feat: add SG2042 support for 6.16 #8

RevySR · 2025-07-31T15:42:30Z

No description provided.

It appears that the xe_res_cursor also assumes 4KiB alignment. Current implementation uses `PAGE_SIZE' as an assumed alignment reference, but 4KiB kernel page sizes is by no means a guarantee. On 16KiB-paged kernels, this causes driver failures during boot up: [ 23.242757] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 23.247363] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2036 at drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_res_cursor.h:182 emit_pte+0x394/0x3b0 [xe] [ 23.256962] Modules linked in: nf_conntrack_netbios_ns(E) nf_conntrack_broadcast(E) nft_fib_inet(E) nft_fib_ipv4(E) nft_fib_ipv6(E) nft_fib(E) nft_reject_inet(E) nf_reject_ipv4(E) nf_reject_ipv6(E) nft_reject(E) nft_ct(E) rfkill(E) nft_chain_nat(E) ip6table_nat(E) ip6table_mangle(E) ip6table_raw(E) ip6table_security(E) iptable_nat(E) nf_nat(E) nf_conntrack(E) nf_defrag_ipv6(E) nf_defrag_ipv4(E) iptable_mangle(E) iptable_raw(E) iptable_security(E) ip_set(E) nf_tables(E) ip6table_filter(E) ip6_tables(E) iptable_filter(E) snd_hda_codec_conexant(E) snd_hda_codec_generic(E) snd_hda_codec_hdmi(E) snd_hda_intel(E) snd_intel_dspcfg(E) snd_hda_codec(E) nls_iso8859_1(E) qrtr(E) nls_cp437(E) snd_hda_core(E) loongson3_cpufreq(E) rtc_efi(E) snd_hwdep(E) snd_pcm(E) spi_loongson_pci(E) snd_timer(E) snd(E) spi_loongson_core(E) soundcore(E) gpio_loongson_64bit(E) rtc_loongson(E) i2c_ls2x(E) mousedev(E) input_leds(E) sch_fq_codel(E) fuse(E) nfnetlink(E) dmi_sysfs(E) ip_tables(E) x_tables(E) xe(E) drm_gpuvm(E) drm_buddy(E) gpu_sched(E) [ 23.257034] drm_exec(E) drm_suballoc_helper(E) drm_display_helper(E) cec(E) rc_core(E) hid_generic(E) tpm_tis_spi(E) r8169(E) loongson(E) i2c_algo_bit(E) realtek(E) drm_ttm_helper(E) led_class(E) ttm(E) drm_client_lib(E) drm_kms_helper(E) sunrpc(E) i2c_dev(E) [ 23.369697] CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 2036 Comm: QSGRenderThread Tainted: G E 6.14.0-rc4-aosc-main-g7cc07e6e50b0-dirty #8 [ 23.381640] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 23.385534] Hardware name: Loongson Loongson-3A6000-HV-7A2000-1w-V0.1-EVB/Loongson-3A6000-HV-7A2000-1w-EVB-V1.21, BIOS Loongson-UDK2018-V4.0.05756-prestab [ 23.399319] pc ffff80000251efc0 ra ffff80000251eddc tp 900000011fe3c000 sp 900000011fe3f7e0 [ 23.407632] a0 0000000000000001 a1 0000000000000000 a2 0000000000000000 a3 0000000000000000 [ 23.415938] a4 0000000000000000 a5 0000000000000000 a6 0000000000060000 a7 900000010c947b00 [ 23.424240] t0 0000000000000000 t1 0000000000000000 t2 0000000000000000 t3 900000012e456230 [ 23.432543] t4 0000000000000035 t5 0000000000004000 t6 00000001fbc40403 t7 0000000000004000 [ 23.440845] t8 9000000100e688a8 u0 5cc06cee8ef0edee s9 9000000100024420 s0 0000000000000047 [ 23.449147] s1 0000000000004000 s2 0000000000000001 s3 900000012adba000 s4 ffffffffffffc000 [ 23.457450] s5 9000000108939428 s6 0000000000000000 s7 0000000000000000 s8 900000011fe3f8e0 [ 23.465851] ra: ffff80000251eddc emit_pte+0x1b0/0x3b0 [xe] [ 23.471761] ERA: ffff80000251efc0 emit_pte+0x394/0x3b0 [xe] [ 23.477557] CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE) [ 23.483732] PRMD: 00000004 (PPLV0 +PIE -PWE) [ 23.488068] EUEN: 00000003 (+FPE +SXE -ASXE -BTE) [ 23.492832] ECFG: 00071c1d (LIE=0,2-4,10-12 VS=7) [ 23.497594] ESTAT: 000c0000 [BRK] (IS= ECode=12 EsubCode=0) [ 23.503133] PRID: 0014d000 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3A6000-HV) [ 23.509164] CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 2036 Comm: QSGRenderThread Tainted: G E 6.14.0-rc4-aosc-main-g7cc07e6e50b0-dirty #8 [ 23.509168] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 23.509168] Hardware name: Loongson Loongson-3A6000-HV-7A2000-1w-V0.1-EVB/Loongson-3A6000-HV-7A2000-1w-EVB-V1.21, BIOS Loongson-UDK2018-V4.0.05756-prestab [ 23.509170] Stack : ffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff 900000000023eb34 900000011fe3c000 [ 23.509176] 900000011fe3f440 0000000000000000 900000011fe3f448 9000000001c31c70 [ 23.509181] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 23.509185] 0000000000000000 5cc06cee8ef0edee 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 23.509190] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 23.509193] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000066b4000 9000000100024420 [ 23.509197] 9000000001eb8000 0000000000000000 9000000001c31c70 0000000000000004 [ 23.509202] 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 23.509206] 900000011fe3f8e0 9000000001c31c70 9000000000244174 00007fffac097534 [ 23.509211] 00000000000000b0 0000000000000004 0000000000000003 0000000000071c1d [ 23.509216] ... [ 23.509218] Call Trace: [ 23.509220] [<9000000000244174>] show_stack+0x3c/0x16c [ 23.509226] [<900000000023eb30>] dump_stack_lvl+0x84/0xe0 [ 23.509230] [<9000000000288208>] __warn+0x8c/0x174 [ 23.509234] [<90000000017c1918>] report_bug+0x1c0/0x22c [ 23.509238] [<90000000017f66e8>] do_bp+0x280/0x344 [ 23.509243] [<90000000002428a0>] handle_bp+0x120/0x1c0 [ 23.509247] [<ffff80000251efc0>] emit_pte+0x394/0x3b0 [xe] [ 23.509295] [<ffff800002520d38>] xe_migrate_clear+0x2d8/0xa54 [xe] [ 23.509341] [<ffff8000024e6c38>] xe_bo_move+0x324/0x930 [xe] [ 23.509387] [<ffff800002209468>] ttm_bo_handle_move_mem+0xd0/0x194 [ttm] [ 23.509392] [<ffff800002209ebc>] ttm_bo_validate+0xd4/0x1cc [ttm] [ 23.509396] [<ffff80000220a138>] ttm_bo_init_reserved+0x184/0x1dc [ttm] [ 23.509399] [<ffff8000024e7840>] ___xe_bo_create_locked+0x1e8/0x3d4 [xe] [ 23.509445] [<ffff8000024e7cf8>] __xe_bo_create_locked+0x2cc/0x390 [xe] [ 23.509489] [<ffff8000024e7e98>] xe_bo_create_user+0x34/0xe4 [xe] [ 23.509533] [<ffff8000024e875c>] xe_gem_create_ioctl+0x154/0x4d8 [xe] [ 23.509578] [<9000000001062784>] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe0/0x14c [ 23.509582] [<9000000001062c10>] drm_ioctl+0x420/0x5f4 [ 23.509585] [<ffff8000024ea778>] xe_drm_ioctl+0x64/0xac [xe] [ 23.509630] [<9000000000653504>] sys_ioctl+0x2b8/0xf98 [ 23.509634] [<90000000017f684c>] do_syscall+0xa0/0x140 [ 23.509637] [<9000000000241e38>] handle_syscall+0xb8/0x158 [ 23.509640] [ 23.509644] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Revise calls to `xe_res_dma()' and `xe_res_cursor()' to use `XE_PTE_MASK' (12) and `SZ_4K' to fix this potentially confused use of `PAGE_SIZE' in relevant code. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: e89b384 ("drm/xe/migrate: Update emit_pte to cope with a size level than 4k") Tested-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]> Tested-by: Wenbin Fang <[email protected]> Tested-by: Haien Liang <[email protected]> Tested-by: Jianfeng Liu <[email protected]> Tested-by: Shirong Liu <[email protected]> Tested-by: Haofeng Wu <[email protected]> Link: FanFansfan@22c55ab Link: https://t.me/c/1109254909/768552 Co-developed-by: Shang Yatsen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Shang Yatsen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Kexy Biscuit <[email protected]>

As syzbot [1] reported as below: R10: 0000000000000100 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffe17473450 R13: 00007f28b1c10854 R14: 000000000000dae5 R15: 00007ffe17474520 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_del_entry_valid+0xa6/0x130 lib/list_debug.c:62 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88812d962278 by task syz-executor/564 CPU: 1 PID: 564 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G W 6.1.129-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack+0x21/0x24 lib/dump_stack.c:88 dump_stack_lvl+0xee/0x158 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description+0x71/0x210 mm/kasan/report.c:316 print_report+0x4a/0x60 mm/kasan/report.c:427 kasan_report+0x122/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:531 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report_generic.c:351 __list_del_entry_valid+0xa6/0x130 lib/list_debug.c:62 __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:134 [inline] list_del_init include/linux/list.h:206 [inline] f2fs_inode_synced+0xf7/0x2e0 fs/f2fs/super.c:1531 f2fs_update_inode+0x74/0x1c40 fs/f2fs/inode.c:585 f2fs_update_inode_page+0x137/0x170 fs/f2fs/inode.c:703 f2fs_write_inode+0x4ec/0x770 fs/f2fs/inode.c:731 write_inode fs/fs-writeback.c:1460 [inline] __writeback_single_inode+0x4a0/0xab0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1677 writeback_single_inode+0x221/0x8b0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1733 sync_inode_metadata+0xb6/0x110 fs/fs-writeback.c:2789 f2fs_sync_inode_meta+0x16d/0x2a0 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1159 block_operations fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1269 [inline] f2fs_write_checkpoint+0xca3/0x2100 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1658 kill_f2fs_super+0x231/0x390 fs/f2fs/super.c:4668 deactivate_locked_super+0x98/0x100 fs/super.c:332 deactivate_super+0xaf/0xe0 fs/super.c:363 cleanup_mnt+0x45f/0x4e0 fs/namespace.c:1186 __cleanup_mnt+0x19/0x20 fs/namespace.c:1193 task_work_run+0x1c6/0x230 kernel/task_work.c:203 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:39 [inline] do_exit+0x9fb/0x2410 kernel/exit.c:871 do_group_exit+0x210/0x2d0 kernel/exit.c:1021 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1032 [inline] __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1030 [inline] __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1030 x64_sys_call+0x7b4/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:232 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x68/0xd2 RIP: 0033:0x7f28b1b8e169 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f28b1b8e13f. RSP: 002b:00007ffe174710a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f28b1c10879 RCX: 00007f28b1b8e169 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 00007ffe1746ee47 R09: 00007ffe17472360 R10: 0000000000000009 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe17472360 R13: 00007f28b1c10854 R14: 000000000000dae5 R15: 00007ffe17474520 </TASK> Allocated by task 569: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline] kasan_set_track+0x4b/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:505 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x72/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:328 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook+0x4f/0x2c0 mm/slab.h:737 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3398 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3406 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3413 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x104/0x220 mm/slub.c:3429 alloc_inode_sb include/linux/fs.h:3245 [inline] f2fs_alloc_inode+0x2d/0x340 fs/f2fs/super.c:1419 alloc_inode fs/inode.c:261 [inline] iget_locked+0x186/0x880 fs/inode.c:1373 f2fs_iget+0x55/0x4c60 fs/f2fs/inode.c:483 f2fs_lookup+0x366/0xab0 fs/f2fs/namei.c:487 __lookup_slow+0x2a3/0x3d0 fs/namei.c:1690 lookup_slow+0x57/0x70 fs/namei.c:1707 walk_component+0x2e6/0x410 fs/namei.c:1998 lookup_last fs/namei.c:2455 [inline] path_lookupat+0x180/0x490 fs/namei.c:2479 filename_lookup+0x1f0/0x500 fs/namei.c:2508 vfs_statx+0x10b/0x660 fs/stat.c:229 vfs_fstatat fs/stat.c:267 [inline] vfs_lstat include/linux/fs.h:3424 [inline] __do_sys_newlstat fs/stat.c:423 [inline] __se_sys_newlstat+0xd5/0x350 fs/stat.c:417 __x64_sys_newlstat+0x5b/0x70 fs/stat.c:417 x64_sys_call+0x393/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:7 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x68/0xd2 Freed by task 13: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline] kasan_set_track+0x4b/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_free_info+0x31/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:516 ____kasan_slab_free+0x132/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:236 __kasan_slab_free+0x11/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:244 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1724 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook+0xc2/0x190 mm/slub.c:1750 slab_free mm/slub.c:3661 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x12d/0x2a0 mm/slub.c:3683 f2fs_free_inode+0x24/0x30 fs/f2fs/super.c:1562 i_callback+0x4c/0x70 fs/inode.c:250 rcu_do_batch+0x503/0xb80 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2297 rcu_core+0x5a2/0xe70 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2557 rcu_core_si+0x9/0x10 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2574 handle_softirqs+0x178/0x500 kernel/softirq.c:578 run_ksoftirqd+0x28/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:945 smpboot_thread_fn+0x45a/0x8c0 kernel/smpboot.c:164 kthread+0x270/0x310 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295 Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x3a/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:45 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xb6/0xc0 mm/kasan/generic.c:486 kasan_record_aux_stack_noalloc+0xb/0x10 mm/kasan/generic.c:496 call_rcu+0xd4/0xf70 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2845 destroy_inode fs/inode.c:316 [inline] evict+0x7da/0x870 fs/inode.c:720 iput_final fs/inode.c:1834 [inline] iput+0x62b/0x830 fs/inode.c:1860 do_unlinkat+0x356/0x540 fs/namei.c:4397 __do_sys_unlink fs/namei.c:4438 [inline] __se_sys_unlink fs/namei.c:4436 [inline] __x64_sys_unlink+0x49/0x50 fs/namei.c:4436 x64_sys_call+0x958/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:88 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x68/0xd2 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88812d961f20 which belongs to the cache f2fs_inode_cache of size 1200 The buggy address is located 856 bytes inside of 1200-byte region [ffff88812d961f20, ffff88812d9623d0) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea0004b65800 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x12d960 head:ffffea0004b65800 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x4000000000010200(slab|head|zone=1) raw: 4000000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff88810a94c500 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 2, migratetype Reclaimable, gfp_mask 0x1d2050(__GFP_IO|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC|__GFP_HARDWALL|__GFP_RECLAIMABLE), pid 569, tgid 568 (syz.2.16), ts 55943246141, free_ts 0 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:31 [inline] post_alloc_hook+0x1d0/0x1f0 mm/page_alloc.c:2532 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:2539 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0x2e63/0x2ef0 mm/page_alloc.c:4328 __alloc_pages+0x235/0x4b0 mm/page_alloc.c:5605 alloc_slab_page include/linux/gfp.h:-1 [inline] allocate_slab mm/slub.c:1939 [inline] new_slab+0xec/0x4b0 mm/slub.c:1992 ___slab_alloc+0x6f6/0xb50 mm/slub.c:3180 __slab_alloc+0x5e/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3279 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3364 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3406 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3413 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x13f/0x220 mm/slub.c:3429 alloc_inode_sb include/linux/fs.h:3245 [inline] f2fs_alloc_inode+0x2d/0x340 fs/f2fs/super.c:1419 alloc_inode fs/inode.c:261 [inline] iget_locked+0x186/0x880 fs/inode.c:1373 f2fs_iget+0x55/0x4c60 fs/f2fs/inode.c:483 f2fs_fill_super+0x3ad7/0x6bb0 fs/f2fs/super.c:4293 mount_bdev+0x2ae/0x3e0 fs/super.c:1443 f2fs_mount+0x34/0x40 fs/f2fs/super.c:4642 legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x190 fs/fs_context.c:632 vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x260 fs/super.c:1573 do_new_mount+0x25a/0xa20 fs/namespace.c:3056 page_owner free stack trace missing Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88812d962100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88812d962180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff88812d962200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88812d962280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88812d962300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=13448368580000 This bug can be reproduced w/ the reproducer [2], once we enable CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS config, the reproducer will trigger panic as below, so the direct reason of this bug is the same as the one below patch [3] fixed. kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:857! RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x1204/0x1a20 Call Trace: <TASK> evict+0x32a/0x7a0 do_unlinkat+0x37b/0x5b0 __x64_sys_unlink+0xad/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x5a/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x1204/0x1a20 [2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=17495ccc580000 [3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/[email protected] Tracepoints before panic: f2fs_unlink_enter: dev = (7,0), dir ino = 3, i_size = 4096, i_blocks = 8, name = file1 f2fs_unlink_exit: dev = (7,0), ino = 7, ret = 0 f2fs_evict_inode: dev = (7,0), ino = 7, pino = 3, i_mode = 0x81ed, i_size = 10, i_nlink = 0, i_blocks = 0, i_advise = 0x0 f2fs_truncate_node: dev = (7,0), ino = 7, nid = 8, block_address = 0x3c05 f2fs_unlink_enter: dev = (7,0), dir ino = 3, i_size = 4096, i_blocks = 8, name = file3 f2fs_unlink_exit: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, ret = 0 f2fs_evict_inode: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, pino = 3, i_mode = 0x81ed, i_size = 9000, i_nlink = 0, i_blocks = 24, i_advise = 0x4 f2fs_truncate: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, pino = 3, i_mode = 0x81ed, i_size = 0, i_nlink = 0, i_blocks = 24, i_advise = 0x4 f2fs_truncate_blocks_enter: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, i_size = 0, i_blocks = 24, start file offset = 0 f2fs_truncate_blocks_exit: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, ret = -2 The root cause is: in the fuzzed image, dnode #8 belongs to inode #7, after inode #7 eviction, dnode #8 was dropped. However there is dirent that has ino #8, so, once we unlink file3, in f2fs_evict_inode(), both f2fs_truncate() and f2fs_update_inode_page() will fail due to we can not load node #8, result in we missed to call f2fs_inode_synced() to clear inode dirty status. Let's fix this by calling f2fs_inode_synced() in error path of f2fs_evict_inode(). PS: As I verified, the reproducer [2] can trigger this bug in v6.1.129, but it failed in v6.16-rc4, this is because the testcase will stop due to other corruption has been detected by f2fs: F2FS-fs (loop0): inconsistent node block, node_type:2, nid:8, node_footer[nid:8,ino:8,ofs:0,cpver:5013063228981249506,blkaddr:15366] F2FS-fs (loop0): f2fs_lookup: inode (ino=9) has zero i_nlink Fixes: 0f18b46 ("f2fs: flush inode metadata when checkpoint is doing") Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=13448368580000 Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>

Patch series "extend hung task blocker tracking to rwsems". Inspired by mutex blocker tracking[1], and having already extended it to semaphores, let's now add support for reader-writer semaphores (rwsems). The approach is simple: when a task enters TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE while waiting for an rwsem, we just call hung_task_set_blocker(). The hung task detector can then query the rwsem's owner to identify the lock holder. Tracking works reliably for writers, as there can only be a single writer holding the lock, and its task struct is stored in the owner field. The main challenge lies with readers. The owner field points to only one of many concurrent readers, so we might lose track of the blocker if that specific reader unlocks, even while others remain. This is not a significant issue, however. In practice, long-lasting lock contention is almost always caused by a writer. Therefore, reliably tracking the writer is the primary goal of this patch series ;) With this change, the hung task detector can now show blocker task's info like below: [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] INFO: task cat:28631 blocked for more than 122 seconds. [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] Tainted: G S 6.16.0-rc3 #8 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] task:cat state:D stack:0 pid:28631 tgid:28631 ppid:28501 task_flags:0x400000 flags:0x00004000 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] Call Trace: [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] <TASK> [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] __schedule+0x7c7/0x1930 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __pfx___schedule+0x10/0x10 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? policy_nodemask+0x215/0x340 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8a/0xe0 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] schedule+0x6a/0x180 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x15/0x30 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] rwsem_down_read_slowpath+0x55e/0xe10 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __pfx_rwsem_down_read_slowpath+0x10/0x10 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __pfx___might_resched+0x10/0x10 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] down_read+0xc9/0x230 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __pfx_down_read+0x10/0x10 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __debugfs_file_get+0x14d/0x700 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __pfx___debugfs_file_get+0x10/0x10 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? handle_pte_fault+0x52a/0x710 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? selinux_file_permission+0x3a9/0x590 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] read_dummy_rwsem_read+0x4a/0x90 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] full_proxy_read+0xff/0x1c0 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? rw_verify_area+0x6d/0x410 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] vfs_read+0x177/0xa50 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __pfx_vfs_read+0x10/0x10 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? fdget_pos+0x1cf/0x4c0 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ksys_read+0xfc/0x1d0 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] do_syscall_64+0x66/0x2d0 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] RIP: 0033:0x7f3f8faefb40 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] RSP: 002b:00007ffdeda5ab98 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000010000 RCX: 00007f3f8faefb40 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: 00000000010fa000 RDI: 0000000000000003 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] RBP: 00000000010fa000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000010fff [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] R10: 00007ffdeda59fe0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000010fa000 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000fff [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] </TASK> [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] INFO: task cat:28631 <reader> blocked on an rw-semaphore likely owned by task cat:28630 <writer> [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] task:cat state:S stack:0 pid:28630 tgid:28630 ppid:28501 task_flags:0x400000 flags:0x00004000 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] Call Trace: [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] <TASK> [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] __schedule+0x7c7/0x1930 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __pfx___schedule+0x10/0x10 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __mod_timer+0x304/0xa80 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] schedule+0x6a/0x180 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] schedule_timeout+0xfb/0x230 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __pfx_schedule_timeout+0x10/0x10 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __pfx_process_timeout+0x10/0x10 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? down_write+0xc4/0x140 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] msleep_interruptible+0xbe/0x150 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] read_dummy_rwsem_write+0x54/0x90 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] full_proxy_read+0xff/0x1c0 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? rw_verify_area+0x6d/0x410 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] vfs_read+0x177/0xa50 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __pfx_vfs_read+0x10/0x10 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? fdget_pos+0x1cf/0x4c0 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ksys_read+0xfc/0x1d0 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] do_syscall_64+0x66/0x2d0 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] RIP: 0033:0x7f8f288efb40 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] RSP: 002b:00007ffffb631038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000010000 RCX: 00007f8f288efb40 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: 000000002a4b5000 RDI: 0000000000000003 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] RBP: 000000002a4b5000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000010fff [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] R10: 00007ffffb630460 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000002a4b5000 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000fff [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] </TASK> This patch (of 3): In preparation for extending blocker tracking to support rwsems, make the rwsem_owner() and is_rwsem_reader_owned() helpers globally available for determining if the blocker is a writer or one of the readers. Additionally, a stale owner pointer in a reader-owned rwsem can lead to false positives in blocker tracking when CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK_BLOCKER is enabled. To mitigate this, clear the owner field on the reader unlock path, similar to what CONFIG_DEBUG_RWSEMS does. A NULL owner is better than a stale one for diagnostics. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/174046694331.2194069.15472952050240807469.stgit@mhiramat.tok.corp.google.com/ [1] Signed-off-by: Lance Yang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Anna Schumaker <[email protected]> Cc: Boqun Feng <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Joel Granados <[email protected]> Cc: John Stultz <[email protected]> Cc: Kent Overstreet <[email protected]> Cc: Mingzhe Yang <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]> Cc: Tomasz Figa <[email protected]> Cc: Waiman Long <[email protected]> Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Cc: Yongliang Gao <[email protected]> Cc: Zi Li <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

Inspired by mutex blocker tracking[1], and having already extended it to semaphores, let's now add support for reader-writer semaphores (rwsems). The approach is simple: when a task enters TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE while waiting for an rwsem, we just call hung_task_set_blocker(). The hung task detector can then query the rwsem's owner to identify the lock holder. Tracking works reliably for writers, as there can only be a single writer holding the lock, and its task struct is stored in the owner field. The main challenge lies with readers. The owner field points to only one of many concurrent readers, so we might lose track of the blocker if that specific reader unlocks, even while others remain. This is not a significant issue, however. In practice, long-lasting lock contention is almost always caused by a writer. Therefore, reliably tracking the writer is the primary goal of this patch series ;) With this change, the hung task detector can now show blocker task's info like below: [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] INFO: task cat:28631 blocked for more than 122 seconds. [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] Tainted: G S 6.16.0-rc3 #8 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] task:cat state:D stack:0 pid:28631 tgid:28631 ppid:28501 task_flags:0x400000 flags:0x00004000 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] Call Trace: [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] <TASK> [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] __schedule+0x7c7/0x1930 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __pfx___schedule+0x10/0x10 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? policy_nodemask+0x215/0x340 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8a/0xe0 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] schedule+0x6a/0x180 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x15/0x30 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] rwsem_down_read_slowpath+0x55e/0xe10 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __pfx_rwsem_down_read_slowpath+0x10/0x10 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __pfx___might_resched+0x10/0x10 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] down_read+0xc9/0x230 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __pfx_down_read+0x10/0x10 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __debugfs_file_get+0x14d/0x700 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __pfx___debugfs_file_get+0x10/0x10 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? handle_pte_fault+0x52a/0x710 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? selinux_file_permission+0x3a9/0x590 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] read_dummy_rwsem_read+0x4a/0x90 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] full_proxy_read+0xff/0x1c0 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? rw_verify_area+0x6d/0x410 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] vfs_read+0x177/0xa50 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __pfx_vfs_read+0x10/0x10 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? fdget_pos+0x1cf/0x4c0 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ksys_read+0xfc/0x1d0 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] do_syscall_64+0x66/0x2d0 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] RIP: 0033:0x7f3f8faefb40 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] RSP: 002b:00007ffdeda5ab98 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000010000 RCX: 00007f3f8faefb40 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: 00000000010fa000 RDI: 0000000000000003 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] RBP: 00000000010fa000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000010fff [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] R10: 00007ffdeda59fe0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000010fa000 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000fff [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] </TASK> [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] INFO: task cat:28631 <reader> blocked on an rw-semaphore likely owned by task cat:28630 <writer> [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] task:cat state:S stack:0 pid:28630 tgid:28630 ppid:28501 task_flags:0x400000 flags:0x00004000 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] Call Trace: [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] <TASK> [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] __schedule+0x7c7/0x1930 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __pfx___schedule+0x10/0x10 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __mod_timer+0x304/0xa80 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] schedule+0x6a/0x180 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] schedule_timeout+0xfb/0x230 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __pfx_schedule_timeout+0x10/0x10 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __pfx_process_timeout+0x10/0x10 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? down_write+0xc4/0x140 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] msleep_interruptible+0xbe/0x150 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] read_dummy_rwsem_write+0x54/0x90 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] full_proxy_read+0xff/0x1c0 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? rw_verify_area+0x6d/0x410 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] vfs_read+0x177/0xa50 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __pfx_vfs_read+0x10/0x10 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? fdget_pos+0x1cf/0x4c0 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ksys_read+0xfc/0x1d0 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] do_syscall_64+0x66/0x2d0 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] RIP: 0033:0x7f8f288efb40 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] RSP: 002b:00007ffffb631038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000010000 RCX: 00007f8f288efb40 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: 000000002a4b5000 RDI: 0000000000000003 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] RBP: 000000002a4b5000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000010fff [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] R10: 00007ffffb630460 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000002a4b5000 [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000fff [Fri Jun 27 15:21:34 2025] </TASK> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/174046694331.2194069.15472952050240807469.stgit@mhiramat.tok.corp.google.com/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Lance Yang <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Anna Schumaker <[email protected]> Cc: Boqun Feng <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Joel Granados <[email protected]> Cc: John Stultz <[email protected]> Cc: Kent Overstreet <[email protected]> Cc: Mingzhe Yang <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]> Cc: Tomasz Figa <[email protected]> Cc: Waiman Long <[email protected]> Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Cc: Yongliang Gao <[email protected]> Cc: Zi Li <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 16d8fd7 ] In rtl8187_stop() move the call of usb_kill_anchored_urbs() before clearing b_tx_status.queue. This change prevents callbacks from using already freed skb due to anchor was not killed before freeing such skb. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000080 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/7 Not tainted 6.15.0 #8 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:ieee80211_tx_status_irqsafe+0x21/0xc0 [mac80211] Call Trace: <IRQ> rtl8187_tx_cb+0x116/0x150 [rtl8187] __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x9d/0x120 usb_giveback_urb_bh+0xbb/0x140 process_one_work+0x19b/0x3c0 bh_worker+0x1a7/0x210 tasklet_action+0x10/0x30 handle_softirqs+0xf0/0x340 __irq_exit_rcu+0xcd/0xf0 common_interrupt+0x85/0xa0 </IRQ> Tested on RTL8187BvE device. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. Fixes: c1db52b ("rtl8187: Use usb anchor facilities to manage urbs") Signed-off-by: Daniil Dulov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ping-Ke Shih <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a509a55 ] As syzbot [1] reported as below: R10: 0000000000000100 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffe17473450 R13: 00007f28b1c10854 R14: 000000000000dae5 R15: 00007ffe17474520 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_del_entry_valid+0xa6/0x130 lib/list_debug.c:62 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88812d962278 by task syz-executor/564 CPU: 1 PID: 564 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G W 6.1.129-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack+0x21/0x24 lib/dump_stack.c:88 dump_stack_lvl+0xee/0x158 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description+0x71/0x210 mm/kasan/report.c:316 print_report+0x4a/0x60 mm/kasan/report.c:427 kasan_report+0x122/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:531 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report_generic.c:351 __list_del_entry_valid+0xa6/0x130 lib/list_debug.c:62 __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:134 [inline] list_del_init include/linux/list.h:206 [inline] f2fs_inode_synced+0xf7/0x2e0 fs/f2fs/super.c:1531 f2fs_update_inode+0x74/0x1c40 fs/f2fs/inode.c:585 f2fs_update_inode_page+0x137/0x170 fs/f2fs/inode.c:703 f2fs_write_inode+0x4ec/0x770 fs/f2fs/inode.c:731 write_inode fs/fs-writeback.c:1460 [inline] __writeback_single_inode+0x4a0/0xab0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1677 writeback_single_inode+0x221/0x8b0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1733 sync_inode_metadata+0xb6/0x110 fs/fs-writeback.c:2789 f2fs_sync_inode_meta+0x16d/0x2a0 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1159 block_operations fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1269 [inline] f2fs_write_checkpoint+0xca3/0x2100 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1658 kill_f2fs_super+0x231/0x390 fs/f2fs/super.c:4668 deactivate_locked_super+0x98/0x100 fs/super.c:332 deactivate_super+0xaf/0xe0 fs/super.c:363 cleanup_mnt+0x45f/0x4e0 fs/namespace.c:1186 __cleanup_mnt+0x19/0x20 fs/namespace.c:1193 task_work_run+0x1c6/0x230 kernel/task_work.c:203 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:39 [inline] do_exit+0x9fb/0x2410 kernel/exit.c:871 do_group_exit+0x210/0x2d0 kernel/exit.c:1021 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1032 [inline] __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1030 [inline] __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1030 x64_sys_call+0x7b4/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:232 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x68/0xd2 RIP: 0033:0x7f28b1b8e169 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f28b1b8e13f. RSP: 002b:00007ffe174710a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f28b1c10879 RCX: 00007f28b1b8e169 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 00007ffe1746ee47 R09: 00007ffe17472360 R10: 0000000000000009 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe17472360 R13: 00007f28b1c10854 R14: 000000000000dae5 R15: 00007ffe17474520 </TASK> Allocated by task 569: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline] kasan_set_track+0x4b/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:505 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x72/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:328 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook+0x4f/0x2c0 mm/slab.h:737 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3398 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3406 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3413 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x104/0x220 mm/slub.c:3429 alloc_inode_sb include/linux/fs.h:3245 [inline] f2fs_alloc_inode+0x2d/0x340 fs/f2fs/super.c:1419 alloc_inode fs/inode.c:261 [inline] iget_locked+0x186/0x880 fs/inode.c:1373 f2fs_iget+0x55/0x4c60 fs/f2fs/inode.c:483 f2fs_lookup+0x366/0xab0 fs/f2fs/namei.c:487 __lookup_slow+0x2a3/0x3d0 fs/namei.c:1690 lookup_slow+0x57/0x70 fs/namei.c:1707 walk_component+0x2e6/0x410 fs/namei.c:1998 lookup_last fs/namei.c:2455 [inline] path_lookupat+0x180/0x490 fs/namei.c:2479 filename_lookup+0x1f0/0x500 fs/namei.c:2508 vfs_statx+0x10b/0x660 fs/stat.c:229 vfs_fstatat fs/stat.c:267 [inline] vfs_lstat include/linux/fs.h:3424 [inline] __do_sys_newlstat fs/stat.c:423 [inline] __se_sys_newlstat+0xd5/0x350 fs/stat.c:417 __x64_sys_newlstat+0x5b/0x70 fs/stat.c:417 x64_sys_call+0x393/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:7 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x68/0xd2 Freed by task 13: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline] kasan_set_track+0x4b/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_free_info+0x31/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:516 ____kasan_slab_free+0x132/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:236 __kasan_slab_free+0x11/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:244 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1724 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook+0xc2/0x190 mm/slub.c:1750 slab_free mm/slub.c:3661 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x12d/0x2a0 mm/slub.c:3683 f2fs_free_inode+0x24/0x30 fs/f2fs/super.c:1562 i_callback+0x4c/0x70 fs/inode.c:250 rcu_do_batch+0x503/0xb80 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2297 rcu_core+0x5a2/0xe70 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2557 rcu_core_si+0x9/0x10 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2574 handle_softirqs+0x178/0x500 kernel/softirq.c:578 run_ksoftirqd+0x28/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:945 smpboot_thread_fn+0x45a/0x8c0 kernel/smpboot.c:164 kthread+0x270/0x310 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295 Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x3a/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:45 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xb6/0xc0 mm/kasan/generic.c:486 kasan_record_aux_stack_noalloc+0xb/0x10 mm/kasan/generic.c:496 call_rcu+0xd4/0xf70 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2845 destroy_inode fs/inode.c:316 [inline] evict+0x7da/0x870 fs/inode.c:720 iput_final fs/inode.c:1834 [inline] iput+0x62b/0x830 fs/inode.c:1860 do_unlinkat+0x356/0x540 fs/namei.c:4397 __do_sys_unlink fs/namei.c:4438 [inline] __se_sys_unlink fs/namei.c:4436 [inline] __x64_sys_unlink+0x49/0x50 fs/namei.c:4436 x64_sys_call+0x958/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:88 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x68/0xd2 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88812d961f20 which belongs to the cache f2fs_inode_cache of size 1200 The buggy address is located 856 bytes inside of 1200-byte region [ffff88812d961f20, ffff88812d9623d0) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea0004b65800 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x12d960 head:ffffea0004b65800 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x4000000000010200(slab|head|zone=1) raw: 4000000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff88810a94c500 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 2, migratetype Reclaimable, gfp_mask 0x1d2050(__GFP_IO|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC|__GFP_HARDWALL|__GFP_RECLAIMABLE), pid 569, tgid 568 (syz.2.16), ts 55943246141, free_ts 0 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:31 [inline] post_alloc_hook+0x1d0/0x1f0 mm/page_alloc.c:2532 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:2539 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0x2e63/0x2ef0 mm/page_alloc.c:4328 __alloc_pages+0x235/0x4b0 mm/page_alloc.c:5605 alloc_slab_page include/linux/gfp.h:-1 [inline] allocate_slab mm/slub.c:1939 [inline] new_slab+0xec/0x4b0 mm/slub.c:1992 ___slab_alloc+0x6f6/0xb50 mm/slub.c:3180 __slab_alloc+0x5e/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3279 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3364 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3406 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3413 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x13f/0x220 mm/slub.c:3429 alloc_inode_sb include/linux/fs.h:3245 [inline] f2fs_alloc_inode+0x2d/0x340 fs/f2fs/super.c:1419 alloc_inode fs/inode.c:261 [inline] iget_locked+0x186/0x880 fs/inode.c:1373 f2fs_iget+0x55/0x4c60 fs/f2fs/inode.c:483 f2fs_fill_super+0x3ad7/0x6bb0 fs/f2fs/super.c:4293 mount_bdev+0x2ae/0x3e0 fs/super.c:1443 f2fs_mount+0x34/0x40 fs/f2fs/super.c:4642 legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x190 fs/fs_context.c:632 vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x260 fs/super.c:1573 do_new_mount+0x25a/0xa20 fs/namespace.c:3056 page_owner free stack trace missing Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88812d962100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88812d962180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff88812d962200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88812d962280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88812d962300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=13448368580000 This bug can be reproduced w/ the reproducer [2], once we enable CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS config, the reproducer will trigger panic as below, so the direct reason of this bug is the same as the one below patch [3] fixed. kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:857! RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x1204/0x1a20 Call Trace: <TASK> evict+0x32a/0x7a0 do_unlinkat+0x37b/0x5b0 __x64_sys_unlink+0xad/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x5a/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x1204/0x1a20 [2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=17495ccc580000 [3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/[email protected] Tracepoints before panic: f2fs_unlink_enter: dev = (7,0), dir ino = 3, i_size = 4096, i_blocks = 8, name = file1 f2fs_unlink_exit: dev = (7,0), ino = 7, ret = 0 f2fs_evict_inode: dev = (7,0), ino = 7, pino = 3, i_mode = 0x81ed, i_size = 10, i_nlink = 0, i_blocks = 0, i_advise = 0x0 f2fs_truncate_node: dev = (7,0), ino = 7, nid = 8, block_address = 0x3c05 f2fs_unlink_enter: dev = (7,0), dir ino = 3, i_size = 4096, i_blocks = 8, name = file3 f2fs_unlink_exit: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, ret = 0 f2fs_evict_inode: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, pino = 3, i_mode = 0x81ed, i_size = 9000, i_nlink = 0, i_blocks = 24, i_advise = 0x4 f2fs_truncate: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, pino = 3, i_mode = 0x81ed, i_size = 0, i_nlink = 0, i_blocks = 24, i_advise = 0x4 f2fs_truncate_blocks_enter: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, i_size = 0, i_blocks = 24, start file offset = 0 f2fs_truncate_blocks_exit: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, ret = -2 The root cause is: in the fuzzed image, dnode #8 belongs to inode #7, after inode #7 eviction, dnode #8 was dropped. However there is dirent that has ino #8, so, once we unlink file3, in f2fs_evict_inode(), both f2fs_truncate() and f2fs_update_inode_page() will fail due to we can not load node #8, result in we missed to call f2fs_inode_synced() to clear inode dirty status. Let's fix this by calling f2fs_inode_synced() in error path of f2fs_evict_inode(). PS: As I verified, the reproducer [2] can trigger this bug in v6.1.129, but it failed in v6.16-rc4, this is because the testcase will stop due to other corruption has been detected by f2fs: F2FS-fs (loop0): inconsistent node block, node_type:2, nid:8, node_footer[nid:8,ino:8,ofs:0,cpver:5013063228981249506,blkaddr:15366] F2FS-fs (loop0): f2fs_lookup: inode (ino=9) has zero i_nlink Fixes: 0f18b46 ("f2fs: flush inode metadata when checkpoint is doing") Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=13448368580000 Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

It appears that the xe_res_cursor also assumes 4KiB alignment. Current implementation uses `PAGE_SIZE' as an assumed alignment reference, but 4KiB kernel page sizes is by no means a guarantee. On 16KiB-paged kernels, this causes driver failures during boot up: [ 23.242757] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 23.247363] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2036 at drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_res_cursor.h:182 emit_pte+0x394/0x3b0 [xe] [ 23.256962] Modules linked in: nf_conntrack_netbios_ns(E) nf_conntrack_broadcast(E) nft_fib_inet(E) nft_fib_ipv4(E) nft_fib_ipv6(E) nft_fib(E) nft_reject_inet(E) nf_reject_ipv4(E) nf_reject_ipv6(E) nft_reject(E) nft_ct(E) rfkill(E) nft_chain_nat(E) ip6table_nat(E) ip6table_mangle(E) ip6table_raw(E) ip6table_security(E) iptable_nat(E) nf_nat(E) nf_conntrack(E) nf_defrag_ipv6(E) nf_defrag_ipv4(E) iptable_mangle(E) iptable_raw(E) iptable_security(E) ip_set(E) nf_tables(E) ip6table_filter(E) ip6_tables(E) iptable_filter(E) snd_hda_codec_conexant(E) snd_hda_codec_generic(E) snd_hda_codec_hdmi(E) snd_hda_intel(E) snd_intel_dspcfg(E) snd_hda_codec(E) nls_iso8859_1(E) qrtr(E) nls_cp437(E) snd_hda_core(E) loongson3_cpufreq(E) rtc_efi(E) snd_hwdep(E) snd_pcm(E) spi_loongson_pci(E) snd_timer(E) snd(E) spi_loongson_core(E) soundcore(E) gpio_loongson_64bit(E) rtc_loongson(E) i2c_ls2x(E) mousedev(E) input_leds(E) sch_fq_codel(E) fuse(E) nfnetlink(E) dmi_sysfs(E) ip_tables(E) x_tables(E) xe(E) drm_gpuvm(E) drm_buddy(E) gpu_sched(E) [ 23.257034] drm_exec(E) drm_suballoc_helper(E) drm_display_helper(E) cec(E) rc_core(E) hid_generic(E) tpm_tis_spi(E) r8169(E) loongson(E) i2c_algo_bit(E) realtek(E) drm_ttm_helper(E) led_class(E) ttm(E) drm_client_lib(E) drm_kms_helper(E) sunrpc(E) i2c_dev(E) [ 23.369697] CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 2036 Comm: QSGRenderThread Tainted: G E 6.14.0-rc4-aosc-main-g7cc07e6e50b0-dirty #8 [ 23.381640] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 23.385534] Hardware name: Loongson Loongson-3A6000-HV-7A2000-1w-V0.1-EVB/Loongson-3A6000-HV-7A2000-1w-EVB-V1.21, BIOS Loongson-UDK2018-V4.0.05756-prestab [ 23.399319] pc ffff80000251efc0 ra ffff80000251eddc tp 900000011fe3c000 sp 900000011fe3f7e0 [ 23.407632] a0 0000000000000001 a1 0000000000000000 a2 0000000000000000 a3 0000000000000000 [ 23.415938] a4 0000000000000000 a5 0000000000000000 a6 0000000000060000 a7 900000010c947b00 [ 23.424240] t0 0000000000000000 t1 0000000000000000 t2 0000000000000000 t3 900000012e456230 [ 23.432543] t4 0000000000000035 t5 0000000000004000 t6 00000001fbc40403 t7 0000000000004000 [ 23.440845] t8 9000000100e688a8 u0 5cc06cee8ef0edee s9 9000000100024420 s0 0000000000000047 [ 23.449147] s1 0000000000004000 s2 0000000000000001 s3 900000012adba000 s4 ffffffffffffc000 [ 23.457450] s5 9000000108939428 s6 0000000000000000 s7 0000000000000000 s8 900000011fe3f8e0 [ 23.465851] ra: ffff80000251eddc emit_pte+0x1b0/0x3b0 [xe] [ 23.471761] ERA: ffff80000251efc0 emit_pte+0x394/0x3b0 [xe] [ 23.477557] CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE) [ 23.483732] PRMD: 00000004 (PPLV0 +PIE -PWE) [ 23.488068] EUEN: 00000003 (+FPE +SXE -ASXE -BTE) [ 23.492832] ECFG: 00071c1d (LIE=0,2-4,10-12 VS=7) [ 23.497594] ESTAT: 000c0000 [BRK] (IS= ECode=12 EsubCode=0) [ 23.503133] PRID: 0014d000 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3A6000-HV) [ 23.509164] CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 2036 Comm: QSGRenderThread Tainted: G E 6.14.0-rc4-aosc-main-g7cc07e6e50b0-dirty #8 [ 23.509168] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 23.509168] Hardware name: Loongson Loongson-3A6000-HV-7A2000-1w-V0.1-EVB/Loongson-3A6000-HV-7A2000-1w-EVB-V1.21, BIOS Loongson-UDK2018-V4.0.05756-prestab [ 23.509170] Stack : ffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff 900000000023eb34 900000011fe3c000 [ 23.509176] 900000011fe3f440 0000000000000000 900000011fe3f448 9000000001c31c70 [ 23.509181] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 23.509185] 0000000000000000 5cc06cee8ef0edee 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 23.509190] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 23.509193] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000066b4000 9000000100024420 [ 23.509197] 9000000001eb8000 0000000000000000 9000000001c31c70 0000000000000004 [ 23.509202] 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 23.509206] 900000011fe3f8e0 9000000001c31c70 9000000000244174 00007fffac097534 [ 23.509211] 00000000000000b0 0000000000000004 0000000000000003 0000000000071c1d [ 23.509216] ... [ 23.509218] Call Trace: [ 23.509220] [<9000000000244174>] show_stack+0x3c/0x16c [ 23.509226] [<900000000023eb30>] dump_stack_lvl+0x84/0xe0 [ 23.509230] [<9000000000288208>] __warn+0x8c/0x174 [ 23.509234] [<90000000017c1918>] report_bug+0x1c0/0x22c [ 23.509238] [<90000000017f66e8>] do_bp+0x280/0x344 [ 23.509243] [<90000000002428a0>] handle_bp+0x120/0x1c0 [ 23.509247] [<ffff80000251efc0>] emit_pte+0x394/0x3b0 [xe] [ 23.509295] [<ffff800002520d38>] xe_migrate_clear+0x2d8/0xa54 [xe] [ 23.509341] [<ffff8000024e6c38>] xe_bo_move+0x324/0x930 [xe] [ 23.509387] [<ffff800002209468>] ttm_bo_handle_move_mem+0xd0/0x194 [ttm] [ 23.509392] [<ffff800002209ebc>] ttm_bo_validate+0xd4/0x1cc [ttm] [ 23.509396] [<ffff80000220a138>] ttm_bo_init_reserved+0x184/0x1dc [ttm] [ 23.509399] [<ffff8000024e7840>] ___xe_bo_create_locked+0x1e8/0x3d4 [xe] [ 23.509445] [<ffff8000024e7cf8>] __xe_bo_create_locked+0x2cc/0x390 [xe] [ 23.509489] [<ffff8000024e7e98>] xe_bo_create_user+0x34/0xe4 [xe] [ 23.509533] [<ffff8000024e875c>] xe_gem_create_ioctl+0x154/0x4d8 [xe] [ 23.509578] [<9000000001062784>] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe0/0x14c [ 23.509582] [<9000000001062c10>] drm_ioctl+0x420/0x5f4 [ 23.509585] [<ffff8000024ea778>] xe_drm_ioctl+0x64/0xac [xe] [ 23.509630] [<9000000000653504>] sys_ioctl+0x2b8/0xf98 [ 23.509634] [<90000000017f684c>] do_syscall+0xa0/0x140 [ 23.509637] [<9000000000241e38>] handle_syscall+0xb8/0x158 [ 23.509640] [ 23.509644] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Revise calls to `xe_res_dma()' and `xe_res_cursor()' to use `XE_PTE_MASK' (12) and `SZ_4K' to fix this potentially confused use of `PAGE_SIZE' in relevant code. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: e89b384 ("drm/xe/migrate: Update emit_pte to cope with a size level than 4k") Tested-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]> Tested-by: Wenbin Fang <[email protected]> Tested-by: Haien Liang <[email protected]> Tested-by: Jianfeng Liu <[email protected]> Tested-by: Shirong Liu <[email protected]> Tested-by: Haofeng Wu <[email protected]> Link: FanFansfan@22c55ab Link: https://t.me/c/1109254909/768552 Co-developed-by: Shang Yatsen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Shang Yatsen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Kexy Biscuit <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 16d8fd7 ] In rtl8187_stop() move the call of usb_kill_anchored_urbs() before clearing b_tx_status.queue. This change prevents callbacks from using already freed skb due to anchor was not killed before freeing such skb. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000080 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/7 Not tainted 6.15.0 #8 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:ieee80211_tx_status_irqsafe+0x21/0xc0 [mac80211] Call Trace: <IRQ> rtl8187_tx_cb+0x116/0x150 [rtl8187] __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x9d/0x120 usb_giveback_urb_bh+0xbb/0x140 process_one_work+0x19b/0x3c0 bh_worker+0x1a7/0x210 tasklet_action+0x10/0x30 handle_softirqs+0xf0/0x340 __irq_exit_rcu+0xcd/0xf0 common_interrupt+0x85/0xa0 </IRQ> Tested on RTL8187BvE device. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. Fixes: c1db52b ("rtl8187: Use usb anchor facilities to manage urbs") Signed-off-by: Daniil Dulov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ping-Ke Shih <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a509a55 ] As syzbot [1] reported as below: R10: 0000000000000100 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffe17473450 R13: 00007f28b1c10854 R14: 000000000000dae5 R15: 00007ffe17474520 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_del_entry_valid+0xa6/0x130 lib/list_debug.c:62 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88812d962278 by task syz-executor/564 CPU: 1 PID: 564 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G W 6.1.129-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack+0x21/0x24 lib/dump_stack.c:88 dump_stack_lvl+0xee/0x158 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description+0x71/0x210 mm/kasan/report.c:316 print_report+0x4a/0x60 mm/kasan/report.c:427 kasan_report+0x122/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:531 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report_generic.c:351 __list_del_entry_valid+0xa6/0x130 lib/list_debug.c:62 __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:134 [inline] list_del_init include/linux/list.h:206 [inline] f2fs_inode_synced+0xf7/0x2e0 fs/f2fs/super.c:1531 f2fs_update_inode+0x74/0x1c40 fs/f2fs/inode.c:585 f2fs_update_inode_page+0x137/0x170 fs/f2fs/inode.c:703 f2fs_write_inode+0x4ec/0x770 fs/f2fs/inode.c:731 write_inode fs/fs-writeback.c:1460 [inline] __writeback_single_inode+0x4a0/0xab0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1677 writeback_single_inode+0x221/0x8b0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1733 sync_inode_metadata+0xb6/0x110 fs/fs-writeback.c:2789 f2fs_sync_inode_meta+0x16d/0x2a0 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1159 block_operations fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1269 [inline] f2fs_write_checkpoint+0xca3/0x2100 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1658 kill_f2fs_super+0x231/0x390 fs/f2fs/super.c:4668 deactivate_locked_super+0x98/0x100 fs/super.c:332 deactivate_super+0xaf/0xe0 fs/super.c:363 cleanup_mnt+0x45f/0x4e0 fs/namespace.c:1186 __cleanup_mnt+0x19/0x20 fs/namespace.c:1193 task_work_run+0x1c6/0x230 kernel/task_work.c:203 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:39 [inline] do_exit+0x9fb/0x2410 kernel/exit.c:871 do_group_exit+0x210/0x2d0 kernel/exit.c:1021 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1032 [inline] __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1030 [inline] __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1030 x64_sys_call+0x7b4/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:232 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x68/0xd2 RIP: 0033:0x7f28b1b8e169 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f28b1b8e13f. RSP: 002b:00007ffe174710a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f28b1c10879 RCX: 00007f28b1b8e169 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 00007ffe1746ee47 R09: 00007ffe17472360 R10: 0000000000000009 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe17472360 R13: 00007f28b1c10854 R14: 000000000000dae5 R15: 00007ffe17474520 </TASK> Allocated by task 569: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline] kasan_set_track+0x4b/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:505 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x72/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:328 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook+0x4f/0x2c0 mm/slab.h:737 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3398 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3406 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3413 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x104/0x220 mm/slub.c:3429 alloc_inode_sb include/linux/fs.h:3245 [inline] f2fs_alloc_inode+0x2d/0x340 fs/f2fs/super.c:1419 alloc_inode fs/inode.c:261 [inline] iget_locked+0x186/0x880 fs/inode.c:1373 f2fs_iget+0x55/0x4c60 fs/f2fs/inode.c:483 f2fs_lookup+0x366/0xab0 fs/f2fs/namei.c:487 __lookup_slow+0x2a3/0x3d0 fs/namei.c:1690 lookup_slow+0x57/0x70 fs/namei.c:1707 walk_component+0x2e6/0x410 fs/namei.c:1998 lookup_last fs/namei.c:2455 [inline] path_lookupat+0x180/0x490 fs/namei.c:2479 filename_lookup+0x1f0/0x500 fs/namei.c:2508 vfs_statx+0x10b/0x660 fs/stat.c:229 vfs_fstatat fs/stat.c:267 [inline] vfs_lstat include/linux/fs.h:3424 [inline] __do_sys_newlstat fs/stat.c:423 [inline] __se_sys_newlstat+0xd5/0x350 fs/stat.c:417 __x64_sys_newlstat+0x5b/0x70 fs/stat.c:417 x64_sys_call+0x393/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:7 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x68/0xd2 Freed by task 13: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline] kasan_set_track+0x4b/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_free_info+0x31/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:516 ____kasan_slab_free+0x132/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:236 __kasan_slab_free+0x11/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:244 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1724 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook+0xc2/0x190 mm/slub.c:1750 slab_free mm/slub.c:3661 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x12d/0x2a0 mm/slub.c:3683 f2fs_free_inode+0x24/0x30 fs/f2fs/super.c:1562 i_callback+0x4c/0x70 fs/inode.c:250 rcu_do_batch+0x503/0xb80 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2297 rcu_core+0x5a2/0xe70 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2557 rcu_core_si+0x9/0x10 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2574 handle_softirqs+0x178/0x500 kernel/softirq.c:578 run_ksoftirqd+0x28/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:945 smpboot_thread_fn+0x45a/0x8c0 kernel/smpboot.c:164 kthread+0x270/0x310 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295 Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x3a/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:45 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xb6/0xc0 mm/kasan/generic.c:486 kasan_record_aux_stack_noalloc+0xb/0x10 mm/kasan/generic.c:496 call_rcu+0xd4/0xf70 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2845 destroy_inode fs/inode.c:316 [inline] evict+0x7da/0x870 fs/inode.c:720 iput_final fs/inode.c:1834 [inline] iput+0x62b/0x830 fs/inode.c:1860 do_unlinkat+0x356/0x540 fs/namei.c:4397 __do_sys_unlink fs/namei.c:4438 [inline] __se_sys_unlink fs/namei.c:4436 [inline] __x64_sys_unlink+0x49/0x50 fs/namei.c:4436 x64_sys_call+0x958/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:88 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x68/0xd2 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88812d961f20 which belongs to the cache f2fs_inode_cache of size 1200 The buggy address is located 856 bytes inside of 1200-byte region [ffff88812d961f20, ffff88812d9623d0) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea0004b65800 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x12d960 head:ffffea0004b65800 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x4000000000010200(slab|head|zone=1) raw: 4000000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff88810a94c500 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 2, migratetype Reclaimable, gfp_mask 0x1d2050(__GFP_IO|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC|__GFP_HARDWALL|__GFP_RECLAIMABLE), pid 569, tgid 568 (syz.2.16), ts 55943246141, free_ts 0 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:31 [inline] post_alloc_hook+0x1d0/0x1f0 mm/page_alloc.c:2532 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:2539 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0x2e63/0x2ef0 mm/page_alloc.c:4328 __alloc_pages+0x235/0x4b0 mm/page_alloc.c:5605 alloc_slab_page include/linux/gfp.h:-1 [inline] allocate_slab mm/slub.c:1939 [inline] new_slab+0xec/0x4b0 mm/slub.c:1992 ___slab_alloc+0x6f6/0xb50 mm/slub.c:3180 __slab_alloc+0x5e/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3279 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3364 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3406 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3413 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x13f/0x220 mm/slub.c:3429 alloc_inode_sb include/linux/fs.h:3245 [inline] f2fs_alloc_inode+0x2d/0x340 fs/f2fs/super.c:1419 alloc_inode fs/inode.c:261 [inline] iget_locked+0x186/0x880 fs/inode.c:1373 f2fs_iget+0x55/0x4c60 fs/f2fs/inode.c:483 f2fs_fill_super+0x3ad7/0x6bb0 fs/f2fs/super.c:4293 mount_bdev+0x2ae/0x3e0 fs/super.c:1443 f2fs_mount+0x34/0x40 fs/f2fs/super.c:4642 legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x190 fs/fs_context.c:632 vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x260 fs/super.c:1573 do_new_mount+0x25a/0xa20 fs/namespace.c:3056 page_owner free stack trace missing Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88812d962100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88812d962180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff88812d962200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88812d962280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88812d962300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=13448368580000 This bug can be reproduced w/ the reproducer [2], once we enable CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS config, the reproducer will trigger panic as below, so the direct reason of this bug is the same as the one below patch [3] fixed. kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:857! RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x1204/0x1a20 Call Trace: <TASK> evict+0x32a/0x7a0 do_unlinkat+0x37b/0x5b0 __x64_sys_unlink+0xad/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x5a/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x1204/0x1a20 [2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=17495ccc580000 [3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/[email protected] Tracepoints before panic: f2fs_unlink_enter: dev = (7,0), dir ino = 3, i_size = 4096, i_blocks = 8, name = file1 f2fs_unlink_exit: dev = (7,0), ino = 7, ret = 0 f2fs_evict_inode: dev = (7,0), ino = 7, pino = 3, i_mode = 0x81ed, i_size = 10, i_nlink = 0, i_blocks = 0, i_advise = 0x0 f2fs_truncate_node: dev = (7,0), ino = 7, nid = 8, block_address = 0x3c05 f2fs_unlink_enter: dev = (7,0), dir ino = 3, i_size = 4096, i_blocks = 8, name = file3 f2fs_unlink_exit: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, ret = 0 f2fs_evict_inode: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, pino = 3, i_mode = 0x81ed, i_size = 9000, i_nlink = 0, i_blocks = 24, i_advise = 0x4 f2fs_truncate: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, pino = 3, i_mode = 0x81ed, i_size = 0, i_nlink = 0, i_blocks = 24, i_advise = 0x4 f2fs_truncate_blocks_enter: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, i_size = 0, i_blocks = 24, start file offset = 0 f2fs_truncate_blocks_exit: dev = (7,0), ino = 8, ret = -2 The root cause is: in the fuzzed image, dnode #8 belongs to inode #7, after inode #7 eviction, dnode #8 was dropped. However there is dirent that has ino #8, so, once we unlink file3, in f2fs_evict_inode(), both f2fs_truncate() and f2fs_update_inode_page() will fail due to we can not load node #8, result in we missed to call f2fs_inode_synced() to clear inode dirty status. Let's fix this by calling f2fs_inode_synced() in error path of f2fs_evict_inode(). PS: As I verified, the reproducer [2] can trigger this bug in v6.1.129, but it failed in v6.16-rc4, this is because the testcase will stop due to other corruption has been detected by f2fs: F2FS-fs (loop0): inconsistent node block, node_type:2, nid:8, node_footer[nid:8,ino:8,ofs:0,cpver:5013063228981249506,blkaddr:15366] F2FS-fs (loop0): f2fs_lookup: inode (ino=9) has zero i_nlink Fixes: 0f18b46 ("f2fs: flush inode metadata when checkpoint is doing") Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=13448368580000 Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

It appears that the xe_res_cursor also assumes 4KiB alignment. Current implementation uses `PAGE_SIZE' as an assumed alignment reference, but 4KiB kernel page sizes is by no means a guarantee. On 16KiB-paged kernels, this causes driver failures during boot up: [ 23.242757] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 23.247363] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2036 at drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_res_cursor.h:182 emit_pte+0x394/0x3b0 [xe] [ 23.256962] Modules linked in: nf_conntrack_netbios_ns(E) nf_conntrack_broadcast(E) nft_fib_inet(E) nft_fib_ipv4(E) nft_fib_ipv6(E) nft_fib(E) nft_reject_inet(E) nf_reject_ipv4(E) nf_reject_ipv6(E) nft_reject(E) nft_ct(E) rfkill(E) nft_chain_nat(E) ip6table_nat(E) ip6table_mangle(E) ip6table_raw(E) ip6table_security(E) iptable_nat(E) nf_nat(E) nf_conntrack(E) nf_defrag_ipv6(E) nf_defrag_ipv4(E) iptable_mangle(E) iptable_raw(E) iptable_security(E) ip_set(E) nf_tables(E) ip6table_filter(E) ip6_tables(E) iptable_filter(E) snd_hda_codec_conexant(E) snd_hda_codec_generic(E) snd_hda_codec_hdmi(E) snd_hda_intel(E) snd_intel_dspcfg(E) snd_hda_codec(E) nls_iso8859_1(E) qrtr(E) nls_cp437(E) snd_hda_core(E) loongson3_cpufreq(E) rtc_efi(E) snd_hwdep(E) snd_pcm(E) spi_loongson_pci(E) snd_timer(E) snd(E) spi_loongson_core(E) soundcore(E) gpio_loongson_64bit(E) rtc_loongson(E) i2c_ls2x(E) mousedev(E) input_leds(E) sch_fq_codel(E) fuse(E) nfnetlink(E) dmi_sysfs(E) ip_tables(E) x_tables(E) xe(E) drm_gpuvm(E) drm_buddy(E) gpu_sched(E) [ 23.257034] drm_exec(E) drm_suballoc_helper(E) drm_display_helper(E) cec(E) rc_core(E) hid_generic(E) tpm_tis_spi(E) r8169(E) loongson(E) i2c_algo_bit(E) realtek(E) drm_ttm_helper(E) led_class(E) ttm(E) drm_client_lib(E) drm_kms_helper(E) sunrpc(E) i2c_dev(E) [ 23.369697] CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 2036 Comm: QSGRenderThread Tainted: G E 6.14.0-rc4-aosc-main-g7cc07e6e50b0-dirty #8 [ 23.381640] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 23.385534] Hardware name: Loongson Loongson-3A6000-HV-7A2000-1w-V0.1-EVB/Loongson-3A6000-HV-7A2000-1w-EVB-V1.21, BIOS Loongson-UDK2018-V4.0.05756-prestab [ 23.399319] pc ffff80000251efc0 ra ffff80000251eddc tp 900000011fe3c000 sp 900000011fe3f7e0 [ 23.407632] a0 0000000000000001 a1 0000000000000000 a2 0000000000000000 a3 0000000000000000 [ 23.415938] a4 0000000000000000 a5 0000000000000000 a6 0000000000060000 a7 900000010c947b00 [ 23.424240] t0 0000000000000000 t1 0000000000000000 t2 0000000000000000 t3 900000012e456230 [ 23.432543] t4 0000000000000035 t5 0000000000004000 t6 00000001fbc40403 t7 0000000000004000 [ 23.440845] t8 9000000100e688a8 u0 5cc06cee8ef0edee s9 9000000100024420 s0 0000000000000047 [ 23.449147] s1 0000000000004000 s2 0000000000000001 s3 900000012adba000 s4 ffffffffffffc000 [ 23.457450] s5 9000000108939428 s6 0000000000000000 s7 0000000000000000 s8 900000011fe3f8e0 [ 23.465851] ra: ffff80000251eddc emit_pte+0x1b0/0x3b0 [xe] [ 23.471761] ERA: ffff80000251efc0 emit_pte+0x394/0x3b0 [xe] [ 23.477557] CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE) [ 23.483732] PRMD: 00000004 (PPLV0 +PIE -PWE) [ 23.488068] EUEN: 00000003 (+FPE +SXE -ASXE -BTE) [ 23.492832] ECFG: 00071c1d (LIE=0,2-4,10-12 VS=7) [ 23.497594] ESTAT: 000c0000 [BRK] (IS= ECode=12 EsubCode=0) [ 23.503133] PRID: 0014d000 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3A6000-HV) [ 23.509164] CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 2036 Comm: QSGRenderThread Tainted: G E 6.14.0-rc4-aosc-main-g7cc07e6e50b0-dirty #8 [ 23.509168] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 23.509168] Hardware name: Loongson Loongson-3A6000-HV-7A2000-1w-V0.1-EVB/Loongson-3A6000-HV-7A2000-1w-EVB-V1.21, BIOS Loongson-UDK2018-V4.0.05756-prestab [ 23.509170] Stack : ffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff 900000000023eb34 900000011fe3c000 [ 23.509176] 900000011fe3f440 0000000000000000 900000011fe3f448 9000000001c31c70 [ 23.509181] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 23.509185] 0000000000000000 5cc06cee8ef0edee 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 23.509190] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 23.509193] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000066b4000 9000000100024420 [ 23.509197] 9000000001eb8000 0000000000000000 9000000001c31c70 0000000000000004 [ 23.509202] 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 23.509206] 900000011fe3f8e0 9000000001c31c70 9000000000244174 00007fffac097534 [ 23.509211] 00000000000000b0 0000000000000004 0000000000000003 0000000000071c1d [ 23.509216] ... [ 23.509218] Call Trace: [ 23.509220] [<9000000000244174>] show_stack+0x3c/0x16c [ 23.509226] [<900000000023eb30>] dump_stack_lvl+0x84/0xe0 [ 23.509230] [<9000000000288208>] __warn+0x8c/0x174 [ 23.509234] [<90000000017c1918>] report_bug+0x1c0/0x22c [ 23.509238] [<90000000017f66e8>] do_bp+0x280/0x344 [ 23.509243] [<90000000002428a0>] handle_bp+0x120/0x1c0 [ 23.509247] [<ffff80000251efc0>] emit_pte+0x394/0x3b0 [xe] [ 23.509295] [<ffff800002520d38>] xe_migrate_clear+0x2d8/0xa54 [xe] [ 23.509341] [<ffff8000024e6c38>] xe_bo_move+0x324/0x930 [xe] [ 23.509387] [<ffff800002209468>] ttm_bo_handle_move_mem+0xd0/0x194 [ttm] [ 23.509392] [<ffff800002209ebc>] ttm_bo_validate+0xd4/0x1cc [ttm] [ 23.509396] [<ffff80000220a138>] ttm_bo_init_reserved+0x184/0x1dc [ttm] [ 23.509399] [<ffff8000024e7840>] ___xe_bo_create_locked+0x1e8/0x3d4 [xe] [ 23.509445] [<ffff8000024e7cf8>] __xe_bo_create_locked+0x2cc/0x390 [xe] [ 23.509489] [<ffff8000024e7e98>] xe_bo_create_user+0x34/0xe4 [xe] [ 23.509533] [<ffff8000024e875c>] xe_gem_create_ioctl+0x154/0x4d8 [xe] [ 23.509578] [<9000000001062784>] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe0/0x14c [ 23.509582] [<9000000001062c10>] drm_ioctl+0x420/0x5f4 [ 23.509585] [<ffff8000024ea778>] xe_drm_ioctl+0x64/0xac [xe] [ 23.509630] [<9000000000653504>] sys_ioctl+0x2b8/0xf98 [ 23.509634] [<90000000017f684c>] do_syscall+0xa0/0x140 [ 23.509637] [<9000000000241e38>] handle_syscall+0xb8/0x158 [ 23.509640] [ 23.509644] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Revise calls to `xe_res_dma()' and `xe_res_cursor()' to use `XE_PTE_MASK' (12) and `SZ_4K' to fix this potentially confused use of `PAGE_SIZE' in relevant code. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: e89b384 ("drm/xe/migrate: Update emit_pte to cope with a size level than 4k") Tested-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]> Tested-by: Wenbin Fang <[email protected]> Tested-by: Haien Liang <[email protected]> Tested-by: Jianfeng Liu <[email protected]> Tested-by: Shirong Liu <[email protected]> Tested-by: Haofeng Wu <[email protected]> Link: FanFansfan@22c55ab Link: https://t.me/c/1109254909/768552 Co-developed-by: Shang Yatsen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Shang Yatsen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Kexy Biscuit <[email protected]>

The sg2042 SoCs support xtheadvector [1] so it can be included in the devicetree. Also include vlenb for the cpu. And set vlenb=16 [2]. This can be tested by passing the "mitigations=off" kernel parameter. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/[email protected]/ [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/aCO44SAoS2kIP61r@ghost/ [2] Signed-off-by: Han Gao <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Inochi Amaoto <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Nutty Liu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Chen Wang <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/915bef0530dee6c8bc0ae473837a4bd6786fa4fb.1751698574.git.rabenda.cn@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Inochi Amaoto <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chen Wang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chen Wang <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit a5fb905) Signed-off-by: Han Gao <[email protected]>

Enable SPI NOR node for SG2042_EVB_V2 device tree Signed-off-by: Zixian Zeng <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Han Gao <[email protected]>

Add binding for Sophgo SG2042 PCIe host controller. Signed-off-by: Chen Wang <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5a784afde48c44b5a8f376f02c5f30ccff8a3312.1736923025.git.unicorn_wang@outlook.com Signed-off-by: Han Gao <[email protected]>

Add support for PCIe controller in SG2042 SoC. The controller uses the Cadence PCIe core programmed by pcie-cadence*.c. The PCIe controller will work in host mode only. Signed-off-by: Chen Wang <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ddedd8f76f83fea2c6d3887132d2fe6f2a6a02c1.1736923025.git.unicorn_wang@outlook.com Signed-off-by: Han Gao <[email protected]>

Document SOPHGO SG2042 compatible for PCIe control registers. These registers are shared by PCIe controller nodes. Signed-off-by: Chen Wang <[email protected]> Acked-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a9b213536c5bbc20de649afae69d2898a75924e4.1736923025.git.unicorn_wang@outlook.com Signed-off-by: Han Gao <[email protected]>

Add PCIe controller nodes in DTS for Sophgo SG2042. Default they are disabled. Signed-off-by: Chen Wang <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4a1f23e5426bfb56cad9c07f90d4efaad5eab976.1736923025.git.unicorn_wang@outlook.com Signed-off-by: Han Gao <[email protected]>

Enable pcie controllers for PioneerBox, which uses SG2042 SoC. Signed-off-by: Chen Wang <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/eb2e8c619a4dd53f9bb1aa33add4f85d4ffa7d79.1736923025.git.unicorn_wang@outlook.com Signed-off-by: Han Gao <[email protected]>

It appears that the xe_res_cursor also assumes 4K alignment. Current code uses `PAGE_SIZE' as an assumed alignment reference but 4K kernel page sizes is by no means a guarantee. On 16K-paged kernels, this causes driver failures during boot up: [ 23.242757] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 23.247363] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2036 at drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_res_cursor.h:182 emit_pte+0x394/0x3b0 [xe] [ 23.256962] Modules linked in: nf_conntrack_netbios_ns(E) nf_conntrack_broadcast(E) nft_fib_inet(E) nft_fib_ipv4(E) nft_fib_ipv6(E) nft_fib(E) nft_reject_inet(E) nf_reject_ipv4(E) nf_reject_ipv6(E) nft_reject(E) nft_ct(E) rfkill(E) nft_chain_nat(E) ip6table_nat(E) ip6table_mangle(E) ip6table_raw(E) ip6table_security(E) iptable_nat(E) nf_nat(E) nf_conntrack(E) nf_defrag_ipv6(E) nf_defrag_ipv4(E) iptable_mangle(E) iptable_raw(E) iptable_security(E) ip_set(E) nf_tables(E) ip6table_filter(E) ip6_tables(E) iptable_filter(E) snd_hda_codec_conexant(E) snd_hda_codec_generic(E) snd_hda_codec_hdmi(E) snd_hda_intel(E) snd_intel_dspcfg(E) snd_hda_codec(E) nls_iso8859_1(E) qrtr(E) nls_cp437(E) snd_hda_core(E) loongson3_cpufreq(E) rtc_efi(E) snd_hwdep(E) snd_pcm(E) spi_loongson_pci(E) snd_timer(E) snd(E) spi_loongson_core(E) soundcore(E) gpio_loongson_64bit(E) rtc_loongson(E) i2c_ls2x(E) mousedev(E) input_leds(E) sch_fq_codel(E) fuse(E) nfnetlink(E) dmi_sysfs(E) ip_tables(E) x_tables(E) xe(E) d rm_gpuvm(E) drm_buddy(E) gpu_sched(E) [ 23.257034] drm_exec(E) drm_suballoc_helper(E) drm_display_helper(E) cec(E) rc_core(E) hid_generic(E) tpm_tis_spi(E) r8169(E) loongson(E) i2c_algo_bit(E) realtek(E) drm_ttm_helper(E) led_class(E) ttm(E) drm_client_lib(E) drm_kms_helper(E) sunrpc(E) i2c_dev(E) [ 23.369697] CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 2036 Comm: QSGRenderThread Tainted: G E 6.14.0-rc4-aosc-main-g7cc07e6e50b0-dirty #8 [ 23.381640] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 23.385534] Hardware name: Loongson Loongson-3A6000-HV-7A2000-1w-V0.1-EVB/Loongson-3A6000-HV-7A2000-1w-EVB-V1.21, BIOS Loongson-UDK2018-V4.0.05756-prestab [ 23.399319] pc ffff80000251efc0 ra ffff80000251eddc tp 900000011fe3c000 sp 900000011fe3f7e0 [ 23.407632] a0 0000000000000001 a1 0000000000000000 a2 0000000000000000 a3 0000000000000000 [ 23.415938] a4 0000000000000000 a5 0000000000000000 a6 0000000000060000 a7 900000010c947b00 [ 23.424240] t0 0000000000000000 t1 0000000000000000 t2 0000000000000000 t3 900000012e456230 [ 23.432543] t4 0000000000000035 t5 0000000000004000 t6 00000001fbc40403 t7 0000000000004000 [ 23.440845] t8 9000000100e688a8 u0 5cc06cee8ef0edee s9 9000000100024420 s0 0000000000000047 [ 23.449147] s1 0000000000004000 s2 0000000000000001 s3 900000012adba000 s4 ffffffffffffc000 [ 23.457450] s5 9000000108939428 s6 0000000000000000 s7 0000000000000000 s8 900000011fe3f8e0 [ 23.465851] ra: ffff80000251eddc emit_pte+0x1b0/0x3b0 [xe] [ 23.471761] ERA: ffff80000251efc0 emit_pte+0x394/0x3b0 [xe] [ 23.477557] CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE) [ 23.483732] PRMD: 00000004 (PPLV0 +PIE -PWE) [ 23.488068] EUEN: 00000003 (+FPE +SXE -ASXE -BTE) [ 23.492832] ECFG: 00071c1d (LIE=0,2-4,10-12 VS=7) [ 23.497594] ESTAT: 000c0000 [BRK] (IS= ECode=12 EsubCode=0) [ 23.503133] PRID: 0014d000 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3A6000-HV) [ 23.509164] CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 2036 Comm: QSGRenderThread Tainted: G E 6.14.0-rc4-aosc-main-g7cc07e6e50b0-dirty #8 [ 23.509168] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 23.509168] Hardware name: Loongson Loongson-3A6000-HV-7A2000-1w-V0.1-EVB/Loongson-3A6000-HV-7A2000-1w-EVB-V1.21, BIOS Loongson-UDK2018-V4.0.05756-prestab [ 23.509170] Stack : ffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff 900000000023eb34 900000011fe3c000 [ 23.509176] 900000011fe3f440 0000000000000000 900000011fe3f448 9000000001c31c70 [ 23.509181] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 23.509185] 0000000000000000 5cc06cee8ef0edee 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 23.509190] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 23.509193] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000066b4000 9000000100024420 [ 23.509197] 9000000001eb8000 0000000000000000 9000000001c31c70 0000000000000004 [ 23.509202] 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 23.509206] 900000011fe3f8e0 9000000001c31c70 9000000000244174 00007fffac097534 [ 23.509211] 00000000000000b0 0000000000000004 0000000000000003 0000000000071c1d [ 23.509216] ... [ 23.509218] Call Trace: [ 23.509220] [<9000000000244174>] show_stack+0x3c/0x16c [ 23.509226] [<900000000023eb30>] dump_stack_lvl+0x84/0xe0 [ 23.509230] [<9000000000288208>] __warn+0x8c/0x174 [ 23.509234] [<90000000017c1918>] report_bug+0x1c0/0x22c [ 23.509238] [<90000000017f66e8>] do_bp+0x280/0x344 [ 23.509243] [<90000000002428a0>] handle_bp+0x120/0x1c0 [ 23.509247] [<ffff80000251efc0>] emit_pte+0x394/0x3b0 [xe] [ 23.509295] [<ffff800002520d38>] xe_migrate_clear+0x2d8/0xa54 [xe] [ 23.509341] [<ffff8000024e6c38>] xe_bo_move+0x324/0x930 [xe] [ 23.509387] [<ffff800002209468>] ttm_bo_handle_move_mem+0xd0/0x194 [ttm] [ 23.509392] [<ffff800002209ebc>] ttm_bo_validate+0xd4/0x1cc [ttm] [ 23.509396] [<ffff80000220a138>] ttm_bo_init_reserved+0x184/0x1dc [ttm] [ 23.509399] [<ffff8000024e7840>] ___xe_bo_create_locked+0x1e8/0x3d4 [xe] [ 23.509445] [<ffff8000024e7cf8>] __xe_bo_create_locked+0x2cc/0x390 [xe] [ 23.509489] [<ffff8000024e7e98>] xe_bo_create_user+0x34/0xe4 [xe] [ 23.509533] [<ffff8000024e875c>] xe_gem_create_ioctl+0x154/0x4d8 [xe] [ 23.509578] [<9000000001062784>] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe0/0x14c [ 23.509582] [<9000000001062c10>] drm_ioctl+0x420/0x5f4 [ 23.509585] [<ffff8000024ea778>] xe_drm_ioctl+0x64/0xac [xe] [ 23.509630] [<9000000000653504>] sys_ioctl+0x2b8/0xf98 [ 23.509634] [<90000000017f684c>] do_syscall+0xa0/0x140 [ 23.509637] [<9000000000241e38>] handle_syscall+0xb8/0x158 [ 23.509640] [ 23.509644] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Revise calls to `xe_res_dma()' and `xe_res_cursor()' to use `XE_PTE_MASK' (12) and `SZ_4K' to fix this potentially confused use of `PAGE_SIZE' in relevant code. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: e89b384 ("drm/xe/migrate: Update emit_pte to cope with a size level than 4k") Tested-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]> Tested-by: Haien Liang <[email protected]> Tested-by: Shirong Liu <[email protected]> Tested-by: Haofeng Wu <[email protected]> Link: FanFansfan@22c55ab Co-developed-by: Shang Yatsen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Shang Yatsen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]>

It appears that the xe_res_cursor also assumes 4KiB alignment. Current implementation uses `PAGE_SIZE' as an assumed alignment reference, but 4KiB kernel page sizes is by no means a guarantee. On 16KiB-paged kernels, this causes driver failures during boot up: [ 23.242757] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 23.247363] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2036 at drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_res_cursor.h:182 emit_pte+0x394/0x3b0 [xe] [ 23.256962] Modules linked in: nf_conntrack_netbios_ns(E) nf_conntrack_broadcast(E) nft_fib_inet(E) nft_fib_ipv4(E) nft_fib_ipv6(E) nft_fib(E) nft_reject_inet(E) nf_reject_ipv4(E) nf_reject_ipv6(E) nft_reject(E) nft_ct(E) rfkill(E) nft_chain_nat(E) ip6table_nat(E) ip6table_mangle(E) ip6table_raw(E) ip6table_security(E) iptable_nat(E) nf_nat(E) nf_conntrack(E) nf_defrag_ipv6(E) nf_defrag_ipv4(E) iptable_mangle(E) iptable_raw(E) iptable_security(E) ip_set(E) nf_tables(E) ip6table_filter(E) ip6_tables(E) iptable_filter(E) snd_hda_codec_conexant(E) snd_hda_codec_generic(E) snd_hda_codec_hdmi(E) snd_hda_intel(E) snd_intel_dspcfg(E) snd_hda_codec(E) nls_iso8859_1(E) qrtr(E) nls_cp437(E) snd_hda_core(E) loongson3_cpufreq(E) rtc_efi(E) snd_hwdep(E) snd_pcm(E) spi_loongson_pci(E) snd_timer(E) snd(E) spi_loongson_core(E) soundcore(E) gpio_loongson_64bit(E) rtc_loongson(E) i2c_ls2x(E) mousedev(E) input_leds(E) sch_fq_codel(E) fuse(E) nfnetlink(E) dmi_sysfs(E) ip_tables(E) x_tables(E) xe(E) drm_gpuvm(E) drm_buddy(E) gpu_sched(E) [ 23.257034] drm_exec(E) drm_suballoc_helper(E) drm_display_helper(E) cec(E) rc_core(E) hid_generic(E) tpm_tis_spi(E) r8169(E) loongson(E) i2c_algo_bit(E) realtek(E) drm_ttm_helper(E) led_class(E) ttm(E) drm_client_lib(E) drm_kms_helper(E) sunrpc(E) i2c_dev(E) [ 23.369697] CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 2036 Comm: QSGRenderThread Tainted: G E 6.14.0-rc4-aosc-main-g7cc07e6e50b0-dirty #8 [ 23.381640] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 23.385534] Hardware name: Loongson Loongson-3A6000-HV-7A2000-1w-V0.1-EVB/Loongson-3A6000-HV-7A2000-1w-EVB-V1.21, BIOS Loongson-UDK2018-V4.0.05756-prestab [ 23.399319] pc ffff80000251efc0 ra ffff80000251eddc tp 900000011fe3c000 sp 900000011fe3f7e0 [ 23.407632] a0 0000000000000001 a1 0000000000000000 a2 0000000000000000 a3 0000000000000000 [ 23.415938] a4 0000000000000000 a5 0000000000000000 a6 0000000000060000 a7 900000010c947b00 [ 23.424240] t0 0000000000000000 t1 0000000000000000 t2 0000000000000000 t3 900000012e456230 [ 23.432543] t4 0000000000000035 t5 0000000000004000 t6 00000001fbc40403 t7 0000000000004000 [ 23.440845] t8 9000000100e688a8 u0 5cc06cee8ef0edee s9 9000000100024420 s0 0000000000000047 [ 23.449147] s1 0000000000004000 s2 0000000000000001 s3 900000012adba000 s4 ffffffffffffc000 [ 23.457450] s5 9000000108939428 s6 0000000000000000 s7 0000000000000000 s8 900000011fe3f8e0 [ 23.465851] ra: ffff80000251eddc emit_pte+0x1b0/0x3b0 [xe] [ 23.471761] ERA: ffff80000251efc0 emit_pte+0x394/0x3b0 [xe] [ 23.477557] CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE) [ 23.483732] PRMD: 00000004 (PPLV0 +PIE -PWE) [ 23.488068] EUEN: 00000003 (+FPE +SXE -ASXE -BTE) [ 23.492832] ECFG: 00071c1d (LIE=0,2-4,10-12 VS=7) [ 23.497594] ESTAT: 000c0000 [BRK] (IS= ECode=12 EsubCode=0) [ 23.503133] PRID: 0014d000 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3A6000-HV) [ 23.509164] CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 2036 Comm: QSGRenderThread Tainted: G E 6.14.0-rc4-aosc-main-g7cc07e6e50b0-dirty #8 [ 23.509168] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 23.509168] Hardware name: Loongson Loongson-3A6000-HV-7A2000-1w-V0.1-EVB/Loongson-3A6000-HV-7A2000-1w-EVB-V1.21, BIOS Loongson-UDK2018-V4.0.05756-prestab [ 23.509170] Stack : ffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff 900000000023eb34 900000011fe3c000 [ 23.509176] 900000011fe3f440 0000000000000000 900000011fe3f448 9000000001c31c70 [ 23.509181] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 23.509185] 0000000000000000 5cc06cee8ef0edee 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 23.509190] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 23.509193] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000066b4000 9000000100024420 [ 23.509197] 9000000001eb8000 0000000000000000 9000000001c31c70 0000000000000004 [ 23.509202] 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 23.509206] 900000011fe3f8e0 9000000001c31c70 9000000000244174 00007fffac097534 [ 23.509211] 00000000000000b0 0000000000000004 0000000000000003 0000000000071c1d [ 23.509216] ... [ 23.509218] Call Trace: [ 23.509220] [<9000000000244174>] show_stack+0x3c/0x16c [ 23.509226] [<900000000023eb30>] dump_stack_lvl+0x84/0xe0 [ 23.509230] [<9000000000288208>] __warn+0x8c/0x174 [ 23.509234] [<90000000017c1918>] report_bug+0x1c0/0x22c [ 23.509238] [<90000000017f66e8>] do_bp+0x280/0x344 [ 23.509243] [<90000000002428a0>] handle_bp+0x120/0x1c0 [ 23.509247] [<ffff80000251efc0>] emit_pte+0x394/0x3b0 [xe] [ 23.509295] [<ffff800002520d38>] xe_migrate_clear+0x2d8/0xa54 [xe] [ 23.509341] [<ffff8000024e6c38>] xe_bo_move+0x324/0x930 [xe] [ 23.509387] [<ffff800002209468>] ttm_bo_handle_move_mem+0xd0/0x194 [ttm] [ 23.509392] [<ffff800002209ebc>] ttm_bo_validate+0xd4/0x1cc [ttm] [ 23.509396] [<ffff80000220a138>] ttm_bo_init_reserved+0x184/0x1dc [ttm] [ 23.509399] [<ffff8000024e7840>] ___xe_bo_create_locked+0x1e8/0x3d4 [xe] [ 23.509445] [<ffff8000024e7cf8>] __xe_bo_create_locked+0x2cc/0x390 [xe] [ 23.509489] [<ffff8000024e7e98>] xe_bo_create_user+0x34/0xe4 [xe] [ 23.509533] [<ffff8000024e875c>] xe_gem_create_ioctl+0x154/0x4d8 [xe] [ 23.509578] [<9000000001062784>] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe0/0x14c [ 23.509582] [<9000000001062c10>] drm_ioctl+0x420/0x5f4 [ 23.509585] [<ffff8000024ea778>] xe_drm_ioctl+0x64/0xac [xe] [ 23.509630] [<9000000000653504>] sys_ioctl+0x2b8/0xf98 [ 23.509634] [<90000000017f684c>] do_syscall+0xa0/0x140 [ 23.509637] [<9000000000241e38>] handle_syscall+0xb8/0x158 [ 23.509640] [ 23.509644] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Revise calls to `xe_res_dma()' and `xe_res_cursor()' to use `XE_PTE_MASK' (12) and `SZ_4K' to fix this potentially confused use of `PAGE_SIZE' in relevant code. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: e89b384 ("drm/xe/migrate: Update emit_pte to cope with a size level than 4k") Tested-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]> Tested-by: Wenbin Fang <[email protected]> Tested-by: Haien Liang <[email protected]> Tested-by: Jianfeng Liu <[email protected]> Tested-by: Shirong Liu <[email protected]> Tested-by: Haofeng Wu <[email protected]> Link: FanFansfan@22c55ab Link: https://t.me/c/1109254909/768552 Co-developed-by: Shang Yatsen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Shang Yatsen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Kexy Biscuit <[email protected]>

It appears that the xe_res_cursor also assumes 4K alignment. Current code uses `PAGE_SIZE' as an assumed alignment reference but 4K kernel page sizes is by no means a guarantee. On 16K-paged kernels, this causes driver failures during boot up: [ 23.242757] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 23.247363] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2036 at drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_res_cursor.h:182 emit_pte+0x394/0x3b0 [xe] [ 23.256962] Modules linked in: nf_conntrack_netbios_ns(E) nf_conntrack_broadcast(E) nft_fib_inet(E) nft_fib_ipv4(E) nft_fib_ipv6(E) nft_fib(E) nft_reject_inet(E) nf_reject_ipv4(E) nf_reject_ipv6(E) nft_reject(E) nft_ct(E) rfkill(E) nft_chain_nat(E) ip6table_nat(E) ip6table_mangle(E) ip6table_raw(E) ip6table_security(E) iptable_nat(E) nf_nat(E) nf_conntrack(E) nf_defrag_ipv6(E) nf_defrag_ipv4(E) iptable_mangle(E) iptable_raw(E) iptable_security(E) ip_set(E) nf_tables(E) ip6table_filter(E) ip6_tables(E) iptable_filter(E) snd_hda_codec_conexant(E) snd_hda_codec_generic(E) snd_hda_codec_hdmi(E) snd_hda_intel(E) snd_intel_dspcfg(E) snd_hda_codec(E) nls_iso8859_1(E) qrtr(E) nls_cp437(E) snd_hda_core(E) loongson3_cpufreq(E) rtc_efi(E) snd_hwdep(E) snd_pcm(E) spi_loongson_pci(E) snd_timer(E) snd(E) spi_loongson_core(E) soundcore(E) gpio_loongson_64bit(E) rtc_loongson(E) i2c_ls2x(E) mousedev(E) input_leds(E) sch_fq_codel(E) fuse(E) nfnetlink(E) dmi_sysfs(E) ip_tables(E) x_tables(E) xe(E) d rm_gpuvm(E) drm_buddy(E) gpu_sched(E) [ 23.257034] drm_exec(E) drm_suballoc_helper(E) drm_display_helper(E) cec(E) rc_core(E) hid_generic(E) tpm_tis_spi(E) r8169(E) loongson(E) i2c_algo_bit(E) realtek(E) drm_ttm_helper(E) led_class(E) ttm(E) drm_client_lib(E) drm_kms_helper(E) sunrpc(E) i2c_dev(E) [ 23.369697] CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 2036 Comm: QSGRenderThread Tainted: G E 6.14.0-rc4-aosc-main-g7cc07e6e50b0-dirty #8 [ 23.381640] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 23.385534] Hardware name: Loongson Loongson-3A6000-HV-7A2000-1w-V0.1-EVB/Loongson-3A6000-HV-7A2000-1w-EVB-V1.21, BIOS Loongson-UDK2018-V4.0.05756-prestab [ 23.399319] pc ffff80000251efc0 ra ffff80000251eddc tp 900000011fe3c000 sp 900000011fe3f7e0 [ 23.407632] a0 0000000000000001 a1 0000000000000000 a2 0000000000000000 a3 0000000000000000 [ 23.415938] a4 0000000000000000 a5 0000000000000000 a6 0000000000060000 a7 900000010c947b00 [ 23.424240] t0 0000000000000000 t1 0000000000000000 t2 0000000000000000 t3 900000012e456230 [ 23.432543] t4 0000000000000035 t5 0000000000004000 t6 00000001fbc40403 t7 0000000000004000 [ 23.440845] t8 9000000100e688a8 u0 5cc06cee8ef0edee s9 9000000100024420 s0 0000000000000047 [ 23.449147] s1 0000000000004000 s2 0000000000000001 s3 900000012adba000 s4 ffffffffffffc000 [ 23.457450] s5 9000000108939428 s6 0000000000000000 s7 0000000000000000 s8 900000011fe3f8e0 [ 23.465851] ra: ffff80000251eddc emit_pte+0x1b0/0x3b0 [xe] [ 23.471761] ERA: ffff80000251efc0 emit_pte+0x394/0x3b0 [xe] [ 23.477557] CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE) [ 23.483732] PRMD: 00000004 (PPLV0 +PIE -PWE) [ 23.488068] EUEN: 00000003 (+FPE +SXE -ASXE -BTE) [ 23.492832] ECFG: 00071c1d (LIE=0,2-4,10-12 VS=7) [ 23.497594] ESTAT: 000c0000 [BRK] (IS= ECode=12 EsubCode=0) [ 23.503133] PRID: 0014d000 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3A6000-HV) [ 23.509164] CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 2036 Comm: QSGRenderThread Tainted: G E 6.14.0-rc4-aosc-main-g7cc07e6e50b0-dirty #8 [ 23.509168] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 23.509168] Hardware name: Loongson Loongson-3A6000-HV-7A2000-1w-V0.1-EVB/Loongson-3A6000-HV-7A2000-1w-EVB-V1.21, BIOS Loongson-UDK2018-V4.0.05756-prestab [ 23.509170] Stack : ffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff 900000000023eb34 900000011fe3c000 [ 23.509176] 900000011fe3f440 0000000000000000 900000011fe3f448 9000000001c31c70 [ 23.509181] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 23.509185] 0000000000000000 5cc06cee8ef0edee 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 23.509190] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 23.509193] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000066b4000 9000000100024420 [ 23.509197] 9000000001eb8000 0000000000000000 9000000001c31c70 0000000000000004 [ 23.509202] 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 23.509206] 900000011fe3f8e0 9000000001c31c70 9000000000244174 00007fffac097534 [ 23.509211] 00000000000000b0 0000000000000004 0000000000000003 0000000000071c1d [ 23.509216] ... [ 23.509218] Call Trace: [ 23.509220] [<9000000000244174>] show_stack+0x3c/0x16c [ 23.509226] [<900000000023eb30>] dump_stack_lvl+0x84/0xe0 [ 23.509230] [<9000000000288208>] __warn+0x8c/0x174 [ 23.509234] [<90000000017c1918>] report_bug+0x1c0/0x22c [ 23.509238] [<90000000017f66e8>] do_bp+0x280/0x344 [ 23.509243] [<90000000002428a0>] handle_bp+0x120/0x1c0 [ 23.509247] [<ffff80000251efc0>] emit_pte+0x394/0x3b0 [xe] [ 23.509295] [<ffff800002520d38>] xe_migrate_clear+0x2d8/0xa54 [xe] [ 23.509341] [<ffff8000024e6c38>] xe_bo_move+0x324/0x930 [xe] [ 23.509387] [<ffff800002209468>] ttm_bo_handle_move_mem+0xd0/0x194 [ttm] [ 23.509392] [<ffff800002209ebc>] ttm_bo_validate+0xd4/0x1cc [ttm] [ 23.509396] [<ffff80000220a138>] ttm_bo_init_reserved+0x184/0x1dc [ttm] [ 23.509399] [<ffff8000024e7840>] ___xe_bo_create_locked+0x1e8/0x3d4 [xe] [ 23.509445] [<ffff8000024e7cf8>] __xe_bo_create_locked+0x2cc/0x390 [xe] [ 23.509489] [<ffff8000024e7e98>] xe_bo_create_user+0x34/0xe4 [xe] [ 23.509533] [<ffff8000024e875c>] xe_gem_create_ioctl+0x154/0x4d8 [xe] [ 23.509578] [<9000000001062784>] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe0/0x14c [ 23.509582] [<9000000001062c10>] drm_ioctl+0x420/0x5f4 [ 23.509585] [<ffff8000024ea778>] xe_drm_ioctl+0x64/0xac [xe] [ 23.509630] [<9000000000653504>] sys_ioctl+0x2b8/0xf98 [ 23.509634] [<90000000017f684c>] do_syscall+0xa0/0x140 [ 23.509637] [<9000000000241e38>] handle_syscall+0xb8/0x158 [ 23.509640] [ 23.509644] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Revise calls to `xe_res_dma()' and `xe_res_cursor()' to use `XE_PTE_MASK' (12) and `SZ_4K' to fix this potentially confused use of `PAGE_SIZE' in relevant code. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: e89b384 ("drm/xe/migrate: Update emit_pte to cope with a size level than 4k") Tested-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]> Tested-by: Haien Liang <[email protected]> Tested-by: Shirong Liu <[email protected]> Tested-by: Haofeng Wu <[email protected]> Link: FanFansfan@22c55ab Co-developed-by: Shang Yatsen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Shang Yatsen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 32ca245 ] Jann Horn reported a use-after-free in unix_stream_read_generic(). The following sequences reproduce the issue: $ python3 from socket import * s1, s2 = socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM) s1.send(b'x', MSG_OOB) s2.recv(1, MSG_OOB) # leave a consumed OOB skb s1.send(b'y', MSG_OOB) s2.recv(1, MSG_OOB) # leave a consumed OOB skb s1.send(b'z', MSG_OOB) s2.recv(1) # recv 'z' illegally s2.recv(1, MSG_OOB) # access 'z' skb (use-after-free) Even though a user reads OOB data, the skb holding the data stays on the recv queue to mark the OOB boundary and break the next recv(). After the last send() in the scenario above, the sk2's recv queue has 2 leading consumed OOB skbs and 1 real OOB skb. Then, the following happens during the next recv() without MSG_OOB 1. unix_stream_read_generic() peeks the first consumed OOB skb 2. manage_oob() returns the next consumed OOB skb 3. unix_stream_read_generic() fetches the next not-yet-consumed OOB skb 4. unix_stream_read_generic() reads and frees the OOB skb , and the last recv(MSG_OOB) triggers KASAN splat. The 3. above occurs because of the SO_PEEK_OFF code, which does not expect unix_skb_len(skb) to be 0, but this is true for such consumed OOB skbs. while (skip >= unix_skb_len(skb)) { skip -= unix_skb_len(skb); skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue); ... } In addition to this use-after-free, there is another issue that ioctl(SIOCATMARK) does not function properly with consecutive consumed OOB skbs. So, nothing good comes out of such a situation. Instead of complicating manage_oob(), ioctl() handling, and the next ECONNRESET fix by introducing a loop for consecutive consumed OOB skbs, let's not leave such consecutive OOB unnecessarily. Now, while receiving an OOB skb in unix_stream_recv_urg(), if its previous skb is a consumed OOB skb, it is freed. [0]: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in unix_stream_read_actor (net/unix/af_unix.c:3027) Read of size 4 at addr ffff888106ef2904 by task python3/315 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 315 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc1-00407-gec315832f6f9 #8 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-4.fc42 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:122) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:409 mm/kasan/report.c:521) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:636) unix_stream_read_actor (net/unix/af_unix.c:3027) unix_stream_read_generic (net/unix/af_unix.c:2708 net/unix/af_unix.c:2847) unix_stream_recvmsg (net/unix/af_unix.c:3048) sock_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1063 (discriminator 20) net/socket.c:1085 (discriminator 20)) __sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2278) __x64_sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2291 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2287 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2287 (discriminator 1)) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 (discriminator 1)) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) RIP: 0033:0x7f8911fcea06 Code: 5d e8 41 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 75 19 83 e2 39 83 fa 08 75 11 e8 26 ff ff ff 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 45 10 0f 05 <48> 8b 5d f8 c9 c3 0f 1f 40 00 f3 0f 1e fa 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 08 RSP: 002b:00007fffdb0dccb0 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fffdb0dcdc8 RCX: 00007f8911fcea06 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007f8911a5e060 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 00007fffdb0dccd0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007f89119a7d20 R13: ffffffffc4653600 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Allocated by task 315: kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48) kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:60 (discriminator 1) mm/kasan/common.c:69 (discriminator 1)) __kasan_slab_alloc (mm/kasan/common.c:348) kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof (./include/linux/kasan.h:250 mm/slub.c:4148 mm/slub.c:4197 mm/slub.c:4249) __alloc_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:660 (discriminator 4)) alloc_skb_with_frags (./include/linux/skbuff.h:1336 net/core/skbuff.c:6668) sock_alloc_send_pskb (net/core/sock.c:2993) unix_stream_sendmsg (./include/net/sock.h:1847 net/unix/af_unix.c:2256 net/unix/af_unix.c:2418) __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:712 (discriminator 20) net/socket.c:727 (discriminator 20) net/socket.c:2226 (discriminator 20)) __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2233 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2229 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2229 (discriminator 1)) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 (discriminator 1)) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) Freed by task 315: kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48) kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:60 (discriminator 1) mm/kasan/common.c:69 (discriminator 1)) kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:579 (discriminator 1)) __kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:271) kmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:4643 (discriminator 3) mm/slub.c:4745 (discriminator 3)) unix_stream_read_generic (net/unix/af_unix.c:3010) unix_stream_recvmsg (net/unix/af_unix.c:3048) sock_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1063 (discriminator 20) net/socket.c:1085 (discriminator 20)) __sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2278) __x64_sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2291 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2287 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2287 (discriminator 1)) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 (discriminator 1)) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888106ef28c0 which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 224 The buggy address is located 68 bytes inside of freed 224-byte region [ffff888106ef28c0, ffff888106ef29a0) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888106ef3cc0 pfn:0x106ef2 head: order:1 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 flags: 0x200000000000040(head|node=0|zone=2) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 0200000000000040 ffff8881001d28c0 ffffea000422fe00 0000000000000004 raw: ffff888106ef3cc0 0000000080190010 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 head: 0200000000000040 ffff8881001d28c0 ffffea000422fe00 0000000000000004 head: ffff888106ef3cc0 0000000080190010 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 head: 0200000000000001 ffffea00041bbc81 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff head: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888106ef2800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc ffff888106ef2880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff888106ef2900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888106ef2980: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff888106ef2a00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb Fixes: 314001f ("af_unix: Add OOB support") Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2d72afb ] A crash in conntrack was reported while trying to unlink the conntrack entry from the hash bucket list: [exception RIP: __nf_ct_delete_from_lists+172] [..] #7 [ff539b5a2b043aa0] nf_ct_delete at ffffffffc124d421 [nf_conntrack] #8 [ff539b5a2b043ad0] nf_ct_gc_expired at ffffffffc124d999 [nf_conntrack] #9 [ff539b5a2b043ae0] __nf_conntrack_find_get at ffffffffc124efbc [nf_conntrack] [..] The nf_conn struct is marked as allocated from slab but appears to be in a partially initialised state: ct hlist pointer is garbage; looks like the ct hash value (hence crash). ct->status is equal to IPS_CONFIRMED|IPS_DYING, which is expected ct->timeout is 30000 (=30s), which is unexpected. Everything else looks like normal udp conntrack entry. If we ignore ct->status and pretend its 0, the entry matches those that are newly allocated but not yet inserted into the hash: - ct hlist pointers are overloaded and store/cache the raw tuple hash - ct->timeout matches the relative time expected for a new udp flow rather than the absolute 'jiffies' value. If it were not for the presence of IPS_CONFIRMED, __nf_conntrack_find_get() would have skipped the entry. Theory is that we did hit following race: cpu x cpu y cpu z found entry E found entry E E is expired <preemption> nf_ct_delete() return E to rcu slab init_conntrack E is re-inited, ct->status set to 0 reply tuplehash hnnode.pprev stores hash value. cpu y found E right before it was deleted on cpu x. E is now re-inited on cpu z. cpu y was preempted before checking for expiry and/or confirm bit. ->refcnt set to 1 E now owned by skb ->timeout set to 30000 If cpu y were to resume now, it would observe E as expired but would skip E due to missing CONFIRMED bit. nf_conntrack_confirm gets called sets: ct->status |= CONFIRMED This is wrong: E is not yet added to hashtable. cpu y resumes, it observes E as expired but CONFIRMED: <resumes> nf_ct_expired() -> yes (ct->timeout is 30s) confirmed bit set. cpu y will try to delete E from the hashtable: nf_ct_delete() -> set DYING bit __nf_ct_delete_from_lists Even this scenario doesn't guarantee a crash: cpu z still holds the table bucket lock(s) so y blocks: wait for spinlock held by z CONFIRMED is set but there is no guarantee ct will be added to hash: "chaintoolong" or "clash resolution" logic both skip the insert step. reply hnnode.pprev still stores the hash value. unlocks spinlock return NF_DROP <unblocks, then crashes on hlist_nulls_del_rcu pprev> In case CPU z does insert the entry into the hashtable, cpu y will unlink E again right away but no crash occurs. Without 'cpu y' race, 'garbage' hlist is of no consequence: ct refcnt remains at 1, eventually skb will be free'd and E gets destroyed via: nf_conntrack_put -> nf_conntrack_destroy -> nf_ct_destroy. To resolve this, move the IPS_CONFIRMED assignment after the table insertion but before the unlock. Pablo points out that the confirm-bit-store could be reordered to happen before hlist add resp. the timeout fixup, so switch to set_bit and before_atomic memory barrier to prevent this. It doesn't matter if other CPUs can observe a newly inserted entry right before the CONFIRMED bit was set: Such event cannot be distinguished from above "E is the old incarnation" case: the entry will be skipped. Also change nf_ct_should_gc() to first check the confirmed bit. The gc sequence is: 1. Check if entry has expired, if not skip to next entry 2. Obtain a reference to the expired entry. 3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1. nf_ct_should_gc() is thus called only for entries that already failed an expiry check. After this patch, once the confirmed bit check passes ct->timeout has been altered to reflect the absolute 'best before' date instead of a relative time. Step 3 will therefore not remove the entry. Without this change to nf_ct_should_gc() we could still get this sequence: 1. Check if entry has expired. 2. Obtain a reference. 3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1: 4 - entry is still observed as expired 5 - meanwhile, ct->timeout is corrected to absolute value on other CPU and confirm bit gets set 6 - confirm bit is seen 7 - valid entry is removed again First do check 6), then 4) so the gc expiry check always picks up either confirmed bit unset (entry gets skipped) or expiry re-check failure for re-inited conntrack objects. This change cannot be backported to releases before 5.19. Without commit 8a75a2c ("netfilter: conntrack: remove unconfirmed list") |= IPS_CONFIRMED line cannot be moved without further changes. Cc: Razvan Cojocaru <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/[email protected]/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/[email protected]/ Fixes: 1397af5 ("netfilter: conntrack: remove the percpu dying list") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>