Chapter 3:

User Authentication
2

Chapter 3 Overview

• Electronic user authentication principles

• Password-based authentication
• Token-based authentication
• Biometric authentication
• Remote user authentication
• Security issues for user authentication
• Practical application: an iris biometric system
• Case study: security problems for ATM
systems
3

Learning Objectives

• Discuss the four general means of

authenticating a user’s identity
• Explain the mechanism by which hashed
passwords used for user authentication
• Understand the use of the Bloom filters in
password management
• Present an overview of token-based user
authentication
• Discuss the issues involved and the approaches
for remote user authentication
4

User Authentication

• Fundamental security building block

 basis of access control & user accountability
• The process of verifying an identity
claimed by or for a system entity
• Two steps:
 Identification: specify identifier
 Verification: bind entity (person) and identifier
• Distinct from message authentication (when
communicating parties are concerned with the integrity of the ex-
changes messages)
5
A Model For Electronic User Authentication

• NIST SP 800-63-2 defines EUA as: the process of establishing

confidence in user identity that are electronically presented
• The NIST SP 800-63-2 model
 User applies to registration authority (RA) and becomes a
subscriber of a credential service provider (CSP)
 RA is a trusted entity
 The CSP exchanges with the subscriber
 The credential (a data structure) binds an identity to a token
possessed by the subscriber
 Claimant: the party to be authenticated
 Verifier: the party verifying
 The verifier passes an assertion about the subscriber to the
relaying party (PR)
6
A Model For Electronic User Authentication
7

Means Of User Authentication

• Four means of authenticating user's

identity
• Based one something the individual
 knows, e.g. password, PIN
 possesses, e.g. key, token, smartcard
 is (static biometrics), e.g. fingerprint, retina
 does (dynamic biometrics), e.g. voice, sign
• Can use alone or combined
• All can provide user authentication
• All have issues
8
Risk Assessment For User Authentication

• Assurance level: the degree of certainty that a

user has presented a credential that refers to
his/her identity
 Level 1: little confidence (an online forum)
 Level 2: some confidence (professional
organizations)
 Level 3: High confidence (patent office applicants)
 Level 4: Very high confidence (employees
accessing restricted/sensitive services)
• Potential impact: low, moderate, impact
Risk Assessment for
User Authentication
• There are
three
separate Assurance
Level
concepts:

Potential
impact

Areas of
risk
Assurance Level
More Four levels
Describes an
organization’s
specifically is of
defined as: assurance
degree of
certainty that Level 1
a user has The degree of
• Little or no confidence in the
asserted identity's validity

presented a confidence in the

vetting process used to
establish the identity of
credential that the individual to whom
the credential was Level 2
refers to his issued • Some confidence in the
asserted identity’s validity

or her identity
Level 3
• High confidence in the
asserted identity's validity
The degree of
confidence that the
individual who uses the
credential is the
individual to whom the Level 4
credential was issued • Very high confidence in the
asserted identity’s validity
Potential Impact
• FIPS 199 defines three levels of potential
impact on organizations or individuals should
there be a breach of security:
 Low
• An authentication error could be expected to have a
limited adverse effect on organizational operations,
organizational assets, or individuals
 Moderate
• An authentication error could be expected to have a
serious adverse effect‫أثر س لبي‬
 High
• An authentication error could be expected to have a
severe or catastrophic adverse effect
13
Risk Assessment For User
Authentication

  Assurance Level Impact Profiles

Potential Impact Categories for Authentication Errors 1 2 3 4

Inconvenience, distress, or damage to standing or reputation Low Mod Mod High

Financial loss or organization liability Low Mod Mod High

Harm to organization programs or interests None Low Mod High

Unauthorized release of sensitive information None Low Mod High

Mod/
Personal safety None None Low
High

Civil or criminal violations None Low Mod High

14

Password Authentication

• Widely used user authentication method

 user provides name/login and password
 system compares password with that saved
for specified login
• Authenticates ID of user logging and
 that the user is authorized to access system
 determines the user’s privileges
 is used in discretionary access control
15

Password Vulnerabilities

• offline dictionary attack

• specific account attack (user john)
• popular password attack (against a wide
range of IDs)
• password guessing against single user (w/
previous knowledge about the user)
• workstation hijacking
• exploiting user mistakes
• exploiting multiple password use
• electronic monitoring
16
Countermeasures For Password Vulnerability

• stop unauthorized access to password

file
• intrusion detection measures
• account lockout mechanisms
• policies against using common pass-
words but rather hard to guess pass-
words
• training & enforcement of policies
• automatic workstation logout
• encrypted network links
17
Countermeasures For Password Vulnerability

• It is worthwhile to study/research
password and password vulnerabilities
 Most common
 Still the most efficient
 18

Use Of Hashed Passwords

19

Why A Salt Value?

• Prevents duplicate passwords from

being visible in the password file
• Increases the difficulty of offline
dictionary attacks
• Nearly impossible to tell if a person
used the same password on multiple
systems
20

UNIX Implementation

• Original scheme
 8 character password form 56-bit key
 12-bit salt used to modify DES en-
cryption into a one-way hash func-
tion
 output translated to 11 character se-
quence
• Now regarded as woefully insecure
 e.g. supercomputer, 50 million tests,
80 min
• Sometimes still used for compati-
bility
21

Improved Implementations

• Have other, stronger, hash/salt variants

• Many systems now use MD5
 with 48-bit salt
 password length is unlimited
 is hashed with 1000 times inner loop
 produces 128-bit hash
• OpenBSD uses Blowfish block cipher
based and hash algorithm called Bcrypt
 uses 128-bit salt to create 192-bit hash
value
22

Password Cracking

• Dictionary attacks
 try each word then obvious variants in large
dictionary against hash in password file
• Rainbow table attacks
 a large dictionary of possible passwords
 for each password:
• precompute tables of hash values for all salts
• a mammoth table of hash values: e.g. 1.4GB ta-
ble cracks 99.9% of alphanumeric Windows
passwords in 13.8 secs
 not feasible if larger salt values used
23

Password Choices/Concerns

• users may pick short passwords

 e.g. 3% were 3 chars or less, easily guessed
 system can reject choices that are too short
• users may pick guessable passwords
 so crackers use lists of likely passwords
 e.g. one study of 14000 encrypted pass-
words guessed nearly 1/4 of them
 would take about 1 hour on fastest systems
to compute all variants, and only need 1
break!
24

Another Case Study

• An analysis of passwords used by

25,000 students
• Over 10% recovered after 10^10
guesses
25

Password File Access Control

• Can block offline guessing attacks by

denying access to encrypted passwords
 make available only to privileged users
 often using a separate shadow password (for
su only)
• Still have vulnerabilities
 exploit O/S bug
 accident with permissions making it readable
 users with same password on other systems
 access from unprotected backup media
 sniff passwords in unprotected network traffic
26

Using Better Passwords

• Clearly have problems with passwords

• Goal to eliminate guessable passwords
 Still easy for user to remember
• Techniques
 user education
 computer-generated passwords
 reactive password checking (periodic check-
ing)
 proactive password checking (at the time of
selection)
27

Proactive Password Checking

• Rule enforcement plus user advice, e.g.
 8+ chars, upper/lower/numeric/punctuation
 may not suffice
• Password cracker
 list of bad passwords
 time and space issues
• Markov Model
 generates guessable passwords
 hence reject any password it might generate
• Bloom Filter
 use to build table based on dictionary using hashes
 check desired password against this table
28

Token-based Authentication

• Object user possesses to authenti-

cate, e.g.
 memory card (magnetic stripe)
 smartcard
29

Memory Card

• store but do not process data

• magnetic stripe card, e.g. bank card
• electronic memory card
• used alone for physical access (e.g.,
hotel rooms)
• some with password/PIN (e.g., ATMs)
• Drawbacks of memory cards include:
 need special reader
 loss of token issues
 user dissatisfaction (OK for ATM, not OK
for computer access)
30

Smartcard
• credit-card like
• has own processor, memory, I/O ports
 ROM, EEPROM, RAM memory
• executes protocol to authenticate with reader/computer
 static: similar to memory cards
 dynamic: passwords created every minute;
entered manually by user or electronically
 challenge-response: computer creates a ran-
dom number; smart card provides its hash
(similar to PK)
• also have USB dongles
31

Electronic Identify Cards

• An important application of smart cards

• A national e-identity (eID)
• Serves the same purpose as other national ID
cards (e.g., a driver’s licence)
 Can provide stronger proof of identity
 A German card
• Personal data, Document number, Card access number
(six digit random number), Machine readable zone
(MRZ): the password
• Uses: ePass (government use), eID (general use), eSign
(can have private key and certificate)
32

User Authentication With eID

33

Biometric Authentication

• Authenticate user based on one of

their physical characteristics:
 facial
 fingerprint
 hand geometry
 retina pattern
 iris
 signature
 voice
34

Operation of a
biometric
system

Verification is analogous to
user login via a smart card
and a PIN

Identification is biometric info

but no IDs; system compares
with stored templates
35

Biometric Accuracy

• The system generates a matching score (a number) that quanti-

fies similarity between the input and the stored template
• Concerns: sensor noise and detection inaccuracy
• Problems of false match/false non-match
36

Biometric Accuracy

• Can plot characteristic curve (2,000,000 compar-

isons)
• Pick threshold balancing error rates
37

Remote User Authentication

• Authentication over network more com-

plex
 Problems of eavesdropping, replay
• Generally use challenge-response
 user sends identity
 host responds with random number r
 user computes f(r,h(P)) and sends back
 host compares value from user with own
computed value, if match user authenticated
• Protects against a number of attacks
38
Protocol For A Password Verification

• Similar approach
for token and
biometric
verification
39

Authentication Security Issues

• Client attacks: attacker attempts
to achieve user authentication
without access to the remote host
 Masquerade as a legitimate user (e.g.,
guess the password or try all pass-
words)
 Countermeasure: strong passwords;
limit number of attempts
40

Authentication Security Issues

• Host attacks: attacker attacks the
host where passwords/passcodes
are stored
 Countermeasure: hashing, protect
password databases
41

Authentication Security Issues

• Eavesdropping: attacker attempts
to learn passwords by observing
the user, finding written passwords,
keylogging
 Countermeasures
• diligence to keep passwords
• multifactor authentication
• admin revoke compromised passwords
42

Authentication Security Issues

• Replay: attacker repeats a previ-
ously captured user response
 Countermeasure
• Challenge-response
• 1-time passcodes
43

Authentication Security Issues

• eavesdropping
• replay
• trojan horse
44

Authentication Security Issues

• Trojan horse: an application or physical device
masquerades as an authentic application or
device
 Countermeasure: authentication of the client within
a trusted security environment
• Denial of service: attacker attempts to disable
a user authentication service (via flooding)
 Countermeasure: a multifactor authentication with
a token
45

Practical Application
46

Case Study: ATM Security

47

Summary

• Introduced user authentication

 using passwords
 using tokens
 using biometrics
• Remote user authentication issues
• Example application and case study
End of Chapter 3