The 4th Maritime Safety International Conference (MASTIC) 2024 IOP Publishing

IOP Conf. Series: Earth and Environmental Science 1423 (2024) 012010 doi:10.1088/1755-1315/1423/1/012010

Maintenance Priority: A Literature Review of

Equipment Criticality Analysis in the Oil and Gas
Industries

D Priyanta1, M B Zaman1 and Semin1

1Department of Marine Engineering, Institut Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember (ITS),

Surabaya 60111, Indonesia

*E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract. Criticality analysis is a fundamental tool in the oil and gas industry to
ensure the ef iciency and safety of equipment. This paper presents a
comprehensive literature review on current methodologies for identifying safety
critical equipment (SCE) and critical equipment (CE). The review begins by
discussing the initial step of identifying SCE, followed by the identi ication of CE.
Various methodologies are examined, ranging from simple, quick screening
techniques to complex, quantitative analyses. Simple methodologies are often used
for initial assessments, while complex methods are applied to equipment posing
high risks that require detailed, quantitative calculations. The review highlights the
strengths and limitations of each approach, providing a comparative analysis of
their effectiveness in different scenarios. Finally, the paper suggests a structured
methodology for developing maintenance tasks tailored speci ically for SCE and
CE, ensuring optimal maintenance strategies that enhance safety and operational
ef iciency. This review aims to guide practitioners in selecting appropriate
methodologies for criticality analysis and maintenance planning in the oil and gas
sector.

1. Introduction
The oil and gas (O&G) industries commonly process crude and natural gas into customer-ready
products. This process can take place in the central processing plant, involving many equipment
ranging from static, rotating, and automatic control systems. This complex production operation
shall be maintained by managing the integrity of all equipment. Therefore, implementing asset
integrity management (AIM) is strongly recommended. AIM will identify and address potential
risks, develop steps to manage and reduce the risks, monitor the condition of the assets, and
ensure the safety and efficiency of the assets [1].
Equipment maintenance is one of the major ways to get the machine to operate properly.
Equipment screening serves as a basis for prioritizing tasks according to their criticality or
importance level and helping to manage risks within an organization. For example, equipment can
be classified into safety-critical (SCE), critical (CE), or non-critical (NCE) categories, after which
maintenance tasks may be assigned accordingly.
Maintenance tasks are administered at the level of failure modes, with certain equipment
exhibiting a prevalent failure mode. An appropriate methodology is determined through a
systematic process, exemplified by using a flowchart to discern the optimal method for
formulating maintenance tasks predicated upon these failure modes [2]. This paper reviews

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The 4th Maritime Safety International Conference (MASTIC) 2024 IOP Publishing
IOP Conf. Series: Earth and Environmental Science 1423 (2024) 012010 doi:10.1088/1755-1315/1423/1/012010

various methodologies for identifying SCE and CE and developing maintenance tasks. It aims to
provide in-depth knowledge of current and best practices in categorizing tools in the oil and gas
industry and formulating maintenance strategies to ensure safe and reliable critical equipment.

2. Methodology
The literature review was centered on the safety-critical equipment (SCE), critical equipment
(CE), and maintenance tasks in the oil and gas industries. A rigorous approach was adopted to
examine relevant materials and reduce bias. The searched databases include Scopus, Google
Scholar, and ResearchGate to find influential studies, recent advancements, and emerging trends.
The first query framework had broad terms such as SCE, CE, and related maintenance tasks. The
focus then narrowed to SCE-specific CE identification and maintenance task development
methodologies. This approach emphasized the studies, frameworks, and techniques developed to
measure equipment criticality and enhance maintenance strategies. It sought to present a variety
of literature on equipment criticality and maintenance practices across different sectors.
The following are a few keywords that are employed in literature searches.
 SCE AND Methodology
 SCE AND Multi-Criteria Decision Making
 CE AND Methodology
 Criticality AND Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis
Papers were chosen from conferences and journals and were not restricted to a specific year.
The abstract, title, and conclusion were examined to ascertain a paper's relevance. The selected
papers will be grouped into two papers discussing SCE and CE. Papers in the SCE and CE group
will be reviewed and regrouped again into subcategories based on the methodology used to
determine SCE or CE. Each methodology in each grouped paper will be reviewed and compared
for its applicability level for practical purposes without leaving the academic sense. The attributes
to determine the practical applicability are the resolution of data requirements, complexity,
assessment tools, analysis resolution, duration, and necessary level of expertise in implementing
each reviewed methodology. The result is a comparison matrix between methods that shows the
advantages and disadvantages of each methodology so that users can determine which method
should be used according to their needs and available resources.

3. Results
A comprehensive review of 45 published papers discussing the methodology for Safety-Critical
Equipment (SCE) and Critical Equipment (CE) have been conducted. There are SCE methodologies
such as logic tree analysis, risk assessment, Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), Layers of
Protection Analysis (LOPA), and Fuzzy-Based LOPA, which would ensure equipment getting
damaged when they fail would lead to significant hazards, thereby making industrial processes
safe and reliable. The CE methodologies consist of risk priority number (RPN), consequence-based
approaches, risk-based methods, fuzzy-consequence-based techniques, fuzzy-based methods, and
Bayesian network analysis.
Each review publication has been examined in terms of key aspects such as methodology, level
of analysis, type of analysis, difficulty level, time and resources required, documentation involved,
and methodology applicability. Figure 1 displays the Sankey diagram of the analysis flows before
determining appropriate maintenance tasks for the equipment.

3.1. Safety Critical Equipment (SCE)

Safety-critical equipment (SCE) and safety-critical elements (SCEs) have different roles in high-
risk industries. This understanding will help take care of all safety actions and property that
should address every possible risk by recognizing these differences. SCEs have a wider set of
systems or units capable of catastrophic disasters than SCE, whose items are physical devices or
machines that prevent accidents or bring down their severity whenever they occur. SCEs range
from procedural components to barriers against potential mortals while there are SCE which is

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The 4th Maritime Safety International Conference (MASTIC) 2024 IOP Publishing
IOP Conf. Series: Earth and Environmental Science 1423 (2024) 012010 doi:10.1088/1755-1315/1423/1/012010

only used on valves, alarms and temperature regulators. Knowing these two terms apart makes it
possible to aim at safety measures and perform maintenance correctly so that all forms of danger
are dealt with broadly.
Various methodologies are used to determine SCE, listed in Table 1. The methodologies are
reviewed and compared to determine their advantages and disadvantages.

Figure 1. The analysis flows to determine maintenance tasks.

Table 1. Comparison of various methodologies to identify SCE

Logic Tree Risk Assessment HAZOP LOPA Fuzzy-Based LOPA
Methodology A series of YES / NO Identifies and A systematic hazard The technique An extension of
questions in a logic evaluates potential analysis technique identifies various LOPA that uses
tree applied to the risks in a process or involves a team of layers of protection fuzzy logic to
equipment in system. It involves experts analyzing and assesses their handle uncertainty
question. assessing the each operational effectiveness in and imprecision in
likelihood and impact stage of a facility to mitigating risk, risk assessment.
of various hazards to identify potential thereby enhancing
determine the overall hazards and their individuals' overall
risk level. consequences. safety and security.
Level of At equipment level At the process or At the process or At the process or At the process or
Analysis system level system level system level system level
Type of Qualitative Qualitative and Primarily qualitative Semi-Quantitative Utilizes fuzzy logic
analysis Quantitative for quantitative
risk assessment.
Level of Low Medium to High High High High
difficulty
Time and It can vary and It can vary and depend Typically, it is time- Generally, it is less It may require
resources depend on the on the complexity of consuming and time-consuming than more time and
complexity of the the process resource intensive. HAZOP but requires resources due to
process detailed data. the complexity of
fuzzy logic
applications.
Documentation Simple Required detail Generates extensive Produces detailed Requires
documentation documentation documentation of reports on the documentation of
identified hazards effectiveness of fuzzy sets and rules
and recommended protection layers and used in the
actions. recommended risk analysis.
reduction measures.
Applicability Commonly found in Broadly applicable It is primarily used in It is commonly used Suitable for
Oil and Gas across various industries with in industries with complex systems
Industries industries. complex processes. high-hazard where traditional
processes. LOPA may not fully
capture the
nuances of risk.
Publication [1] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [15] [16] [17] [18] [20] [21]
reviewed [13] [14] [19]

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The 4th Maritime Safety International Conference (MASTIC) 2024 IOP Publishing
IOP Conf. Series: Earth and Environmental Science 1423 (2024) 012010 doi:10.1088/1755-1315/1423/1/012010

3.1.1. Logic Tree Analysis. A logic tree is a systematic tool for evaluating the equipment failure
consequences of major accidents. It consists of binary questions that represent various aspects of
the potential consequences of failure. The flowchart guides users through a step-by-step analysis
that identifies Safety-Critical Equipment (SCE) or non-SCE components. This method aids in
identifying critical components that need strong safety measures.
The SCE logic tree is a pragmatic method for determining Safety Critical Equipment (SCE),
presented in reference [1][3]. This easy-to-understand binary-question system effectively
assesses the role of machinery in reducing serious incidents. Because of its practicality and
efficiency, it has gained popularity in the oil and gas industry, where safety remains an ongoing
issue. References [4][5] contain discussions and elaborations on SCE logic tree methodology.

3.1.2. Risk Assessment. Risk assessment is critical for identifying and assessing Safety Critical
Elements (SCEs), which can significantly impact a system's safety and integrity. This involves risk
identification and analysis, which helps develop major hazard scenarios and pinpoint major
hazards. High-risk major hazards are typically comprised of SCEs, and within these SCEs, specific
Safety Critical Equipment (SCE) can be pinpointed [6]. In oil and gas facilities, SCEs are integral to
barrier systems that protect against major hazardous events like fires, explosions, and collisions.
A systematic approach to implementing SCEs involves risk assessment, scenario development,
and systematic SCE management to enhance safety and prevent major accidents [7]. A thorough
risk assessment is conducted to understand the risks associated with various activities within the
facility, and major hazard scenarios are developed to determine which systems or equipment
qualify as SCEs based on their criticality in preventing or mitigating major accidents [8].

3.1.3. Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study. HAZOP is a systematic approach used to identify risks
in processes or systems, involving multi-disciplinary teams evaluating flowcharts, piping
drawings, and sequence diagrams. This helps determine Safety-Critical Elements (SCEs) by
estimating potential aftermath of technical malfunctions and hazards. SCEs are crucial as failures
can lead to major accidents. Once identified, SCE can also be identified.
HAZOP's application in offshore platforms assesses the risk level of equipment components
and identifies critical elements requiring intensive maintenance [9]. In a Crude Oil Production Unit
(COPU), HAZOP systematically analyzes the system to identify 71 relevant risks and evaluate their
environmental, health, and economic impacts [10]. An enhanced HAZOP analysis using Multilevel
Flow Modeling (MFM) provides a comprehensive approach to process safety and risk mitigation
[11].
FMECA and HAZOP Integrated Analysis (FHIA) methodologies are combined in LNG
regasification plant storage systems for safety assessment, merging failure mode estimation with
systematic hazard identification, facilitating the identification of Safety-Critical Elements (SCEs)
and associated risks [12]. System complexity increases the complexity of HAZOP studies, making
the process challenging. An example from a Sour Crude Oil Processing Industry (SCOPI) and a
Measurement and Regulatory Station (MRS) in Greece suggests an integrated approach combining
HAZOP with Decision-Matrix Risk Assessment (DMRA) and safety-color mapping to identify, rank,
and address SCEs [13]. HAZOP analysis is a systematic approach to software failure analysis,
utilizing the viewpoint concept from IEEE-1471. This approach simplifies data handling and helps
analysts systematically identify SCEs and their risk factors [14]. This systematic approach enables
complete evaluation and risk prioritization, enhancing efficiency and accuracy in data handling.

3.1.4. Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA). The Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is a risk
management tool that helps to uncover security layers and assigns Safety Integrity Levels (SILs)
for every layer in the process sector. The SIL measures how often safety instrumented functions
(SIFs) fail and carry a meaning of risk reduction attained through SIFs. Thus, LOPA can be applied
in identifying safety instrumented systems (SIS) along with safety-critical elements (SCEs) [15].
SIS comprises input components, logic solvers, and the final components, which are crucial in

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The 4th Maritime Safety International Conference (MASTIC) 2024 IOP Publishing
IOP Conf. Series: Earth and Environmental Science 1423 (2024) 012010 doi:10.1088/1755-1315/1423/1/012010

detecting and controlling harmful events in the oil and gas industries [16]. Additionally, LOPA
finds out how effective SCEs are so that the correct identification and management of dangers can
occur. Also, LOPA when combined with expert systems and fuzzy logic enhances safety assurance.
Furthermore, LOPA studies have looked at fire explosion prevention in tank storage facilities
where several protection levels have been established to reduce threats [17]. Moreover, an IOW
bank covers equipment integrity when it combines LOPA, which would describe safe operating
limits for pressure devices [18]. In addition, the combination between LOPA and Bayesian
approach appeared prominently in risk evaluation conducted on crucial subsea gas compression
systems (SGCS) that rendered a complete platform for assessing and controlling threats related to
SGCS parts [19].

3.1.5. Fuzzy-Based LOPA. The study explores the integration of fuzzy logic and LOPA in addressing
the failure of crude oil shipping pumps, reducing the risk reduction factor (RRF) for potential
hazards [20]. This method provides a more accurate and precise risk assessment, enabling better-
informed decision-making and potentially more cost-effective safety measures. The study also
explores the application of fuzzy-based LOPA methodology in the natural gas industry, analyzing
ammonia hazards [21]. The study proposes a quantitative risk assessment model based on fuzzy
logic, assigning membership functions and ranges for likelihood, severity of consequences, and
total risk levels. The approach is demonstrated through a case study on ammonia hazards,
showcasing its potential application in resolving risk-ranking ties. Overall, the study highlights
the potential of fuzzy logic in enhancing risk assessment and decision-making in various
industries.

3.2. Critical Equipment (CE)

Critical equipment (CE) can be determined by conducting Equipment Criticality Analysis
(ECA). ECA can be defined as a systematic process for evaluating and prioritizing equipment based
on its potential impact on the organization. ECA assesses factors such as safety, reliability, quality,
frequency, and cost to determine the criticality level of each piece of equipment, which is crucial
for effective maintenance planning and resource allocation.
Numerous methodologies are employed in ECA, each with its strengths and weaknesses. These
methodologies can be broadly categorized into three main approaches: consequence-based,
reliability-based, and fuzzy-based. The following sections will review various methodologies for
determining ECA. Table 2 summarizes the comparison of various methodologies used to identify
CE.

3.2.1. Risk Priority Number (RPN). Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is a
systematic methodology for criticality analysis pioneered by MIL-STD-1629A [22]. It aids in
identifying potential failure modes, their consequences, and the strategic allocation of resources
for mitigation and prevention. FMECA is particularly useful for analyzing equipment with multiple
failure modes, prioritizing issues based on their potential impact. The Risk Priority Number (RPN)
is a key tool in FMECA, combining severity (S), occurrence (O), and detection ratings (D) to
quantify the risk level of each failure mode. A higher RPN indicates a more critical failure mode,
enabling effective identification and prioritization of critical equipment.
The practical application of Risk Priority Number (RPN) and FMEA is crucial in assessing
potential failures in pipeline ball valves [23] and reciprocating gas compressors [24]. RPN is
calculated to prioritize risks associated with different components based on severity, occurrence
probability, and risk priority. This approach is particularly useful in reducing failures and
enhancing oil and natural gas industry performance. The risk priority number (RPN) is calculated
by multiplying occurrence, detection, and severity, which is defined qualitatively without any
underlying model. This method is useful for evaluating failure risk and identifying appropriate
risk reduction actions, even when only qualitative data is available [25]. The modified method
accommodates expert evaluations even when only qualitative data is available.

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The 4th Maritime Safety International Conference (MASTIC) 2024 IOP Publishing
IOP Conf. Series: Earth and Environmental Science 1423 (2024) 012010 doi:10.1088/1755-1315/1423/1/012010

Table 2. Comparison of various methodologies to identify CE

Fuzzy
Risk Priority Consequence- Bayesian
Risk-Based Consequence Fuzzy Based
Number (RPN) Based Network
Based
Methodology Assigns a Evaluates the Assesses the Uses fuzzy logic Utilizes fuzzy Models the
numerical value potential risk of to evaluate the logic to rank relationships
to each potential consequences equipment consequences of equipment between
failure mode of equipment failure by equipment based on their different
based on its failure, considering the failure, providing criticality, often failure modes
severity, focusing on probability and a more nuanced used in and their
occurrence, and safety, impact of assessment. conjunction with consequences
detection ease. environmental potential other methods. using Bayesian
impact, and failures. networks.
production
loss.
Level of Equipment Failure Mode
Equipment level Equipment level Equipment level Equipment level
Analysis level Level
Type of Semi- Semi-
Semi-quantitative Quantitative Semi-quantitative Quantitative
Analysis quantitative quantitative
Level of
Medium High Medium High High High
Difficulty
Time and
Moderate High Moderate High High High
Resources
Documentatio
Simple Detailed Simple Detailed Detailed Complex
n
Applicability Widely used in Oil and gas, General Industries Industries Advanced risk
industries chemical, and applicability requiring requiring assessments in
other high-risk across various complex risk nuanced complex
industries industries assessments criticality systems
assessments
Publication [22] [23] [24] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [5] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [41] [42] [43]
reviewed [25] [26] [27] [39] [40] [44] [45]
[28]

The RPN enhancement method, proposed by [26], combines FMECA with the Dempster–Shafer
(D-S) evidence theory to assess the risk and reliability of oil pump units. This approach addresses
the limitations of traditional risk assessment methods, involving expert evaluations, multi-value
representation of RPN, and optimized prioritization. However, the RPN approach has flaws, such
as gaps in acceptable values, duplicate values, and sensitivity to minor changes. Alternative RPN
formulations, such as those aligned with IEC 60812, are explored [27]. The proposed modified
RPN calculation divides severity and occurrence into subfactors, providing a more realistic
evaluation of risk and enhancing oil pump safety and reliability [28].

3.2.2. Consequence-Based Criticality Analysis. The NORSOK Z-008 standard is a widely recognized
industry guideline that provides comprehensive instructions for risk-based maintenance and
consequence classification [29]. This standard applies to all plant systems and items, including
offshore topside systems, subsea production systems, and oil and gas terminals. The standard
emphasizes the importance of assessing the criticality of equipment and evaluating the potential
consequences of failure. This approach helps identify equipment that requires more stringent
monitoring and maintenance to prevent catastrophic failures, which could lead to safety hazards,
environmental damage, operational downtime, and financial losses. By prioritizing high-risk
equipment, maintenance strategies can be optimized, ensuring that the most critical components
receive the necessary attention and resources to mitigate the risk of failure. This risk-based
approach to maintenance enhances operational reliability and safety, contributing to more
efficient allocation of maintenance resources and reducing the likelihood of unplanned outages
and associated costs.
The study focuses on prioritizing maintenance efforts for complex components in a gas central
processing plant using risk-based methods can be found in [30]. Criticality rankings are obtained

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The 4th Maritime Safety International Conference (MASTIC) 2024 IOP Publishing
IOP Conf. Series: Earth and Environmental Science 1423 (2024) 012010 doi:10.1088/1755-1315/1423/1/012010

by assessing probability and consequence ratings, categorizing components as high, medium, or

low criticality. The research vessel's machinery system is analyzed using modified NORSOK Z-008,
revealing that 21% of equipment falls into the high-risk category and requires planned
maintenance, while 79% is in the low-risk category and requires unplanned maintenance. This
approach helps prioritize maintenance efforts in a complex system with limited resources [31].

3.2.3. Risk-Based Criticality Analysis. Risk-based equipment criticality analysis uses risk as a metric
to determine the criticality of equipment, with higher risk indicating higher criticality. This risk is
calculated by combining the probability of failure (PoF) and the consequences of failure (CoF).
Risk-based modeling focuses on developing methods to model equipment failure's probability and
consequence. Models can be qualitative, semi-quantitative, or quantitative, each offering varying
levels of precision and complexity in evaluating equipment criticality. Quantitative risk analysis is
preferred in the risk prioritization process due to its clarity and facilitation of decision-making.
Qualitative risk analysis uses narrative criteria to evaluate probability and consequence ratings,
while semi-quantitative risk analysis quantifies factors influencing PoF and CoF by scoring.
Determination of PoF, CoF, and risk level ratings is based on an assessment
The Reference [32] introduced ECA protocols for offshore carbon steel static mechanical
equipment, utilizing a 5 x 6 risk matrix based on probability and consequence ratings to determine
the criticality level of each equipment item. Risk-scoring protocols are also essential in
determining the criticality of electromechanical equipment in the Catalyst Preparation Unit [33].
Two scoring approaches are compared to rank the criticality of electromechanical equipment. A
case study evaluates current maintenance strategies and suggests a revised framework
prioritizing critical equipment based on failure impact. Using secondary data like OREDA,
probability estimation determines the probability of failure rating and minimizes downtime [5].
This approach optimizes resource allocation and minimizes downtime.

3.2.4. Fuzzy Consequence-Based Criticality Analysis. Fuzzy logic, a mathematical framework that
addresses uncertainty and imprecision, can enhance the NORSOK Z-008 framework by providing
a more realistic representation of system importance. Traditional approaches may not fully
capture uncertainties and expert reasoning, but incorporating fuzzy sets and linguistic variables
allows for more nuanced and flexible risk evaluation. This criticality matrix assists decision-
makers in prioritizing maintenance tasks effectively, overcoming the drawbacks of traditional
approaches [34].
Unexpected failures and production losses are significant challenges in manufacturing
systems. Risk-based maintenance (RBM) planning is crucial for mitigating these issues.
Prioritizing maintenance tasks based on potential failures informs maintenance strategy,
intervals, and spare parts inventory decisions. A fuzzy inference system (FIS) is introduced to
minimize suboptimal classifications [35].

3.2.5. Fuzzy-Based Criticality Analysis. Conventional FMECA calculates an RPN for each failure
mode by multiplying the ranks of three risk factors: Occurrence, Severity, and Non-Detection.
Classical FMECA has limitations, such as homogeneity and challenges in predicting occurrence,
severity, and detection. Fuzzy-FMECA uses linguistic terms and an if-then rule-based system to
identify and prioritize failure modes, providing a more nuanced evaluation of potential failures
and their criticality. Fuzzy rules encapsulate expert knowledge and reasoning.
The study to explore the application of fuzzy-based FMECA in assessing the criticality of LNG
storage facilities may refer to [36][37]. The fuzzy logic addresses uncertainties and vagueness in
risk assessments, enhancing the precision of risk evaluations. The other study focuses on the
unloading facility of an LNG terminal, highlighting the importance of identifying safety-critical
elements (SCEs) and proposing mitigation strategies [38]. Fuzzy-based FMECA has also been used
to evaluate risks associated with offshore platforms, combining FMECA with fuzzy set theory and
gray relational analysis (GRA). The study also employs the Fuzzy Borda Method (FBM) to

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The 4th Maritime Safety International Conference (MASTIC) 2024 IOP Publishing
IOP Conf. Series: Earth and Environmental Science 1423 (2024) 012010 doi:10.1088/1755-1315/1423/1/012010

aggregate expert evaluations, demonstrating its effectiveness in identifying and ranking risks
more accurately than conventional methods [39].
The study discusses fuzzy-based FMECA in risk analysis of FPSO oil and gas processing systems
[40]. The method, enhanced with fuzzy evidence reasoning and fuzzy TOPSIS, addresses
conventional FMECA's weaknesses like equal factor weighting and subjective biases by using
fuzzy logic to represent occurrence, severity, and detectability ratings, providing a robust tool for
decision-making in complex marine environments.

3.2.6. Bayesian Network Criticality Analysis.

Bayesian networks (BN) provide a robust visual representation of dependencies among variables,
enhancing FMECA by identifying critical failure modes, causes, and effects. FMECA, an enhanced
method, integrates fuzzy logic and Bayesian networks to address traditional limitations like
handling uncertain data and subjective evaluations. The fuzzy best-worst method (FBWM)
determines the weights of severity, occurrence, and detection risk parameters, while the fuzzy
Bayesian network (FBN) calculates the occurrence probabilities of failure modes, incorporating
expert judgments to handle uncertainties and dependencies between failure events [41].
A Bayesian network (BN) approach is proposed to assess the risk of third-party damage (TPD)
in oil and gas pipelines [42]. This approach considers pre- and post-failure risk factors, integrating
risk indicators like pipeline location, material, and environmental conditions. This helps
comprehensively identify the critical segment of the pipeline. A hybrid methodology integrating
FMECA, BN, and dynamic principal component analysis (DPCA) is also proposed to enhance fault
detection in industrial processes [43]. FMECA identifies and prioritizes potential failure modes
based on their severity, occurrence, and detectability, while BN models probabilistic relationships
between process variables and failure modes. This method effectively differentiates between non-
critical and critical faults and, indirectly, the critical and non-critical equipment that accompany
non-critical and critical faults.
A novel safety assessment model for oil and gas pipeline failures is proposed, incorporating
fuzzy logic into Bayesian belief networks to deal with uncertainties [44]. The FBBN (fuzzy
Bayesian belief network) model is useful in safety analysis due to its flexible structure, which
allows it to fit various accident scenarios. The proposed method can identify the most significant
causes of pipeline failures through sensitivity analysis, such as construction defects, overload,
mechanical damage, bad installation, and worker quality.
Other applications of Bayesian networks in determining equipment criticality include
comparing constant bottom-hole pressure drilling to conventional overbalanced drilling [45].
Bow-tie models are transformed into Bayesian networks to overcome the complexities of
modeling dependencies and updating beliefs based on operational data.

3.3. Developing Maintenance Tasks

The oil and gas industry can utilize generic maintenance concepts (GMC) described in [29] to
create maintenance procedures for their equipment. GMC refers to a collection of cost-effective
maintenance actions, techniques, and specifics that sustain equipment in similar conditions. If a
GMC is unavailable, it is suggested that equipment be treated individually as a separate generic
class. It involves a detailed analysis to identify and document the maintenance actions, strategies,
and details specific to that equipment. The detailed analysis will classify the equipment as SCE,
CE, or non-critical. The method is outlined in section 3.1. and 3.2. can be adopted to classify the
equipment.
Maintenance tasks of classified equipment can be developed by considering its failure modes.
For practical purposes, reference [2] suggested that risk-based inspection (RBI) analysis could be
adopted to develop an inspection plan for equipment with loss of containment as the dominant
failure mode. Reliability-centered maintenance (RCM) could be adopted for equipment with
multiple failure modes to develop maintenance tasks. RCM used FMEA to document the failure

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The 4th Maritime Safety International Conference (MASTIC) 2024 IOP Publishing
IOP Conf. Series: Earth and Environmental Science 1423 (2024) 012010 doi:10.1088/1755-1315/1423/1/012010

analysis and maintenance logic tree to determine the equipment’s maintenance task based on its
failure modes. The RBI and RCM extension analysis, incorporating sophisticated techniques such
as fuzzy logic and Bayesian networks, could be implemented for SCE and CE.

4. Discussion
ECA is a crucial step in Risk-Based Maintenance (RBM), prioritizing maintenance efforts based on
equipment risk and criticality. ECA assigns criticality levels using a three-tier classification
system: C1 for high criticality, C2 for medium criticality, and C3 for low criticality. This helps
identify equipment that requires more stringent maintenance and monitoring due to its potential
impact on system performance and safety.
SCE is categorized as highly critical equipment, ensuring system safety and preventing
catastrophic failures. Non-SCE equipment is classified into Critical Equipment (CE) or Non-Critical
Equipment (NCE). CEs, classified as C1 or C2, have significant importance but may not be as critical
as SCE, while NCEs, classified as C3, require less intensive maintenance efforts.
This paper provides a comprehensive overview of methodologies for identifying safety-critical
equipment (SCE) and critical equipment (CE) in the oil and gas (O&G) industry. The logic tree
approach is widely used in the O&G industry due to its simplicity and direct method for identifying
SCE. This method is effective for equipment with loss of containment as the dominant failure
mode, allowing for efficient safety management and resource allocation. Other methods include
risk assessment, Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), and Layers of Protection Analysis
(LOPA). Advanced techniques like Fuzzy-Based LOPA incorporate fuzzy logic for more nuanced
risk evaluations. These methods typically do not directly point out SCE, as the analysis occurs at a
level lower than the equipment, such as failure modes level. This approach ensures thorough
evaluation of all potential failure modes, leading to a more accurate and reliable identification of
critical safety equipment.
FMECA is a traditional method for assessing critical equipment (CE). It systematically examines
potential failure modes, causes, and effects, evaluating their criticality using a risk-priority
number (RPN). This method prioritizes maintenance and safety efforts based on criticality. The
consequence-based criticality analysis identifies the equipment that poses the greatest risk to
safety and operations, particularly in environments where the primary concern is mitigating the
impact of failures. Risk-based criticality analysis integrates the probability and consequences of
failure, providing a balanced view of equipment risks and enabling informed decision-making.
FMECA can be expanded by incorporating fuzzy logic or Bayesian networks for more quantitative
and detailed analysis. These techniques handle uncertainties and imprecisions in data, enhancing
the precision and robustness of FMECA and enabling a deeper understanding of equipment failure
risks.

5. Conclusions
RCA is crucial in RBM in prioritizing maintenance efforts based on equipment risk and criticality.
ECA identifies equipment requiring stringent maintenance and monitoring due to its potential
impact on system performance and safety. SCE is critical for ensuring system safety and
preventing catastrophic failures.
Various methodologies are used in the O&G industry to identify SCE and critical equipment.
The logic tree approach is a popular method for identifying SCE, especially for equipment with
loss of containment as the dominant failure mode. Alternative methods like Risk assessment,
HAZOP, and LOPA provide nuanced risk evaluations. Advanced techniques like Fuzzy-Based LOPA
enhance the precision of criticality assessments.
FMECA is another method for prioritizing maintenance and safety efforts based on criticality.
Enhancements with fuzzy logic or Bayesian networks improve the accuracy of criticality
assessments. In conclusion, rigorous criticality assessments are essential for ensuring the safety
and reliability of critical equipment in the O&G industry. Combining traditional and advanced
methodologies can optimize system performance.

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The 4th Maritime Safety International Conference (MASTIC) 2024 IOP Publishing
IOP Conf. Series: Earth and Environmental Science 1423 (2024) 012010 doi:10.1088/1755-1315/1423/1/012010

6. Acknowledgments
The authors express their gratitude to the Department of Marine Engineering, Institut Teknologi
Sepuluh Nopember (ITS), Surabaya, Indonesia, for supporting this research.

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