakens the
organizational clout of the unified and specified commanders (the
CINCs) vis a vis the other elements.

Second, though housed together, the three Pentagon-based

elements are by no means limited in size. They are all large. Table
7-1 indicates the smallest, the Air Force secretariat, numbered
approximately 320 individuals at the beginning of FY80; the largest,
the Army hedquarters staff, approximately 3,381. Organizational
realignment issues in DOD are unparalleled with respect to the
absolute numbers of people who may be affected and who are
therefore interested in influencing the outcome.

Third, although all of the Pentagun-based headquarters are

large, great disparities in size are evident. The service headquarters
staffs range from approximately three to nine times the size of the
secretariats. The JCS/Joint Staff and Secretary of Defense/OSD
complexes are in the middle-far larger than the service secretariats
but only about one-half the size of any one of the service military
headquarters staffs.

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The US System for Developing Strategy

Table 7-1: Staff Strengths Projected for the

End of Fiscal Year 1979

Office of the Secretary of Defense 1,568

Joint Staff 1,273
Military Department Secretariats
Army 378
Navy 852
Air Force 320
Service Headquarters Staffs
Army 3.381
Navy 2.228
Air Force 2,930

Source: Budget data submitted to the Executive Secretary, Defense Organ-

ization Study, Spring 1979

Fourth, the potential influence of the organizations varies sig-

nificantly, even though each possesses sufficient resources to
make its presence felt on issues of particular concern. In part, these
differences reflect the uneven sizes and, in the case of the CINCs,
the location of the organizatons; but not entirely. More fundamental
are the allocations of responsibilities. For examle, the comprehen-
sive charter of the Secretary of Defense-direction, authority, and
control-makes OSD a principal determinant on any issue it
chooses to address. But the missions, resources, and capabilities of
the services make them principal determinants also. On the other
hand, the advisory function of the JCS, as well as its placement in
the chain of command at the sufferance of the Secretary of Defense,
are factors which would tend to undermine its relative position.

The final aspect worthy of comment at this point is that the

collocation of the leadership and principal staffs of three of the
elements in the Pentagon adds a dynamic dimension which makes
the phenomenon being examined unique. Issues of DOD reorgani-
zation involve the possible internal and external realignment of a
number of staff organizations, all large and several among the
largest in the world. located in such close proximity that face-to-
face contact between and among members of the organizations at
any level requires no more than a five-minute walk. An important
implication of the proximity of these organizations is that they must
be perceived as a closely knit system as well as a collection of

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 The US System for Developing Strategy

separate entities. The dynamic interplay among the organizations

fosters several systemic tendencies: a dilution of hierarchy in favor
of bargaining; an advantage for those who oppose change and favor
the status quo over proponents of new initiatives; and increased
potential for the more aggressive, independent organizations to
gain predominance over others.

Fleshing Out the Basic Organization Model

Organizational Complexities. Viewing DOD solely in terms of

the basic organization model (figure 7-1) which depicts only the
essential elements and relationships incurs the risk of oversimplifi-
cation. The model may convey the impression DOD is a rigidly
structured pyramid which extends inexorably through succeeding
levels of subordination from the Secretary of Defense at the apex to
operating forces in the field. In fact, of course, that is by no means
the case. The structure is riven with formal and informal reporting
and advisory links, communications channels, and other internal
and external avenues of access to influence in addition to the
maintaining and employing arms shown in the model.

Several examples illustrate the variety of interactions among

elements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff is composed of the chiefs of each
service and the Joint Staff is composed of officers from each ser-
vice. Thus the service-JCS linkage, though not depicted in the basic
organization model, is possibly stronger than the relationships
which do appear. Moreover, by law, the JCS is the principal military
adviser to the President as well as the Secretary of Defense, thus
providing that body tremendous leverage outside the formal hierar-
chical structure. Each chief, qua chief-of-service, also enjoys com-
parable privileged access to Congress. The same is true of Service
Secretaries. Finally, the Secretary of Defense's own staff, OSD. has
been regularly subjected to detailed legislative engineering. The
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, ASD(HA). for
example, was established by Congress over the objections of
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird.

These examples demonstrate that the organization of the

Department of Defense is only partially, and very inexactly, hierar-
chical. It might, in fact, be characterized as "permissive" in its
tolerance of deviations from the pyramidal structure. The abstract
basic organizational model symbolizes, although it cannot possibly

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The US System for Developing Strategy

portray, the scope of the responsibilities and activities of the con-

stituent elements as well as the complicated interrelationships
among them. But a sound analysis, while manipulating the abstract
model in search of valid "macro" insights, must remain cognizant of
the underlying realities governing the permissive structure.

Reorganization as a Political Process. The permissiveness of

the DOD structure is congruent with the proclivities of its constitu-
ent organizations. Although the division of responsibilities, reflect-
ing legislation and departmental directives appears clear-cut in the
model, each of the organizations below the Secretary of Defense in
fact exhibits a strong interest in both the maintainingand employ-
ing functions. Consequently, the organizations of each element
may attempt to play a part in decisions respecting both of the
principal functions. This phenomenon is particularly evident when
an organization perceives the issues being decided as either poten-
tially advantageous orthreatening to its strength, vitality, and ability
to perform its accustomed part of one or both functions.

Reorganization issues fall into this category, as an examination

of the model indicates. Proposals which would expand or contract
the authority, power, or structure of one element almost invariably
impact upon other elements. For example, some critics maintain the
"top" of the structure, the Secretary/OSD element, exercises exces-
sive control, sometimes labeled "micromanagement," over the
maintaining function. They would reduce the central management
role and, as a corollary, expand the role of the military departments.
Others hold, in effect, the maintainingside of the model has immod-
erate influence on the employing arm as a result of service head-
quarters staff preponderance in the joint staffing process and
service control over the component commands. Some of the DOS
77-80 proposals would strengthen the JCS and combatant com-
mand elements, thereby redressing this purported imbalance. Set-
ting aside the merits of the arguments for the present, it is apparent
that each of the elements will have an interest in decisions concern-
ing these reorganization proposals.

Equally apparent is that the organizations in each element have

the ability to translate their interest into influence on reorganization
decisions. Several factors contribute to their effectiveness in
advancing claims. Within very broad, and ill-defined, limits, the
constituent organizations enjoy abundant freedom of action as a

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 The US System for Developing Strategy

consequence of the structural configuration of the Department of

Defense. The framework, as discussed above, is characterized by
large organizations, differentiated in size and power, collocated,
except for the combatant commands, in the Pentagon (facilitating
interaction at all levels), and joined in a very permissive hierarchy.
Moreover, the organizations are situated at the seat of government.
Their freedom of action provides ample opportunities to seek and
find powerful external proponents whose interests parallel their
own.

Finally, the constituent organizations can advance strong argu-

ments they are entitled to participate in the reorganization decision
process. After all, DOD is a going concern. It is performing its
mission, albeit perhaps imperfectly, through the concerted efforts
of the organizations which compose the constituent elements of the
model. Each organization possesses position, stature, expertise.
and experience. In sum, in the absence of an unlikely event which
discredits part or all of the current structure and thereby presents
the opportunity for some external entity to begin, like Moses, with a
tabula rasa, the positions of the organizations of each element will
play an important part in shaping reorganization decisions.

The foregoing discussion suggests reorganization in DOD is a

very political process involving the constituent elements of the
organization, Congress, outside governmental agencies, and even
private groups. It supports the contention, which will be discussed
later, that reorganization proposals insensitive to ambient political
conditions-that is, the perspectives of the constituent organiza-
tions which will figure in reorganization decisions-are unlikely to
find acceptance.

The discussion also explains why the more extreme organiza-

tional proposals advanced by reformers over the years did not
receive serious consideration. If reorganization issues are political,
involving the clash and adjustment of interests among bureaucratic
organizations, reorganization decisions must accommodate a coa-
lition sufficiently powerful to hold sway over opponents. Construct-
ing such a coalition, in other than extraordinary circumstances,
rules out extreme proposals.*

"The political nature of reorganization is a phenomenon repeatedly

encountered and remarked in this paper. In its reference to the "clash and

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The US System for Developing Strategy

The Nature of the Constituent DOD Organizations-A

Bureaucratic Perspective

What latitude for change in the Department of Defense exists if

a number of organizations must reachf consensus as a precondi-
tion? Answering that question requires an examination of the
nature of the organizations--the relevant characteristics and inter-
ests of DOD constituent organizations which help to explain why
they might support or oppose particular reorganization proposals.

Recent organizational literature, particularly the work of Mor-

ton Halperin, has focused on DOD constitutent organizations., The
remainder of this section employs the organizational literature to
examine the nature of the bureaucratic organizational which figure
in DOD reorganization decisions.

Characteristics of DOD Constituent Organizations. In the most

general terms, an organization may be defined as a combination of
people with a common set of values who work together by fulfilling
different but complementary functions to achieve some purpose or
objective; the participants also share a set of beliefs (an ideology)
which relates their values and purposes to larger organizations
within which they operate.7 This definition, based on Carl Fried-
rich's concept of organization, suggests the major characteristics
and interests relevant to this inquiry which students of defense
organization have identified in one or more of the elements of the
DOD model.

Each of the DOD elements contains organizations with separ-

ately identifiable purposes or objectives which may be general or
specific." The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has a general
charter to "perform such duties and exercise such powers as the
Secretary of Defense may prescribe." On the other hand, each
service is assigned a specific mission. For example, the Navy "is

adjustment of interests" this paragraph conveys the intended meaning of

"political" in what follows. Thus "politics" is not limited to the activities of
elected officials: the processes which adjust and accommodate the inher-
ent contradictions among the myriad interets present in a modern society
are found throughout the governmental apparatus, and elsewhere as well.

258
 The US System for Developing Strategy

responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary for the

effective prosecution of war ... "

Several of the organizations with a specific mission also have

large, expensive capabilitieswhich are necessary to accomplish the
mission. The capabilities, of course, are the combat forces and their
supporting elements. Questions concerning capabilities-their
size, composition, readiness, supportability, and modernization-
reach the very essence, or raison d'etre, of the Defense Establish-
ment and, as a corollary, largely define the dimensions of its internal
conflicts. They involve the allocation of the limited resources availa-
ble to the DOD to the constituent elements which are in turn respon-
sible for maintaining and employing the military instrument.
Decisions must be made under the conditions of uncertainty which
prevail in the national security arena because such variables as the
intent and capabilities of potential adversaries (the "threat") are (at
least, in part) unknown and unknowable. In these circumstances,
the constituent elements of the DOD '.,ith specific missions inevita-
bly and understandably attempt to decrease the uncertainty by
pressing for greater capabilities to ensure they can accomplish their
missions. Under the conditions of limited resources, all claims can-
not be met. Thus, the tendency for intraorganizational conflict
within the DOD is built-in.

The inherent difficulty of operationalizing national security

objectives reinforces this tendency. These objectives of the "larger
organizaton" in Friedrich's concept are often so general any
number of alternative specific objectives or actions can be profered
by various proponents as the optimum way to pursue them. In
discussing this point, Halperin explains the dilemma faced by the
United States after the Soviet launching of Sputnik I.

Despite the general consensus that the United States needed to

preserve its strategic deterrent and maintain its technological
advantage over the Soviet Union after the Sputnik launching,
President Eisenhower, Congressional leaders, and the heads of
the military services all had very different notions of what
course of action would achieve these objectives.'

The Cuban missile crisis included a similar experience. The

United States finally realized its objective when the Soviet Union
agreed to remove missiles from Cuba. That outcome was achieved

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 The US System for Developing Strategy

through the imposition of a successful policy of blockading Cuba, a

policy implemented only after days of exhaustive consideration of
other options (eventually discarded) involving the Air Force, Army,
and other agencies.

The absence of a clear linkage "downward" between the gen-

eral objectives of the large organization and those of the constituent
organizations results in the reverse phenomenon. A characteristic
of the elements of DOD organizations, particularly those with spe-
cific missions and large capabilities, is the tendency to view their
purposes and objectives as identical with national purposes and
objectives. Friedrich points out in the definition that organizational
ideology relates the values and purposes of the lesser to the larger
organization. Halperin and Kanter find that, as a result of the
absence of clear-cut, exclusive operational courses of action to
achieve national objectives, each participant is "relatively free to
give operational meaning" to the objectives."1 The ambiguous link-
age of objectives and means sometimes results in the participants of
the lesser organization considering the relationship between their
values and purposes and those of the larger organization as an
identity. To paraphrase former Secretary of Defense Charles Wil-
son, "what's good for the Air Force is good for the country"-
because the Air Force provides capabilities to accomplish the
objectives of national security.

It is only a short step from this reasoning to another character-

istic, the often-noted phenomenon whereby its members adopt, as
one of its principal purposes, the well-being and survival of the
organizaton itself. The organization, after all, is the institution which
provides and promotes the values and purposes shared by the
participants and is crucial as well to the larger organization. Thus
the lesser organization becomes an instrumental value which must
be preserved.

Organizational Interests of DOD Constituent Elements. Based

on several of the characteristics discussed above, Halperin identi-
fied the principal interests of organizations which participate in the
national security policy process, among which the constituent ele-
ments of the Department of Defense are an important part. These
interests are influence, domain, essential role, independence.
budget, and morale.'12

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 The US System for Developing Strategy

Influence. The most pervasive interest is to exert independent

influence. An organization must have influence to further organiza-
tional purposes, ensure organizational well-being, and, in some
cases, secure capabilities-all of which, in the opinion of organiza-
tion participants, are worthy goals, by definition tor identity) in the
national interest.

Domain. All governmental organizations, from the most com-

prehensive to the most specialized, are concerned about their
organizational turf, or domain. A complex society requires that
functions be differentiated and assigned to separate organizations.
But it is impossible to differentiate functions so precisely that dis-
agreements over functional responsibilities do not arise between
and among organizations. At the highest levels of government,
these concerns with domain involve the separation of powers
among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches; in Con-
gress, jurisdictional disputes among the committees; in OSD. dis-
agreements over functional responsibilities; among the military
services, disputes over roles and missions; and between the JCS
and OSD, conflict concerning where policy ends and operations
begin.

Essence. The essential role or "essence" of an organization

derives from the common set of values and purposes participants
share. It is a normative conception held by the members-what the-
organization ought to be, how it ought to proceed, and what it ought
to seek to achieve. The services, with their environmental orienta-
tions toward land, sea, and air warfare, are prime examples of
organizations in which this interest is particularly powerful.

The US Navy has perceived its essential role as maintaining

warships which guarantee freedom and control of the seas. The
question of what kind of warships-aircraft carriers to project naval
air power, other types of surface combatant ships, or submarines-
has divided the Navy since World War I1. Nevertheless, the unifying
element, sea control, has been sufficiently strong to define the
"Navy" for its members and exclude other conceptions of essence.

The Army defines itself in terms of providing the capability for

ground combat by organized, regular units. This concept accom-
modates such traditional combat arms specialities as infantry,

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The US System for Developing Strategy

artillery, and armor as well as the more recent air mobility capabili-
ties. It discourages elite missions. Also very much on the periphery
are such capabilities as air defense and long-range missiles-and,
in the 1940s, strategic bombardment.' 3 In fact, lack of enthusiasm
for the latter capability because of its challenge to the ground
combat role accounts in some part for Army willingness to allow
creation of a separate Air Force after World War Il.'"

The Air Force achieved its status as a separate service largely as

a result of the effots of pilots who agreed with the Army on this
point." They were convinced their essential role, flying combat
aircraft capable of defeating an enemy through strategic bombard-
ment, was fundamentally different from, and incompatible with, the
values of the remainder of the Army. This conception of the Air
Force essence, though altered to accommodate a broader range of
aerospace vehicles, remains strong.

Independence. Organizations are interested in maintaining or

enhancing their independence or autonomy in order to safeguard
their essence and domain. This interest is most apparent in organi-
zations like the services which have resources and attempt to exert
as much independent control over them as possible. Interest in
autonomy at times overshadows other interests. In The Common
Defense, Samuel Huntington cited cases in which a service opts for
a smaller budget with greater control of its disposition rather than a
6
larger budget with the possible loss of some degree of control.'

Other manifestations of the interest in independence or auto-

nomy include: attempts to gain total operational control over per-
sonnel assigned to accomplish a mission: avoidance of operations
involving the combined forces or resources of several organiza-
tions: reluctance to participate in operations controlled by foreign
governments: and resistance to participation by outsiders in agency
operations.'

Budget. Despite occasional instances in which concern with

independence may prevail, all DOD organizations are interested in
the size and composition of the defense budget. For staff organiza-
tions with general purposes, the budget serves as an indicator of the
significance of their influence in providing advice on their particular
area of responsibility. For organizations requiring large capabilities
to accomplish their missions, the size of their portion of the budget,

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 The US System for Developing Strategy

and its relation to the budgets of other mission-oriented organiza-

tions, reflect in a concrete manner national priorities at a given
moment.

Morale. if the well-being and survival of an organization can be

rationalized as a legitimate purpose of the organization, as dis-
cussed above, it follows that maintaining the morale of the partici-
pants, qua members, is an important interest of the organization.
The values and purposes they share must continue to be regarded
by members in a favorable light; the purpose or objective they seek
must continue to appear worthwhile-not only personally but in the
context of beneficence to the larger organization. These considera-
tions reinforce attempts by organizations to maintain the essence
perceived by members, protect their domain, and enhance their
capabilities. Furthermore, they explain, in the case of the military
services, why compensation'and promotion are important not only
as personal rewards, but also as confirmation of the continuing
validity of the organizational ideology which relates military service
to national purpose. Any form of actual or perceived loss of status
on the part of the larger organization (for example, "erosion" of
benefits) is interpreted as weakening the ideological linkage and is
resisted.

The External Environment

Thus far the discussion of institutions has treated the Depart-

ment of Defense as a separate entity. The external environment the
Department faces has been discussed only as an avenue for the
constituent elements to gain influence by attracting extrinsic sup-
port for their positions. But DOD organizational issues are not
solely an intradepartmental concern. Organizations external to the
Department possess characteristics and interests similar to those of
the constituent elements as well as the requisite access and power
to translate their interests into influence. Consequently, DOD reor-
ganization depends on the demands and constraints which derive
from its relations with other executive departments, the White
House, Congress, and, at times, many other groups and interests.

Congress and President

Legislative and Executive Civilian Control. The constitutional

commitment to civilian control of the military and the American

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The US System for Developing Strategy

pluralistic political tradition of dividing powers and creating over-

lapping responsibilities among the branches of government pro-
foundly influence all aspects of defense organization. Civilian
control is a responsibility shared by the President and Congress;
each branch is assigned constitutional powers to effect civilian
supremacy. The result is a multifaceted approach which sometimes
leads to differences on defense organization.

The executive branch tends to favor a concept of civilian con-

trol which emphasizes the President as Commander in Chief served
by a strong Secretary of Defense with a legislative mandate granting
him authority over and responsibility for the Department of
Defense.,8

The Congress, on the other hand, exercises its responsibilities

for civilian control through its governance of the disposition of
resources and its access to officials, many with legislative charters,
who are interspersed at several levels below the Secretary of
Defense.1 9 In addition to service Secretaries, these positions
include Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of Defense and
service Assistant Secretaries as well as high-ranking military offic-
ers. Congress has jealously guarded its right to receive the advice of
these officials directly. As a corollary, Congress has consistently
objected to any plan which might tend to concentrate power in the
hands of one staff headed by a single preeminent military officer-
the perceived German general staff model. The legislative concept
of civilian control, then, ensures that the Congress, in determining
the allocation of resources for national defense, can consult with
politically responsible officials at levels which range from broad
polic,/ formulation and implementation to detailed scrutiny of spe-
cific activities. Congress has consistently defended its prerogatives
to assure civilian control in this manner in pursuance of its mandate
to provide for the armed forces.

As a result of the shared power with respect to national security.

the organization of the Department of Defense must accommodate
both the executive and legislative branches. This imperative inevita-
bly bounds the universe of feasible organizational changes because
of the differing perspectives of the two branches. Realistic organi-
zational initiatives must take cognizance of the constraints imposed
by the differing perspectives of both branches.

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 The US System for Developing Strategy

Other Factors. Even if the differ ng approaches to civilian con-

trol were set aside, other factors inhibit reorganization initiatives by
the Congress and the White House. Foremost among these is the
legislative process. New legislation requires agreement by both
Houses of Congress, including their various subcommittees and full
committees as well as the President. Thus the legislative process
offers opponents of reform multiple redoubts from which to defeat
prospective legislation. Legislative pitfalls are so well known that
the process requires no further elaboration here. It suffices to note
that as this piece is being written in September 1982, even tnough
the JCS Reorganization Bill has passed the House Of Representa-
tives after six months of deliberations, prospects of Senate action
this year are not bright. A half-passed law is, of course, no law at all.
But the bill will lose even that status with the advent of the new
Congress.

Possibly as daunting to the politically accountable officials as

the legislative process are the esoteric nature of the reorganization
issue and the absence of time to devote to it. Presidents and Con-
gressman are elected, they tend to believe, to initiate and carry out
policies -and programs, not to invest the inordinate time required to
master the intricacies of arcane organizational arrangements in the
Department of Defense. One of the most telling obstacles to JCS
reorganization in 1982 has been the Defense officials' belief that
they should devote their full time and energies to the Reagan
Administration program to rearm America. Even President Carter,
who promised during his campaign to reorganize the government,
had no specific idea what direction his "mandate" in that regard
should take with respect to the Department of Defense. And, soon
inundated with myriad policy decisions, he was afforded no oppor-
tunity to study the issue and decide.

Nor is it likely that the priorities of very many Congressmen will

ever be such that they believe themselves able to devote the hours
necessary to understand DOD organization sufficiently to make an
independent judgment in the absense of a legislative proposal by
the executive branch. During the 1982 JCS reorganization hearings.
the Congressmen on the House Armed Services Committee were
engaged in considering and acting on the annual defense authori-
zation, military construction, and military pay bills as well as a large
supplemental authorization bill. Each piece of legislation requires
subcommittee hearings, markup sessions, full committee consider-

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The US System for Developing Strategy

ation, preparation of reports, support during consideration by the

full House, and conference sessions with the Senate. Most Con-
gressmen are members of at least one other major committee with
similar activities. In addition, during the period of the JCS hearings
Congressmen were confronted with a number of fundamental
national policy decisions including the first budget resolution and
the mammoth tax bill of 1982. Finally, all of this was taking place
during a period in which most congressmen were forced to devote a
great de&': of time to keeping their jobs, it being an election year.

In sum, it is difficult for Congress to concentrate sufficiently on

DOD reorganization to master the subject. That this happened in
1982 with respect to JCS reorganization is a tribute to the persever-
ence of dedicated legislators, particularly Chairman White. But the
Congressmen themselves would be the first to acknowledge that
the multiple demands on their time present a formidable barrier to
DOD reorganization efforts.

The National Security Apparatus

Other executive-branch agencies as well as the White House

evidence keen interest in the manner in which DOD participates in
the formulation and implementation of national policies which
orchestrate all facets of national security affairs. This interest
extends to the organizational arrangements within DOD which link
the military to national policy, institutionalize its responsibility to
civilian authority, and ensure national objectives are accurately
reflected in military plans and budgets. Proposed DOD organiza-
tional changes, because they may affect the development of
national security policy and its implementation, wili be carefully
scrutinized by other members of the national security community.

It should be noted that rather than serving as an impediment to

reorganization, the bias of external agencies may well be in the
opposite direction. A National Security Council enquiry concerning
the issues surrounding JCS reorganization during the summer of
1982 apparently spurred the Secretary of Defense to initiate a
review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Prior to the expression of NSC
concern the Department had shown little interest.

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 The US System for Developing Strategy

The Public

Department of Defense organization decisions are of concern

to many other persons and organizations. For many intensity of
their interest depends upon the subject of the decision. Portions of
the general public, for example, are vitally concerned with base
realignments and closings; educational institutions with research
and development policies and procedures: business with acquisi-
tion processes; allied governments and international security
organizations with the unified and specified command structure.
mobilization responsibilities, and foreign military sales.

An informal "defense community" also exists. It consists princi-

pally of former defense officials, retired military personnel, acade-
micians, and a variety of organizations ranging from the Air Force
Association to the Council on Foreign Relations. The debate on
JCS reorganization in 1982 revealed that the defense community is
split on the issue. Most of the private sector witnesses testified in
favor of reform and, in fact, provided some of the most compelling
testimony favoring change. Nevertheless, opponents were also
effective witnesses and, in addition, appear to have been much
more active and successful behind the scenes exploiting the advan-
tages the legislative process affords those who favorthe status quo.

Conclusions Concerning Institutional Impediments

Examining the Department of Defense from an institutional

perspective yields the following observations and conclusions con-
cerning reorganization.

The Department is composed of many constituent organiza-

tions which vary in size, location, importance to the overall defense
mission, and influence.

The structure which links these constituent organizations

together into the Department of Defense is more accurately charac-
terized as "confederal" than hierarchical, particularly with respect
to the most powerful constituent organizations. Thus the subordi-
nate DOD organizations enjoy much greater freedom of action than
a strict hierarchical interpretation of the Department structure
would indicate.

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The US System for Developing Strategy

The bonds which unify several of the most powerful DOD con-
stituent organizations, the services, are much stronger than the
links which frame the Department structure. The services, with
missions critical to national survival, evidence the typical character-
istics of close-knit bureaucratic organizations. Therefore, it is not
difficult for them to identify their purposes as national objectives,
their well-being and organizational survival as an instrumental
national good in itself. Thus justified in their actions, the services
pursue their interests: influence, independence or autonomy,
domain (roles and missions), budget, and morale.

In these circumstances organizational measures, which almost

invariably seek to bring greater unity to the Department of Defense
as an organization, are likely to be viewed by one or more DOD
constituent organizations as threatening their national mission and
their interests. Thus opposition to reorganizations is almost auto-
matic. The more far-reaching a proposal, and the more DOD con-
stituent elements it affects, the more intense the opposition within
DOD is likely to be.

Because of their independent influence and the permissiveness

of the DOD structure, constituent organization opposition trans-
lates into a powerful institutional bias within the Department of
Defense against change.

Department of Defense reorganization, then, must be viewed as

a political process involving the clash and reconciliation of inter-
ests. Bargaining and negotiation are more characteristic of the
process than is decisive authoritative action, though the latter may
also figure at times.

The organizational milieu in which the Department of Defense

is situated often reinforces the political aspect of reorganization
actions. It also favors those who support the status quo. Congress
and the executive branch must agree on any significant reorganiza-
tion. Yet they have differing concepts of how best to effect civilian
control. Congress tends to be wary of proposals which would
strengthen central control at the expense of the constituent organi-
zations. Also both branches tend to be confronted by, and saturated
with, substantive defense issues which drive out DOD organiza-
tional concerns. In that regard, the complexity of defense organiza-
tion and the intricacies of the legislative process create a bias

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 The US System for Developing Strategy

against congressional action. The private sector "defense commun-

ity," though its majority probably favors DOD reform, nevertheless
includes a significant group of knowledgeable opponents who
effectively employ the checks and balances available in our govern-
mental system to thwart reorganization.

III. THE GULF BETWEEN WHAT "OUGHT TO BE"

AND WHAT IS

The apparent gulf between the de jure and de facto DOD organ-
ization reinforces the institutional bias against restructuring. This
section advances two variations of the basic organization model to
demonstrate the stark difference between the DOD organizational
concept embodied in law and the acutal organization as depicted in
recent studies of the organization.

Legislative or Objective Model-DOD Organization De Jure

If the basic "neutral" model is rearranged to reflect changes in

the legal morphology of the Department of Defense from its incep-
tion in 1947 to the last major legislative reorganizaton in 1958 the
model depicted in figure 7-2 emerges.

As compared to the "neutral" basic organization model of fig-

ure 7-1, the employing arm in the legislative model is stronger and
more independent. The JCS and combatant command elements are
much closer together, concerned primarily with unified employ-
ment of forces, or US military "output." As a consequence, the
component commands are further removed from, and more tenu-
ously linked to, their parent services through the support channel.
The more pronounced differentiation between the organizational
arms focuses the military departments on maintaining or "input"
functions-recruiting, training, and supporting forces. The service
chiefs in the legislative model have the capacity to accomplish the
intellectual hurdle required by their "dual-hat" responsibilities.
When meeting as the corporate body of the JCS, they assume the
appropriate employment arm perspective, adopting a joint, or uni-
fied, "national" outlook. Reconciliation between output demands
and input constraints occurs at three levels-in the integration of
maintaining and employment functions required to conduct unified
and specified command military operations, in the duality of the
service chief-JCS role, and in the relationships of the subordinate

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 The US System 1or Developing Strategy

PRESIDENT

SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE 05D)

S/ ~CHIEFS OF STAFF "

MIIT R JCS•I

UNIFIED

AND SPECIFIED
COMMANDS
COMPONENT

Figure 7-2: Legislative Organization Model of the Department of

Defense

elements to the Secretary of Defense/OSD. However, the politically

responsible Secretary makes the ultimate decisions relating input
to output.

The designation of this model as the "legislative or objective"

model is not meant to imply a narrow congressional idealization of
DOD organization. In fact, the model rather accurately portrays the
goal of those who support organizational reform of the Department
of Defense, as is apparent from the brief description of the Jones,
Meyer, and Taylor proposals at the outset. Also, in addition to
Congress, several Secretaries of Defense, the military departments,
the JCS, and two Presidents participated in the development of the
National Security Act and its revisions during a period which
spanned the 1940s and 1950s. Nevertheless, the following review of
the successive legislative reorganizations between 1947 and 1958
reveals that the model portrays the structural configuration which

270
 The US System for Developing Strategy

emerges from the legal provisions on which the Department of

Defense is now established. In that sense, the model reflects the
legislativey fixed "objective" of Congress.

The Secretary of Defense. The most widely recognized devel-

opment in post-World War II defense organization has been the
centralization of authority in the Secretary of Defense. From a
position in 1947 in which the services retained all powers not specif-
ically delegated elsewhere, the Secretary of Defense has acquired
complete responsibility for the management of the Department of
Defense. His initially small, immediate Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) has expanded in size, legal authority, and expertise
to provide the capability to discharge his responsibilities. As a
result, the Secretary is in fact as well as title the predominant
Defense official.

Commentary on centralization has at times tended to over-

shadow the more fundamental process which in large part explains
this phenomenon, the trend toward integration of defense func-
tions. Succeeding reorganizations in 1949, 1953, and 1958 con-
tained measures intended to secure the integration of service
claims into unified, fiscally constrained acquisition and budget
proposals; eliminate overlap in research and development; consoli-
date the performance of similar functions; and provide a stronger
framework for the internal resolution of differences which would in
turn facilitate an integrated DOD approach to national security
issues. Integration has inevitably resulted in greater centralization
of power in the Secretary of Defense and his staff.

The National Military Command Structure. Organizational

changes with respect to the national military command structure
(NMCS) since the National Security Act was first adopted in 1947
have had three major purposes. First, reforms have repeatedly
attempted to transform the Joint Chiefs of Staffs into a more
"national" advisory body as opposed to the perceived orientation of
each Chief to his particular Service. Creation in 1949 of a nonvoting
but prestigious Chairman divorced from any service was followed in
1953 with several modifications designed to strengthen his role.
Second, the chain of command has been changed several times to
streamline the linkage between the President as Commander in
Chief and the operational forces he commands. Service Secretaries
were explicitly included in the chain of command and the JCS was

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The US System for Developing Strategy

excluded in 1953; in 1958, Service Secretaries were excluded and

the chain was redefined to extend from the President to the Secre-
tary of Defense to the combatant commanders. (However, a subse-
quently issued DOD directive provided that the Secretary will
transmit orders through the JCS.) Third, employing arm responsi-
bilities for combat forces have been increased. in addition to remov-
ing service Secretaries from the chain of command, the 1958
reorganization assigned planning responsibilities to the unified and
specified commanders.

The Military Departments. The effect of the successive revi-

sions of the National Security Act has been to diminish legally
assigned responsibilities of the military departments, channeling
their activities into the maintaining areas-providing manpower,
weapon systems, and support for the combat forces assigned to the
unified and specified commands. Many of the increased powers
granted to the Secretary of Defense and National Military Com-
mand Structure elements as the National Security Act was revised
correspondingly diminished the responsibilities of the services. The
military departments lost "executive department" status in 1949: in
addition, Service Secretaries were eliminated from National Secur-
ity Council membership and lost their right of direct appeal to the
President and his budget authorities in what is now the Office of
Management and Budget. In 1958, the service Secretaries were
removed from the chain of operational command; their planning
and operational responsibilities were reassigned to the JCS and
unified and specified commanders, respectively. In addition, the
Secretary of Defense was given the authority to reassign supply and
service functions, assign combat forces, and designate which ser-
vice would develop new weapon systems. Subsequently, in the
1960s, the initiation of the planning, programming, and budgeting
system (PPBS) resulted in a significant diminution of military
department control over budgetary matters. Also, the movement
toward creating defense agencies to perform common functions
began. Over the years the defense agencies have assumed respon-
sibilities formerly assigned to the military departments in a number
of areas including logistics, communications, intelligence, and
mapping.

These changes should not be viewed as manifestations of a

plan, either implicit or explicit, gradually to weaken the military
departments and eventually to eliminate them. Rather, they evi-

272
 The US System for Developing Strategy

dence the congressional intention to concentrate the military

departments on the maintaining function. The departments retain
major management responsibilities the Congress has carefully
elaborated in law. Those responsibilities include training, opera-
tions, administration, support and maintenance, welfare, prepared-
ness, and accountability for the effectiveness of their services. The
military departments, by law, are also responsible for the adminis-
tration of forces assigned to the combatant commands. In practice,
this means the military departments have continuing support
responsibility for all US forces. Finally, Congress regularly calls
upon Service Secretaries and other military department officials to
explain matters under their purview. The tenor of the dialogue in
these hearings indicates Congress holds the military departments
responsible for the resources with which they are entrusted.

As will become apparent below, the criticisms of DOD organi-

zation, taken as a whole, suggest the legislative model does not
accurately depict the structural relationships which actually obtain.

Critique Model-DOD Organization De Facto

If the basic organization model is again rearranged to reflect

the findings and criticisms of the Defense Organizaton Study, 1977-
1980 (DOS 77-80) concerning the existing relationships among the
elements, the concept of current DOD organization depicted in
figure 7-3 emerges. This critique model is based on all five studies
and cannot be attributed to any one of them; it is an interpretation
that results from integrating their findings and conclusions, and
then manipulating the basic organization model to depict the com-
posite result.

The critique model indicates that the dominating organizations

in the Department of Defense are the central management (the
Secretary and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)) and the
services. The latter exercise preponderant influence over the joint
structure. As a result, the relationship between central management
and the services is the anvil on which the major decisions concern-
ing both maintaining and employing functions are hammered out in
the Department of Defense

The service Secretaries have little influence, relatively. They are

not participants in top management and are not in a position to act

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The US System for Developing Strategy

as the actual leaders of their departments. They represent an inter-

vening layer of management between the Secretary of Defense and
the services which is subject to challenge in the absence of more
meaningful contributions.

The joint organizations are far too weak. The two primary func-
tions of the joint system, military advice and employment of forces
in the field, are compromised. Military advice, the principal function
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), is flawed by the inability of the

THE PRESENT STRUCTURE

AS PORTRAYED BY CRITICS

PRESIDENT

Sto E.NS
SECRETARY

MAINTAIN SECRETARY iOSO,

AND
EMPLOY•

SCHIEFS
SECRETARIE.S JOINT
OFSTAFF

SERVICES',,

Figure 7-3: Integrated DOS 77-80 Critique Model of the Organization of

the Department of Defense

274
 The US System for Developing Strategy

Chiefs, also imbued with service responsibilities, to address a broad

range of contentious issues as a corporate entity. The JCS acts as a
forum for arriving at conjoint service positions through negotiations
in which each service seeks to maximize its position through bar-
gaining at multiple levels.

By this reading, however, the JCS fails to approximate fulfilling

its raison d'etre for two reasons. First, the JCS bargaining approach
produces military advice that is fundamentally different from what
was intended by the authors of the National Security Act-and,
more important, of less value to the President and Secretary of
Defense. The framers of the act sought an organization to produce
military advice derived from the deliberations of a corporate body of
the highest military leaders considering issues from a national per-
spective detached from, but cognizant of, service interests. Second,
because bargaining is unable to produce compromises acceptable
to the services in contentious areas, the JCS finesses a broad range
of issues that shape the very core of the US defense posture. These
issues include the allocation of resources, basic strategy, roles and
missions of the services, joint doctrine, and the functions, responsi-
bilities, and geographic assignments of unified and specified
commands.

The Joint Staff is fashioned to assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in

the bargaining process. Its procedures establish rules of the game
for consultation that maximize service influence and preclude an
independent Joint Staff voice. Its analytical capability has been
systematically weakened. Furthermore, the services control its per-
sonnel structure and have no interest in developing a Joint Staff
whose talent rivals that of service staffs.

The commanders in chief of the unified and specified com-

mands (CINCs) have neither the influence nor the clear-cut, dura-
ble links with higher authority commensurate with their
responsibilities as theater commanders of US forces in the field. In
crucial decisions determining the composition and warfighting
capability of theater forces, subordinate component commanders
and, by extension, the services overshadow the CINCs. No over-
arching joint readiness assessment system exists to analyze the
preparedness of each unified theater force and subsequently relate

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The US System for Developing Strategy

this assessment through joint channels to resource allocation deci-

sions intended to correct deficiencies. Instead, readiness evalua-
tions are conducted by the component commands, controlled by
the services, and linked to service budget proposals, In contrast, the
CINCs have no spokesman in Washington to represent their collec-
tive views. Consequently, the joint influence on resource allocation
decisions that ultimately determine the structure and readiness of
forces is almost nil or irrelevant, despite the obvious fundamental
importance of these decisions to the accomplishment of the basic
joint function, employing US forces. Finally, the CINCs' chain of
command from and to the Secretary of Defense is rendered poten-
tially indecisive by its routing through the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, a
committee, as opposed to a single military official acting as the
agent of the Secretary of Defense in supervising the CINCs.

By inference, the component commands are too independent

of the unified commanders. These commands have dual designa-
tions as major service commands. This latter identity is far more
influential than the joint, or unified, nature of their assignment. The
Services train and equip as well as control "the flow of men, money,
and material to the CINCs' components. The services (and the
components) thus have the major influence on both the structure
and the readiness of the forces for which the CINC is responsible.2,
The configuration of each component in a theater as a self-
sufficient fighting force with a full range of support possibly results
in costly redundancies in areas such as supply, maintenance,
administration, and discipline. Consolidating some functions
deserves serious consideration, particularly in the logistics areas
where control by the theater commander could possibly increase
warfighting capability as well as save dollars.

The preeminence of the four services in the DOD organiza-

tional structure is completely disproportionate to their legally
assigned and limited formal responsibilities for the maintaining
function-in essence, organizing, training, and equipping forces.
The interests of the services in maintaining organizational inde-
pendence and ensuring their capability to accomplish service mis-
sions provide continuing incentives to influence as many decisions
affecting them as possible. In effect, the services have co-opted the
joint structure through the dual roles of the service chiefs, over-
weening influence on the Joint Staff, participation in CINC selec-
tion, and predominant control overthe component commands. As a

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 The US System for Developing Strategy

result, the underlying framework for making and implementing

decisions in the Department of Defense, whether on maintainingor
employing issues, is dialogue between the Secretary of Defen-
se/Office of the Secretary of Defense and the services.

This finding does not mean that the military is unresponsive. On

the contrary, the adherence of the services to civilian control is
beyond question. It does mean that the military input into decision-
making, whether through service Secretaries, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Joint Staff, CINCs, or components, is predominantly service-
oriented. On a broad range of contentious issues, military advice
from a national perspective is unavailable to civilian decisionmak-
ers who are forced to provide this perspective themselves, whether
or not they are qualified to do so.

Given that the basic DOD relationship is between the Office of

the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the services, with the unfortu-
nate absence of a truly joint military voice, are other aspects of the
relationship in balance? Definitely not. In each of the several func-
tional resource management areas examined by the component
studies of the DOS 77-80, the services were found to exercise too
much latitude.

In the acquisition process the tendency of each service to favor

alternatives that will enhance its organization and to rush into pro-
duction with inadequate test and evaluation is not sufficiently offset
by a broader OSD perspective. In the area of health care, excessive
service autonomy results in inconsistent planning that makes it
impossible to ascertain medical readiness needs despite convinc-
ing evidence of serious shortfalls. Although some evidence sug-
gests service logistics concepts may be outdated and should be
challenged, progress in this direction is unlikely in the absence of
OSD action. The services are unable to address many training
problems effectively. More vigorous OSD involvement is needed,
even though this would diminish traditional service autonomy in
training. A similar situation exists in personnel management with
respect to developing a uniform methodology and DOD-wide data
bank as prerequisites to optimizing the mix of experienced and
inexperienced personnel in various career fields.

Despite these management shortcomings in specific functional

areas, the Office of the Secretary of Defense is endowed with suffi-

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The US System for Developing Strategy

cient authority, responsibilities, control mechanisms, and talent to

make it a formidable counterpoise to the services. The Secretary of
Defense ultimately controls defense policy, strategy, resource allo-
cation, and manpower decisions within the Department. Although
the studies that compose the DOS 77-80 fault the Office of the
Secretary for failing to provide stronger leadership in several areas,
they do not call for expanding OSD power. In fact, offsetting the
foregoing criticisms to some extent are charges of OSD overman-
agement in the acquisition review process, overly detailed program
guidance, and imprudent step-by-step direction of complex military
operations during crises.

The underlying theme of the studies relative to the Office of the

Secretary of Defense (OSD) is that a change in management
approach is needed. The Office of the Secretary slights the broad
policy function; it fails to define the linkages between national
objectives and military planning, to evalute alternative approaches
to military requirements, and to ensure that decisions, once made,
are implemented and the results assessed for needed adjustments.
Effecting the needed change to a management approach in which
broad policy is the central focus will require correction of a number
of weaknesses: ineffectual military participation in OSD policy
formulation; insufficient delegation to operating levels of the
Department; imprecise delineation of authority between the Office
of the Secretary of Defense and the military departments; weak
OSD evaluation capability; inattention to output measures such as
joint warfighting or readiness capabilities in resource allocation
decisions; and absence of cohesion and teamwork among constitu-
ent elements of the Department.

Attempts to Bridge the Gulf

The implication of the DOS 77-80 critique and the recent initia-
tives by Generals Jones and Meyer and others is that the time has
come to consider modifying the present Department of Defense
structure. The earlier discussion of institutional barriers suggests
that a spontaneous, sustained internal DOD effort to improve
defense organization is very unlikely.

But if that means the impetus for reform must come from out-
side the Department, history suggests prospects are equally bleak.
Students and practitioners who have addressed the current organi-

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 The US System for Developing Strategy

zation in scholarly treatises and official government studies have

consistently agreed on the major outlines of what is wrong with
defense organization. This point was graphically demonstrated by
General Jones before the Investigations Subcommittee when he
displayed a thick stack of studies of JCS organization which span
over three decades, all of which found that major flaws exist in the
structure.

Why, then, have structural weaknesses been unattended since

1958? Why has this facet of defense affairs been so unresponsive to
the findings and recommendation of critics while relative flexibility
has been evident in responding to other deficiencies?

Resort to Alternative Organizational Approaches. One reason

is the relative ease and apparent effectiveness of alternative organi-
zational approaches. Since 1958, if not before, the authority of the
Secretary of Defense to establish processes for deciding resource
allocation, acquisition, and similar issues has been unchallenged.
Organizational processes, after all, in one respect are merely rules
defining who figures and to what degree, in a decision. The power to
establish a process is the power to slice through the structure of an
organization, bypassing certain elements regardless of their posi-
tion in the hierarchy, and including others, even though they may be
formally subordinate. Thus processes can be used to avoid direct
conflict and facilitate action by defining, and redefining when
necessary, the rules of the game for making decisions.

And process changes are less dolorous for Secretaries of

Defense than reorganizations. Although the formal authority of the
Secretary of Defense to reorganize his department is comparable to
his authority to create and modify processes, the de facto circum-
stances differ markedly. A Secretary who proposes significant reor-
ganization of the military departments or Joint Chiefs of Staff can be
certain he will be strongly challenged both from within the Depart-
ment of Defense and from powerful segments of the Congress and
the general public. Faced with inevitable, unremitting opposition to
significant restructuring, Secretaries focus on modifying
processes.

Absence of Political Sensitivity. A second reason for the

absence of significant structural changes is that many reform pro-
posals have been too far-reaching to attract committed and power-

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The US System for Developing Strategy

ful proponents. They run the gamut from recommending complete

centralization to championing a return to decentralized service
preeminence. Acceptance of any one of those proposals wcoild
result in changes as wrenching as any of the sweeping reorganiza-
tions of the 1940s and 1950s. The 1961 Symington Report sug-
gested eliminating the present military departments and placing the
Services, as separate organizational units, under the Secretary of
Defense within a single Department of Defense. In addition, the
report recommended replacing the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a
single officer who would act as the principal military adviser to the
President and Secretary of Defense, preside over a military advisory
council unaffiliated with the services, and direct the combatant
commands. 2 I The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel proposed completely
regrouping the functions of DOD under three Deputy Secretaries of
Defense to which service Secretaries and a revamped military oper-
ations structure would be subordinate.2 2 Paul Y. Hammond recom-
mended conferring authority and responsibility for the military
program of all of the services upon the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff who would head a formally established general staff.23
Finally, John C. Reis' treatise favoring a return to decentralized
organizaton suggested the possibility of consolidating the unified
and specified commands into four mission-oriented services which
would absorb the existing military departments.2 4

After the strident conflicts of the early post-World War II years,

the erstwhile combatants had little energy and no enthusiasm for
further battles along these lines. Furthermore, less provocation
existed. The Secretary of Defense emerged with such sweeping
authority he could hardly continue to claim to be too weak to run the
Department. The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps found
they had succesfully defended the separate identities and relative
autonomy they sought. Finally, the external factors which had
fanned the reorganization fires subsided with the election of Presi-
dent Kennedy. Parsimonious Truman and Eisenhower defense
budgets, which gave rise to intense service competition and corres-
ponding public reaction in support of greater unification, gave way
to an expanding defense posture and subsequently to the plentiful
Vietnam budgets. Nor did succeeding Presidents share Eisenhow-
er's penchant for personal involvement in Department of Defense
reorganization. In these circumstances, despite the periodic pro-
posals for major realignments, none of the powerful potential prop-
onents demonstrated sufficient interest to make structural change a
viable issue.

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Thus the later years have confirmed what the early years dem-
onstated: structural reorganization of the Department of Defense is,
first and foremost, a political process, involving the clash and
adjustment of bureaucratic, legislative, and private interests. Re-
structuring is not, as many studies implicitly assume, an academic
exercise in organizational optimization. Those who would reorgan-
ize the Department of Defense are simply too prone to advance
far-reaching P~roposals while remaining insensitive to possible
sources of support and opposition in the bureaucracy, White
House, Congress, and public. If they are to influence the shape of
public institutions such as the Department of Defense, reformers
must advance reorganization proposals developed with an
informed appreciation of the likely boundaries of the politically
possible.

IV. CONFLICT AND COOPERATION

A phenonemon often remarked, and once again demonstrated

during the JCS reorganization hearings, is that the prescriptions of
proponents of reorganization are as diverse as the diagnoses of
DOD organizational maladies are similar.2 1 Identifying problems is
primarily an empirical exercise; deriving solutions, primarily deduc-
tive. Until those who advocate organizational reform move closer to
agreement on the premises from which their recommendations are
derived, the very diversity of their views will continue to serve as an
impediment to meaningful reorganization. To arrive at similar
deductions concerning organizational realignments requires start-
ing with similar premises concerning the nature of organizations.

In particular, in the case of the Department of Defense, those

who would reshape the structure need to consider more carfully the
sources and implications of conflict and cooperation in organiza-
tions. Any reorganization which fails to consider and provide for the
interplay of those phenomena is unlikely to achieve the reformers'
goal of a more integrated national defense effort.

Coexistence of Conflict and Cooperation in Olianizations

Assumptions about conflict and cooperation constitute one of

the major fault lines which divide organizational literature. The
rational, hierarchic model elaborated by Max Weber concentrates
on the division of labor and the rules which govern each division in a

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bureaucracy; i.e.. jurisdiction, function, authority, duties and rights,

et cetera. 26 This model implicitly assumes the members of the
organization voluntarily cooperate to achieve goals established by
the leadership situated at the pinnacle of the hierarchic pyramid.
More recent scholarship by Halperin and others, discussed earlier,
emphasize what Weber's model overlooks: the conflict among the
elements of an organization which inevitably attends delegation of
authority and decentralized operations. These authors explain
bureaucratic behavior on the basis of interaction among conflicting
and competing interests.2 7 Neither model is sufficient in itself. The
hierarchic model cannot deal with the complexities which conflict
imposes and thus fails to explain nonrational (bargaining) decison
processes and outcomes. The conflict model, emphasizing dis-
agreement, does not adequately explain how cooperation is
achieved and actions are finally taken.26

Nevertheless, the tenor of the findings of the many studies of

Department of Defense organization suggests each model approxi-
mates significant portions of reality. An eclectic approach which
subsumes discordant premises must be accepted. Despite the
apparent contradiction, empirical evidence leaves no room to doubt
both tendencies are inherent in bureaucratic organizations. They
coexist. In some circumstances explanations of bureaucratic
behavior which assume cooperation are more accurate; in others,
those which emphasize conflict. The purpose of any reorganization
must be to foster circumstances in which both conflict and coopera-
tion contribute to achievement of organizational objectives.

Conflict-Sources, Legitimacy, and Requirements for Control

The treatment of conflict in organized bodies, although over-

looked by Weber, nevertheless has a distinguished lineage. James
Madison, in essay 10 of The Federalist,suggests the structure of the
United States Constitution derives from an appreciation of the per-
vasiveness, and potentially disastrous effects, of unregulated con-
flict among "factions." The Federalist attributes the origin of
factions, and thus conflict, to (1) man's nature, in which reasoning
ability and emotional make-up provide the basis for arriving at
differing opinions (concerning, for example, religion, government,
and political leadership which are pursued with "zeal"); and (2) the
26
claims of different interests based on the distribution of property.
Two centuries have done nothing to tarnish those insights,

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although the earlier discussion of institutional impediments to reor-

ganization suggests the source of conflict might be broadened
beyond "property" in explaining bureaucratic organizations to
include interests such as influence, domain, independence,
essence, budget, and morale.

As a result of genuinely incompatible judgments and interests,

then, conflict within and among organizations is inherent, perva-
sive, and (regrettably, in Madison's view) legitimate. Because
resources are too scarce to accommodate all valid requirements,
because the opinions of sincere men may diverge on the most
appropriate course of action, and because decisions are made in
conditions of uncertainty in which no definitive proof existsthat the
alternative selected is in fact "best," differences are inevitable and
the pursuit of competing claims justified. Charles Ries has given
eloquent expression to the legitimacy of conflict in the Department
of Defense:

There is no reason to believe those sharing power will view all

policy questions identically. Differences will occur. And these
differences do not appear because some individuals have the
"right" or the "truly national" view while others have the
"wrong" or "parochial" view. On the contrary, differences occur
because of the different duties of those who share power.
Duties to office, duties to constituency, duties to organization,
duties to knowledge and duties to self are different.'

Despite mutual agreement on its legitimacy, Ries and The Fed-

eralist disagree on the value of conflict. Ries appears to justify all
conflict; The Federalist,to condemn it. Neither position is tenable.
Certain forms of conflict are detrimental. On the other hand, the
success of an organization like the Department of Defense in defin-
ing and achieving its objectives depends in large part on how it
structures conflict to achieve constructive results. Conflict is coun-
terproductive, for example, when based on personal jealousies and
animosities, or on narrow organizational considerations of a con-
stituent element manifestly at variance with the objectives and well-
being of the parent organization. It is equally harmful when it results
from unrelenting pursuit by a subordinate element of a course of
action rejected by the Secretary of Defense in favor of another.

But conflict which derives from the pursuit of their interests by

,he constituent elements of an organization provides the issue

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agenda, complete with alternatives, which constitutes the basic

data and framework for organizational decisions. That statement is
true whether the competing elements are the sales and production
departments of a business or the military departments of the
Department of Defense. The conflicts may be over objectives, the
operational goals the Department of Defense should pursue to
maintain national security; for example, an assured destruction
versus a counterforce targeting strategy, or a Navy preeminent in all
aspects of sea power (air, surface, and subsurface) and capable of
prosecuting all types of warfare (conventional, tactical nuclear, and
strategic) at the expense, if necessary, of the Air Force and Army. Or
the conflicts may involve selection of the means to achieve given
ends: for example, the choice between an Air Force and a Navy
cruise missile design. Any assumption that the Secretary of Defen-
se/Office of the Secretary of Defense-or any single military or
civilian staff-has the capability within its own resources to plumb
the depths of issues such as these (which involve ultimate national
defense goals and ends-means compatibility) and arrive independ-
ently at solutions at once feasible and acceptable to elements of the
Department charged with carrying them out would be completely
spirited advocacy on pending decisions as well as valuable source
which fails to provide avenues for differing positions to reach the
top denies its central management the most innovative thinking and
spirited advocacy on pending decisions as well as avaluable soruce
of intelligence on the most significant issues facing the
organization.

The problem, then, in coming to grips with conflict is not to

eliminate it, as many reorganization proposals implicitly assume.
That is impossible. The problem in structuring an organization is to
manipulate conflict to secure its benefits and minimize its harmful
effects. This pluralistic approach requires that (1) all relevant inter-
ests are represented in decisions which will have an impact on them-
and (2) interests are checked through organizational devices-
structure, procedures, and processes-which secure their benefits
while harnessing their excesses.

The first requirement is self-evident: a decision uninstructed by

all significant view points and urged by strongly interested advo-
cates could very easily fall short of approximating overall organiza-
tional goals.

The second, more complex, requirement assumes, with The

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Federalist, that organized interests, if left unchecked, will pursue

their goals to the point of disregarding "the public good" or "the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community." This being
the case, "the principal32
task" is "the regulation of thnos various and
interfering interests.'"

Organizations, whether private or public, in advancing their

interests tend to continue to escalate their claims until checked. The
reason is not difficult to find. Whether they merely fail to consider
the question of the more general interest, or are able to rationalize
their objectives and actions as conforming with it, is irrelevant. The
point is that an abstract concept such as the general, public, or
national interest, which political philosophers are patently unable
to define, poses absolutely no limitation to the activities of organiza-
tions in pursuing their interests. That is true whether the interests
involved are businesses, labor unions, environmentalists, develop-
ers, government departments (DOD versus State), free traders,
protectionists, nuclear power advocates, their opponents, minority
activists, or Army, Navy and Air Force proponents. Consequently, in
attempting to control the strong-willed organizations which com-
prise the confederation that is the Department of Defense, reorgani-
zation actions should focus on configuring the inevitably
conflicting constituent elements to check and balance each other.

Cooperation-Source and Potential for Controlling Conflict

David Truman has suggested another, more subtle, check to
the potential excesses of organizational interests which bridges the
gap between conflict and cooperation. Truman points out that
members of any organization are also members of many other
groups, both organized and unorganized. Each of these groups has
interests which may or may not be compatible. The overlapping
memberships of the participants in any one organization impose
inherent limits on its demands. Moreover, additional limits result
from participants' loyalties to latent interests which, when mobil-
ized (or disturbed), are very powerful. The latent interests include a
sense of fair play (or the absence thereof), pride in the overall
organization, and a sense of propriety or impropriety in the manne,
in which decisions are made."

Several examples illustrate the limitations which overlapping

organizational membership and unorganized interests may impose
in the context of the Department of Defense. A member of the Air
Force may have supported acquisition of the B-1 bomber but

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opposed any further Air Force effort to acquire it during the Carter
Administration after the President rejected the program. A naval
aviator may support the air against the surface and subsurface
components within the Navy but later support a Navy budget which
stints naval air against Air Force and Army budget proposals. De-
spite personal reservations concerning its wisdom, a serviceman
may willingly participate in a controversial war, such as Vietnam.
because of his commitment to the constitutional and democratic
process from which the war policy, however misguided in his
view. emerged. A service Secretary or chief may advocate that his
department assume jurisdiction over military space activities but,
after thorough consideration of the issue by the Secretary of
Defense in consultation with all concerned, fully support a multiple-
service approach to space activities. Thus the variety of loyalties
and interests of the members of an organization may serve to limit
the objectives and activities of the organization.

Overlapping interests and loyalties can be exploited to foster

cooperation in a number of ways: by restructuring to ensure that all
significant interests are represented in decisions (as in the case of
the service Secretary above): by establishing "rules of the game" for
decisionmaking, through organizational changes or by other
means which are generally acknowledged as legitimate and thus
become "interests" in themselves (as in the cases of the doubting
Vietnam War veteran and the B-1 advocate): by ensuring that the
broad overall implications of alternatives under consideration are
assessed and made known as well as the effects on subordinate
organizations (as in the case of the naval aviator). Through tech-
niques such as those, the multiple loyalties and interests which
characterize each member of the organization make claims on him.
He will pursue immediate and intense interests, such as a service
position, through bargaining and negotiations with other interests.
But beyond a certain point he will give way to other claims which he
also perceives as justified. Consequently, in an organization as
interlaced with overlapping layers and loyalties as DOD, reorgani-
zation actions should attempt to manipulatethe framework of coop-
eration to ensure competing claims are at the cutting edge of
decision for all participants.

Conclusions Concernir'n Conflict and Cooperation.

Herbert Simon has written that "administrative organizations

are systems of cooperative behavior.'- 4 With respect to the organi-

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zational circumstances of the Department of Defense, that state-

ment is no more than half true, in and of itself-and completely inad-
equate as an operative assumption. Simon would have been just as
wide of the mark, however, had he written that organizations are
essentially arenas of conflict. Large bureaucracies like the Depart-
ment of Defense which are composed of powerful constituent ele-
ments are characterized by strong patterns of both conflict and
cooperation. Purposeful, integrated, and coordinated action can
only be achieved by deliberately arranging these patterns to achieve
constructive results. The foregoing discussion suggests the follow-
ing guidelines for reorganization proposals which would exploit
conflict and cooperation. That many DOD reorganization proposals
would violate one or more of these guidelines is a major impediment
to successful reform.

Mobilize all significant interests whose perspectives are ger-

mane to decisions on Departmental activities. The DOS 77-80 stu-
dies, for example, recommended that relatively unorganized
interests such as the genuine joint perspective be organized, and
that weak institutions with a useful perspective, such as service
Secretaries, be strengthened. Most of the recent proposals for JCS
reorganization have recommended strengthening the Joint Staff
and the unified and specified commanders as well as the JCS
Chairman. Such recommendations would tend to strengthen the
joint interest vis-a-vis service interests.

Structure conflict to ensure all relevant interests figure in deci-

sions. Ensure that conflict is channeled into adversary relationships
which delineate the differing positions, alternative solutions, and
their implications. This guideline would favor retaining the Joint
Chiefs of Staff because it is potentially a superb conflict arena. It
would, however, require that other relevant interests-that is. those
with a joint perspective-be fully represented as well as the present
service interests.

Structure conflict resolution to encourage cooperation and

legitimize. as a last resort, the exercise of authority. First, improve
the quality, consistency, and flow of communications thereby
reducing conflict based on inadequate or erroneous information.
Second, increase the certainty opposing positions will be revealed
and challenged in fora with authority to make decisions. thus
encouraging cooperation by participants reluctant to face such
exposure. Third, intensify the latent claims on participants for

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accommodation by unorganized or weak interests. Finally, in addi-

tion to voluntary cooperation, encourage negotiated cooperation
through bargaining and compromise by reinforcing participants'
anticipation that other decision points in the structure are prepared
to exercise their prerogative to decide in the absence of agreement.

This guideline would also favor retaining the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. But the JCS would require modification to become a vehicle
for conflict resolution. The flow of communications would neces-
sarily be broadened to include independent assessments from the
Joint Staff and the unified and specified commanders, as well as the
services, so that conflicts among all relevant interests are laid bare.
The various interests would then serve to check each other. Most
important, this guideline would require strengthening the JCS
Chairman who would serve to encourage conflict resolution.
through consensus-building among all interests if possible. but
through the interposition of his own independent advice to civilian
authorities in the absence of agreement.

V. HOW IMPEDIMENTS TO REORGANIZATION AFFECT CUR-

RENT JCS REORGANIZATION PROPOSALS

By this point the impediments to reorganization of the Depart-

ment of Defense must seem overwhelming. And, in fact, they have
been for almost a quarter of a century.

If they are so strong, how can they be overcome? Answering

that question would require an analysis comparable to this one. But
analyzing some of the current proposals to reorganize the JCS in
terms of the obstacles to reorganization identified herein yields
some insights on their prospects.

The spectrum of JCS reorganization proposals extends from

the status quo to General Taylor's proposal to revamp the entire
joint structure. Thanks to the events of this year, those who support
reorganization may find that the status quo end of the spectrum is
becoming recognized as an extreme. Scathing critiques of the
organization by two serving members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
followed by three months of exhaustive hearings in which the weak-
nesses of the organization were painstakingly revealed make it
difficult for those who oppose any changes at all to remain credible.
What were earlier identified as "latent interests" may have been

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mobile in support of correcting glaring deficiencies in the national

defense structure.

Rejecting the status quo, however, does not make proposals at

the other end of the spectrum, characterized by General Taylor's
scheme, any more likely to beaccepted. Intheabsenceof awartime
catastrophe or some other event that completely discredits the pres-
ent JCS organization, thereby allowing architects of reorganization
to sketch their proposals on a tabula casa. no recommendation
which involves obliterating the present structure is likely to be taken
seriously.

Proposals of this nature display too little political sensitivity.

They immediately arouse more opposition than could possibly be
overcome by a few well-intentioned supporters. For example, Gen-
eral Taylor's proposal for a Military Staff, National Command
Authorities headed by a chief of staff is open to the timeworn but
effective alarums about the dangers of an emergent "man on horse-
back" at the head of a powerful Prussian-type general staff. Just as
important, because these schemes threaten the interests (domain,
influence, autonomy, budget) of many of the most powerful organi-
zations within the Department of Defense, they excite intense inter-
nal opposition. In short, the Taylor proposal and its ilk, insofar as
they entail discarding the present organization and starting over,
must be rejected because of their lack of political sensitivity.*
That conclusion is admittedly harsh. It does not even reach the
merits of the more far-reaching recommendations before rejecting
them. But an examination of General Meyer's proposal, which is
somewhat similar to General Taylor's and must also be discarded
on political grounds, reveals it apparently disregards the implica-
tions of the interplay of conflict and cooperation in organizations.
Because the dual roles of each service chief involve a conflict of
interest, General Meyer would eliminate the JCS, thus severing the
strongest service tie with the joint structure. Recalling the discus-
sion in Part IV of this paper, this realignment would do nothing to
eliminate the inherent conflicts in the Department of Defense. But it
would eliminate the JCS as an arena for conflict resolution. And
General Meyer's proposed National Military Advisory Council,

*Recall that "political" herein refers to irie clashi and adjustment of

interests in the bureaucracy as well as the elective offices.

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devised to exclude parochial service interests, would not take the

place of the JCS as a potential arena to resolve conflicts.

In his testimony. General Allen, the Air Force Chief of Staff,

strongly emphasized the need to retain the service-JCS link to
achieve the adjustment and integration which he feared the Meyer
proposal would destroy. With the caveat that the service-joint lin-
kage should remain intact, General Allen supported General Jones
initiative.

Thus the Jones proposal, more than the others, appreciates the
potential of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a conflict arena which can
address and resolve the inherent conflicts, thereby achieving the
necessary integration between the maintaining,or input, side of the
defense structure and the warfighting employment, or output, side.
But General Jones' approach also garners support because it is
incremental. It is intended to retain as much of the present system
as he thinks prudent. Many of his recommendations are directed at
resolving specific problems which he deliberately and persuasively
identifies.

But Jones would accomplish his principal objectives by making

the JCS Chairman the principal military adviser and giving him
complete control over the Joint Staff. Those recommendations
exceed the bounds of political acceptability. They excite intense
opposition from the services whose chiefs, as members of the JCS,
would be reduced to rendering their adviceto the Chairman, not the
Secretary of Defense and the President (unless specifically asked).
as at present. Also, giving the Chairman complete control of the
Joint Staff conflicts with General Allen's caveat that the service-
joint linkage must not be threatened. Finally, of course, these two
Jones recommendations arouse concern among those on Con-
gress, and elsewhere, who are not comfortable with a single preemi-
nent source of military advice and a very powerful central military
staff. Although General Jones' skillfully crafted proposal
deservedly received more support than any reorganization pro-
posal in many years, it nevertheless required modification in order
to overcome the obstacles to DOD reorganization.

The necessary changes, in the view of the Congressmen who

framed it, appear in the House Armed Services Committee bill,
H.R. 6954 (see appendix to this paper). It is politically sensitive: it is
tailored to garner the support (or blunt the opposition) of a broad

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range of governmental and private defense-oriented organizations

and individuals; e.g., the Congress, Secretary of Defense, the uni-
fied and specified commanders, some of the services, the National
Security Council staff, the private sector defense community. The
bill would make the Chairman an adviser in his own right, not the
principal military adviser. The JCS would retain its traditional char-
ter. Though the bill would strengthen the Chairman's control over
the Joint Staff, the Joint Chiefs would be able to challenge the
Chairman's stewardship. Finally, the bill would accommodate some
of the concerns expressed by opponents of reorganization: It pro-
vides a dissent channel for each member of the JCS to the Secretary
of Defense and the President. It ensures the linkage between the
services and Joint Staff. Though it relaxes them. it retains the
legislative limitations on Joint Staff assignments thought to be
important by those who fear the emergence of a general staff. (A
more complete explanation of the rationale for these and other
provisions is contained in Chairman White's speech explaining the
legislative intent of H.R. 6954. See appendix following this paper.

At the outset of the Investigations Subcommittee hearings

General Jones expressed concern that his effort might result in a
few inconsequential changes which would allow opponents of JCS
reform to bury the issue for another quarter-century. It is one thing
to demonstrate that a proposal has merit in terms of its political
acceptability: it is another to demonstrate that it has merit.

If the Part IV discussion of the implications for reorganization of

conflict and cooperation is valid, then H.R. 6954, though the least
far-reaching, may be the most promising of all proposa;s advanced
this year. Its provisions address specific shortcomings identified
and substantiated during the hearings; e.g., the need for a Deputy
Chairman and the necessity to improve Joint Staff personnel selec-
tion, promotions, tenure, management, and independence. It con-
cludes the essence of proposals by Generals Meyer and Taylor and
others for a council devoted to long-range strategic thinking
(although the structure, composition, and charter of the council, as
currently contained in the bill, have been challenged and may
require modification).

Most important, however, is the overall organizational frame-

work for the joint structure which the specific provisions of H.R.
6954 are intended to establish. The bill represents an attempt to

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revitalize the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a mechanism for conflict

resolution. The joint perspectives of the unified and specified com-
manders and a more independent Joint Staff would receive fuller
consideraton by the Joint Chiefs. And the Chairman's independent
advisory role would serve as a powerful incentive for less service-
oriented accommodation of issues. Thus many of the conflicts on
military issues which now engage civilian authorities on one side
and military service leaders on the other-the Office of the Secre-
tary of Defense versus the services-would be recast as issues
involving differing military perspectives-the maintaining side of
the basic model versus the employment side. The potential for
resolution of these issues in favor of increased integration of the
nation's defense effort would be increased. With ample avenues for
dissent, unresolved issues would be presented to politically
accountable authorities in a more clear-cut fashion. And the mil-
itary advice they receive would inevitably be more sharply focused.

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 Appendix: Floor Statement of
Honorable Richard C. White on H.R. 6954

Mr. Speaker, the bill, H.R. 6954, would provide for more efficient and
effective operation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and establish a Senior
Strategy Advisory Board.

Earlier this year Gen. David C. Jones, in an unprecedented action for a

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced a personal commitment to
correct what he perceived as basic shortcomings in the Joint Chiefs of Staff
organization. Almost as extraordinary was the subsequent action of Gen
Edward C. Meyer, the Army Chief of Staff, who joined General Jones in
criticizing the present structure and suggested that the Chairman had not
gone far enough in his recommendations for change.

Prompted by the alarms sounded by Generals Jones and Meyer the

Investigations Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee began
hearings on JCS reorganization in April. The subcommittee received tes-
timony from an impressive body of more than 40 witnesses, including the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, former Secretaries of Defense, former Chairmen and
members of the JCS, commanders of unified commands, and other civilian
and military witnesses.

Mr. Speaker, the hearings revealed near-unanimous agreement that

serious organizational problems hamper the performance of the present
Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a result, our highest military body might fail to
function adequately in case of war. And, as was the case during World War
II, World War I, and as far back as the Spanish-American War. we would be
faced with the necessity of making fundamental changes to our military
organization in the midst of a crisis. The most casual observer must realize
that there may not be time for such a realignment in a future conflict.
Equally important (is that) in a continually threatening peacetime environ-
ment, timely, clear-cut, realistic, feasible, and prudent professional military
advice is often not available to civilian leaders. Consequently, the influence
of the military in civilian counsels has diminished over time and, because
decisions must nevertheless be made, has often been overshadowed by
civilian analysts.

Witnesses emphasized that the advice rendered by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff as a body is often inadequate. Thus the JCS does not fulfill its legisla-
tive charter as "the principal military advisers to the President. the National
Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense." JCS advice often is not
available when needed. When formal advice is finally rendered, its form and
substance has been so diluted that it is of little use to civilian leaders.

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The US System for Developing Strategy

The advice rendered by the JCS is also faulted for a lack of realism. The
structure of the Joint Chiefs is such that the group often cannot deal
realistically with issues which affect service interests.

I want to emphasize that all parties to the hearings uniformly distin-

guished between the performance of individual Service chiefs, whose per-
sonal advice was given high marks, and the performance of the JCS as a
group of advisers acting collegially. Thus the hearings clearly indicated
that JCS problems are organizational in nature and by no means reflect on
the competence of the members.

H.R. 6954 is intended to eliminatethe most harmful effects of two of the

most serious of these organizational problems which dilute the quality of
military advice: (1) the contradiction between the responsibility of an indi-
vidual as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as a chief of his Service:
and (2) present limitations on the Joint Staff.

Let me now turn to an explanation of the provisions in the bill. First,

provisions designed to expand and strengthen the sources of military
advice. Although the Armed Services Committee agrees that the dual
responsibilities of Service chiefs may undermine the advisory capability of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate group with respect to certain issues.
it is not prepared to admit that the JCS is fatally flawed, The committee
proposes to expand and strengthen the sources of military advice, retaining
the JCS as the principal military advisers. H.R. 6954 will accomplish that
purpose by establishing a Senior Strategy Advisory Board, strengthening
the JCS Chairman's role as a military adviser, and creating a deputy chair-
man to assist the Chairman in his added responsibilities.

The Senior Strategy Advisory Board will fill the void in reflective think-
ing on military matters emphasized by several witnesses, particularly with
respect to long-range strategy. The Board. consisting often retired former
members of the JCS or unified or specified commanders, will provide such
advice and recommendations on military strategy and tactics as it consid-
ers appropriate to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.

The JCS Chairman is uniquely qualified to assume additional responsi-

bilities as an adviser who reflects the unified military viewpoint because he
is the only member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who has no Service
responsibilities.

H.R. 6954 makes the Chairman responsible for providing military

advice in his own right and gives him access to the Joint Staff for assistance
in developing his formal positions. Though his advisory responsibility is not
confined by the bill to any one area, the committee intends that the Chair-
man give special attention to those issues which the collegial JCS has been

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unable to address effectively-for example, resource allocation, roles and

missions, the Unified Command Plan, and joint dcctrine and training. The
committee also intends for the Chairman to forge stronger links with the
unified commanders in developing his positions. He should serve as their
spokesman in Washington, establishing priorities and integrating their
recommendations into a coherent set of combatant command proposals.

Increasing the Chairman's advisory role is not meant to stifle legitimate

dissent, however. To ensure open channels forexpressing opposing views.
HR. 6954 provides that a Chief may submit any opinion in oisagreement
with the military advice of the Chairman or the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the
Secretary of Defense and, subsequently, to the President.

The deputy chairman would act as Chairman in the absence or disabil-

ity of the Chairman and exercise such duties as may be delegated by the
Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. Although the
argument for creating a deputy chairman is strengthened by the provisions
which increase the Chairman's 'responsibilities, establishing the position
makes sense in any case. The JCS Chairman is the senior military officer in
the United States. His responsibilities are in proportion to his rank. Yet,
unlike the Secretary of Defense, secretaries of the military departments, or
chiefs of each service, the Chairman has no deputy.

I now turn to the provisions for improving staff support. First. Joint Staff
personnel.

Testimony revealed a number of disincentives which at times have had

the effect of discouraging officers from seeking Joint Staff assignments:
promotions have lagged: Services disagree on the caliber of the officers
who should be assigned; Joint Staff influence is perceived as limited.

H.R. 6954 affirms that the Joint Staff is the preeminent US military staff:
and it provides that the Joint Staff be manned by the most outstanding
Service officers. The bill also includes two provisions concerning promo-
tions. First, it requires the JCS Chairman to evaluate the performance of
any officer who h:,- worked on the Joint Staff and who is recommended for
promotion above major general or rear admiral. Second, the bill makes the
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman, responsible for
ensuring that Joint Staff officers receive equitab,, career rewards for their
performance. Performance at the Joint Staff level should be considered a
mark of distinction deserving special attention by promotion boards

Next, provisions which would improve Joint Staff continuity and

experience.

Existing legislative provisions limiting Joint Staff assignments to three

years and prohib 'ing reassignment in less than three years (except for 30

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The US System for Developing Strategy

officers) erect insuperable obstacles to staff continuity. At present the

entire staff turns over every two and one-half years. General Jones
remarked to Congressmen: "It is just as though every time you went
through an election and came to Washington, you had a whole new
staff ... "

H.R. 6954 provides that the Secretary of Defense may extend the
three-year assignment for as much as an additional three years. Also. as
many as 100 Joint Staff members, as opposed to 30 at present, could return
to Joint Staff duty in less than three years.

Finally, I will review provisions to improve Joint Staff management and

procedures, and establish a Joint Staff charter.

At present the Joint Staff is smothered by complex. voluminous operat-

ing procedures which ensure that the Services control the form and content
of Joint Staff work. Those procedures should be revised to ensure Joint
Staff independence and focus its efforts toward achieving joint military
objectives.

To that end, H.R. 6954 provides that ,he JCS Chairman shall manage
the Joint Staff in the performance of its duties. Moreover, it directs the
Secretary of Defense to ensure that the Joint Staff is independently organ-
ized and operated. Finally, it provides a charter for the Joint Staff which
prescribes the objective of its duties: to support the Chairman and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in providing for the unified strategic direction of the combat-
ant forces, for their operation under unified command, and for their integra-
tion into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces. These provisions
provide authority for the Chairman to revise the current joint staffing proce-
dures and a corresponding responsibility to do so in shaping the Joint Staff
to fulfill its charter. In addition, the provisions vest ultimate responsibility in
the Secretary of Defense. who is charted with ensuring Joint Staff inde-
pendence and that the charter be followed.

H.R. 6954 also modifies the terms of reference for managing the Joint
Staff. It removes the condition that the Chairman's management shall be
"on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Thus the Chairman's authoiity -
independent of the JCS. But his management most conform to the Joint
Staff charter and would be subject to challenge by the JCS if that body
deems Joint Staff support inadequate to its needs. Finally. the provisions
would also give the Chairman latitude to elicit Joint Staff support in the
performance of his duties as a military adviser in his own right.

A final provision ensures that the Joint Staff will continue tu receive
information from the services and the combatant commands and that the
channels for dissent remain open. The committee intends H.R. 6954 tc
establish conditions in which the Joint Staff is the independent author of its

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 The US System for Developing Strategy

own work. But the committee does not intend to diminish the vital channels
of communication between the Joint Staff, Services, and combatant com-
mands which are necessary to provide the basic information necessary for
competent staff work. H.R. 6954 provides that, subject to guidelines estab-
lished by the Secretary of Defense, each officer serving as a chief of Service
or as the commander of a unified or specified command may have an
opportunity to provide formal comments on any report or recommendation
of the Joint Staff prepared for submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff before
the report or recommendation is submitted.

In conclusion. I strongly recommend adoption of H.R. 6954 for two

reasons. First, though this is a modest proposal, each of the provisions of
this bill are steps in the right direction-and, collectively, they may possibly
prove to besufficient in themselves with respect to necessary changes in the
law. I would much rather err on the side of caution than to strike out into the
uncharted waters of fundamental organizational change. If joint military
performance does not improve sufficiently, the Congress can always build
on the measures contained in this bill.

The second reason for adopting H.R. 6954 follows from the first. Mod-
est. prudent legislation by Congress this year should encourage action by
the Department of Defense to correct the many problems identified in the
hearings which should not require legislation. The Pentagon is the real
arena for reform. This bill, and subsequent formal oversight into its imple-
mentation by the Congress, should serve as a catalyst for change in the
Defense Department

Finally, in closing, I want to pay tribute to Gen. David C. Jones. His

courage, conviction, and devotion to duty caused him to raise the issue of
Joint Chiefs of Staff reform even though he realized that many of his
colleagues would not appreciate his stand. He deserves credit for placing a
significant defense problem on the national agenda for resolution. And
Gen. Edward C. Meyer is equally deserving for the part he has played.

I hope the Congress will seize the opportunity presented by the initia-
tives of these officers to effect needed changes in the joint military
structure.

297
 2 NRF H*Ro6954
Toi aitid ltitI' 10, Uniwd States CodeI, ti wroxidIe for more efficient and effective
operation of the .int C'iiefs if Saiff and to estaiblishu a Senior Strategy
.Advisorv Board in thi- Department if D)efense.

IN TIlE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

At'wtST IW, 1982
Mr. WtHITE (for himself, Mr STRATTON, Mr. MOiItI,}tAN. Mr. ID.0N IAtilt.11r.
AsiMIN, Mr. MAROUitIES, Mr. ROBiERT W. D)ANItI,, .JR.. and Mr. NEt.I.t-
(GAN) ititroducuId tlii fildhwiug bill, which was referre'd to t he Comnmliittei on
Armed Services

A BILL
To amend title 10, United States Code, to provide for more
efficient and effective operation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and to establish a Senior Strategy Advisory Board in the
Department of Defense.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States of America in (onqress assembled,

3 SIIORT TITLE

4 SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the ",Joint Chiefs

5 of Staff Reorganization Act of 1982".

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 1 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

2 SEC. 2. Section 141(d) of title 10, United States Code,

3 is amended-

4 (1) by inserting "(1)" after "(d)"; and

5 (2) by adding at the end thereof the following new

6 paragraph:
7 "(2) A member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may submit

S to the Secretary of l)efense any opinion in disagreement with

9) military advice of the Chairman or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

10 After first informing the Secretary of Defense. a member of

11 the Joint Chiefs of Staff may submit to the President any

12 opinion in disagreement with military advic-e of the Chairman

13 or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.".

14 CHAIRMAN OF JOINT C(HIEFS OF STAFF

15 SEC. 3. Section 142(b)(3) of title 10, United States

16 Code, is amended by striking out "have not agreed" and in-

17 serting in lieu thereof "have agreed and have not agreed and

18 provide military advice in his own right".

19 DEPUTY ('HAIRMAN OF JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

20 SEC. 4. (a)(1) Chapter 5 of title 10, United States Code,

21 is amended by inserting after section 142 the following new

22 section:
23 "§ 142a. Deputy Chairman

24 "(a)(1) There is a Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

25 of Staff. The Deputy Chairman shall be appointed by the

HR 6954 IH

299
 3
1 President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,

2 from the officers of the regular components of the armed

3 forces. The Chairman and Deputy Chairman may not be

4 members of the same armed force.

5 "(2) The Deputy Chairman serves at the pleasure of the

6 President for a term of up to two years and may be reap-

7 pointed in the same manner for one additional term, except

8 that in time of war declared by Congress there is no limit on

9 the number of reappointments.

10 "(b) The Deputy Chairman acts as Chairman in the ab-

11 sence or disability of the Chairman and exercises such duties

12 as may be delegated by the Chairman with the approval of

13 the Secretary of Defense. When there is a vacancy in the

14 office of Chairman, the Deputy Chairman, unless otherwise

15 directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, shall per-

16 form the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appoint-

17 ed.
18 "(c) The Deputy Chairman may attend all meetings of

19 the Joint Chiefs of Staff but may not vote on a matter before

20 the Joint Chiefs of Staff except when acting as Chairman in

21 the absence or disability of the Chairman or when there is a

22 vacancy in the office of Chairman.

23 "(d) The Deputy Chairman, while so serving, holds the

24 rank of general or, in the case of an officer of the Navy,

25 admiral. The Deputy Chairman may not exercise military

HR 6954 IH

300
 4

1 command over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any of the armed

2 forces.".

3 (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chap-

4 ter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section

5 142 the following new item:

"142a. Deputy Chairman.".

6 (b) Section 525(b)(3) of such title is amended by insert-

7 ing "or Deputy Chairman" after "Chairman".

8 JOINT STAFF

9 SEc. 5. (a) Subsection (a) of section 143 of title 10,

10 United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

11 "(a)(1) There is under the Joint Chiefs of Staff a Joint

12 Staff consisting of not more than four hundred officers. The

13 members of the Joint Staff shall be selected by the Chairman

14 of the ,Joint Chiefs of Staff in approximately equal numbers

15 from-

16 "(A) the Army;

17 "(B) the Navy and the Marine Corps; and

18 "(C) the Air Force.

19 "(2) Selection of officers of an armed force to serve on

20 the Joint Staff shall be made by the Chairman from a list of

21 officers submitted by that armed force. Each officer whose

22 name is submitted shall be among those officers considered to

23 be the most outstanding officers of that armed force. The

24 Chairman may specify the number of officers to be included

25 on any such list.

HR 6954 IH

301
 5
1 "(3) Officers assigned to the Joint Staff shall be as-

2 signed for a period of three years, except that in time of war

3 there is no limit on the tenure of members of the Joint Staff.

4 Members of the Joint Staff serve at the pleasure of the Secre-

5 tary of Defense, and the tenure of a member of the Joint

6 Staff may at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense he

7 extended for a period of up to three additional years.

8 "(4) Except in time of war, officers completing a tour of

9 duty with the Joint Staff may not be reassigned to the Joint

10 Staff for a period of not less than three years following their
II previous tour of duty on the Joint Staff, except that selected

12 officers may be recalled to Joint Staff duty in less than three

13 years with the approval of the Secretary of Defense in each

14 case. The number of such officers recalled to Joint Staff duty

15 in less than three years shall not exceed one hundred serving
16 on the Joint Staff at any one time.".

17 (b) Subsection (c) of such section is amended by striking

18 out ", on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff" and inserting in

19 lieu thereof "in the performance of those duties".

20 (c) Subsection (d) of such section is amended by insert-

21 ing "and the Chairman" after "Joint Chiefs of Staff".

22 (d) Such section is further amended by adding at the end

23 thereof the following new subsections:

24 "(e)(1) Subject to guidelines established by the Secre-

25 tary of Defense, each officer serving as a chief of service or

HR 6954 In

302
 6
1 as the commander of a unified or specified command may

2 have an opportunity to provide formal comments on any

3 report or recommendation of the Joint Staff prepared for sub-

4 mittal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff before such report or rec-

5 ommendation is submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A

6 copy of any such comment shall, at the discretion of the offi-

7 cer submitting the comment, be included as an appendix in

8 the submittal of such report or recommendation to the Joint

9 Chiefs of Staff. For purposes of this paragraph, the chiefs of

10 service are the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval

11 Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Coin-

12 mandant of the Marine Corps.

13 "(2) The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the

14 Joint Staff is independently organized and operated so that

15 the Joint Staff, and the members of the Joint Statt, support

16 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint

17 Chiefs of Staff in meeting the congressional purpose set forth

18 in the last clause of section 2 of the National Security Act of

19 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401) to provide for the unified strategic

20 direction of the combatant forces, for their operation under

21 unified command, and for their integration into an efficient

22 team of land, naval, and air forces.

23 "(0(1) The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with

24 the Chairman, shall ensure that officer personnel policies of

25 the armed forces concerning promotion, retention, and as-

HR 6954 III

303
 7
1 signment give appropriate consideration to the performance

2 of an officer as a member of the Joint Staff.

3 "(2) In the case of an officer who has served on the

4 Joint Staff and who is selected for recommendation to the

5 President for appointment to a grade above major general or

6 rear admiral, the Chairman shall submit to the President, at

7 the same time as the recommendation for such appointment is

8 submitted, the evaluation of the Chairman of the performance

9 of that officer as a member of the Joint Staff.".

10 SENIOR STRATEGY ADVISORY BOARD

11 SEC. 6. (a)(1) Chapter 7 of title 10, United States Code,

12 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new

13 section:

14 "§ 178. Senior Strategy Advisory Board

15 "(a) There is established in the Department of Defense

16 a Senior Strategy Advisory Board. The Board shall, from

17 time to time, provide such advice and recommendations on

18 matters of military sLrategy and tactics as it considers appro-

19 priate to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the

20 Joint Chiefs of Staff.

21 "(b)(1) The Board shall consist of ten members appoint-

22 ed by the President from among retired officers in the grade

23 of general or admiral who, while on active duty, served as a

24 member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or as the commander of a

25 unified or specifed command.

HR 6954 IH

304

•,mm=mmm • ~ I•• •m1 1• lMMMU

 8

1 "(2) Each member of the Board shall be appointed for a

2 term of five years, except that-

3 "(A) a member appointed to fill a vacancy occur-

4 ring before the expiration of the term for which his

5 predecessor was appointed shall be appointed for the

6 remainder of that term;

7 "(B) a member whose term of office has expired

8 shall continue to serve until his successor is appointed;

9 and
10 "(C) of the members first appointed, three shall be

11 appointed for a term of one year, three shall be ap-

12 pointed for a term of three years, and four shall be ap-

13 pointed for a term of five years, as designated by the

14 President at the time of appointment.

15 Members whose term has expired may be reappointed for one

16 additional term.
17 "(3) The Chairman of the Board shall be designated by

18 the President from among the members of the Board.

19 "(c) The Board shall meet regularly at the call of the

20 Chairman or a majority of the members of the Board, but not

21 less often than once each month.

22 "(d) Members of the Board are not entitled to compen-

23 sation for service on the Board but may be paid per diem and
24 travel and transporation allowances authorized under section

25 5703 of title 5.

HR 6954 I11

305
 9

"(e) The Board shall continue in existence until termi-

2 nated by law.".

3 (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chap-

4 ter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

"-It. Senior Strategy Advisorv Board."

5 (b) Section 178 of title 10, United States Code, as added

6 by subsection (a), shall take effect on October 1, 1982.

HR 6954 HI

306
 Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Must Change

General David C. Jones, USAF (Ret.)

Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, if viewed as the military board of a

government corporation,would provide some striking contrasts to
organization and management principles followed in the private
sector. The board consists of five directors, all insiders, four of
whom simultaneously head line divisions. It reports to the chief
executive and a cabinet member, and is supported by a corporate
staff which draws all its officers from line divisions and turns over
every two years. Line divisions control officer assignments and
advancement: there is no transfer of officers among line divisions.
The board meets three times a week to address operationalas well as
policy matters, which normally are first reviewed by a four-layered
committee system involving full participationof division staffs from
the start. At 75 percent of the board meetings, one or more of the
directors are represented by substitutes. If the board can't reach
unanimous agreement on an issue, it must-by law-inform its
superiors. At least the four top leadership and management levels
within the corporationreceive the same basic compensation,set by
two committees consisting of a total 535 members, and any person-
nel changes in the top three levels (about 150 positions) must be
approved in advance by one of the committees.

I HAVE BEEN A MEMBER OF THIS "BOARD" for nearly eight

years and its Chairman for most of the past four years, and have thus
served as a member of the Joint Chiefs under four Presidents and
four Secretaries of Defense During this time, and before, many
good men have struggled very hard to make the best of the joint
system, and most, if not all, have experienced a great sense of
frustration in dealing with both large and small problems.

Copyright - 1982 by Army and Navy Journal, Inc. All rights reserved.
Reprinted by permission.

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The US System for Developing Strategy

Much of this frustration comes from having to cope with legisla-

tive and organizational constraints which reflect concerns of the
past, inhibit attempts to meet the rapidly changing demands of
today's world, and violate basic leadership and management princi-
ples. Yet, despite many studies that have periodically documented
problems with this military committee system and made cogent
recommendations for improvements, the system has been remarka-
bly resistant to change. Committees can serve a useful purpose in
providing a wide range of advice to a chief executive or even in
making some key policy decisions, but they are notoriously poor
agents for running anything-let alone everything.

Although I recognize the very strong and persistent headwinds.

I could not leave office in good conscience this summer without
making a major effort to illuminate the real issues once more and
hopefully wrest some substantial changes. Most of the problems
and some of the approaches I will address have been discovered-
then reburied-many times in the past 35 years. The difference this
time is thb-t the proposals for improvement are coming from some-
one inside the system who for many years has been in the best
position to understand the causes and consequences of shortcom-
ings. In formulating my approach, I have been helped by a group of
senior retired officers who are in a better position than those now
serving to step aside from long-standing Service positions and
objectively assess the joint system.

ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM

The roots of enforced diffusion of military authority can be

traced to a period which precedes the founding of the republic. The
continental Congress distrusted standing armies and military
heroes, and even with George Washington in command, estab-
lished multiple checks on his authority. The principles of the sepa-
ration of powers and civilian control over the military have
appropriately become deeply imbedded in our culture, both in law
and in custom as well as in the attitudes of our military
professionals.

In many cases, however, the mechanisms erected to exercise

such controls have had the unintended effect of permitting-and
often promoting--serious organizational deficiencies. As our mil-
itary institutions evolved, the various military subbureaucracies

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 The US System for Developing Strategy

attempted to establish as much independence as possible. As a

result, by the end of the 19th century, both military departments-
War and Navy-were riddled with semiautonomous, often intracta-
ble fiefdoms: branches, corps, departments, bureaus, and so forth.

By the time we went to war with Spain in 1898, conditions were

ripe for reform, but as is so often the case it took near military
disaster in the conduct of the war to provide the impetus within the
Army and Navy to move toward better integration within the Servi-
ces. The Army, despite much opposition, created a Chief of Staff
position in 1903; after several intermediate steps, the Navy created
the position of Chief of Naval Operations in 1915. Institutional
resistance was still great, however, and it would take decades
before centralized authority had shifted to the Chiefs of the
Services.

Both the Army and the Navy began World War II with authority
and responsibility diffused. The Army still had a large number of
semiautonomous agencies with little effective coordination below
the Chief of Staff level. Immediately after Pearl Harbor, General
Marshall streamlined the Army by reducing the number of officers
reporting directly to him from 61 to six. In December of 1941, the
Navy had split responsibility in Washington with Admiral Stark as
Chief of Naval Operations and Admiral King as Commander-in-
Chief of the US Fleet. A few months later much of that problem was
solved when Admiral King assumed both jobs.

Inter-Service cooperation developed even more slowly. Before

technological developments began to blur the boundaries between
sea and land warfare, the Services had evolved independently into
distinctly different organizations with separate policies and tradi-
tions. Competition rather than cooperation was the standard. This
evolution resulted in four organizations which even today gravitate
quite naturally to two groups of shared traditions and experiences: a
maritime grouping (Navy and Marine Corps), and primarily a land
warfare grouping (Army and later the Air Force).

However, circumstances surrounding defense in the 20th cen-

tury created needs and motives for unified action. The first United
States experience in deploying and supplying large expeditionary
forces occurred in 1898, and it was not until World War I that the
airplane emerged to blur historical distinctions between ground

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The US System for Developing Strategy

and sea warfare. These sorts of changes spurred the military into
developing embryonic arrangements in the early part of the century
for coordinating strategic and logistic plans and for conducting
joint maneuvers. Until World War II, however, such arrangements
remained rather .exceptional and clearly did not work well.

The watershed for development of a permanent inter-Service

system was the crisis atmosphere surrounding our entry into World
War I1. The British had established a committee of the heads of their
military services in 1923. When intensive military consultation with
the British commenced after Pearl Harbor, it soon became appar-
ent that we too needed some such system, not only to assure
smoother dealings with the British but also to coordinate our own
national war effort.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff was established informally by Presi-

dent Roosevelt in February 1942. The White House appointments
calendar suggests that the President met with the Chiefs as a body
frequently during 1942, but primarily with the Chief of Staff to the
President in the remaining three years of the war. For the most part.
the Chiefs, along with their British counterparts, directed largely
separate wars through three geographic commands which were
essentially divided by Service. General Eisenhower commanded
Europe while Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur commanded
separate theaters in the Pacific. Strategic planning was conducted
on the basis of direct guidance: put first priority on Europe; use the
Nation's full resources to support coalition efforts to defeat the
enemy forces; and compel the Axis governments to surrender
unconditionally. In many ways, it was a simpler world. But as the
biographies of many World War II leaders reveal, the joint system
established then did not work very well: Service partisanship and
inadequate coordination resulted in innumerable delays on many
critical issues.

As the war drew to a close, an exhaustive debate ensued on how

to organize the postwar military: the Army favored, but the Navy
opposed, a highly integrated system. Many at that time believed that
the Army would dominate any integrated system. The Air Force,
then still part of the Army, supported integration, but was primarily
interested in becoming a separate Service.

After nearly two years of studies, committee reports, and Presi-

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 The US System for Developing Strategy

dential interventions, the National Security Act of 1947 emerged as

a compromise between those who favored full Service integration
and those who feared centralization of military authority. The act
created a loose confederation among the military Services and a
Secretary of Defense, who initially had little authority. Amendments
in 1949, 1953, and 1958 served to strengthen the Secretary's author-
ity and to expand the size and purview of his staff, but as far as the
joint system was concerned, the changes were much more margi-
nal. The role of the Chairman was formalized, the Joint Staff was
expanded, and the chain of command from the President and
Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commands was clarified.

Even modest changes, however, created great controversy.

During part of the period (when) the amendments were being
addressed, I was aide to General Curtis LeMay, then Commander of
the Strategic Air Command, and I had many opportunities to
observe the intense debates which took place not only in Washing-
ton but throughout much of the military. Only from such a vantage
point was it clear how strong the pressures for preserving Service
autonomy remained.

President Eisenhower, writing in 1965, said he had reminded

his associates on signing the Defense Reorganization Bill of 1958
that it was just another step toward what was necessary. I believe he
would be disappointed that further steps have not been taken.

Since 1958, there have been many recommendations for funda-

mental revisions of the system-but few changes in its statutory
framework. In 1978the Commandant of the Marine Corps was made
a full member of the Joint Chiefs by law, but this primarily codified
what had already become practice. Essentially, despite major
changes in the world (on which I will comment later), we have had
24 years-and in many ways 35 years-without fundamental revi-
sions of the joint system, a system which in effect represents ar-
rangements developed in a patchwork way during World War II.

HOW WE OPERATE

At the top of that system are the Joint Chiefs, appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate. By law, we are the principal
military advisers to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the
National Security Council.

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The US System for Developing Strategy

As a body, we are responsible for reviewing and developing

ways to improve the state of military readiness, assessing threats to
our security interests, and identifying the forces required to meet
those threats. We supervise but do not command the senior Com-
batant Commanders, and maintain an elaborate command, control,
and communications system which provides the links to and within
our combat forces worldwide. We also consult with foreign military
leaders and provide military representation to arms-control negotia-
tions teams. The Combatant Commanders are Commanders of
European Command, Pacific Command, Atlantic Command,
Southern Command, Readiness Command, Strategic Air Com-
mand, Aerospace Defense Command, Military Airlift Command,
and the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. Some of these have
multiple services involved (Unified Commands) and some a single
service (Specified Commands).

Four of the members of the Joint Chiefs are the military heads
of their individual Services who, except in time of war, are restricted
to a single four-year term. Since 1947, nearly 50 officers have held
the office of Chief of one of the four Services. A Service Chief is not
only afull member of theJoint Chiefs of Staff but also is the leader of
his uniformed Service. As its principal military spokesman, the
Service considers him the guardian of its professional interests,
standards, and traditions.

The fifth member of the Joint Chiefs, the Chairman, is the only
one to devote all of his time to joint affairs. Although outranking all
other military offices, the Chairman does not exercise command
over the Joint Chiefs or the armed forces but acts as an adviser, a
moderator, an implementor, and an integrating influence whenever
possible. A Chairman is appointed for a two-year term and may be
reappointed once, except during time of war when unlimited two-
year reappointments are allowed.

After four years as a Service Chief and now on my fourth year as

the Chairman, I have found that a Chairman generally has more
influence but less control than a Service Chief. Whereas a Service
Chief can draw on significant institutional sources of formal author-
ity, the Chairman's influence must be derived primarily from his
effectiveness in personal relationships. His position provides the
opportunity to meet with the leadership of the Nation, but it is his
professional competence, his ability to present well thought-out

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 The US System for Developing Strategy

and broad-based arguments, and his performance as a team player

grappling with difficult questions of national priorities that deter-
mine his degree of influence. The Chairman's only institutional
advantage is his status as the one senior military official whose sole
responsibility encompasses the entire spectrum of defense.

The Joint Chiefs are supported by a Joint Staff which is signifi-

cantly limited by law in terms of size-it is dwarfed by the Service
and Secretary of Defense staffs-and the tenure of officer assign-
ments. Except for urgent matters, a joint action is traditionally
handled by assigning the issue to a Joint Staff action officer who
meets with comparable-level representatives from the four Service
staffs. The pressures at this point create a greater drive for agree-
ment than for quality: the process usually results in extensive dis-
cussion and careful draftsmanship of a paper designed to
accommodate the views of each Service-at least to the extent of
not goring anyone's ox.

The paper then works its way up through a series of such

committees to a group composed of the Service Operations Depu-
ties (three-star position on each Service staff) and the three-star
Director of the Joint Staff. These individuals-who normally attend
the meetings of the Joint Chiefs-can approve a routine paper, but
refer any substantive issues or unagreed matter to the Chiefs. As
would be expected, papers produced by such a multiple committee
process are often watered down or well waffled, although not as
badly as Dean Acheson judged when in his 1969 memoirs he wrote
of the Joint Chiefs organization: "Since it is a committee and its
views are the result of votes on formal papers prepared for it, it quite
literally is like my favorite old lady who could not say what she
thought until she heard what she said."

When there is not time for this elaborate staff process or even to
convene the Joint Chiefs, I must take action and consult with my
colleagues later. The most extreme example would be that of direct
attack on the United States. The Soviets have a number of subma-
rines on alert off our Atlantic and Pacific coasts which could deliver
nuclear warheads on Washington and other targets in a very few
minutes. If an attack were made, our warning sensors would pick up
the launches within seconds, and reports would reach Washington
and other key points almost immediately. The general or admiral on
24-hour duty in the National Military Command Center would at

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once notify me as well as others. I then would recommend a course

of action to the President and Secretary of Defense, and would
implement the Presidential decision without delay.

At the other end of the spectrum are incidents such as the one
last year when a Libyan pilot fired a missile at our Navy fighters over
the Gulf of Sidra and our pilots responded by downing two of the
Libyan planes. I was notified immediately and in turn informed the
Secretary of Defense. I then proceeded to the National Military
Command Center in the Pentagon to determine what further action,
if any, was required. The need to respond to crises and incidents
such as this one requires that I be immediately available, a require-
ment to which I have long been accustomed.

The more routine actions are considered each week in three

regularly scheduled Joint Chiefs meetings, in which operational as
well as policy issues are addressed. When in Washington, the first
responsibility of a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff isto attend all
of these meetings, but because of our worldwide responsibilities we
must be gone a considerable amount of the time. The Vice Chief of
Staff substitutes when a Service Chief is absent, but since the
Chairman is not allowed a deputy (a major weakness which I will
address later), the senior Service Chief in attendance chairs the
meeting when I am away. My experience has been that one or more
substitutes attend about three-quarters of the meetings, a situation
that results in a lack of continuity.

By law, if we cannot reach unanimous agreement on an issue.

we must inform the Secretary of Defense. Such splits are referred to
the Secretary a few times a year, but we are understandably reluc-
tant to forward disagreements, so we invest much time and effort to
accommodate differing views of the Chiefs.

The Joint Chiefs must maintain many constructive external

relationships, the most important of which derives from their role as
the senior military advisers to the civilian leadership, particularly
the Secretary of Defense and the President. The Chiefs meet with
the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense each Tuesday to
discuss joint matters as well as attend other meetings with them
during the week. As Chairman I meet privately with the Secretary
and his Deputy each day and participate with them in interagency
discussions.

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Traditionally, Presidents have met with the Chiefs as a body

only on a few occasions. More often we send memoranda to the
Secretary of Defense and request that they be forwarded to the
President. Any Chief has the right to ask for an individual appoint-
ment or correspond directly with the President, but this right has
also been exercised very rarely. To the best of my knowledge, it was
last used in 1974 by Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, then Chief of Naval
Operations, who wrote directly to President Nixon to urge a
stronger negotiating stance during the SALT II negotiations.

The main contact with the President comes when I participate

as the Joint Chiefs' representative in National Security Council
meetings. Such meetings are scheduled frequently by President
Reagan, who has used the National Security Council forum more
than any President since Eisenhower. I have the full opportunity at
these meetings to express to the President the corporate views of
the Chiefs as well as my personal views on any matters, regardless
of whether the Chiefs have addressed them. I also have the oppor-
tunity to express such views below the Presidential level as a
member of various interagency and Defense working groups, such
as the Military Manpower Task Force, the Defense Resources
Board, and the Armed Forces Policy Council.

Next to advising the President and the Secretary of Defense, the

Joint Chiefs' most important responsibility is the requirement to
oversee the Combatant Commands. In meeting this resonsibility, it
is essential to nurture a close relationship with the commanders
through longstanding personal contacts and frequent communica-
tions as well as visits to the field. The Service Chiefs are also
responsible to their Secretaries for organizing, equipping, and train-
ing the forces assigned to the Combatant Commands.

Responsiveness to Congress is another important responsibil-

ity of the Joint Chiefs. The Secretary of Defense and I normally
appear together before eight Congressional committees-many
times each year before some. Service Chiefs also have hearings
before several committees, particularly those concerned with Ser-
vice budget matters. And the Joint Chiefs occasionally will appear
as a body, as we did during various arms-control hearings. Exten-
sive questioning of every action of the Defense Department is the
norm during hearings as well as in detailed written questions
addressed to us throughout the year.

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Whenever military officers appear at a congressional hearing,

we are expected to respond fully to questioning, even when asked
for personal views about matters on which we may disagree with the
position of the Administration. I have responded to unsolicited
questions with personal views at variance with the decisions of the
civilian leadership on a number of occasions, the most recent of
which concerned my reservations on the basing decision for the
M-X intercontinental ballistic missile. I believe our system is unique
among the nations of the world in airing such disagreement. A
number of years ago, when I explained this aspect of US military-
congressional relations to a head of government of one of our allies,
he responded that one of his military officers would be fired if he
gave a view other than the official position to his Parliament. The US
civilian leadership throughout the years has understood and even
supported the military's responsiveness to congressional questions
so long as our comments have been made in good faith and neither
solicited nor intended to circumvent a decision. I have found that
senior officers have generally been sensitive to this responsibility.

Since it is essential to maintain the American people's confi-

dence and support for our defense programs, the Joint Chiefs
consider public relations, including speeches and other public ap-
pearances, another important function.

Finally, it is important for the Joint Chiefs to work very closely

with our friends and allies, since we simply cannot go it alone in
today's world. I meet with my NATO counterparts on at least four
occasions each year, and with officials from many other countries
somewhat less frequently. Since almost every aspect of our job has
intern3tional implications, foreign travel is an indispensable aid to
understanding key issues and establishing good relations with for-
eign leaders.

These important external relationships take a great deal of time,

but it is the cumbersomeness of the committee processes that
constrains our ability to produce the best joint military advice. One
of the Presidentially directed studies of the joint system, the 1978
Steadman Report, concluded that the advice provided personally
(usually orally) by the Chairman and the Service Chiefs was of high
quality, but that the institutional products (the formal position pa-
pers-were not found very useful.

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SOME PROGRESS...

Despite the institutional constraints, however, we have man-

aged to make some joint program improvements over the last few
years. Much of the credit for whatever progress has been made must
go to my colleagues on the Joint Chiefs. The Nation has been, and
continues to be, well served by these competent, hard-working
officers. Some of the improvements are:
o development of a broader joint exercise program, to include
mobilization practice;
o establishment of a Joint Deployment Agency to integrate deploy-
ment plans and activities;
"* integration of our land and sea transportation systems;
"* redirection of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces to
achieve better understanding of mobilization;
* revamping of our joint education system, to include establish-
ment, in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense, of research
centers at the National Defense University to help us take fresh
looks at defense problems;
o organizational adjustments for better integration of the joint com-
mand, control, and communications system;
o establishment of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force to
improve our capability to deploy and operate forces in Southwest
Asia and as a mechanism to develop and exercise integrated opera-
tions by elements of all four Services;
o increasing the Combatant Commanders' opportunity to influ-
ence resource decisions, to include appearing before the Defense
Resources board; and
e involving the Service Chiefs in specific joint issues when visiting
the field in order to report findings and recommendations at a Jiont
Chiefs meeting.

BUT PERSISTENT SHORTCOMINGS

...

While the above represents some important and helpful changes

in inter-Service programs, such progress has been limited primar-
ily to issues which only marginally affect important Service inter-
ests. However, unless the basic long-term shortcomings of the
system are corrected, the severity of their consequences will con-
tinue to increase as the national security environment becomes ever
more complex. We need to spend more time on our warfighting
capabilities and less on an intramural scramble for resources.

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In my view, the basic causes of our most serious deficiencies

can be divided into two categories: personnel and organization.

Personnel

There is inadequate cross-Service and joint experience in our

military, from the top down. The incentives and rewards for seeking
such experience are virtually nonexistent. And the problem is com-
pounded by the high degree of turbulence in key positions.

We do not prepare officers to assume the responsibilities of

membership on the Joint Chiefs as well as we should. I include
myself in this judgment even though I was fortunate in having an
unusually diversified background before becoming a member of the
Joint Chiefs. In my many years in theAir Force, I had been assigned
to bombers and fighters, command and staff, Washington an field
tours. I had attended the National War College, an institution
designed to prepare military officers and foreign policy civilians for
joint and interagency duty. I had been an aide to an unusually
competent commander, General LeMay, and he taught me much-
his initial guidance to me was, "You are in this job to learn first and
serve second, and do not mix those priorities." I had 10 years' duty
overseas in Japan, Vietnam, and Europe, including direct involve-
ment in two wars. And in my last overseas assignment I had two
jobs-as US air commander with geographic responsibility stretch-
ing from Norway to Iran, and concurrently, as a NATO air com-
mander with coalition responsibility for the air forces of a number of
nations.

However, I still lacked two major ingredients of a fully rounded

experience when I was appointed Chief of Staff of the Air Force. I
had begun service in the Army and had maintained close contact
with that Service even after the Air Force became independent. But
my contact with the maritime forces-the Navy and Marines-was
limited. I had visited and had participated in joint exercises with
maritime forces, but still did not have as deep an understanding of
their strengths and weaknesses, their doctrines and traditions, as I
would have liked. Unfortunately, my experience in this regard is far
from unique: few Navy or Marine officers have substantial exper-
ience with the Army or Air Force, and vice versa.

The second gap in my experience is also too common among

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officers who assume key positions in the joint system (both on the
Joint Chiefs and as Combatant Commanders): I had never served
on theJoint Staff or in the headquarters of a Unified Command. And.
frankly, I have found from my own experience that serving on the
Joint Chiefs as head of a Service does not necessarily make an
individual a truly joint officer. My perspective changed when I
became Chairman and was immersed every hour in joint problems
But I must confess that as Air Force Chief, while I prided myself on
my joint attitude and believed that some fundamental changes were
needed, I was reluctant-as were the other Service Chiefs-to
accept any infringement on Service autonomy on individual issues.

Most newly assigned officers arrive on the Joint Staff or a

Unified Command staff from a Service-oriented career with little
inter-Service experience and inadequate preparation for joint duty.
In the case of the Joint Staff, the problem is compounded by statu-
tory limits-restrictions which do not apply to the Service and
Secretary of Defense staffs. For example, Public Law 10 (USC 143)
states that:
* The tenure of members of the Joint Staff.. .except in time of
war... may (not) be more than three years.
9 Except in time of war.. .officers may not be reassigned to the
Joint Staff (in) less than three years.. .except... with the approval
of the Secretary of Defense, who may waive this restriction for no
more than 30 officers.

Furthermore, officers come from and return to their Services.

which control their assignments and promotions. The strong Ser-
vice string thus attached to a Joint officer (and to those assigned to
the Unified Commands as well) provides little incentive-and often
considerable disincentive-for officers to seek joint duty or to differ
with their Service position in joint deliberations. Indeed, it is hard to
argue that Joint Staff duty is a path to the top. With the exception of
Army General Earle Wheeler, not a single Director of the Joint Staff
or one of its major components has ever become Chief of his
Service or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

We have many outstanding officers on the Joint Staff who work

very hard under very difficult conditions with few rewards. It is no
wonder that many retire while on-or soon after leaving-the Joint
Staff, or seek early release for a more rewarding job. The three-year
limit on assignments-when coupled with our reluctanceto stand in

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the way of good people attempting to move to Service jobs that may
further their careers-results in aturnover of theJoint Staff in a little
more than two years. Better continuity is required.

Organization.

In the joint system we not only have the advantages and all the
disadvantages typical of committees, but our problems are further
compounded by the "spokesman-statesman" dilemma that a Ser-
vice Chief encounters. This is especially true when the issue of
distribution-of sources or of missions-is raised. Time after time
during my years as a member of theJoint Chiefs, the extraordinary
difficulty of addressing-let alone gaining the Chiefs' agreement
on-the distribution of constrained resources has been driven
home to me. A Service Chief finds himself in a very tough position
when asked to give up or forgo significant resources or important
roles and missions, both because his priorities have been shaped by
his Service experience and because he must be the loyal and trusted
leader of a Service whose members sincerely believe their Service
deserves a greater share of constrained resources and of military
missions-and the control thereof.

Service Chiefs do differ with the position of their Service staffs

on occasion, but to do so too often and particularly on fundamental
issues is to risk losing the support essential for carrying out Service
responsibilities. One former Chief relates that during a joint meet-
ing, a Service action officer (a major) handed him a note which said,
"General, under no condition can you agree to the third paragraph."
This incident is representative of a phenomenon which has often
been called "the tyranny of the action officer." However, that phrase
tends to obscure a significant point: the major was expressing the
viewpoint of a large and often unforgiving bureaucracy.

We in the defense business share the problem which afflicts

most of corporate America-the difficulties inherent in long-range
planning. Today's business leaders are of course well aware of the
problems of accurately predicting the future and developing suc-
cessful strategies to improve long-range profitability-and creating
incentives within constituencies to address the long term. Those of
us responsible for defense planning must contend with the same
problems as well as further complications stemming from the lack

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of a readily calculable "bottom line," the buffetings of political and

social disturbances anywhere on the globe, and a high degree of
resistance to change.

Any institution that imbues its members with traditions, doc-

trines, and discipline is likely to find it quite difficult to assess
changes in its environment with a high degree of objectivity. Deep-
seated Service traditions are important in fostering a fighting spirit,
Service pride, and heroism, but they may also engender a tendency
to look inward and to perpetuate doctrines and thought patterns
that do not keep pace with changing requirements. Since fresh
approaches to strategy tend to threaten an institution's interests
and self-image, it is often more comfortable to look to the past than
to seek new ways to meet the challenges of the future. When
coupled with a system that keeps Service leadership bound up in a
continuous struggle for resources, such inclinations can lead to a
preoccupation with weapon systerrs, techniques, and tactics atthe
expense of sound planning.

Despite valiant efforts to improve strategic planning in the

Pentagon, we are often faced with intense pressures to spend most
of our time addressing immediate issues. Those pressures are par-
ticularly great with regard to budget actions: sometimes we are
addressing three budget documents at a time. For example, in the
fall of 1981 we were working with Congress on the Fiscal Year 1982
budget (well after the fiscal year had started), preparing the 1983
budget for submission to Congress in January 1982, and doing
long-range planning for the following five-year budget period
(1984-1988). The work with the Congress obviously took budgetary
precedence, and at the same time, big and small crises (Poland. El
Salvador, Libya, Middle East, etc) were rippling through Washing-
ton with increased frequency. Under such conditions, it takes
strong discipline to avoid being a total captive of the urgent.

NEEDED CHANGES

The shortcomings outlined about have been with the joint sys-
tem for too long and the need for correction is more urgent now than
at any time. Since we live in an era when conflicts could erupt
regionally or globally much more quickly than in the past, we must
build our military strength without delay-anci we must be able to
integrate our military forces with great efficiency.

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It is clear to me that the fundamental problem is not with

individuals but is an organizational one. I have been a close
observer or a direct participant in joint activities for more than 20
years. During that time there have been six Chairmen and dozens of
Service Chiefs and the basic problems have continued regardless of
who has been in a specific chair.

As a minimum, we need changes in three specific areas:

(1) Strengthen the Role of the Chairman

Many areas cannot be addressed effectively by committee

action, particularly when four out of five committee members have
institutional stakes in the issues and the pressure is on to achieve
unanimity in order to act. It is unreasonable to expect the Service
Chiefs to take one position as Service advocates when dealing in
Service channels, and a totally different position in the joint arena.
Such matters should therefore be removed from addressal by the
Joint Chiefs as a body.

To the extent that an inter-Service perspective is needed on

distribution issues, that perspective could be better provided by the
Chairman in consultation with the Combatant Commanders. This in
turn would require strengthening of the Unified Commander's role
with respect to his Service Component Commanders, who com-
mand the forces and report both to the Unified Commander and the
Service Chief. Under the current system the Service Component
Commander's attention is often drawn more to Service issues than
to inter-Service coordination problems. In other areas-such as
joint operational and long-range planning, crisis management, and
a number of routine matters-neither the Service Chiefs nor the
Service staffs need participate at the level of detail in which they are
involved today.

Furthermore, the Chairman should be authorized a deputy. It is

an anomaly that the military officer with the most complex job is
virtually the only senior-and in many cases not so senior-officer
who does not have a deputy. This causes substantial problems of
continuity when individual Service Chiefs, who spend only a frac-
tion of their time o, joint activities, stand in for the Chairman in his
absence. Secondly, the Chairman needs assistance, particularly in
ensuring the readiness, improving the war planning, and managing

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the joint exercising of the combatant forces. I would also recom-

mend that, at least until there is far more cross-experience and
education among all four Services, the Chairman and the Deputy
Chairman should come from the two different groupings (one to be
a Navy or Marine officer and the other an Army or Air Force officer).

I am convinced that without some such revised role for the

Chairman and less reliance on the cumbersome committee pro-
cesses, the very great demands on the time of a Service Chief will
continue and perhaps even worsen. President Eisenhower recog-
nized this problem and when he transmitted his final reorganization
plan to Congress in 1958, he stated: "This situation is produced by
their having the dual responsibilities of chief of the military services
and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The problem is not new
but has not yielded to past efforts to solve it." Unfortimately, the
approach Eisenhower then advocated--Iaving a .not deiegate
major portions of his Service responsibilitips to his Vice Chief (with
the hope that this would overcome many of the joint problems)-
has not worked either, as the subsequent 24 years of experience
have shown. I, for one, would also like tj .oe
the Serice Chiefs be
able to spend more time as the leaders of their Service in improving
the capabilities of their units and in managing the spending of the
billions of dollars in the Service budgets.

There is great wisdom in having the Joint Chiefs of Staff act as

senior military advisers to the President and Secretary of Defense
on certain key issues. But without a stronger role and better support
for the Chairman, the work of the Joint Chiefs is likely to remain too
dispersed, diluted, and diffused to provide the best possible military
advice or to ensure the full capability of our combatant forces.

(2) Limit Service Staff Involvement in the Joint Process

As mentioned before, the Service staff dwarf the Joint Staff with
many of the Service officers duplicating the work of the Joint Staff.
There are two basic problems. First, the Service staff involvement is
a cumbersome staffing process and, second, the Service Chiefs
receive their advice on joint matters from their Service staffs.

There are some advantages of having Service staffs involved in

the joint process, but we should abolish the current system in which
each Service has almost a de facto veto on every issue at every stage

3z3
The US System for Developing Strategy

of the routine staffing process. President Eisenhower noted 23

years ago that "these laborious processes exist because each mil-
itary department feels obliged to judge independently each work
product of the Joint Staff." The situation has not changed. The role
of Service staffs cani and should be reduced to providing informa-
tional inputs-the result would be a better product and fewer offic-
ers needed on the Service staffs.

When a Service Chief acts on a Service matter he should receive

advice from his Service staff and when he acts on a joint matter he
should receive his advice from the Joint Staff; however, since the
beginning of the joint process, Service Chiefs have relied almost
exclusively on their Service staffs in preparing for joint meetings. It
is unrealistic to expect truly inter-Service advice from a staff com-
prised of officers from only one Service. The Joint Staff can and
should provide such advice.

(3) Broaden the Training, Experience, and Rewards for Joint Duty

Finally, more officers should have more truly joint experiences

at more points in their careers-and should be rewarded for doing
so. There should be more interchange among Services at the junior
ranks, as Eisenhower strongly advocated, and preparation for joint
assignments should be significantly upgraded. The joint educa-
tional system should also be expanded and improved. (Along these
lines, one innovative idea that is being addressed is to have all newly
appointed generals and admirals attend a common course of joint
education.) An assignment to the Joint Staff or to a Unified Com-
mand headquarters should be part of an upward mobility pattern,
rather than a diversion or end of a career, as has been the case so
often in the past. It is difficult to see how present patterns can be
changed, however, without some influence by the Chairman on the
selection and promotion of officers. Also, the statutory restrictions
on service on the Joint Staff should be removed.

Despite the magnitude of the task, I am encouraged by the

willingness of my colleagues to address the issues and by the
support of the Secretary of Defense and others in the Administra-
tion on the need for change. Furthermore, I sense a different mood
in Congress than that shown in the 1940s and 1950s, when large and
powerful elements strongly protected Service autonomy. I am
working hard in my final months as Chairman to bring about the

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necessary changes. More specifically, I have underway a course of

action which addresses, first, recommendations to my colleagues
on changes which are within the authority of the Chiefs, and,
second, recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the
President on other changes, to include specific proposals for legis-
lative action.

Such change never comes easily. As the Navy approached its

major reorganizations at the start of the century, US naval historian
Alfred Mahan concluded that no Service could agree to give up
sovereignty, but would have to have reorganization forced upon it
from outside the organization. Six months before Pearl Harbor, a
farsighted Chairman of the General Board of the Navy proposed a
truly integrated joint system to the Secretary of the Navy. Like many
innovative proposals before and since, the idea was referred to a
committee for study and overtakern by events. It is interesting to
note, however, that then-Brigadier General Dwight D. Eisenhower
supported this proposal with the judgment that "coordination by
cooperation is ineffective."

The Services have an understandable desire to protect organi-

zational interests, to preserve their sovereignty, and to conserve
hard-won prerogatives. Nevertheless, we cannot escape the fact
that our national security today requires the integration of Service
efforts more than at any time in our history. To attempt to achieve
meaningful integration only through the existing committee system
is to leave it at the mercy of well-proven institutional counterpres-
sures. I believe that we can find a middle ground which draws on the
strengths of the separate Services and of having Service Chiefs as
members of the Joint Chiefs, while at the same time making the
changes necessary to strengthen our joint system. If not, major
surgery will be required.

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 The JCS-How Much Reform is Needed?

General Edward C. Meyer, USA (Ret.)

Former Chief of Staff, United States Army

AN EXCELLENT CASE for strengthening the authority of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff has been made by General David C. Jones. His
recommendations echo a well-established pattern .... His is but the
latest expression of a frustration long felt by senior military
officers-for all the reasons cited by General Jones-that there
must be a better way to shape alternatives and to provide the best
possible military advice. Virtually every serious student and practi-
tioner has recommended that the JCS be strengthened. The near
unanimity of their views can no longer be ignored, particularly in the
light of grave new dimensions to the problem of national security.

* The Soviets understand full well that the United States no longer
enjoys clear nuclear superiority. Their new nuclear prowess, com-
bined with other radically improved Soviet military capabilities.
lends then new confidence in their ability to mount and sustain a
rapid offensive, nuclear or conventional. Indeed, after two decades
of sustained build-up, the Soviets may now believe they can con-
duct simultaneous and sustained offensive military operations in
several theaters.

* The West has not responded firmly and in a united fashion to this
challenge. A carefully nurtured and sophisticated Soviet political
offensive and growing Western revulsion to a defense buildup,
particularly among the youth, have considerably weakened the old
consensus based on traditional notions of how to defend against
Soviet aggression.

* Overshadowing these factors is the sharp change that has

occurred in the pace of warfare:. .. A revolution... (changing) the

Copyright c) 1982 by Army and Navy Journal, Inc. All rights reserved.
Reprinted by permission.

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whole scale and tempo .... Warning times are vanishing.., making
timely reaction difficult." These words of President Eisenhower,
true in 1958 when the sequencing of conventional operational
phrases was measured in weeks and months, are even more compel-
ling today when some scenarios allow only days, perhaps hours, for
decision and reaction.

e Domestically, the explosion of lawmaking and regulation-writing

in the 1970s has greatly complicated the development of a coherent
defense posture. Additionally, the increasing demands of the
appointed and elected leadership and the growth in congressional
staffs have had an impact on the time available for the individual
Chief to direct his Service. The Chiefs have even less time for
strategic reflection or attention to the responsiveness of the JCS
system.

Fortunately, we now appear to be beginning a serious reexami-

nation of the role, organization, and functioning of the JCS. In the
process, we should examine the even broader issue of whether the
Nation's civilian leaders receive the best possible advice from their
military experts. The challenges our Nation faces today and the
prospects for more demanding challenges in the critical years
ahead require that the reforms we finally adopt cure the ills of the
system. Strong medicine is needed. Various inadequacies in the
National Security Act of 1947 have been addressed but were not
fully corrected by a series of amendments over subsequent years.
We now have a 35-year patchwork of law, custom, and shibboleth.

My own professional judgment is that the changes urged by

General Jones, while headed in the right direction, do not go far
enough to correct what ails the JCS. I believe that we must consider
the feasibility of changes beyond the ones proposed by General
Jones creating a stronger Chairman and Joint Staff. We must find a
way to provide better balanced, sounder, and more timely advice
from senior Service professionals in addition to strengthening the
Chairman and the Joint Staff.

THE EXPERIENCE OF WAR

The historical context of the problem goes back much further
than 1947, to the Civil War, when President Lincoln brought into
being the "unified command" which eventually won the war. Since
then reformers have tried every 20 or 30 years to institutionalize a

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better mechanism for planning and directing the military establish-

ment, but none fully succeeded. What is notable is that each wave of
reform followed the trauma of war and each sought to prevent in the
future the troubles-sometimes disasters-encountered in devising
and executing national strategy. Thus, the turn of the century
reforms were the product of the planning debacle of the Spanish-
American War; the 1920 reforms reflected our World War I
experience.

Today, war is too devastating, the cost of warmaking machin-

ery too expensive, the likely warning time too short for us to await
another lesson. We must not delay until after World War Ill to create
the command structure needed to fight it, nor can we defer any
longer those reforms which if in existence today are likely to help
prevent war.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff dates back to the committee of heads

of Services we adopted in 1942, emulating the British. The bureau-
cratic latticework of the 1920s and 1930s erected a faqade of coop-
eration over well-protected Service prerogatives, which quickly
gave way under pressures of wartime reality. With all-out war facing
the President, he began to pay close attention to the committee of
Chiefs. The continuous dialogue between the White House and the
Chiefs resulted in sound military directives from on high so indis-
pensable to victory. The key to this system was frequent access by
the military to the decision-making bodies of government, both
executive and legislative. That access was a matter of necessity, for
the experience of war demonstrated anew the need for combined
cross-Service planning. There is little doubt that the Chiefs estab-
lished their credibility as trusted military advisers in World War I1.

It is important to remember, however, that the times and the cir-

cumstances of the 1940s are not those of the 1980s. The geograph-
ical separability and remoteness of the combat theaters, coupled
with limited overlap in the technologies employed by each Service.
allowed the national leadership to parcel out theater responsibilities
using traditional Service roles. Resource constraints such as we
face today were of minimal consideration at the national level:
American industry concentrated on war production: conscription
provided manpower for 90 Army and six Marine divisions, an 8,200-
ship Navy (including 98 carriers), and 79,000 aircraft (roughly equiv-
alent to 1,097 tactical wings today). Defense was alloted more than

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one-third of the gross national product. Such abundance obviated

the kind of inter-Service competition for scarce resources we know
today, with the draft on stand-by, with defense allocations one-
twentieth of the GNP and with many disincentives for industry's
participation in defense.

POSTWAR CHALLENGES AND LEGISLATION

After World War II. the urgencies which had supported whole-
hearted joint prosecution of the war at the top disappeared. What
remained were underlying sources of wartime inter-theater, intra-
theater, and inter-Service disputes. Nimitz vs. MacArthur. Navy vs.
Army. Pacific vs. Europe. Additionally. our postwar alliances gener-
ated new requirements for starkly different environments of threat
and geography New technological developments offered weapons
systems whose capabilities blurred the accepted boundaries
among Service roles and missions, Renewed interest in domestic
programs greatly reduced defense resources. It was hardly an
environment supportive of inter-Service harmony. President Eisen-
nowers ,message to Congress in 1958 pointed out the path to
pursue:

.. Separate ground. sea. and air warfare is gone forever. If ever

again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all ele-
ments. with all Services, as one single concentrated effort.
Peacetime preparation and organizational activity must con-
form to this fact.

AN IMPERFECT LAW

The first effort toward a more integrated defense establishment

was the creation of the Department of Defense in the National
Security Act of 1947.

That act also formally established the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a

council of advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense on
military policy, organization, strategy, and plans.

At the same time, members of that council, the Service Chiefs,

were told to retain their departmental responsibilities to organize.
equip, and train their forces. Foremost of these, for the Chief of Staff
of the Army, is his direct responsibility "...to the Secretary of the

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Army for the efficiency of the Army, its preparedness for military
operations, and plans..."

It should not therefore be surprising that the four Service Chiefs

found it somewhat difficult to sit down three times a week and act as
a corporate body against some of the very remedies they individu-
ally were seeking to apply within their respective Services. Nor were
the oft-made criticisms of their deliberations without a strong ele-
ment of unfairness. Given budgets which provide for less than
minimum defense needs, the Chiefs often found themselves unable
to act responsibly in their joint role except to the detriment of
legitimate Service requirements. This "dual-hatting," dictated by
law, confers real power with the Service Chief hat and little ability to
influence policy, programming, and budget issues with the joint hat.
This is the root cause of the ills which so many distinguished
officers have addressed these past 35 years.

The Act of 1947 has been successively amended to grant

increased authority to the Secretary of Defense and to build up the
Joint Staff and the Chairman of the JCS. But while centralized
civilian control over the process of determining defense resources
materialized, structural changes for the JCS were minor, largely
cosmetic. The JCS, while charged with the responsibility to con-
ceive, plan, and organize a defense founded on a unified command
structure, has never been provided the means to realize these plans.
In particular, they continue to lack real linkages with the resource
allocation process.

The 1947 legislation as amended in 1958 might have worked if

the only threat to our national values was a Soviet invasion of
Europe. The planning world, however, is far more complex: in con-
junction with our allies we must be able to respond to legitimate
national interests in many regions of the world. The central problem
for a coherent defense program is funding the right balance of
mutually supporting Service forces to meet the full array of likely
contingencies. As currently worked in the resource allocation pro-
cess today, we do not make a true horizontal examination. Rather,
we focus on single Services or on functions--vertical slices-which
in aggregate yield less than what might otherwise be attainable.
Solid linkages must be forged between likely contingencies and
resources if we are to minimize risk in the future.

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The US System for Developing Strategy

All of this accounts for a long thread of continuity in the cri-

tiques of Generals Bradley. Gavin, Taylor, and Jones. They are not
alone. Almost from its inception the JCS has been a magnet for
critical studies. There have been at least nine such efforts during the
past 12 years alone. As General Jones notes. each new Administra-
tion customarily revisits the national security apparatus and its
decisionmaking process. Unfortunately, only evolutionary adjust-
ments occurred in the wake of these efforts, and change targeted at
fundamental shortcomings of the JCS has been absent.

On the other hand, the resource management process within

DOD has been a favorite area for structural change: as in the case of
the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), Zero
Base Budgeting: and the current Defense Resources Board. Evi-
dently the motivation has been stronger toward efficient manage-
ment rather than the development of effective military planning. The
latter could only result from much greater interplay between the
joint military and civilian leadership. Simply put, the basic issue of
aligning Service programming and expenditures to the require-
ments of unified command planning had been inadequately treated.

CRITERIA FOR CHANGE

The key to the effectiveness of the current JCS structure, or any

other we might examine, lies in how well it serves the President, the
Defense Establishment, and the Congress with timely and thought-
ful advice on issues regarding:
* Policy: objectives, goals, restraints, and insights
* Strategy: concepts, global interrelationships, direction, and
warnings
* Planning: force development, options, and range of realistic alter-
natives together with risks
* Assessments: key national security issues, arms control, security
assistance, regional defense policies, and the like
"* Priorities: based on operational needs; discipline, the PPBS
"* Resources: money, men, and material of war in a joint or unified
context.

Against these criteria, how is the current system judged? Criti-

cism from civilians within Defense comes from many directions:

We badly need, and have not had, a coherent overall mil-

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 The US System for Developing Strategy

itary view about such matters as strategy and forces. Partly as a

result, a gaggle of kibitzers has furmed throughout government
on these questions .... The individual military Services have
clear stands on many of these issues, but an overall coherent
military view has been conspicuous by its absence.
... For years the only central voice in defense has been
provided by the civilian staff of the Secretary of Defense. Lack-
ing military expertise it has, largely, failed.

-James Woolsey, 1982

There is certainly a lot of commentary available from peo-
ple who have been involved.. .who say that the plans are not
what they want them to be. ... The Chiefs and the Joint Staff
can rightfully respond that frequently they get no guidance at
all in the preparation of plans, that the key decisions in formu-
lating plans for various contingencies are often political
decisions ....
-John Kester. April 1980

Criticism comes from civilians outside Defense as well. It takes

this tone:

In fact, during the last decade the Chiefs have gradually lost
influence both in the Pentagon and in wider interagency
debates. In part. their declining clout reflects the rise of the
civilian defense intellectuals.. .who entered the Pentagon as
experts in the arcane world of nuclear weapons and arms con-
trol and challenged the traditional notion that "wars should be
left to the generals."
-Richard Burt, June 1979
If the Congress perceives shortcomings in the work of the
Chiefs, it is perhaps because their present organizational struc-
ture forces them to wear two hats simultaneously,
What we in congress desperately need from the Joint
Chiefs are military judgments and recommendations... free
from Service bias. Then we can make informed judgments
about cutting or adding to a budget.
-Senator John Culver, 1978

The thrust of these statements is clear: when advice on joint

military issues is required, sources other than JCS are increasingly
sought. What verdict is rendered about the credibility of the system
when it becomes desirable to create a new cell embedded within the
National Defense University to provide alternative military
strategies?

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The US System for Developing Strategy

WHAT KIND OF FIX IS NEEDED?

It is surprising that the system works at all in light of its serious

organizational, conceptual, and functional flaws. When it does
work, it is principally-due to the exceptional officers assigned to the
Joint Staff who labor mightily to make the creaking machinery turn.
It is their diligence and dedication which get us through operational
crises and find paths through planning and staffing obstacles.

It is possible, of course, to jury-rig an unofficial arrangement to

answer at least some criticisms of the current organization. But we
are in a time when that solution is increasingly unattractice. Today,
the Services are working to implant at their operational and tactical
levels-a military command ctracture capable of reacting faster
than any opponent. The ;, .,pace of global change and the need
for competent advice lo nort notice argue instead for a compara-
ble capability at the strategic level. Though the pace of decision-
making in peacetime way not routinely demand this, most
contingencies we face .n tIie future will require us to go to war with
whatever peacetime mii ta y structure is in place. Adhorcracy is not
the answer.

What, then, are the options?

THE JONES PROPOSAL

General Jone's proposal is intended to make the joint system

more responsive and effective than it is now. As a first priority he
urges development of a stronger Chairman, an essential ingredient
of any reform. The JCS would still be composed of the Chiefs of
Service, but the joint role of the latter in operational planning and
risk assessment of the individual Service programs and budgets
would decrease appreciably and would remain to be defined. As a
consequence, their role in the policy aspects of joint military plan-
ning would be changed. The Chairman's role would be stronger in
the development of contingency plans, in directing the unified and
specified commanders in conducting military operations, and in
providing an independent assessment of the operational risks asso-
ciated with consolidated Service programs.

Additionally, the Jones proposal would establish a new posi-

tion of Vice Chairman to provide continuity in directing the joint

334
 The US System for Developing Strategy

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 The US System for Developing Strategy

Table 7-3: Major Studies on Reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Inevitably, there will be some impetus to turn the proposals by General

Jones and General Meyer over to a group for study. If done, the exercise
should be a very brief one, for as the following list of 20 studies over 38 years
reveals, the need to restructure the JCS has been studied to death, We don't
need any more studies, we need action,

Apr 1944-McNarney Plan

Mar 1945-Richardson Committee Majority Report

Sep 1945-Eberstadt Plan

Oct 1945--Collins Plan

Jan 1947-Army-Navy Compromise Plan (Norstad-Sherman Plan)

Nov 1948-Eberstadt Committee (of the Hoover Commission) Report

Feb 1949-Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the

Government (Hoover Commission) Report

Apr 1953-Rockefeller Committee Report

Apr 1953-President Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan

Jan 1958-Wheeler Committee Report (prepared at the request of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff)

Apr 1958-President Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan

Dec 1960-Symington Study on Reoganization of the Department of

Defense (prepared for President-elect Kennedy)

Jul 1970-Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (Fitzhugh) Report

Jun 1978-Ignatius Report on Defense Reorganization

Jul 1978-Steadman Committee Report on National Military Command

Structure

Feb 1979-Defense Resource Management (Rice) Report

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 The US System for Developing Strategy

Sep 1979-National Security Policy Integration (Odeen) Report

Dec 1981-Joint Planning and Execution Steering Committee Report

Feb 1982-Two Separate Reports of the Chairman's Special Study Group

Feb 1982-Jones' Reorganization Proposal

process in the absence of the Chairman. The creation of this posi-

tion could result in more efffective coordination between the JCS
and the National Security Council, the President, and the Unified
and Specified Commands on a routine basis because one of the
same two men would be at all the key meetings. However, the
addition of this Vice Chairman would degrade the position of the
Service Chiefs and change th,eir role in still undetermined ways.

Accompanying these policy and structural changes would be

an important procedural change. The Joint Staff would work forthe
Chairman, not the JCS corporately. The extent of Service staff
participation in the development of joint positions and papers
would be limited to providing factual inputs and advice on fewer
issues selected by the Chairman. The Joint Chiefs would meet to
consider proposals from an improved Joint Staff.

Unchanged, or as yet unclarified in the Jones proposal, are the

relationships between the various agencies within the Defense
Department most affected by changes in military structure. Will
some functions of OSD be subsumed by an invigorated Joint Staff?
Will an enhanced voice for the Chairman affect the ability of the
Services to make Service views known to the Secretary of Defense
and Congress? These and other relationships need to be laid out
clearly before the full impact of the Chairman's proposal can be
understood.

IS THERE A BETTER WAY TO GO?

General Jones's proposal clearly moves us beyond the current

system and well along the path of reform. Yet, even with adoption-
a process which will require some legislative action-an opportun-
ity for further building exists. Three major problems still need to be
solved.

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The US System for Developing Strategy

First is the divided loyalty we currently demand of the Service

Chiefs. Dual-hatting, however refined, will continue to impair the
ability of these top military authorities to provide sound, usable. and
timely military advice to our civilian leadership.

Second, while the Chairman's proposal clearly promises to

improve the Joint Staff's performance in peacetime, there may be a
better way to provide a structure which can transition rapidly to war.

It is likely the process of joint strategic direction in wartime will

totally consume the Chiefs' time. Simultaneously, immense issues
of internal Service prioritization and direction will erupt, making
equally large demands. Some will say that two relatively major wars
have been fought satisfactorily with the current system. But today
we face the most formidable force ever assembled in the history of
the world, an opponent with the means to seize the initiative glo-
bally, in unanticipated ways, using an arsenal of great variety. Addi-
tionally, we must be prepared to respond to lesser yet equally
critical contingencies which if not quickly contained could provide
the flashpoint for World War I1l. The pace of future war is key, and
having the right structure in placeto keep up with that pace is vital,

The other aspect of transitioning to war involves the creation of

solid relationships in peace which do not have to be abruptly
(perhaps chaotically) rewickered in crisis. I believe that the driving
factor in war is the ability to sustain effective theater operations
which are fully responsive to the grand design of national political
objectives. Similarly, the driving element in wartime resource distri-
bution is the operationally derived requirements of the theater com-
manders. However, we operate in a peacetime mode which accords
highest priority to cost effectiveness: the best defense at or under
cost. This is a worthy objective. But we should arrive at it by a
process which at the outset subordinates cost with acceptable risk
to intended capability of the Commanders-in-Chief (CinCs).
Resource allocation must be tied to operational planning directly.
not ex post facto. This requires not only a strengthening of the Joint
Staff. but redirection as well.

Third, we need to increase the role of theCinCs even morethan

General Jones has proposed in order to involve them more fully in
the defense decisionmaking process,

338
 The US System for Developing Strategy

These fundamental problems of the joint system lead me to

believe that we have a situation in which major surgery may be
necessary.

A COUNCIL

One clear option is the creation of a body of full-time military

advisers to the President and Secretary of Defense, thus ending the
dual-hatting which has proved so troublesome.

The new body would logically consist of distinguished four-star

rank officers, not charged with any Service responsibilities, who
would never return to their respective Services. Each member
would possess a varied background with extensive joint Service
experience. Additionally, individual members would be sought who
had particular expertise in areas of special importance to the joint
arena: e.g.. strategic nuclear policy; unconventional as well as con-
ventional warfare: and command, control, and communications.
One of the Council members could be appointed Vice Chairman for
continuity purposes.

Based on guidance from the Secretary of Defense, this body of

military advisers would examine military alternatives and recom-
mend strategic scenarios to govern how the military departments
are to organize, equip, and prepare their forces for war. The group
might be called the National Military Advisory Council (NMAC), as
Senator Symington suggested in 1960.

THE CHAIRMAN

The Chairman's position would remain in the new Council but

with a greatly enhanced role and increased influence. He would no
longer be the first among equals, dependent upon consensus to
shape his advice. Instead he would direct planning and operations
and be able to speak his own mind as well as disagree with the
opinion of the Council. Thus, more than one view and well-
conceived strategic alternatives would emerge. The real or per-
ceived obsession with unanimity, with an accompanying tendency
for a lowest common denominator solution would end.

The Chairman alone would direct the Joint Staff. He would

determine the issues for study and initiate staff actions through the

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The US System for Developing Strategy

director of the Joint Staff. Throughout, he would remain sensitive to

the concerns of the Council. To fulfill the enhanced responsibilities
of the Chairman of the Council, the staff would be strengthened.
One particular area of emphasis would be the development of an
effective programming and budgeting capability. Other technical
and administrative support would be increased to permit the Joint
Staff to support the proposed role of the Chairman and the Council.

The Council's method of operation would be somewhat akin to

that of a judicial body, its members sitting as an experienced body
of military professionals to decide matters of joint military impor-
tance. The authenticity and credibility of their judgments would be
based not only on decades of firsthand experience, but also by the
continuous opportunity to review requirements of the unified com-
mands and their reported readiness. The Councilors would be able
to arrive at recommendations in a reflective atmosphere, focused on
how best to flesh out the means to achieve the national objectives.
Opinions would be freely given by all members and presented as
majority and minority views. The recommendations would be timely
and objective, and as the developers of the prime military input to
the President and the Secretary of Defense, their views would be
hard to dismiss.

Experience clearly shows that the more trusted and profes-

sional the advice, the more willing civilian authorities are to seek it.
Simply eliminating the dual hats raises the expectation of height-
ened objectivity in the profferred advice of this body. Overtime. its
credibility verified, the Council could assume an increasingly
influential voice in formulating defense policy. Additionally. and of
equal importance, the direct formal link between the Secretary of
Defense and the Council would serve to encourage a greater degree
of civil-military interaction and dialogue which in turn could streng-
then the bond between the Secretary and his military advisors. The
dangers of today's world and the new dimensions to the national
security problem clearly require full-time joint military advisers.
Greater interaction and dialogue would provide the civilian leader-
ship with a deeper understanding of the complexities involved in
military planning and operations. Clearly, a better civilian perspec-
tive would be invaluable in unexpected crises which demand sound
and rapid policy decisions.

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 The US System for Developing Strategy

ADVANTAGES OF FULL-SCALE REFORM

The Council would remove the conflicting dual-hat roles of the

Service Chiefs. In peacetime the clear division between military
authorities responsible for providing advice on Service and joint
matters should result in a major improvement in the timeliness and
value of military advice. In wartime, the division of responsibilities
between the Council and the Chiefs should permit both bodies to
better engage the greatly increased decisionmaking demanded
during a crisis.

Removal of direct Service involvement in the relationship of the

Chairman and the Council to the CinCs would free the latter to
become more visible participants in the development of defense
policy and joint programs. The CinCs would give the Council their
views on the development of feasible and affordable military
courses of action for the near term, as well as the near-term fixes
which would improve their force capabilities. Coupled with an
improved Joint Staff, the CinC input would influence the "front-
end" formulation of military strategy instead of the CinCs remaining
in a reactive mode to establish policy in the Defense Guidance.

RELATIONSHIPS

The manner in which these improvements would operate is

summarized by viewing how relationships and lines of authority
would shift in the several proposals. In the Defense decisionmaking
hierarchy, the Council, led by the Chairman, would be directly
responsible for translating top-down policy guidance from the
Secretary of Defense and the President into strategic and cross-
Service programming direction to the Services. The Council might
best fulfill its responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense by analyz-
ing strategic alternatives for cost and risk implications. As part of its
role, the Council would suggest allocations among the Services as
well as a distribution of major combat forces designed to meet
strategic objectives.

Unlike some similar proposals of past years, the Services would

be closely involved with the Council in the development of strategic
alternatives, and would help a strengthened Joint Staff provide the
individual land, sea, and air perspectives necessary for effective
joint planning and analysis. Periodically throughout the analytic

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The US System for Developing Strategy

process, the Services, represented by the Service Secretaries and

Chiefs, would meet as a collective "board of directors" to comment
on, or to disagree with, the Council's position on key issues.

Armed with the Council's recommended strategies and pro-

grams, together with any dissenting views from the Services, the
Secretary of Defense and the President would be equipped to n~ake
fundamental decisions on the specific course of defense planning
and programming.

The close Service affiliation with the Council might at first

glance appear to focus the Council too narrowly on tactical and
administrative detail and not enough on what the President needs.
However, past experience has shown that continuous Service in-
volvement is essential in the development of grand strategy to
ensure that the product reflects the latest, most imaginative, and
dynamic aspects of individual Service doctrine and technological
development, as well as clear appreciation of what is feasible.

For this process to be successful, the Service Chiefs would

undertake to sponsor visits by the Council to the commands, and to
update the members on doctrinal developments, new weapons sys-
tems, and readiness of the forces. Indeed, it ought to be easier for a
four-star to learn about the joint system and study in depth develop-
ments taking place in other Services once he is freed from the daily
pressures of a high-level Service assignment.

Once approved by the Secretary of Defense, the strategic

recommendations of the Council would become directive in nature
and would shape the general outline of each Service program.
Consequently, the Services would have less of a voice than at
present in resolving cross-cutting resource issues and determining
the composition of their major forces. However, by narrowing the
focus to internal Service concerns, the Chiefs and the Service
Secretaries would be given more freedom to concentrate on long-
range Service planning and the discrete Service aspects of doctri-
nal, tactical, and technological innovation.

The streamlined relationship between the CinCs, the Council,

and the Secretary of Defense would have a beneficial effect on how
we plan for war. The new relationship between the Secretary and his
military advisers would lead to more clearly defined "top-down"

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 The US System for Developing Strategy

guidance from civilian leaders. The Council, now fully committed to

joint matters and familiar with requirements from the CinCs would
then translate that policy into strategic guidance for the field
commanders.

Last the CinCs, in turn, would send more useful feedback from
the field to civilian policymakers, thus completing the repetitive
dialogue so essential for solid contingency planning. The Council
would also decentralize the planning process by focusing primarily
on the larger issues of global integration of strategies and regional
planning guidance. As a result, the CinCs would be freed to deter-
mine details of force composition, force employment, deployment.
and support.

The Council would also better assist Congress in discharging

its important role. At present, congressional committees debate at
length the specifics of Service programs without full insight into
how these programs fit into an overall strategic context. Because of
its cross-Service perspective, the Council would be able to provide
Congress with a much-needed horizontal appraisal of individual
Service programs divorced from Service advocacy of weapons sys-
tems. The Council view would present the Administration's pro-
gram to Congress.

The format would be cast in terms of the capabilities provided

by the combined budgets of the Services to the operating forces in
relation to the near and long-term threat. Congress would thus have
an opportunity to probe for the genuine goals of military policy and
would be better able to isolate less essential and redundant pro-
grams. The position of the Council in relation to the Services would
given them a central role in the congressional budget review.

THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST

No solution which seeks fundamental reform is without poten-

tial drawbacks. At first glance it might appear that the influence of
the Service Chiefs might be severely diminished by the loss of their
JCS responsibilities. It is true that the role of the Chiefs would
change. My belief is that the additional time available to the heads of
Services by being relieved of time-consuming JCS duties would
permit them to concentrate on the more meaningful aspects of
Service roles in joint and combined operations. Relinquishing of

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The US System for Developing Strategy

routine JCS duties would be a small price to pay to achieve this end-
The Council would also relieve the Chiefs of the need continually to
justify and defend to Congres the size of Service budgets and the
composition of major Service forces to meet the national strategy.
These issues would be developed and explained to Congress and
the President by the Council.

A particularly emotional issue might be the creation of four new

general officers. Why add another layer of military bureaucracy
when other government agencies are being pared to the bone? It is
important to observe that the Council would not be another staff
layer but would, in fact, consist of four-stars who, because of their
backgrounds and seniority, would otherwise continue to be influen-
tial in national security affairs regardless of their official positions.

Since they would in effect be merely extended on active duty

before final retirement, the members would not disturb internal
Service command arrangements. Moreover, the efficiency with
which the advisers could provide advice and make decisions would
greatly diminish the need for the redundant joint and Service staff
work now necessary with the Service Chief wearing two hats. While
the Joint Staff would grow moderately, the total number of officers
now engaged directly or indirectly in joint work either on the Joint
Staff or in the Service would decrease.

Another criticism might be that such senior officers would be

unable to rise above their Service biases. I believe this to be unwar-
ranted since the officers would have had past joint experience, and
therefore access to the experience of other Services. Moreover, the
officers would be representing joint interests and would not be
returning to their Services upon completion of their appointment to
the Council.

Reform as sweeping as this would require legislative change to

the National Security Act of 1947. New relationships as outlined
above would have to be fully defined, understood, and accepted by
Congress-a process complicated by a historical reluctance to
accept any change which might suggest creation of a "General
Staff" from which a military elite might emerge. This has been a
recurring theme in opposition to reform of our highest military body
since first suggested during World War I1. It is important to empha-
size that all reforms suggested since the war have clearly accepted

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 The US System for Developing Strategy

military subordination to civilian authority. Contrary to popular

belief, the German General Staff was an army staff; not a joint staff.
In fact, it was Germany's lack of an effective joint staff apparatus
and a corresponding failure in both World Wars to establish a
unified control-over three separate Services that contributed signifi-
cantly to final defeat. One of the most telling indictments of this lack
of coordination was made by General Zimmerman of the German
army:

It is a matter of irony that Eisenhower, theservant of thegreat

democracies, was given full powers of command over an armed
force consisting of all three Services. With us, living under a
dictatorship where unity of command might have been taken for
granted, each of the services fought its own battle. Neither
Rundstedt nor Rommell, try though they might, succeeded in
changing this state of affairs in creating a unified command.
The result was that the German army fought singlehanded
against all the armed forces of the Allies.

CONCLUSION

Since the end of World War II the correlation of forces has

shifted dramatically. The shift demands that our national security
policy be buttressed by better and faster planning mechanisms. It
also demands that the roles of the civilian and military leaders
charged with this vital responsibility be clearly defined so that we
provide our citizens the defense posture necessary to ensure their
freedoms.

The prerequisites for organizational changes include:

* First and foremost: to ensure for civilian leaders the best and most
usable military advice possible. Above all, this advice must be rele-
vant and timely.
* Second: to ensure that the organization will work in wartime: and,
where possible, that it focuses in peacetime on the same issues with
which it will be seized in wartime.
* Third: to ensure that the CinCs are given sufficient guidance and
resources to do meaningful planning, are permitted to do such
planning, and remain intimately involved in near-term issues relat-
ing to the capabilities and readiness of their forces.

If these three prerequisites are used as the basis for evaluating

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The US System for Developing Strategy

organizational changes we should be able to come up with an

organization which-
"* provides clear, concise, and timely military advice'
"* permits the Chairman to shape internal discussions:
"* gives CinCs the ability to influence in peacetime what they are
expected to implement in wartime:
* focuses the Service Secretaries and Chiefs on the current readi-
ness and the future of their Services;
* directs the OSD staff toward implementation of the Defense
Department's critical functions in peace and war:
e provides to the President, the Congress, and the American people
a clear indication of how much more secure they are as a result of
the dullars spent on defense.

Reform of the mechanism which provides military advice and

counsel to our civilian leadership is long overdue. Tinkering with
the mechanisms will not suffice. Only by addressing the issues
which have been considered to be too tough to cope with in the past
do we have a chance of instituting the reforms necessary to develop
the smooth-running machinery required to see our nation through
to the 21st century with our freedoms and national values intact.

346
Navy, Marines Adamantly Oppose JCS Reforms
Most Others Tell Congress Are Long Overdue

Deborah M. Kyle and Benjamin F. Schemmer

Armed Forces Journal International

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF have split right down the middle on
the need to overhaul the US top military planning body, as recently
proposed by outgoing JCS Chairman General David C. Jones and
Army Chief of Staff General E.C. Meyer. But incoming JCS Chair-
man General John W. Vessey has given their initiatives new impetus
by testifying at his Senate confirmation hearing on 11 May 1982 that
he favors Congressional action along the lines Jones and Meyer
have suggested. Vessey will replace Jones on 1 July.

The Navy and Marine Corps are outspokenly opposed to any

organizational or legislative overhaul of the JCS and the Joint Staff
system, and the Air Force seems to haý e weighed in on both sides of
the issue during in-depth hearings which began on 21 April before
the House Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee and which
will continue well into July.

Navy/Marine Corps opposition to the reform proposals has

been united among both present and retired Chiefs from those
Services-and at times almost brutal. The current Chief of Naval
Operations. Admiral Thomas B. Hayward (who retires in June), told
the subcommittee in a forcefully delivered, intense, prepared state-
ment, for instance, that he was "deeply offended by the slanderous
criticisms which one frequently hears about the Joint Chiefs being
an ineffective group of parochial Service Chiefs who spend most of
their time bickering among themselves, horse trading to preserve
turf and what is best for their Service." That criticism, as Hayward
summarized it, as a somewhat overstated but not unreasonable

Copyright c 1982 by Army and Navy Journal. Inc. All rights reserved.
Reprinted by permission.

347
The US System for Developing Strategy

paraphrase of the very flaws which both Jones and Meyer have said
mar the present Joint Chiefs of Staff set-up and often render its
supporting Joint Staff ineffective.

The hearings, chaired by Congressman Richard White, a 10-

term Democrat from El Paso, Texas are going into more depth
than.. on any defense issue since the TFX hearings of the early
1960s. (As of 6 May, when the hearings broke off for two weeks,
some 30 witnesses had testified on the reform initiatives launched
by Jones and Meyer; the Investigating Subcommittee has firm plans
to call at least 13, and more likely will hear from 18, additional
witnesses before Congress adjourns for its August, election-year
recess.)

White opened the hearings with a succinct summary of the

Jones and Meyer proposals adding, "We don't intend to just hold
hearings and do nothing about it. It's too important to the national
security of this country," he said. "We plan to put forward some type
of proposal," and later noted specifically that the subcommittee did
plan to draft legislation on the issue. But whether or not any Con-
gressional action-beyond hearings-can take place this year is
uncertain at best: the Fiscal Year 1983 budget process is now
behind schedule, and tough, time-consuming election campaigns
loom ahead for both Houses of Congress.

SENATE PLANS JULY HEARINGS

Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Tower (R,

Tex.) has said both publicly and privately that his committee also
plans substantive hearings. Soon after his Committee reported out
its fiscal 1983 Defense Authorization Bill in late March, Tower said
he hoped such hearings might begin after Congress' Easter recess
and right after the Senate floor debate on the authorization bill,
which had been scheduled for late April. But that schedule has been
set awry by the Administration's and Congress's prolonged search
for a compromise on the overall fiscal 1983 Federal budget, and
Senate hearings on JCS reforms will probably not be held until July.
At this juncture, the Senate does not plan to call anywhere near the
number of witnesses the House has, and will probably focus instead
on just present and former JCS members and Defense Secretaries.
One informed source ... (said) that notwithstanding the unavoida-
ble delay in beginning hearings, the Senate would still have ample

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 The US System for Developing Strategy

time to debate and pass reform legislation this year, if members of

the Armed Services Committee decide that new or revised legisla-
tion is needed. Similar action on the House side seems less possi-
ble, and the issue may be held open until a new session of Congress
convenes next January.

NAVY/MARINE OPPOSITION

Admiral Hayward's blunt testimony opposing any JCS reform

initiatives left the House subcommittee members almost speechless
when he finished his prepared statement, saying, "Reorganization
is simply not necessary" and "no reorganization is needed" in about
10 different ways. Finally, Chairman White asked him, "Admiral, is
there any recommendation by either General Jones or General
Meyer that you do endorse?" Hayward said, in effect, "Not one-ex-
cept that I do agree we need to strengthen the role of the JCS." But
he said that would happen if civilian leaders demanded more active
participation by the JCS in the early, formative stages of deliberat-
ing national policy and global strategy; if the JCs were more asser-
tive in making their views known; and if Congress demanded greater
participation by the JCS in its deliberations. As the hearing broke
up, Hayward... (said) in front of Chairman White and his staff, "You
know that I did not want these hearings to happen. It will not come to
any good." Someone quipped that if his intent had been to pour cold
water on the issue, the heat of his opposition may have ignited
Congress's interest instead.

Marine Corps Commandant General Robert H. Barrow gave the

subcommittee a crisp and articulate statement in line with Hay-
ward's view, but even more strongly worded on some points. Barrow
said that Jones's proposals would "do serious harm to the system."
Making the Chairman--instead of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a
corporate body (as is now the case)-the principal military adviser
with control of the Joint Staff "is essentially a supreme chief of
staff/general staff system," Barrow argued, that "would prevent the
development of legitimate alternatives that should be presented to
appropriate civilian authority for decision."

He added that "the JCS corporate system, with JCS corporate

members being also Chiefs of Services, thus combining authority
with responsibility, would be virtually destroyed."

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The US System for Developing Strategy

Barrow added a quote from Churchill: "Any clever person can

make plans for winning a war if he doesn't have to carry them out."
(He did not mention, but others noted, that the same quote could be
used to argue General Jones' case for making the Chairman instead
of the corporate Chiefs the Nation's principal military adviser, since
under the present system no one military person has any such
responsibility. The Chairman isn't in the operational chain of com-
mand nor are any of the Service Chiefs: decisions go from the
Secretary of Defense to the Unified or Specified commanders
through the JCS as a corporate body. One senior Senator on the
Armed Services Committee, apprised of Hayward and Barrow's
strong testimony before the House.... (said) What did you expect?
They've always been that way: they get two votes out of five going
into every meeting in the tank."

Air Force Chief of Staff General Lew Allen, Jr., though not in
total accord with either the Jones or Meyer proposals, noted that
"an improved joint system with Service Chief and Service staff
participation is needed (to) improve both the formulation and the
execution of war plans and military strategy and the Service respon-
sibilities for creating the proper force." Allen warned that the "exist-
ing process in the joint area is cumbersome. The planning takes too
long and is phased imperfectly with the budget cycle; the products
are not as crisp and relevant as they could be. We must seek
improvements to our systems."

VESSEY SUPPORTS REFORMS

During a confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Servi-

ces Committee on 11 May on General John W. Vessey's nomination
to become JCS Chairman, Sen. Goldwater (R, Ariz.) said he agreed
with the changes proposed by General Jones, and asked Vessey if
they would be acceptable to him.

Vessey said in an introductory aside that he had known that

General Jones would propose some changes in the JCS system and
had looked forward with "delight" to the debate that would ensue:
but, Vessey quipped, he had thought he would be observing that
debate from retirement in his new home in Minnesota. Instead. he
said, he now finds himself "up to my armpits in the middle of the
discussions."

350
 The US System for Developing Strategy

Vessey said that "any organization can be improved" and h, j,,t

"the JCS in that category." He noted that the House Ar,,,ed Serv-
ces Investigations Subcommittee had heard a wide range of wit-
nesses and experts on the subject, and tha'. the "range of views
expressed is as wide as the scope of the hearings." But, Vesey said.
if the Senate and House both held hearings, he felt confident the two
committees "can find the thread that may lead to sensible changes in
the organization." Without commiting himself at this stage to specif-
ics of either proposal. Vessey said, "I agree with many of the things
General Jones and General Meyer have proposed." But, he added,
three fundamental questions first "have to be answered by the
President, the Secretary of Defense, and Congress about which
direction we want to go in to change the (JCS) organization:"

* Does the Nation want to go to a Defense General Staff system that

has been specifically prohibited since the Defense Reorganization
Act of 1947?
* Should the Chiefs of the Services continue to be a part of that
body-or separated from it to run their own organizations? (Vessey
noted there are "arguments on both side of that question.")
* How do you deal with differing views among advisers? (Vessey
said he had not seen much "inter-Service bickering" among the
Chiefs, but had seen some "honest differences of opinion," and that
it would be "unusual to always find unanimity.")

24 HASC WITNESSES TO DATE

The House subcommittee has heard testimony from all five

present JCS members and nine previous ones: from three members
of Congress; one former Secretary of Defense, two former Deputy
Secretaries and one former Under Secretary; one former Specified
commander (not counting some former JCS members who also
held such posts); and various other witnesses-in all, 24 to date. It
has heard from two retired Air Force and three retired Army JCS
members, and two retired Navy and two retired Marine Corps JCS
members. Of those testifying so far, 11 have come out in favor of
General Jones's proposal or some variation thereof, six suprort
General Meyer's plan, and seven were adamantly opposed to any
reorganization efforts. The subcommittee hopes to have current
SecDef Caspar Weinberger testify in July, along with former
Defense Secretary Elliot Richardson; and before its hearings con-
clude, will have heard from all living JCS Chairmen past or present

351
The US System for Developing Strategy

Highlights of the testimony to date are provided below.

"Room for Improvement"

"I am increasingly convinced that all too often, we do not get the
military advice we so sorely need.

"My experience as a member of the Appropriations' Defense

Subcommittee has led me to feel that there is considerable room for
improvement in the way we develop national strategy and allocate
resources."
-Rep. Norman Dicks

"We Desperately Need Reform"

"We have had almost 25 years now of review .... We have had
over a dozen major studies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff system. No
one who has studied it has been very happy with it. Many people
have been extremely unhappy with it. General Jones and General
Meyer have served a very important role in opening up this debate
and dialogue.

"We need a Chief of the Joint Staff rather than a Chairman, and
that Chief may be a five-star position."
-Rep. Newt Gingrich

"Drastic Changes"

"I believe that General Jones's recommendations are both well

founded and a significant step in the right direction .... I, like
General Meyer, would be inclined to make changes substantially
larger than those suggested by General Jones...though I would
differ on some of the details.

"It should be clear that the Service Chiefs who now, together
with the Chairman of the JCS, constitute the JCS, have a built-in and
insuperable conflict of interest.

"I would urge the Committee to support at least as much organ-

izational change as is contained in General Jones's proposals."
-Dr. Harold Brown

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 The US System for Developing Strategy

"Changes... Imperative"

"The existing committee-type structure of the JCS produces

too much fragmentation of views as well as inter-Service comprom-
ise and logrolling to fulfill the President's need for clear, timely and
objective advice on military matters.

"I find myself generally in agreement with the recommenda-

tions made by General Jones.

"The burdens and responsibilities of the JCS, in their dual role

as Service Chiefs and JCS members, have long been too great for
the JCS to carry out its important functions effectively."
-Hon. Rosewell L. Gilpatrick

"Bad Organizations Hinder"

"My personal preference would be for something along the

lines of General Meyer's proposal.

"Until the Chiefs are organized in a way that allows them to

respond quickly and with meaningful advice rather than platitudes,
they are not going to be sought out, because they will not have
much that is helpful to say.

"It probably is the most important defense issue (Congress) will

consider all year, and the one with the most enduring effect on our
military posture."
-Hon. John G. Kester

An Open "Scandal"

"While General Jones's proposals are a big step in the right

direction, I would prefer General Meyer's as facing up to both the
need for decoupling and for conversion of the Joint Staff to one
which is truly joint.

"A second major institutional failing is that no one man, how-

ever competent, can possibly perform adequately two full-time jobs
as both Service Chief and JCS member, even if the inherent conflict
of interest between them did not exist."

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The US System for Developing Strategy

"in my judgment the real problem is ins:'tutonal.There is a

built-in conflict of interest between the roles of JCS member and
Service Chief. -Amb. Robert W. Komer

Backing Meyer

"I'd be inclined to go along with General Meyer's

recommendation.

"The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs should depend on (theJCS)

staff, not the Service staffs."
-Hon. David Packard

An "Important Issue"

"I'm more inclined to General Jones's halfway reform. But

(either type) of reform or a blend would be betterthan what we have
today.

"I believe that reform of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in order to get
a joint view, is important.

"I'm inclined not to go as far as the Meyer (uncoupling plan) at

this time, because Services would be shunted aside in offering
advice. But the question of reform is overriding. I'd support reform
first even if that means the Meyer proposal."
-Hon. R. James Woolsey

Needs "Tweaking and Tuning"

"I think that both General Jones and General Meyer recognize
the potential for constructive change .... I am not sanguine about
the reception that these will receive in some quarters-hardened
positions in opposition will surface almost immediately; their
motives will be made suspect and the specters of the German
general staff or the military dictators and martinets, with unwar-
ranted influence and suppressed surbordinates, will be invoked on
all sides.

"The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) should be

described in the statutes, Executive orders, and Departmental

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 The US System for Developing Strategy

directives as the senior military officer on active duty and as the

principal military spokesman of the United States: he should be
nominated by the President, approved by the Senate for a four-year
term: he should be given five stars and a Cabinet-level pay scale.

"4 think there are changes that easily can be-and should
be-recommended by this Committee and approved by Congress
and the Administration."
-General Russell E. Dougherty, USAF (Ret.)

"Go a Little Further"

JCS members are "just physically not capable of handling botn

tasks-sitting on the JCS and as head of their (Service). I think we
need two separate jobs.

"I support a 'deputy or vice commander' of the armed forces of

the US reporting directly to the President.

"I'm in general agreement with the basic changes General

Jones proposed.. but I'd go a little further."
-General Curtis LeMay, USAF (Ret.)

Reorganization A Must

"There is a need for administrative reorganizaton but this does

not require legislative action.

"I support the need for a Deputy Chairman but his duties must
be fairly well circumscribed to that he does not become a member of
the JCS.

"1would not endorse Service Chiefs assuming Deputy Chair-

man responsibilities in the Chairman's absence because if you're
running a Service, you've got a good handful there."
-General John D. Ryan, USAF (Ret.)

"Systemic" Weaknesses

"The contributions to increased military efficiency and effec-

tiveness that could be made through improved top-level military
planning and advice are not being realized.

355
The US System for Developing Strategy

"The truth is that the weaknesses are systemic, and that it is

systemic improvement that is needed.

"I believe (it is) unmistakably clear that a strengthening of the

role of the Chairman of the JCS will be critical to systemic
improvement."
-General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA (Ret.)

"Effective" Under Pressure

"I think (the JCS) could function effectively under time

constraints.

"...As a member of the JCS, my value to the body was in direct

proportion to my knowledge of my individual Service. (Service
allegiance) is a problem, but you have to rise above it.

"I believe the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has all the
power he needs."
-General Harold K. Johnson, USA (Ret.)

"Current System... Collective Wisdom"

"I feel that our present organization provides the checks and
balances which moderate extreme views.

"I feel strongly that the best way of providing balanced military
advice to our civilian leaders is by the use of talents and varied by
the broad experience of the military Chiefs of all Services-each
knows his own Service and each is an expert in his field.

"I believe that our present system places the final authority and
responsibility where they belong-that is, on the elected and duly
appointed civilian leadership of our country-and yet gives due
consideration to the experienced judgment of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in the formulation of these decisions."
-General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA (Ret.)

"Disadvantages Outweigh Advantages"

"I do have a very strong conviction that we must be extraordi-

narily cautious in approaching any decision to make significant

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 The US System for Developing Strategy

changes. The present system works.

"Elimination of the Service Chiefs in favor of a two-man Chair-

man and Deputy entity has two dangerous if not fatal flaws. The
availability of the most knowledgable and experienced military
advice on the readiness and capability of our military forces is
turned off; there will exist a separation of responsibility and author-
ity for the readiness of our military forces.

"Chiefs and their military staffs represent the most up-to-date

repository of total knowledge concerning the long-term capabilities
and the immediate readiness of their forces... To eliminate the
direct participation of these four officers ...is, in my view, to discard
a source of professional wisdom and operating experience that
would fundamentally impair the quality of our national security
policies and our military operational'planning."
-Admiral James L. Holloway III, USN (Ret.)

"Leave the Organization Alone"

"The system does work due primarily to the things that General
Jones wants to change .... The present system provides the best
arrangement for providing strategic direction to the armed forces as
dictated by law.

"In my view, the Chairman has all of the authority within the
uniformed organizations he is willing to take.

"1,for one, would far prefer to have the Service Chiefs meet with
me as Chairman to discuss crises than I would some super-council
that could only get their information secondhand from those who
really know, that is, the Service Chiefs. In short, it is my opinion that
if an officer cannot find time to handle both his Service duties as well
as his joint duties, then he is not qualified for either job."
-Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN (Ret.)

"Essentially Sound" As Is

"There is no need to reorganizethe present Joint Chiefs of Staff

organization in any major way.

"The Chairman should be authorized a Deputy... (who) would

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The US System for Developing Strategy

improve continuity of action and be of great assistance to the

Chairman in increasing readiness, improving war planning, and
managing the joint exercising of the combatant forces.

"I have the following recommendations to make for improving

the functioning of the JCS: More frequent and regular meetings
between the JCS and the Secretary of Defense and the JCS and the
President. The Chiefs of Services to turn over more of their Service
duties to their Vice Chiefs and to concentrate and spend more time
on their JCS duties .... Through a series of Command Post Exer-
cises and war games, test the two opposing concepts and compare
results."

"The Joint Chiefs should continue their dual responsibilities...

with priority to JCS duties."
-General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., USMC (Ret.)

"Sound and Effective" As Designed

"The Chairman has the authority he is willing to exercise .... It

would appear that there is little-if any-greater authority which
could be provided him unless it were to be specifically or implicitly
surrendered by the Secretary of Defense, the President, or the
Congress.

"The present organization is undeniably subject to improve-

ment, but there is ample authority and opportunity to effect
improvement under present law and within the existing framework
of the organization.

"The creation of such a billet (a Deputy Chairman) is objection-

able, even under the current system.

"As I understand General Jones's proposals. he would have the

Chairman of the JCS, instead of the JCS, (be) the principal military
adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense. and have the
Joint Staff work for the Chairman. This similarity to an armed forces
general staff in form, if not in authority is clear and unequivocal
despite the protestation to the contrary."
-General Louis H. Wilson, USMC (Ret.)

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 "The US System for Developing Strategy

"Rivalries Multiply Difficulties'

"Quality of JCS advice is documentably poor enough to make

Presidents skeptical of that advice.

"No Chief could rationally advocate additional divisions, ships,

or planes as a Service spokesman, then recommend reductions
during JCS review.

"Pressures to appear harmonious, however, impede defense

planning.

"When the Chairman of the JCS comes to the SecDef with the
lowest common denominator answer, they can't competewith OSD
civilian analysts.

"Right now, the Joint Staff is dependent on the Service Staff

because (the Joint Staff) lack the expertise of the Service Staff."
-John M. Collins, Senior Specialist in
National Defense, Library of Congress

359
 Endnotes

CHAPTER 3

Nuechterlein, "National Interests and National Strategy"

"1.New York Times, 12 August 1982, p. 28

2. White House press release: "Remarks of Judge William Clark, National
Security Adviser to the President." 21 May 1982. p. 4.
3. Ibid. p. 7.
4. For a more detailed discussion of these categories of national interest.
see Donald E. Neuchterlein, "The Concept of National Interest: A Time for
New Approaches," Orbis, Spring 1979, pp. 76-80.
5. The national-interest matrix and its use as an analytical tool is described
in greater detail in ibid., pp. 80-82.

Rosenau, "Fragmegrative Challenges to National Strategy"

1. For an example of a recent, frustrated expression along these lines, see

Robert E. Hunter, "U.S. Foreign Policy: A Matter of Luck," Los Angeles
Times 29 June 1982, Part II, p. 5, who stresses that "the tradition of U.S.
reliance on pragmatism in dealing with other nations is dead and argues
that therefore "there must be a central vision of foreign policy in order to
bring the apples and oranges of individual events into some sort of balance,
if not harmony .... In effect, in our new state of relatively diminshed power
in the world, we need a world view that can make sense of the bits and
pieces-a way of looking at our problems and devising answers that derives
its legitimacy from the facts of life. It is basically different from having an
ideology, of either the right or the left, that tries instead to impose an
American vision on global events that can distort reality."
2. For an extended discussion of the concept of national adaptation, see
J.N. Rosenau, The Study of PoliticalAdaptation (New York: Nichols Pub-
lishing Company, 1981). For an application of the concept to the present
circumstances of the United States, see J.N. Rosenau and OR. Holsti.
"American Leadership in a Shrinking World: The Breakdown of Consen-
suses and the Emergence of Conflicting Belief Systems, World Politics,Vol.
XXXV (April 1983).
3. See J.N. Rosenau, The Study of Global Interdependence:Essays on the
Transnationalizationof World Affairs (New York: Nichols Publishing Com-
pany, 1980), and N.J. Rosenau, "The Civic Self in Transnational Perspec-
tive," in J. Gillespie and D. Zinnes (eds.), Missing Elements in Political
Inquiry (Beverly Hills: Sage Publishers, 1982).
4. The question of whether interdependence involves mutual dependen-

361
Endnotes

cies or is a form of hierarchical dependence of one unit on another has

proven particularly troublesome. For debates over this question and other
problems of the concept of interdependence, see Ibid.. and the various
essays in R. Maghoori and B. Ramberg (eds.), International Relations Third
Debate: Globalism vs. Realism (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 1982)
5. In addition to a forthcoming book, the major findings of our project can
be found in the following coauthored articles: "The Foreign Policy Beliefs
of Women in Leadership Positions." Journal of Politics,Vol. 43 (May 1981).
pp. 326-47: "Does Where You Stand Depend on When You Were Born? The
Impact of Generation on Post-Vietnam Foreign Policy Beliefs," Public
Opinion Quarterly,Vol. 44 (Spring 1980), pp. 1-22: "Cold War Axioms in the
Post-Vietnam Era," in O.R. Holsti, A. George. and R.M Siverson (eds.),
Change in the InternationalSystem (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,
1980). pp. 263-301: "The United States in (and out of) Vietnam: An Adaptive
Transformation?" Yearbook of World Affairs (1980), pp. 186-204: "Ameri-
ca's Foreign Policy Agenda: The Post-Vietnam Beliefs of American Lead-
ers," in C. W. Kegley, Jr.. and P.J. McGowan (eds.). Challenges to America:
United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
1979), pp. 231-268: "Vietnam, Consensus. and the Belief Systems of Ameri-
can Leaders." World Politics, Vol. XXXV (October 1979), pp. 1-56.
6. Ole R. Holsti, "The Three-Headed Eagle: The United States and System
Change," International Studies Quarterly. Vol. 23 (September 1980), pp.
339-59.
7. For a cogent discussion of these domestic divisions, see Daniel Yankelo-
vich, "Economic Policy and the Question of Political Will," in Walter E.
Hoadley (ed.), The Economy and the President: 1980 and Beyond (Engle-
wood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1980), pp. 18-24.
8. Rosenau and Holsti, "American Leadership in a Shrinking World" (cited
in endnote 2).
9. For an example of this line of reasoning, see James Fallows, National
Defense (New York: Vintage Press, 1982), pp. xv-xvi.
10. This approach has been most recently developed by Donald E. Nuech-
terlein. See, for example, his "America Overcommitted," Foreign Service
Journal (March 1982), pp. 14-30.
11. Ronald Steel, "Keep the Marines Out of It: Escort Role in Lebanon Would
Defeat Chance for Diplomacy,"LosAngeles Times 13 July 1982, Part ii. p. 5.
12. Nuechterlein, op. cit., pp. 14-15.
13. For an elaboration of this conception of the national interest, see James
N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York: Nichols
Publishing Company, revised ed., 1980), Chap. 11.
14. For a contrary line of reasoning, in which considerable hope is offered
that a specification of priorities among interests can become the basis of a
nationwide consensus, see Theodore C. Sorensen, "The Absent Opposi-
tion," Foreign Policy, No. 47 (Summer 1982), pp. 66-81.

362
 Endnotes

CHAPTER 4

Smernoff, "Two-Track Strategy for Space"

1. The FY 1982 Department of Defense Program for Research. Develop-

ment. and Acquisition. statement by William J. Perry, Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering, to the 97th Congress, 1st Session.
20 January 1982, pp. 11-10.
2. Soviet Military Power, released by the DOD in September 1981, pp.
76-79.
3. "Soviets Outspending U.S. on Space by $3-4 Billion." Aviation Week &
Space Technology, July 19, 1982, p. 28.
4. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Outer Space-Bat-
tlefield of the Future? (London: Taylor & Francis Ltd.. 1978), especially
Chapter 3, "Reconnaissance Satellites."
5. Edward C. Aldridge, Jr., Under Secretary of the Air Force, "Space Com-
mand: Defense in the Fourth Medium," Defense 83. January 1983.
6. Four of the five basic military space options were initially defined and
discussed by Lt. Col. Dino A. Lorenzini and Maj. Charles L. Fox in "2001: A
U.S. Space Force." Naval War College Review. March-April 1981.
7. See Richard L. Garwin, "Effective Military Technology for the 1980s,"
InternationalSecurity, Fall 1976.
8. Assistant Under Secretary of Defense (for Policy) Ronald Stivers.
speech of 26 May 1982.
9. Colin S. Gray, "The Military Uses of Space to the Year 2000." presented
to the Seventh International Arms Control Symposium, Philadelphia, 6-8
May 1982, pp. 3-4.
10. White House press release, June 20, 1978. Also see Donald L. Hafner,
"Averting a Brobdingnagian Skeet Shoot: Arms Control Measures for Anti-
satellite Weapons," InternationalSecurity, Winter 1980-81, and David A.
Andelman, "Space Wars," Foreign Policy, Fall 1981.
11. See Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival, by the Independent
Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, chaired by Olaf Palme
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), pp. 154-55.
12. See especially the Lorenzini-Fox article in Naval War College Review
and High Frontier:A New NationalStrategy,coordinated by Lt. Gen. Daniel
0. Graham, 1982, as well s the fine paper by Lt. Col. Barry Watts and Maj.
Lance Lord, "Beyond the Missile Age: HowtoThink About Military Compe-
tition in Space," in Military Space Doctrine: The Great Frontier,a book of
readings for the US Air Force Adacemy's Military Space Doctrine Sympo-
sium, 1-3 April 1981, Volume IV.
13. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Tech-
netronic Era (New York: Viking Press, 1970), p. 247.
14. James Canan, War in Space (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), p. 179.
15. Fred Charles Ikle, "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?"

363
Endnotes

Foreign Affairs, January 1973, p 285. His complete line is: "While luck has
been with us so far, strategic thinking must and can find a new path into the
twenty-first century."
16. This scenario was posed by Richard L. Garwin (loc. cit.. p. 73):
"nuclear-armed interceptors would be used to attack the imagined laser-
bearing satellites as they were being readied to orbit over a period of
months." Ballistic missile defense (BMD) is usually construed as equivalent
to antiballistic missile (ABM) systems, which are now severely constrained
by the US-Soviet ABM Treaty of 1972.
17. Barry J. Sme-noff, "The Strategic Value of Space-Based Laser Wea-
pons," Air University Review, March-April 1982.
18. William V. O'Brien, The Conduct of Just and Limited War (New York:
Praeger, 1981), p. 130.
19. The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military
Posture for FY 1983. p. 64. In its discussion of technological leadership, this
document states that "lasers are perhaps second only to micro-electronics
in their promise of impact on military systems." Indeed, the laser is the only
major weapon-system component based on a new scientific phenomenon
that has been introduced since the development of nuclear weapons during
World War II; see Alexander H. Flax. "Military Aerospace to 2000," Astro-
nautics and Aeronatuics, May 1980, p. 33.
20. Department of State Bulletin, 9 October 1967.
21. For a current statement of the proposition that "we are fated to live in a
MAD world," see Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., and Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky,
'MAD Versus NUTS: Can Doctrine or Weaponry Remedy the Mutual Hos-
tage Relationship of the Superpowers?" Foreign Affairs, Winter 1981/82.
22. The Soviet Union has always emphasized strategic defense more than
the US, suggesting that it may more easily "tilt" toward a world of defensive
emphasis. See Col. William J. Barlow, "Soviet Damage-Denial: Strategy,
Systems. SALT, and Solution," Air University Review, September-October
1981.
23. For a preliminary discussion of contemporary issues of nuclear moral-
ity, see Barry J. Smernoff, "An Exploratory Moral Analysis of Strategic
Nuclear Options and Arms-Control Regimes," Military Chaplain's Review.
Fall 1982.
24. William J. Perry and Cynthia A. Roberts, "Winning Through Sophistica-
tion: How to Meet the Soviet Military Challenge," Technology Review, July
1982, and William J. Perry, "Technological Prospects," in Rethinking the
U.S. Strategic Posture, edited by Barry M. Blechman (Cambridge, Mass.:
Ballinger, 1982).
25. Jeffrey Record, "Beyond NATO: New Military Directions for theUnited
States," in U.S. Strategy at the Crossroads,Institute for Foreign Policy
Analysis, July 1982. Also see Michael Vlahos, America: Images of Empire.
SAIS Occational Papers in International Affairs (Washington, D.C.: Johns
Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute/SAIS, August 1982) for the case that
America and Europe are in the initial stages of slow disengagement, and the

364
 Endnotes

former must develp new modes of power projection to protect its interests
and allies.

365
 Endnotes

CHAPTER 5

Kolodziej, "Alternative Strategies for Western Europe"

1. See, for example, President Reagan's proposals to upgrade strategic

nuclear programs. New York Times, 2 October 1982.
2. See the speech of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt before the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 28 October 1977, reprinted in US Cong.,
House, Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Modernization of NA TO's Long-
Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (Washington: GPO, 1980), pp. 71-80.
3. See comments of Josef Joffe in New York Times. 29 December 1982.
4. See New York Times. 18 October 1982. In a response to a question from
foreign visitors, President Reagan said that he did not "honestly know"
whether nuclear war in Europe would have the exchange of tactical
(nuclear) weapons against troops in the field without it bringing either one
of the major powers to pushing the button."
5. The evolution of the cruise and Pershing II deployment decisions, the
so-called two-track decision is reviewed in numerous sources. See, for
example, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Modernization of NATO's
Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces and Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SI PRI), World Armaments and Disarmament Yearbook
1982 (London: Taylor and Francis Ltd., 1982), pp. 3-50. For a spectrum of
views regarding the LRTNF issue, consult the following: Philip J. Farley. et
al., Intermediate-RangeNuclear Forces in Europe: Issues and Approaches
(Stanford: Arms Control and Disarmament Program, 1982): Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Challenges for U.S. NationalSecurfity,
(Washington, 1982), especially pp. 135-195 on theater nuclear forces: Gre-
gory Treverton, Nuclear Weapons in Europe, Adelphi Papers No. 168 (Lon-
don: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981): Stanley Hoffmann.
"NATO and Nuclear Weapons: Reason and Unreasons," Foreign Policy.
Winter, 1981-82 pp. 327-347; Christoph Bertram, "Implications of Theatre
Nuclear Weapons in Europe." ibid., 305-326: Catherine McArdle Kelleher,
"The Present as Prologue: Europe andTheatreNuclear Weapons," Interna-
tional Security, Spring, 1981 pp. 150-168; Richard Burt, "The Hidden
Nuclear Crisis in the Atlantic Alliance" in NA TO's Strategic Options, David
S. Yost, ed. (New York: Pergamon, 1981), pp. 46-62: "Theatre Nuclear Force
Modernization," Report of the Royal United Services Institute for Strategic
Studies, RUSI Journal for Defense Stuies, September 1980, pp. 3-10:
Robert Kennedy, Soviet Theater-Nuclear Forces: Implications for NATO
Defense,"Orbis Summer 1981, pp. 331-350. Uwe Newrlich, "Theatre
Nuclear Forces in Europe: Is NATO Running Out of Options?" in NATO:
The Next Thirty Years, Kenneth A. Myers, ed. (Boulder, Colo Westview,
1980), pp. 63-94.
For earlier articles of interest that assisted in development of the
LRTNF issue, see Robert Metzger and Paul Doty, "Army Control Enters the

4 366
 Endnotes

Gray Areas," InternationalSecurity. Winter 1978-79. pp. 17-52: Aspen Insti-

tute, Strategic Arms Control and West European Interests (Berlin, 1978): G
Philip Hughes. "Cutting the Gordian Knot: A Theatre-Nuclear Force for
Deterrence in Europe," Orbis, Summer, 1978, pp. 309-332: J. J. Martin.
"Nuclear Weapons in NATO's Nuclear Strategy, ibid., Winter 1979, pp.
875-896. Pierre Gallois, "La Defense de 'Europe Face au Pacte de Varso-
wie." Le Monde des Conflits Nov.-Dec. 1978.
6. Bertram makes this point and also discusses the difficulties raised by
this new procedure.
7. NATO, Press Service. Press Release M-DPC-1 (82) 24 "Financial and
Economic Data Relating to NATO Defense," December, 1982. The French
are actually proposing to keep defense expenditures at roughly 3.9 percent
of GNP. but spending priorities continue to favor nuclear forces with the
result that further conventional cutbacks are in the offing.
8. Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Western Europe, 6 December
1982, p. KI1 7 December 1982, p. K2; 9 December 1982. pp K1-K4: and 13
December 1982, pp. K1-K2.
9 NATO Press Release.
10. This estimate derives from a recent review of NATO opinion found in
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Challenges for U.S. National
Security, (Washington. D.C., 1981), II. pp. 53-98
11 For general overviews of European-American relations that focus on
structural differences, see Josef Joffee, "European-American Relations
The Enduring Crisis," ForeignAffairs.Spring 1981. pp 835-851: EdwardA.
Kolodziej. "Europe: The Partial Partner," International Security. Winter
1980-81, pp. 104-131: Simon Serfaty, "The United States and Europe " The
Washington Quarterly. Winter 1981, pp. 70-86. and more recently Eliot A
Cohen. "The Long-Term Crisis of the Alliance," Foreign Affairs, Winter
1982-83, pp. 325-343.
For general discussions of European-American differences over mil-
itary policy, including strategic and arms control policies, see Colin Gray,
"SALT II and the NATO Alliance," InternationalSecurity Review. Summer
1979, pp. 178-206: Walter Hahn, 'Does NATO Have a Future." ibid.. Summer
1980, pp. 151-172: Franqois de Rose, "The Future of SALT and Western
Security in Europe," Foreign Affairs. Summer 1979, pp 1065-1074. Pierre
Lellouche, "Europe and Her Defense." ibid. Spring 1981, pp 813-834 and
Christopher J. Makis, "Bringing in the Allies," Foreign Policy. Summer 1979
pp. 91-108.
12 See US, Cong., House Committee on Foreign Relations. Interim Report
on Nuclear Weapons in Europe (Washington: GPO. 1981), pp 27-38, des-
cribes Germany's reaction to the Reagan administration'smanagement of
the LRTNF decision.
13. Committee on Foreign Relations, Modernizaton, pp. 26-27
14. Morton Halperin reminds us of these concerns although his anaysib of
LRTNF tends to wish away the problem far more than is warranted by the
Soviet build up. Morton Halperin, "NATO and the TNF Controversy

367
Endnotes

Threats to the Alliance," Orbis, Spring, 1982, pp. 105-116.

15. For a general critique, see Patrick Morgan, Deterrence (Beverly Hills,
Calif.: Sage, 1977). Recent works of note that strive to place deterrence
theory on an empirical foundation include, inter alia., Alexander George
and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and
Practice (New York: Columbia University, 1974); Glenn H. Snyder and Paul
Diesing, Conflict Among Nations (Princeton: Princeton University, 1977);
and Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hop-
kins, 1981).
16. See Graham Allison's study of the Cuban missile case. Essence of
Decision (Boston: Little, Brown. 1971).
For suggestive pre-World War studies, see Ned Lebow, and Diesing and
Snyder cited in 15 above, and George Quester, Deterrence before Hiro-
shima (New York: John Wiley, 1966)
17. See, for example. Robert Jervis, Perceptionand Misperception in Inter-
national Relations (Princeton: Princeton University. 1976) and Alexander L.
George. PresidentialDecisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use
of Information and Advice (Boulder. Colorado: Westview, 1980).
18. The classical study remains Thomas Schelling's Strategy of Conflict.
(New York: Oxford University, 1963).
19. Allison, pp. 67-143, and Irving L. Janis, Groupthink (New York:
Houghton Mifflin. 2nd ed., 1982).
20. Ibid., and Morton H. Halperin, BureaucraticPolitics and ForeignPolicy
(Washington.: Brookings, 1974).
21. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Relations (New York: Addison-
Wesley, 1979).
22. The reluctance of NATO planners to confront domestic opponents in
dealing with modernization runs throughout the LRTNF debate. See Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations. Modernization, as well asthe later study, cited
above, Interim Report. Lawrence Freedman views the controversy engen-
dered over LRTNF as an opportunity to build public consensus for an
effective and credible deterrent. Lawrence Freedman, "Limited War, Unlim-
ited Protest," Orbis, Spring 1982, pp. 89-104.
23. The relevant literature on this question is vast and sprawling. Some
relevant analyses of varying persuasions about the status of conventional
forces in Europe include Robert Lucas Fischer, Defending the Central
Front: The Balance of Forces, Adelphi Paper No. 127 (London: Interna-
tional Institute of Strategic Studies, 1976): Carnegie Endowment, Chal-
lenges, pp. 53-98; Joshua Epstein, "On Conventional Deterrence in Europe:
Questions of Soviet Confidence," Orbis, Spring 1982 pp. 71-86; Steven
Canby, Rethinking the NATO Military Problem (Washington: Smithson-
ian Institution, 1978) and his "NATO Defense: The Problem Is Not More
Money,' in American Security Policy and Policy Making, Robert Harkavy
and Edward A. Kolodziej, eds. (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1980. pp.
21-44. Also of interest are two articles by John J. Mersheimer, "Maneuver,
Mobile Defense, and The NATO Central Front," International Security,

368
 Endnotes

Winter 1981-82, pp. 104-122 and "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in
Central Europe," ibid., Summer 1982, pp. 3-39: and Norbert Hannig. "The
Defense of Europe with Conventional Weapons," International Defense
Review. November 1981, pp. 1439-1443.
24. The problem of mobilization and reinforcement is likely to be more
political than military. See Richard K. Betts, "Surprise Attack: NATO's
Political Vulnerability." InternationalSecurity, Spring 1981, pp. 117-149.
25. Carnegie Endowment, Challenge pp. 53-98.
26. International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 1982-
1983 (London, 1982), pp. 132-133.
27. Ibid., p. 131. The foreword to a recent NATO assessment of its capabili-
ties essentially concurs: "The numerical balance of forces has moved
slowly but steadily in favor of the Warsaw Pact over the past two decades.
During this period the members of the North Atlantic Alliance have lost
much of the technological advantage which permitted NATO to rely on t'ie
view that quality could compensate for quantity. It is clear that the trend is
dangerous. Nevertheless the overall deterrent continues to safeguard
peace." NATO, NA TO and the Warsaw Pact (Brussels. 1982). It is usefu! to
note that neither French nor Spanish forces are counted in NATO's esti-
mates. The Soviet Union's assessment of the balance in Europe sharply
conflicts with the pessimistic assessment of IISS and NATO See Threat to
Europe (Moscow: Progress Publishers. 1981).
28. The role of PGMs is debated in Jonathan Alford, The Impact of New
Military Technology (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies,
1981).
29. French strategic doctrine since the middle 1970s has shifted from a
deterrent posture narrowly based on the protection of national frontiers to
one of extended deterrence that at a conventional level envisions increased
cooperation with allied forces, either bilaterally, as with Germany, or multi-
laterally, with NATO. See the author's "French Security Policy: Decisions
and Dilemmas," Armed Forces and Society. Winter 1982. pp. 185-222
French planning for the 1980s foresees cutbacks of up to 30,000 in conven-
tional forces. While these reductions are serious, the political conditions
favoring increased French-European or French-NATO cooperation have
not been greater since the inception of the Fifth Republic although the
French commitment to an independent nuclear force remain strong. See
note 8.
30. A recent controversial study conducted by b~rigadier General Christian
Krause for the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation, reported to be closely
associated with the Social Democratic Party, is even doubtful about the
need for a NATO conventional or nuclear buildup. Washington Times, 16
August 1982, p. 6. See note 23 above.
31. See the incisive critique of NA TO and the Warsaw Pact by Anthony H
Cordesman, "NATO's Estimate of the Balance: The Meaning for US Secur-
ity Policy." Armed Forces Journal International, August. 1982. pp. 48-68.
32. Karl Kaiser et al., "Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace: A

369
Endnotes

German Response to No First Use." Foreign Affairs. Summer 1982, pp.

1157-1170 and commentary, pp. 1171-1180.
33. The reopening of the debate over "no first use" was launched by the
lead article in the Summer 1982 issue of Foreign Affairs by the so-called
"gang of four." See McGeorge Bundy "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic
Alliance." Ibid., pp. Spring 1982, pp. 753-768.
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 7 October 1982, p. K2.

35. On this point, illustrative are the remarks of President FranQois Mitte-
rand. New York Times, 3 January 1983.
36. Bertram, note 5. John Newhouse, ColdDawn(New York: Holt Rinehard
and Winston, 1973)
37. The argument favoring an integration of strategic and theater nuclear
arms is not new: it is merely ignored. See Laurence Freedman, "The
Dilemma of Theatre Nuclear Arms Control." Survival, January-February
1981, pp. 2-10.
38. See, for example, Theodor H. Winkler, Arms Control and the Politics of
European Security, Adelphi Paper No. 177 (London: International Institute
for Strategic Studies, 1982).
39. See Schmidt speech note 2.
40 Franqois de Rose, "Updating Deterrence in Europe: Inflexible
Response?" Survival, January-February 1982, pp. 19-23. See also the
related exchange between Henry Kissinger and McGeorge Bundy on deter-
rence in Survival, November-December 1979.
41. Anthony H. Cordesman, American Strategic Forces and Extended
Deterrence, Adelphi Papers No. 175 (London: International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1982), pp. 35-36. Also Gallois. note 5.
42. Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough?Shaping
the Defense Program, 1961-69 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 207.
Very helpful, too, are the two Adelphi Papers by Geoffrey Kemp. These
discuss at length the nuclear capabilities needed by medium powers to
reach MAD levels: Nuclear Forces for Medium Powers, PartI: Targets and
Weapon Systems, Adelphi Paper No. 106 and Parts II and /ll: Strategic
Requirements and Options. Adelphi Paper No. 107.
43. Kevin N. Lewis, "The Prompt and Delayed Effects of Nuclear War."
Scientific American, July 1979, pp. 35-47. The Lewis analysis supports the
view of those who argue that MAD in one or the other of its various forms is
the only possible basis on which to build nuclear planning. A war-winning
strategy is ruled out by this line of reasoning. See Spurgeon Keeny Jr. and
Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, "The Mutual Hostage Relationship of the Super-
powers," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1981-1982, pp. 287-304. Robert Jervis
develops a similar argument in "Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter,"
Political Science Quarterly, Winter 1979-1980, pp. 617-633.
44. Cordesman, p. 44.
45. See Cordesman for analyses and calculations.
46. Ibid., p. 48.

370
 Endnotes

47. Ibid., p. 29.

48. New York Times, 19 January 1983. The dismissal of Eugene Rostow as
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the principal
negotiator for mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe was not
reassuring to European advocation of a compromise on LRTNF with the
Soviet Union.
49. Treverton, Adelphi Paper No. 168 and Lawrence Freedman, "NATO
Myths," Foreign Policy Winter 1981-82, pp. 48-68.

371
Endnotes

CHAPTER 6

Simes, "Assessing Soviet National Security Strategy"

1. Robert G. Kaiser, Russia: The People and the Power (New York: 1976)
pp. xiv-xv.
2. Interview with Vadim Zagladin by Budapest Domestic Television Ser-
vice, 16 September 1982, as reported by Foreign Broadcast Information
Service Daily Report on the Soviet Union, 17 September 1982.
3. Cf., F. Stephen Larrabee and Dim itri K. Simes, "The Broader Perils of the
'Pipeline War' with Europe," Washington Post, 26 September 1982.
4. Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of
Forces," Problems of Communism, May-June 1980, p. 1.
5. Harry Gelman, The Politburo's Management of its American Problem
(Santa Monica: Rand, April 1981), p. 5.
6, Norman Podhoretz, The Present Danger (New York: Simon and Schus-
ter, 1979).
7. Pravda, 14 March 1969.
8. Voprosy Istorii KPSS, May 1974, p. 6.
9. Kommunist, No, 11, 1978, p. 81.

Pfaltzgraff, "US Strategy for National Security"

1. See, for example, Nicolas J. Spykman, America's Strategy in World

Politics. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1942.
2. George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs,
July 1947, pp. 575-576.
3. For an extended examination of containment and NSC-68, see John
Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A CriticalAppraisal of Postwar
American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press.
1982), esp, pp. 89-99.
4. For an extended treatment of this theme, see Colin S, Gray, The Geopolit-
ics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland,Rimlands and the TechnologicalRevolu-
tion (New York: Crane Russak & Co., Inc., for the National Strategy Infor-
mation Center, 1977).
5. See Robert E. Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1962), esp. Chapter 2.
6. For contrasting approaches to US global strategy, see Jeffrey Record
and Robert J. Hanks, US Strategy at the Crossroads: Two Views, Foreign
Policy Report, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1982; and Robert W.
Komer "Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defence," Foreign Affairs, Summer
1982.
7. NA TO: Can the Alliance be Saved? Report of Senator Sam Nunn to the
"Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 13 May 1982.
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982, p. 4.

372
 Endnotes
8. Richard Halloran, "Pentagon
Draws Up First Strategy for Fighting
Long Nuclear War," New York a
Times, 30 May 1982, p. 1.
9. Speech by President Reagan
in London on 8 June 1982. Washington
Post, 9 June 1982, p. A-11.
10. The InternationalSecurity
Dimensionsof Space,A Conference
International Security Studies Report.
Program, The Fletcher School
Diplomacy, Tufts University, 26-28 of Law and
April 1982. Published bytheInstitute
Foreign Policy Analysis, 1982. for

373
 Endnotes

CHAPTER 7

Barrett, "Impediments to Defense Reorganization"

1. 128 Cong. Rec. H 5948 (16 August 1982) (Remarks of Representative

Richard C. White).
2. Hearings before the House Armed Services Investigations Subcommit-
tee on Joint Chiefs of Staff Reogranization. 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., in
publication.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Paul R. Ignatius, Department of Defense Reorganization Study Project.
DepartmentalHeadquartersStudy, A Report to the Secretary of Defense, 1
June 1978: Richard C. Steadman, Report to the Secretary of Defense on the
National Military Command Structure (Washington, DC: US Government
Printing Office, 1978): Donald B. Rice. Defense Resource Management
Study. Final Report (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office,
1979): Theodore Antonelli, Report to the Secretary of Defense of the
Defense Agency Review, March 1979; Donald E. Rosenblum, Combat
Effective Training Management Study, prepared for the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics, July 1979.
6. Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter. "The Bureaucratic Perspective: A
Preliminary Framework," in Readings in American Foreign Policy: A
BureaucraticPerspective, ed. Halperin and Kanter (Boston: Little. Brown
and Company (Inc.) 1973), pp. 3-5, 9-10.
7. Carl Joachim Friedrich, Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory
of Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963). p. 132.
8. Halperin and Kanter, "Bureaucratic Perspective," pp. 10-11.
9. US, Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical
Office, The Department of Defense, Documents on Establishment and
"Organization,1944-1978, "Department of Defense Reorganization Act of
1958-6 August 1958 (72 Stat. 514)" (Washington, DC: US Government
Printing Office, 1978), p. 208.
10. Halperin and Kanter, "Bureaucratic Perspective," p. 5.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., pp. 8-12.
13. Morton H. Halperin, "The Role of the Military in the Formation and
Execution of National Security Policy," University Programs Modular Stu-
dies (Morristown, New Jersey:1 General Learning Press, 1974). p. 5.
14. Perry McCoy Smith, Air .1 Force Plans for Peace. 1943-1945 (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University ) Press, 1970). p. 19.
15. Smith, Air Force 6Plans for Peace.
,1
16. SamuelPress,
P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New York: Columbia
: University rs 1961), p. 151.
st
17. Halperin, "Role of the Military," pp. 11-12.
ie

374

i
 Endnotes

18. See, for example, President Truman's message to Congress, 19

December 1945, reproduced in US, Department of Defense Historical
Office, Documents, pp. 7-17. See especially p. 13.
19. John C, Ries, The Management of Defense: Organizationand Control
of the US Armed Services (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964). pp. 211,
12.
20. Richard C. Steadman, Report to the Secretary of Defense on the
National Military Command Structure (Washington, DC: US Government
Printing Office, 1978), p. 33.
21. 107 Cong. Rec. 1831 (9 February 1961) (Remarks of SenatorSymington
followed by Report to Senator Kennedy from Committee on the Defense
Establishment).
22. Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, Report to the Presidentand Secretary of
Defense on the Departmentof Defense (Washington, DC: US Government
Printing Office, 1970).
23. Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1961). pp. 384-85.
24. John C. Ries, The Management of Defense: Organizationand Control
of the US Armed Services (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964). p. 208.
25. 128 Cong. Rec. H 5948 (16 August 1982) (Remarks of Representative
Richard C. White).
26. Max Weber, From Max Weber, trans. and ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright
Mills (New York: Galaxy, Oxford University Press, 1958). pp. 196-252.
27. See, for example, the works authored by Morton Halperin and Arnold
Kanter cited in Part II endnotes. Also see: Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual
Models and The Cuban Missile Crisis:' in Readings in American Foreign
Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective, ed., Morton H. Halperin and Arnold
Kanter (Boston: Little, Brown and Company (Inc.), 1973), pp. 45-84. Hugh
Heclo, A Government of Strangers: Executive Polit,cs in Washington
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1977).
28. William A. Lucas and Raymond H. Dawson, The OrganizationalPolitics
of Defense (Pittsburgh:InternationalStudies Association, University Cen-
ter for International Studies. University of Pittsburgh, 1974), p. 19.
29. James Madison, "The Federalist No, 10," in The Federalist by Alex-
ander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison (New York: Modern Library.
Random House, n.d.), pp. 53-62.
30. John C. Ries, The Management of Defense: Organizationand Control
of the Armed Services (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), p. 200.
31. Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 110-111.
32. Madison. "Federalist 10," pp. 54-56.
33. David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc., 1962), pp. 506-516.
34. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: Macmillan Pub-
lishing Co., Inc., 1976), p. 246.

375
 Biographical Notes

CONFERENCE COSPONSORS

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN S. PUSTAY, US Air Force, President,

National Defense University, He formerly was Assistant to the Chairman,
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Pustay commanded the
Keesler, MS. Technical Training Center after high level assignments in
Headquarters, US Air Force, and a tour as executive assistant to the Secre-
tary of the Air Force. General Pustay also served in Belgium with the
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe. He was an Associate Pro-
fessor of Political Science at the Air Force Academy and as a White House
fellow assisted Secretary of State Rusk. A graduate of the US Naval
Academy, he holds a master's degree from San Francisco State College and
a Ph.D. degree from the University of Denver. General Pustay has fre-
quently published in professional journals and his book on Counterinsur-
gency Warfare was one of the first works on this subject in English. He is a
1970 graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

HONORABLE FRANCIS J. WEST, JR., Assistant Secretary of Defense for

International Security Affairs, From 1976 until assuming his current posi-
tion, Secretary West was Dean of Advanced Research and Director, Stra-
tegic Research Center for Advanced Research, at the Naval War College.
Secretary West has also been a Professor of Management at the Naval War
College and an analyst with the Rand Corporation. He has served as
Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for Systems
Analysis. Secretary West is a former Marine Corps officer with service in
Vietnam. He is the author of Sea Plan 2000, a naval force planning study.
among numerous other publications. Secretary West earned his B.A.
degree in history from Georgetown University and his M.A. degree in public
affairs from Princeton University.

DISTINGUISHED GUEST

HONORABLE HAROLD L. BROWN, Distinguished Visiting Professor of

National Security Affairs, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International
Studies, Washington, D.C. Before he joined Johns Hopkins, Dr. Brown was
Secretary of Defense from January 1977 to January 1981. He previously
was President, California Institute of Technology, Secretary of the Air
Force, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, and member of the
US Delegation, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). A former research
scientist at Columbia University and the University of California, Berkeley.
Dr. Brown was the director of the E.O. Lawrence Radiation Laboratory,

377
Biographical Notes

California. A phi beta kappa graduate of Columbia University, Dr. Brown

also received his doctorate in physics there in 1949.

CONFERENCE ORGANIZER

COLONEL FRANKLIN D. MARGIOTTA, US Air Force, Director of

Research, National Defense University (NDU), Director of the National
Security Affairs Institute, and Publisher, NDU Press. He formerly served as
Dean of Curriculum and Research Professor at the Air University, and has
extensive operational experience as a B-52 aircraft commander, Strategic
Air Command. Colonel Margiotta received a doctoral degree in political
science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has edited and
contributed to two books, The Changing World of the American Military
and Evolving StrategicRealities: Implications for US Policymakers. He also
has authored several chapters and journal articles in other publications.

CONFERENCE COORDINATION

MR. JOHN PHILIP MERRILL, Director, Policy Research and Special Assist-
ant for Long-Range Planning, Department of Defense (DOD). Mr. Merrill
was graduated from the University of California, with a B.A. (honors) and
M.A. (high honors) in marxist economic history. He was a graduate in
materiel management from the Air Force Institute of Technology and took
postgraduate foreign language study at Wright State University. Prior to his
current assignment Mr. Merrill coordinated analytical support for various
DOD components including the Assistant Secretary for International
Security Affairs and the Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Planning. He
previously served as a delegate to US-Soviet conventional arms control
negotiations and as the first civilian appointee to the professional staff of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Plans and Policy Group. A recipient of numerous
commendations from the Departments of State and Defense, Mr. Merrill is a
frequent guest lecturer at US and foreign universities.

EDITOR

LIEUTENANT COLONEL TERRY L. HEYNS, US Air Force, the editor of

UnderstandingU.S. Strategy, is the Associate Professor of Research at the
Research Directorate of the National Defense University. He received an
A.B. from Saint Louis University an! an M.A. from the University of Kansas,
with postgraduate study at the University of Kansas and the University of
Texas at Austin. He is also a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and
the National War College. LTC Heyns' active duty assignments include
service in Southeast Asia and Europe.

378
 Biographical Notes

CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

COLONEL DON L. ANDERSON, US Air Force, Deputy Commandant,

Armed Forces Staff College, National Defense University, Norfolk. Colonel
Anderson has received an MA.S. in political science from George
Washington University and a D.P.A. in public administration from Nova
University in Florida. He has served in theUS Air Force asVice Commander
(5th AF): Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters, Allied
Forces NATO North Region, Deputy Chief and Chief, Aerospace Vehicles
Branch, Military Assistant and Assistant for Military Applications, USAF
Headquarters; and Assistant Deputy Commander for Operations, 8th Tacti-
cal Fighter Wing, Thailand. Colonel Anderson attended the Air Command
and Staff College and the National War College.

MR NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE, President, Martin Marietta Denver Aero-

space. He is also Chairman of the Defense Science Board. Mr. Augustine
graduated from Princeton University receiving B.S.E. and M.S.E. degrees in
aeronautical engineering. He has served as Under Secretary of the Army,
Assistant Secretary of theArmy (Research and Development): is President-
elect of American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics; and Chairman
of Aeronautics Panel, Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. He is the author
of "Augustine's Laws" and a book on defense management.

MR. JOHN A. BAKER, Department of State, Faculty, National War College.

National Defense University. A graduate of Yale University, Mr. Baker
attended the University of Geneva Institut des Hautes Etudes, the US Army
Russian Language Area course in Oberammergau, and American Univer-
sity. He was in the Fellow's program at the Harvard University Center for
International Affairs. Mr. Baker was a State Department Special Advisor to
the US Delegation, U.N. General Assembly. Other assignments in the State
Department include Deputy Assistant Secretary for Current Analysis.
Bureau of Intelligence and Research: and Director, Bureau of Refugee
Affairs. He was US Representative to the U.N. Organization for Food and
Agriculture and Minister-Consular, American Embassy in Rome. He also
served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political and Multilateral Affairs
and as Director, Office of U.N. Political Affairs, for the Bureau of Interna-
tional Organization, Department of State. Among his publications is "Soviet
Policy in the Middle East," Harvard Paper (1968).

DR. ARCHIE D. BARRETT, Professional Staff Member, US House of Repre-

sentatives Committee on Armed Services. He has a B.S. degree from the US
Military Academy, West Point, and M.P.A. and Ph.D. degrees from Harvard
University specializing in political economy and government. A retired Air
Force officer, he was formerly a Senior Research Fellow, National Defense
University. Before joining the University, Dr. Barrett was the military staff
assistant to the Executive Secretary of the Defense Organization Study (the

379

rb
Biographical Notes

Defense Department portion of the President's Reorganization Project). He

has extensive experience in NATO general defense, nuclear and logistics
plans and policies: Air Staff long-range planning, concept and doctrine
development: and flight operations, strategic and tactical. Dr. Barrett's
publications include Reappraising Defense Organization (forthcoming.
National Defense University Press) and "Department of Defense Organiza-
tion: Planning for Planning," in Planning U.S. Security (1981).

MR. JAMES A. BARRY, Division Chief, Office of Soviet Analysis, Central

Intelligence Agency. A graduate of Georgetown University. Mr. Barry
served as an officer in the US Navy. He later received his M.A. in interna-
tional affairs from George Washington University, and has since served at
the Central Intelligence Agency in a number of analytical, staff, and man-
agement positions.

BRIGADIER GENERAL CARL N. BEER, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff/Plans

for Space Command and Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff/Plans for North
American Aerospace Defense Command. General Beer was graduated
magna cum laude from the University of Oklahoma and later completed his
Ph.D. there in operations research. He is a distinguished graduate of the
Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University. His
service in the US Air Force includes assignments flying fighter-interceptor
aircraft for Air Defense Command, developing base support capability for
F-4/RF-4 aircraft in Southeast Asia, instructing F-4 combat crews at Davis-
Monthan AFB, and flying combat missions from Thailand. He served as
Deputy Department Head at USAF Academy and then as Chief, Fighter
Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, Studies and Analyses, Headquarters US
Air Force. His next assignment was as Executive Assistant to the Special
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

DR. RAYMOND E. BELL, JR., Deputy Director, WarGaming and Simulation

Center, National Defense University. Dr. Bell was graduated from the
United States Military Academy with a bachelor of science degree and
received a master of arts in German culture from Middleburv College and a
Ph.D. in Austrian military labor history from New York University.

JAMES R. BLAKER, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Policy Analy-

sis), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. Dr. Blaker was the Senior
Analyst, US Army Threat Analysis Group and Senior Analyst and Director
of the Southeast Asian Division, OSD (Systems Analysis). Previously Dr.
Blaker was Deputy Assistant Director for National Security ai d Interna-
tional Affairs, Congressional Budget Office and Deputy Under Secretary of
the Air Force for International Affairs (1981-1982). A graduate of the Univer-
sity of Michigan he holds a Ph.D. degree from Ohio State University. In
addition, Dr. Blaker was also a visiting lecturer in Western Philosophy at the

380
 Biographical Notes

University of the Philippines and taught US national politics and govern-

ment at Ohio State University.

DR. JAMES BROWN, Professor of Political Science. Southern Methodist

University. Dr. Brown earned his Ph.D. in civil-military politics from the
State University of New York at Buffalo. Previously he was Professor of
National Security Affairs, Air University, and a member of the US Delega-
tion attending the Wehrkunde Conference, Munich, Germany, 1982. His
articles and books include "Turkey: A Policy in Flux," in Current History
(January 1982); "The Armed Forces of Greece," in Brassey's Defense
Yearbook (1982); Military Ethics and Professionalism (coauthor Michael
Collins, 1981); and "Challenges and Uncertainty: NATO's Southern
Flank," in Air University Review (1980).
COLONEL MATTHEW P. CAULFIELD, USMC, Military Fellow, Council on
Foreign Relations. Colonel Caulfield, in addition to serving in numerous
command and staff positions as a Marine Corps Infantry Officer, has been
the Head, Strategic Initiatives Branch, Headquarters US Marine Corps and
is a gradute, Royal College of Defense Studies. London. He has a B.S.
degree from Fordham University, an M.S. in government from George
Washington University, and an M.B.A. from Harvard University.

DR. CHARLES W. COOK, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Space Plans and

Policy, US Air Force. Dr. Cook received his B.A. degree in mathematics
from the University of South Dakota and his M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in
nuclear physics from the California Institute of Technology. He was pre-
viously appointed Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space
Systems and Assistant Director, Defensive Systems. Defense Research
and Engineering, Office of the Secretary of Defense. His other assign-
ments were with the Central Intelligence Agency, North American Avia-
tion, ARPA and Institite for Defense Analyses and General Dynamics
Corporation. He has been honored with the Secretary of Defense Merito-
rious Civilian Service and Distinguished Service awards and the Air Force
Exceptional Civilian Service award. His publications include book chap-
ters and journal articles on nuclear physics.

DR. ROBERT S. COOPER, Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects

Agency. Dr. Cooper graduated with Distinction from the University of Iowa
and received his master's in electrical engineering from Ohio State Univer-
sity and his doctorate of science in electrical engineering from the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology (M.I.T.). His previous positions includes
Vice President of Engineering, Satellite Business Systems: Director, NASA-
Goddard Space Flight Center; Assistant Director of Defense Research and
Engineering, Department of Defense; and Staff Member, Group Leader.
and Division Director at M.I.T. Lincoln Laboratory. He was an Ohio State
University Westinghouse Fellow and an M.I.T. Ford Foundation Post-
Doctoral Fellow.

381
Biographical Notes

COLONEL HAROLD S. COYLE, JR., USAF. Deputy Director for Doctrine,

Strategy, and Plans Integration, Directorate of Plans, DCS/P&O, Head-
quarters US Air Force. A graduate of the US Naval Academy specializing in
engineering, Colonel Coyle went on to Purdue University where he com-
pleted an M.S. in indL strial management and a Ph.D in industrial relations
His assignments include Chief, Strategic Arms Limitation Office, Directo-
rate of Plans. Hedquarters USAF: Senior Military Assistant to the Under
Secretary of Defense/Policy; Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, Deputy Director, Office of Space Systems, Office of the Secretary
of the Air Force: and Associate Professor, USAF Academy.

MR. ROGER E. CUBBY, Chief, European Issues Division, Office of Euro-

pean Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency. A graduate of Harvard Univer-
sity. Mr. Cubby earned his M.A. in political science at the University of
Wisconsin at Madison. He has served in US Army Intelligence. at the City
University of New York: and in various analytical, management, and staff
positions at the Central Intelligence Agency.

COLONEL RICHARD J. DALESKI, US Air Force, Special Assistant to the

President, National Defense University. Colonel Daleski was formerly Vice
Dean of Faculty, National War College. While serving with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, he participated in the Defense Organization Study
Colonel D _ileski also served with the Headquarters Staff of the US Air Force
as Chief of Plans and Policy. He was a Federal Executive Fellow at the
Brookings Institution and taught at the US Air Force Academy. A graduate
of the US Military Academy, Colonel Daleski earned a master's degree in
public administration at Princeton University and a doctoral degree in
comparabive and international politics at the University of Denver. Among
his pubi.cations are Defense Management in the 1980s: The Rohl of the
Service Secretaries (1980); "Political Development and Democracy." in
National Security Forum (1975); and "Improving Resource Management in
the Officer Personnel System," in Interservice Defense Conference Pro-
ceedings (1973).

DR. VI.NCENT DAVIS, Director and Patterson Chair Professor. Patterson

School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, University of Kentucky
He received his B.A. from Vanderbilt University, his M.P.A in International
Politics and Economics, M.A. in - 2reign Policy, and Ph.D. in DefensePolicy
from Princeton University. Since being on the faculties of Princeton Univer-
sity. Dartmouth College, and the Graduate School of International Studies
of the University of Denver, Dr. Davis has been Visiting Research Professor
at Princeton and Nimitz Chair Professor of the International Studies Asso-
ciation, ,ember of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, member
of the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, as well as
various other professional societies. His publications include The Post-
Imperal Presdency(1970); Kissinger and BureaucraticPolitics (1979). The

382
 Biographical Notes

Politics of Innovation (1967): The Admirals Lobby (1967); and Postwar

Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy (1966).

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES H. DIXON, US Army, Faculty, National

War College, National Defense University. He received his bachelor's and
master's degrees from Auburn University. He also earned an M.A. in politi-
cal science and a Ph.D. in international relations from the University of
North Carolina. Colonel Dixon is a graduate of the Air Command and Staff
College and has served on the faculty at the US Military Academy at West
Point. He was a flight instructor at the US Primary Helicopter School and
was assigned to the Office of Personnel Operations, Department of the
Army, Washington. Among his publications are American National Secur-
ity: Policy and Process (coauthor, 1981); and "A Structural-Functional
Mathematical Model for Analyzing Protracted Social Conflict," in Interna-
tional Interactions (1981).

DR. THOMAS H. ETZOLD, Assistant Director, Strategic Studies. Center for

Naval Warfare Studies. Dr. Etzold received his A.B. and M.A. degrees from
Indiana University and an M.Phil. and a Ph.D. in history from Yale Univer-
sity. He was Professor of Strategy at the Naval War College. His publica-
tions include Defense or Delusion?America's Military in the 1980s (1982)
and Containment:Documents on American Policy andStrategy. 1945-1950
(1978).

DR. WILLIAM H. EVERS, JR., Vice President for Government Programs. W.

J. Schafer Associates, Inc. Dr. Evers earned his bachelor and master
degrees in aeronautics and astronautics from Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and his Ph.D. in aerospace engineering (plasma physics) from
Cornell University. A nationally recognized expert in high energy laser
technology and applications, Dr. Evers has served as Chairman of the Laser
Device Panel of the Defense Department's High Energy Laser Review
Group. He earlier was the Technical Advisor and Chief of the Applied
Technology Division for the Army High Energy Laser Systems Protect
Office of the Army Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. Dr
Evers has authored several papers and reports on high energy lasers.
plasma physics, and rocket engine combustion stability.

DR. NORMAN FRIEDMAN, Deputy Director for National Security Studies,

Hudson Institute. He received his A.B. and Ph.D. degrees in physics from
Columbia College and Columbia University, respectively. His areas of
specialty at the Husdon Institute include military, naval, and tactical-
technological studies; US-Soviet nuclear strategy; industrial mobilization;
and Soviet tactical style for naval and land force. His recent publications
include Naval Radar,CarrierAir Power. Modern Warship Design and Devel-
opment, and US Destroyers: An IllustratedDesign History (forthcoming).
Among his journal articles are "The Soviet Mobilization Base." in Air Force

383
Biographical Notes

Magazine (1979): "C3 War at Sea," in Naval Review 1977: and "The Soviet
Bomber Force: Two 'Revolutions' in Warfare."

COLONEL SAMUEL B. GARDINER. USAF, Faculty, Department of Military

Strategy, National War College. He received a B.B.A. in management from
the University of Wisconsin, an M.B.A. from California State University, and
a M.S. in international affairs from George Washington University. Prior to
his present assignment, Colonel Gardiner was the Deputy Director for
Resources, Directorate of Programs, Headquarters US Air Force: pre-
viously he was Executive Officer to the Deputy Chief of Staff Plans and
Operations, SHAPE, Belgium.

CONGRESSMAN NEWT L. GINGRICH, Member of Congress, Republican.

Georgia, Sixth District. A history graduate of Emory University, Congress-
man Gingrich went on to earn his M.A. and Ph.D. in modern European
history from Tulane University. He was a Professor of History at West
Georgia College, Carrollton, Georgia. Among his publications are "The
Other Side of the Hill," in Defense Science (Vol. 1, No. 2, 1982); "Think Now.
Buy Later," in Washington Post (April 12, 1982): and "Advances Through
Simulation," in Military Electronics (November 1981).

ALEX GLIKSMAN, Professional Staff Member, US Senate, Committee on

Foreign Relations, is a specialist in arms control and international security
issues. He has worked as a defense policy consultant and was a frequent
contributor to the press, defense and foreign pclicy journals and other
media in the areas of strategic and regional arms control, US-European
relations, and NATO and European nuclear issues. He has taught on the
graduate faculty of the University of Southern California, School of Interna-
tional Relations, and at the University of Maryland. Alex Gliksman earned a
B.A. in politics at New York University, held a study grant at the University
of Vienna, and pursued doctoral studies in international relations at the
University College London.

GENERAL ANDREW J. GOODPASTER, US Army (Ret.) General Goodpas-

ter was Superintendent of the US Military Academy at West Point and
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. He also served in Vietnam as
Deputy Commander. In his early years, General Goodpaster served as Staff
Secretary to President Eisenhower and, during World War II, commanded
an engineering battalion in Italy. He earned his master's degree and docto-
rate in international relations from Princeton University and has published
For the Common Defense (1976).

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DANIEL 0. GRAHAM, USA (Ret.), Director, High

Frontier, Inc. A graduate of the US Military Academy, West Point, Lieuten-

384
 Biographical Notes

ant General Graham has served adistinguished military career in Germany,

Korea, Vietnam, and Washington including Director of the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency. Other appointments since retirement from the US Army
include staff of American Security Council and Co-Chairman, Coalition for
Peace through Strength: advisor to Ronald Reagan in 1976 and 1980 cam-
paigns: and Research Professor, University of Miami. His publications
include High Frontier:A New National Strategy (1982). Shall America Be
Defended. SALT I/ and Beyond (1980), and New Strategy for the West
(1976)

DR. COLIN S. GRAY, President, National Institute for Public Policy. He has
a B.A. degree with honors in government (economics) from Manchester
University and a D.Phil. in international politics from Oxford University. He
is a member of the General Advisory Committee of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, He was formerly Director, National Security Studies,
Hudson Institute, and Assistant Director, International Institute for Stra-
tegic Studies. In 1982 he has published Strategic Studies andPublicPolicy.
The American Experience and Strategic Studies: A CriticalAssessment,

MR. WILLIAM H. GREGORY, Editor-in-Chief, Aviation Week & Space

Technology magazine. Following a tour as a Naval Aviator Mr. Gregory was
graduated from Creighton University with a bachelor of science in journal-
ism. Mr. Gregory joined the staff of Aviation Week & Space Technology
where he became Managing and then Executive Editor. He has published
numerous articles and editorials in Aviation Week & Space Technology on
military and commercial aerospace subjects.

MR. STEPHEN J. HADLEY, Partner, Shea & Gardner (attorneys). A gradu-

tae of Cornell University with a B.A. in government, Mr. Hadley earned a
JD. degree from Yale Law School. Before joining Shea & Gardner he
served as Consultant to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee. as a
member of the National Security Council Staff, and as Program Analyst for
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

MR. STEPHEN R. HANMER, JR., Acting Director, Theater Nuclear Policy.

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy).
He was graduated from the Virginia Military Institute with a B.S. in physics,
and received M.S. degrees in mechanical and aerospace engineering from
the University of Southern California. A retired US Army Colonel, Mr.
Hanmer has also been US Representative to the NATO Nuclear Planning
Group Staff, and Associate Professor for Fluid Mechanics, US Military
Academy.

DR. ALBERT S. HANSER, Professor of History, West Georgia College.

Carrollton, Georgia. Dr. Hanser received his A.B. in history from Wayne
State University and his M.A. and Ph.D. in history from the University of
Chicago. Prior to joining West Georgia's faculty he was on the faculties of

385
Biographical Notes

Illinois State and Vanderbilt universities. He has been a Senior Research

Associate at the National Defense University. Dr. Hanser served as Con-
gressman Gingrich's primary adviser in defense matters and was a consul-
tant to Training and Doctrine Command. US Army.

MR. ANTHONY HARRIGAN, President, United States Industrial Council

Mr. Harrigan has authored eight books on foreign policy and national
issues in addition to coauthoring "The Indian Ocean and the Threat to the
West." He has been a contributor to defense journals in the United States.
Canada, England. France, and Germany. He has been twice a recipient of
the "Military Review" award for military writing. He also is an occasional
lecturer at leading universities and has taken overseas assignments as a
correspondent in Vietnam, Cuba. Israel. South Africa, and other countries

MR. JOHN HAWES, Director, Office of European Political and Security

Affairs, Department of State. Mr. Hawes is a graduate of Princeton Univer-
sity in government and international affairs. He has served as Political
Advisor. US Mission to NATO in Brussels. on the US Delegation to the
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Negotiations in Vienna: and as
Director, Office of International Security Policy, Department of State

DR. WILLIS M. HAWKINS, Senior Advisor. Lockheed Corporation He

received his bachelor of science degree in aeronatucial engineering spe-
cializing in aerospace design and development, from the University of
Michigan and subsequently an honorary doctor of engineering from there
and an honorary doctor of science from Illinois College Dr. Hawkins'
previous position was President of the Lockheed California Company. He
has held numerous other positions in the Lockheed Corporation including
Director and Senior Vice President. Science and Engineering; and Vice
President and General Manager, Space Division. Lockheed Missiles and
Space Company. He was also appointed Assistant Secretary, US Army.
Research and Development. His publications include the Wright Brothers
Memorial Lecture (1982) and American Institute of Aeronautics and Astro-
nomics lecture (Littlewood, 1978 and Vonkarman, 1981).

MR. HANS HEYMANN, JR., National Intelligence Officer at Large. Central

Intelligence Agency. A graduate of Rutgers University, Mr. Heymann
earned a master's in international economic relations and a Russian Area
and Language Study Certificate from Columbia University. He has served
as Acting Naitonal Intelligence Officer for Western Europe and, most
recently, as Acting National Intelligence Officer for the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe. His other assignments include consultant to the Office of
Special Assistant to the President; Professorial Lecturer in Economics.
George Washington University; and Senior Economist, The RAND Corpo-
ration. Mr. Heymann is the author of numerous studies on Soviet econom-

386
 Biographical Notes

ics. US foreign aid, arms transfer, research and development policies, and
China's approach to acquisition of advanced technology.

MR. CHARLES HORNER, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Science

and Technology. He was granted a B.A. from University of Pennsylvania
and an M.A. from University of Chicago. He also attended the Stanford
University Language Center at National Taiwan University and Tokyo Uni-
versity. His previous positions include Deputy Representative to the U.N.
Conference on the Law of the Sea and Adjunct Professor and Research
Associate in the Landegger Program in International Busines Diplomacy at
the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. He also served in the
Senate as Senior Legislative Assistant, Office of Senator Daniel Moynihan
and Professional Staff Member, US Senate Subcommittee on Investiga-
tions and on National Security and International Operations. Previously he
was on the Research Staff of the RAND Corporation. He is a member of the
Committee on Fellows and Programs, Lehrman Institute. New York. He has
been a contributor to the Wall Street Journal.American Spectator. Com-
mentary. and Washington Quarterly.

MS. KAREN ELLIOTT HOUSE, Diplomatic Correspondent. Wall Street

Journal. Washington Bureau and Fellow. Institute of Politics, Harvard Uni-
versity. Ms. House earned a bachelor of journalism from the University of
Texas at Austin, She has been Washington Correspnodent for the Dallas
Morning News and was the 1979 recipient fo the Edward Weintal Award for
distinguished foreign policy reporting. Georgetown University School of
Foreign Service.

MR. WILLIAM N. HULETT, President. Stouffer Hotels. Mr. Hutlett holds a

bachelor's degree in business administration from the University of
Washington in Seattle. He was formerly Vice President, Westin Hotels. with
operating and development responsibilities in Hawaii and midwestern
United States.

DR. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, Clarence Dillon Professor of International

Affairs and Director of the Center for International Affairs. Harvard Univer-
sity. Dr. Huntington also served at Harvard as Chairman of the Department
of Government. At the White House, he was Coordinator of Security Plan-
ning for the National Security Council. Dr. Huntington founded and coe-
dited the quarterly journal Foreign Policy. He has served on the Council of
the American Political Science Association and as Chairman of the Defense
and Arms Control Study Group of the Democratic Advisory Council.
Among his numerous publications are American Politics: The Promise of
Disharmony: No Easy Choice: PoliticalParticipationin Developing Coun-
tries, The Crisis of Democracy: and Political Power: USA USSR. coau-
thored with Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski.

387
Biographical Notes

COLONEL C. POWELL HUTTON, USA, Chief, Strategic Plans and Policy

Division. Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Head-
quarters, Department of the Army. A graduate of the US Military Academy,
Colonel Hutton earned his BA. and M.A. degrees in philosophy, politics.
and economics from Oxford University. He was Rhodes Scholar at Balliol
College of Oxford University and later a Senior Army Fellow at the Center
for International Affairs of Harvard University, Colonel Hutton has served
as Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers (Europe); and in the Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army. He was a
student at the US Army War College and served in Armor and Cavalry units
in the United States. Korea. Vietnam, and Germany.

GENERAL DAVID C. JONES, US Air Force (Ret.), Former Chairman. Joint

Chiefs of Staff. Before being appointed Chairman of the JCS in 1978.
General Jones served four years as Chief of Staff, US Air Force. following
his command of US Air Forces Europe (USAFE) Among General Jones's
numerous command and staff assignments are combat tours in Korea and
Vietnam. In his many awards and decorations, General Jones counts the
Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Air Force Distinguished Service
Medal, and the Distinguished Flying Cross. A native of South Dakota.
General Jones was graduated from the National War College and was
awarded an honorary doctorate of humane letters from the University of
Nebraska. an honorary doctorate of laws from Louisiana Tech University.
and an honorary doctorate of humane letters from Minot State College

MR. PHILIP S. KAPLAN, Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff, Depart-

ment of State. Mr. Kaplan received his B.A. from the University of Connecti-
cut and his J.D. from the University of California. School of Law, Berkeley
A Foreign Service Officer, he was Director for Multilateral Policy and
Coordination, Bureau of International Organization Affairs. He served as a
member of the US Delegation to the Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced
Force Reductions in Vienna. with the American Embassy in Bonn. and with
the US Mission to the European Community in Brussels.

MR. PHILLIP A. KARBER, Director. Strategic Concepts Development Cen-

ter. Also he is currently an adjunct professor at the Georgetown Graduate
School. A former US Marine, Mr. Karber did his graduate work at George-
town University where he was a Fellow at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies. He previously has served as Vice President for
National Security Programs. BDM Corporation. McLean, Virginia. and a
National Security Congressional Aide to several ranking members of the
House and Senate; and as a television news reporter and news director of a
CBS affiliate in California. He also was on loan to the Office of theSecretary
of Defense for four years as Director of National Security Study Memoran-
dum 186 He is a member of the US Army Science Board and the European-

388
 Biographical Notes

America Arms Control Workshop. Mr. Karber has authored numerous

articles and contributed to seven books dealing with defense issues.

DR. CATHERINE McARDLE KELLEHER, Professor and Director of the

Defense Studies Program, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland
Dr. Kelleher is also Adjunct Professor of Military Strategy at the National
War College. She earned her Ph.D at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology. In addition to her government assignments she has served on the
faculties of Columbia University, the University of Illinois, the University of
Michigan, and the Graduate School of International Studies at the Univer-
sity of Denver. She has written numerous scholarly articles and books.
including Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons (1975), American
Arms and a Changing Europe (coauthor, 1975): and Political-MilitarySys-
tem (1974).

COLONEL THOMAS J. KENNEDY, JR., US Army. Senior Research Fellow,

National Defense University. A graduate of the University of Kansas,
Colonel Kennedy received a B.A. in international relations and an MA. in
Slavic studies there. A Military Intelligence Officer and Foreign Area Spe-
cialist for Eastern Europe, his other assignments have included operations.
policy and planning, and positions on both the Army General Staff and the
Joint Staff supporting the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

MR. NOEL C. KOCH, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for

International Security Affairs and Deputy Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs. Mr. Koch received the bachelor of arts degree in English at Widener
University and master of arts degree in international relations from Bryn
Mawr College. He served in the Reagan campaign as an advisoron interna-
tional policy and public affairs and in the Nixon and Ford administrations as
special assistant to the President on assignments such as the Apollo space
program, drug enforcement, defense and international affairs, and energy
policy develooment. His other appointments include Assistant to the Post-
master General, Special Counsel to the President's Advisory Committee on
Refugees, and member of Washington Regional Selection Panel for White
House Fellows.

MR. FRANKLIN D. KRAMER, Partner, Shea & Gardner. Mr. Kramer earned
his B.A. degree from Yale University and his J.D. from Harvard Law School.
He has served the US Government previously as Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and as Special
Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs.

DR. JOSEPH J. KRUZEL, Professor of Political Science, Duke University.

In addition Dr. Kruzel is Director, Duke-University of North Carolina Inter-
national Security Seminar. Having graduated from the US Air Force

389
Biographical Notes

Academy as Outstanding Cadet in International Affairs, Dr. Kruzel went on

to receive M.A., M.P.A., and Ph.D. degrees in government from Harvard
University. He was a member of the US delegation to SALT I and consult-
ant to the Secretary of Defense for SALT I1.He served the US Government
also as Current Intelligence Briefing Officer for the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and as Deputy Desk Officer for Laos, Burma. and Cambodia. International
Security Affairs. Office of the Secretary of Defense. Dr. Kruzels other
assignments include Research Associate, International Institute for Stra-
tegic Studies (London): Member of Board, Arms Control Association, and
Visiting Scholar. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
Smithsonian Institution. Among his numerous publications in defense
strategy and arms control are Parchment and Swords: Arms Control in
Historical Perspective (forthcoming): "The International Arms Trade." in
National Security Affairs: Theoretical Perspectives and Contemporary
Issues (1982): and "Verification and SALT II.- in Verification and SALT
(19801.

REAR ADMIRAL RONALD J. KURTH, US Navy, Di: actor, Politico-Military

Policy and Current Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
Rear Admiral Kurth was trained as a Naval Aviator. He was graduated from
Harvard ,Jniversity with a Ph.D. in political science specializing in the
Soviet Unon. His past assignments include Military Fellow. Council on
Foreign Relations: US Naval Attache in Moscow: and Teaching Fellow at
Harvard University. Among his publications are "Soviet Naval Capabilities
in the Pacific and Indian Ocean Areas." and "The Military and Power in the
United States."

MS. DEBORAH M. KYLE, Congressional Editor and Vice President of the

Armed Forces JournalInternational.A graduate of Glassboro State Col-
lege, Ms. Kyle is an M.B.A. candidate at George Washington University
She has been with the Armed Forces JournalInternationalfor six years. the
last three years as Congressional Editor. She worked with the foreign
policy coordinator in the 1976 Carter campaign.

HONORABLE L. BRUCE LAINGEN, Department of State. Vice President.

National Defense U niversity. Ambassador Laingen has been Vice President
of the National Defense University since July 1981. He served as Charge
d'affaires of the US Embassy in Tehran from June 1979 until the student
takeover the* November. He was among those held hostage inTehran from
then until the hostage release January 20, 1981. A former Ambassador to
Malta. he entered the Foreign Service in 1946 after World War II duty with
the Navy Overseas diplomatic tours have included Germany, Iran, Pakis-
tan, and Afghanistan. He was serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs when he was nominated as Ambassador to Malta A
graduate of St. Olaf College, he received his master's degree from the
University of Minnesota. He received the Department of State Meritorious
Honor Award in 1967 and its Award for Valor in 1981.

390
 Biographical Notes

DR. ROY D. LAIRD, Professor of Political Science and Soviet and East
European Area Studies. University of Kansas. Dr. Laird received his B.A.
dep,'ee in biology from Hastings College, his M.A. in political science from
the University of Nebraska, and his Ph.D in political science and USSR
studies from the University of Washington. He has previously served the US
Government as Research Analyst, Central Intelligence Agency. He was a
founder of the International Conference on Soviet and East European
Agriculture. Among his numerous publications on Soviet affairs are "Soviet
Meat and Grain, 1981-85: Output Projections." in Soviet Georgraphy:
Review and Translation (1982): Agriculture Policies in the USSR and East-
ern Europe (with Ronald Francisco and Betty Laird) (1980): Soviet Commu-
nism and Agrarian Revolution (with Betty Laird) (1970): and The Soviet
Paradigm (1970).

DR. JAMES R. LEUTZE, Bowman and Gordon Gray Professor, Department

of History, and Chairman, Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense. Univer-
sity of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. He was graduated from the University of
Maryland, received an M.A. from the University of Miamianda Ph.D. in20th
century American diplomatic history from Duke University. While in the Air
Force he served in the Administrative Office and later the Commander
Headquarters Squadron, Technical Training School at Lowry Air Force
Base. Subsequently he joined the faculty at the University of North Carol-
ina. where he received the Tanner Award for distinguished undergraduate
teaching, the Bernath Prize for distinguished publication in American for-
eign policy, as well as the Bowman and Gordon Gray professorship for
teaching. Among Dr. Leutze's publications are A Different Kind of Victory.
The Biography of Admiral Thomas C. Hirt (1981): Bargaining for Supre-
macy. Anglo-American Naval Collaboration,1937- 1941 (1977). The Role of
the Military i) a Democracy (ed.) (1974): and The London Journal of
General Raymond E. Lee (1971).

COLONEL DINO A. LORENZINI, USAF, Program Manager, TALON GOLD.

Directed-Energy Office, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency He
previously served as the Defense Economic Course Director at the Naval
War College, Deputy Director at the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System
Joint Program Office, and chief of the Inertial Guidance Research Labora-
tory at the USAF Academy. He is a distinguished graduate of the Air
Command and Staff and the Naval War Colleges. He holds master's
degrees from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in astronau-
tics and from Auburn University in business and management. along with a
doctoral degree from MIT in astronautical engineering. Colonel Lorenzini
has authored several articles on space, including '2001: A U.S. Space
Force," NWC Review. March 1981.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM MALONEY, US Marine Corps, Deputy

Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies, and Operations, US Marine Corps Gen-

391
Biographical Notes

eral Maloney is also Operations Deputy for the US Marine Corps for the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was trained as an aviator and is a graduate of Brown
University. He received a master's from Stanford University, and a master's
in international affairs from George Washington University. His previous
assignments include Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing: and
Director of Information, Hedquarters, US Marine Corps. He also directed
Operations, J3, Pacific Command, and has served in Korea, Okinawa,
Vietnam, the Mediterranean, the western Pacific, and various commands in
the United States. Among his medals are theSilver Star, the Legion of Merit,
the Gold Star, the Distinguished Flying Cross, and the Bronze Star.

DR. ERNEST R. MAY, Charles Warren Professor of History. Dr. May has
served as the Director of the Institute of Politics and as the Dean of Harvard
College. In addition, Dr. May has been a consultant to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Office of Secretary of Defense, National Security Council, and var-
ious Congressional committees. He received a Ph.D. in history from Univer-
sity of California, Los Angeles. Dr. May has published books on the Monroe
Doctrine, the Spanish-American War, US Entry into World War I, and
Presidents as Commanders-in-Chief. Also Dr. May has written "Lessons" of
the Past and is editing a forthcoming book on the history of intelligence
analysis.

COLONEL ROBERT E. McCLEAVE, JR., US Army, Associate Director.

Mobilization Concepts Development Center, National Defense University.
A graduate of the University of Pennsylvania, he holds master's degrees
from the University of Tennessee and Brown University. He is also a gradu-
ate of the National War College and the Foreign Service Institute (South
East Asia). Among his previous assignments are Chief, International Logis-
tics Branch, Directorate for Logistics, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Transportation Plans Officer. Directorate for Traosportation and Services.
Department of Army, Deputy chief of Staff, Logistics: Battalion Com-
mander, 69th Transportation Battalion, Korea: and Logistics Plans Officer,
Driectorate for Logistics, Pacific Command. Among his publications are
"Determining Industrial Mobilization," in DLA Dimensions (February 1981):
and "National Defense Requirement for the US Merchant Marine," in Naval
War College Review (June 1969).

MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE, Deputy Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs. Educated at the US Naval Academy, Mr. McFar-
lane went on to serve as a US Marine officer, completed two tours in
Vietnam, and was selected for early promotion. He also studied at L'Institut
des Hautes Etudes, Geneva, where he completed a license in international
relations. He was a Senior Research Fellow, National Defense University.
His previous assignments include Counselor, US Department of State:
Professional Staff, Senate Committee on Armed Services: and Executive
Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. He

392
 Biographical Notes

is the recipient of the Distinguished Service Medal, His publications include

"The Political Potential of Parity," in Naval Institute Proceedings (1979):
Crisis Resolution (coauthor) (1978); and "At Sea Where We Belong." in
Naval Institute Proceedings (1971).

DR. JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, Assistant Professor, Political Science. Uni-

versity of Chicago. Dr. Mearsheimer received a bachelor of science degree
from the US Military Academy at West Point and doctor of philosophy
degree in international relations from Cornell University. Previously a Post-
Doctoral Fellow at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs, he
was also a Research Fellow at the Brookings Institution. His book Conven-
tional Deterrence is forthcoming from Cornell University Press.

MR. JOHN PHILIP MERRILL, Director, Policy Research and Special Assist-
ant for Long-Range Planning, Department of Defense (DOD). Mr. Merrill
was graduated from the University of California. with a B.A. (honors) and
M.A. (high honors) in marxist economic history. He was a graduate in
materiel management from the Air Force Institute of Technology and took
postgraduate foreign language study at Wright State University. Prior to his
current assignment Mr. Merrill coordinated analytical support for various
DOD components including the Assistant Secretary for International
Security Affairs and the Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Planning. He
previously served as a delegate to US-Soviet conventional arms control
negotiations and as the first civilian appointee to the professional staff of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Plans and Policy Group. A recipient of numerous
commendations from the Departments of State and Defense, Mr. Merrill is a
frequent guest lecturer at US and foreign universities.

GENERAL EDWARD CHARLES MEYER, US Army, Chief of Staff. Previous

to becoming Chief of Staff of the US Army, General Meyer served as
Assistant Deputy, then Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, US
Army. His other recent major assignments include Commanding General,
3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), US Army Europe; Deputy Commandant,
US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. and Commander,
2d Brigade and then Chief of Staff for the 1st Cavalry Division, Vietnam, He
also was a Federal Executive Fellow at the Brookings Institution. Among his
many decorations are the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Silver
Star (with Oak Leaf Cluster), the Legion of Merit (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters).
the Distinguished Flying Cross, and the Purple Heart.

MR. FRANKLIN C. MILLER, Director, Strategic Forces Policy. Office of

Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy). A former
naval officer, Mr. Miller served as Politico-Military Affairs Officer, Depart-
ment of State and as Assistant for Theater Nuclear Policy, Office of Assist-
ant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). A graduate of

393
Biographical Notes

Williams College, Mr. Miller also holds an M.P.A. from Princeton University
in international relations specializing in national security policy.

DR. ROBERT H. MOORE, Corporate Vice President, Alexander & Alex-

ander Services Inc. He has served as a consultant to the Conference Board
as well as to the Senate Armed Services Committee and members of
Congress. Dr. Moore has taught at Wisconsin, West Point and Maryland,
where he was a tenured Associate Professor on the Graduate Faculty. He is
a graduate of Davidson College with an MA. from the University of North
Carolina and a Ph.D. from Wisconsin. Dr. Moore is coauthor of School for
Soldiers: West Point and the Profession of Arms, selected by The New York
Times as a Book of the Year and featured in PBS's "No Excuse Sir" (1981).

MR. JAMES W. MORRISON, Director, European Policy, Office of Deputy

Assistant Secretary of Defense (European and NATO Policy), Office of
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy) He holds an
A.B from Indiana University in government and an M.I.A. from Columbia
University in international affairs. He is a graduate of the National War
College, National Defense University. Mr. Morrison has served as Deputy
Director, DOD Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Task Force and as a
Staff Assistant to the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (International
Security Affairs).

LIEUTENANT COLONEL LOUIS J. MOSES, US Air Force, Senior Research

Fellow, National Defense University and student, National War College.
National Defense University. Colonel Moses earned his A.B. degree in
chemistry and psychology from Coe College and his M.B.A. in economics
from the University of Tennessee. He has served as Special Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff: as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary
of the US Air Force; and on other staff jobs at Headquarters, US Air Force.

MR. ALLAN A. MYER, Staff Member, National Security Council. Mr. Myer
was granted an M.A. in Soviet studies from Georgetown University. He has
served as Staff Officer, Strategy and Policy Directorate, Operations and
Plans, Headquarters US Army: as faculty member, National War College,
National Defense University, -,nd as faculty member, Strategy Department,
US Army Command and General Staff College. He has published in Naval
War College Review, Military Review, Swiss Military Review, and Norwe-
gian Military Review.

MR. LARRY C. NAPPER, Officer in Charge of the Multilateral Affairs Div-

ision of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Department of State. A graduate
of Texas A&M University, Mr. Napper earned his M.A in foreign affairs at the
University of Virginia. He has previously served in US Embassies in Moscow
and in Botswana. Mr. Napper has written two chapters on US-Soviet con-
flict in Africa during the 1970s which will appear in the forthcoming Manag-

394
 Biographical Notes

Ing US-Soviet Rivalry.

REAR ADMIRAL RONALD E. NARMI, US Navy, Commandant, Industrial

College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University. a graduate of
Iowa State College with a B.S. in aeronautical engineering, he has earned
an M.S. in physics from the US Naval Postgraduate School, an M.S. in
systems management from the University of Southern California, and an
MS. in administration from George Washington University. He is also a
distinguished graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Rear
Admiral Narmi has served as Executive Assistant to the Vice Chief of Naval
Operations; as Deputy Manager Anti-Submarine Weapons System Project
Office; as a Wing Commander, Command Patrol Wing 11: and as Deputy
Director, Chief Naval Operations Executive Panel. Among his publications
is Military Leadership: The Indispensible Ingredient (ed. forthcoming,
1982).

LIEUTENANT COLONEL GUNTER H. NEUBERT, Senior Research Fellow,

National Defense University. Colonel Neubert was graduated from the
University of Michigan with a B.S. in chemistry and from the University of
Texas. El Paso with an M.S. in chemistry. He is a gradute of the US Army
War College. His previous assignments include Battalion Commander and
Special Assistant to the Commandant, US Army Chemical School; Instruc-
tor, Chemistry, US Military Academy at West Point: Division Chemical
Officer, Headquarters, 101st Airborne; Instructor. Radiological Safety Pro-
ject Officer, Special Studies, US Army Ordnance Center and School: and
Instructor. Radiological Safety, US Army Chemical School. Instructor,
Chemistry, US Military Academy at West Point; Division Chemical Officer,
Headquarters, 101st Airborne: Instructor, Radiological Safety Project
Officer, Special Studies, US Army Ordnance Center and School: and
Instructor, Radiological Safety, US Army Chemical Center and School.

DR. DONALD E. NUECHTERLEIN, Professor of International Affairs. Fed-

eral Executive Institute. Dr. Nuechterlein is preparing a book expanding on
the paper included in chapter 3 of this volume. In the fall of 1982 he will be a
senior associate member at St. Antony's College of Oxford University. He
was a Fulbright professor at the University of Wales from 1975 to 1976. From
1965 to 1968 he was on the senior staff, Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs. Previous to that appointment he
was a Rockefeller scholar at the University of California, Berkeley, and the
Cultural Attache at the American Embassy in Bangkok. Thailand. He was
graduated from the University of Michigan with a Ph.D. in international
relations. His publications include National Interests and Presidential
Leadership: The Setting of Priorities (1978): US National Interests in a
Changing World (1973): Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia
(1965); and Iceland: Reluctant Ally (1961).

395
Biographical Notes

DR. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., Professor of Government, Harvard University. Dr.

Nye has served as Deputy to the Under Secretary of State for Security
Assistance, Science and Technology, and chaired the National Security
Council Group on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. For his service
he was presented the highest Department of State commendation, the
Distinguished Honor Award. He is the author of the books, Power and
Interdependence and Energy and Security. as well as many professional
articles. He is a member of the Trilateral Commission, the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the
Commission on International Relations of the National Academy of Scien-
ces. A former Governor of the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, he
served as Chairman of the Research Advisory Board of the Committee for
Economic Development and was a member of the Ford Foundation's
Nuclear Energy Policy Study. A graduate of Princeton University, he
earned his master's degree at Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar and
received a Ph.D. degree in political science from Harvard University.

MR. JAMES E. OBERG, Flight Controller, Mission Control. Space Shuttle

Program McDonnell-Douglas. Mr. Oberg's specialization as a flight con-
troller is in orbital rendevous and he is a close observer of the Soviet space
program. A former US Air Force Officer, Mr. Oberg has advanced graduate
degrees in computer science and mathematics. Previously assigned to an
Air Force weapons lab, he worked on systems definition for the airborne
laser weapon testbed. He has written numerous magazine articles on the
Soviet space program and the book Red Star in Orbit (1981).

DR. VLADIMIR PETROV, Professor of International Affairs. Institute for

Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University, Dr. Petrov has been a
Lecturer, Russian Area Studies, Yale University: Editor. Voice of America in
Europe, Munich: and Consultant, Strategic Studies Center, SRI. He holds a
Ph.D. in international relations from Yale University and has published
US-Soviet Detente, Past and Future; Soviet-Chinese Relations 1945-70
(Borisov and Koloskov, ed.) and Escape from the Future.

DR. ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR., President, Institute for Foreign Policy

Analysis, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Professor of International Polit-
ics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Dr. Ptaltzgraff
has a B.A. in political science from Swarthmore College, an M.B.A in
international business, an M.A. in international relations, and a Ph.D. in
political science from the University of Pennsylvania. His publications
include Projection of Power: Perspectives, Perceptions, and Problems
(1982): Intelligence Policy and NationalSecurity (1981): The Atlantic Com-
munity in Crisis: Redefining the Atlantic Relationship (1979): Arms
Transfers to the Third World: The Military Buildup in Less IndustrialCoun-
tries (1978): Soviet Theater Strategy in Europe: Implications for NATO
(1978): The Cruise Missile: Bargaining Chip or Defense Bargain?(1977):

396
 Biographical Notes

The Study of International Relations (1977); New Technologies and Non-

Nuclear Conflict: The Other Arms Race (1975); and Contending Theories of
International Relations (1971, 1981 2nd ed.).

DR. JAROSLAW PIEKALKIEWICZ, Professor of Political Science and

Soviet and East European Area Studies, University of Kansas, and Lecturer
for the University of Kansas at the US Army Command and Staff College.
Dr. Piekalkiewicz is a World War II veteran of the anti-Nazi resistance in
Poland and was decorated for bravery. He received his B.A. with honors in
economics and politics from Trinity College, University of Dublin, Ireland
and his Ph.D. in government and certificate with distinction, Russian and
East European Institute, from the University of Indiana. He is the holder of
many awards for study in East-Central Europe including Senior Researcher
in the Czechoslovak Academy of Science. Previously Assistant Director of
the Soviet and Slavic Area Program. Dr. Piekalkiewicz is now Director of the
University of Kansas-University of Warsaw Exchange Program. He teaches
in and lectures on comparative politics, politics of ideocracy, and logic of
political inquiry for non-Western students. He has authored many articles
on the Communist political systems of east-central Europe and Public
Opinion Polling in Czechoslovakia. Communist Local Government. and
The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia (coauthor).

DR. ALBERT C. PIERCE, Deputy Director, Strategic Concepts Develop-

ment Center, National Defense University. A cum laude graduate of
Catholic Uniuversity. he holds an M.A. and a Ph.D in political science from
Tufts University. Dr. Pierce was a Senior Research Fellow, National
Defense University. Prior to that position he was Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense. He also served with the US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency and as Assistant to the President of the University of Massachu-
setts. Most recently he published an essay on current defense issues in
Foreign Policy and Defense Review.

MR. ROBERT B. PIRIE, JR., Director, Naval Strategy Program Center for
Naval Analyses. Since his position as Commanding Officer, USS SKIP-
JACK, for the US Navy, Mr. Pirie has held staff positions with the National
Security Council and Office of the Secretary of Defense, has been the
Deputy Assistant Director for National Security of the Congressional
Budget Office, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Man-
power, Reserve Affairs & Logistics), and Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower, Reserve Affairs & Logistics). After his graduation from the US
naval Academy, Mr. Pirie obtained a B.A. and an M.A. from Oxford Univer-
sity specializing in philosophy, politics, and economics

397
Biographical Notes

DR. ROBERT J. PRANGER, Director of International Programs, American

Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C. DR. Pranger received his B.A. (Phi
Beta Kappa), M.A., and Ph.D. degrees in political science from the Univer-
sity of California. Berkeley. Currently he is also Adjunct Professor in Inter-
national Politics, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, and
Professorial Lecturer in Middle East Studies, Johns Hopkins School for
Advanced International Studies. He has served as Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense for Policy, Plans, and NSC Affairs: and as Associate
Professor of Political Science, University of Washington. He is a memberof
the Council on Foreign Relations and twice the recipient of the DOD
Meritorious Civilian Service Medal. Among his publications are Nuclear
Strategy and National Security (1977): Detente and Defense (1976):
Eclipse of Citizenship (1968); and Action, Symbolism, and Order (1968).

DR. GEORGE H. QUESTER, Professor and Chairman, Department of

Government and Politics, University of Maryland. Dr. Quester was gradu-
ated from Columbia University with an A.B. in history. He earned his M.A.
and Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University. He has served on the
faculties of the National War College, Cornell University. and Harvard Uni-
versity. Among his publications are American Foreign Policy: The Lost
Consensus (1982); Offense and Defense in the InternationalSystem (1977);
and The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation(1973).

DR. URI RA'ANAN, Professor of International Politics and Chairman of the

International Security Studies Program. Fletcher School of Law and Diplo-
macy. Dr. Ra'anan is also a Fellow of the Russian Research Center at
Harvard University. He had previously taught political science and govern-
ment at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Columbia University,
and City University of New York. He was educated at Oxford University and
is the author of works on the US-Soviet strategic balance, the Sino-Soviet
conflict, Soviet foreign policy. Soviet military aid to the Third World, Soviet
Policy in the Middle East, the diplomatic history of the Middle East. Chinese
factional struggles, and the politics of the coup d'etat.

MR. HERBERT A. REYNOLDS, Deputy Director. Intelligence and Space

Policy, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. A retired
Air Force Lieutenant Colonel, Mr. Reynolds was a pilot during World War II
and the Korean War and spent most of his Air Force career in reconnais-
sance and intelligence-related activities. More recently he served on the

398
 Biographical Notes

Reagan Transition Team (for Defense) and previously was Vice President
of Corporate Development at HRB-Singer. He also held the position of
senior Engineering Manager at Boeing Aerospace Company.

DR. JAMES N. ROSENAU, Director, Institute for Transnational Studies,

University of Southern California. He received his Ph.D. in political science
from Princeton Ulniversity. His writings include The Dramas of Political
Life (1980), The Study of Global Interdependence (1980), and The Study of
PoliticalAdaptation (1981). Dr. Rosenau, edited In Search of Global Patt-
erns (1976) and World System Structure (1981).

COLONEL GILBERT D. RYE, US Air Force, Staff Member, National Secur-

ity Council. Colonel Rye has held a variety of positions in budgeting,
research and development, and planning in the Air Force. He served as
Deputy Director of Budget for the Air Force in Vietnam, as Assistant to the
Commander, Space and Missile Systems Organization. on the staff of
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, as Chief of Program Control
for Project 85, and later as Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander
Europe for Communications, Command, and Control. Previous to assign-
ment on the NSC staff, Colonel Rye was assigned to Air Force Headquar-
ters as a long-range planner, Deputy Chief of the Strategy Division, and
Chief of the Air Force Space Plans Division.

REAR ADMIRAL JAMES A. SAGERHOLM, US Navy, Director, Long-Range

Planning Group, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Some of Admiral
Sagerholm's previous assignments were Commanding Officer, USS
KAMEHAMEHA; Deputy Director of naval Intelligence; Commander of the
South Atlantic Force, US Atlantic Fleet: Director of the Office of Program
Appraisal, Office of the Secretary of the Navy: and Directorof Contingency
Plans and Requirements, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs.

DR. RALPH SANDERS, Faculty, Industrial College of the Armed Forces,

National Defense University. A graduate of Georgetown University, Dr
Sanders earned his B.S. and MS. in foreign service and his Ph.D in interna-
tional relations there. Dr. Sanders has also taught on the faculties of the
National War College and Southern California University. Washington Pub-
lic Affairs Center. Among his publications are "Bureaucratic Plays and
Strategems: The Case of the US Department of Defense, in The Jerusalem
Journal of International Relations (1980); Science and Technology: Vital
National Resources (1975), The Politics of Defense Analysis (1974): and
Project Plowshare: The Development of the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear
Explosion (1962).

399
Biographical Notes

DR. SAM C. SARKESIAN, Professor, Department of Political Science, Loy-

ola University of Chicago; and Chairman, Inter-University Seminar on
Armed Forces and Society. He is also President, Study Group on Armed
Forces and Society, International Political Science Association. Dr. Sarke-
sian was granted his Ph.D. from Columbia University. A retired Lieutenant
Colonel, US Army. he served in Airborne, Special Forces, and Infantry units
in Germany, Korea, and Vietnam, earning the Legion of Merit and Bronze
Star, among other citations. Dr. Sarkesian was Executive Secretary and
Associate Chairman, Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and
Society. He formerly was Chairman. Department of Political Science, Loy-
ola University. He has published books and articles on national security
and military professionalism among which are US Policy and Low-
Intensity Conflict: Potentials for Military Struggles in the 1980s (1981);
Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military Professionalism (1981): Non-
nuclear Conflicts in the Nuclear Age (1980); Combat Effectiveness: Stress
and Cohesion in the Volunteer Military (1980); and Defense Policy and the
Presidency (1979).

DR. THOMAS L. SCHELLING, Lucius N. Littauer Prossor of Political Econ-

omy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Prior to
arriving at Harvard, Dr. Schelling was a member of Defense Science Board:
Scientific Advisory Board, US Air Force; and Senior Staff Member. the
RAND Corporation. In addition, Dr. Schelling has served the US Govern-
ment in Copenhagen, Paris, and at the White House in the Executive Office
of the President as well as on the Academic Advisory Board of the National
Defense University and as a lecturer for US National War College. US Naval
War College, US Army War College, US Air War College, NATO Defense
College, Israeli Defense College, and the Canadian Defense College. His
publications include Arms and Influence (1967); Strategy and Arms Control
(1961) (with Morton H. Halperin): and The Strategy of Conflict (1960).

CAPTAIN J. R. SEESHOLTZ, US Navy, Technology Planner, Long-Range

Planning Group, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. A graduate of the
US Naval Academy, Captain Seesholtz received a Ph.D. in oceanography
from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has served as Project
Officer, for the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for ASW Programs and as
Program Manager for Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Hie
was the Commanding Officer of the USS AJAX and the USS DOLPH '4. He
was a participant in the October 1981 Space Panel of the Nava' Studies
Board of the National Academy of Sciences.

COLONEL ROBERT SIGETHY, US Air Force, Dean of Faculty and Aca-

demic Programs, Industrial College of the Armed Forces. National Defense
University. A graduate of Lehigh University. he has an MS. in industrial
management from Purdue University and a Ph.D irn public administration
from American University. He completed Squadron Officer School as well

400
 Biographical Notes

as the Air Command and Staff College and The Industrial College of the
Armed Forces. Colonel Sigethy previously was Director of Plans and Oper-
ations then Commander, Air Force Office of Scientific Research at Boiling
AFBý and at Andrews AFB, Chief, Laboratory Plans Division. then Chief.
Laboratory Programs Division, Headquarters, Air Force Systems
Command.

DR. DIMITRI K. SIMES, Executive Director, Soviet and East European

Research Program, Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute. Formerly with
the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Dr. Simes
previously was Director of Soviet Studies at the Georgetown University
Center for Strategic and International Studies. He attended Moscow State
University's School of History and a graduate school of the Institute of
World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of
Sciences, where he was also a Research Associate from 1967 to 1972. Dr
Simes has served as a consultant to the US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency and, currently, to both Houses of Congress. He has written numer-
ous studies and articles dealing with various aspects of Soviet foreign and
domestic policies, including Soviet Succession: Leadership in Transition
and Detente and Conflict: Soviet Foreign Policy. 1972-1977.

DR. BARRY J. SMERNOFF, President, B. J. Smernoff Associates, Ltd. A

graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, he received his
Ph.D. in physics from Brandeis University. He served as a staff member at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory and at the
Hudson Institute, as a consultant to the US General Accounting Office. and
has testified before various Congressional committees. He currently con-
sults for both Federal and State agencies. His publications include "The
Strategic Value of Space-Based Laser Weapons," in Air University Review
(March-April 1982) and The Future of Conflict (coauthor. 1979).

MR. JED SNYDER, Senior Special Assistant to the Director of the Bureau of
Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State. A graduate of Colby College
he earned his MA. in political science and international relations from the
University of Chicago and is currently a doctoral candidate there specializ-
ing in strategic studies and the NATO Alliance. Before joining the US
Government, Mr. Snyder was associate researcher at the Pan Heuristics
Division of R&D Associates. His principal areas of research were US and
Soviet comparative power projection capabilities and European security
issues. Mr. Snyder also has been a consultant for the Rand Corporation and
is a Fellow of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society.
He is also a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in
London. His publications include "Strengthening the NATO Alliance:
Toward a Strategy for the 1980s," in Naval War College Review (1981)

401
Biographical Notes

DR. WILLIAM LLOYD STEARMAN, Senior Consultant, National Security

Council, and Director, Russian Area Studies Program, Georgetown Univer-
sity. He holds a B.A. from the University of California at Berkeley. an M.A.
and a Ph.D. in international relations from the Graduate Institute of Interna-
tional Studies, Geneva. He served in the US Foreign Service for 28 years
and also was Senior Staff Member, National Security Council (NSC) and
previously Chief, Indonesia Staff, NSC. He has also been Acting Assistant
Director, International Relations Bureau for ACDA. He has written The
Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria (1962).

DR. JOHN D. STEINBRUNER, Director, Foreign Policy Studies Program.

the Brookings Institution. A specialist in US strategic policy and decision
theory, Dr. Steinbruner previously was a professor in the School of Organi-
zation and Management and the Department of Political Science at Yale
University. Long a US Government consultant on national security matters.
he is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International
Institute for Strategic Studies. The author of the Cybernetic Theory of
Decision. he is on the editorial board of InternationalSecurity and the
American Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. Dr. Steinbruner
holds a Ph.D. degree in political science from the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology.

MAJOR GENERAL LEE E. SURUT, US Army, Commandant, National War

College, National Defense University, A graduate of the US Military
Academy at West Point, Major General Surut received an M.A. in English
from Columbia University, and an M.S. in international affairs from George
Washington University. He is also a graduate of the National War College.
He has served as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
(Joint Affairs), US Army; as Director, Strategy, Plans, and Policy, Office of
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, US Army; as Joint
Chiefs of Staff Representative to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction
Talks, Vienna; as Chief, Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency. Organiza-
tion of Joint Chiefs of Staff: as well as in posts in Germany, Belgium. and
Vietnam.

DR. WILLIAM J. TAYLOR, JR., Director of Political-Military Studies, Geor-

getown Center for Strategic and International Studies. Dr. Taylor is a
graduate of American University's School of International Service with a
Ph.D. in international relations. A retired US Army Colonel, he has been
Director of National Security Studies, US Military Academy at West Point,
and Visiting Academy Professor to the National War College. A frequent
lecturer and author or coauthor of more than 50 publications, Dr. Taylor's
most recent publications include The Future of Conflict and U.S. Interest
(1982), The Future of Conflict in the 1980s (with Maraanen; 1982), and
American National Security: Policy and Process (with Jordan. 1981).

402
 Biographical Notes

DR. W. SCOTT THOMPSON, Associate Director for Programs, US Infor-

mation Agency. A graduate of Stanford University, he earned his D.Phil.
from Oxford University. Dr. Thompson was Senior Fellow at both George-
town University for Strategic and International Studies and the Heritage
Foundation. He also has been Professor at the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy. Research Fellow at the Center for International Affairs of Har-
vard University, and Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. Among his
publications are The Third World: Premises for US Policy, from Weak-
nesses to Strength: National Strategiesin the 1980s, The Thai Insurgency.
and Fulcrum of Power: The Third World Between Moscow and Washington.

ADMIRAL HARRY D. TRAIN II, US Navy, Supreme Allied Commander

Atlantic, Commander-in-Chief Atlantic. and Commander-in-Chief US
Atlantic Fleet. Admiral Train is a gradute of the US Naval Academy and the
US Naval Postgraduate School where he studied operations (systems)
analysis. He has previously served as Commander Sixth Fleet: Director.
Joint Staff, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Director. Systems
Analysis Division, Naval Operations and Commander, Cruiser Destroyer
Flotilla EIGHT. Among his personal decorations are the Distinguished
Service Medal with two Gold Stars. the Legion of Merit with three Gold
Stars, the Meritorious Service Medal, and the Navy Commendation Medal.

MAJOR GENERAL BERNARD E. TRAINOR, US Marine Corps. Director.

Plans Division, Plans, Policies and Operations Department. Headquarters.
US Marine Corps. A former exchange officer to the British Royal Marines.
he commanded a company in 45 Commando. 3d Commando Brigade.
Previous assignments include Director, 1st Marine Corps District, New
York City: Assistant Depot Commander, Parris Island. South Carolina: and
Deputy for Education, Education Center, Quantico. Virginia. Heearned his
master's degree in history at the University of Colorado and is a distin-
guished graduate of the Air War College. He has published a book, A
History of the Marine Corps.

MR TONY VELOCCI, JR., Senior Editor, Nation's Business magazine. US

Chamber of Commerce. Mr. Velocci is a graduate of Syracuse University
with a B S. in journalism. He specializes in defense and energy-related
subjects, having spoken and written in-depth on US strategic and conven-
tional defense readiness. He is frequently a contributing author to the
Natonal Defense magazine and to college and university textbooks on the
future of nuclear energy. Mr. Velocci lectured as Editor-in-Residence at
Syracuse University on energy and defense-related topics.

MR LAWRENCE MICHAEL WEEKS, Deputy Associate Administrator for

Space Flight. NASA Headquarters. Mr. Weeks is a graduate of Iowa State

403
Biographical Notes

University with a B.S. in applied mechanics. He has also received an M.S. in

applied mechanics from Washington University at St. Louis. Before joining
NASA, Mr. Weeks was Manager of Advanced Systems Development, Reen-
try and Environmental Systems, General Electric. He previously worked on
the NASA Large Space Telescope Program at Perkin-Elmer Corporation,
and as Vice President and General Manager of the Missile and Space
Division, LTV Corporation. He has also been with IBM-Electronic Systems,
Owego, New York; Aerospace Corporation, El Segundo.

DR. SAMUEL F. WELLS, JR., Secretary. International Security Studies

Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Dr. Wells
previously taught at the University of North Carolina, where he was an
Associate Professor of History, and at Wellesley College. Specializing in
the fields of American foreign relations, economic diplomacy, arms control,
and national security policy, Dr. Wells has had numerous articles published
on those topics. He has had several fellowships, including a Ford Founda-
tion grant for research in international security. A graduate of the University
of North Carolina, he received his master's and doctoral degrees in history
and international relations from Harvard University.

MR. ROY A. WERNER, Corporate Director, Policy Research. A magna cum

laude graduate of the University of Central Florida, Mr. Werner received his
M.Phil. in international politics from Oxford University. His previous posi-
tions for the US Government include Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
of the Army, Professional Staff Member for the US Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, and various career civil service positions. He has written
"The Asian Military Balance and the Benign Chinese Military Threat," in
The Implicationsof US-ChinaMilitary Cooperation (1982): and "Resources
and Requirements," in Strengthening Deterrence: NA TO and the Western
Defense in the 1980s (1981).

CONGRESSMAN RICHARD C. WHITE, Member of Congress, 16th District,

Democrat, Texas. Congressman White is a member of the House Armed
Services Committee, Chairman of its Investigations Subcommittee, and
member of the Science and Technology Committee. This is his eighteenth
year in Congress. He is past chairman of the Democratic Research Organi-
zation and currently serves on its Executive Committee. Congressman
White served during World War II as a Japanesse interpreter for the US
Marines and was awarded the Purple Heart. He received his L.L.B. law
degree from the University of Texas at Austin.

DR. DARNELL M. WHITT, Intelligence Advisor to'the Under Secretary of

Defense for Policy. Having served on the Policy Planning Staff in OSD(ISA)
and at the US diplomatic mission to NATO in Paris and Brussels, he has
taught at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International
Studies and at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. Dur-

404
 Biographical Notes

ing the mid-1970s, he was Executive Director of the Committee of Nine-a

group fo prominent officials who reassessed political, security, and eco-
nomic relations between Western Europe and North America. Dr. Whitt is
coauthor of Detente Diplomacy: United States and European Security in
the 1970s and coauthor of Quarrelon the Rhine: Intra-Alliance Diplomacy
in an Interdependent World. He is a member of the International Institute for
Strategic Studies (London) and the Editorial Advisory Board of The Atlantic
Community Quarterly, as well as a Captain in the Naval Reserve.

DR. DOV S. ZAKHEIM, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense

for Policy. A summa cum laude graduate in government from Columbia
University, Dr. Zakheim received his D. Phil. in politics and economics from
St. Antony's College, University of Oxford. Presently he also serves on the
Maritime Policy Study Group of the Center for Strategic and International
Studies at Georgetown University. He is a member of the US Naval Institute.
the American Political Science Association, and the Society of Government
Economists; and in the United Kingdom, the Royal Institute of International
Affairs, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Institute of
Bankers. Dr. Zakheim has served as Special Assistant to the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy and as Principal
Analyst with the National Security and International Affairs Division. Con-
gressional Budget Office. He is author or coauthor of nine Congressional
Budget Office studies and has contributed to professional and academic
journals on security and academic affairs.

405
 Glossary of Abbreviations

ABM antiballistic missile

AFSATCOM Air Force Satellite Communications
ALCM air-launched cruise missile
ASAT antisatellite
BMD ballistic missile defense
CEP circular error probable (nuclear missile/warhead pre-
diction accuracy)
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
C, command, control, and communications
ClI command, control, communications, and intelligence
D, defense, deterrence, and detente
EMP electromagnetic pulse (of a nuclear explosion in space)
EW electronic warfare
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
GBMD global ballistic missile defense
GLCM ground-launched cruise missile
GNP gross national product
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMF International Monetary Fund
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
LRTNF long-range theater nuclear force
MAD Mutual Assured Destruction
MIRV multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle
MLF Multilateral Force (NATO-related)
MX (literally, "missile, experimental.') US land-based ICBM
follow-on to Minuteman
MX-MPS MX multiple protective shelter (basing mode)
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NMAC National Military Advisory Council
NPG Nuclear Planning Group (NATO-related)
NSC-68 National Security Council Report 68 of 14 April 1950
(policy of containment of the USSR)
OAS Organization of American States
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization
PPBS planning, programming, and budgeting system
RV reentry vehicle
SAC Strategic Air Command
SACEUR Supreme Allied Command, Europe

407
 SAIS School of Advanced International Studies (Washington-
based Johns Hopkins University adjunct)
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAM surface-to-air missile
SDP Social Democratic Party (Federal Republic of Germany)
SlOP Single Integrated Operational Plan (nuclear doctrine)
SLBM sea-launched ballistic missile
SLCM sea-launched cruise missile
SOF strategic offensive force
SRAM short-range air missile
SS surface-to-surface (missile)
START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
TNF Theater Nuclear Force

"U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFTCE: 198S- -i 'i1I

408
 NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

Lieutenant General John S. Pustay, USAF, President

__ The Research Directorate and NDU Press __

Director of Research and Publisher

Colonel John E. Endicott, USAF

Associate Director and Professor of Research

Colonel Frederick T. Kiley, USAF

Deputy Director, Plans and Programs

Major William A. Buckingham, Jr., USAF

Deputy Director, Administration

Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Pearl M. Moriwaki, USN

Deputy Director, Production

Major Donald Anderson, USAF

Senior Editor
George C. Maerz

Writer--Editors Editorial Clerks

Evelyn Lakes Pat Williams,
Janis L. Hietala Lead Clerk
Rebecca W. Miller Dorothy M. Mack
Albert C. Helder Carol Valentine

Executive Secretary Office Manager

Anne Windebank Laura W. Hall

Office Assistants
Hattie Johnson
Cecelia Giles