INTRODUCTION

MEANING AND OBJECT OF INTERPRETATION:

Enacted laws, especially the modern Acts and Rules, are drafted by legal experts and it
could be expected that the language used will leave little room for interpretation or construction.
The age-old process of application of the enacted law has led to formulate the certain rules of
interpretation or construction. “By interpretation or construction is meant the process by which the
courts seek to ascertain the meaning of the Legislature through the medium of authoritative forms
in which it is expressed”- says Salmond.

A statute is an edict of the Legislature [Vishnu Pratap Sugar Works (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Chief
Inspector of Stamp, U.P., 1968] and the conventional way of interpretation or construing a statute
is to seek the “intention” of its maker. A statute is to be construed accordingly ‘to the intent of
them that make it’ [R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India, 1957] and “the duty of judicature
is to act upon the true intention of the legislature-the mens or sentential legis” (Salmond
“Jurisprudence”). If the statutory provision is open to more than one interpretation the court has
to choose that interpretation which represents the true intention of the legislature [Venkatswami
Naidu, R v. Narasram Naraindas, 1966], in other words the ‘legal meaning’ [Dinesh Chandra
Jamanadas Gandhi v. State of Gujarat, 1989] or ‘true meaning’ [Black Clawson International
Limited v. Papierwerke Waldhof Aschaffenburg A.G., 1975] of the statutory provision. The task is
often not an easy one and the difficulties arise because of various reasons, as like, words in any
language are not scientific symbols having any precise or definite meaning and also it is
impossible even for the most imaginative Legislature to forecast exhaustively situations and
circumstances that may emerge after enacting a statute where its application may be called for.
The numerous rules of interpretation formulated by courts are expressed by different judges and
support may be found in these formulations for apparently contradictory propositions.

The problem of interpretation is a problem of meaning of words and their effectiveness as

medium of expression to communicate a particular thought, “Words and phrases are symbols that
stimulate mental references to referents” [G. Williams: Language and the Law]. But words of any
language are capable of referring to different referents in different texts and times. The courts
have therefore to look essentially to the words of the statute to discern the ‘referent’ aiding their
effort as much as possible by the context. Apart from controversies as to the limits of the context
outside the statute, there is a difficulty in and arising out of ‘fringe’ meaning of words.

The intention of the Legislature assimilates two aspects: In one aspect it carries the
concept of ‘meaning’ i.e. what the words mean and in another aspect, it conveys the concept of
‘purpose and object’ or the ‘reason and spirit’ pervading through the statute. The purpose of
interpretation, therefore, combines both literal and purposive approaches. In other words the
legislative intention i.e. the true or legal meaning of an enactment is derived by considering the
meaning of the words used in the enactment in the light of any discernible purpose or object which
comprehends the mischief and its remedy to which the enactment is directed. [Statute of Himachal
Pradesh v. Kailash Chand Mahajan, 1992]. This formulation has now received the approval of the
Supreme Court and has been called the “Cardinal principle of construction” [Union of India v.
Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., 2001]

The meaning of the expression ‘intention of the Legislature’ is explained in another form
by Lord Watson in an often quoted passage where he called it a ‘slippery phase’ and said: “In a
court of law or equity, what the legislature intended to be done or not to be done can only be
legitimately ascertained from that which it has intended to or chosen to enact, either in express
words or by reasonable and necessary implication” [Aaron Solomon and Co. Ltd. case, 1897].
But the whole of what is enacted “by necessary implication” can hardly be determined without
keeping in mind the purpose or object of the statute [State of Punjab v. Okara Grain Buyers
Syndicate Ltd., 1964]. This formulation therefore does not in effect reject the concept of “purpose”
but contains the same within the import of the phrase “necessary implication”.

The rules of interpretation are not rules of law and are not to be applied like the rules
enacted by the Legislature in an interpretation Act [Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal
Affairs, West Bengal v. Corporation of Calcutta, 1967]. They serve as guides and such of them
which serve no useful purpose now can be rejected by courts and new rules can be evolved in
their place (ibid). By boldly rejecting outmoded rules, by substituting, if necessary new rules in
their place (ibid) and by avoiding unnecessary generalization [Kehar Singh v. State, 1988] the
superior can help in task of realization of the rules. In applying the rules it must be kept in the view
that the rules are not binding in the ordinary sense like legislation “they are our servants and not
masters. They are aids to interpretation, presumptions and pointers. Not infrequently one rule
points in one direction, another in a different direction. In each case we must look at all relevant
circumstances and decided as matter of judgment what weight to attach to any particular rule.”
[Maunsel v. Olins, 1975]

An intelligent application of the rules and the solution in each real difficulty depends upon
the individual skill of a judge. By combining knowledge, wisdom and experience great judges
develop the instinct of finding out that solution which harmonize the words in the policy or object
behind them. Justice Cardozo said: “A judge must think of himself as an artist, who although he
must know the handbooks, should never trust to them for his guidance; in the end he must rely
upon his almost instinctive sense of where the line lay between the words and the purpose which
lay behind it.”