pkg: remove unused code

This code was meant to be deleted in
9592a00 I believe.

Signed-off-by: Euan Kemp <[email protected]>

metrics: Improves naming of traits (ory#803)

Closes ory#802

cmd: Adds OpenID Connect refresh handler

Previously, it was impossible to refresh OpenID Connect ID Tokens. This is now possible as the factory has been added to the oauth2 factory in the host process.

Closes ory#794

oauth2: Resolves possible session fixation attack

This patch resolves a vulnerability in the consent flow. This vulnerability
affects versions 0.10.0 ~ 0.11.5 only. Versions < 0.10.0 are not affected.

The vulnerability can be exploited as follows:

1. Malice initiates an OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code Flow:
  https://hydra/oauth2/auth?client=...
2. Hydra redirects malice to the consent app and appends consent
  id "example-id": https://consent-app/?consent=example-id
3. Malice convinces Bob to open url https://consent-app/?consent=example-id
  and authorize the access request.
4. The consent app would redirect Bob back to
  `https://hydra/oauth2/auth?client=...&consent=example-id`. However,
  through some means, Malice is able to prevent redirection of Bob's
  user agent.
5. Malice accesses the original auth code url and appends the consent id:
  `https://hydra/oauth2/auth?client=...&consent=example-id`
6. As the consent request is granted but not claimed, and because Malice's
  user agent contains the valid CSRF token, Malice receives an authorize
  code that is meant to be issued to Bob.
7. Malice can now act on Bob's behalf.

For this attack to work, the following preconditions must be met:

1. Malice must be able to convince Bob to access the forged consent url.
2. Malice must be able to convince Bob to grant the forged consent request.
3. Malice must be able to prevent the consent app's redirect after
  successful consent request acceptance.
4. Malice must be able to perform this attack within the expiry (10 minutes)
  of the consent request.

For these reasons, an exploit for this vulnerability is not likely,
but possible.

This patch closes the described vulnerability by requiring a
`consent_csrf` value additional to the `consent` value in the query
parameters of the authorization url. Without that value, the authorization
code flow will not be successful. The `consent_csrf` is transmitted out-of-band
to the consent app and not accessible to Malice. Let's revisit the example
from above:

1. Malice initiates an OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code Flow:
  https://hydra/oauth2/auth?client=...
  - Hydra creates the consent request id and an additional CSRF token
    which is stored in the database and the encrypted cookie. Malice
    is not able to see the CSRF token.
2. Hydra redirects malice to the consent app and appends consent
  id "example-id": https://consent-app/?consent=example-id
3. Malice convinces Bob to open url https://consent-app/?consent=example-id
  and authorize the access request.
4. The consent app would redirect Bob back to
  `https://hydra/oauth2/auth?client=...&consent=example-id&consent_csrf=csrf_token`.
  The redirection URL is only accessible to the consent app and Bob's user agent.
  However, through some means, Malice is able to prevent redirection of Bob's
  user agent.
5. Malices does not know the value for `consent_csrf`, accessing
  `https://hydra/oauth2/auth?client=...&consent=example-id` without
  setting `consent_csrf` causes the request to fail and the consent to
  be revoked.

This patch does not introduce breaking changes. Upgrading to the version
which contains this patch does not require any code changes or deployment
changes.

docs: Incorporates changes from version v0.11.3

teleme: Improves telemetry module and upgrades to segment 3.0.0 (ory#752

)

oauth2: Protects consent flow against session fixation (ory#754)

Closes ory#753

Resolves issues with pagination (ory#750)

group: Resolves CI test issues by removing group

docs: Resolves issue with broken 5-minute tutorial

Closes ory#717