Endencia vs David

Facts:
Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of
Justice Pastor Endencias and Justice Fernando Jugos (and other judges) salary
pursuant to Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 590 which provides that No salary wherever
received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as
exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a
diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.
The judges however argued that under the case of Perfecto vs Meer, judges are
exempt from taxation this is also in observance of the doctrine of separation of
powers, i.e., the executive, to which the Internal Revenue reports, is separate from the
judiciary; that under the Constitution, the judiciary is independent and the salaries of
judges may not be diminished by the other branches of government; that taxing their
salaries is already a diminution of their benefits/salaries (see Section 9, Art. VIII,
Constitution).
The Solicitor General, arguing in behalf of the CIR, states that the decision in
Perfecto vs Meer was rendered ineffective when Congress enacted Republic Act No.
590.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.
HELD: No. The said provision is a violation of the separation of powers. Only courts
have the power to interpret laws. Congress makes laws but courts interpret them. In
Sec. 13, R.A. 590, Congress is already encroaching upon the functions of the courts
when it inserted the phrase: payment of which [tax] is hereby declared not to be a
diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.
Here, Congress is already saying that imposing taxes upon judges is not a
diminution of their salary. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of
the meaning of the phrase which shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office, found in Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of
judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the
Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction
of the Judiciary.
The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any
declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give

it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a
statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature
would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term.
The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the
exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law,
the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it
may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their
task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation sought and
provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case
by the highest court of the land.

Estrada Vs Disierto
FACTS:
Joseph Erap Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. From the beginning of Eraps term, he was
plagued by problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from
power started on October 4, 2000. Singson, a longtime friend of Estrada, went on air and
accused the Estrada, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 19, Estrada fell from power.
At 1:20 p.m. of said day, the Erap informed then Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that
General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected.
January 20 turned to be the day of Eraps surrender. On January 22, the Monday after
taking her oath, Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency.
After his fall from the pedestal of power, Eraps legal problems appeared in clusters.
Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in
motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.
HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was confirmed
by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he
acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the
reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the
presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation.
He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going
to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his
gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to

the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will
not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our
country. Estradas reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the
presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His
presidency is now in the past tense. Even if Erap can prove that he did not resign, still, he
cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely
unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the
decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime
of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively
fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the
constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law
that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt"
standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the
fundamental rights of the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of
the law using the facial challenge.
Ruling:
On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute
vagueness. The petitioners contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient
notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-forvagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioners reliance since
ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can
only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face,
wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine
may not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity.
Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to
be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.

On the other hand, over breadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose
may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade
the area of protected freedoms.
Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to
vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon
protected speech Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances
as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists.
Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a
statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that
one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute
on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other
situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of
statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to
parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident
that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real.
The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the
Congress decision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death.
Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for
lacking merit.

People vs Nazario
Facts:
Eusebio Nazario was charged in violation of refusal and failure to pay his municipal
taxes amounting to Php 362.62 because of his fishpond operation provided under Ordinance 4,
Series of 1955, as amended. He is a resident of Sta. Mesa Manila and just leases a fishpond
located at Pagbilao, Quezon with the Philippine Fisheries Commission. The years in question of
failure to pay was for 1964, 1965, and 1966. Nazario did not pay because he was not sure if he
was covered under the ordinance. He was found guilty thus this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended null and void for being ambiguous
and
uncertain
2. Whether or not the ordinance was unconstitutional for being ex post facto
Held:
1. No, the coverage of the ordinance covers him as the actual operator of the fishpond thus he
comes with the term Manager. He was the one who spent money in developing and
maintaining it, so despite only leasing it from the national government, the latter does not get
any profit as it goes only to Nazario. The dates of payment are also clearly stated Beginning
and taking effect from 1964 if the fishpond started operating in 1964.
2. No, it is not ex post facto. Ordinance 4 was enacted in 1955 so it cant be that the
amendment under Ordinance 12 is being made to apply retroactively. Also, the act of nonpayment has been made punishable since 1955 so it means Ordinance 12 is not imposing a
retroactive penalty.
The appeal is DISMISSED with cost against the appellant.

ORTIGAS & CO. vs. FEATI BANK

FACTS:
Ortigas and Co. is engaged in real estate business developing and selling lots to
the public. It sold to Augusto Padilla and Natividad Angeles Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31
of the Highway Hills Subdivision, Mandaluyong by sale on instalments. The vendees
then transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in favour of one Emma
Chavez. The agreements of sale on instalment and the deeds of sale contained the
restriction that The parcel of land subject of this deed of sale shall be used by the

Buyer exclusively for residential purposes, and she shall not be entitled to take or
remove soil, stones or gravel from it or any other lots belonging to the Seller.
Feati Bank and Trust Co. later bought said lots from Emma Chavez in the name
of Republic Flour Mills. Ortigas and Co. claims that the restrictions were imposed as
part of its general building scheme designed for the beautification and development of
the Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part of its big landed estate. Feati Bank, on
the other hand, maintains that the area along the western part of EDSA from Shaw
Boulevard to Pasig River has been declared a commercial and industrial zone, per
Resolution No. 27 s-1960 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal. Later on,
Feati Bank commenced construction on the said lots for a building devoted to banking
purposes. It refused to comply with the demands of Ortigas & Co. to stop the said
construction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Resolution No. 27 s-1960 can nullify or supersede the contractual
obligations assumed by the defendant.
HELD:
Yes. While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is
not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power,
i.e. the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety of the general welfare of the people. This general welfare clause
shall be liberally interpreted in case of doubt, so as to give more power to local
governments in promoting the economic conditions, social welfare and material
progress of the people in the community. The only exceptions under Section 12 of the
Local Autonomy Act (R.A. 2264) are existing vested rights arising out of a contract
between a province, city or municipality on one hand and a third party on the other
hand. Said case is not present in this petition.
Resolution No. 27 s-1960 declaring the western part of EDSA as an industrial
and commercial zone was passed in the exercise of police power to safeguard or
promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the
locality.

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, vs. RAUL M. GONZALES

Facts:
The case originates from events that occurred a year after the 2004 national and
local elections. On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the
opposition was planning to release an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation
allegedly between the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a
high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which was audiotaped

allegedly through wire-tapping. On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice

(DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the
compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held
liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act.. In another press briefing, Secretary Gonzales
ordered the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to go after media organizations
"found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape"
of an alleged wiretapped conversation involving the President about fixing votes in the
2004 national elections.
Issue:
Is the warning to media in not airing the hello Garci tapes a case of prior restraint?
Ruling:
Yes. The Court holds that it is not decisive that the press statements made by
respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is
sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of
their official functions. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the
government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept
of an "act" does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official
circular. Otherwise, the non-formalization of an act into an official order or circular will
result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint. The press
statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they constitute impermissible
forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and press.

MAMBA v. GARCIA
Facts:
On August 23, 1996, a complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No.1866
(illegal possession of firearms) was filed against a certain Renato Bulatao by the
Cagayan Provincial Police Command before the sala of respondent Judge Dominador
L. Garcia of the Municipal Trial Court, Tuao, Cagayan.
Respondent set the preliminary investigation, but the same was subsequently
postponed and reset as respondent was not present, although the complaining officers
appeared in court.
Later, the preliminary investigation was again reset. On the day before the new
date of preliminary investigation, the accused, Renato Bulatao, complained to the NBI
that at the first scheduled preliminary investigation, the arresting officer demanded
P30,000.00 from him in consideration of the withdrawal of the criminal case against him.
According to Bulatao, the demand was reiterated by Salvador and respondent judge. As
Bulatao told them that he could not afford it, the amount was reduced toP6,000.00.
Based on Bulataos report, the NBI set out to entrap Salvador and respondent
judge.
Bulatao was given a tape recorder to record his conversation with whoever will
receive the money. After handing the money to the police officers, Bulatao went out of
respondent's chambers. Upon his signal, the NBI operatives waiting outside
respondent's court then rushed to the judge's chambers and arrested the two police
officers after recovering marked bills in their possession.
After the matter was referred by this Court to the Executive Judge for
investigation, the latter scheduled several hearings for the reception of evidence for the

respondent. The records show that hearings were set on different dates, but respondent
did not appear despite due notice. Accordingly, he was deemedto have waived the right
to present evidence and the case was submitted for decision. Hence only his counteraffidavit was considered, in which respondent claimed that it was Bulatao who asked
permission to talk to the two police officers.
Issue:
Whether the investigating judges reliance on the taped conversation is proper?
Held:
The Investigating Judge's reliance on the tape-recorded conversation between
Bulatao and the two police officers is erroneous. The recording of private conversations
without the consent of the parties contravenes the provisions of Rep. Act. No. 4200,
otherwise known as the Anti-Wire Tapping Law, and renders the same inadmissible in
evidence in any proceeding.
In all other respects, however, the findings of the Investigating Judge are in
accordance with the evidence. We hold, however, that respondent judge is guilty not
just of improper conduct but of serious misconduct. Serious misconduct is such conduct
which affects a public officer's performance of his duties as such officer and not only
that which affects his character as a private individual.

Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals

253 SCRA 699, G.R. No. 107383,
February 20, 1996
FACTS:
Petitioner, Cecilia Zulueta went to the clinic of her husband, private respondent Dr.
Alfredo Martin. In the presence of her mother, a driver and Martins secretary, she
forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in the clinic and took 157 documents consisting
of private correspondence between Martin and his alleged paramours. The documents
were seized for use as evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification
from the practice of medicine which Zulueta had filed against her Martin. Martin filed an
action for recovery of the documents and for damages against Zulueta. The RTC,
decided in favor of Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of properties
described and ordering Zulueta to return the properties to Martin and pay him nominal
and moral damages and attorneys fees, and cost of the suit. Furthermore, Zulueta and
her attorneys were enjoined from using or submitting/admitting as evidence the
documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:

Whether the documents and papers in question are admissible in evidence.

HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court held that the documents and papers in question are
inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable (Sec.3, Par.1, Art.III, 1987
Constitution) is no less applicable simply because it is the wife who is the party against
whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the provision
in the constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise as provide by law. (Sec.3, Par.1, Art. III, 1987 Constitution) Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding. (Sec.3, Par.2, Art. III,1987 Constitution)

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of
marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage does not shed his/her integrity or his
right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him
or to her.
The law ensures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without consent
of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. (Sec.22, Rule130, Rules of Court).
Neither maybe examined without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions. (Sec.24, Rule 130, Rules of Court) PETITION DENIED. (Zulueta vs Court of
Appeals, 253 SCRA 699, GR No. 107383, February 20, 1996)

CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES

L-2877 (38 SCRA 284) March 31, 1971
FACTS:
In 1956, herein appellants brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his
common-law spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got
married only in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation was executed. Five months
later, or September 13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by
reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a
claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her
in1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes
thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as

it was made at the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering
Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies
to a common-law relationship.
HELD:
While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the
spouses during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as
the dictates of morality requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship.
As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the
law is to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of
fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every
reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and
wife without the benefit of nuptials.
The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not
necessarily result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a
widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the
other half.
Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with
the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

Melchor vs. COA

MARIO R. MELCHOR, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
G.R. No. 95398
August 16, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioner Mario R. Melchor entered into a contract with Cebu Diamond
Construction for the construction of Phase I of the home Technology Building of
Alangalang Agro-Industrial School of Alangalang, Leyte, for the price of P488, 000.
Pablo Narido, chief accountant of the school, issued a certificate of availability of funds

to cover the construction cost. Narido, however, failed to sign as a Witness to the
contract, contrarily to the requirement of Section I of Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 968.
While the construction of Phase I was under way, the contractor, in a letter dated
November 8, 1983 addressed to Melchor, sought an additional charge of P73,000
equivalent to 15% of the stipulated amount due to an increase in the cost of labor and
construction materials. The petitioner then sent a letter asking for the approval of the
Regional Director of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) on the
contractor's additional charge which the latter later approved.
The contractor requested series of extensions for the completion of the
construction which the petitioner granted. However, the contractor later gave up the
project mainly to save itself from further losses due to, among other things, increased
cost of construction materials and labor.
The Commission on Audit Regional Director, Cesar A. Damole, disallowed the
payment of P515,305.60 in post-audit on the ground that the contract was null and void
for lack of signature of the chief accountant of the school as witness to it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner should be held personally liable for the amount paid
for the construction of a public school building on the ground that the infrastructure
contract is null and void for want of one signature?
RULING:
The Court finds that the contract executed by the petitioner and Cebu Diamond
Construction is enforceable and, therefore, the petitioner should not be made to
personally pay for the building already constructed.
In the case before us, the chief accountant issued a certificate of availability of
funds but failed to sign the contract as witness. But since Section 86 states that the
certificate shall be attached to and become an integral part of the proposed contract,
then the failure of the chief accountant to affix his signature to the contract was
somehow made up by his own certification which is the basic and more important
validating document. We agree with the petitioner's view that there was substantial
compliance with the requirements of LOI 968 in the execution of the contract.

BDO vs Equitable Banking

Facts:
Equitable Banking Corp. drew 6 crossed Managers Check payable to certain
member of its establishment. Subsequently, the Checks were deposited with Banco de
Oro to the credit of its depositor, a certain Aida Trencio.
Following the normal procedures, and after stamping at the back of the of the
Checks the usual endorsements: All prior and/or lack of endorsement guaranteed,
Banco de Oro sent the checks for clearing through PCHC. Accordingly, Equitable
Banking Corp. paid the Checks. Its clearing account was debited for the value of the
Checks and Banco de Oros clearing account was credited for the same amount.
Thereafter, Equitable Banking Corp. discovered that the endorsements at the
back of the Checks were forged or otherwise belong to the persons other than the
payees. Pursuant to the PCHC Clearing Rules and Regulations, Equitable Bank
presented the checks directly to the Banco de Oro to claim reimbursement. However,
the latter refused.
Issue:
1.) Were the subject Checks non-negotiable?
2.)
Is the Negotiable Instruments Law applicable in deciding controversies of this nature
by the PCHC?
3.) Was Banco de Oro negligent and thus responsible for any undue payment?
Ratio:
1.)

Banco de Oro by its own acts, stamped its guarantee is now estopped from
claiming that the checks under consideration are not negotiable instruments.

The Checks were accepted for deposit by Banco de Oro stamping thereon its
guarantee, in order that it can clear said Checks with Equitable Banking Corp.
By such deliberate and positive attitude of Banco de Oro, it has for all legal
intents and purposes treated the said Checks as negotiable instruments and
accordingly assumed the warranty of the endorser when it stamped its guarantee of
prior endorsement at the back.
2.)
The participation of the two banks in the clearing operation of PCHC is a
manifestation of their submission to its jurisdiction.
3.)
Although the subject Checks are non-negotiable, the responsibility of petitioner
as endorser thereof remains. While the drawer generally owes no duty of diligence to
the collecting banks, the law imposes a duty of diligence in the collecting bank to
scrutinize Checks deposited with it for the purpose of determining their genuineness
and regularity.
The collecting bank being primarily engaged in banking holds itself out to the
public as the expert and the law holds it to a high standard of conduct.

Vda de Ape vs CA
Cleopas Ape died in 1950 and left a parcel of land (Lot 2319) to his 11 children. The
children never formally divided the property amongst themselves except through hantalhantal whereby each just occupied a certain portion and developed each.
On the other hand, the spouses Lumayno were interested in the land so they started
buying the portion of land that each of the heirs occupied. On 11 Apr 1973, one of the
children, Fortunato, entered into a contract of sale with Lumayno. In exchange of his lot,
Lumayno agreed to pay P5,000.00. She paid in advance P30.00. Fortunato was given a
receipt prepared by Lumaynos son in law (Andres Flores). Flores also acted as
witness. Lumayno also executed sales transactions with Fortunatos siblings separately.
In 1973, Lumayno compelled Fortunato to make the the delivery to her of the registrable
deed of sale over Fortunatos portion of the Lot No. 2319. Fortunato assailed the validity
of the contract of sale. He also invoked his right to redeem (as a co-owner) the portions
of land sold by his siblings to Lumayno. Fortunato died during the pendency of the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid contract of sale?
HELD: No. Fortunato was a no read no write person. It was incumbent for the the
other party to prove that details of the contract was fully explained to Fortunato before
Fortunato signed the receipt.

A contract of sale is a consensual contract, thus, it is perfected by mere consent of the

parties. It is born from the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is
the object of the sale and upon the price. Upon its perfection, the parties may
reciprocally demand performance, that is, the vendee may compel the transfer of the
ownership and to deliver the object of the sale while the vendor may demand the
vendee to pay the thing sold. For there to be a perfected contract of sale, however, the
following elements must be present: consent, object, and price in money or its
equivalent.
For consent to be valid, it must meet the following requisites:
(a) it should be intelligent, or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers;
(b) it should be free and
(c) it should be spontaneous. Intelligence in consent is vitiated by error; freedom by
violence, intimidation or undue influence; spontaneity by fraud.
Lumayno claimed that she explained fully the receipt to Fortunato, but Flores testimony
belies it. Flores said there was another witness but the other was a maid who also
lacked education. Further, Flores himself was not aware that the receipt was to transfer
the ownership of Fortunatos land to her mom-in-law. It merely occurred to him to
explain the details of the receipt but he never did.