A web-based simulation of how different strategies for the Prisoner's Dilemma evolve over time under explicit evolutionary rules, based on population size, strategy set, payoff matrix, and selection dynamics.

• Six Strategy Types: Always Cooperate, Always Defect, Tit-for-Tat, Grudge, Prober, and Random
• Evolutionary Dynamics: Population-based evolution with selection, reproduction, and mutation
• Interactive Web Interface:
  • Left panel: Parameter controls
  • Center panel: Dual visualization modes (Statistical View and Agent Animation)
  • Right panel: Documentation area
  • Bottom panel: Terminal output with exact proportions
• High-Performance Backend: NumPy-optimized simulation engine with vectorized operations
• Dark Theme UI: Modern dark interface with high-contrast colors

1. Install dependencies:

pip install -r requirements.txt

1. Start the Flask server:

python app.py

2. Open your browser and navigate to:

http://localhost:5000

3. Configure simulation parameters:

   • Set initial population size
   • Select strategies and set initial proportions
   • Configure payoff matrix
   • Set evolution parameters (generations, selection, mutation rate)

4. Click "Run Simulation" to execute

5. View results in:

   • Statistical View: Population size over time (line chart) and current strategy proportions (bar chart)
   • Agent Animation: Visual representation of players arranged in a circle, with pairing animations

Prisoner_dilemma_simulation/
├── app.py                 # Flask backend API
├── simulation.py          # Core simulation engine
├── strategies.py          # Strategy implementations
├── requirements.txt       # Python dependencies
├── templates/
│   └── index.html        # Main web interface
└── static/
    ├── style.css         # Dark theme styling
    └── app.js            # Frontend JavaScript

• Always Cooperate: Always plays Cooperate
• Always Defect: Always plays Defect
• Tit-for-Tat: Cooperates first, then copies opponent's last move
• Grudge: Cooperates until opponent defects, then always defects
• Prober: Cooperates for random rounds (1 to R-1), defects, then repeats
• Random: 50% chance of cooperate or defect each round

MIT License - see LICENSE file for details