PSG Institute of Technology and Applied Research

Neelambur, Coimbatore – 641 062

CB3491 Cryptography and

Cyber Security

07/05/25 CCS / Dr I Kala, UNIT IV 1/66

 PSG Institute of Technology and Applied Research
Neelambur, Coimbatore – 641 062

UNIT IV

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07/05/25 CCS / Dr I Kala, UNIT IV 3
 Authentication Requirements
• disclosure
• traffic analysis
• masquerade
• content modification
• sequence modification
• timing modification
• source repudiation
• destination repudiation

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 Message Authentication
• message authentication is concerned with:
– protecting the integrity of a message
– validating identity of originator
– non-repudiation of origin (dispute resolution)
• will consider the security requirements
• then three alternative functions used:
– message encryption
– message authentication code (MAC)
– hash function
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 Message Encryption

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 Message Encryption
• if public-key encryption is used:
– encryption provides no confidence of sender
– since anyone potentially knows public-key
– however if
• sender signs message using their private-key
• then encrypts with recipients public key
• have both secrecy and authentication
– again need to recognize corrupted messages
– but at cost of two public-key uses on message
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 Message Authentication Code
(MAC)
• generated by an algorithm that creates a
small fixed-sized block
– depending on both message and some key
– like encryption though need not be reversible
• appended to message as a signature
• receiver performs same computation on
message and checks it matches the MAC
• provides assurance that message is
unaltered and comes from sender
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 Message Authentication Code

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 Message Authentication Codes
• as shown the MAC provides confidentiality
• can also use encryption for secrecy
– generally use separate keys for each
– can compute MAC either before or after encryption
– is generally regarded as better done before
• why use a MAC?
– sometimes only authentication is needed
– sometimes need authentication to persist longer than
the encryption (eg. archival use)
• note that a MAC is not a digital signature

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 MAC Properties
• a MAC is a cryptographic checksum
MAC = CK(M)
– condenses a variable-length message M
– using a secret key K
– to a fixed-sized authenticator
• is a many-to-one function
– potentially many messages have same MAC
– but finding these needs to be very difficult
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 Requirements for MACs
• taking into account the types of attacks
• need the MAC to satisfy the following:
1. knowing a message and MAC, is infeasible
to find another message with same MAC
2. MACs should be uniformly distributed
3. MAC should depend equally on all bits of the
message

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 HMAC
• specified as Internet standard RFC2104
• uses hash function on the message:
HMACK = Hash[(K+ XOR opad) ||
Hash[(K+ XOR ipad)||M)]]
• where K+ is the key padded out to size
• and opad, ipad are specified padding constants
• overhead is just 3 more hash calculations than
the message needs alone
• any of MD5, SHA-1, RIPEMD-160 can be used
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 HMAC Overview

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 HMAC Security
• know that the security of HMAC relates to
that of the underlying hash algorithm
• attacking HMAC requires either:
– brute force attack on key used
– birthday attack (but since keyed would need
to observe a very large number of messages)
• choose hash function used based on
speed verses security constraints
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 CMAC

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 Hash Functions

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 Hash Functions & Digital
Signatures

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 Hash Function Properties
• a Hash Function produces a fingerprint of
some file/message/data
h = H(M)
– condenses a variable-length message M
– to a fixed-sized fingerprint
• assumed to be public

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 Requirements for Hash Functions
1. can be applied to any sized message M
2. produces fixed-length output h
3. is easy to compute h=H(M) for any message M
4. given h is infeasible to find x s.t. H(x)=h
• one-way property
5. given x is infeasible to find y s.t. H(y)=H(x)
• weak collision resistance
6. is infeasible to find any x,y s.t. H(y)=H(x)
• strong collision resistance
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 Hash Algorithms
• see similarities in the evolution of hash
functions & block ciphers
– increasing power of brute-force attacks
– leading to evolution in algorithms
– from DES to AES in block ciphers
– from MD4 & MD5 to SHA-1 & RIPEMD-160 in
hash algorithms
• likewise tend to use common iterative
structure as do block ciphers
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Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1)
• SHA was designed by NIST & NSA in 1993,
revised 1995 as SHA-1
• US standard for use with DSA signature scheme
– standard is FIPS 180-1 1995, also Internet RFC3174
– nb. the algorithm is SHA, the standard is SHS
• produces 160-bit hash values
• now the generally preferred hash algorithm
• based on design of MD4 with key differences

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 SHA Overview
1. Appending Padding Bits: pad message so its length is
896 mod 1024
2. Appending Length : append a 128-bit length value to
message
3. Initializing Buffers: initialise 5-word (160-bit) buffer
(A,B,C,D,E) to
(67452301,efcdab89,98badcfe,10325476,c3d2e1f0)
4. Processing Message in 512-bit Blocks : process
message in 16-word (512-bit) chunks:
– expand 16 words into 80 words by mixing & shifting
– use 4 rounds of 20 bit operations on message block & buffer
– add output to input to form new buffer value
5. output hash value is the final buffer value
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 SHA-1 Compression Function
• each round has 20 steps which replaces
the 5 buffer words thus:
(A,B,C,D,E) <-(E+f(t,B,C,D)+(A<<5)+Wt+Kt),A,
(B<<30),C,D)
• a,b,c,d refer to the 4 words of the buffer
• t is the step number
• f(t,B,C,D) is nonlinear function for round
• W is derived from the message block
t

• Kt is a constant value derived from sin

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 SHA-1 Compression Function

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 SHA-1 verses MD5
• brute force attack is harder (160 vs 128
bits for MD5)
• not vulnerable to any known attacks
(compared to MD4/5)
• a little slower than MD5 (80 vs 64 steps)
• both designed as simple and compact
• optimised for big endian CPU's (vs MD5
which is optimised for little endian CPU’s)
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 Revised Secure Hash Standard
• NIST have issued a revision FIPS 180-2
• adds 3 additional hash algorithms
• SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
• designed for compatibility with increased
security provided by the AES cipher
• structure & detail is similar to SHA-1
• hence analysis should be similar

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 Digital Signatures
• have looked at message authentication
– but does not address issues of lack of trust
• digital signatures provide the ability to:
– verify author, date & time of signature
– authenticate message contents
– be verified by third parties to resolve disputes
• hence include authentication function with
additional capabilities
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 Digital Signature Properties
• must depend on the message signed
• must use information unique to sender
– to prevent both forgery and denial
• must be relatively easy to produce
• must be relatively easy to recognize & verify
• be computationally infeasible to forge
– with new message for existing digital signature
– with fraudulent digital signature for given message
• be practical save digital signature in storage
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 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
• US Govt approved signature scheme FIPS 186
• uses the SHA hash algorithm
• designed by NIST & NSA in early 90's
• DSS is the standard, DSA is the algorithm
• a variant on ElGamal and Schnorr schemes
• creates a 320 bit signature, but with 512-1024
bit security
• security depends on difficulty of computing
discrete logarithms
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 Digital Signature approaches

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 DSA Key Generation
• have shared global public key values (p,q,g):
– a large prime p = 2L
• where L= 512 to 1024 bits and is a multiple of 64
– choose q, a 160 bit prime factor of p-1
– choose g = h(p-1)/q
• where h<p-1, h(p-1)/q (mod p) > 1
• users choose private & compute public key:
– choose x<q
– compute y = gx (mod p)

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 DSA Signature Creation
• to sign a message M the sender:
– generates a random signature key k, k<q
– nb. k must be random, be destroyed after
use, and never be reused
• then computes signature pair:
r = (gk(mod p))(mod q)
s = (k-1.SHA(M)+ x.r)(mod q)
• sends signature (r,s) with message M
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 DSA Signature Verification
• having received M & signature (r,s)
• to verify a signature, recipient computes:
w = s-1(mod q)
u1= (SHA(M).w)(mod q)
u2= (r.w)(mod q)
v = (gu1.yu2(mod p)) (mod q)
• if v=r then signature is verified
• see book web site for details of proof why
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 DSA or DSS

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 DSS Signing and Verifying

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 Direct Digital Signatures
• involve only sender & receiver
• assumed receiver has sender’s public-key
• digital signature made by sender signing
entire message or hash with private-key
• can encrypt using receivers public-key
• important that sign first then encrypt
message & signature
• security depends on sender’s private-key
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 Arbitrated Digital Signatures
• involves use of arbiter A
– validates any signed message
– then dated and sent to recipient
• requires suitable level of trust in arbiter
• can be implemented with either private or
public-key algorithms
• arbiter may or may not see message

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 Authentication Protocols
• used to convince parties of each others
identity and to exchange session keys
• may be one-way or mutual
• key issues are
– confidentiality – to protect session keys
– timeliness – to prevent replay attacks

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 Replay Attacks
• where a valid signed message is copied and
later resent
– simple replay
– repetition that can be logged
– repetition that cannot be detected
– backward replay without modification
• countermeasures include
– use of sequence numbers (generally impractical)
– timestamps (needs synchronized clocks)
– challenge/response (using unique nonce)
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 Using Symmetric Encryption
• as discussed previously can use a two-
level hierarchy of keys
• usually with a trusted Key Distribution
Center (KDC)
– each party shares own master key with KDC
– KDC generates session keys used for
connections between parties
– master keys used to distribute these to them

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 Needham-Schroeder Protocol
• original third-party key distribution protocol
• for session between A B mediated by KDC
• protocol overview is:
1. A→KDC: IDA || IDB || N1
2. KDC→A: EKa[Ks || IDB || N1 || EKb[Ks||IDA] ]
3. A→B: EKb[Ks||IDA]
4. B→A: EKs[N2]
5. A→B: EKs[f(N2)]
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 Needham-Schroeder Protocol
• used to securely distribute a new session
key for communications between A & B
• but is vulnerable to a replay attack if an old
session key has been compromised
– then message 3 can be resent convincing B
that is communicating with A
• modifications to address this require:
– timestamps (Denning 81)
– using an extra nonce (Neuman 93)

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 Using Public-Key Encryption
• have a range of approaches based on the
use of public-key encryption
• need to ensure have correct public keys
for other parties
• using a central Authentication Server (AS)
• various protocols exist using timestamps
or nonces

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 Denning AS Protocol
• Denning 81 presented the following:
1. A→AS: IDA || IDB
2. AS→A: EKRas[IDA||KUa||T] || EKRas[IDB||KUb||T]
3. A→B: EKRas[IDA||KUa||T] || EKRas[IDB||KUb||T] ||
EKUb[EKRas[Ks||T]]
• note session key is chosen by A, hence
AS need not be trusted to protect it
• timestamps prevent replay but require
synchronized clocks
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 One-Way Authentication
• required when sender & receiver are not in
communications at same time (eg. email)
• have header in clear so can be delivered
by email system
• may want contents of body protected &
sender authenticated

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 Using Symmetric Encryption
• can refine use of KDC but can’t have final
exchange of nonces, vis:
1. A→KDC: IDA || IDB || N1
2. KDC→A: EKa[Ks || IDB || N1 || EKb[Ks||IDA] ]
3. A→B: EKb[Ks||IDA] || EKs[M]
• does not protect against replays
– could rely on timestamp in message, though
email delays make this problematic
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 Public-Key Approaches
• have seen some public-key approaches
• if confidentiality is major concern, can use:
A→B: EKUb[Ks] || EKs[M]
– has encrypted session key, encrypted message
• if authentication needed use a digital
signature with a digital certificate:
A→B: M || EKRa[H(M)] || EKRas[T||IDA||KUa]
– with message, signature, certificate
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 Elgamal Encryption

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 Elgamal Message Exchange

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 Elgamal Example

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 Entity Authentication

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 14-1 INTRODUCTION

Entity authentication is a technique designed to let one

party prove the identity of another party. An entity can
be a person, a process, a client, or a server. The entity
whose identity needs to be proved is called the
claimant; the party that tries to prove the identity of
the claimant is called the verifier.

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 14.1.1 Data-Origin Versus Entity Authentication

1) Message authentication might not happen in real

time; entity authentication does.
2) Message authentication simply authenticates one
message; the process needs to be repeated for each
new message. Entity authentication authenticates the
claimant for the entire duration of a session.

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 14.1.2 Verification Categories

Something known

Something possessed

Something inherent

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 14-2 PASSWORDS

The simplest and oldest method of entity

authentication is the password-based authentication,
where the password is something that the claimant
knows.

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 14.2.1 Fixed Password

First Approach Figure 14.1 User ID and password file

Attacks on the first approach

Eavesdropping
Stealing a password
Accessing a password file
guessing
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 14.2.1 Continued

Second Approach Figure 14.2 Hashing the password

Dictionary attack
Create a list of password, calculate the hash value,
and search the second-column entries to find a
match.
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 14.2.1 Continued

Third Approach Figure 14.3 Salting the password

When the password is created, a random string, called the

salt, is concatenated to the password. The salted password is
then hashed.
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The Unix OS uses a variationCCS
of /this
Dr I Kala, UNIT IV
method.
 14.2.1 Continued

Fourth Approach

• In the fourth approach, two identification techniques

are combined.
• A good example of this type of authentication is the use
of an ATM card (something possessed) with a PIN
(personal identification number) (something known).

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 14.2.2 One-Time Password

 A one-time password is a password that is used only

once.
 In the first approach, the user and the system agree
upon a list of passwords.
 In the second approach, the user and the system agree
to sequentially update the password.
 In the third approach, the user and the system create a
sequentially updated password using a hash function.

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 14.2.2 Continued

Figure 14.4 the third approach -- Lamport one-time password

 Alice and Bob agree upon an

original password P0 and a counter n.
 The system stores the identity of
Alice, the value of n and the hash.
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 14-3 CHALLENGE-RESPONSE

In password authentication, the claimant proves her

identity by demonstrating that she knows a secret, the
password. However, because the claimant reveals this
secret, it is susceptible to interception by the adversary.
In challenge-response authentication, the claimant
proves that she knows a secret without sending it.

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 14-3 Continue

Note
In challenge-response authentication, the claimant
proves that she knows a secret without sending it to
the verifier.

Note
The challenge is a time-varying value sent by the
verifier; the response is the result
of a function applied on the challenge.

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 14.3.1 Using a Symmetric-Key Cipher

First Approach Figure 14.5 Nonce challenge

1. ID of claimant
2. The challenge: RB is the nonce randomly chosen by the Bob to
challenge Alice
3. Alice encrypts the nonce using the shared secret key known only
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CCS /decrypts the message.
Dr I Kala, UNIT IV If the nonce
obtained from decryption is the same as the one sent by Bob.
 14.3.1 Continued

Figure 14.6 Timestamp challenge

Second Approach

The challenge message is the current time sent

from the verifier to the claimant.
The claimant encrypt Alice ID and time with
Alice-Bob secret key.
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 14.3.1 Continued

Third Approach. Figure 14.7 Bidirectional authentication

1. Alice ID
2. The challenge from Bob to Alice RB
3. Alice respond and send her challenge RA
4. Bob’s response. RA and RB are switched to prevent a replay attack.
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 14.3.2 Using Keyed-Hash Functions

Instead of using encryption/decryption for entity

authentication, we can also use a keyed-hash function
(MAC). Figure 14.8 Keyed-hash function

1. The challenge message is the current time sent from the

verifier to the claimant.
2. The timestamp is sent both as plaintext and as text scrambled
by the keyed-hash function.
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3. Bob compares his calculation with what he received.
 14.3.3 Using an Asymmetric-Key Cipher

First Approach
Figure 14.9 Unidirectional, asymmetric-key authentication

Ownership of claimant’s private key

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 14.3.3 Continued

Second Approach
Figure 14.10 Bidirectional, asymmetric-key

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 14.3.4 Using Digital Signature

Figure 14.11 Digital signature, unidirectional

First Approach

Ownership of claimant’s private key

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 14.3.4 Continued

Second Approach
Figure 14.12 Digital signature, bidirectional authentication

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 14-5 BIOMETRICS

Biometrics is the measurement of physiological or

behavioral features that identify a person
(authentication by something inherent). Biometrics
measures features that cannot be guessed, stolen, or
shared.

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 14.5.1 Components

Several components are needed for biometrics, including

capturing devices, processors, and storage devices..

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 14.5.2 Enrollment

Before using any biometric techniques for authentication,

the corresponding feature of each person in the
community should be available in the database. This is
referred to as enrollment.

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 14.5.3 Authentication

Verification

Identification

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 14.5.4 Techniques

Figure 14.17 Techniques

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 Authentication Applications
• will consider authentication functions
• developed to support application-level
authentication & digital signatures
• will consider Kerberos – a private-key
authentication service
• then X.509 directory authentication service

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 Kerberos
• trusted key server system from MIT
• provides centralised private-key third-party
authentication in a distributed network
– allows users access to services distributed
through network
– without needing to trust all workstations
– rather all trust a central authentication server
• two versions in use: 4 & 5
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 Kerberos Requirements
• first published report identified its
requirements as:
– security
– reliability
– transparency
– scalability
• implemented using an authentication
protocol based on Needham-Schroeder
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 Kerberos 4 Overview
• a basic third-party authentication scheme
• have an Authentication Server (AS)
– users initially negotiate with AS to identify self
– AS provides a non-corruptible authentication
credential (ticket granting ticket TGT)
• have a Ticket Granting server (TGS)
– users subsequently request access to other
services from TGS on basis of users TGT

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 Kerberos 4 Overview

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 Kerberos Realms
• a Kerberos environment consists of:
– a Kerberos server
– a number of clients, all registered with server
– application servers, sharing keys with server
• this is termed a realm
– typically a single administrative domain
• if have multiple realms, their Kerberos
servers must share keys and trust
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 Kerberos Version 5
• developed in mid 1990’s
• provides improvements over v4
– addresses environmental shortcomings
• encryption alg, network protocol, byte order, ticket
lifetime, authentication forwarding, interrealm auth
– and technical deficiencies
• double encryption, non-std mode of use, session
keys, password attacks
• specified as Internet standard RFC 1510
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 X.509 Authentication Service
• part of CCITT X.500 directory service standards
– distributed servers maintaining some info database
• defines framework for authentication services
– directory may store public-key certificates
– with public key of user
– signed by certification authority
• also defines authentication protocols
• uses public-key crypto & digital signatures
– algorithms not standardised, but RSA recommended

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 X.509 Certificates
• issued by a Certification Authority (CA), containing:
– version (1, 2, or 3)
– serial number (unique within CA) identifying certificate
– signature algorithm identifier
– issuer X.500 name (CA)
– period of validity (from - to dates)
– subject X.500 name (name of owner)
– subject public-key info (algorithm, parameters, key)
– issuer unique identifier (v2+)
– subject unique identifier (v2+)
– extension fields (v3)
– signature (of hash of all fields in certificate)
• notation CA<<A>> denotes certificate for A signed by CA
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 X.509 Certificates

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 CA Hierarchy Use

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 Certificate Revocation
• certificates have a period of validity
• may need to revoke before expiry, eg:
1. user's private key is compromised
2. user is no longer certified by this CA
3. CA's certificate is compromised
• CA’s maintain list of revoked certificates
– the Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
• users should check certs with CA’s CRL
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