UNIT 1 RELIGIOUS PLURALISM

Contents

1.0 Objectives
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Conditions that Promote or Hinder Religious Pluralism
1.3 Philosophical Responses to Religious Pluralism
1.4 Practical Responses to Religious Pluralism
1.5 Let Us Sum Up
1.6 Key Words
1.7 Further Readings and References
1.8 Answers to Check Your Progress

1.0 OBJECTIVES

Until the middle of the last century, the philosophy of religion, as practiced in the West,
presumed the uniqueness of Christianity, so that philosophical reflection on religion was
centered around the Christian religion and has concentrated primarily on the Christian (or the
Judeo-Christian) concept of God. However, during the last century philosophers of religion have
increasingly felt obliged to take note of the fact that there are many other great world faiths and
that monotheism is only one of the major types of religion, so that it is now common for
philosophers of religion to include in their reflection the problems surrounding the plurality of
faith traditions. The main objective of this Unit is to draw the attention of the students to
existence of many religions and introduce them to the questions it raises for philosophers of
religion. It begins by defining religious pluralism, contrasting it with plurality of religion, and
looks into the conditions that promote or hinder religious pluralism. Then the enquiry proceeds
to examine the ways philosophers have responded to the questions—both philosophical and
practical—connected with religious pluralism.
Thus by the end of this Unit you should be able:
• to have a basic understanding of religious pluralism and the problems it raises;

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• to tolerate and even appreciate plurality;

• to understand the conditions that promote or hinder religious pluralism;

• to evaluate the various solutions proposed by philosophers in the past;

• to suggest new solutions to the problems raised by the awareness of the plurality or religion.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Some people make a distinction between religious plurality and religious pluralism, and define
the former as the fact of religious diversity and the latter as a simple acknowledgement and
acceptance of that fact. This definition, though valid, does not exhaust the meaning of the
expression “religious pluralism,” which is used in a number of related ways. Some consider
religious pluralism as a worldview which acknowledges that one’s religion is not the sole and
exclusive source of truth, and admits that there are at least some truths and true value in other
religions. Another definition of religious pluralism involves accepting the beliefs taught by other
religions as true though they differ from the ones taught by one’s own religion. This involves an
acceptance of the concept that all religions are valid though their beliefs appear to be conflicting.

A broader definition of religious pluralism includes in its primary meaning not only the
acknowledgement of the fact of plurality and an acceptance of the validity of all religions, but
also an active engagement with plurality in the form of inter-religious dialogue and cooperation.
Thus, according to Diana Eck, “Pluralism is not the sheer fact of this plurality alone, but is active
engagement with plurality. Pluralism and plurality are sometimes used as if they were
synonymous. But plurality is just diversity, plain and simple—splendid, colorful, maybe even
threatening. Such diversity does not, however, have to affect me. I can observe diversity. I can
even celebrate diversity, as the cliché goes. But I have to participate in pluralism....Pluralism
requires the cultivation of public space where we all encounter one another.” Thus, in the
broader sense, religious pluralism involves not only the acceptance of the validity of other
religions, but also dialogue among religions, where individuals of different religions discuss
religious beliefs and learn from and work with each other without attempting to convince each
other of the correctness of their individual set of beliefs.

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Check Your Progress I
Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer
b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit
1) Differentiate between plurality of religion and religious pluralism.
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2) What are the ways in which the expression “religious pluralism” is used?
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1.2 CONDITIONS THAT PROMOTE OR HINDER RELIGIOUS PLURALISM

Conditions for the Existence of Religious Plurality

One of the necessary conditions for the existence of religious pluralism is the existence of
freedom of religion. Religious diversity can exist only if there is freedom of religion. To have
freedom of religion it is not necessary that an individual religion accepts that other religions are
legitimate or that freedom of religion and religious plurality in general are good things. What is
necessary is that religions accept to coexist, acting within a commonly accepted law of a
particular region. Freedom of religion exists when different religions of a particular region
possess the same rights of worship and public expression.
Some argue that religious freedom alone is not enough for religious pluralism to flourish. For
religious pluralism to flourish there has to be mutual respect between different religious
traditions. The required respect can be promoted by societal and theological change aimed to
overcome religious differences between religions and denominations within the same religion.
Such a change can be introduced by a non-literal view of one’s religious traditions and by
emphasizing fundamental principles rather than more marginal issues. It is basically an attitude
which rejects focus on immaterial differences, and instead gives respect to those beliefs held in

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common. It is clear that in such an atmosphere of mutual respect and cooperation religious
pluralism can flourish.

Conditions That Hinder Religious Pluralism

If religious freedom and respect for other religions promote religious pluralism, absence of
religious freedom shuts out religious pluralism. In atheist countries there can be no religious
pluralism, since in such countries there can be no religion at all.
Another factor that hinders religious pluralism is exclusivism. Exclusivist religions teach that
theirs is the only way to truth and salvation; some of them would even argue that it is the duty of
a true believer to wage jihad against the falsehoods taught by other religions. Some
fundamentalist groups like the Taliban argue fiercely against other religions and teach that
religious practices of liberal Muslims and of other religions are pernicious. This attitude led to
the destruction of the Alexandrian library by Caliph Omar and of the ancient Buddha statues of
Bamyan as well as to the Crusades and witch hunt of the Early Modern Period. Exclusivism
cannot see any good in other religions or tolerate them. It is easy to see that where such an
attitude prevails, there can be no religious pluralism. This situation obtains in certain Islamic
countries like Saudi Arabia where no religion other than Islam is permitted.
A lesser form of exclusivism consists in giving one religion or denomination special rights
that are denied to others. This situation obtains in certain Islamic countries where Shariat law is
promulgated. Though less deplorable than exclusivism, this sort of preferential treatment is
detrimental to religious pluralism.
Check Your Progress II
Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer
b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit
1) What are the conditions that make the existence of religious diversity possible?
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2) What are the conditions that hinder religious pluralism?
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1.3 PHILOSOPHICAL RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS PLURALISM

Analysis of Religious Concepts

One of the early responses to religious pluralism was to show a desire to study the religious
concepts of religions other than one’s own. This gave rise to the branch of philosophy called
comparative religion. Comparative religion is a field of religious study that analyzes the
similarities and differences of themes, myths, rituals and concepts among the world’s religions.
In the field of comparative religion, the main world-religions are generally classified as
Abrahamic, Indian or Taoic, and attempts are made to analyze the similarities and differences
among the various ideational aspects of these religions. Thus attempts have been made to analyse
Eastern descriptions of unitive mysticism; Hindu and Buddhist notions of reincarnation,
centering on the question of personal identity from life to life; such Buddhist ideas as anatta (“no
self”), sunynta (“emptiness”); and a number of other important concepts. But much remains to be
done and many other major concepts await attention, both individually and comparatively.
Indeed this area of philosophical inquiry has almost unlimited scope for development.

Reflecting on the Relationship among Religions

Another response to religious pluralism was to initiate a reflection on the relationship among
various religions. This is one of the important philosophical questions in the area of religious
pluralism, though naturalism, which views religion in all its forms as a delusory projection upon
the universe of human hopes, fears, and ideals, dismisses it as a pseudo problem. Those who take
the question seriously propose two different models of relationship which can be broadly
classified into two groups: exclusivism and pluralism.
Exclusivism
Exclusivism addresses the problem of the relationship among religions in a simple way by
dismissing as false all religions other than one’s own. Basically, it is the view that there can only

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be one true religion. Other religions are dismissed as false and misleading, at least in so far as
their beliefs are incompatible with those taught by one’s own. This is the most widely-held view;
most of the adherents of each religion (including some, but not all, of its reflective thinkers), at
least implicitly assume this view.
However, a “hermeneutic of suspicion” is provoked by the evident fact that in almost all
cases the religion one accepts (or against which one reacts) is selected by the accident of birth.
Someone born to devout Muslim parents in Iran or Indonesia is very likely to be a Muslim,
someone born to devout Buddhist parents in Thailand or Sri Lanka is very likely to be a
Buddhist, someone born to devout Christian parents in Italy or Mexico is very likely to be a
Catholic Christian, and so on. Thus there is a certain non-rational arbitrariness in the claim that
the particular tradition within which one happens to have been born is the one and only true
religion. And if the conviction is added that salvation and eternal life depend upon accepting the
truths of one’s own religion, it may well seem unfair that this saving truth is known only to one
group, into which only a minority of the human race have had the good fortune to be born.
This thought has been countered by some Christian philosophers by an appeal to God’s
foreknowledge. According to this proposal God knows that certain individuals would freely
reject the Christian gospel, even if they had heard it. Those who had no opportunity to hear the
Christian gospel are such people. This suggestion, which could of course be deployed from
within each religion, involves an idea that is theologically objectionable to many, namely, that
God has created vast numbers of people whom God knows will forfeit salvation.
To overcome this difficulty a separation is introduced between knowing the truth from
receiving salvation. Then it is argued that though knowing truth is important, it is neither
necessary, nor sufficient to attain salvation. It is claimed that some (or all) of those who do not in
this life come to know the truth of the gospel may nevertheless, by divine grace, receive
Christian salvation. Such people, it is suggested, may be counted now as “anonymous
Christians.” The question here is whether there is not still an arbitrary privileging of one’s own
religion as the sole channel of salvation. If each religion makes similar claims, it is difficult to
see how such a dispute can be settled.
Pluralism
Uncomfortable with the implications of exclusivism, many contemporary thinkers look for
pluralist views. Pluralist views in all its various forms reject the exclusivist view that there can

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only be one religion that knows the truth and is a locus of salvation, and accept that other
traditions too can be sources of truth and salvation. The prominent pluralist views are: unity in
diversity, complementarity of religions, and radical diversity.
The Transcendent Unity of Religions: One form of pluralism claims that the various historical
religions like Hinduism, Islam and Christianity are manifestations of a core universal religion.
Thus the pluralist view adopted by Frithjof Schuon, Rene Guenon, Ananda Coomaraswamy,
Seyyed Hossein Nasr, and Huston Smith and others distinguishes between the esoteric religion of
the mystics and the exoteric religions of the mass of believers. It is then claimed that the former
is, in its innermost core, identical across the different religions, whereas the latter, consisting of
culturally conditioned concepts, doctrines, imagery, lifestyle, and spiritual practices, differ and
are indeed at many points mutually incompatible. Each exoteric tradition (historical Christianity,
Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, etc.) should accordingly maintain its own unique individuality,
because each is a valid expression of the ultimate reality that is directly known by the mystics.
Thus historical religions are seen as different manifestations of core experience; all religions are
united at the level of this experience.
This view encounters two difficulties. First, by making mysticism the unifying core of
religion, it relativizes historical manifestations. The second difficulty is more serious. The claim
that the esoteric religion of the mystics is, in its innermost core, identical across the different
religions, is not supported by facts. The fact is that descriptions of the mystics differ
considerably. Whilst some mystics report union with a personal divine being, others report union
with a nonpersonal reality, and still others report isolation or even blissful emptiness. Thus there
seems to be no unity among esoteric traditions.
Complementarity of Religions: Ninian Smart and Keith Ward, while explaining the relationship
among religions, stress the idea of the complementarity of the world religions. Ward speaks of “a
Supreme Reality which wills all to be consciously related to it.” Complementary aspects of this
Reality are revealed within the different world religions. Thus, for example, “the Semitic and
Indian traditions are complementary, emphasizing the active and unchanging poles respectively
of the Supreme Spiritual Reality to which they both seek to relate.” By their friendly interactions,
each seeking to learn from the others, a “convergent spirituality” may emerge in ways which
cannot be known in advance.

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Radical Diversity: John Cobb denies any significant sort of relationship among religions. Each
tradition is unique and independent; there is no unifying factor common to all religious forms.
Not only the external expressions but even the Ultimates of religion are different. The personal
God affirmed by monotheistic religions, for example, is different from the ever-changing,
interdependent process of the universe (pratitya-samutpada) affirmed by Buddhism. On this
view, each religion is unique; there is no significant unity among them, except that of a common
name and some of some external structural features like moral codes, belief-systems and ritual
practices. But the contents of these differ. Thus there is radical diversity. The attempt to find a
unifying common core is futile. The difficulty with this view is that it fails to explain why the
various belief systems are called religions. Individuals of a class must some way related; they
must have at least some central common elements.

Check Your Progress III

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer
b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit
1) What are the two important ways in which the relationship between religions is conceived?
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2) What are the important ways in which religious plurality is explained?
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Resolving Conflicting Truth Claims

The third philosophical response to religious pluralism focuses on solving the problem of
conflicting truth claims of the different religions. Suggested solutions generally proceed on two
lines. The first line inquires whether there is a way of rationally validating the claims of various
religions. It looks for evidential support for and against each of the conflicting claims, believing
that disagreements can be resolved by the strength of such evidence. The second line of inquiry

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tries to resolve the problem of conflicting truth claims with the help of the theories about the
relationship among religions.
Solving Religious Conflicts with the Help of Evidence
Pre-Kantian philosophy, especially deist philosophy, believed that the central religious claims
such as belief in God and the immortality of the soul can be proved rationally. But after Hume
and Kant a widespread consensus emerged that the traditional theistic arguments fail to prove
religious claims—although there are prominent thinkers who resist this conclusions. However,
attempts to validate religious claims were not given up. Instead of reason experience was
proposed as a valid source of religious knowledge. It is argued that religious people report a wide
range of forms of distinctively religious experience, including mystical experiences of direct
awareness of, and even union with, God; a sense of divine presence in moments of worship or
contemplation; an indirect consciousness of God in the feeling of absolute dependence upon a
creator, or of a divine presence and activity mediated through the beauties and sublimities of
nature, the claims of conscience, the profound significance of human love, the crises of birth and
death, and many kinds of personal and historical events. Can such experiences count as good
evidences for resolving disagreements?
The older kind of apologetic used religious experience as a source of knowledge about God
and supernatural realities. This is open to the objection that such experiences may have a purely
natural origin in the powers of the human imagination. Religious experience thus remains
objectively ambiguous.
At this point the “principle of rational credulity” is invoked, according to which it is rational
to trust our experience as a source of valid knowledge except in so far as we have reason to
distrust it. We apply this principle in our ordinary experience of our physical environment: we do
not need a reason to trust sense experience in general but rather a reason to distrust it on
particular occasions. And it is claimed that the same principle should apply impartially to
religious experience as well. Prima facie it is an awareness of a non-physical divine reality; and
we must trust it insofar as we have no reason to distrust it.
Critics have raised two objections against treating religious experience on a par with sense
experience. First, whereas sense experience is universal and compulsory, religious experience is
optional and confined to a limited number of people, so that whilst sensory reports can in
principle be confirmed by anyone, reports of religious experience cannot be; and second,

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whereas sense experience produces a universally agreed description of the physical world,
religious experience within the different traditions produces different and often incompatible
descriptions of the divine. Because of these reasons, critics reject the claim of parity of religious
experience with sense experience. Thereby the principle of rational credulity is rendered
inapplicable in the case of religious experience.
A positive argument against the reliability of religious experience as a valid source of
knowledge comes from the observation that it produces different and often incompatible
descriptions of the object. Hindus, Muslims, Christians and Buddhist and other religious groups
claim that their non-compatible beliefs correspond to their religious experiences. If their claim is
true, from a religious point of view the question now becomes: Whose description is true? Which
is the true religion? Since all of them claim the support of religious experience, all of them must
be equally true, though they do not agree! Thus the fact of religious diversity and the inability of
religious experience to settle the differences undermine the entire argument that religious
experience has parity with sense experience in producing true beliefs and that it can be used to
resolve religious differences.
Solving Religious Conflicts with the Help of Theories of Religion
Another way of solving the problem of conflicting truth claims relies on various interpretations
of the relationship among religions. A variety of such interpretations of religion have been
offered, each of which would solve the problem in its own way. The most important of them are
naturalism, exclusivism, theory of transcendental unity, and complementarity theory.
Naturalism: Naturalism solves the problem in a simple way by denying its existence. It views all
religious claims as false, arising from delusory projection upon the universe of human hopes,
fears, and ideals. All religious claims of knowledge being false, their conflict does not present
any problem. The difficulty with this view is that it does not take any religion seriously or offer
constructive solution to the problem; it merely dismisses the problem as a pseudo problem.
Consequently, many are dissatisfied with this approach, and insist on addressing the problem.
Those who take religion seriously insist that religious belief is not purely human projection.
They admit that religious belief involves imaginative projection, but argue that it has high levels
of cognitive content. According to them, religious beliefs, whilst obviously involving
imaginative projection, attempt to describe experiences of a transcendent reality. When this view
is adopted, the problem of conflicting truth claims is acute; and a variety of religious

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interpretations of religion have been offered to solve it, each of which would solve the problem
in its own way.
Exclusivism: Unlike naturalism, exclusivism acknowledges the conflict as real. But having
acknowledged the existence of a real problem, exclusivism, like naturalism, offers a simple
solution. When there is a conflict, the beliefs of one’s own religion are to be accepted as true and
the others are to be dismissed as false.
This view favors one religion holding it as the sole depository of truth while dismissing all
other ones, especially those that disagree with the religion of one’s choice, as propagators of
error. However, a “hermeneutic of suspicion” is provoked by the way one happens to favor a
religion. Most often the decision to favor a religion is prompted by the accident of birth, rather
than rational considerations. Thus there is a certain non-rational arbitrariness in the choice of a
religion to be accorded the status of being the one and only true religion. And if the conviction is
added that salvation and eternal life depend upon accepting the truths of one’s own religion, it
may well seem unfair that this saving truth is known only to one group, into which only a
minority of the human race have had the good fortune to be born.
The Transcendent Unity of Religions: The proponents of the transcendental unity of religions
hold that the conflicts between the truth claims of religion are only apparent. Disagreements
pertain to the nonessential externals of religion; they vanish at the source, where there is
agreement. The pluralist view then tries to identify the common core of religion where
disagreements vanish. This attempt has thrown up three suggestions.
In the first instance, a distinction is made between the esoteric religion of the mystics and the
exoteric religions of the mass of believers, and it is claimed that the former is, in its innermost
core, identical across the different religions, whereas the latter, consisting of cultural elements,
differ and are indeed at many points mutually incompatible. Religious disagreements can be
overcome by concentrating on the esoteric religion of the mystics rather than the exoteric
religion.
This view encounters two difficulties. First, it relativizes the different religious belief-systems
and ways of life. Secondly, the claim that the esoteric religion of the mystics is identical across
the different religions, is not borne out by facts. As a matter of fact, the descriptions of the
mystics differ considerably. Whilst some mystics report union with a personal divine being,
others report union with a nonpersonal reality, and still others report an annihilation of the self or

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a merger into a universal self, or even blissful emptiness. Thus there seems to be no agreement
even at the level of esoteric religion. Consequently, the problem of conflicting truth claims is left
unsolved.
The second suggestion is based on a distinction between the core mystical experience and the
report of that experience. It is suggested that the mystics of all tradition have similar experience,
but while describing it, each one is obliged to rely on the concepts and thought-forms of one’s
own tradition. The differences in the description of the mystics are then attributed to varying
theological interpretations of a common, ineffable experience.
Here it is disputed whether mysticism constitutes, as is claimed, a direct and unmediated
awareness of the divine reality, or whether even this experience is conditioned by the thought-
forms of the mystic’s tradition. Are the differences in the reports of the mystics to be attributed
to varying interpretations of a common, ineffable experience; or should we hold that a
preconscious interpretative activity enters into the formation of the conscious experience, so that
the mystics’ actual experiences are characteristically different? If the differences in the reports of
the mystics are indicative of genuinely different experiences, the attempt to find in a common
mystical experience a unifying principle beyond the multiplicity of religious beliefs and practices
stands checkmated.
The third suggestion is based upon a Kantian-type distinction between the Real (or the Divine
or the Ultimate) in itself and the Real as humanly conceived and experienced. The Kantian-type
hypothesis meets the problem of the conflicting truth claims of the different religions by
proposing that that they do not in fact conflict because they are claims about different
manifestations of the Real to different human faith communities, each operating with its own
conceptuality, spiritual practices, form of life, treasury of myths and stories, and historical
memories. On this hypothesis, Reality is one, disagreements arise because this one reality is
experienced in different ways. One of the significant critical questions about this hypothesis is
whether in reducing the distinctive belief-systems of the different religions from absolute truths
to reports of one human perception of the divine reality, it does not contradict the cherished self-
understanding of each as the depository of truth.
Plurality of Ultimates: The logical ground for proposing a single Ultimate at the source of
differing experiences has been subjected to scrutiny. Are the differences in the reports of the
mystics merely a matter of different experiences of a single Ultimate or are they indicative of the

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existence of different Ultimates? If the differences are indicative of the existence of different
Ultimates, it easy to explain why religious claims conflict: the claims of different religions do not
agree, because they describe different objects and experiences. Here the critical questions
concern the relationship among the different Ultimates.
Complementarity Theory: According to this theory, the Supreme Reality reveals complementary
aspects of itself within the different world religions. Disagreements arise because no religion
possesses the entire truth. It is then claimed that through their friendly interactions, each seeking
to learn from the others, a total picture will emerge and conflicts will be resolved. The question
here is whether religious truths are varying revelations of the same reality, or whether they are
descriptions of different Ultimates.
Check Your Progress IV
Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer
b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit
1) Examine whether religious experiences count as good evidences for resolving disagreements.
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2) What are the proposed solutions to the problem of conflicting truth claims?
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1.4 PRACTICAL RESPONSE TO RELIGIOUS PLURALISM

Irrespective of the way we view it, religious plurality is a statistical fact that we are called to live
with. Therefore, the practical question is, how are we to interact with people of religious beliefs
and practices other than our own? In this context, three practical steps are suggested: religious
toleration, appreciating diversity, and religious dialogue.

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i. Religious Toleration
Toleration in general is the enduring of something disagreeable. Thus it is different from
indifference toward things that do not matter and also from broad-minded celebration of
differences. It involves a decision to forgo using power or coercion to change the things we
dislike; so it is not merely resignation at the inevitability of the disagreeable. Toleration involves
having power to change the disagreeable, but not using it. Tolerating other’s views and actions
is quite compatible with trying to change another’s mind, as long as one relies on rational
persuasion—or, perhaps, emotional appeals—rather than blunt threats or subtle brainwashing.
Religious toleration is an aspect of toleration in general; it is enduring disagreeable
religious differences which are either expressed or acted upon. It is not to be confused with
secularization or erosion of religious devotion. It is also distinct from the sort of pluralistic
ecumenicism that seeks consensus on central religious matters or views other religious beliefs as
simply different routes to similar goals. We can believe that we are clearly right and others are
egregiously wrong on a matter of huge and holy significance, and still decide not to use force or
coercion to bring change in their beliefs and practices.
Philosophers have suggested various reasons for tolerance. Arguing pragmatically, Locke
asserted that tolerance is necessary for civil peace. Then looking for rational grounds, he argued
that any attempt to forcefully change other’s religious beliefs and practices is “absolutely
impertinent: because they are not proper to convince the mind.” So coerced conversions are
irrational not only because they are imprudent, but also downright self-contradictory, for “I
cannot be saved by a Religion that I distrust, and by a Worship that I abhor. It is in vain for an
Unbeliever to take up the outward shew of another mans profession. Faith only, and inward
sincerity, are the things that procure acceptance with God.”
Mill, on the other hand, bases his argument for toleration on individual liberty. In his work,
On Liberty, right after noting that intolerance is so natural to humans, he asserts his “one very
simple principle”: no one shall interfere with the liberty of action of any of other except for self-
protection. Combine this principle with a moral principle of respect for the individual and the
individual’s conscience and autonomy and we get classical liberalism’s case for full toleration of
religious practices—the contentious but peaceful coexistence of different religions in a neutral
state.

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ii. Appreciating and Encouraging Diversity
The arguments for religious toleration mentioned above must be distinguished from another
consideration that Mill introduced, namely, the positive appreciation and promotion of diversity.
Locke was not one to celebrate plurality; he merely argued the irrationality of not enduring it.
One could go further and argue for actually appreciating and even promoting disagreeable
practices. Thus an employer might set up work schedules that accommodate an employee’s
disagreeable religious practices, and a society may empower minorities to broadcast disagreeable
viewpoints. Mill and others have argued that it is prudent for individuals and societies to promote
the airing of what contradicts them, because that is how we correct our mistakes and arrive at
better reasons and more truth. Democratic governments not only tolerate criticism, but set up
structures like opposition parties and free media to air alternative, and often critical, views.
Theists also can take a leaf out of their book and set up structures that would protect and promote
the airing of alternative views. The motivation for this can come from a view that human
comprehension of God’s will is inherently limited and fallible. This view would yield a
theologically based, epistemological humility that not only tolerates but also enables the
expression of what seems to be heresy, since the latter might give new insights into what one
already believes. It must be specially noted that for promoting such cooperation one need not
necessarily accept that the other is right at least in some way; such openness to accommodate
those who differ from us is consistent with viewing the other as being wrong in a disagreeable
way.
iii. Interreligious or Interfaith Dialogue
Another practical way of responding to religious diversity is to engage in interfaith or inter-
religious dialogue. The term interfaith dialogue refers to cooperative and positive interaction
between people of different religious traditions and spiritual or humanistic beliefs, at both the
individual and institutional level with the aim of deriving understanding and cooperation and if
possible a common ground in belief. This can be achieved through a concentration on similarities
between faiths, understanding of values, and commitment to the world. It is distinct from
syncretism, in that dialogue often involves promoting understanding between different religions
to increase acceptance of others, whereas to syncretism seeks to synthesize new beliefs fusing
differing systems of belief. In dialogue no attempt is made to fuse differing systems of belief;

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what is sought is positive interaction between people of different traditions and beliefs, aimed to
promote mutual understanding and cooperation.

The major argument in favor of dialogue is that besides bringing deeper understanding among
religions, it would help to resolve conflicts fueled by religion and promote cooperation among
them to construct a better world. The resolve for dialogue can be further buttressed by the
assumption that all spiritual and religious traditions are a source of values that ensure dignified
life for all, so that if we want to live our faith with integrity, these traditions need to be jointly
explored.

Check Your Progress V

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer
b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit
1. Explain the meaning of religious toleration.
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2. Explain the meaning and importance of religious dialogue.
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1.5 LET US SUM UP

To sum up, in our globalized and rapidly shrinking world, religious pluralism is obviously a
major issue within the philosophy of religion. Besides the question of defining religious
pluralism, discussion on the topic centers most frequently on two issues: the relation among the
religions and the most appropriate response—both philosophical and practical—to the obvious
fact of plurality. These issues present so obvious a challenge to philosophical speculation that it
seems inevitable that they will be increasingly widely discussed in the coming decades.

1.6 KEY WORDS

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Religious pluralism: an acceptance of the fact of religious diversity and of the concept that all
religions are valid, though they differ from one’s own.
Religious exclusivism: the view that dismisses as false all religions other than one’s own.
Naturalism: The view that denies spiritual realities beyond nature and accepts nature as the
ultimate reality. It views all religious claims as false, arising from delusory projection upon the
universe of human hopes, fears, and ideals.
Religious toleration: It is enduring disagreeable religious differences which are either expressed
or acted upon.
Secularization: Dismissing religion from public life, and in extreme cases total erosion of
religious devotion.
Ecumenicism: A search for consensus on central religious matters, or a view that other religious
beliefs are simply different routes to similar goals.
Interfaith dialogue: Cooperative and positive interaction between people of different religious
traditions and spiritual or humanistic beliefs, at both the individual and institutional level with
the aim of deriving understanding and cooperation and if possible a common ground in belief.

1.7 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

Beneke, Chris. Beyond Toleration: The Religious Origins of American Pluralism. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2006.
Gordis, Robert. “Ground Rules for a Christian-Jewish Dialogue” In: The Root and the Branch,
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1962.
Hick, John. “Religious Pluralism.” A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, edited by Quinn
and Taliaferro. Wiley-Blackwell, 1997, 607-614.
Himma, Kenneth Einar. “Finding a High Road: The Moral Case for Salvific Pluralism,”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. Vol. 52, no. 1 (August 2002), 1-33.
Langerak, Edward. “Theism and Toleration.” A Companion to Philosophy of Religion. Ed.
Quinn and Taliaferro. Wiley-Blackwell, 1997, 514-22.
Ucko, Hans ed. People of God, Peoples of God. WCC Publications, 1996.
“Religious Pluralism,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religious_pluralism.

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1.8 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Answers to Check Your Progress I

1. Some people make a distinction between religious plurality and religious pluralism, and
define the former as the fact of religious diversity and the latter as a simple acknowledgement
and acceptance of that fact.

2. The expression religious pluralism is used in a number of related ways. Some consider
religious pluralism as a worldview which acknowledges that one’s religion is not the sole and
exclusive source of truth, and admits that there are at least some truths and true value in other
religions. Another definition of religious pluralism involves accepting the beliefs taught by
other religions as true though they differ from the ones taught by one’s own religion. This
involves an acceptance of the concept that all religions are valid though their beliefs appear to
be conflicting. A broader definition of religious pluralism goes beyond the acknowledgement
of the fact of plurality and an acceptance of the validity of all religions and includes an active
engagement with plurality in the form of inter-religious dialogue and cooperation.

Answers to Check Your Progress II

1.One of the necessary conditions for the existence of religious pluralism is the existence of
freedom of religion. To have freedom of religion, religions must accept to coexist, acting
within a commonly accepted law of a particular region. Freedom of religion exists when
different religions of a particular region possess the same rights of worship and public
expression. Secondly, for religious pluralism to flourish there has to be mutual respect
between different religious traditions. It is only in an atmosphere of mutual respect and
cooperation that religious pluralism can flourish.

2. Just as religious freedom promotes religious pluralism, its absence shuts out religious
pluralism. In atheist countries there can be no religious pluralism, since in such countries
there can be no religion at all.
Another factor that hinders religious pluralism is exclusivism. Exclusivist religions teach that
theirs is the only way to truth and salvation; they cannot see any good in other religions or

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 tolerate them. Some of them would even argue that it is the duty of a true believer to wage
jihad against the falsehoods taught by other religions. This situation obtains in certain. It is
easy to see that where such an attitude prevails, there can be no religious pluralism.
A lesser form of exclusivism consists in giving one religion or denomination special rights
that are denied to others. This situation obtains in certain Islamic countries where Shariat law
is promulgated. Though less deplorable than exclusivism, this sort of preferential treatment is
detrimental to religious pluralism.

Answers to Check Your Progress III

1) Those who take the question of the relationship between religions seriously propose two
models of relationship: exclusivism and pluralism. Exclusivism addresses the problem in a
simple way by dismissing as false all religions other than one’s own. Basically, it is the view
that there can only be one true religion. Other religions are dismissed as false and misleading,
at least in so far as their beliefs are incompatible with those taught by one’s own. Pluralism,
on the other hand, rejects the exclusivist view and accepts that other traditions too can be
sources of truth and salvation.

2) Those who accept pluralism try to explain it. The prominent pluralist explanations are: unity
in diversity, complementarity of religions, and radical diversity.
Unity in diversity: One form of pluralism claims that the various historical religions like
Hinduism, Islam and Christianity are manifestations of a core universal religion. Thus the
pluralist view adopted by Frithjof Schuon, Rene Guenon, Ananda Coomaraswamy, Seyyed
Hossein Nasr, and Huston Smith and others distinguish between the esoteric religion of the
mystics and the exoteric religions of the mass of believers. It is then claimed that the former
is, in its innermost core, identical across the different religions, whereas the latter, consisting
of culturally conditioned concepts, doctrines, imagery, lifestyle, and spiritual practices, differ
and are indeed at many points mutually incompatible. Thus historical religions are seen as
different manifestations of core experience; all religions are united at the level of this
experience.

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 Complementarity of Religions: This is another way of viewing plurality. Proponents of this
theory speak of a Supreme Reality which wills all to be consciously related to it.
Complementary aspects of this Reality are revealed within the different world religions. Thus,
for example, the Semitic and Indian traditions are complementary, emphasizing the active and
unchanging poles respectively of the Supreme Spiritual Reality to which they both seek to
relate. By their friendly interactions, each seeking to learn from the others, a “convergent
spirituality” may emerge in ways which cannot be known in advance.
Radical Diversity: This view holds that each tradition is unique and independent; there is no
unifying factor common to all religious forms. Not only the external expressions but even the
Ultimates of religion are different. The personal God affirmed by monotheistic religions, for
example, is different from the ever-changing, interdependent process of the universe (pratitya-
samutpada) affirmed by Buddhism. On this view, each religion is unique; there is no
significant unity among them, except that of a common name and some of external structural
features like moral codes, belief-systems and ritual practices. But the contents of these differ.
Thus there is radical diversity. The attempt to find a unifying common core is futile.

Answers to Check Your Progress IV

1. After Hume and Kant a widespread consensus emerged that the traditional theistic
arguments fail to prove religious claims. In its place experience was proposed as a valid
source of religious knowledge. Therefore it is important to examine whether such experiences
can count as good evidences for resolving disagreements.
Some people raised objections against using religious experience as a source of knowledge
about God and supernatural realities, because such experiences may have a purely natural
origin in the powers of the human imagination. Religious experience, they argued, remains
objectively ambiguous.
At this point the “principle of rational credulity” is invoked, according to which it is rational
to trust our experience as a source of valid knowledge except in so far as we have reason to
distrust it. And it is claimed that the same principle should apply impartially to religious
experience as well. Prima facie it is an awareness of a non-physical divine reality; and we
must trust it insofar as we have no reason to distrust it.

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 Critics have raised two objections against treating religious experience on a par with sense
experience. First, whereas sense experience is universal and compulsory, religious experience
is optional and confined to a limited number of people, so that whilst sensory reports can in
principle be confirmed by anyone, reports of religious experience cannot be; and second,
whereas sense experience produces a universally agreed description of the physical world,
religious experience within the different traditions produces different and often incompatible
descriptions of the divine. Because of these reasons, critics reject the claim of parity of
religious experience with sense experience. Thereby the principle of rational credulity is
rendered inapplicable in the case of religious experience.

A positive argument against the reliability of religious experience as a valid source of

knowledge comes from the observation that it produces different and often incompatible
descriptions of the object. Hindus, Muslims, Christians and Buddhist and other religious
groups claim that their non-compatible beliefs correspond to their religious experiences. If
their claim is true, from a religious point of view the question now becomes: Whose
description is true? Which is the true religion? Since all of them claim the support of religious
experience, all of them must be equally true, though they do not agree! Thus the fact of
religious diversity and the inability of religious experience to settle the differences undermine
the entire argument that religious experience has parity with sense experience in producing
true beliefs and that it can be used to resolve religious differences.

2) One way of solving the problem of conflicting truth claims relies on various interpretations of
the relationship among religions. A variety of such interpretations of religion have been
offered, each of which would solve the problem in its own way. The most important of them
are naturalism, exclusivism, theory of transcendental unity, and complementarity theory.
Naturalism: Naturalism solves the problem in a simple way by denying its existence. It views
all religious claims as false, arising from delusory projection upon the universe of human
hopes, fears, and ideals. All religious claims of knowledge being false, their conflict does not
present any problem.

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 Exclusivism: Unlike naturalism, exclusivism acknowledges the conflict as real. Exclusivism,
like naturalism, offers a simple solution. When there is a conflict, the beliefs of one’s own
religion are to be accepted as true and the others are to be dismissed as false.
The Transcendent Unity of Religions: The proponents of the transcendental unity of religions
hold that the conflicts between the truth claims of religion are only apparent. Disagreements
pertain to the nonessential externals of religion; they vanish at the source, where there is
agreement. The pluralist view then tries to identify the common core of religion where
disagreements vanish.
Plurality of Ultimates: Some have proposed that the differences in the reports of the mystics
are they indicative of the existence of different Ultimates. If this is true, it easy to explain why
religious claims conflict: the claims of different religions do not agree, because they describe
different objects and experiences.
Complementarity Theory: According to this theory, the Supreme Reality reveals
complementary aspects of itself within the different world religions. Disagreements arise
because no religion possesses the entire truth. It is then claimed that through their friendly
interactions a total picture will emerge and conflicts will be resolved.

Answers to Check Your Progress V

1. One practical way of responding to religious diversity is to practice religious toleration.

Toleration in general is the enduring of something disagreeable. It involves a decision to forgo
using power or coercion to change the things we dislike; so it is not merely resignation at the
inevitability of the disagreeable. Toleration involves having power to change the disagreeable,
but not using it. Religious toleration is an aspect of toleration in general; it is enduring
disagreeable religious differences which are either expressed or acted upon. We can believe
that we are clearly right and others are egregiously wrong on a matter of huge and holy
significance, and still decide not to use force or coercion to bring change in their beliefs and
practices.

2. Another practical way of responding to religious diversity is to engage in interfaith or inter-

religious dialogue. The term interfaith dialogue refers to cooperative and positive interaction

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between people of different religious traditions and spiritual or humanistic beliefs, at both the
individual and institutional level with the aim of deriving understanding and cooperation and
if possible a common ground in belief. This can be achieved through a concentration on
similarities between faiths, understanding of values, and commitment to the world.
The major argument in favor of dialogue is that besides bringing deeper understanding among
religions, it would help to resolve conflicts fueled by religion and promote cooperation among
them to construct a better world. The resolve for dialogue can be further buttressed by the
assumption that all spiritual and religious traditions are a source of values that ensure
dignified life for all, so that if we want to live our faith with integrity, these traditions need to
be jointly explored.

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