Popper wanted to distinguish science from non-science-a category said to include "logic, metaphys... more Popper wanted to distinguish science from non-science-a category said to include "logic, metaphysics, and psychoanalysis." Scientific claims he thought were falsifiable, at least in principle; that's what makes them special. This is apt to seem wrong in both directions. Logical claims, e.g., ϕ is unprovable, can be falsified. And while scientific hypotheses of certain forms («All Fs are G») may be falsifiable, not so hypotheses of other forms: «Each F eventually becomes G».
Oxford Handbook of Applied Philosophy of Language, ed. Luvell Anderson and Ernie Lepore, 2022
If we want everything to stay as it is, everything has to change. Giuseppe di Lampedusa, The Leop... more If we want everything to stay as it is, everything has to change. Giuseppe di Lampedusa, The Leopard
Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Language, 2024
Analytic semantics got its start when Frege, initially in Begriffschrift and then "Uber Sinn und ... more Analytic semantics got its start when Frege, initially in Begriffschrift and then "Uber Sinn und Bedeutung," grew puzzled about differences in cognitive content between sentences that in some good sense "say the same"-sentences attributing the same properties to the same objects, or placing those objects in the same relation. He was particularly impressed by claims like
1 Kripke must have known of this idea. It's hinted at in Kripke [2017], written originally for Qu... more 1 Kripke must have known of this idea. It's hinted at in Kripke [2017], written originally for Quine in the 1960s. Work going back to the 1970s on Carnap's version is reported in Kripke[2024].
Are physical events subject to mental influence? Even to raise the question suggests what the ans... more Are physical events subject to mental influence? Even to raise the question suggests what the answer had better be. Deny mental causation and you are denying that anyone everdoes anything: answer a question or anything else. 2 Tongues may wag and arms may wave about, but there is no action unless these things occur at the bidding of appropriate mental states. Nor is action the only casualty if mental states are physically inert. Smirking, beaming, moping about, shivering in anticipation, raising a skeptical eyebrow, favoring a ...
A development and defense of Kripke's secret doctrine, only hinted at in his work but repeatedly ... more A development and defense of Kripke's secret doctrine, only hinted at in his work but repeatedly so, of nonexistence.
Levy and Godfrey-Smith, *The Scientific Imagination* (OUP, 2020)
The title comes from a well-known paper of Putnam’s (Putnam [1980]). The content is very differen... more The title comes from a well-known paper of Putnam’s (Putnam [1980]). The content is very different. Putnam uses model theory1 to cast doubt on our ability to engage semantically with an objective world. The role of mathematics for him is to prove this pessimistic conclusion. I on the other hand am wondering how models can help us to engage semantically with the objective world. Mathematics functions for me as an analogy. Numbers among their many other accomplishments boost the language’s expressive power; they give us access to recondite physical facts. Models, among their many other accomplishments, do the same thing; they give us access to recondite physical facts. This anyway is the analogy I will try to develop in this paper.
An undemanding claim ' sometimes implies, or seems to, a more demanding one c. Some have posited,... more An undemanding claim ' sometimes implies, or seems to, a more demanding one c. Some have posited, to explain this, a confusion between ' and ' Ã , an analogue of ' that does not imply c. If-thenists take ' Ã to be If c then '. Incrementalism is the form of if-thenism that construes If c then ' as the surplus content of ' over c ('»c). The paper argues that it is the only form of if-thenism that stands a chance of being correct.
KITBOOK, a volume for Kit Fine edited by Federico Faroldi and Frederik Van De Putte, 2020
Develops update rules for permissions and commands in the spirit of truthmaker semantics, taxonom... more Develops update rules for permissions and commands in the spirit of truthmaker semantics, taxonomizing them "prospectively" by their intended static semantical results.
I reply to comments on "If-Thenism" by Suki Finn, Katharina Felka, Amie Thomasson, Seahwa Kim, Da... more I reply to comments on "If-Thenism" by Suki Finn, Katharina Felka, Amie Thomasson, Seahwa Kim, Daniel Dohrn, Gideon Rosen, Otavio Bueno, Brad Armour-Garb, Fred Kroon, Mary Leng, Joseph Ulatowski, Mark Colyvan, and Matteo Plebani.
for a volume on Unstructured Content edited by Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini, Andy Egan, Peter ... more for a volume on Unstructured Content edited by Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini, Andy Egan, Peter van Elswyk, and Dirk Kindermann
Knowledge is closed under (known) implication, according to standard theories. Orthodoxy can allo... more Knowledge is closed under (known) implication, according to standard theories. Orthodoxy can allow, though, that *apparent* counterexamples to closure exist, much as Kripkeans recognize the existence of illusions of possibility (IPOs)which they seek to explain away. Should not everyone, orthodox or not, want tomake sense of ‘‘intimations of openness’’ (IONs)? This paper compares two stylesof explanation: (1) evidence that boosts P ’s probability need not boost that of its consequence Q; (2) evidence bearing on P’s subject matter may not bear on the subject matter of Q.
Introduction to thing/matter issues for the Norton Introduction to Philosophy , ed., Alex Byrne, ... more Introduction to thing/matter issues for the Norton Introduction to Philosophy , ed., Alex Byrne, Joshua Cohen, Gideon Rosen, and Seana Shiffrin
Popper wanted to distinguish science from non-science-a category said to include "logic, metaphys... more Popper wanted to distinguish science from non-science-a category said to include "logic, metaphysics, and psychoanalysis." Scientific claims he thought were falsifiable, at least in principle; that's what makes them special. This is apt to seem wrong in both directions. Logical claims, e.g., ϕ is unprovable, can be falsified. And while scientific hypotheses of certain forms («All Fs are G») may be falsifiable, not so hypotheses of other forms: «Each F eventually becomes G».
Oxford Handbook of Applied Philosophy of Language, ed. Luvell Anderson and Ernie Lepore, 2022
If we want everything to stay as it is, everything has to change. Giuseppe di Lampedusa, The Leop... more If we want everything to stay as it is, everything has to change. Giuseppe di Lampedusa, The Leopard
Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Language, 2024
Analytic semantics got its start when Frege, initially in Begriffschrift and then "Uber Sinn und ... more Analytic semantics got its start when Frege, initially in Begriffschrift and then "Uber Sinn und Bedeutung," grew puzzled about differences in cognitive content between sentences that in some good sense "say the same"-sentences attributing the same properties to the same objects, or placing those objects in the same relation. He was particularly impressed by claims like
1 Kripke must have known of this idea. It's hinted at in Kripke [2017], written originally for Qu... more 1 Kripke must have known of this idea. It's hinted at in Kripke [2017], written originally for Quine in the 1960s. Work going back to the 1970s on Carnap's version is reported in Kripke[2024].
Are physical events subject to mental influence? Even to raise the question suggests what the ans... more Are physical events subject to mental influence? Even to raise the question suggests what the answer had better be. Deny mental causation and you are denying that anyone everdoes anything: answer a question or anything else. 2 Tongues may wag and arms may wave about, but there is no action unless these things occur at the bidding of appropriate mental states. Nor is action the only casualty if mental states are physically inert. Smirking, beaming, moping about, shivering in anticipation, raising a skeptical eyebrow, favoring a ...
A development and defense of Kripke's secret doctrine, only hinted at in his work but repeatedly ... more A development and defense of Kripke's secret doctrine, only hinted at in his work but repeatedly so, of nonexistence.
Levy and Godfrey-Smith, *The Scientific Imagination* (OUP, 2020)
The title comes from a well-known paper of Putnam’s (Putnam [1980]). The content is very differen... more The title comes from a well-known paper of Putnam’s (Putnam [1980]). The content is very different. Putnam uses model theory1 to cast doubt on our ability to engage semantically with an objective world. The role of mathematics for him is to prove this pessimistic conclusion. I on the other hand am wondering how models can help us to engage semantically with the objective world. Mathematics functions for me as an analogy. Numbers among their many other accomplishments boost the language’s expressive power; they give us access to recondite physical facts. Models, among their many other accomplishments, do the same thing; they give us access to recondite physical facts. This anyway is the analogy I will try to develop in this paper.
An undemanding claim ' sometimes implies, or seems to, a more demanding one c. Some have posited,... more An undemanding claim ' sometimes implies, or seems to, a more demanding one c. Some have posited, to explain this, a confusion between ' and ' Ã , an analogue of ' that does not imply c. If-thenists take ' Ã to be If c then '. Incrementalism is the form of if-thenism that construes If c then ' as the surplus content of ' over c ('»c). The paper argues that it is the only form of if-thenism that stands a chance of being correct.
KITBOOK, a volume for Kit Fine edited by Federico Faroldi and Frederik Van De Putte, 2020
Develops update rules for permissions and commands in the spirit of truthmaker semantics, taxonom... more Develops update rules for permissions and commands in the spirit of truthmaker semantics, taxonomizing them "prospectively" by their intended static semantical results.
I reply to comments on "If-Thenism" by Suki Finn, Katharina Felka, Amie Thomasson, Seahwa Kim, Da... more I reply to comments on "If-Thenism" by Suki Finn, Katharina Felka, Amie Thomasson, Seahwa Kim, Daniel Dohrn, Gideon Rosen, Otavio Bueno, Brad Armour-Garb, Fred Kroon, Mary Leng, Joseph Ulatowski, Mark Colyvan, and Matteo Plebani.
for a volume on Unstructured Content edited by Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini, Andy Egan, Peter ... more for a volume on Unstructured Content edited by Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini, Andy Egan, Peter van Elswyk, and Dirk Kindermann
Knowledge is closed under (known) implication, according to standard theories. Orthodoxy can allo... more Knowledge is closed under (known) implication, according to standard theories. Orthodoxy can allow, though, that *apparent* counterexamples to closure exist, much as Kripkeans recognize the existence of illusions of possibility (IPOs)which they seek to explain away. Should not everyone, orthodox or not, want tomake sense of ‘‘intimations of openness’’ (IONs)? This paper compares two stylesof explanation: (1) evidence that boosts P ’s probability need not boost that of its consequence Q; (2) evidence bearing on P’s subject matter may not bear on the subject matter of Q.
Introduction to thing/matter issues for the Norton Introduction to Philosophy , ed., Alex Byrne, ... more Introduction to thing/matter issues for the Norton Introduction to Philosophy , ed., Alex Byrne, Joshua Cohen, Gideon Rosen, and Seana Shiffrin
Indicative conditionals appear to lie on a continuum, with the subjective and information-based o... more Indicative conditionals appear to lie on a continuum, with the subjective and information-based on one side, and the objective and fact-based on the other. Attempts to bring them all under the same theoretical umbrella usually start at the subjective end; conditionals get more objective as they come to be based in higher-quality, less parochial, information. I propose to go in the other direction, looking first for a class of "absolute" conditionals, then bringing in other conditionals by relaxing the constraints defining that class. (A plan of action is laid out at the end of section 4. The final footnote of each section sketches the contents of the next.) 1
"I am truthful" cannot be true in standard theories of truth. We explore why and propose a fix.
... more "I am truthful" cannot be true in standard theories of truth. We explore why and propose a fix.
When evidence E is acquired, pr(E) rises to 1. What about its truth-makers' probabilities pr(ε)... more When evidence E is acquired, pr(E) rises to 1. What about its truth-makers' probabilities pr(ε)? These will have to change too, as E's probability is a function of theirs. Bayes' rule is strangely uncurious about this; it doesn't ask about the probabilistic underpinnings of E's newfound certainty. What possible excuse can it have, when E's bearing on H depends on the relative probabilities of pro-H truth-makers and anti-H?. The explanation (it's not an excuse) is that ε for the Bayesian trails along probabilistically after E. A rule allowing E to trail along after its truth-makers is proposed. All heck breaks loose, e.g., evidential relations become hyperintensional.
Subtraction in arithmetic is the inverse of addition; p-q is the r such that q + r = p. Division ... more Subtraction in arithmetic is the inverse of addition; p-q is the r such that q + r = p. Division is the inverse of multiplication. And so on. What about in logic? LOGICAL SUBTRACTION To go by the arithmetic analogy, P∼Q ought to be the R such that Q&R is equivalent to P. But, there are many such Rs. In the simplest case, where P implies Q, R could be anything from Q⊃P to P itself. Q⊃P stands out as the weakest solution to Q&R ⇔ P. This is the perennial favorite; but though tempting the temptation should be resisted. Lots of reasons for this.
Carnap also proposed (tentatively) a particular way of measuring the degree to which E confirms i... more Carnap also proposed (tentatively) a particular way of measuring the degree to which E confirms i H: d(H, E
Causes are often conceived as events without which the effect would not have occurred. But could... more Causes are often conceived as events without which the effect would not have occurred. But couldn't there still be causation in worlds where every effect was metaphysically inevitable? A different picture is presented: a cause of E is an event taking us part way down the road actually leading to E.
Unpublished Appendix to *Aboutness*
Worlds are ways for things to be-possible ones in some sense... more Unpublished Appendix to *Aboutness*
Worlds are ways for things to be-possible ones in some sense of "possible" (Notation: w.) Logical space is the set of worlds. (Notation: W.) Propositions are subsets of logical space, or sets of worlds. (Notation: A, B, C,....). 1 A proposition A is true in world w i↵ w ✏ A, otherwise false. 2 Sentences are, you know. (Notation: A, B, C,....) Expression is the relation sentence X bears to proposition X when for all w, X is true in w i↵ w ✏ X.
Let's play a game. I'll describe it first at an abstract level, leaving details for later. Your j... more Let's play a game. I'll describe it first at an abstract level, leaving details for later. Your job is to choose between options A and B. The options overlap in that each way of B-ing extends to two ways ⋆ and ⋆ of A-ing, and each way of A-ing is a ⋆ or ⋆ for some way of B-ing. 1 The s win you a penny, and likewise the ⋆ s. Both are as good as worthless, and worthless is the name we will know them by. All other s-the ⋆ s-win you a million dollars. The ⋆ s are the lucrative s. This leaves a lot to the imagination, of course, but we can see already that if you were to play the A/B game, A would be a better option than B. One could assign probabilities and do expected utility calculations, but none of that is really necessary. It's enough to note that A dominates B:
In this interview, Stephen Yablo talks about his parents, a psychologist and an engineer, his bar... more In this interview, Stephen Yablo talks about his parents, a psychologist and an engineer, his bar mitzvah, ping pong, Spiderman, Atlantis, impossibility, drugs, breaking and entering, correspondence courses, working with the mentally disabled, attending university of Toronto, philosophy of dance, Protagoras, van Fraassen, Joni Mitchell, taking classes with John Slater, Bas van Fraasen, and Hans Herzberger, philosophy post-Wittgenstein, moving to India, joining the program in Logic and Methodology at UC Berkeley, working with Davidson, Myro, and Grice, getting 38 (!) job interviews, embarrassing himself in front of Sellars, landing a gig at Michigan, moving to MIT, the difference between philosophical progress and understanding, The Minority Body, Nintendo Wii, the leveraged freedom chair, The Verificationist, Synecdoche, Lupin, and his last meal…
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For a volume in honor of Raymond Smullyan
Worlds are ways for things to be-possible ones in some sense of "possible" (Notation: w.) Logical space is the set of worlds. (Notation: W.) Propositions are subsets of logical space, or sets of worlds. (Notation: A, B, C,....). 1 A proposition A is true in world w i↵ w ✏ A, otherwise false. 2 Sentences are, you know. (Notation: A, B, C,....) Expression is the relation sentence X bears to proposition X when for all w, X is true in w i↵ w ✏ X.