RFID SECURITY
How Does RFID Work?
02.3DFEX4.78AF51
EasyToll card #816
Radio signal (contactless)
Range: from 3-5 inches to 3 yards
Tags (transponders) Reader (transceiver) Database
Attached to objects, call out their Reads data off the tags Matches tag IDs to
(unique) name and/or static data without direct contact physical objects
on a special radio frequency
Asymmetric channels
Range of Reader
(Forward Channel)
m
~100
READER TAG EAVESDROPPER
~5 m
Tag’s Range (Backward Channel)
Applications
Tracking/Identification
Library Books
Children
Pets
Auto Parts
Inventory management in a Supply
Chain
Contactless Smart Cards
A Generic Supply Chain
Retailers
Wholesalers
Manufacturers Supply web
(retail
customers not
Suppliers
shown)
goods, invoices
Purchase orders, payments
Key Decisions
When to order
How much to order
As order quantity increases, holding cost
increases
As order quantity decreases, stockout cost
increases
From whom to order
The Problem - Motivation
Basic problem with RFID tags
Can be remotely scanned
Respond to query by any reader
This leads to security and privacy risk
Resource constraints
Limited power and computing resources
Hence classical cryptographic mechanisms not
feasible
The RFID security challenge
How to obtain maximum security with almost no
resources?
The Problems of Privacy and Security
RFID privacy concerns the problem of misbehaving
readers harvesting information from well-behaving tags.
Risks :
Leakage of personal information (prescriptions,
brand/size of clothes etc.).
Location privacy: Tracking the physical location of
individuals by their RFID tags.
RFID authentication concerns the problem of well
behaving readers receiving information from misbehaving
tags, particularly counterfeit ones.
Risks:
Forgery
Sabotage
Cost and capability
The strength and flavor of proposed
security solutions will depend on the
allowed tag cost for different
applications
50+ cent tags. Low-end tags will be
10 cent, 5 cent and 2 cent in about 5
years
Challenge
Tens of research ideas have been
proposed in the past two years
Propose improvements over the
existing privacy enhancing protocols
for the extremely resource
constrained RFID systems
Security Attacks
Spoofing
Imitating the behavior of a genuine tag
Denial of Service
Man in the middle attack
Modify the response of the tag to the reader or vice
versa
Replay Attack
Eavesdrop message from the tag (reader) & re-
transmit the message to the legitimate reader (tag).
Traffic Analysis
Monitoring of comm. between reader & tag allows
adversary to perform traffic analysis & generate
statistical data.
Security and Privacy Requirements
Anonymity
Tag output should not give idea about ID
Untraceability
Tag output should be varying
Indistinguishibility
Tag output should be truly random, i.e. variation
should not be predictable
Forward Security
Adversary should not be able to associate the
current output with past output
Mutual Authentication
Tag-to-reader and reader-to-tag authentication
Backend Requirements
Efficiency and scalability
Order of computation/precomputation
required as a function of number of tags
Flexibility
Changes required with addition/removal
of tags
Hash Lock [Rivest, Weis, Sharma, Engels]
Goal: Authenticate reader to the RFID tag
Reader “Who are you?” RFID tag
metaID
key
Compute hash(key) and
compare with stored metaID
“My real ID is…”
Stores metaID=hash(key)
Stores key; hash(key) for any tag
Unique key for each tag
Hash Lock Analysis
PROS
Relatively cheap to implement : Tag has to store hash
function implementation and metaID
Security based on weak collision-resistance of hash
function
Scalable due to low key look-up overhead
CONS
Constant tag output – enables traceability
Motivates Randomization
Too many messages/rounds
Requires reader to know all keys
Randomized Hash Lock [Weis et al.]
Goal: Authenticate reader to the RFID tag
Reader RFID tag
“Who are you?”
Generate random R
R, hash(R,IDk)
Compute hash(R,IDi) for every
known IDi and compare
“You must be IDk” Stores its own IDk
Stores all IDs:
ID1, … ,IDn
Randomized Hash Lock Analysis
PROS
Randomized response prevents tracking
Tag needs to store hash implementation and
pseudo-random number generator
CONS
Inefficient brute force key look-up
No Forward security
Motivates updating tag ID on each read
Security Flaw - Adversary can impersonate tag
by learning a valid tag response.
OSK Scheme [Ohkubo, Suzuki and Kinoshita]
Goal: Enable reader to identify the RFID tag, change tag
identifier on each read
Database Reader Tag
Query
Ai=G(Si)
Compute Ai=G(Si)
Hash
Chain Si+1=H(Si)
Tag ID
OSK Analysis
PROS
Different random like values on every read operation
prevents tracking
Forward Security ensured due to one way hash property
Tag needs to store only 2 hash implementations, hence
low cost
Minimal number of transmissions
CONS
Not scalable for large scale applications due to brute
force search
Motivates reducing computation time at
reader/backend
Susceptible to DoS attacks
May lead to problem due to hash collisions.
Summary
RFIDs have many useful applications
related to tracking and identification
But there are some important issues of
security and privacy
Small number of gates for S/P makes the
design of such protocols challenging
Tens of schemes proposed for
security/privacy but subtle drawbacks with
many of them. Much more work needed in
this area
