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Final Assignment 1

The document is a research assignment by Shambhavi Singh analyzing nuclear deterrence, its utility, challenges, and future in international security. It discusses the historical context of nuclear weapons, the effectiveness of deterrence during the Cold War, and the complexities introduced by proliferation, terrorism, and technological advancements. The conclusion emphasizes the need for a comprehensive strategy to manage nuclear arsenals and promote disarmament amidst ongoing geopolitical tensions.
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
6 views7 pages

Final Assignment 1

The document is a research assignment by Shambhavi Singh analyzing nuclear deterrence, its utility, challenges, and future in international security. It discusses the historical context of nuclear weapons, the effectiveness of deterrence during the Cold War, and the complexities introduced by proliferation, terrorism, and technological advancements. The conclusion emphasizes the need for a comprehensive strategy to manage nuclear arsenals and promote disarmament amidst ongoing geopolitical tensions.
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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INDIAN INSTITUTE OF GOVERNANCE AND LEADERSHIP (IIGL)

(Under the aegis of Confederation of Young Leaders)


Diploma in International Affairs and Diplomacy

NAME – SHAMBHAVI SINGH


ROLL NUMBER - IIGLIRD208596
ASSIGNMENT – FINAL ASSIGNMENT
FORMAT - RESEARCH ASSIGNMENT
TOPIC NAME – Nuclear Deterrence: Analyzing the Utility, Challenges, and Future of Nuclear Weapons in
International Security
TOPIC NUMBER – 4

Introduction
“War is too important to be left to the generals.” – Georges Clemenceau

The discovery of nuclear weapons and their catastrophic effects during World War II significantly reshaped
global military strategy and international relations. In addition to demonstrating the devastating power
of nuclear weapons, the 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked the
beginning of the nuclear era. As a result, particularly during the Cold War, nuclear deterrence—a
tactic to avert conflict by threatening overwhelming reprisal with nuclear weapons—became a
pillar of military strategy. he United States and the Soviet Union developed vast arsenals of
nuclear weapons, leading to the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). This theory
suggested that the possession of large numbers of nuclear weapons by both sides would prevent
either from initiating a nuclear conflict, as the consequences would be catastrophic for both. The
logic of MAD was grounded in the assumption that rational actors would not risk their own
annihilation. The idea of nuclear deterrence has been crucial in keeping nuclear-armed countries
comparatively peaceful, but it has also brought up a number of issues with proliferation,
morality, and technological development. Using theoretical frameworks, historical case studies,
and current global dynamics, this study examines the value, difficulties, and prospects of nuclear
deterrence in international security.

Theoretical Foundations of Nuclear Deterrence


The foundation of nuclear deterrence is the belief that hostile acts will be deterred by the
prospect of a devastating reaction to any act of aggression.For many states, possessing nuclear
weapons or aligning with nuclear powers has been a means to ensure national security and deter
potential threats. For example, countries such as North Korea and Pakistan have pursued nuclear
weapons as a deterrence against perceived existential threats from regional rivals, namely South
Korea and India, respectively. The presence of nuclear weapons in these regions has altered their
security dynamics and created new arenas for strategic competition. Nuclear deterrence as a
strategy depends on the common sense of those who, aware of the devastating effects of nuclear
war, abstain from hostile behavior and the use of nuclear weapons. The core of nuclear deterrent,
according to deterrence theory pioneer Thomas Schelling, is the capacity to convey credible
threats. Any aggressive conduct must be perceived by the adversary as resulting in unacceptable
reprisal. According to Schelling, the main benefit of nuclear weapons is that they give the threat
of war legitimacy—not because we might be willing to engage in combat, but rather because we
might be willing to cause catastrophic damage.(Schelling, 1960).

Structural realist Kenneth Waltz elaborates on this idea by arguing that the proliferation of
nuclear weapons enhances international security by making conflict between nuclear-armed
nations extremely unlikely because of the enormous stakes. Waltz's "Stability-Instability
Paradox" explains how nuclear deterrence might allow for smaller, conventional confrontations
while also promoting strategic stability between great countries. He contends that although
nuclear deterrence keeps major wars from breaking out, it does not stop minor confrontations
from happening. (Waltz, 1995).

Scott Sagan, in his critique of the assumption of rationality in nuclear decision-making, warns against the
fallibility of human and institutional behavior in managing nuclear arsenals. He suggests that decision-making
processes can be subject to error, leading to the accidental use of nuclear weapons or unauthorized launches.
This view challenges the belief that nuclear deterrence can always function in a rational and predictable
manner, as it often depends on institutional reliability and the competence of military commanders.

Utility of Nuclear Deterrence

Nuclear deterrence has proven useful in preserving peace among major powers, particularly during the Cold
War. The rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union during this period exemplified how nuclear
weapons, rather than leading to widespread destruction, acted as a stabilizing force. The Cuban Missile Crisis
of 1962, when the Soviet Union placed nuclear missiles in Cuba, brought the world to the brink of nuclear war.
However, both superpowers recognized the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear confrontation, and through
diplomatic negotiation, the crisis was defused, showcasing the power of nuclear deterrence in preventing
full-scale war.

This stability was maintained by the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) policy, which made
sure that no side could win a nuclear war by a landslide. This idea was subsequently
demonstrated in the Sino-Indian border dispute in 1962, where the deterrent power of nuclear
weapons prevented both China and India from turning their disagreement into a full-scale war
despite their territorial disputes.

As demonstrated by North Korea's nuclear program, nations may also exert considerable political
influence through the use of nuclear weapons. Because of its nuclear weapons, North Korea has
been able to establish itself internationally and win diplomatic concessions from major nations,
despite its isolation and economic sanctions. Because of North Korea's nuclear deterrent, outside
forces cannot militarily intervene, guaranteeing the regime's survival and changing regional
security dynamics.

Challenges to Nuclear Deterrence

●​ Risk of Proliferation:
The spread of nuclear weapons, especially in unstable or volatile areas, is one of the biggest
threats to nuclear deterrence. The deterrence framework has become more complex due to the
proliferation of nuclear technology and the acquisition of nuclear weapons by nations like North
Korea, India, and Pakistan. One example of how nuclear deterrence might fall short of averting
conventional battles is the nuclear standoff between India and Pakistan. Despite having nuclear
weapons, the two countries' 1999 Kargil War showed that deterrence may not always be effective
in averting small-scale confrontations, particularly in areas where territorial disputes have existed
for a long time.
The two nuclear-armed neighbors' relationship became even more tense after the 2019 Pulwama
tragedy, in which a suicide bomber targeted Indian soldiers in Kashmir. Given that both countries
have nuclear weapons, there was an immediate risk of the conflict turning into a nuclear war.
This case emphasizes how unstable nuclear deterrence is in high-tension areas and how minor
confrontations have the potential to become out of hand.

●​ Terrorism and Non-State Actors:


The premise of nuclear deterrence is that reasonable state actors will be dissuaded by the
prospect of reprisal alone. This reasoning, however, does not apply to non-state actors like
terrorist groups. Threats of nuclear retaliation might not be enough to dissuade ideologically
motivated groups like ISIS or al-Qaeda. Furthermore, a serious security risk is the potential for
non-state actors to get nuclear materials illegally. The International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) has issued a warning over the possibility that terrorists may get nuclear weapons,
circumventing established deterrents.

●​ Technological Advancements:
Developments in hypersonic missiles and cyberwarfare pose serious threats to the dependability
of nuclear deterrence. Unintentional nuclear launches might become more likely if cyberattacks
on nuclear command and control systems interfere with communication and decision-making.
Similarly, the stability that nuclear deterrence depends on is at danger from hypersonic missiles,
which may circumvent current missile defense systems. By creating new risks and weaknesses in
the context of nuclear security, these technical advancements have the potential to reduce the
effectiveness of conventional deterrent tactics.
●​ Moral and Ethical Concerns:
There is much discussion on the morality of nuclear deterrence, especially in relation to the
employment of weapons capable of causing large-scale civilian fatalities. According to political
theorist Michael Walzer, nuclear deterrence is predicated on the readiness to do disproportionate
harm to non-combatants, which runs against to the tenets of just war theory. The unpredictable
nature of nuclear escalation, which might have disastrous effects much beyond the initial battle,
adds to the moral conundrum surrounding nuclear deterrence. According to Walzer, "The threat
of nuclear war is an attempt to intimidate others into accepting your will, and the willingness to
make that threat is morally dubious" (Walzer, 1977, p. 2).

●​ Economic Costs:
Another major obstacle to nuclear deterrence is the expense of maintaining and updating nuclear
arsenals. For instance, the US spends billions of dollars a year on its nuclear triad, taking funds
away from domestic initiatives like infrastructure, healthcare, and education. For poor countries,
this financial burden is especially troublesome because funds intended for nuclear initiatives
would be better used to meet social and economic demands. Furthermore, the necessity for
technological improvements in nuclear capabilities drives the global arms race, which worsens
economic inequality, especially in developing nations.

Erosion of International Norms:


International disarmament and non-proliferation standards have deteriorated as a result of
nuclear deterrence. The spirit of disarmament is undermined by nuclear states' continued arsenal
expansion in spite of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other arms control accords. This
contradiction is especially noticeable in the cases of China, Russia, and the United States, who
have committed to arms control agreements yet are still developing their nuclear weapons. The
proliferation of nuclear weapons in areas like the Middle East and South Asia is fueled by
nuclear states' inability to fulfill their disarmament commitments, further undermining
international security.

Case Studies

●​ India-Pakistan Competition:
The difficulties of nuclear deterrence in regional wars are exemplified by the India-Pakistan
conflict, including the Kargil War in 1999 and the Balakot airstrikes in 2019. Even with both
nations having nuclear weapons, there was still a significant chance that a conventional
confrontation might turn into a nuclear exchange. The limitations of nuclear deterrence in
averting wars stemming from long-standing territorial and ideological disagreements are shown
by this instance.

●​ The nuclear program of North Korea:


North Korea's nuclear arsenal has given the government considerable diplomatic clout abroad.
The world was on the verge of war during the 2017 North Korea-US conflict, but a military
conflict was averted by nuclear deterrence. But in a world where nuclear proliferation persists
unchecked, the limitations of deterrence are brought to light by the international community's
failure to adequately confront North Korea's nuclear aspirations.

●​ The Nuclear Ambiguity of Israel:


Israel has not acknowledged nor denied having nuclear weapons, adhering to a policy of nuclear
ambiguity. In the Middle East, where Israel faces existential threats from its neighbors, this tactic
acts as a deterrent. However, as nations like Iran seek their own nuclear programs in response to
Israel's alleged advantage, this policy of ambiguity has sparked a nuclear arms race in the region.

Future of Nuclear Deterrence

The efficacy of nuclear deterrence is being called into question by new threats and technological
advancements. Developments in machine learning and artificial intelligence may improve
decision-making by lowering human error and enhancing threat assessment. However, there are
additional hazards associated with automating nuclear decision-making, including the possibility
of unintentional escalation or incorrect computation.
Furthermore, resource scarcity and the growing threat of climate change could exacerbate
geopolitical tensions, especially in areas where access to resources like water and arable land is
increasingly disputed. As countries look to ensure their resource needs, this might make nuclear
threats or even conflict more likely.
Global governance organizations like the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) must actively work to lower the dangers associated with nuclear weapons in
order to guarantee the continued applicability of nuclear deterrence. Reducing the possibility of
nuclear conflict requires multilateral approaches to arms control, increased openness, and
initiatives to stop the spread of nuclear technology.

Conclusion
“Nuclear weapons are a bad solution to a good question.” – John F. Kennedy
During times of intense geopolitical rivalry, especially during the Cold War, nuclear deterrence
has been essential to preserving peace. Its future is still unclear, though, since moral dilemmas,
technological developments, and the possibility of nuclear proliferation continue to present
formidable obstacles. A comprehensive strategy to nuclear arsenal management, diplomacy, and
arms control is necessary due to the complexity of global security. The international community
must look for a middle ground that promotes disarmament, reduces the hazards connected with
nuclear weapons, and protects state security.

References

- Schelling, T. C. (1960). *The Strategy of Conflict*. Harvard University Press.


- Waltz, K. (1995). *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*. W.W. Norton & Company.
- Sagan, S. D. (1993). *The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons*. Princeton
University Press.
- Walzer, M. (1977). *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*. Basic Books.

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