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  • Sepia@mander.xyzOPtoEurope@feddit.orgGermany: Leftwing militants claim responsibility for arson attack on Berlin power grid
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    15 小时前

    From a left-wing perspective, it does not make sense to create blackouts in residential districts (unless they were very well off …

    Creating blackouts or any other form of violence never ‘makes sense’ in residential districts.

    And what does ‘left-wing’ and ‘right-wing’ even mean, at least in the extreme forms? What difference does it make when violence rules? Violence, imho, doesn’t make sense. It may take some time until we eventually know for sure who is responsible, maybe indeed some weirdos hired by malign foreign states.

    But as you mention the ‘left-wing perspective:’ Here on Lemmy is a larger group that calls itself left-wing, but in their communities they literally hail aggression and cheering violence against people, including violence against Ukraine by Russian invaders. Just read their comms.

    As we know from other posts, there has been a study last year about this.

    This study investigates the presence of left-wing extremism on the Lemmygrad. ml instance of the decentralized social media platform Lemmy, from its launch in 2019 up to a month after the bans of the subreddits r/GenZedong and r/GenZhou … Their [Lemmygrad users’] support can extend beyond backing these authoritarian regimes [particularly Russia, China, and North Korea], even cheering on their violent actions, as evidenced by their posts on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Additionally, we observe anti-Zionist and antisemitic behaviors, which show similarities to right-wing extremism … Our analysis suggests a concerning endorsement of authoritarian actions and extremist rhetoric on Lemmygrad. ml, further indicating that left-wing extremist communities on decentralized platforms should receive more attention from the academic community.

    [Edit typo.]












  • Spain PM Pedro Sánchez and the Ruling PSOE Face Mounting Legal Challenges in 2026

    The most significant legal proceedings target [Spanish Prime Minister and leader of the Socialist Party PSOE] Pedro Sánchez’s immediate family and close political allies, marking a critical moment for Spain’s centre-left government. The investigations span a range of alleged misconduct, from potential corruption to influence peddling, and could have far-reaching consequences for the ruling coalition.

    One of the most high-profile cases involves José Luis Ábalos, former Transport Minister and key PSOE organiser, who faces potential imprisonment of up to 24 years. Prosecutors allege he engaged in criminal organisation, accepting bribes, misappropriating public funds, and exploiting insider information during the COVID-19 pandemic’s emergency procurement processes.

    Particularly sensitive is the investigation into Begoña Gómez, the Prime Minister’s wife, who is being scrutinised for potential professional misconduct related to her business activities. Simultaneously, David Sánchez, the Prime Minister’s brother, will stand trial on May 28th for alleged influence trafficking and improper conduct in the Badajoz Provincial Administration.

    The legal challenges represent an unprecedented threat to the PSOE’s political reputation. Unlike previous corruption scandals that primarily implicated lower-level party members, these investigations reach directly into the Prime Minister’s inner circle, potentially undermining public trust in the government …


















  • GDP growth for 2025 is expected to slow to around 1% or lower. The GDP in Q3/2025 was 0.6% (according to Russia’s own official stats).

    But the real problems can’t be seen by the GDP number. Practically all of this ‘growth’ comes form the industrial-military complex at the expense of civilian industries. For example, Russian soldiers’ families have received the equivalent of $2,000 to $20,000, sometimes more, depending on the region where they live. In the first three year of the war, the Kremlin spent spent 38 billion USD on these payments - the equivalent of 1.5% of Russia’s GDP.

    The central bank recently made a small reduction of the key interest rate to 16%, which strongly indicates that inflation is much higher than the official 6%, hurting businesses but, more importantly, Russian people, and the VAT increase will make the situation likely worse in 2026.

    Russian entrepreneurs’ business confidence is fading, and so is consumer confidence (again, according to panels from within Russia). The high interest rates make debt prohibitively high for most civilian businesses as companies in the military sector are main beneficiaries with access state-subsidized loans, which in turn fuels inflation.

    Most economists haven’t been predicting a collapse of Russia’s economy, but rather a slow long-term decline. This decline, however, will most likely occur even if the war would end today, they say.

    [Edit typo.]


  • I posted this in another thread, but when reading the comments it may fit also here.

    Ivashov is for sure pro-Russian in principle, and certainly not what we would call pro-Western or a friend of democracy. He and his fellow generals warned, however, of a war against Ukraine already early 2022.

    On 1 February 2022, roughly three weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine, Leonid Ivashov, then chairman of the All-Russian Officers Assembly, published a piece titled, ‘On the Eve of War?’ – Appeal of the All-Russian Officers Assembly to the President and Citizens of the Russian Federation, warning about a war against Ukraine:

    Today mankind is living in expectation of war. A war inevitably means human casualties, destruction, suffering for large masses of people, loss of the habitual way of life, and the disruption of the vital systems of states and peoples. A big war is an enormous tragedy, someone’s grave crime. And it so happens that Russia has found itself in the center of this imminent catastrophe.

    And this is perhaps happening for the first time in its history. In the past, Russia (the Soviet Union) waged necessary (justified) wars, generally when there was no other way out, when the vital interests of the state and society were under threat. But what is threatening Russia’s existence today? And are there really any such threats anyway?

    He then continues criticizing Putin’s foreign policy:

    Naturally, in order for Ukraine to remain a friendly neighbor for Russia, Russia would have had to demonstrate the attractiveness of its state model and system of government. But Russia never became a friendly neighbor; its model of development and foreign policy mechanism for international cooperation repelled almost all its neighbors and beyond. Russia’s appropriation of the Crimea and Sevastopol, and their nonrecognition as Russian by the international community (meaning that the majority of countries in the world still believe they belong to Ukraine) are convincing proof of the failure of Russian foreign policy and the unattractiveness of its domestic policy. Attempts to use ultimatums and the threat of force to make [others] “fall in love with” Russia and its leaders are pointless and extremely dangerous.

    Ivashov, usually maintaining a hard line against the West, refused the Kremlin’s public propaganda of Nato being a threat:

    As far as external threats are concerned, they definitely exist. But in our expert opinion, they are not critical at the moment, and do not pose a direct threat to the existence of Russian statehood and its vital interests. Strategic stability has been preserved overall, nuclear weapons are under reliable control and groups of NATO forces are not amassing or displaying any threatening activity. Therefore, the explosive situation surrounding Ukraine is primarily artificial and self-serving for some internal forces, including in Russia.

    He then addresses the threat a war could pose to the Russian state:

    The use of military force against Ukraine will, first of all, call into question Russia’s very existence as a state. Second, it will turn Russians and Ukrainians into mortal enemies. Third, thousands (tens of thousands) of young, healthy people will die on both sides, which will naturally have an effect on the future demographic situation in our dying countries. On the battlefield field – if there is a battle – Russian troops will face not just Ukrainian soldiers, many of whom will be [ethnically] Russian, but also NATO troops and equipment, while NATO member states will be obligated to declare war against Russia … In addition, there is no doubt that Russia will be added to the category of countries that pose a threat to peace and international security, subjected to the most severe sanctions, transformed into a pariah in the eyes of the international community and probably lose the status of an independent state. There is no way that the president, the government and the Defense Ministry do not understand these consequences.

    Finally, they address Putin himself, demanding his resignation:

    We, Russia’s officers, demand that the Russian president abandon the criminal policy of provoking a war in which Russia will find itself alone against the united forces of the West and create conditions for implementing Art. 3 of the Russian Constitution [which states that the people are the only source of power – Trans.] and resign.


  • He is for sure pro-Russian in principle, and certainly not what we would call pro-Western or a friend of democracy. He and his fellow generals warned, however, of a war against Ukraine already early 2022.

    On 1 February 2022, roughly three weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine, Leonid Ivashov, then chairman of the All-Russian Officers Assembly, published a piece title, ‘On the Eve of War?’ – Appeal of the All-Russian Officers Assembly to the President and Citizens of the Russian Federation, warning about a war against Ukraine:

    Today mankind is living in expectation of war. A war inevitably means human casualties, destruction, suffering for large masses of people, loss of the habitual way of life, and the disruption of the vital systems of states and peoples. A big war is an enormous tragedy, someone’s grave crime. And it so happens that Russia has found itself in the center of this imminent catastrophe.

    And this is perhaps happening for the first time in its history. In the past, Russia (the Soviet Union) waged necessary (justified) wars, generally when there was no other way out, when the vital interests of the state and society were under threat. But what is threatening Russia’s existence today? And are there really any such threats anyway?

    He then continues criticizing Putin’s foreign policy:

    Naturally, in order for Ukraine to remain a friendly neighbor for Russia, Russia would have had to demonstrate the attractiveness of its state model and system of government. But Russia never became a friendly neighbor; its model of development and foreign policy mechanism for international cooperation repelled almost all its neighbors and beyond. Russia’s appropriation of the Crimea and Sevastopol, and their nonrecognition as Russian by the international community (meaning that the majority of countries in the world still believe they belong to Ukraine) are convincing proof of the failure of Russian foreign policy and the unattractiveness of its domestic policy. Attempts to use ultimatums and the threat of force to make [others] “fall in love with” Russia and its leaders are pointless and extremely dangerous.

    Ivashov, usually maintaining a hard line against the West, refused the Kremlin’s public propaganda of Nato being a threat:

    As far as external threats are concerned, they definitely exist. But in our expert opinion, they are not critical at the moment, and do not pose a direct threat to the existence of Russian statehood and its vital interests. Strategic stability has been preserved overall, nuclear weapons are under reliable control and groups of NATO forces are not amassing or displaying any threatening activity. Therefore, the explosive situation surrounding Ukraine is primarily artificial and self-serving for some internal forces, including in Russia.

    He then addresses the threat a war could pose to the Russian state:

    The use of military force against Ukraine will, first of all, call into question Russia’s very existence as a state. Second, it will turn Russians and Ukrainians into mortal enemies. Third, thousands (tens of thousands) of young, healthy people will die on both sides, which will naturally have an effect on the future demographic situation in our dying countries. On the battlefield field – if there is a battle – Russian troops will face not just Ukrainian soldiers, many of whom will be [ethnically] Russian, but also NATO troops and equipment, while NATO member states will be obligated to declare war against Russia … In addition, there is no doubt that Russia will be added to the category of countries that pose a threat to peace and international security, subjected to the most severe sanctions, transformed into a pariah in the eyes of the international community and probably lose the status of an independent state. There is no way that the president, the government and the Defense Ministry do not understand these consequences.

    Finally, they address Putin himself, demanding his resignation:

    We, Russia’s officers, demand that the Russian president abandon the criminal policy of provoking a war in which Russia will find itself alone against the united forces of the West and create conditions for implementing Art. 3 of the Russian Constitution [which states that the people are the only source of power – Trans.] and resign.



  • I posted a piece recently in another thread about Russia’s Descent Into Tyranny (here is an archived version). It is one of the best, straight-to-the point articles about Russia’s societal and economic development under Putin in the four years of the his invasion of Ukraine I’ve ever read.

    The author is Nina Khrushcheva, Professor of International Affairs at The New School in New York City. She is the great-granddaughter of former leader of the Soviet Union Nikita Khrushchev.

    A paraphrased summary:

    … To visit Russia over the past four years has been to observe the consolidation of a dictatorship in real time—to answer the question readers confront in 1984, wondering how Big Brother’s gaze became so penetrating and relentless. At the start of the invasion, the state lacked the means to quell all possible opposition, and so it suppressed selectively … But in the time since, Moscow has built a larger repressive apparatus. It has cultivated a climate of fear and uncertainty that encouraged many Russians to silence not just themselves but also one another. The accumulation of subtle changes on the part of both the state and society has led Russia deeper and deeper into tyranny—a cycle that seems unlikely to break as long as Putin’s regime pursues the kind of total control that until recently seemed only to exist in Russia’s communist past or in Orwell’s fiction.

    All over Russia, young men have been recruited to go to the front. Their families receive the equivalent of $2,000 to $20,000, or more, depending on the region. In three years, the government spent almost $38 billion, or 1.5 percent of Russia’s GDP, on these payments. The defense ministry said the army received almost 500,000 new recruits in 2024, and 450,000 in 2025. Some are coerced; some are criminals who would rather go to war than to prison. In addition to getting paid, they are absolved of their crimes … Putin has tried to fashion the campaign in Ukraine as a defensive war, putting it on par with World War II, in Russia known as the “Great Patriotic War”.

    In his 1993 article “Working Towards the Führer”, the British historian Ian Kershaw explained how authoritarianism takes over: through the use of ideology to justify individual and collective actions, through voluntary societal complicity, and through state repression. The leader outlines repressive requirements, then everyone else—starting with his entourage but extending to businesses, governmental and political organizations, schools and universities, and volunteer groups and individuals—make up the rules of behavior. The uber-patriotism of Putinism follows the same script. Ordinary citizens are not just passively complicit but co-authors of repression as they attempt to please their leader and police members of their communities. Officials eager to outdo each other become ever more aggressive in their crackdowns. The result is absurd spectacles as apparatchiks hone the craft of making the abnormal seem normal, and vice versa.

    The government has even turned against regime insiders. Since the summer, there have been daily detentions of once-trusted government officials, politicians, and high-ranking army officers, who now stand accused of corruption. June and July also witnessed the brutal arrests of journalists from the online news outlet Ura.ru and the Telegram channel Baza, both hyperpatriotic, pro-war publications that had been obediently hateful toward “the enemy”—Ukraine, foreign agents, Kremlin critics. In the fall, a few of the most faithful were labeled foreign agents, including Sergei Markov, a pro-Kremlin political propagandist, and Roman Alekhin, a prominent pro-war blogger. The reasons are subject to speculation: Markov dared to offer Putin advice, or perhaps he was too cozy with Azerbaijan. Alekhin could be critical of the Russian battlefield situation. The highly militant Crimean-born blogger Tatiana Montyan skipped foreign agent status altogether and was labeled “terrorist and extremist”, apparently because she criticized certain Kremlin-connected patriots. Now, no independent evaluation of Russia’s actions is tolerated, even when it comes from the most loyal of followers.






  • I don’t know where you are getting this, but wherever it is, stay away from it.

    The data regarding the business confidence comes from Russian panelists. These are Russian entrepreneurs.

    Even Russia’s official data are pessimistic. The Russian Economic Development Ministry has already in September lowered its GDP growth forecast for 2025 to 1.0% from the 2.5% it was predicting in April. The Russian Central Bank in October lowered its 2025 growth forecast to 0.5%-1.0% from its July outlook of 1.0-2.0%.

    This growth comes apparently solely from the industrial-military complex at the expense of civilian industries. According to Rosstat, Russia’s Federal Statistics Service, total industrial production jumped 3 percent month-on-month in October, though driven largely by defense-related manufacturing. At the same time, according to Rosstat, production of construction materials and glass has been declining for about a year, with output of basic building materials down roughly 11–12 percent over that period.

    The auto industry suffered across all categories as vehicle output saw a 8.9% decline in October compared with the previous month and plunged 62% year-on-year (China’s car industry is the big winner here, btw).

    Russian Railways, with a debt burden of 4 trillion rubles (43 billion euros), scaled back investment real capital investment in transport by 26% in the first half of 2025, while investment in passenger rail dropped by 48%.

    As the military industry is granted preferential treatment - particularly subsidized loans to bear the high interest rates -, Russia’s budget deficit widens, and, again, the civilian industry (here with the exception of very few companies such as some construction businesses that receives similarly subsidies) pays the bill.

    It also fuels inflation. Putin has recently announced that the ‘goal’ of an annual inflation rate of 6% for 2025 has been reached, but the Russian Central Bank has a different view and set the key interest rate at 16%, again around 10 percentage points higher then the official inflation rate.

    This is a TINY sample of data that paints a devastating picture of Russia’s economy - and it comes from official Russian sources such as Rosstat and directly from the government.