fix(py-isolation-adversarial-policy): suppress S307 on encoded-injection payload#2182
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imran-siddique merged 1 commit intoMay 12, 2026
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…ion payload
`BUILTIN_VECTORS` in `chaos/adversarial_policy.py` contains an attack
vector whose ``payload["command"]`` is the literal string
``"eval(base64decode('aW1wb3J0IG9z'))"`` — test data used to assert
that the policy engine blocks injection attempts. The string is never
evaluated.
Static scanners (bandit, ruff S307) flag the substring ``eval(`` even
inside a string literal that's only used as fixture data, producing a
noisy false positive every time the file is scanned.
Add ``# noqa: S307`` with a comment naming why the suppression is
correct: the token is test data, not invoked code. Suppression is
intentionally narrow — only the one line that carries the ``eval(``
token, not the whole module.
Pure annotation change — no behaviour delta, no new tests needed (the
existing 37 adversarial-chaos tests cover the vector being a
valid fixture entry).
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PR Review Summary
Verdict: ✅ Ready for human review |
MohammadHaroonAbuomar
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Jun 1, 2026
…ion payload (microsoft#2182) `BUILTIN_VECTORS` in `chaos/adversarial_policy.py` contains an attack vector whose ``payload["command"]`` is the literal string ``"eval(base64decode('aW1wb3J0IG9z'))"`` — test data used to assert that the policy engine blocks injection attempts. The string is never evaluated. Static scanners (bandit, ruff S307) flag the substring ``eval(`` even inside a string literal that's only used as fixture data, producing a noisy false positive every time the file is scanned. Add ``# noqa: S307`` with a comment naming why the suppression is correct: the token is test data, not invoked code. Suppression is intentionally narrow — only the one line that carries the ``eval(`` token, not the whole module. Pure annotation change — no behaviour delta, no new tests needed (the existing 37 adversarial-chaos tests cover the vector being a valid fixture entry).
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Summary
adversarial_policy.py'sBUILTIN_VECTORScontains an attack vector whosepayload["command"]is the literal string"eval(base64decode('aW1wb3J0IG9z'))"— test data used to assert that the policy engine blocks injection attempts. The string is never evaluated.Static scanners (
banditrule B307,ruffrule S307) flag the substringeval(even inside a string literal that's only used as fixture data, producing a noisy false positive every time the file is scanned.Change
Add
# noqa: S307with a comment naming why the suppression is correct: the token is test data, not invoked code. Suppression is intentionally narrow — only the one line that carries theeval(token, not the whole module — so a realeval(call anywhere else in the file would still flag.Tests
Pure annotation change — no behaviour delta, no new tests needed.
The existing 37 adversarial-chaos tests cover the vector being a valid fixture entry; they still pass with the noqa annotation in place.
Test plan
test_adversarial_chaos.pybandit/ruffS307 no longer flagsadversarial_policy.py:113Surfaced during independent audit conducted by @finnoybu (Ken Tannenbaum, AEGIS Initiative); [LOW, Python Isolation].