coder · aslilac · Jul 23, 2026 · Jul 15, 2026 · Jul 15, 2026 · Jul 21, 2026
diff --git a/coderd/externalauth.go b/coderd/externalauth.go
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"net/http"
-	"net/url"
 
 	"github.com/sqlc-dev/pqtype"
 	"golang.org/x/sync/errgroup"
@@ -331,7 +330,7 @@ func (api *API) externalAuthCallback(externalAuthConfig *externalauth.Config) ht
 			// FE know not to enter the authentication loop again, and instead display an error.
 			redirect = fmt.Sprintf("/external-auth/%s?redirected=true", externalAuthConfig.ID)
 		}
-		redirect = uriFromURL(redirect)
+		redirect = httpapi.SafeRedirectPath(redirect)
 		http.Redirect(rw, r, redirect, http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
 	}
 }
@@ -429,12 +428,3 @@ func ExternalAuthConfig(cfg *externalauth.Config) codersdk.ExternalAuthLinkProvi
 		CodeChallengeMethodsSupported: slice.ToStrings(cfg.CodeChallengeMethodsSupported),
 	}
 }
-
-func uriFromURL(u string) string {
-	uri, err := url.Parse(u)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "/"
-	}
-
-	return uri.RequestURI()
-}
diff --git a/coderd/httpapi/redirect.go b/coderd/httpapi/redirect.go
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+package httpapi
+
+import (
+	"net/url"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// SafeRedirectPath reduces a redirect URL down to a safe, relative path. The
+// scheme and host are dropped to prevent redirecting to another origin. Opaque
+// URLs (e.g. `javascript:`, `data:`) are rejected outright and default to /.
+func SafeRedirectPath(u string) string {
+	uri, err := url.Parse(u)
+	if err != nil || uri.Opaque != "" {
+		return "/"
+	}
+
+	// A path with 2 or more leading slashes (e.g. "//evil.com") is interpreted as
+	// protocol-relative, so make sure there is exactly one.
+	path := "/" + strings.TrimLeft(uri.EscapedPath(), "/")
+	if uri.RawQuery != "" {
+		path += "?" + uri.RawQuery
+	}
+	// We're specifically checking Fragment instead of RawFragment here because
+	// RawFragment is only populated when the parser needs to preserve a
+	// non-default escaping, so it is empty for plain-alphanumeric fragments like
+	// "#wooble". EscapedFragment handles escaping correctly in either case.
+	if uri.Fragment != "" {
+		path += "#" + uri.EscapedFragment()
+	}
+	return path
+}
diff --git a/coderd/httpapi/redirect_test.go b/coderd/httpapi/redirect_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+package httpapi_test
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/httpapi"
+)
+
+func TestSafeRedirectPath(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name string
+		in   string
+		want string
+	}{
+		{"empty", "", "/"},
+		{"simple path", "/foo/bar", "/foo/bar"},
+		{"path with query", "/foo/bar?baz=qux", "/foo/bar?baz=qux"},
+		{"path with fragment", "/foo/bar#wooble", "/foo/bar#wooble"},
+		{"path with query+fragment", "/foo/bar?wibble=wobble#wooble", "/foo/bar?wibble=wobble#wooble"},
+		{"no leading slash", "foo/bar", "/foo/bar"},
+		{"malformed", "http://[::1]:namedport", "/"},
+		// Ensure backslashes aren't a blindspot.
+		{"backslash after slash", `/\evil.example.com`, "/%5Cevil.example.com"},
+		{"leading double backslash", `\\evil.example.com`, "/%5C%5Cevil.example.com"},
+		{"backslash then slash", `\/evil.example.com`, "/%5C/evil.example.com"},
+		{"mixed slash backslash", `/\/evil.example.com`, "/%5C/evil.example.com"},
+		{"scheme with backslash", `https:/\evil.example.com`, "/%5Cevil.example.com"},
+		// Cure53 CDM-02-009: triple-slash open redirect.
+		{"protocol relative triple slash", "///evil.example.com", "/evil.example.com"},
+		{"protocol relative double slash", "//evil.example.com", "/"},
+		{"absolute url with host", "http://evil.example.com/path", "/path"},
+		{"absolute url with host and query", "https://evil.example.com/path?a=b", "/path?a=b"},
+		// Cure53 CDM-02-009: javascript: scheme bypassing CSP.
+		{"javascript scheme", "javascript:alert(origin)", "/"},
+		{"nested javascript scheme", "javascript:javascript:javascript:alert(origin)", "/"},
+		{"data scheme", "data:text/html,<script>alert(origin)</script>", "/"},
+	}
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+			if got := httpapi.SafeRedirectPath(tt.in); got != tt.want {
+				t.Errorf("SafeRedirectPath(%q) = %q, want %q", tt.in, got, tt.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
diff --git a/coderd/httpmw/oauth2.go b/coderd/httpmw/oauth2.go
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ func ExtractOAuth2(config promoauth.OAuth2Config, client *http.Client, cookieCfg
 				// the host of the AccessURL but ultimately as long as our redirect
 				// url omits a host we're ensuring that we're routing to a path
 				// local to the application.
-				redirect = uriFromURL(redirect)
+				redirect = httpapi.SafeRedirectPath(redirect)
 			}
 
 			// When dynamic redirect URIs are enabled, validate the request Host
@@ -532,15 +532,6 @@ func ExtractOAuth2ProviderAppSecret(db database.Store) func(http.Handler) http.H
 	}
 }
 
-func uriFromURL(u string) string {
-	uri, err := url.Parse(u)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "/"
-	}
-
-	return uri.RequestURI()
-}
-
 // buildDynamicRedirectURI constructs the OIDC redirect_uri from the incoming
 // request, used when CODER_OIDC_REDIRECT_ALLOWED_HOSTS is configured.
 //

diff --git a/coderd/userauth.go b/coderd/userauth.go
@@ -1140,7 +1140,7 @@ func (api *API) userOAuth2Github(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		http.SetCookie(rw, cookie)
 	}
 
-	redirect = uriFromURL(redirect)
+	redirect = httpapi.SafeRedirectPath(redirect)
 	if api.GithubOAuth2Config.DeviceFlowEnabled {
 		// In the device flow, the redirect is handled client-side.
 		httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusOK, codersdk.OAuth2DeviceFlowCallbackResponse{
@@ -1574,7 +1574,7 @@ func (api *API) userOIDC(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	redirect := state.Redirect
 	// Strip the host if it exists on the URL to prevent
 	// any nefarious redirects.
-	redirect = uriFromURL(redirect)
+	redirect = httpapi.SafeRedirectPath(redirect)
 	http.Redirect(rw, r, redirect, http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
 }