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fix(compiler): strip namespaced SVG script elements during template compilation #68689

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Merged
leonsenft merged 2 commits into from
May 19, 2026
Merged

fix(compiler): strip namespaced SVG script elements during template compilation #68689

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b564883
fix(compiler): strip namespaced SVG script elements during template c…
alan-agius4 May 12, 2026
953a053
fixup! fix(compiler): strip namespaced SVG script elements during tem…
alan-agius4 May 19, 2026
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28 changes: 0 additions & 28 deletions packages/compiler-cli/test/ngtsc/ngtsc_spec.ts
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -8648,34 +8648,6 @@ runInEachFileSystem((os: string) => {
expect(trim(jsContents)).toContain(trim(hostBindingsFn));
});

it('should generate sanitizers for URL properties in SVG script fn in Component', () => {
env.write(
'test.ts',
`
import {Component} from '@angular/core';

@Component({
selector: 'test-cmp',
template: \`
<svg>
<script [attr.xlink:href]="attr" [attr.href]="attr"></script>
</svg>
\`,
})
export class TestCmp {
attr = './script.js';
}
`,
);

env.driveMain();

const jsContents = env.getContents('test.js');
expect(jsContents).toContain(
'i0.ɵɵattribute("href", ctx.attr, i0.ɵɵsanitizeResourceUrl, "xlink")("href", ctx.attr, i0.ɵɵsanitizeResourceUrl);',
);
});

it('should not generate sanitizers for URL properties in hostBindings fn in Component', () => {
env.write(
`test.ts`,
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6 changes: 0 additions & 6 deletions packages/compiler/src/schema/dom_security_schema.ts
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -92,12 +92,6 @@ export function SECURITY_SCHEMA(): {[k: string]: SecurityContext} {
['object', ['codebase', 'data']],
]);

// The below are for Script SVG
// See: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/SVGScriptElement/href
registerContext(SecurityContext.RESOURCE_URL, SVG_NAMESPACE, [
['script', ['src', 'href', 'xlink:href']],
]);

// Keep this in sync with SECURITY_SENSITIVE_ELEMENTS in packages/core/src/sanitization/sanitization.ts
// The `unknown` elements refer to cases when we need to validate the input/binding in a directive (host bindings)
// and the directive can be applied to multiple different elements (with different tag names). In this case we generate
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25 changes: 11 additions & 14 deletions packages/compiler/src/template_parser/template_preparser.ts
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ const LINK_ELEMENT = 'link';
const LINK_STYLE_REL_ATTR = 'rel';
const LINK_STYLE_HREF_ATTR = 'href';
const LINK_STYLE_REL_VALUE = 'stylesheet';
const STYLE_ELEMENT = 'style';
const SCRIPT_ELEMENT = 'script';
const STYLE_ELEMENTS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([':svg:style', 'style']);
const SCRIPT_ELEMENTS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([':svg:script', 'script']);
const NG_NON_BINDABLE_ATTR = 'ngNonBindable';
const NG_PROJECT_AS = 'ngProjectAs';

Expand All @@ -25,7 +25,8 @@ export function preparseElement(ast: html.Element): PreparsedElement {
let relAttr: string | null = null;
let nonBindable = false;
let projectAs = '';
ast.attrs.forEach((attr) => {

for (const attr of ast.attrs) {
const lcAttrName = attr.name.toLowerCase();
if (lcAttrName == NG_CONTENT_SELECT_ATTR) {
selectAttr = attr.value;
Expand All @@ -40,15 +41,18 @@ export function preparseElement(ast: html.Element): PreparsedElement {
projectAs = attr.value;
}
}
});
selectAttr = normalizeNgContentSelect(selectAttr);
}

// Normalize selector to '*' if empty
selectAttr ||= '*';

const nodeName = ast.name.toLowerCase();
let type = PreparsedElementType.OTHER;
if (isNgContent(nodeName)) {
type = PreparsedElementType.NG_CONTENT;
} else if (nodeName == STYLE_ELEMENT) {
} else if (STYLE_ELEMENTS.has(nodeName)) {
type = PreparsedElementType.STYLE;
} else if (nodeName == SCRIPT_ELEMENT) {
} else if (SCRIPT_ELEMENTS.has(nodeName)) {
type = PreparsedElementType.SCRIPT;
} else if (nodeName == LINK_ELEMENT && relAttr == LINK_STYLE_REL_VALUE) {
type = PreparsedElementType.STYLESHEET;
Expand All @@ -73,10 +77,3 @@ export class PreparsedElement {
public projectAs: string,
) {}
}

function normalizeNgContentSelect(selectAttr: string | null): string {
if (selectAttr === null || selectAttr.length === 0) {
return '*';
}
return selectAttr;
}
3 changes: 1 addition & 2 deletions packages/core/src/sanitization/sanitization.ts
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Expand Up @@ -219,8 +219,7 @@ const RESOURCE_MAP: Record<string, Record<string, true | undefined> | undefined>
'frame': {'src': true},
'iframe': {'src': true},
'media': {'src': true},
'script': {'src': true, 'href': true, 'xlink:href': true},
':svg:script': {'src': true, 'href': true, 'xlink:href': true},

'base': {'href': true},
'link': {'href': true},
'object': {'data': true, 'codebase': true},
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14 changes: 14 additions & 0 deletions packages/core/test/acceptance/security_spec.ts
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -902,3 +902,17 @@ describe('Component host element validation', () => {
}
});
});

describe('SVG <script> bindings', () => {
it(`should remove svg <script> element`, () => {
@Component({
template: `<svg><script src="https://bad.com/script.js"></script></svg>`,
changeDetection: ChangeDetectionStrategy.Eager,
})
class TestCmp {}

const fixture = TestBed.createComponent(TestCmp);
fixture.detectChanges();
expect(fixture.nativeElement.querySelector('script')).toBeFalsy();
});
});
8 changes: 4 additions & 4 deletions packages/core/test/sanitization/sanitization_spec.ts
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Expand Up @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ describe('sanitization', () => {
[SecurityContext.RESOURCE_URL, ɵɵsanitizeResourceUrl],
]);
Object.entries(schema).forEach(([key, context]) => {
if (context === SecurityContext.URL || SecurityContext.RESOURCE_URL) {
if (context === SecurityContext.URL || context === SecurityContext.RESOURCE_URL) {

@alxhub alxhub May 12, 2026

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😱

const [tag, prop] = key.split('|');
const contexts = contextsByProp.get(prop) || new Set<number>();
contexts.add(context);
Expand All @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ describe('sanitization', () => {
expect(getUrlSanitizer('IFRAME', 'SRC')).toEqual(ɵɵsanitizeResourceUrl);
expect(getUrlSanitizer('IFRAME', 'src')).toEqual(ɵɵsanitizeResourceUrl);
expect(getUrlSanitizer('iframe', 'SRC')).toEqual(ɵɵsanitizeResourceUrl);
expect(getUrlSanitizer('ScRiPt', 'xLiNk:HrEf')).toEqual(ɵɵsanitizeResourceUrl);
expect(getUrlSanitizer('ScRiPt', 'xLiNk:HrEf')).toEqual(ɵɵsanitizeUrl);
expect(getUrlSanitizer('A', 'HREF')).toEqual(ɵɵsanitizeUrl);
});

Expand All @@ -150,8 +150,8 @@ describe('sanitization', () => {

expect(() => ɵɵsanitizeUrlOrResourceUrl('http://server', 'iframe', 'SRC')).toThrowError(ERROR);

expect(() => ɵɵsanitizeUrlOrResourceUrl('http://server', 'ScRiPt', 'xLiNk:HrEf')).toThrowError(
ERROR,
expect(ɵɵsanitizeUrlOrResourceUrl('javascript:true', 'ScRiPt', 'xLiNk:HrEf')).toEqual(
'unsafe:javascript:true',
);

expect(ɵɵsanitizeUrlOrResourceUrl('javascript:true', 'A', 'HREF')).toEqual(
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