CIS3360: Security in Computing
Chapter 5 : Network Security I
Cliff Zou
Spring 2012
Network Monitoring Tool:
Wireshark
• Wireshark is a packet sniffer and protocol analyzer
• Captures and analyzes frames
• Supports plugins
• Usually required to run with administrator privileges
• Setting the network interface in promiscuous mode
captures traffic across the entire LAN segment and not
just frames addressed to the machine
• Freely available on www.wireshark.org
menu
main toolbar
filter toolbar
packet list pane
packet details
pane
packet bytes pane
status bar 3
MAC Addresses and ARP
32-bit IP address:
network-layer address
used to get datagram to destination IP subnet
MAC (or LAN or physical or Ethernet)
address:
Data link layer address
used to get datagram from one interface to another physically-
connected interface (same network)
48 bit MAC address (for most LANs)
burned in the adapter ROM
Some Network interface cards (NICs) can change their MAC
5-4
ARP: Address Resolution Protocol
Question: how to determine Each IP node (Host,
MAC address of host B when Router) on LAN has ARP
knowing B’s IP address? table
ARP Table: IP/MAC
237.196.7.78 address mappings for
1A-2F-BB-76-09-AD some LAN nodes
237.196.7.23 < IP address; MAC address; TTL>
237.196.7.14
TTL (Time To Live): time
after which address
LAN
71-65-F7-2B-08-53
mapping will be forgotten
58-23-D7-FA-20-B0
(typically 20 min)
0C-C4-11-6F-E3-98
237.196.7.88
5-5
ARP
ARP works by broadcasting requests and caching responses for future
use
The protocol begins with a computer broadcasting a message of the
form
who has <IP address1> tell <IP address2>
When the machine with <IP address1> or an ARP server receives
this message, its broadcasts the response
<IP address1> is <MAC address>
The requestor’s IP address <IP address2> is contained in the link
header
The Linux and Windows command arp - a displays the ARP table
Internet Address Physical Address Type
128.148.31.1 00-00-0c-07-ac-00 dynamic
128.148.31.15 00-0c-76-b2-d7-1d dynamic
128.148.31.71 00-0c-76-b2-d0-d2 dynamic
128.148.31.75 00-0c-76-b2-d7-1d dynamic
128.148.31.102 00-22-0c-a3-e4-00 dynamic
128.148.31.137 00-1d-92-b6-f1-a9 dynamic
ARP Spoofing
The ARP table is updated whenever an ARP response is
received
Requests are not tracked
ARP announcements are not authenticated
Machines trust each other
A rogue machine can spoof other machines
ARP Poisoning (ARP Spoofing)
According to the standard, almost all ARP
implementations are stateless
An arp cache updates every time that it receives
an arp reply… even if it did not send any arp
request!
It is possible to “poison” an arp cache by
sending gratuitous arp replies
ARP Caches
IP: 192.168.1.1 IP: 192.168.1.105
MAC: 00:11:22:33:44:01 Data MAC: 00:11:22:33:44:02
192.168.1.1 is at
00:11:22:33:44:01
192.168.1.105 is at
00:11:22:33:44:02
ARP Cache ARP Cache
192.168.1.105 00:11:22:33:44:02 192.168.1.1 00:11:22:33:44:01
Poisoned ARP Caches
(man-in-the-middle attack)
192.168.1.106
00:11:22:33:44:03
Data Data
192.168.1.105 is at 192.168.1.1 is at
00:11:22:33:44:03 00:11:22:33:44:03
192.168.1.1 192.168.1.105
00:11:22:33:44:01 00:11:22:33:44:02
Poisoned ARP Cache Poisoned ARP Cache
192.168.1.105 00:11:22:33:44:03 192.168.1.1 00:11:22:33:44:03
ARP Spoofing
Using static entries solves the problem but it is almost
impossible to manage!
Check multiple occurrence of the same MAC
i.e., One MAC mapping to multiple IP addresses (see previous
slide’s example)
Software detection solutions
Anti-arpspoof, Xarp, Arpwatch
TCP Session Hijacking
TCP connection has both client server
sequence number and
acknowledge number in each SY
seq=c N,
lient_
packet. s eq
The two ends negotiate what ,
/ACK eq,
Y N
seq. and ack. Numbers to be S
s e r
seq= lient_se
s
ver_ q+1
used in TCP set up stage. ack =
c
seq and ack number size: 232 A
seq=c CK,
li
ack=s ent_seq+1
Makes seq/ack guessing very hard er v er _
seq+1
to achieve
Very hard to hijack an already
setup TCP connection!
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TCP Session Hijacking
Possible when an attacker is on the same network
segment as the target machine.
Attacker can sniff all back/forth tcp packets and know the
seq/ack numbers.
Attacker can inject a packet with the correct seq/ack numbers
with the spoofed IP address.
IP spoofing needs low-level packet programming, OS-based socket
programming cannot be used!
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TCP Session Hijacking
Due to
ARP spoofing
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TCP Session Hijacking
Another way is “coordinated IP spoofing” by using two
computers, such as the “Thin pipe / Thick pipe method”
introduced in spam lecture:
High Speed Broadband connection (HSB)
Controls a Low Speed Zombie (LSZ)
Assumes no egress filtering at HSB’s ISP
Hides IP address of HSB. LSZ is blacklisted.
TCP handshake
LSZ
Target
TCP Seq #s SMTP
Server
HSB SMTP bulk mail
(Source IP = LSZ)
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Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack
An attempt to make a computer or network resource
unavailable to its intended users
DoS to the network bandwidth of targeted server
DoS to the computing resource of targeted server
Memory, CPU
DoS to the vulnerability in targeted server
Causing server OS crash (buffer overflow bug, logic bug, etc)
Causing server program crash (e.g., Apache, Sendmail, SQL)
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack
Sending attack packets from multiple computers
Botnet is the root cause for DDoS attacks
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Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack
Format:
Real IP-based attack using botnets
Attacker does not worry about exposing bots’ IP addresses.
TCP flooding, UDP flooding, icmp flooding
Spoofed IP-based attack
SYN flooding with spoofed IPs.
Source address hiding attack
Smurf attack
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Smurf Attack
Some contents from this link:
www.pentics.net/denial-of-service/.../msppt/19971027_smurf.ppt
Uses ICMP echo/reply packets with broadcast networks to
multiply traffic
Requires the ability to send spoofed packets
Abuses “bounce-sites” to attack victims
Traffic multiplied by a factor of 50 to 200
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Description of Smurfing Attack
ICMP echo (spoofed source address of victim)
Sent to IP broadcast address
ICMP echo reply
Internet
Perpetrator
Victim
Router broadcasts to
all LAN’s computers
How to prevent being a “bounce site”
Turn off directed broadcasts to subnets with 5 hosts or
more
Cisco router: Interface command “no ip directed-broadcast”
Use access control lists (if necessary) to prevent ICMP
echo requests from entering your network
Probably not an elegant solution; makes troubleshooting
difficult
But many networks are doing this now
Encourage vendors to turn off replies for ICMP echos to
broadcast addresses
Host Requirements RFC-1122 Section 3.2.2.6 states “An ICMP
Echo Request destined to an IP broadcast or IP multicast
address MAY be silently discarded.”
Patches are available for free UNIX-ish operating systems.
20
SYN Flooding Attack
An attacker sends a large number of SYN
requests to a target's system
Target uses too much memory and CPU resources
to process these fake connection requests
Target’s bandwidth is overwhelmed
Usually SYN flood packets use spoofed source
IPs
No TCP connection is set up (not like the TCP
hijacking!)
Hide attacking source
Make the target very hard to decide which TCP SYN
is attack and which TCP SYN is from legitimate Image from wikipedia
users!
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SYN Flood Defense: SYN Cookie
Some contents from:
http://www.cc.gatech.edu/classes/AY2007/cs7260_spring/lectures/L18.ppt
General idea
Client sends SYN to server (client_seq number only)
Server responds to Client with SYN-ACK cookie
Server_sqn = f(src addr, src port, dest addr, dest port, rand)
Ack number is normal value: client_seq +1
Server does not save state
Honest client responds with ACK(client_ack = server_sqn+1)
Server checks response
If matches SYN-ACK, establishes connection
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TCP SYN cookie
TCP SYN/ACK server_seq encodes a cookie
32-bit sequence number
time mod 32: counter to ensure sequence numbers
increase every 64 seconds
MSS: encoding of server MSS (can only have 8 settings)
Cookie: easy to create and validate, hard to forge
Includes timestamp, nonce, 4-tuple
32 0
t mod 32 MSS Cookie=HMAC(t, Ns, SIP, SPort, DIP, DPort)
5 bits 3 bits
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SYN Cookies
client
sends SYN packet and ACK number to server
SYN
waits for SYN-ACK from server w/ matching
ACK number ack-number
server
responds w/ SYN-ACK packet w/ initial SYN- SYN-ACK
cookie sequence number
seq-number as SYN-cookie,
Sequence number is cryptographically ack-number
generated value based on client address,
NO BUFFER ALLOCATED
port, and time.
client ACK
sends ACK to server w/ matching sequence
seq_number
number ack-number+data
server
If ACK is to an unopened socket, server SYN-ACK
validates returned sequence number as
SYN-cookie seq-number, ack-number
If value is reasonable, a buffer is allocated TCP BUFFER ALLOCATED
and socket is opened
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SYN Cookies Limitation
Windows has not adopted SYN cookies
Some Linux distributions have used it
Maximum segment size can only be 8 possible values
Do not allow the use of TCP option field
Many TCP option fields have been used by many programs
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IP Traceback
R R A R
R R R7 R
R4 R5 R6
R R3
R1 R2
V
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Logging Challenges
Attack path reconstruction is difficult
Packet may be transformed as it moves through the network
Full packet storage is problematic
Memory requirements are prohibitive at high line speeds (OC-
192 is ~10Mpkt/sec)
Extensive packet logs are a privacy risk
Traffic repositories may aid eavesdroppers
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