Lecture on

Advanced Internet Security

Stateful and Stateless Packet filtering

Walter Kriha
 Roadmap
Part 1: Firewall Architecture Part 2: Filtering Technology
• The purpose of a firewall • IP, TCP, ICMP filtering
• IP components important for • static filtering: ipchains
firewalls • dynamic (stateful) filtering: iptables
• Firewall Types • Filtering limits
• Firewall limits • Firewall piercing

Part 3: Services and Protocols Part 4: Securing Web Applications

• frequently needed services and • Content Management on the web
their problems • Transactional Services
• dangerous services • Web Application Servers
• middleware protocols
• New threats (p2p, webservices)
• Proxies and SSL

We will deal with firewall issues rather in detail as they have a lot of impact on software
architecture as well.
 Goals for today

Learn the characteristics of packet filtering

Learn how to create a static packet filter using stateless
ipchains and stateful iptables

We will cover application level filtering e.g. Web Application Firewalls later
 On what can we trigger?
IP Header
TCP Header ICMP Header
Parameters
Parameters Parameters (e.g. packet
(e.g. protocol tcp
(e.g port and direction) size, types)
or udp)

internal network address

external network address
NIC1 NIC2
Firewall
destination/source address destination/source address
from : to
xxx(20) yyy(4567), tcp
yyy(4567) xxx(20), tcp

The difference between a stateless and a stateful filter lies in the memory about
past requests (both incoming and outgoing) within the stateful filter. It is not
necessary to allow all incoming udp requests just because the filter does not
know if they are responses to previously outgoing requests. A stateful filter can
selectively open a specific udp port for a certain time window because it has
seen an outgoing request to this port.
 Packets and Headers

• IP Header
• ICMP Packet
• TCP Packet
• UDP Packet

Besides context information like on which NIC a packet arrived, the information
contained in headers is the most important filtering characteristic available to be
matched by the patterns in filter rules. After each header we will discuss
opportunities for filtering on header elements.
 IP Datagram Header
Check fragment
id token to
definitions
help in
fragment
reassembly.
TCP (6)
ICMP (1)
Version | header length | Type of Service | Total Length UDP (17)
Identification | Flags | Fragmentation Offset GGP (3)
EGP (8)
The header Time to live | Protocol | Header Checksum etc.
basic
structure Source Address
should be Destination Address
checked Verify
before Options | Padding checksum
filtering before
Source and
data .................. filtering
destination
address need
to be
validated
against IP
spoofing
attempts

The information contained in IP headers is either used for checks against denial of
service attacks, ip-spoofing etc. or used to route proper requests to the next receiver.
Fragments are very critical because only the first package contains the complete
information. A static packet filter should always have fragmented packets re-assembled
before filtering starts. (details:http://www.freesoft.org/CIE/Course/Section3/7.htm)
 Does port indicate

TCP Header that the request is

going to a
privileged port
(specific service)?

Connection
Source port | Destination port
tracking can
Sequence Number check the
sequence
The header Acknowledgement Number numbers
basic
structure Offset | Reserved | Flags | Window
should be Checksum | Urgent Pointer Drop packets
checked with unusual
before Options | Padding flags etc.
filtering
data ..................
Connection
tracking can
be service
specific, e.g.
active ftp
support

Once the basic checks for a correct format are done the most important information in
the tcp header are ports, flags and possibly service information embedded in the
content. Connection tracking will use sequence numbers etc. to protect the firewall
from attacks on the tcp stack. Important flags for drop/accept conditions are SYN
without ACK (connection init) and ACK without SYN (response to previous request)
 UDP Header
Source port | Destination port

Length | Checksum
Note that no data ..................
connection
information
is contained
in a UDP
packet

A stateless (static) filter has no way to distinguish a new UDP request coming from
outside from a response to a previous outgoing request. This makes UDP especially
critical.
 ICMP Problem Message Header
Type | Code | Checksum

Pointer | unused
ICMP Internet header + 64 bytes of original data datagram
messages
need to be
checked for
extreme
sizes

The functions of ICMP message types include redirecting routes (dangerous),

fragmentation information (needed), source flow control (source quench, needed) and
remote host checks (echo etc., dangerous). Please note that a static (stateless) filter
needs to allow all incoming echo-replies because they could be a response to an
outgoing echo-request.
 NAT, SNAT, DNAT, Masquerading
Network
Address masquerading is
Translation almost like SNAT only
Version | header length | Type of Service | Total Length that there is no static
(NAT) means
that the source Identification | Flags | Fragmentation Offset IP address. Instead, the
or destination source address is
address of a Time to live | Protocol | Header Checksum dynamically grabbed
packet is from an ISP, e.g via
Source Address DHCP, pppoe etc.
changed
Destination Address

Options | Padding
data ..................
With Destination NAT
With Source NAT (SNAT), the
(DNAT) the target address
source address is changed, e.g. to map
is changed, e.g. to allow
from private IP addresses to the real
transparent proxying or
IP address of a firewall, thereby
load-balancing
hiding the internal network.

You want filtering to use the DNATed address but not the SNATed address (you care
about the new target of an internal request but you don‘t care about which source
address is finally used (as long as it is not an illegal one of course). That‘s why SNAT
is best done after filtering.
 Ipchains - A chain of rules
throw packet
Header RULES: default policy away, error
Parameters REJECT action
Pattern to match -> action to take message to
(e.g. protocol tcp sender
or udp, source address, Pattern to match -> action to take
flags, port) throw packet
away, no
Pattern to match -> action to take DROP action
response to
caller

preprocessor: forward
Some IP packet defragmentation, packet to next
CRC checks ACCEPT action
Pattern matcher logical step
form checks

forward
packet to a
Context Information: USER chain
different
NIC, internal network chain
address, own IP address Optional: history of
Direction Information previous packets

Rules, pattern matcher and optional history form a filter element. Some default
filter elements exist (Input, Forward, Output) but users can define their own
elements and build chains of filtering elements.
 Default chains (ipchains example)
CRCs, input from all interfaces
defragmentation etc. enters here masquerading/routing
chain

Pre- Pre-
Input chain Routing Forward Chain
processing processing

Trash Trash
output for all interfaces
goes through here responses to
masquerading and non-
masq. packets
Pre-
Output Chain
processing

These are the default chains for all interfaces. Users can define additional chains.
At any point a package can be thrown away. The default policy of a chain should
be „reject“ or „deny“. Certain processing applies before the package contents meet
the pattern matching algorithms to ensure proper package forms.
 Rules which always apply
• Do net let packets with EXTERNAL SOURCE address come in through your INTERNAL NIC
(those packets MUST be fakes)
• Do not let packets with INTERNAL SOURCE address come in through your EXTERNAL NIC (those
packets MUST be fakes or you are using multiple interior routers to the same perimeter network
(DMZ) and they believe that the shortest path is through your perimeter network. This would expose
critical data from the internal network and is a big problem anyway.
• Do not let packets pass with broadcast addresses in the SOURCE address field in either direction. A
reply to those packets would be a broadcast.
• Do not let packets pass with multicast addresses in the SOURCE address field in either direction.
Multicast addresses are always destination addresses.
• Do not allow packets with source routing or IP flags to pass in either direction (man-in-the middle)
• Restrict ICMP packets in size
• Perform re-assembly of fragmented packets before rule processing happens.
• Set „default deny“ on all chains and log denied packets.
• During rule configuration set all chains to „default deny“ and remove those rules at the end of
configuration

These rules are independent of network configuration. It is important to implement

these filters IN BOTH DIRECTIONS not only to prevent malicious outsiders from
entering your hosts but also malicious insiders (or unwitting users and
compromised machines) from using your computing equipment for attacks on
others (e.g. distributed denial of service attacks)
 Special Modules for Protection
auto-defragmentation: echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_always_defrag
syn-flooding protection: echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_syncookies
no echo broadcast replies: echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts
no bogus error replies: echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses
no icmp redirects: for f in /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/*/accept_redirects; do echo 0 > $f (for
all interfaces)
no source routing: for f in /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/*/accept_source_route; do echo 0 > $f
(for all interfaces)
no ip-spoofing: for f in /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/*/rp_filter; do echo 0 > $f (for all
interfaces)
log suspicious packets: for f in /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/*/log_martians; do echo 1 > $f
(for all interfaces)
allow ip-forwarding for masquerading: echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward

These commands need to become part of the firewall boot process (in Linux:
/etc/rc.local) to make sure that they are installed properly. Modules with masquerading
support for special protocols (IRC, real audio etc.) can also be installed by the filter
script directly. (from Klein, Linux Sicherheit pg. 589ff)
 ipchains: conditions and actions
• protocol (TCP, UDP, ICMP, IGMP)
• source and destination address
• source and destination port
• TCP connection init (ACK flag)
• ICMP types
• IP fragmentation (better solved by pre-assembling fragments before checking)
• interface

• ACCEPT (let packet pass, process it and/or forward it to next chain)

• DENY (throw packet silently away, do not generate error message)
• REJECT (generate ICMP response but throw packet away)
• MASQ (perform masquerading on the packet. Move a response directly to the
output chain. Used in forward chain only)
• REDIRECT (move packet to different port on local host. Can be used for
transparent proxying)
• RETURN (Use default policy in a default chain or return from user defined chain)
• NAME of user-defined chain to be called.
 A stateless filter
filter (firewall) 11.12.13.14
1.2.3.4 (intranet)
(internet)

command: ping command: ping

11.12.13.14 11.12.13.14

command: pong command: pong

1.2.3.4 1.2.3.4

Attacker!!

command: pong command: pong

1.2.3.4 1.2.3.4

A host in our intranet sends a ping command (icmp echo request) to an external host
on the internet. As far as the stateless filter goes this is one complete transaction. It
will NOT retain any knowledge about this request. When a pong (icmp echo-reply)
comes in the filter can only let it pass through (no matter from where it comes!) or
deny all those packets (disabling the ping service altogether). An attacker can send
echo-replies which have NEVER been requested from internal hosts.
 A stateful filter
filter (firewall) 11.12.13.14
1.2.3.4 (intranet)
(internet)

command: ping command: ping

11.12.13.14 11.12.13.14

1.2.3.4 -> 11.12.13.14 (ping)

command: pong
command: pong
1.2.3.4
1.2.3.4

1.2.3.4 -> 11.12.13.14 (ping)

There is a packet from 11.12.13.14 to 1.2.3.4 (pong), was there a ping from
1.2.3.4 to 11.12.13.14 previously? if YES, accept, if NO, drop packet

A filtering firewall keeps a table of outgoing requests. If a packet comes in from the Internet
it is matched against the outgoing requests (destination, port, protocol). The whole mapping
lasts only for a certain time (timeout) until the filter clears the request information. If a
response is „late“, it gets dropped. An attacker would need to spoof the real sender AND hit
the little window where the filter waits for responses AND the response must match port,
protocol and destination. This works good for connectionless protocols (UDP, ICMP) but
works even better for TCP if e.g. sequence numbers are checked as well. Even exotic
protocols with several connections and directions can be tracked.
 A chain of rules
User defined or default chain:
Start of chain: Beginning at start of
chain, every rule is
matched against the
Pattern to match -> action to take packet. The first rule
More specifc rules are at the which matches gets its
top of the chain. Pattern to match -> action to take action applied to the
packet and the processing
Pattern to match -> action to take in this chain is
terminated. The package

More general rules are at the

. may be forwarded to
another chain.
bottom of the chain.
.
.
Chain default policy: DENY or End of
ACCEPT chain

Chain manipulation commands work on the whole chain. Rule manipulation

commands only on a specific rule.
 Chains calling chains
e.g. input chain
mychain
Pattern to match -> action to take
call
Pattern to match -> action to take
Pattern to match -> action mychain
Pattern to match -> action mychain
Pattern to match -> action to take

Pattern to match -> action to take

.
return to (if
. packet
wasn‘t
accepted)
.
End of
chain

A user defined chain can be the target of an action. Processing (filtering) will continue
with the first rule in the new chain and end when a rule matches the packet or at the
end of the chain. At that point control returns to the calling chain.
 The ipchains user level driver program

Rules configuration
file ipchains
program

Unix user
level

chains
Network stack

special Output
special
modules
special
modules
special
modules Forward
Unix modules
kernel module like tcp-syn Input
cookies, ip-spoofing
protection etc.

Only the program that installs the rules is located in user space. The netfilter/iptables
framework provides an interface and queue which allows filtering to happen also in
user space. Kernel space filtering is extremely fast but also limited in functions and
very critical. An error in a module will crash the kernel for sure.
 ipchains command syntax
ipchains command [chain] parameter action

Example:
• ipchains –P input DENY (set default policy for input chain to DENY)
• ipchains –f output (delete all rules in output chain)
• ipchains –A output –i $EXT_IFACE –p tcp –s $MY_IPADDR
$UNPRIVILEGED_PORTS – destination-port 80 –j ACCEPT (allow http connections
from this host and ports beyond 1023 to any host port 80 using the external NIC)

„Command“ is one of the ipchains chain manipulation commands. Parameter is

the pattern to match a request against. „Action“ is either a real action like
„DENY“ – dropping a packet, or forwarding the packet to a user defined chain.
 Chain manipulating commands

Chain manipulation:
• Create user defined chain (-N)
• Delete user defined chain (default chains cannot be deleted) (-X)
• Zero counters on all rules in chain (-Z)
• Flush default or user defined chains. (-F)
• Install default policy of a chain. (-P)
• List rules in chain (-L)

No surprise here: most commands will be the same in the new netfilter/iptables
framework as well. Setting the default policy to DENY on all chains creates a „deny
all“ policy and is also useful during rule manipulation.
 Rule manipulating commands

Rule manipulation:
• Append new rule to chain (-A)
• Delete matching rule in chain.
with position parameter:
• Insert, Delete, Replace rule at POSITION in chain
masquerading rules:
• list current masquerading rules (-M –L)
• set masquerading timeout values (-M –S)

Interaktive rule manipulation is tedious and error prone. Luckily there are utilities
which load and store complete configuration files containing a firewall ruleset.
(ipchains-store etc.)
 The structure of a firewall config file
Load kernel modules needed

flush all chains, reset counters, delete all chains

Install default „DENY“ policy in default chains

Define variables (EXT_IFACE, INT_IFACE,

Netsworks) which will be used in rules later

Allow loopback interface traffic

Protects host during
manipulation of firewall Install default „DENY“ policy
rules. With ipchains the
interfaces used in those
scripts need to be UP! Load special protection modules (ip-spoofing etc.)

Install general protection rules (some just repeat

what special protection modules do)

Service specific rules: DNS, FTP, TELNET etc.

Delete first default „DENY“ rule in every chain

Ipchains and also iptables follow this structure. The biggest part is of course the
definition of rules for each service that needs to pass through the firewall.
 A word on notations in ipchains

• Actions are in UPPER CASE (e.g. ACCEPT)

• interfaces can be given with + notation: e.g. ppp+ means all ppp... interfaces in the
system
• chains are in lower case (e.g. input)
• the check for SYN bit set and ACK NOT set is –y or –syn. This is a sign for a tcp
connection request.
• Significant part of a network can be described like: (CIDR notation)
- 123.456.789.0/24 (the first three byte are significant)
- 123.456.0.0/16 (the first two byte are significant)
- 123.0.0.0/8 (only the first byte is significant)
 ipchains examples

1. A short standalone firewall (from roaring penguin pppoe)

2. Redirection to transparent http proxy
3. User-defined chains
4. Building a DMZ
 A bare bone standalone firewall
# Interface to Internet
EXTIF=ppp+
ANY=0.0.0.0/0
#no complete default deny policy
ipchains -P input ACCEPT
ipchains -P output ACCEPT
ipchains -P forward DENY
#flush all chains
ipchains -F forward
ipchains -F input
ipchains -F output
# Deny TCP and UDP packets to privileged ports
ipchains -A input -l -i $EXTIF -d $ANY 0:1023 -p udp -j DENY
ipchains -A input -l -i $EXTIF -d $ANY 0:1023 -p tcp -j DENY
# Deny TCP connection attempts
ipchains -A input -l -i $EXTIF -p tcp -y -j DENY
# Deny ICMP echo-requests
ipchains -A input -l -i $EXTIF -s $ANY echo-request -p icmp -j DENY

from: roaring penguin pppoe package. This is surely only the beginning of a
firewall strategy. Masquerading can be enabled with: ipchains -A forward –s
$LocalNet –d $Any -j MASQ ; echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
 Redirect to transparent http proxy

INT_IFACE=192.1.1.0/24
ANY=0.0.0.0/0
ipchains -A input -p tcp -s $INT_IFACE -d $ANY 80 -j REDIRECT 8080

Everything coming from the internal network with a destination of anything and
port 80 (http) will be redirected to the local port 8080 where a http proxy (e.g.
squid) is running.
 User defined chains
# Create your own chain
/sbin/ipchains -N my-chain
# Allow email to got to the server. This is an INCOMING connection request
/sbin/ipchains -A my-chain -s 0.0.0.0/0 smtp -d 192.1.2.10 1024:-j ACCEPT
# Allow email connections to outside email servers. OUTGOING conn.req.
/sbin/ipchains -A my-chain -s 192.1.2.10 -d 0.0.0.0/0 smtp -j ACCEPT
# Allow Web connections to your Web Server. INCOMING
/sbin/ipchains -A my-chain -s 0.0.0.0/0 1024: -d 192.1.2.11 www -j ACCEPT
# Allow Web connections to outside Web Server. OUTGOING
/sbin/ipchains -A my-chain -s 192.1.2.0/24 1024: -d 0.0.0.0/0 www -j ACCEPT
# Allow DNS traffic. Opens ALL your UDP ports for UDP traffic originating
#from any server at port 53. Do you really want this?
/sbin/ipchains -A my-chain -p UDP -s 0.0.0.0/0 dns -d 192.1.2.0/24 -j ACCEPT

This chain opens quite a number of ports for incoming connections. For DNS the
use of an intermediate DNS server using port 53 would be advisable.
 Digression: Model Checking
# Allow Web connections to outside Web Server. OUTGOING
/sbin/ipchains -A my-chain -s 192.1.2.0/24 1024: -d 0.0.0.0/0 www -j ACCEPT

Is the ipchains statement a true implementation of the model (informally specified in the
comment)? Not really. Think about the protocol used in www traffic and what the rule
defines? The rule actually does allow connection establishment from internal network to
any destinations port 80 using ANY kind of protocol. This is NOT what the model
specified. A model checker would build a space with possible solutions of the model,
reconstruct such a space from the rule and compare both. While doing so it would detect
that the rule allows more solutions/options than the original model.
To make such model checking easier the rules/model should be monotonous, i.e. always
adding rights but not taking some away. Following this advice is also good when building
rule based filters manually: Do not mix deny and accept rules!
 Using a DMZ
192.168.1.0/24 192.168.1.250 filter (firewall) (internet)
(intranet)

192.84.219.128 smtp host

DNS host
192.84.219.129

192.84.219.130 WEB host

We are using routable internet IP addresses for the DMZ but internal-only addresses for
our Intranet. The DMZ provides mail services (SMTP), DNS lookup via a DNS server
and also access to a web server running on host 15.16.17.20. This is an example from the
linux IPCHAINS-HOWTO (Rusty Russel)
 Separating traffic (1)
192.168.1.0/24 192.168.1.250 filter (firewall) (internet)
(intranet)

GOOD
eth1 ppp0
BAD
eth0
192.84.219.128
192.84.219.129
192.84.219.130
DMZ

this setup results in 6 different chains: good-bad, bad-good, good-dmz, dmz-good, bad-
dmz, dmz-bad plus one chain for icmp traffic. To secure traffic directed at the firewall
directly, 3 more chains are defined: good-if, bad-if, dmz-if to separate traffic coming in
from the firewalls three NICs.
 Separating traffic (2)
ipchains – N good-dmz ipchains – N dzm-good
ipchains – N bad-dmz ipchains – N dzm-bad creation of user defined chains

ipchains –N good-bad ipchains –N bad-good

ipchains –N icmp-acc

ipchains –A forward –s 192.168.1.0/24 –i eth0 –j good-dmz

ipchains –A forward –s 192.168.1.0/24 –i ppp0 –j good-bad
ipchains –A forward –s 192.84.219.0/24 –i ppp0 –j dmz-bad
ipchains –A forward –s 192.84.219.0/24 –i eth1 –j dmz-good
ipchains –A forward –s –i eth0 –j bad-dmz
ipchains –A forward –s –i eth1 –j bad-good
ipchains –A forward –j DENY -l

Only the outgoing interface is available in the forward chain. This forces us to use the
source-address for filtering (protected by rp-filter)
 A complete sample

we will discuss the packet filter script by Rusty Russel ( Do you find
the problem with the ICMP user defined chain in this script?)
 Testing ipchains

ipchains -C [chain] parameter action

Original rule:
•ipchains –A output –i $EXT_IFACE –p tcp –s $MY_IPADDR $UNPRIVILEGED_PORTS
– destination-port 80 –j ACCEPT

• Command to generate test packages according to above rule:

•ipchains –C output –i $EXT_IFACE –p tcp –s $MY_IPADDR 6000 – destination-port 80 –
j ACCEPT

Most rules can be turned into test generators by using the –C option instead of –A
or –I. Please note that port RANGES are not possible with –C. The above example
should result in „accepted“.
 Content filters and special protocols: ftp

command: port 4712 command: port 8000

ftp control
control port
port 21
4711
8000

ftp data port

data port 4712 8001
20

The client puts the port number of its data-receiving port into a packet to the ftp-
servers control port. The masquerading firewall needs to look into the data packet,
detect the port number, open dummy control and data ports at the firewall and route
INCOMING data connection requests to the clients data port. This is a typical
example for a problematic protocol in two ways: first it hides network information in
packet data – making NAT hard to perform. And secondly it expects INCOMING
connection requests to be accepted. Only if the firewall tracks the connection and
knows the protocol will it be able to detect that the data request from the ftp-server is
really a response to a control request from the client.
 Requirements for Packet Filters

• Filtering per interface

• Filtering on incoming and outgoing packets per interface
• Order of rules needs to be respected by the configuration
tool – no re-ordering of rules.
• Logging of accepted and rejected packets must be possible.
Logging itself needs to be configurable with respect to
device and quantity (to avoid DOS by log-flooding)
• Rules need to be validated and tested.
 A critique of ipchains

• No stateful filtering (no actions based on packet history)

• packets need to pass all three chains making rules
complicated
• Lacking extensibility with respect to patterns and targets
• Software design in kernel needed re-design.
• Redirection of packets to user space lacking.

Still, ipchains is a stable and reliable mechanism to build a firewall on a general

purpose Linux system. The new netfilter/iptables are of course a different game.
 Differences between ipchains and iptables
• packets pass all three chains • packets pass only ONE chain
(input, forward, output) • Incoming and outgoing
• Only outgoing interface interfaces available in all chains
available in FORWARD chain • clear separation of filtering
• Filtering and mangling mixed (INPUT, FORWARD,
(no separate „tables“) OUTPUT) and mangling/NAT
• Filter rules affected by (PRE/POST-ROUTING)
masquerading (SNAT) • Filtering rules independent of
masquerading. Rules operate
always on real addresses.
 Netfilter Architecture in ipv4
through Firewall

NF_IP_PRE_ROUTING Routing NF_IP_FORWARD NF_IP_POST_ROUTING

Routing

NF_IP_LOCAL_IN NF_IP_LOCAL_OUT

Filter table

Nat table

to Firewall Mangle table from Firewall

All NF_IP_xxx points are hooks where a table can register for a callback if a packet
passes. The most important change compared to ipchains is that every packet in the
filter tables passes ONE and ONLY ONE chain. The chains are the processors of the
respective hook callback,e.g. NF_IP_LOCAL_IN events are processed in the INPUT
chain of the filter table.
 Default chains (iptables example)
all input not directed at
Destination NAT the firewall itself goes Source NAT happens here
here

Pre- Post-
Routing Forward Chain
processing processing

Routing

Input chain firewall generated

packets
Output Chain

No packet modification is done in INPUT, FORWARD or OUTPUT chains. No

filtering does happen in the pre- and postrouting phases: If NAT is used, only the
first packet of a request would hit this chain and the rest could not be filtered here
anyway.
 An OO-view on the netfilter framework

Template/hook pattern as well as strategy and factory patterns could be used to design
the netfilter framework. A table implements a number of hooks which will be called
from the framework at the proper time.
An OO-view on the netfilter framework
 Special Modules for Protection
dynamic IP addr: echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_dynaddr
(and those mentioned in the ipchains lecture!)
additional modules:
ip_tables, ip_conntrack, iptable_filter, iptable_mangle, iptable_nat, ipt_LOG, ipt_limit,
ipt_state, ipt_owner, ipt_MASQUERADE, ip_conntrack_ftp, ipt_conntrack_irc

Modules are installed with /sbin/modprobe [modulname]. Especially important are the
connection tracking modules.
 iptables: conditions and actions
• protocol (TCP, UDP, ICMP, IGMP)
• source and destination address
• source and destination port
• TCP connection init (ACK flag)
• ICMP types
• IP fragmentation (better solved by pre-assembling fragments before checking)
• interface

• ACCEPT (let packet pass, process it and/or forward it to next chain)

• DENY (throw packet silently away, do not generate error message)
• REJECT (generate ICMP response but throw packet away)
• MASQ (perform masquerading on the packet. Move a response directly to the
output chain. Used in forward chain only)
• REDIRECT (move packet to different port on local host. Can be used for
transparent proxying)
• RETURN (Use default policy in a default chain or return from user defined chain)
• NAME of user-defined chain to be called.
 iptables command syntax
iptables -t table -command [chain] [match] –j [target/jump]

Example:
• iptables –A INPUT –i $IFACE –p tcp –sport 80 –m state –state ESTABLISHED –j
ACCEPT (allow incoming web traffic if it belongs to a previous outgoing request)
• iptables –A INPUT –i $IFACE –p tcp –sport 20 –m state –state ESTABLISHED,
RELATED –j ACCEPT (allow incoming ACTIVE ftp traffic if it belongs to a previous
outgoing request, even though the incoming request is for a new – but related - port)
• iptables –A INPUT –i $IFACE – p udp –j LOG –log-prefix „UDP Incoming:“
•iptables –A INPUT –i $IFACE – p udp –j DROP (log and drop all udp traffic)

The „filter“ table is the default. Other tables (nat, mangle) need to be specified
explicitely. Note that most of the syntax is still the same as with ipchains.
 Match Modules
-m <match module> -- <module parameter>

• Owner (gid-owner, pid-owner, sid-owner). Matches

packets from specific owners. Some ICMP packets do not
have an owner.
• TCP/UDP/ICMP/TOS/MARK
• mac address (interesting in connection with DHCP)
• multi-port (range of non-sequential ports)
• limit (see next pages)
• state (see next pages)
 Limit

--limit hits/time

iptables – A INPUT –p icmp –icmp-type ping –m limit 10/minute –l LOG

iptables –A INPUT –p icmp –icmp-type ping –j DROP

limits how many times a rule applies per time period. E.g. do not
accept and log more than 50 echo request per 5 minutes to prevent
log based DOS attacks

The basic sequence of a bandwidth limiting rule pair is always: first comes a limited accept rule, followed by an unconditional
DROP rule on the same pattern.
 State

--state INVALID, NEW, ESTABLISHED, RELATED

iptables – A OUTPUT –m state –state NEW, ESTABLISHED, RELATED –j ACCEPT

iptables – A INPUT –m state –state ESTABLISHED, RELATED –j ACCEPT

Allows only outgoing new connections. Allows established and

related connections in both directions. Requires a default deny
policy installed.

The sate module does advanced connection tracking and knows e.g. that a certain
UDP packet is a response to a previous outgoing UDP packet. A connection is
„ESTABLISHED“ if several packets have been going back and forth – this way
even connectionless UDP packets can belong to an „ESTABLISHED“ session.
„RELATED“ connections are physically independent connections which
nevertheless belong to an existing connection (like active ftp)
 Load Balancing
-A PREROUTING -i eth0 -p tcp --dport 80 -m state --state NEW -m nth --counter 0 --every 4 --packet 0 \ -j
DNAT --to-destination 192.168.0.5:80
-A PREROUTING -i eth0 -p tcp --dport 80 -m state --state NEW -m nth --counter 0 --every 4 --packet 1 \ -j
DNAT --to-destination 192.168.0.6:80

Or with
„random“:

-A PREROUTING -i eth0 -p tcp --dport 80 -m state --state NEW -m random --average 25 \ -j DNAT --to-
destination 192.168.0.5:80
-A PREROUTING -i eth0 -p tcp --dport 80 -m state --state NEW -m random --average 25 \ -j DNAT --to-
destination 192.168.0.6:80

From Barry O‘Donovan, Advanced features… (see ressources)

 Patch-O-Matic
New matches:
•iplimit: restrict connections from a certain host or network
• length: filter packets based on their lenght
• nth: filter on each „nth“ packet
• string: match against a certain string in a packet

new targets:
• FTOS: sets TTL to arbitrary value
• ULOG: user space logging
• NETMAP (SNAT like behavior)

See the netfilter extensions howto for more matches and targets. The iptables user
space driver program is so flexible that it will deal automatically with new matches or
targets that were installed.
 Targets (actions or jumps)
• ACCEPT (ends rule processing in this chain)
• DROP (throws packet away without error message to sender)
• REJECT (same but sends error message, works only in input, forward and output chain)
• LOG (logs packet AND continues: the only target that does not stop rule processing)
• RETURN (return back from user defined chain to default chain)
• QUEUE (sends packet from kernel space (tcp stack) to user space for further processing. Comes with complete API for
proxies etc.)
• REDIRECT (routes packets to a port on the local host, used e.g. for transparent proxying)
• userdefined target (subroutine like flow of control to user defined chain)
• MARK (used in mangle table to set internal routing information for this packet in the kernal)
• TOS (sets routing information within a packet, can be communicated to other firewalls or routers)
• MIRROR (experimental, exchanges source and destination address of a packet and sends it back. Watch out for spoofing
attacks creating loops)
• SNAT (Source NAT, used to map internal addresses to a real IP address)
• DNAT (Destination NAT, used e.g. to forward incoming internet packets to servers on the internal (hidden) network or
DMZ)
• MASQUERADE (like SNAT only with dynamic IP address)
• TTL (change time-to-live value in mangle table, e.g. to hide several machines from an ISP or to hide a firewall from a
firewalking probe)
• ULOG (user defined logging facility. Multicasts packets to user space loggers)
 Nat with netfilter

NF_IP_PRE_ROUTING Routing NF_IP_FORWARD NF_IP_POST_ROUTING

Source NAT (e.g.

Destination NAT Routing masquerading) is
(e.g. transparent
done through this
proxying) is done
hook in chain
through this hook NF_IP_LOCAL_IN NF_IP_LOCAL_OUT SNAT OR
in chain DNAT
MASQUERADE
chain of the NAT
chain of the NAT
table
table

Nat table
(POSTROUTING,PREROU
TING,MASQUERADE,)
from local
to local
processing
processing

The big difference to ipchains is the fact that now all packets pass with their real
source/destination address through the netfilter process and routing is based on those
real addresses as well. This make logging and decision making much easier.
 iptables examples

1. rc.firewall script
2. rc.DMZ.firewall script

These examples are from the Iptables tutorial by Oskar Andreasson

 Firewall Piercing
filter (firewall) 11.12.13.14
1.2.3.4 (intranet)
(internet)

command: command:
ssh/telnet ssh/telnet

allows tcp connection to some

host some port

arbitrary socket programs

Tunnel created by telnet or SSH IP Emulator Daemon

IP Emulator (PPP/SLIRP)
(PPPD/SLIRP)

Telnet or SSH tty connection Telnet or SSH daemon

The only requirement for firewall piercing is: you must be able to connect to some port on a
machine on the Internet. This machine runs a telnet or secure shell daemon (possibly started
after receiving a mail from the client behind the firewall using procmail). On top of this tty
like connection a generic IP emulator daemon emulates a complete IP connection over this
tty. The client can then run arbitrary socket based programs directly through this channel into
the Internet. Routing needs to be carefully configured to separate tunnel and tunnelled
addresses. Works like a VPN with ssh
(http://tldp.org/HOWTO/mini/Firewall-Piercing/x296.html
 Firewall Piercing: How P2P Software does it
Skype server

1. Register with 1. Register with

server, get partner server, get partner
IP and Port IP and Port
(11.12.13.14:9000) (1.2.3.4:8000)

Source: 2. Udp packet to Source:

1.2.3.4:8000 11.12.13.14:9000
11.12.13.14:9000

Source:8000 Source:9000

IP Firewall IP Firewall
1.2.3.4 2. Udp packet to
11.12.13.14
1.2.3.4:8000

IP host in intranet: IP host in intranet:

192.168.1.20 192.168.1.20

The trick is in the 2. step: by sending a upd packet to destination address:target port (which
gets thrown away) the OWN firewall learns to expect packages from this address because it
believes them to be a RESPONSE (see Jürgen Schmidt, the hole trick in ressources)
 Resources (1)
• www.linuxguruz.org/iptables The portal for all iptables related
information. Especially useful are:
• Linux iptables HOWTO
http://www.linuxguruz.org/iptables/howto/iptables-HOWTO.html
• Netfilter Extensions HOWTO - Patch-O-Matic
http://www.linuxguruz.org/iptables/howto/netfilter-extensions-
HOWTO.html (really interesting matches and targets, e.g. load-balancers)
• Linux 2.4 Packet Filtering HOWTO
http://www.linuxguruz.org/iptables/howto/packet-filtering-HOWTO.html
• Manpage of IPTABLES
http://www.linuxguruz.org/iptables/howto/maniptables.html
• IPTables Tutorial http://www.boingworld.com/workshops/linux/iptables-
tutorial/ (the complete tutorial on iptables)
• Iptables Basics
http://www.linuxnewbie.org/nhf/intel/security/iptables_basics.html
 Resources (2)
• Netfilter framework in Linux 2.4
http://www.gnumonks.org/papers/netfilter-lk2000/presentation.html
(a description of the whole framework. You will understand what
tables really are after reading it. Lots of template/hook design
patterns.
• Iptables - What is it
http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~jns/security/iptables/index.html
• Jürgen Schmidt, The hole trick, How Skype & Co. get round
firewalls http://www.heise-security.co.uk/articles/82481 Explains
udp piercing used by p2p software
• Barry O‘Donovan, Advanced Features of Netfilter/Iptables.
Shows how to use NAT table and random/nth for load balancing
and other matches. http://linuxgazette.net/108/odonovan.html .
Look for loadbalancing and iptables for other solutions to
loadbalancing.
 Resources (3)
• Craig Hunt, TCP/IP Network Administration. If you start building
firewalls you will need this book if questions about routing, sockets
etc. show up. Contains headers, protocols and services.
• Douglas Comer, Internetworking with TCP/IP. Code explained. A
classic if you want to build your own protocol stack or want to
understand how TCP REALLY works.
• Elizabeth D. Zwicky, Simon Cooper, Brent Chapman: Building
Internet Firewalls (also available in German this book covers most
types of firewalls and also discusses services, protocols and
middleware. Use the first part as a general introduction and the rest as a
dictionary if users request certain services.)
• Tobias Klein, Linux Sicherheit. Contains example script for ipchains.
• Scott Mann, Ellen L.Mitchell, Linux Security System. Use open source
tools to achieve host and network security with Linux. Contains a
larger part on ipchains.
• Feiner Filtern, c‘t 2001 Heft 26. A good explanation of the new
netfilter/iptables firewall concept in Linux.
 Resources (4)

• Rusty Russel, IPCHAINS-HOWTO (contains DMZ

example and use of user defined chains)
• Linux Magazin 04/05 page 6: „Zecke“ from Tobias Klein.
A syscall proxy which uses an existing application
protocol to transport syscalls from the attacker to the
victim and routes results back. Stateful inspection and
application level tracking do not help as the same
connection and established protocol are used