Added shellcheck disable directive for intentional immediate
variable expansion in trap statement. The trap correctly captures
the temp file path at trap setup time, which is the desired
behavior for cleanup handlers.

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Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

Complete Phase 5 security remediation addressing file permissions
and Docker container hardening based on comprehensive analysis.

Changes:
- M-2: Restrict shell script permissions from 755 to 750
  * Apply owner+group only execute permissions to /docker/scripts
  * Apply owner+group only execute permissions to /docker/cli
  * Follows principle of least privilege (CIS Benchmark)

- M-8: Implement Docker security hardening with minimal capabilities
  * Drop ALL capabilities, add only required 5: CHOWN, DAC_OVERRIDE,
    FOWNER, SETUID, SETGID
  * Add no-new-privileges:true to prevent privilege escalation
  * Configure secure tmpfs with noexec,nosuid,nodev flags
  * Based on analysis of all 74 extensions and core system operations
  * Determined NET_BIND_SERVICE not needed (SSH on port 2222)
  * Determined SYS_ADMIN not needed (runtime handles mounts)

Documentation:
- Update security audit report with Phase 5 completion
- Mark 20 of 29 findings remediated (69% complete)
- Update Compliance Gaps section (SOC 2, CIS Docker Benchmark)
- Update Conclusion with severity breakdown and updated estimates

Analysis methodology:
- Spawned 5 parallel agents to analyze all 74 extensions
- Examined core system operations (entrypoint, executor, installers)
- 19 extensions (26%) require elevated capabilities (apt/dpkg)
- 55 extensions (74%) are user-space only (mise/npm/pip)

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

Revert M-2 shell script permission changes from 750 back to 755
due to CI/CD test failures. Document decision as accepted risk
with comprehensive justification in security audit report.

Root Cause:
- 750 permissions (rwxr-x---) restricted execution to owner+group
- Scripts owned by root:root (Docker build runs as root)
- Container runs as developer user (uid 1001, not in root group)
- Developer user cannot execute scripts with 750 permissions
- Test failures: Permission denied errors in GitHub Actions
  https://github.com/pacphi/sindri/actions/runs/20302566607

Test Failures Observed:
  bash: /docker/scripts/sindri-test.sh: Permission denied
  bash: /docker/cli/extension-manager: Permission denied

Decision Rationale:
- 755 still secure: scripts are root-owned (write-protected)
- Primary security concern is preventing modification (achieved)
- Functional requirement: scripts must be executable by developer
- Defense-in-depth: parent directories prevent unauthorized writes
- Low priority finding per security audit
- Alternative (group ownership changes) adds complexity for
  minimal security gain

Security Posture:
- Scripts remain at 755 (rwxr-xr-x)
- Only root can modify scripts (not world-writable)
- Scripts execute with user's privileges (not elevated)
- Immutable infrastructure: scripts baked into read-only image layer
- Risk level: Very Low

Documentation:
- Updated M-2 status to "ACCEPTED RISK" in security audit
- Added test failure details with GitHub Actions link
- Created "Accepted Risks" section in report
- Updated remediation status: 19 fixed + 1 accepted risk
- Updated compliance gaps for CIS Docker Benchmark

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

The sudoers file contained invalid syntax at line 82:
  developer ALL=(ALL) !NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/systemctl mask *,
The !NOPASSWD construct does not exist in sudoers syntax. The correct
approach is to only allow what's needed with NOPASSWD (lines 78-79),
and require password for everything else (line 87).

The dangerous operations (systemctl mask, reboot, shutdown, etc.) are
already implicitly blocked because they're not in the NOPASSWD list.

Fixes container startup failure with /etc/sudoers.d/developer:82:22 syntax error.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

The security hardening changed from usermod -p '*' to usermod -L to lock
the developer account (M-1 fix). However, usermod -L can prevent SSH key
authentication if UsePAM is not enabled in sshd_config.

Without UsePAM yes, SSH interprets locked accounts as 'not allowed to log in'
and rejects all authentication attempts, including public keys. With UsePAM yes,
locked accounts are interpreted as 'no password set', allowing SSH key auth.

This fixes the 'Permission denied (publickey)' error when connecting via SSH.

References:
- https://arlimus.github.io/articles/usepam/
- https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/linux-locking-an-account/

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

With UsePAM yes enabled, SSH now allows keyboard-interactive authentication
which prompts for passwords. Since accounts are locked (usermod -L) and we
only want public key authentication, disable keyboard-interactive auth.

This ensures SSH only accepts public keys, not password prompts.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

usermod -L incompatible with SSH key auth when UsePAM enabled.
Reverted to original usermod -p '*' approach. Updated audit report.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

Previous commit f2e4877 claimed to revert M-1 but only removed UsePAM from
sshd_config while leaving usermod -L in entrypoint.sh. This incomplete fix
caused SSH connection failures ("kex_exchange_identification: read:
Connection reset by peer") because:

1. Ubuntu defaults to UsePAM yes when directive is missing
2. usermod -L locks accounts which PAM blocks even for SSH key auth
3. PAM's pam_unix.so rejects locked accounts during account validation

This commit completes the revert:
- Changes entrypoint.sh from usermod -L to usermod -p '*' (line 195)
- Adds explicit UsePAM no to sshd_config (line 17)

Security posture maintained:
- Password auth still impossible (usermod -p '*' cannot be matched)
- SSH key auth remains the only allowed authentication method
- PasswordAuthentication no, KbdInteractiveAuthentication no enforced
- All H-1 crypto hardening and rate limiting preserved

Reference: Security Audit Report M-1 (Accepted Risk)
Root cause: https://arlimus.github.io/articles/usepam/

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Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

Add comprehensive documentation for remaining security findings:

- SECURITY_AUDIT_ADDENDUM.md: Detailed implementation plan for 3
  critical and 2 high-severity findings with industry best practices,
  code examples, and phased approach (10-18 hours estimated)

- FLY_IO_SECRETS_COMPATIBILITY.md: Analysis proving C-7 GitHub token
  remediation options are fully compatible with Fly.io secrets
  injection mechanism, including verification testing plan

- Minor formatting fix in SECURITY_AUDIT_REPORT.md (table alignment)

Key additions:
- 6 parallel research agents analyzed OWASP, CIS, NIST, SLSA standards
- Extension impact analysis (68 of 73 affected by DNS requirements)
- Three decision points identified for C-3, C-7, H-7 remediations
- Phase 1 ready for implementation (H-10, C-8 - no decisions needed)

Related: Security Audit Report remediation tracking

🤖 Generated with Claude Code (https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

…opic-dev profile

…ovements

…ocal installs

Add centralized get_github_release_version() function to common.sh that
uses gh CLI as primary method with curl fallback for reliability. Refactor
extension install scripts to use this standardized pattern.

Security improvements (C-5 compliance):
- Install AWS CLI, Alibaba CLI, doctl, and Ollama to ~/.local/bin
- Avoid sudo for installations that don't require system-level access
- Update sudoers with APT_ENV alias for env-wrapped apt commands
- Use full paths in executor.sh to match sudoers patterns

Ollama improvements:
- Add GPU detection with helpful CPU-only guidance
- Direct binary download instead of piping curl to sh

Cleanup:
- Remove obsolete Fly.io analysis planning document

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <[email protected]>

Reverted restricted sudo configuration (60 operations) to standard
NOPASSWD: ALL for development containers due to functional failures.

Root cause: executor.sh uses 'sudo env DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
apt-get' which doesn't match sudoers patterns even with full paths.
Attempted APT_ENV alias still resulted in password prompts for 6
extensions (docker, tmux-workspace, infra-tools, cloud-tools, ollama,
supabase-cli).

Accepted risk justification:
- Industry standard for dev containers (Docker/Fly.io best practices)
- User already has root-equivalent access (Docker socket, SSH, filesystem)
- Other critical controls remain (C-1, C-2, C-4, C-6 injection fixes)
- Development environment context (not production)

Security audit updates:
- C-5 moved from "FIXED" to "ACCEPTED RISK"
- Remediation count: 19 → 18 fixed, 2 → 3 accepted risks
- Risk level: MEDIUM-LOW → MEDIUM
- Updated Conclusions, Summary of Recommendations, Compliance Gaps

Files changed:
- docker/config/developer-sudoers: 93 → 18 lines (simplified)
- docs/planning/SECURITY_AUDIT_REPORT.md: Updated C-5 status and analysis

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

Fixed 404 error by using the correct download URL format. Ollama
provides a tarball (.tgz) not a direct binary.

Changes:
- URL: ollama-linux-amd64 → ollama-linux-amd64.tgz
- Extract bin/ollama from tarball and install to ~/.local/bin
- No sudo required (user-local install)

This fixes the last remaining extension failure in anthropic-dev profile
on Fly.io deployments.

Source: https://docs.ollama.com/linux

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

Corrected anchor fragment for C-5 finding in the Accepted Risks table to
match the actual heading format (three hyphens instead of two). This fixes
the MD051 markdownlint error for invalid link fragments.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>