Database and Application Security
Database and Application Security, Nov 2006
Database Security
Database Security - protection from malicious attempts to steal (view) or modify data.
Database and Application Security, Nov 2006
Importance of Data
Bank/Demat accounts Credit card, Salary, Income tax data University admissions, marks/grades Land records, licenses Data = crown jewels for organizations
Database and Application Security, Nov 2006
Overview
Levels of data security Authorization in databases Application Vulnerabilities Summary and References
Database and Application Security, Nov 2006
Levels of Data Security
Human level: Corrupt/careless User Network/User Interface Database application program Database system Operating System Physical level
Database and Application Security, Nov 2006
Physical/OS Security
Physical level
Traditional lock-and-key security Protection from floods, fire, etc.
E.g. WTC (9/11), fires in IITM, WWW conf website, etc.
Protection from administrator error
E.g. delete critical files
Solution
Remote backup for disaster recovery Plus archival backup (e.g. DVDs/tapes)
Operating system level
Protection from virus/worm attacks critical
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Database Encryption
E.g. What if a laptop/disk/USB key with critical data is lost? Partial solution: encrypt the database at storage level, transparent to application
Whole database/file/relation
Unit of encryption: page
Column encryption
Main issue: key management
E.g. user provides decryption key (password) when database is
started up
Supported by many database systems
Standard practice now to encrypt credit card information, and other
sensitive information
Database and Application Security, Nov 2006
Security (Cont.)
Network level: must use encryption to prevent
Eavesdropping: unauthorized reading of messages Masquerading:
pretending to be an authorized
user or legitimate site, or sending messages supposedly from authorized users
Database and Application Security, Nov 2006
Network Security
All information must be encrypted to prevent eavesdropping
Public/private key encryption widely used Handled by secure http - https:// E.g. someone impersonates seller or bank/credit card company and fools buyer into revealing information
Encrypting messages alone doesnt solve this problem More on this in next slide
Must prevent person-in-the-middle attacks
Database and Application Security, Nov 2006
Site Authentication
Digital certificates are used in https to prevent impersonation/man-in-the middle attack
Certification agency creates digital certificate by encrypting, e.g., sites public key using its own private key
Verifies site identity by external means first!
Site sends certificate to buyer Customer uses public key of certification agency to decrypt certificate and find sites public key
Man-in-the-middle cannot send fake public key
Sites public key used for setting up secure communication
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Security at the Database/Application Program
Authentication and authorization mechanisms to allow specific users access only to required data Authentication: who are you? Prove it! Authorization: what you are allowed to do
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Database vs. Application
Application authenticates/authorizes users Application itself authenticates itself to database
Database password
Application Program
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Database
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User Authentication
Password
Most users abuse passwords. For e.g.
Easy to guess password Share passwords with others
Smartcards
Need smartcard + a PIN or password
Mosaab Daoud
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User Authentication
Central authentication systems allow users to be authenticated centrally
LDAP or MS Active Directory often used for central authentication and user management in organizations
Single sign-on: authenticate once, and access multiple applications without fresh authentication
Microsoft passport, PubCookie etc Avoids plethora of passwords Password only given to central site, not to applications
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Overview
Levels of security Authorization in databases Application Vulnerabilities References
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Authorization
Different authorizations for different users
Accounts clerk vs. Accounts manager vs. End users
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Database/Application Security
Ensure that only authenticated users can access the system And can access (read/update) only data/interfaces that they are authorized to access
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Limitations of SQL Authorization
SQL does not support authorization at a tuple level
E.g. we cannot restrict students to see only (the tuples storing) their own grades
Web applications are dominant users of databases
Application end users don't have database user ids, they are all mapped to the same database user id Database access control provides only a very coarse application-level access control
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Access Control in Application Layer
Applications authenticate end users and decide what interfaces to give to whom
Screen level authorization: which users are allowed to access which screens Parameter checking: users only authorized to execute forms with certain parameter values
E.g. CSE faculty can see only CSE grades
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Access Control in Application Layer
Authorization in application layer vs. database layer
Benefits
fine grained authorizations, such as to individual tuples,
can be implemented by the application. authorizations based on business logic easier to code at application level
Drawback:
Authorization must be done in application code, and may
be dispersed all over an application Hard to check or modify authorizations Checking for absence of authorization loopholes becomes very difficult since it requires reading large amounts of application code
Need a good via-media
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Oracle Virtual Private Database
Oracle VPD
Provides ability to automatically add predicates to where clause of SQL queries, to enforce fine-grained access control
E.g. select * from grades becomes
select * from grades where rollno=userId()
Mechanism:
DBA creates an authorization function. When invoked with a
relation name and mode of access, function returns a string containing authorization predicate Strings for each relation and-ed together and added to users query
Application domain: hosted applications, where applications of different organizations share a database (down to relation level)
Added predicates ensures each organization sees only its own
data
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Privacy
Aggregate information about private information can be very valuable
E.g. identification of epidemics, mining for patterns (e.g. disease causes) etc. E.g. in US, many organizations released anonymized medical data, with names removed, but zipcode (= pincode), sex and date of birth retained
Turns out above (zipcode,sex,date of birth) uniquely identify most people!
Privacy preserving data release
Correlate anonymized data with (say) electoral data with same information
Recent problems at America Online
identified in several cases
Released search history, apparently anonymized, but users could be easily
Several top officials were fired
Earlier problems revealed medical history of Massachusetts state governer.
Not yet a criminal issue, but lawsuits have happened Conflict with Right To Information Act
Many issues still to be resolved
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Overview
Levels of security Authorization in databases Application Vulnerabilities References
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Application Security
Applications are often the biggest source of insecurity
Poor coding of application may allow unauthorized access Application code may be very big, easy to make mistakes and leave security holes Very large surface area
Used in fewer places
Some security by obfuscation Lots of holes due to poor/hasty programming
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OWASP Top 10 Web Security Vulnerabilities
1. Unvalidated input 2. Broken access control 3. Broken account/session management 4. Cross-site scripting (XSS) flaws 5. Buffer overflows 6. (SQL) Injection flaws 7. Improper error handling 8. Insecure storage 9. Denial-of-service 10.Insecure configuration management
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SQL Injection
E.g. application takes accnt_number as input from user and creates an SQL query as follows:
string query = "select balance from account where account_number =" + accnt_number +"" Suppose instead of a valid account number, user types in
; delete from r; then (oops!) the query becomes select balance from account where account_number = ; delete from r;
Hackers can probe for SQL injection vulnerability by typing, e.g. *** in an input box
Tools can probe for vulnerability Error messages can reveal information to hacker
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Preventing SQL Injection
To prevent SQL injection attacks use prepared statements (instead of creating query strings from input parameters)
PreparedStatement pstmt= conn.prepareStatement( "select balance from account where account_number =?); pstmt.setString(1,accnt_number); pstmt.execute(); (assume that conn is an already open connection to the database)
Alternatives:
use stored procedures use a function that removes special characters (such as quotes) from strings
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Passwords in Scripts
E.g.: file1.jsp (or java or other source file) located in publicly accessible area of web server
Intruder looks for http://<urlpath>/file1.jsp~
or .jsp.swp, etc
If jsp has database userid/password in clear text, big trouble
Happened at IITB
Morals
Never store scripts (java/jsp) in an area accessible to http Never store passwords in scripts, keep them in config files Never store config files in any web-accessible areas Restrict database access to only trusted clients
At port level, or using database provided functionality
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Outsider vs. Insider Attack
Most security schemes address outsider attack Have password to database? Can update anything
Bypassing all application level security measures
More people with access more danger
Application program has database password Great deal of trust in people who manage databases
Risk of compromise greater with value of data Happened with auto-rickshaw registration in New Delhi
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Protecting from Users
Multi-person approval:
Standard practice in banks, accounts departments Encoded as part of application workflow External paper trail Smart cards
Strong authentication of users
Careful allocation of authorizations on a need to use basis
Practical problem: absence of a user should not prevent organization from functioning Many organizations therefore grant overly generous authorizations
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Protecting from Programmers/DBA
Have password to database, can update anything!
Digital signatures by end users can help in some situations
E.g. low update rate data such as land records, birth/death data
Application program has database password
Seize control of the application program can do anything to the database Solution:
only a few system administrators
Dont give database password to development team keep password in a configuration file on live server, accessible to
Ongoing research on trusted applications
E.g. OS computes checksum on application to verify corruption Allows file-system access only to trusted applications
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Database and Application Security, Nov 2006
Protection from admin/super-users
Operating system administrators (also known as super-users) can do anything they want to the database.
Small number of trusted administrators Encrypt entire database (and/or file system) Supported, e.g. in SQL Server 2005 Authentication (password/smart card) when database is started up
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What if a laptop with critical data is lost?
Detecting Corruption
Audit trails: record of all (update) activity on the database: who did what, when
Application level audit trail
Helps detect fraudulent activities by users Independent audit section to check all updates BUT: DBAs can bypass this level
E.g. audit trail apparently deleted in New Delhi auto-rickshaw license case by malicious users with DBA access
Database level audit trail
Database needs to ensure these cant be turned off, and turned
on again after doing damage Supported by most commercial database systems But required DBAs with knowledge of application to monitor at this level
Keep archival copies and cross check periodically
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Information Leakage
So you thought only the query result matters?
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Information Leakage via UDFs
Auth view myemployee: only those employee whose dept_id is in A1 myudf(E.salary) Query:
select * from employee where myudf(salary)
myudf(E.salary)
myemployees
myudf(E.salary)
employees
A1
employees A1
Final query plan is not safe
UDF may be pushed down in plan, and executed on unauthorized intermediate result As a side-effect, UDF may expose values passed to it [Litchfield] Can be partly solved using sandboxing
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Other channels of information leakage
Exceptions, Error Messages
Query: select * from employee
where 1/(salary-100K) = 0.23
Query plan: Selection condition in query gets pushed below authorization semi-join Divide by zero exception if salary = 100K Reveals that employee has salary = 100K
Timing Analysis
Sub-query can perform an expensive computation only if certain tuples are present in its input
To prevent leakage, treat all channels as unsafe operations 36
Database and Application Security, Nov 2006
Preventing Information Leakage via UDFs
UDF on Top: Keep UDFs at the top of query plan
Definitely safe, no information leakage Better plans possible if UDF is selective
myudf(E.salary)
myudf(E.salary)
employees
A1
employees
A1
Optimal Safe plan
When is a plan safe? How to search for optimal safe plan? For details, see: Kabra et al., SIGMOD 2006
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Overview
Levels of security Authorization in databases Application Vulnerabilities Summary
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Summary
Data security is critical Requires security at different levels Several technical solutions But human training is essential
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Acknowledgments
Pictures in this talk taken from various web sources!
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References
(Shameless advertisement!) Chapter 8 of Database System Concepts 5th Edition, Silberschatz, Korth and Sudarshan, McGraw-Hill The Open Web Application Security Project
http://www.owasp.org
Web application security scanners
e.g. WebInspect (SPI Dynamics) http://www.windowsecurity.com/software/Web-Application-Security/ http://www.cgisecurity.com/development/sql.shtml http://developers.sun.com/learning/javaoneonline/2005/webtier/TS-5935.pdf Kabra, Ramamurthy and Sudarshan, Redundancy and Information Leakage in Fine-Grained Access Control, SIGMOD 2006 Rizvi, Mendelzon, Sudarshan and Roy, Extending Query Rewriting Techniques for Fine-Grained Access Control, SIGMOD 2004
SQL Injection
9 ways to hack a web app
Related research papers
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Extra Slides
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Authorization
Forms of authorization on (parts of) the database: Read authorization - allows reading, but not modification of data. Insert authorization - allows insertion of new data, but not modification of existing data. Update authorization - allows modification, but not deletion of data. Delete authorization - allows deletion of data
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Security Specification in SQL
The grant statement is used to confer authorization grant <privilege list> on <relation name or view name> to <user list> <user list> is:
a user-id public, which allows all valid users the privilege granted A role (more on this later)
Granting a privilege on a view does not imply granting any privileges on the underlying relations. The grantor of the privilege must already hold the privilege on the specified item (or be the database administrator).
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Privileges in SQL
select: allows read access to relation,or the ability to query using the view
grant select on branch to U1, U2, U3 insert: the ability to insert tuples update: the ability to update using the SQL update statement delete: the ability to delete tuples. references: ability to declare foreign keys when creating relations. usage: In SQL-92; authorizes a user to use a specified domain all privileges: used as a short form for all the allowable privileges
Example: grant users U1, U2, and U3 select authorization on the branch relation:
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Privilege To Grant Privileges
with grant option: allows a user who is granted a privilege to pass the privilege on to other users.
Example:
grant select on branch to U1 with grant option gives U1 the select privileges on branch and allows U1 to grant this privilege to others
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Roles
Roles permit common privileges for a class of users can be specified just once by creating a corresponding role Privileges can be granted to or revoked from roles Roles can be assigned to users, and even to other roles SQL:1999 supports roles
create role teller create role manager grant select on branch to teller grant update ( balance) on account to teller grant all privileges on account to manager grant teller to manager grant teller to alice, bob grant manager to avi
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Revoking Authorization in SQL
The revoke statement is used to revoke authorization.
revoke<privilege list> on <relation name or view name> from <user list> [restrict| cascade]
Example:
revoke select on branch from U1, U2, U3 cascade
Revocation of a privilege from a user may cause other users also to lose that privilege; referred to as cascading of the revoke. We can prevent cascading by specifying restrict: With restrict, the revoke command fails if cascading revokes are required.
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revoke select on branch from U1, U2, U3 restrict
Database and Application Security, Nov 2006
Revoking Authorization in SQL (Cont.)
<privilege-list> may be all to revoke all privileges the revokee may hold. If <revokee-list> includes public all users lose the privilege except those granted it explicitly. If the same privilege was granted twice to the same user by different grantees, the user may retain the privilege after the revocation. All privileges that depend on the privilege being revoked are also revoked.
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Secure Payment
Three-way communication between seller, buyer and credit-card company to make payment
Credit card company credits amount to seller Credit card company consolidates all payments from a buyer and collects them together
E.g. via buyers bank through physical/electronic
check payment
Several secure payment protocols
E.g. Secure Electronic Transaction (SET)
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