G.R. No.

L-15045 January 20, 1961

IN RE: PETITION FOR EXEMPTION FROM COVERAGE BY THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM.
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee.

Feria, Manglapus and Associates for petitioner-appellant.

Legal Staff, Social Security System and Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

On September 1, 1958, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, thru counsel, filed with the Social
Security Commission a request that "Catholic Charities, and all religious and charitable institutions
and/or organizations, which are directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila," be exempted from compulsory coverage of Republic Act No. 1161,
as amended, otherwise known as the Social Security Law of 1954. The request was based on the
claim that the said Act is a labor law and does not cover religious and charitable institutions but is
limited to businesses and activities organized for profit. Acting upon the recommendation of its Legal
Staff, the Social Security Commission in its Resolution No. 572, series of 1958, denied the request.
The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, reiterating its arguments and raising constitutional
objections, requested for reconsideration of the resolution. The request, however, was denied by the
Commission in its Resolution No. 767, series of 1958; hence, this appeal taken in pursuance of
section 5(c) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended.

Section 9 of the Social Security Law, as amended, provides that coverage "in the System shall be
compulsory upon all members between the age of sixteen and sixty rears inclusive, if they have
been for at least six months a the service of an employer who is a member of the System, Provided,
that the Commission may not compel any employer to become member of the System unless he
shall have been in operation for at least two years and has at the time of admission, if admitted for
membership during the first year of the System's operation at least fifty employees, and if admitted
for membership the following year of operation and thereafter, at least six employees x x x." The
term employer" as used in the law is defined as any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign,
who carries in the Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind and
uses the services of another person who is under his orders as regards the employment, except the
Government and any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including
corporations owned or controlled by the Government" (par. [c], see. 8), while an "employee" refers to
"any person who performs services for an 'employer' in which either or both mental and physical
efforts are used and who receives compensation for such services" (par. [d], see. 8). "Employment",
according to paragraph [i] of said section 8, covers any service performed by an employer except
those expressly enumerated thereunder, like employment under the Government, or any of its
political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities including corporations owned and controlled by
the Government, domestic service in a private home, employment purely casual, etc.

From the above legal provisions, it is apparent that the coverage of the Social Security Law is
predicated on the existence of an employer-employee relationship of more or less permanent nature
and extends to employment of all kinds except those expressly excluded.

Appellant contends that the term "employer" as defined in the law should following the principle
of ejusdem generis be limited to those who carry on "undertakings or activities which have the
element of profit or gain, or which are pursued for profit or gain," because the phrase ,activity of any
kind" in the definition is preceded by the words "any trade, business, industry, undertaking." The
contention cannot be sustained. The rule ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It
is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered
and defeated. (Grosjean vs. American Paints Works [La], 160 So. 449). In the case at bar, the
definition of the term "employer" is, we think, sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and
charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit, like herein appellant, within its meaning.
This is made more evident by the fact that it contains an exception in which said institutions or
entities are not included. And, certainly, had the Legislature really intended to limit the operation of
the law to entities organized for profit or gain, it would not have defined an "employer" in such a way
as to include the Government and yet make an express exception of it.

It is significant to note that when Republic Act No. 1161 was enacted, services performed in the
employ of institutions organized for religious or charitable purposes were by express provisions of
said Act excluded from coverage thereof (sec. 8, par. [j] subpars. 7 and 8). That portion of the law,
however, has been deleted by express provision of Republic Act No. 1792, which took effect in
1957. This is clear indication that the Legislature intended to include charitable and religious
institutions within the scope of the law.

In support of its contention that the Social Security Law was intended to cover only employment for
profit or gain, appellant also cites the discussions of the Senate, portions of which were quoted in its
brief. There is, however, nothing whatsoever in those discussions touching upon the question of
whether the law should be limited to organizations for profit or gain. Of course, the said discussions
dwelt at length upon the need of a law to meet the problems of industrializing society and upon the
plight of an employer who fails to make a profit. But this is readily explained by the fact that the
majority of those to be affected by the operation of the law are corporations and industries which are
established primarily for profit or gain.

Appellant further argues that the Social Security Law is a labor law and, consequently, following the
rule laid down in the case of Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Araos (G.R. No. L-10091, January 29,
1958) and other cases1, applies only to industry and occupation for purposes of profit and gain. The
cases cited, however, are not in point, for the reason that the law therein involved expressly limits its
application either to commercial, industrial, or agricultural establishments, or enterprises. .

Upon the other hand, the Social Security Law was enacted pursuant to the "policy of the Republic of
the Philippines to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be
suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and shall provide protection to
employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death." (See. 2, Republic Act No.
1161, as amended.) Such enactment is a legitimate exercise of the police power. It affords
protection to labor, especially to working women and minors, and is in full accord with the
constitutional provisions on the "promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people." Being in fact a social legislation, compatible with the policy of the Church
to ameliorate living conditions of the working class, appellant cannot arbitrarily delimit the extent of
its provisions to relations between capital and labor in industry and agriculture.

There is no merit in the claim that the inclusion of religious organizations under the coverage of the
Social Security Law violates the constitutional prohibition against the application of public funds for
the use, benefit or support of any priest who might be employed by appellant. The funds contributed
to the System created by the law are not public funds, but funds belonging to the members which
are merely held in trust by the Government. At any rate, assuming that said funds are impressed
with the character of public funds, their payment as retirement death or disability benefits would not
constitute a violation of the cited provisions of the Constitution, since such payment shall be made to
the priest not because he is a priest but because he is an employee.
Neither may it be validly argued that the enforcement of the Social Security Law impairs appellant's
right to disseminate religious information. All that is required of appellant is to make monthly
contributions to the System for covered employees in its employ. These contributions, contrary to
appellant's contention, are not in the nature of taxes on employment." Together with the
contributions imposed upon the employees and the Government, they are intended for the protection
of said employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death in line with the
constitutional mandate to promote social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all
the people.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Resolutions Nos. 572 kind 767, series of 1958, of the Social
Security Commission are hereby affirmed. So ordered with costs against appellant.

G.R. No. L-26298 September 28, 1984

CMS ESTATE, INC., petitioner,

vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondents.

Sison Dominguez & Cervantes for petitioner.

The Legal Counsel for respondent SSS.

CUEVAS, J.:

This appeal by the CMS Estate, Inc. from the decision rendered by the Social Security Commission
in its Case No. 12, entitled "CMS Estate, Inc. vs. Social Security System, declaring CMS subject to
compulsory coverage as of September 1, 1957 and "directing the Social Security System to effect
such coverage of the petitioner's employees in its logging and real estate business conformably to
the provision of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended was certified to Us by the defunct Court of
Appeals 1 for further disposition considering that purely questions of law are involved.

Petitioner is a domestic corporation organized primarily for the purpose of engaging in the real estate
business. On December 1, 1952, it started doing business with only six (6) employees. It's Articles of
Incorporation was amended on June 4, 1956 in order to engage in the logging business. The
Securities and Exchange Commission issued the certificate of filing of said amended articles on
June 18, 1956. Petitioner likewise obtained an ordinary license from the Bureau of Forestry to
operate a forest concession of 13,000 hectares situated in the municipality of Baganga, Province of
Davao.

On January 28, 1957, petitioner entered into a contract of management with one Eufracio D. Rojas
for the operation and exploitation of the forest concession The logging operation actually started on
April 1, 1957 with four monthly salaried employees. As of September 1, 1957, petitioner had 89
employees and laborers in the logging operation. On December 26, 1957, petitioner revoked its
contract of management with Mr. Rojas.

On August 1, 1958, petitioner became a member of the Social Security System with respect to its
real estate business. On September 6, 1958, petitioner remitted to the System the sum of P203.13
representing the initial premium on the monthly salaries of the employees in its logging business.
However, on October 9, 1958, petitioner demanded the refund of the said amount, claiming that it is
not yet subject to compulsory coverage with respect to its logging business. The request was denied
by respondent System on the ground that the logging business was a mere expansion of petitioner's
activities and for purposes of the Social Security Act, petitioner should be considered a member of
the System since December 1, 1952 when it commenced its real estate business.

On November 10, 1958, petitioner filed a petition with the Social Security Commission praying for
the determination of the effectivity date of the compulsory coverage of petitioner's logging business.

After both parties have submitted their respective memoranda, the Commission issued on January
14, 1960, Resolution No. 91, 2 the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

Premises considered, the instant petition is hereby denied and petitioner is hereby
adjudged to be subject to compulsory coverage as of Sept. 1, 1957 and the Social
Security System is hereby directed to effect such coverage of petitioner's employees
in its logging and real estate business conformably to the provisions of Rep. Act No.
1161, as amended.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in Resolution No. 609 of the Commission.

These two (2) resolutions are now the subject of petitioner's appeal. Petitioner submits that
respondent Commission erred in holding

(1) that the contributions required of employers and employees under our Social
Security Act of 1954 are not in the nature of excise taxes because the said Act was
allegedly enacted by Congress in the exercise of the police power of the State, not of
its taxing power;

(2) that no contractee independent contractor relationship existed between

petitioner and Eufracio D. Rojas during the time that he was operating its forest
concession at Baganga, Davao;

(3) that a corporation which has been in operation for more than two years in one
business is immediately covered with respect to any new and independent business
it may subsequently engage in;

(4) that a corporation should be treated as a single employing unit for purposes of
coverage under the Social Security Act, irrespective of its separate, unrelated and
independent business established and operated at different places and on different
dates; and

(5) that Section 9 of the Social Security Act on the question of compulsory
membership and employers should be given a liberal interpretation.

Respondent, on the other hand, advances the following propositions, inter alia:

(1) that the Social Security Act speaks of compulsory coverage of employers and not
of business;
 (2) that once an employer is initially covered under the Social Security Act, any other
business undertaken or established by the same employer is likewise subject in spite
of the fact that the latter has not been in operation for at least two years;

(3) that petitioner's logging business while actually of a different, distinct, separate
and independent nature from its real estate business should be considered as an
operation under the same management;

(4) that the amendment of petitioner's articles of incorporation, so as to enable it to

engage in the logging business did not alter the juridical personality of petitioner; and

(5) the petitioner's logging operation is a mere expansion of its business activities.

The Social Security Law was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government "to develop, establish
gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people
throughout the Philippines, and shall provide protection against the hazards of disability, sickness,
old age and death" (Sec. 2, RA 1161, as amended). It is thus clear that said enactment implements
the general welfare mandate of the Constitution and constitutes a legitimate exercise of the police
power of the State. As held in the case of Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., et al. vs. SSS 3

Membership in the SSS is not a result of bilateral, concensual agreement where the
rights and obligations of the parties are defined by and subject to their will, RA 1161
requires compulsory coverage of employees and employers under the System. It is
actually a legal imposition on said employers and employees, designed to provide
social security to the workingmen. Membership in the SSS is therefore, in
compliance with the lawful exercise of the police power of the State, to which the
principle of non-impairment of the obligation of contract is not a proper defense.

xxx xxx xxx

The taxing power of the State is exercised for the purpose of raising revenues. However, under our
Social Security Law, the emphasis is more on the promotion of the general welfare. The Act is not
part of out Internal Revenue Code nor are the contributions and premiums therein dealt with and
provided for, collectible by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The funds contributed to the System
belong to the members who will receive benefits, as a matter of right, whenever the hazards
provided by the law occur.

All that is required of appellant is to make monthly contributions to the System for
covered employees in its employ. These contributions, contrary to appellant's
contention, are not 'in the nature of taxes on employment.' Together with the
contributions imposed upon employees and the Government, they are intended for
the protection of said employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age
and death in line with the constitutional mandate to promote social justice to insure
the well-being and economic security of all the people.4

Because of the broad social purpose of the Social Security Act, all doubts in construing the Act
should favor coverage rather than exemption.

Prior to its amendment, Sec. 9 of the Act provides that before an employer could be compelled to
become a member of the System, he must have been in operation for at least two years and has at
the time of admission at least six employees. It should be pointed out that it is the employer, either
natural, or judicial person, who is subject to compulsory coverage and not the business. If the
intention of the legislature was to consider every venture of the employer as the basis of a separate
coverage, an express provision to that effect could have been made. Unfortunately, however, none
of that sort appeared provided for in the said law.

Should each business venture of the employer be considered as the basis of the coverage, an
employer with more than one line of business but with less than six employees in each, would never
be covered although he has in his employ a total of more than six employees which is sufficient to
bring him within the ambit of compulsory coverage. This would frustrate rather than foster the policy
of the Act. The legislative intent must be respected. In the absence of an express provision for a
separate coverage for each kind of business, the reasonable interpretation is that once an employer
is covered in a particular kind of business, he should be automatically covered with respect to any
new name. Any interpretation which would defeat rather than promote the ends for which the Social
Security Act was enacted should be eschewed. 5

Petitioner contends that the Commission cannot indiscriminately combine for purposes of coverage
two distinct and separate businesses when one has not yet been in operation for more than two
years thus rendering nugatory the period for more than two years thus rendering nugatory the period
of stabilization fixed by the Act. This contention lacks merit since the amendatory law, RA 2658,
which was approved on June 18, 1960, eliminated the two-year stabilization period as employers
now become automatically covered immediately upon the start of the business.

Section 10 (formerly Sec. 9) of RA 1161, as amended by RA 2658 now provides:

Sec. 10. Effective date of coverage. Compulsory coverage of the employer shall
take effect on the first day of his operation, and that of the employee on the date of
his employment. (Emphasis supplied)

As We have previously mentioned, it is the intention of the law to cover as many persons as possible
so as to promote the constitutional objective of social justice. It is axiomatic that a later law prevails
over a prior statute and moreover the legislative in tent must be given effect. 6

Petitioner further submits that Eufrancio Rojas is an independent contractor who engages in an
independent business of his own consisting of the operation of the timber concession of the former.
Rojas was appointed as operations manager of the logging consession; 7 he has no power to appoint
or hire employees; as the term implies, he only manages the employees and it is petitioner who
furnishes him the necessary equipment for use in the logging business; and he is not free from the
control and direction of his employer in matter connected with the performance of his work. These
factors clearly indicate that Rojas is not an independent contractor but merely an employee of
petitioner; and should be entitled to the compulsory coverage of the Act.

The records indubitably show that petitioner started its real estate business on December 1, 1952
while its logging operation was actually commenced on April 1, 1957. Applying the provision of Sec.
10 of the Act, petitioner is subject to compulsory coverage as of December 1, 1952 with respect to
the real estate business and as of April 1, 1957 with respect to its logging operation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. With costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDEREd

G.R. No. L-21642 July 30, 1966

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
CANDELARIA D. DAVAC, ET AL., respondents;
LOURDES Tuplano, respondent-appellant.

J. Ma. Francisco and N. G. Bravo for respondent-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and E. T. Duran for
petitioner-appellee.

BARRERA, J.:

This is an appeal from the resolution of the Social Security Commission declaring respondent
Candelaria Davac as the person entitled to receive the death benefits payable for the death of
Petronilo Davac.

The facts of the case as found by the Social Security Commission, briefly are: The late Petronilo
Davac, a former employee of Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. became a member of the Social Security
System (SSS for short) on September 1, 1957. As such member, he was assigned SS I.D. No. 08-
007137. In SSS form E-1 (Member's Record) which he accomplished and filed with the SSS on
November 21, 1957, he designated respondent Candelaria Davac as his beneficiary and indicated
his relationship to her as that of "wife". He died on April 5, 1959 and, thereupon, each of the
respondents (Candelaria Davac and Lourdes Tuplano) filed their claims for death benefit with the
SSS. It appears from their respective claims and the documents submitted in support thereof, that
the deceased contracted two marriages, the first, with claimant Lourdes Tuplano on August 29,
1946, who bore him a child, Romeo Davac, and the second, with Candelaria Davac on January 18,
1949, with whom he had a minor daughter Elizabeth Davac. Due to their conflicting claims, the
processing thereof was held in abeyance, whereupon the SSS filed this petition praying that
respondents be required to interpose and litigate between themselves their conflicting claims over
the death benefits in question.1wph1.t

On February 25, 1963, the Social Security Commission issued the resolution referred to above, Not
satisfied with the said resolution, respondent Lourdes Tuplano brought to us the present appeal.

The only question to be determined herein is whether or not the Social Security Commission acted
correctly in declaring respondent Candelaria Davac as the person entitled to receive the death
benefits in question.

Section 13, Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by Republic Act No. 1792, in force at the time
Petronilo Davac's death on April 5, 1959, provides:

1. SEC. 13. Upon the covered employee's death or total and permanent disability under such
conditions as the Commission may define, before becoming eligible for retirement and if
either such death or disability is not compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
he or, in case of his death, his beneficiaries, as recorded by his employer shall be entitled to
the following benefit: ... . (emphasis supplied.)

Under this provision, the beneficiary "as recorded" by the employee's employer is the one entitled to
the death benefits. In the case of Tecson vs. Social Security System, (L-15798, December 28,
1961), this Court, construing said Section 13, said:

It may be true that the purpose of the coverage under the Social Security System is
protection of the employee as well as of his family, but this purpose or intention of the law
 cannot be enforced to the extent of contradicting the very provisions of said law as contained
in Section 13, thereof, ... . When the provision of a law are clear and explicit, the courts can
do nothing but apply its clear and explicit provisions (Velasco vs. Lopez, 1 Phil, 270;
Caminetti vs. U.S., 242 U.S. 470, 61 L. ed. 442).

But appellant contends that the designation herein made in the person of the second and, therefore,
bigamous wife is null and void, because (1) it contravenes the provisions of the Civil Code, and (2) it
deprives the lawful wife of her share in the conjugal property as well as of her own and her child's
legitime in the inheritance.

As to the first point, appellant argues that a beneficiary under the Social Security System partakes of
the nature of a beneficiary in life insurance policy and, therefore, the same qualifications and
disqualifications should be applied.

Article 2012 of the New Civil Code provides:

ART. 2012. Any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation under Article 739
cannot be named beneficiary of a life insurance policy by the person who cannot make any
donation to him according to said article.

And Article 739 of the same Code prescribes:

ART. 739. The following donations shall be void:

(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of
the donation;

xxx xxx xxx

Without deciding whether the naming of a beneficiary of the benefits accruing from membership in
the Social Security System is a donation, or that it creates a situation analogous to the relation of an
insured and the beneficiary under a life insurance policy, it is enough, for the purpose of the instant
case, to state that the disqualification mentioned in Article 739 is not applicable to herein appellee
Candelaria Davac because she was not guilty of concubinage, there being no proof that she had
knowledge of the previous marriage of her husband Petronilo.1

Regarding the second point raised by appellant, the benefits accruing from membership in the Social
Security System do not form part of the properties of the conjugal partnership of the covered
member. They are disbursed from a public special fund created by Congress in pursuance to the
declared policy of the Republic "to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system
which ... shall provide protection against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death."2

The sources of this special fund are the covered employee's contribution (equal to 2- per cent of
the employee's monthly compensation);3 the employer's contribution (equivalent to 3- per cent of
the monthly compensation of the covered employee);4 and the Government contribution which
consists in yearly appropriation of public funds to assure the maintenance of an adequate working
balance of the funds of the System.5 Additionally, Section 21 of the Social Security Act, as amended
by Republic Act 1792, provides:
 SEC. 21. Government Guarantee. The benefits prescribed in this Act shall not be
diminished and to guarantee said benefits the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
accepts general responsibility for the solvency of the System.

From the foregoing provisions, it appears that the benefit receivable under the Act is in the nature of
a special privilege or an arrangement secured by the law, pursuant to the policy of the State to
provide social security to the workingmen. The amounts that may thus be received cannot be
considered as property earned by the member during his lifetime. His contribution to the fund, it may
be noted, constitutes only an insignificant portion thereof. Then, the benefits are specifically declared
not transferable,6 and exempted from tax legal processes, and lien.7Furthermore, in the settlement of
claims thereunder the procedure to be observed is governed not by the general provisions of law,
but by rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission. Thus, if the money is payable to the
estate of a deceased member, it is the Commission, not the probate or regular court that determines
the person or persons to whom it is payable.8 that the benefits under the Social Security Act are not
intended by the lawmaking body to form part of the estate of the covered members may be gathered
from the subsequent amendment made to Section 15 thereof, as follows:

SEC. 15. Non-transferability of benefit. The system shall pay the benefits provided for in
this Act to such persons as may be entitled thereto in accordance with the provisions of this
Act. Such benefits are not transferable, and no power of attorney or other document
executed by those entitled thereto in favor of any agent, attorney, or any other individual for
the collection thereof in their behalf shall be recognized except when they are physically and
legally unable to collect personally such benefits: Provided, however, That in the case of
death benefits, if no beneficiary has been designated or the designation there of is void, said
benefits shall be paid to the legal heirs in accordance with the laws of succession. (Rep. Act
2658, amending Rep. Act 1161.)

In short, if there is a named beneficiary and the designation is not invalid (as it is not so in this case),
it is not the heirs of the employee who are entitled to receive the benefits (unless they are the
designated beneficiaries themselves). It is only when there is no designated beneficiaries or when
the designation is void, that the laws of succession are applicable. And we have already held that
the Social Security Act is not a law of succession.9

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing considerations, the resolution of the Social Security Commission
appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

So ordered.

G.R. No. 165545 March 24, 2006

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,

vs.
TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES,J.:

The Court of Appeals Decision1 dated June 23, 20042 and Resolution dated September 28,
20043 reversing the Resolution dated April 2, 20034 and Order dated June 4, 20035 of the Social
Security Commission (SSC) in SSC Case No. 4-15149-01 are challenged in the present petition for
review on certiorari.
On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice) contracted marriage in
Barcelona, Sorsogon.6

More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the then Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Sorsogon a petition7 to declare Alice presumptively dead.

By Order of December 10, 1970,8 the CFI granted the petition, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, there being no opposition filed against the petition notwithstanding the publication of
the Notice of Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the country, Alice Diaz is hereby
declared to [sic] all legal intents and purposes, except for those of succession, presumptively dead.

SO ORDERED.9 (Underscoring supplied)

Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon
contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent) in Casiguran, Sorsogon.10

On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social Security System (SSS) since 1960
and a retiree pensioner thereof effective July 1994, died.11

Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits, and was granted P12,00012 by the SSS.

Respondent filed on March 11, 1998 an additional claim for death benefits13 which was also granted
by the SSS on April 6, 1998.14

Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa)
contested before the SSS the release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She claimed
that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice, the second with her mother
Elisa, and the third with respondent, all of whom are still alive; she, together with her siblings, paid
for Bailons medical and funeral expenses; and all the documents submitted by respondent to the
SSS in support of her claims are spurious.

In support of her claim, Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon Chavez (Norma) submitted an Affidavit
dated February 13, 199915 averring that they are two of nine children of Bailon and Elisa who
cohabited as husband and wife as early as 1958; and they were reserving their right to file the
necessary court action to contest the marriage between Bailon and respondent as they personally
know that Alice is "still very much alive."16

In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, a certain Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to be the brother and guardian
of "Aliz P. Diaz," filed before the SSS a claim for death benefits accruing from Bailons death,17 he
further attesting in a sworn statement18 that it was Norma who defrayed Bailons funeral expenses.

Elisa and seven of her children19 subsequently filed claims for death benefits as Bailons
beneficiaries before the SSS.20

Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS Bicol Cluster, Naga City recommended the
cancellation of payment of death pension benefits to respondent and the issuance of an order for the
refund of the amount paid to her from February 1998 to May 1999 representing such benefits; the
denial of the claim of Alice on the ground that she was not dependent upon Bailon for support during
his lifetime; and the payment of the balance of the five-year guaranteed pension to Bailons
beneficiaries according to the order of preference provided under the law, after the amount
erroneously paid to respondent has been collected. The pertinent portions of the Memorandum read:

1. Aliz [sic] Diaz never disappeared. The court must have been misled by misrepresentation
in declaring the first wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz, as presumptively dead.

xxxx

x x x the Order of the court in the "Petition to Declare Alice Diaz Presumptively Dead," did
not become final. The presence of Aliz [sic] Diaz, is contrary proof that rendered it invalid.

xxxx

3. It was the deceased member who abandoned his wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz. He, being in bad
faith, and is the deserting spouse, his remarriage is void, being bigamous.

xxxx

In this case, it is the deceased member who was the deserting spouse and who remarried, thus his
marriage to Teresita Jarque, for the second time was void as it was bigamous. To require affidavit of
reappearance to terminate the second marriage is not necessary as there is no disappearance of
Aliz [sic] Diaz, the first wife, and a voidable marriage [sic], to speak of.21 (Underscoring supplied)

In the meantime, the SSS Sorsogon Branch, by letter of August 16, 2000,22 advised respondent that
as Cecilia and Norma were the ones who defrayed Bailons funeral expenses, she should return
the P12,000 paid to her.

In a separate letter dated September 7, 1999,23 the SSS advised respondent of the cancellation of
her monthly pension for death benefits in view of the opinion rendered by its legal department that
her marriage with Bailon was void as it was contracted while the latters marriage with Alice was still
subsisting; and the December 10, 1970 CFI Order declaring Alice presumptively dead did not
become final, her "presence" being "contrary proof" against the validity of the order. It thus requested
respondent to return the amount of P24,000 representing the total amount of monthly pension she
had received from the SSS from February 1998 to May 1999.

Respondent protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits by letter to the SSS
dated October 12, 1999.24 In a subsequent letter dated November 27, 199925 to the SSC, she
reiterated her request for the release of her monthly pension, asserting that her marriage with Bailon
was not declared before any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful, hence, it remained valid and
subsisting for all legal intents and purposes as in fact Bailon designated her as his beneficiary.

The SSS, however, by letter to respondent dated January 21, 2000,26 maintained the denial of her
claim for and the discontinuance of payment of monthly pension. It advised her, however, that she
was not deprived of her right to file a petition with the SSC.

Respondent thus filed a petition27 against the SSS before the SSC for the restoration to her of her
entitlement to monthly pension.

In the meantime, respondent informed the SSS that she was returning, under protest, the amount
of P12,000 representing the funeral benefits she received, she alleging that Norma and her siblings
"forcibly and coercively prevented her from spending any amount during Bailons wake."28
After the SSS filed its Answer29 to respondents petition, and the parties filed their respective Position
Papers, one Alicia P. Diaz filed an Affidavit30 dated August 14, 2002 with the SSS Naga Branch
attesting that she is the widow of Bailon; she had only recently come to know of the petition filed by
Bailon to declare her presumptively dead; it is not true that she disappeared as Bailon could have
easily located her, she having stayed at her parents residence in Barcelona, Sorsogon after she
found out that Bailon was having an extramarital affair; and Bailon used to visit her even after their
separation.

By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC found that the marriage of respondent to Bailon was void
and, therefore, she was "just a common-law-wife." Accordingly it disposed as follows,
quoted verbatim:

WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds, that petitioner Teresita Jarque-Bailon is not the
legitimate spouse and primary beneficiary of SSS member Clemente Bailon.

Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby ordered to refund to the SSS the amount of P24,000.00
representing the death benefit she received therefrom for the period February 1998 until May 1999
as well as P12,000.00 representing the funeral benefit.

The SSS is hereby ordered to pay Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz-Bailon the appropriate death benefit arising
from the demise of SSS member Clemente Bailon in accordance with Section 8(e) and (k) as well as
Section 13 of the SS Law, as amended, and its prevailing rules and regulations and to inform this
Commission of its compliance herewith.

SO ORDERED.31 (Underscoring supplied)

In so ruling against respondent, the SSC ratiocinated.

After a thorough examination of the evidence at hand, this Commission comes to the inevitable
conclusion that the petitioner is not the legitimate wife of the deceased member.

xxxx

There is x x x ample evidence pointing to the fact that, contrary to the declaration of the then CFI of
Sorsogon (10th Judicial District), the first wife never disappeared as the deceased member
represented in bad faith. This Commission accords credence to the findings of the SSS contained in
its Memorandum dated August 9, 1999,32revealing that Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz never left Barcelona,
Sorsogon, after her separation from Clemente Bailon x x x.

As the declaration of presumptive death was extracted by the deceased member using artifice and
by exerting fraud upon the unsuspecting court of law, x x x it never had the effect of giving the
deceased member the right to marry anew. x x x [I]t is clear that the marriage to the petitioner is
void, considering that the first marriage on April 25, 1955 to Alice Diaz was not previously annulled,
invalidated or otherwise dissolved during the lifetime of the parties thereto. x x x as determined
through the investigation conducted by the SSS, Clemente Bailon was the abandoning spouse, not
Alice Diaz Bailon.

xxxx
It having been established, by substantial evidence, that the petitioner was just a common-law
wife of the deceased member, it necessarily follows that she is not entitled as a primary beneficiary,
to the latters death benefit. x x x

xxxx

It having been determined that Teresita Jarque was not the legitimate surviving spouse and primary
beneficiary of Clemente Bailon, it behooves her to refund the total amount of death benefit she
received from the SSS for the period from February 1998 until May 1999 pursuant to the principle
of solutio indebiti x x x

Likewise, it appearing that she was not the one who actually defrayed the cost of the wake and
burial of Clemente Bailon, she must return the amount of P12,000.00 which was earlier given to her
by the SSS as funeral benefit.33(Underscoring supplied)

Respondents Motion for Reconsideration34 having been denied by Order of June 4, 2003, she filed a
petition for review35 before the Court of Appeals (CA).

By Decision of June 23, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the April 2, 2003 Resolution and June
4, 2003 Order of the SSC and thus ordered the SSS to pay respondent all the pension benefits due
her. Held the CA:

x x x [T]he paramount concern in this case transcends the issue of whether or not the decision of the
then CFI, now RTC, declaring Alice Diaz presumptively dead has attained finality but, more
importantly, whether or not the respondents SSS and Commission can validly re-evaluate the
findings of the RTC, and on its own, declare the latters decision to be bereft of any basis. On similar
import, can respondents SSS and Commission validly declare the first marriage subsisting and the
second marriage null and void?

xxxx

x x x while it is true that a judgment declaring a person presumptively dead never attains finality as
the finding that "the person is unheard of in seven years is merely a presumption juris tantum," the
second marriage contracted by a person with an absent spouse endures until annulled. It is only the
competent court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code and
upon the reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for annulment may be filed. Nowhere
does the law contemplates [sic] the possibility that respondent SSS may validly declare the second
marriage null and void on the basis alone of its own investigation and declare that the decision of the
RTC declaring one to be presumptively dead is without basis.

Respondent SSS cannot arrogate upon itself the authority to review the decision of the regular
courts under the pretext of determining the actual and lawful beneficiaries of its members.
Notwithstanding its opinion as to the soundness of the findings of the RTC, it should extend due
credence to the decision of the RTC absent of [sic] any judicial pronouncement to the contrary. x x x

x x x [A]ssuming arguendo that respondent SSS actually possesses the authority to declare the
decision of the RTC to be without basis, the procedure it followed was offensive to the principle of
fair play and thus its findings are of doubtful quality considering that petitioner Teresita was not given
ample opportunity to present evidence for and her behalf.

xxxx
Respondent SSS is correct in stating that the filing of an Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil
Registry is no longer practical under the premises. Indeed, there is no more first marriage to restore
as the marital bond between Alice Diaz and Clemente Bailon was already terminated upon the
latters death. Neither is there a second marriage to terminate because the second marriage was
likewise dissolved by the death of Clemente Bailon.

However, it is not correct to conclude that simply because the filing of the Affidavit of Reappearance
with the Civil Registry where parties to the subsequent marriage reside is already inutile, the
respondent SSS has now the authority to review the decision of the RTC and consequently declare
the second marriage null and void.36(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The SSC and the SSS separately filed their Motions for Reconsideration37 which were both denied
for lack of merit.

Hence, the SSS present petition for review on certiorari38 anchored on the following grounds:

THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO LAW.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING

TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.39

The SSS faults the CA for failing to give due consideration to the findings of facts of the SSC on the
prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice; in disregarding the authority of the SSC to
determine to whom, between Alice and respondent, the death benefits should be awarded pursuant
to Section 540 of the Social Security Law; and in declaring that the SSS did not give respondent due
process or ample opportunity to present evidence in her behalf.

The SSS submits that "the observations and findings relative to the CFI proceedings are of no
moment to the present controversy, as the same may be considered only as obiter dicta in view of
the SSCs finding of the existence of a prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice by
virtue of which Alice has a better right to the death benefits."41

The petition fails.

That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect to SSS coverage, benefits and
contributions, there is no doubt. In so exercising such power, however, it cannot review, much less
reverse, decisions rendered by courts of law as it did in the case at bar when it declared that the
December 10, 1970 CFI Order was obtained through fraud and subsequently disregarded the same,
making its own findings with respect to the validity of Bailon and Alices marriage on the one hand
and the invalidity of Bailon and respondents marriage on the other.

In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC virtually acted as an appellate court.
The law does not give the SSC unfettered discretion to trifle with orders of regular courts in the
exercise of its authority to determine the beneficiaries of the SSS.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988
of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law
in effect at the time of their celebration.42

Article 83 of the Civil Code43 provides:

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse
of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and
391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null
and void by a competent court. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or
dissolved or contracted under any of the three exceptional circumstances. It bears noting that the
marriage under any of these exceptional cases is deemed valid "until declared null and void by a
competent court." It follows that the onus probandi in these cases rests on the party assailing the
second marriage.44

In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15 consecutive years45 when
Bailon sought the declaration of her presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even a
requirement then for purposes of remarriage.46

Eminent jurist Arturo M. Tolentino (now deceased) commented:

Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the
validity of the second marriage, and the burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second
marriage to prove that the first marriage had not been dissolved; it is not enough to prove the first
marriage, for it must also be shown that it had not ended when the second marriage was
contracted. The presumption in favor of the innocence of the defendant from crime or wrong and of
the legality of his second marriage, will prevail over the presumption of the continuance of life of the
first spouse or of the continuance of the marital relation with such first spouse.47 (Underscoring
supplied)

Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable,48 it is terminated by final judgment of
annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in
the subsequent marriage.

Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus
Article 42 thereof provides:
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically
terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is
a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.

A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil
registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested
person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the
fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by the above-quoted provision of
the Family Code does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the
absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.49

If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by
affidavit or by court action, such absentees mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses
in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage.50 Since the second marriage has been
contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues
inspite of the spouses physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded
as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.51

If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of reappearance or by

judicial declaration but by death of either spouse as in the case at bar, Tolentino submits:

x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse, the effects of
dissolution of valid marriages shall arise. The good or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be
raised, because, as in annullable or voidable marriages, the marriage cannot be questioned except
in a direct action for annulment.52(Underscoring supplied)

Similarly, Lapuz v. Eufemio53 instructs:

In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83,
paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife
having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally believed
dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons
involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for
annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And
furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable
marriage must be carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse," as
expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment
proceeding.54 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct
proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and
not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage
had been perfectly valid.55 Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made
good ab initio.56

In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailons and respondents
marriage prior to the formers death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-
beneficiary of Bailon.
In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the other issues raised has been rendered
unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 161357. June 6, 2006]

ELENA P. DYCAICO v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM AND SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION

En Banc

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUNE 6, 2006

G.R. No. 161357 (Elena P. Dycaico v. Social Security System and Social Security Commission)

The Social Security System (SSS) and Social Security Commission (SSC) filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration of the Court's Decision dated November 30, 2005 declaring as void the proviso "as of the
date of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) of Republic Act No. 8282 (RA 8282) for being contrary to the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. The Court further held that the SSS could not deny
the claim of petitioner Elena P. Dycaico for survivor's pension on the basis of this invalid proviso.

Briefly, the facts are restated as follows:

Bonifacio S. Dycaico was a member of the SSS since January 24, 1980. In his self-employed data record, he
named Elena P. Dycaico (the petitioner) and their eight children as his beneficiaries. At that time, Bonifacio
and the petitioner were not married. Bonifacio was considered retired in June 1989 and began receiving his
monthly pension since then until he passed away on June 19, 1997. However, a few months before he died,
or on January 6, 1997, he married the petitioner.

Upon Bonifacio's death, the petitioner filed with the SSS an application for survivor's pension. Her
application was denied on the ground that under Section 12-B(d) of RA 8282 she could not be considered a
primary beneficiary of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement. The said provision reads:

Sec. 12-B. Retirement Benefits. -

xxxx

(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his retirement shall be
entitled to receive the monthly pension. ...

In the Court's Decision dated November 30, 2005, now sought to be reconsidered, the proviso "as of the
date of his retirement" was struck down for violating the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.

In gist, the Court ruled that the proviso violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it
impermissibly discriminates against those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to the SSS
members were contracted after the latter's retirement. The petitioner and those similarly situated, who
belong to this group of dependent spouses, are not entitled to survivor's pension under Section I2-B(d) of
RA 8282 by reason of the subject proviso. Further, the due process clause of the Constitution is infringed by
the proviso because it outrightly deprives those dependent spouses who married the SSS members after
their retirement of the survivor's pension, a property interest, without giving them an opportunity to be
heard. Their disqualification is based on the conclusive or "irrebutable" presumption created by the proviso
that marriages contracted after retirement are sham marriages or solely for the purpose of securing the
benefits under RA 8282. These dependent spouses are not afforded any opportunity to refute the presence
of the illicit purpose.

The SSS filed its Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the assailed Decision of the Court "if not corrected,
poses a strong threat to the financial viability of the SSS" and that "the SSS anticipates the possibility of
some unscrupulous members who might contract spurious marriage after the contingency (retirement) to
enable their spouse to claim the benefits under RA 8282 upon their anticipated death." [1] In support of this
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allegation, the SSS submitted the Report of Rizaldy T. Capulong, its Assistant Vice-President and Deputy
Chief Actuary, on the possible effect of the assailed Decision on the SSS fund.

The SSS argues that, like the beneficiary in a life insurance policy, the beneficiary under RA 8282 must have
an insurable interest upon the occurrence of the contingency. In the case of the petitioner, she was only the
common-law spouse of Bonifacio when he retired, which was the contingent event, according to the SSS,
and, therefore, no insurable interest existed. The SSS cites Article 2012 of the Civil Code which provides
that "any person forbidden from receiving any donation under Article 739[2] cannot be named beneficiary of
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a life insurance policy by the person who cannot make any donation to him." RA 8282 similarly prohibits a
common-law spouse from being named as a beneficiary of the member.

It is further contended that RA 8282 is the governing contract between the SSS and its members, and the
entitlement to benefits is dependent upon the conditions and requirements set forth therein. Section I2-
B(d), in particular, provides that the survivor's pension of a deceased retired member is given only to
primary beneficiaries as of the latter's date of retirement. The petitioner was not yet married to Bonifacio
when the latter retired; hence, no inchoate right to the benefit accrued to the petitioner because she was
not a primary beneficiary as required under RA 8282.

The SSS takes exception to the Court's application to the present case of the ruling in Government Service
Insurance System v. Montesclaros.[3] In the said case, the Court invalidated the proviso in Presidential
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Decree No. 1146 which stated that the "dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said pension if his
marriage with the pensioner is contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension."
It was held that this proviso violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
According to the SSS, the said proviso differs from the subject proviso in Section 12-B(d) of RA 8282
because in the former (the proviso in PD 1146) the restriction was imposed before the occurrence of the
contingency or retirement of the member. There was thus no substantial distinction between those
dependent spouses whose respective marriages to GSIS members were contracted within three (3) years
prior to the latter's retirement and those whose marriages were contracted beyond three (3) years prior to
retirement, which rendered the same violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

The SSS theorizes that, in contrast, the restriction occasioned by the proviso "as of the date of his
retirement" in Section 12-B(d) in RA 8282 is imposed after the occurrence of the contingency. There is
allegedly a substantial distinction between the two groups of dependent spouses since the interest of the
SSS member over his pension is perfected only upon the happening of the contingency, an interest which is
certainly subject to the regulations and limitations imposed by the SSS.

The SSS likewise disagrees with the Court's characterization of retirement benefits as property interest of
the pensioner as well as his or her surviving spouse. It quotes the following pronouncement in Social
Security System v. Davac:[4] cralaw

[T]he benefits accruing from membership in the Social Security System do not form part of the properties of
the conjugal partnership of the covered member. They are disbursed from a public special fund created by
Congress in pursuance to the declared policy of the Republic to develop, establish gradually and perfect a
social security system which x x x shall provide protection against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age
and death.

xxxx
[It] appears that the benefit receivable under the Act is in the nature of a special privilege or an
arrangement secured by the law, pursuant to the policy of the State to provide social security to the
workingmen. The amounts that may thus be received cannot be considered as property earned by the
member during his lifetime. His contribution to the fund, it may be noted, constitutes only an insignificant
portion thereof. Then, the benefits are specifically declared not transferable, and exempted from tax, legal
processes, and lien. Furthermore, in the settlement of claims thereunder the procedure to be observed is
governed not by the general provisions of law, but by rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission.
Thus, if money is payable to the estate of a deceased member, it is the Commission, not the probate or
regular court that determines the person or persons to whom it is payable. That the benefits under the
Social Security Act are not intended by the lawmaking body to form part of the estate of the covered
members may be gathered from the subsequent amendment to Section 15 thereof. x x x[5] cralaw

The SSS thus posits that the pension under RA 8282 cannot be considered as the members' protected
property or contractual rights which can no longer be regulated by the SSS. Otherwise, the SSS will merely
be a custodian of the members' fund without an arm to carry out the purpose for which it was created.

Finally, the SSS maintains that the petitioner was afforded due process as shown by the fact that she was
given the opportunity to file her claim and to prove her case before the SSS and SSC. Unfortunately, the
petitioner failed to adduce evidence and prove her case in both venues.

For its part, the SSC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, submits that the proviso "as of the date of
his retirement" does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it is applied
uniformly and equally to all dependent spouses of SSS members who contracted their respective marriages
after the latter's retirement.

The SSC opines that RA 8282 respects the sanctity of marriage as an institution and, consequently, provides
that only the legitimate spouse is classified and is entitled to support. The petitioner could not have qualified
as a primary beneficiary notwithstanding her designation as such by Bonifacio because she was not his legal
spouse at that time. Mere designation does not confer legitimacy to the union, nor does it ipso facto confer
upon her a primary beneficiary status.

The SSC expounds that the petitioner was only the common-law spouse of Bonifacio when he retired and,
therefore, not qualified to be his dependent and primary beneficiary under Section 8 (e) and (k) of RA 8282.
Nowhere in the law is a common-law spouse, even if designated, qualified to be a beneficiary. The
petitioner's subsequent marriage to Bonifacio allegedly had no retroactive effect except as to the
legitimation of their children.

The SSC asserts that the viability of the Social Security Fund is "the single most valid argument against the
declaration of unconstitutionality of the proviso "as of the date of his retirement."[6] The stability of the SSS
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must be assured and the actuarial soundness of its reserve fund must be guaranteed.

Echoing the stance of the SSS, the SSC contends that the case of Montesclaros[7] is not squarely applicable
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to the present case because Section 12-B(d) does not require a surviving spouse to be married to a member
for at least three (3) years prior to the latter's retirement. The provision only requires that the marriage
should have taken place anytime prior to retirement. The legitimacy of the relationship of the surviving
spouse to the member at the time of the first contingency is a condition sine qua non since the legal
spouse's inchoate right to the survivor's pension benefit accrues from the member's retirement. Like the
SSS, the SSC cites the case of Davac[8] in contending that the social security benefits are special privileges
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and cannot be considered as property interest of the members.

The SSS and the SSC thus urge the Court to reconsider its Decision dated November 30, 2005.

The Motions for Reconsideration are bereft of merit.

The Court shall first address the concern that the invalidation of the proviso "as of the date of his
retirement" in Section I2-B(d) of RA 8282 would adversely affect the SSS fund as to cause its possible
depletion. As stated by the SSC, this is "the single most valid argument against the declaration of
unconstitutionality" of the subject proviso. This argument is hardly persuasive. The Report of its Assistant
Vice-President and Deputy Chief Actuary attached by the SSS to its Motion for Reconsideration admits that it
is based on "theoretical computations only since we have no actual data currently available to use as a basis
for its actual computation. In particular, the retiree pensioners' database of the Actuarial Department does
not have information on civil status."[9] At best, therefore, the argument on the possible depletion of the
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fund is purely speculative or conjectural, utterly devoid of any basis.

Further, the Court does not subscribe to the scenario envisioned by the SSS of "the possibility of some
unscrupulous members who might contract spurious marriage after the contingency (retirement) to enable
their spouse[s] to claim the benefits under RA 8282." This view reveals a rather cynical and disdainful
attitude towards the men and women who diligently toil and contribute a portion of their monthly earnings
to the fund in order that they, as well as their beneficiaries, would have some relief in the event of disability,
illness, death and other contingencies resulting in the loss of income. The Court does not believe that these
men and women would be so unscrupulous as to enter into sham marriages after retirement just so their
respective partners to the chicanery would enjoy the survivorship pension under RA 8282.

Even granting arguendo that there are such unscrupulous members, the burden is on the SSS to prove that
marriages contracted after retirement were so entered for an illicit purpose, i.e., solely for the purpose of
receiving the benefits under RA 8282. The outright disqualification of surviving spouses whose respective
marriages to the SSS members were valid, albeit contracted after the latter's retirement, from entitlement
to the survivorship pension by reason of the proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) is
repugnant not only to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, but also to its social
justice policy.

That the fund has to be protected has been considered by the Court as a trite excuse[10] and, in this case, it
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is not a cogent argument vis-a-vis the constitutional infringements occasioned by the subject proviso.

The SSS and SSC likewise harp on the fact that when Bonifacio designated the petitioner as one of his
beneficiaries, together with their children, they were not married at that time. Accordingly, the designation
is allegedly void. However, it should be pointed out that the petitioner's entitlement to the survivor's pension
does not arise from such designation. Rather, her entitlement to survivorship pension is based on the fact
that, at the time of Bonifacio's death, she was his dependent spouse. In other words, regardless of the said
invalid designation, the petitioner was the dependent spouse of Bonifacio by reason of their valid marriage
to each other.

The SSS and the SSC classify the survivorship pension applied for by the petitioner as a death benefit.
Hence, the contingency[11] that gives rise to the petitioner's entitlement thereto is the death of Bonifacio,
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not his retirement, as erroneously asserted by 'the SSS and the SSC. At the time when the contingency
occurred, i.e., Bonifacio's death, the petitioner was his "primary beneficiary" following Section 8(k) of RA
8282 which enumerates the primary beneficiaries of the member as follows:

(1) the dependent spouse until he or she remarries;

(2) the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children.

In relation thereto, Section 8(e) thereof qualifies the dependent spouse and dependent children as follows:

(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;

(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully
employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is
congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support,
physically or mentally.

There is no question that the petitioner was the dependent spouse of Bonifacio who was likewise his legal
spouse entitled by law to receive support from him. Accordingly, as Bonifacio's primary beneficiary at the
time of his death, the petitioner is entitled to the survivor's pension under RA 8282.

The SSS likens the beneficiary under RA 8282 to the beneficiary in a life insurance policy. It then cites
Article 2012 of the Civil Code which provides that "any person forbidden from receiving any donation under
Article 739 cannot be named beneficiary of a life insurance policy by the person who cannot make any
donation to him." The analogy and cited provisions of law are not quite apt. On this point, the Court stated
in Davac:

Without deciding whether the naming of a beneficiary of the benefits accruing from membership in the
Social Security System is a donation, or that it creates a situation analogous to the relation of an insured
and the beneficiary under a life insurance, it is enough, for the purpose of the instant case, to state that the
disqualification mentioned in Article 739 is not applicable to herein Candelaria Davac because she was not
guilty of concubinage, there being no proof that she had knowledge of the previous marriage of her
husband.[12]cralaw

In the same manner, it is not necessary in this case to resolve whether a beneficiary under RA 8282
partakes the nature of a beneficiary in life insurance policy and, therefore, the same qualification and
disqualifications should be applied. As earlier intimated, the petitioner's entitlement to the survivor's pension
is not by reason of Bonifacio's designation of her as his beneficiary but because at the time of his death, she
was his dependent spouse and, consequently, his primary beneficiary. In any case, Article 739[13] of the cralaw

Civil Code is not likewise applicable to the present case because, and this should be stressed, the SSS and
SSC have not established that the petitioner was guilty of concubinage. What only appears from the records
of the present case is that from 1980, when Bonifacio designated the petitioner as one of his beneficiaries,
up to 1997, they lived together as common-law spouses. There is nothing in the records, however, that
shows that Bonifacio and the petitioner were guilty of adultery and concubinage, respectively. It has not
been established that prior to his marriage to the petitioner, Bonifacio had a valid and subsisting marriage
with another woman.

Relying on Davac, the SSS and SSC disagree with the Court's characterization of the retirement benefits and
survivorship pension as property interest falling within the ambit of the due process clause of the
Constitution. The SSS and SSC have clearly misread Davac. A careful perusal thereof reveals that the Court
therein merely declared that death benefits do not form part of the conjugal partnership of the covered
member. It did not, in any way, make any pronouncement that death benefits are not considered property
interest.

A review of the facts obtaining in Davac would readily show its inapplicability to the present case. Petronilo
Davac became a member of the SSS on September 1, 1957. He designated Candelaria Davac as his
beneficiary indicating in the SSS form that he filed on November 21, 1957 that she was his "wife''. Petronilo
died less than two years later on April 5, 1959. It appeared that he contracted two marriages during his
lifetime, the first with claimant Lourdes Tuplano on August 29, 1946; and the second with claimant
Candelaria on January 18, 1949. Both Lourdes and Candelaria filed their respective claims for death benefits
with the SSS.

The SSC declared Candelaria as the person entitled to receive the death benefits payable for the death of
Petronilo. Lourdes questioned the said decision alleging that the designation of Candelaria, the bigamous
"wife," was null and void because (1) it contravenes the provisions of the Civil Code; and (2) it deprives the
lawful wife of her share in the conjugal property as well as of her own and her child's legitimate in the
inheritance.

The Court affirmed the SSC's decision as it declared Candelaria to be the person entitled to receive the
death benefits. It reasoned that under the law in force at the time,[14] the beneficiary "as recorded" by the
cralaw

employee's employer is the one entitled to the death benefits of the covered employee. It ruled that the
disqualification mentioned in Article 739 was not applicable to Candelaria because she was not guilty of
concubinage, there being no proof that she had knowledge of the previous marriage of her husband. It also
dismissed the second contention of Lourdes, i.e., that she was deprived of her share in the conjugal
property, by holding that death benefits do not form part of the properties of the conjugal partnership of the
covered member. In short, under the law then in effect, if there was a named beneficiary and the
designation was not invalid, it was not the heirs of the employee who are entitled to receive the benefits.

It bears reiterating that unlike in Davac, in the present case, the petitioner's entitlement to the survivor's
pension is based on the fact that she was Bonifacio's dependent spouse at the time of his death and,
therefore, his primary beneficiary in consonance of the definition of the term under Section 8 (e) and (k) of
RA 8282.
As explained by the Court in the Decision of November 30, 2005, the retirement and death benefits,
including the survivor's pension, in RA 8282 are property interest in the sense that the members who have
contributed to the SSS fund cannot be deprived of the pension and death benefits without due process of
law. On account of the employees' mandatory contributions to the said fund, these benefits have ceased to
be considered as mere gratuity but form part of employees' contractual compensation. A protected interest
in retirement benefits arises when the employee actually retires.[15] At that point, a retiree who meets the
cralaw

eligibility requirements acquires an interest protected by the due process clause in benefits at the level
provided by the law in effect at the time he or she becomes eligible.[16] Following the demise of her
cralaw

husband, a widow's right to receive a pension is also an element of the husband's contractual
compensation.[17] It is the light that the retirement and death benefits, including the survivor's pension, in
cralaw

RA 8282 are property interest protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. As the dependent
spouse of Bonifacio entitled by law to receive support from him, the petitioner has indubitably acquired a
property interest in the survivor's pension. As such, compassion for the petitioner in this case is not a dole
out but a right.[18] cralaw

The subject proviso's infringement of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution has
already been amply discussed by the Court in the Decision of November 30, 2005. It sees no need to
reiterate the same.

WHEREFORE, the respective Motions for Reconsideration of the Social Security System and the Social
Security Commission are DENIED with FINALITY. They are DIRECTED to release forthwith petitioner
Elena P. Dycaico's survivor's benefits upon finality of the Decision in this case.

Very truly yours,

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, G.R. No. 165546

Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET CALLEJO, SR., and
H. AGUAS, and minor JEYLNN CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
H. AGUAS, represented by her
Legal Guardian, ROSANNA Promulgated:
H. AGUAS,
Respondents. February 27, 2006

x--------------------------------------------------x
 DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court

of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66531 and its Resolution denying the motion
for reconsideration thereof.

The antecedents are as follows:

Pablo Aguas, a member of the Social Security System (SSS) and a

pensioner, died on December 8, 1996. Pablos surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas,
filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits on December 13, 1996. Rosanna
indicated in her claim that Pablo was likewise survived by his minor child, Jeylnn,
who was born on October 29, 1991.[2] Her claim for monthly pension was settled
on February 13, 1997.[3]

Sometime in April 1997, the SSS received a sworn letter[4] dated April 2,
1997 from Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablos sister, contesting Rosannas claim for
death benefits. She alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family abode
approximately more than six years before, and lived with another man on whom
she has been dependent for support. She further averred that Pablo had no legal
children with Rosanna, but that the latter had several children with a certain
Romeo dela Pea. In support of her allegation, Leticia enclosed a notarized copy of
the original birth certificate[5] of one Jefren H. dela Pea, showing that the latter was
born on November 15, 1996 to Rosanna Y. Hernandez and Romeo C. dela Pea, and
that the two were married on November 1, 1990.

As a result, the SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and Jeylnns monthly
pension in September 1997. It also conducted an investigation to verify Leticias
allegations. In a Memorandum[6] dated November 18, 1997, the Social Security
Officer who conducted the investigation reported that, based on an interview with
Mariquita D. Dizon, Pablos first cousin and neighbor, and Jessie Gonzales (also a
neighbor). She learned that the deceased had no legal children with
Rosanna; Jenelyn[7] and Jefren were Rosannas children with one Romeo C. dela
Pea; and Rosanna left the deceased six years before his death and lived with
Romeo while she was still pregnant with Jenelyn, who was born on October 29,
1991. Mariquita also confirmed that Pablo was not capable of having a child as he
was under treatment.

On the basis of the report and an alleged confirmation by a certain Dr.

Manuel Macapinlac that Pablo was infertile, the SSS denied Rosannas request to
resume the payment of their pensions. She was advised to refund to the SSS within
30 days the amount of P10,350.00 representing the total death benefits released to
her and Jenelyn from December 1996 to August 1997 at P1,150.00 per month.[8]

Rosanna and Jeylnn, through counsel, requested for a reconsideration of the

said decision.[9] However, in its Letter dated February 6, 1998, the SSS denied the
claim.[10]

This prompted Rosanna and Jeylnn to file a claim/petition for the

Restoration/Payment of Pensions with the Social Security Commission (SSC)
on February 20, 1998.[11]Janet H. Aguas, who also claimed to be the child of the
deceased and Rosanna, now joined them as claimant. The case was docketed as
SSC Case No. 3-14769-98.

The claimants appended to their petition, among others, photocopies of the

following: (1) Pablo and Rosannas marriage certificate; (2) Janets certificate of live
birth; (3) Jeylnns certificate of live birth; and (4) Pablos certificate of death.

In its Answer, the SSS averred that, based on the sworn testimonies and
documentary evidence showing the disqualification of the petitioners as primary
beneficiaries, the claims were barren of factual and legal basis; as such, it was
justified in denying their claims.[12]

In their Position Paper, the claimants averred that Jeylnn was a legitimate
child of Pablo as evidenced by her birth certificate bearing Pablos signature as
Jeylnns father. They asserted that Rosanna never left Pablo and that they lived
together as husband and wife under one roof. In support thereof, they attached a
Joint Affidavit[13] executed by their neighbors, Vivencia Turla and Carmelita
Yangu, where they declared that Rosanna and Pablo lived together as husband and
wife until the latters death. In Janets birth certificate, which was registered in the
Civil Registry of San Fernando, it appears that her father was Pablo and her mother
was Rosanna. As to the alleged infertility of Pablo, the claimants averred that Dr.
Macapinlac denied giving the opinion precisely because he was not an expert on
such matters, and that he treated the deceased only for tuberculosis. The claimant
likewise claimed that the information the SSS gathered from the doctor was
privileged communication.[14]

In compliance with the SSCs order, the SSS secured Confirmation

Reports[15] signed by clerks from the corresponding civil registers confirming (1)
the fact of marriage between Pablo and Rosanna on December 4, 1977; (2) the fact
of Jefren dela Peas birth on November 15, 1996; (3) the fact of Jeylnns birth on
October 29, 1991; and (4) the fact of Pablos death on December 8, 1996.

The SSC decided to set the case for hearing. It also directed the SSS to
verify the authenticity of Pablos signature as appearing on Jeylnns birth certificate
from his claim records, particularly his SSS Form E-1 and retirement benefit
application.[16] The SSS complied with said directive and manifested to the SSC
that, based on the laboratory analysis conducted, Pablos signature in the birth
certificate was made by the same person who signed the members record and other
similar documents submitted by Pablo.[17]

The SSC then summoned Vivencia Turla, Carmelita Yangu and Leticia
Aguas-Macapinlac for clarificatory questions with regard to their respective sworn
affidavits.[18]Vivencia testified that she had known Pablo and Rosanna for more
than 30 years already; the couple were married and lived in Macabacle,
Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga; she was a former neighbor of the spouses, but
four years after their marriage, she (Vivencia) and her family moved to Sto. Nio
Triangulo, San Fernando, Pampanga; she would often visit the two, especially
during Christmas or fiestas; the spouses real child was Jeylnn; Janet was only an
adopted child; the spouse later transferred residence, not far from their old house,
and Janet, together with her husband and son, remained in the old house.[19]

On the other hand, Carmelita testified that she had been a neighbor of Pablo
and Rosanna for 15 years and that, up to the present, Rosanna and her children,
Janet, Jeylnn and Jefren, were still her neighbors; Janet and Jeylnn were the
children of Pablo and Rosanna but she did not know whose child Jefren is.[20]

According to Leticia, Janet was not the real child of Pablo and Rosanna; she
was just taken in by the spouses because for a long time they could not have
children;[21]however, there were no legal papers on Janets adoption.[22] Later on,
Rosanna got pregnant with Jeylnn; after the latters baptism, there was a commotion
at the house because Romeo dela Pea was claiming that he was the father of the
child and he got mad because the child was named after Pablo; the latter also got
mad and even attempted to shoot Rosanna; he drove them away from the house;
since then, Pablo and Rosanna separated;[23] she knew about this because at that
time their mother was sick, and she would often visit her at their ancestral home,
where Pablo and Rosanna were also staying; Rosanna was no longer living in their
ancestral home but Janet resided therein; she did not know where Rosanna was
staying now but she knew that the latter and Romeo dela Pea were still living
together.[24]

Subsequently, Mariquita Dizon and Jessie Gonzales were also summoned

for clarificatory questions.[25] During the hearing, Mariquita brought with her
photocopies of two baptismal certificates: that of Jeylnn Aguas, [26] child of Pablo
Aguas and Rosanna Hernandez born on October 29, 1991, and that of Jenelyn H.
dela Pea,[27] child of Romeo dela Pea and Rosanna Hernandez, born on January 29,
1992.

On March 14, 2001, the SSC rendered a decision denying the claims for lack
of merit and ordering Rosanna to immediately refund to the SSS the amount
of P10,350.00 erroneously paid to her and Jeylnn as primary beneficiaries of the
deceased. The SSC likewise directed the SSS to pay the death benefit to qualified
secondary beneficiaries of the deceased, and in their absence, to his legal heirs.[28]

The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as primary beneficiary,
it appearing that she had contracted marriage with Romeo dela Pea during the
subsistence of her marriage to Pablo. The SSC based its conclusion on the birth
certificate of Jefren dela Pea stating that his mother, Rosanna, and father, Romeo
dela Pea, were married on November 1, 1990. The SSC declared that Rosanna had
a child with Romeo dela Pea while she was still married to Pablo (as evidenced by
the baptismal certificate of Jenelyn H. dela Pea showing that she was the child of
Rosanna Hernandez and Romeo dela Pea and that she was born on January 29,
1992). The SSC concluded that Rosanna was no longer entitled to support from
Pablo prior to his death because of her act of adultery. As for Jeylnn, the SSC ruled
that, even if her birth certificate was signed by Pablo as her father, there was
more compelling evidence that Jeylnn was not his legitimate child. The SSC
deduced from the records that Jeylnn and Jenelyn was one and the same person and
concluded, based on the latters baptismal certificate, that she was the daughter of
Rosanna and Romeo dela Pea. It also gave credence to the testimonies of Leticia
and Mariquita that Jeylnn was the child of Rosanna and Romeo dela Pea. As for
Janet, the SSC relied on Leticias declaration that she was only adopted by Pablo
and Rosanna.[29]

The claimants filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision but
their motion was denied by the SSC for lack of merit and for having been filed out
of time.[30]The claimants then elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

On September 9, 2003, the CA rendered a decision in favor of

petitioners. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the resolution and order appealed from are

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is
entered DECLARING petitioners as ENTITLED to the SSS benefits
accruing from the death of Pablo Aguas. The case is
hereby REMANDED to public respondent for purposes of computing
the benefits that may have accrued in favor of petitioners after the same
was cut and suspended in September 1997.

SO ORDERED.[31]

In so ruling, the CA relied on the birth certificates of Janet and Jeylnn

showing that they were the children of the deceased. According to the appellate
court, for judicial purposes, these records were binding upon the parties, including
the SSS. These entries made in public documents may only be challenged through
adversarial proceedings in courts of law, and may not be altered by mere
testimonies of witnesses to the contrary. As for Rosanna, the CA found no
evidence to show that she ceased to receive support from Pablo before he died.
Rosannas alleged affair with Romeo dela Pea was not properly proven. In any case,
even if Rosanna married Romeo dela Pea during her marriage to Pablo, the same
would have been a void marriage; it would not have ipso facto made her not
dependent for support upon Pablo and negate the presumption that, as the surviving
spouse, she is entitled to support from her husband.[32]

The SSS filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, which the CA
denied for lack of merit.[33] Hence, this petition.

Petitioner seeks a reversal of the decision of the appellate court, contending

that it

I
GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ROSANNA AGUAS IS
ACTUALLY DEPENDENT FOR SUPPORT UPON THE MEMBER
DURING HIS LIFETIME TO QUALIFY AS PRIMARY
BENEFICIARY WITHIN THE INTENDMENT OF SECTION 8(e), IN
RELATION TO SECTION (k) OF THE SSS LAW, AS AMENDED.

II
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT JANET AGUAS AND JEYLNN
AGUAS ARE ENTITLED TO THE PENSION BENEFIT ACCRUING
FROM THE DEATH OF PABLO AGUAS.[34]

Petitioner invokes Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by

Presidential Decree No. 735, which defines a dependent spouse as the legitimate
spouse dependent for support upon the employee. According to petitioner, Rosanna
forfeited her right to be supported by Pablo when she engaged in an intimate and
illicit relationship with Romeo dela Pea and married the latter during her marriage
to Pablo. Such act constitutes abandonment, which divested her of the right to
receive support from her husband. It asserts that her act of adultery is evident from
the birth certificate of Jefren H. dela Pea showing that he was born on November
15, 1996 to Rosanna and Romeo dela Pea. Petitioner submits that Rosanna cannot
be considered as a dependent spouse of Pablo; consequently, she is not a primary
beneficiary.[35]
 As for Janet and Jeylnn, petitioner maintains that they are not entitled to the
pension because, based on the evidence on record, particularly the testimonies of
the witnesses, they are not the legitimate children of Pablo. It argues that, in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial authority under Section 5(a) of the Social Security
Act, the SSC can pass upon the legitimacy of respondents relationship with the
member to determine whether they are entitled to the benefits, even without
correcting their birth certificates.[36]

Respondents, for their part, assert that petitioner failed to prove that Rosanna
committed acts of adultery or that she married another man after the death of her
husband. They contend that Janet and Jeylnns legitimacy may be impugned only
on the grounds stated in Article 166 of the Family Code, none of which were
proven in this case.[37]

The issue to be resolved in this case is whether Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet
are entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo.

The petition is partly meritorious.

The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised by the parties
and passed upon by the Court in petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.[38] In an appeal via certiorari, the Court may not review the factual findings
of the CA.[39] It is not the Courts function under Rule 45 to review, examine, and
evaluate or weigh the probative value of the
[40]
evidence presented. However, the Court may review findings of facts in some
instances, such as, when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts,
when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court or quasi-judicial
agency, or when the findings of facts of the CA are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.[41] The Court finds these
instances present in this case.

At the time of Pablos death, the prevailing law was Republic Act No. 1161,
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 735. Section 13 of the law enumerates
those who are entitled to death benefits:
 Sec.13. Death benefits. Effective July 1, 1975, upon the covered
employees death, (a) his primary beneficiaries shall be entitled to the
basic monthly pension, and his dependents to the dependents pension:
Provided, That he has paid at least thirty-six monthly contributions prior
to the semester of death: Provided, further, That if the foregoing
condition is not satisfied, or if he has no primary beneficiaries, his
secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit
equivalent to thirty times the basic monthly pension: Provided, however,
That the death benefit shall not be less than the total contributions paid
by him and his employer on his behalf nor less than five hundred pesos:
Provided, finally, That the covered employee who dies in the month of
coverage shall be entitled to the minimum benefit.

Section 8(k) and (e), in turn, defines dependents and primary beneficiaries of
an SSS member as follows:

SECTION 8. Terms defined. For the purposes of this Act the

following terms shall, unless the context indicates otherwise, have the
following meanings:

xxxx

(e) Dependent. The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted

child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over twenty-one
years of age provided that he is congenitally incapacitated and incapable
of self-support physically or mentally; the legitimate spouse dependent
for support upon the employee; and the legitimate parents wholly
dependent upon the covered employee for regular support.

xxxx

(k) Beneficiaries. The dependent spouse until he remarries and

dependent children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries. In their
absence, the dependent parents and, subject to the restrictions imposed
on dependent children, the legitimate descendants and illegitimate
children who shall be the secondary beneficiaries. In the absence of any
of the foregoing, any other person designated by the covered employee
as secondary beneficiary.
 Whoever claims entitlement to such benefits should establish his or her right
thereto by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence, the quantum of evidence
required to establish a fact in cases before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies,
is that level of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.[42]

The Court has reviewed the records of the case and finds that only Jeylnn
has sufficiently established her right to a monthly pension.

Jeylnns claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which

bears the signature of Pablo. Petitioner was able to authenticate the certification
from the Civil Registry showing that she was born on October 29, 1991. The
records also show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on December 4, 1977 and
the marriage subsisted until the latters death on December 8, 1996. It is therefore
evident that Jeylnn was born during Rosanna and Pablos marriage.

It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code, children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. This Court,
in De Jesus v. Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon,[43] extensively discussed
this presumption

There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly

established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing
reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate.
This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof
that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during
the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth
of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have
sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife
are living separately in such way that sexual intercourse is not possible;
or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual
intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set
forth in Article 170,[44] and in proper cases Article 171,[45] of the Family
Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the
legitimacy of the child would no longer be legally feasible and the status
conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.[46]
 Indeed, impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the
husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs.[47] In this case, there is no showing that
Pablo challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime. Hence, Jeylnns
status as a legitimate child of Pablo can no longer be contested.

The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed by her birth

certificate bearing Pablos signature, which was verified from his specimen
signature on file with petitioner. A birth certificate signed by the father is a
competent evidence of paternity.[48]

The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164, however, can not extend
to Janet because her date of birth was not substantially proven. Such presumption
may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that
the childs parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth
occurred during the subsistence of that marriage.[49] It should be noted that
respondents likewise submitted a photocopy of Janets alleged birth
certificate. However, the Court cannot give said birth certificate the same probative
weight as Jeylnns because it was not verified in any way by the civil register. It
stands as a mere photocopy, without probative weight. Unlike Jeylnn, there was no
confirmation by the civil register of the fact of Janets birth on the date stated in the
certificate.

In any case, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts
contained therein.[50] Here, the witnesses were unanimous in saying that Janet was
not the real child but merely adopted by Rosanna and Pablo. Leticia also testified
that Janets adoption did not undergo any legal proceedings; hence, there were no
papers to prove it. Under Section 8(e) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, only
legally adopted children are considered dependent children. Absent any proof that
the family has legally adopted Janet, the Court cannot consider her a dependent
child of Pablo, hence, not a primary beneficiary.

On the claims of Rosanna, it bears stressing that for her to qualify as a primary
beneficiary, she must prove that she was the legitimate spouse dependent for
support from the employee. The claimant-spouse must therefore establish two
qualifying factors: (1) that she is the legitimate spouse, and (2) that she is
dependent upon the member for support. In this case, Rosanna presented proof to
show that she is the legitimate spouse of Pablo, that is, a copy of their marriage
certificate which was verified with the civil register by petitioner. But whether or
not Rosanna has sufficiently established that she was still dependent on Pablo at
the time of his death remains to be resolved. Indeed, a husband and wife are
obliged to support each other,[51] but whether one is actually dependent for support
upon the other is something that has to be shown; it cannot be presumed from the
fact of marriage alone.

In a parallel case[52] involving a claim for benefits under the GSIS law, the
Court defined a dependent as one who derives his or her main support from
another. Meaning, relying on, or subject to, someone else for support; not able to
exist or sustain oneself, or to perform anything without the will, power, or aid of
someone else. It should be noted that the GSIS law likewise defines a dependent
spouse as the legitimate spouse dependent for
support upon the member or pensioner. In that case, the Court found it obvious that
a wife who abandoned the family for more than 17 years until her husband died,
and lived with other men, was not dependent on her husband for support, financial
or otherwise, during that entire period. Hence, the Court denied her claim for death
benefits.

The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already separated de

facto from her husband cannot be said to be dependent for support upon the
husband, absent any showing to the contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that the
husband and wife were still living together at the time of his death, it would be safe
to presume that she was dependent on the husband for support, unless it is shown
that she is capable of providing for herself.

Rosanna had the burden to prove that all the statutory requirements have
been complied with, particularly her dependency on her husband for support at the
time of his death. Aside from her own testimony, the only evidence adduced by
Rosanna to prove that she and Pablo lived together as husband and wife until his
death were the affidavits of Vivencia Turla and Carmelita Yangu where they made
such declaration.

Still, the affidavits of Vivencia and Carmelita and their testimonies before
the SSC will not prevail over the categorical and straightforward testimonies of the
other witnesses who testified that Rosanna and Pablo had already separated for
almost six years before the latter died. Except for the bare assertion of Carmelita
that the couple never separated, there was no further statement regarding the
witnesses assertion in their affidavits that the couple lived together until Pablos
death. On the contrary, Leticia narrated that the two separated after Jeylnns
baptism as a result of an argument regarding Romeo dela Pea. According to
Leticia, there was a commotion at their ancestral house because Romeo dela Pea
was grumbling why Jeylnn was named after Pablo when he was the father, and as a
result, Pablo drove them away. The SSCs observation and conclusion on the two
baptismal certificates of Jeylnn and Jenelyn convinces this Court to further believe
Leticias testimony on why Pablo and Rosanna separated. As noted by the SSC:

It appears from the records that Jeylnn Aguas and Jenelyn H. dela
Pea are one and the same person. Jeylnn Aguas, born on October 29,
1991 was baptized at the Metropolitan Cathedral of San Fernando,
Pampanga, on November 24, 1991 as the child of Pablo Aguas and
Rosanna Hernandez. Jenelyn H dela Pea, on the other hand, was born
on January 29, 1992 to spouses Rosanna Hernandez and Romeo dela Pea
and baptized on February 9, 1992. It will be noted that Jenelyn dela Pea
was born approximately three months after the birth of Jeylnn Aguas. It
is physically impossible for Rosanna to have given birth successively to
two children in so short a time. x x x The testimony of Leticia Aguas-
Macapinlac that Rosanna was driven away by Pablo after the baptism of
Jeylnn because of the commotion that was created by Romeo dela Pea
who wanted Jeylnn to be baptized using his name explains why Jeylnn
was again baptized in the Parish of Sto. Nio in San Fernando using the
name Jenelyn dela Pea. They changed her date of birth also to make it
appear in the record of the parish that she is another child of Rosanna.[53]

On the other hand, Mariquita categorically affirmed that Rosanna was no

longer living at Pablos house even before he died, and that she is still living with
Romeo dela Pea up to the present. Mariquita testified as follows:

Hearing Officer:
Nagsama ba si Rosanna at Romeo?
Mrs. Dizon:
Ngayon at kahit na noon.

Hearing Officer:
Kailan namatay si Pablo?
Mrs. Dizon:
1996.
Hearing Officer:
Noong bago mamatay si Pablo?
Mrs. Dizon:
Nagsasama na sila Romeo at Rosanna noon.

Hearing Officer:
So, buhay pa si Pablo
Mrs. Dizon:
. nagsasama na sila ni Romeo.

Hearing Officer:
Kailan nagkahiwalay si Romeo at Rosanna?
Mrs. Dizon:
Hindi na sila nagkahiwalay.

Hearing Officer:
Hindi, ibig ko sabihin si Pablo at Rosana?
Mrs. Dizon:
Hindi ko alam kasi hindi ako madalas pumunta sa kanila eh, dahil
namatay na yung nanay ni Kuya Pabling, yung tiyahin ko, kapatid ng
nanay ko. Noon madalas ako noong buhay pa yung nanay ni Kuya
Pabling dahil kami ang nag aalaga sa kanya.

Hearing Officer:
Bago namatay si Pablo, nagsasama ba sina Romeo at Rosanna?
Mrs. Dizon:
Oo.

Hearing Officer:
Sa ngayon, may alam ka pa ba kung nagsasama pa sila Romeo at
Rosanna?
Mrs. Dizon:
Oo, nagsasama sila, may bahay sila.

Hearing Officer:
Saan naman?
Mrs. Dizon:
Doon sa malapit sa amin sa may riles ng tren.[54]
 In conclusion, the Court finds that, among respondents, only Jeylnn is
entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo, as it was
established that she is his legitimate child. On the other hand, the records show that
Janet was merely adopted by the spouses, but there are no legal papers to prove it;
hence, she cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary. Finally, while Rosanna was the
legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary
since she failed to present any proof to show that at the time of his death, she was
still dependent on him for support even if they were already living separately.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Only Jeylnn H. Aguas is declared
entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo Aguas.

SO ORDERED.

YOLANDA SIGNEY, G.R. No. 173582

Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, VELASCO, JR., JJ.
EDITHA ESPINOSA-CASTILLO,
and GINA SERVANO, represen- Promulgated:
tative of GINALYN and RODELYN
SIGNEY,
Respondents. January 28, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
 DECISION
TINGA, J:

We are called to determine who is entitled to the social security benefits of a

Social Security System (SSS) member who was survived not only by his legal
wife, but also by two common-law wives with whom he had six children.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure assails the 31 March 2004 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals
affirming the resolution of the Social Security Commission (SSC), [3] as well as
the 23 July 2004 Resolution[4] of the same court denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

The facts as culled from the records are as follows:

Rodolfo Signey, Sr., a member of the SSS, died on 21 May 2001. In his
members records, he had designated Yolanda Signey (petitioner) as primary
beneficiary and his four children with her as secondary beneficiaries. On 6 July
2001, petitioner filed a claim for death benefits with the public respondent
SSS.[5] She revealed in her SSS claim that the deceased had a common-law wife,
Gina Servano (Gina), with whom he had two minor
children namey, Ginalyn Servano (Ginalyn), born on 13 April 1996,
and RodelynSigney (Rodelyn), born on 20 April 2000.[6]

Petitioners declaration was confirmed when Gina herself filed a claim for the
same death benefits on 13 July 2001 in which she also declared that both she and
petitioner were common-law wives of the deceased and that Editha Espinosa
(Editha) was the legal wife.
 In addition, in October 2001, Editha also filed an application for death
benefits with the SSS stating that she was the legal wife of the deceased.[7]

The SSS, through a letter dated 4 December 2001,[8] denied the death benefit
claim of petitioner. However, it recognized Ginalyn and Rodelyn, the minor
children of the deceased with Gina, as the primary beneficiaries under the SSS
Law. The SSS also found that the 20 March 1992 marriage between petitioner and
the deceased was null and void because of a prior subsisting marriage contracted
on 29 October 1967 between the deceased and Editha, as confirmed with the Local
Civil Registry of Cebu City.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition[9] with the SSC in which she attached a
waiver of rights[10] executed by Editha whereby the latter waived any/all claims
from National Trucking Forwarding Corporation (NTFC) under the supervision of
National Development Corporation (NDC), Social Security System (SSS) and
other (i)nsurance(b)enefits due to the deceased Rodolfo Signey Sr., who died
intestate on May 21, 2001 at Manila Doctors, and further declared that I am legally
married to Mr. Aquilino Castillo and not to Mr. Rodolfo P. Signey Sr.[11]

In a Resolution[12] dated 29 January 2003, the SSC affirmed the decision of

the SSS. The SSC gave more weight to the SSS field investigation and the
confirmed certification of marriage showing that the deceased was married
to Editha on 29 October 1967, than to the aforestated declarations of Editha in her
waiver of rights. It found that petitioner only relied on the waiver of Editha, as she
failed to present any evidence to invalidate or otherwise controvert the confirmed
marriage certificate. The SSC also found, based on the SSS field investigation
report dated 6 November 2001 that even if Editha was the legal wife, she was not
qualified to the death benefits since
she herself admitted that she was not dependent on her deceased husband for
support inasmuch as she was cohabiting with a certain Aquilino Castillo.[13]

Considering that petitioner, Editha, and Gina were not entitled to the death
benefits, the SSC applied Section 8(e) and (k) of Republic Act (RA) No. 8282, the
SSS Law which was in force at the time of the members death on 21 May 2001,
and held that the dependent legitimate and illegitimate minor children of the
deceased member were also considered primary beneficiaries. The records
disclosed that the deceased had one legitimate child, Ma. Evelyn Signey, who
predeceased him, and several illegitimate children with petitioner and with Gina.
Based on their respective certificates of live birth, the deceased SSS members four
illegitimate children with petitioner could no longer be considered dependents at
the time of his death because all of them were over 21 years old when he died on
21 May 2001, the youngest having been born on 31 March 1978. On the other
hand, the deceased SSS members illegitimate children with Gina were qualified to
be his primary beneficiaries for they were still minors at the time of his
death, Ginalyn having been born on 13 April 1996, and Rodelyn on 20 April
2000.[14]

The SSC denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in an

[15]
Order dated 9 April 2003. This order further elaborated on the reasons for the
denial of petitioners claims. It held that the mere designation of petitioner and her
children as beneficiaries by the deceased member was not the controlling factor in
the determination of beneficiaries. Sections 13, 8(e) and 8(k) of the SSS Law, as
amended, provide that dependent legal spouse entitled by law to receive support
from the member and dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and
illegitimate children of the member shall be the primary beneficiaries of the
latter.[16] Based on the certification dated 25 July 2001 issued by the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, the marriage of the deceased and Editha on 29
October 1967 at the Metropolitan Cathedral, Cebu City was duly registered under
LCR Registry No. 2083 on 21 November 1967. The SSS field investigation reports
verified the authenticity of the said certification.[17]

The SSC did not give credence to the waiver executed by Editha, which
manifested her lack of interest in the outcome of the case, considering that she was
not entitled to the benefit anyway because of her admitted cohabitation
with Aquilino Castillo. Moreover, the SSC held that considering that one of the
requisites of a valid waiver is the existence of an actual right which could be
renounced, petitioner in effect recognized that Editha had a right over the benefits
of the deceased thereby enabling her to renounce said right in favor of petitioner
and her children. The declaration by Editha that she was not married to the
deceased is not only contrary to the records of the Local Civil Registrar
of Cebu City which state that they were married on 29 October 1967 but also
renders nugatory the waiver of right itself, for if she was not married to the
deceased then she would have no rights that may be waived.

Petitioner had argued that the illegitimate children of the deceased with Gina
failed to show proof that they were indeed dependent on the deceased for support
during his lifetime. The SSC observed that Section 8(e) of the SSS Law, as
amended, provides among others that dependents include the legitimate,
legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not
gainfully employed, and has not reached 21 years of age. The provision vested the
right of the benefit to his illegitimate minor children, Ginalyn and Rodelyn,
irrespective of any proof that they had been dependent on the support of the
deceased.[18]

Petitioner appealed the judgment of the SSC to the Court of Appeals by

filing a Petition for Review[19] under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the SSC in its 31 March
2004 Decision. Resolving the determinative question of who between petitioner
and the illegitimate children of the deceased are the primary beneficiaries lawfully
entitled to the social security benefits accruing by virtue of the latters death, it held
that based on Section 8(e) of R. A. No. 8282, a surviving spouse claiming death
benefits as a dependent must be the legal spouse. Petitioners presentation of a
marriage certificate attesting to her marriage to the deceased was futile, according
to the appellate court, as said marriage is null and void in view of the previous
marriage of the deceased to Editha as certified by the Local Civil Registrar
of Cebu City.

The appellate court also held that the law is clear that for a child to be
qualified as dependent, he must be unmarried, not gainfully employed and must
not be 21 years of age, or if over 21 years of age, he is congenitally or while still a
minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically
or mentally. And in this case, only the illegitimate children of the deceased with
Gina namely, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, are the qualified beneficiaries as
they were still minors at the time of the death of their father. Considering petitioner
is disqualified to be a beneficiary and the absence of any legitimate children of the
deceased, it follows that the dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased
should be entitled to the death benefits as primary beneficiaries, the Court of
Appeals concluded.[20]

The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner in

a Resolution[21] dated 23 July 2004. It found that there was no new matter of
substance which would warrant a modification and/or reversal of the 31 March
2004 Decision.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner raises issues similar to the ones which have been adequately
resolved by the SSC and the appellate court. The first issue is whether petitioners
marriage with the deceased is valid. The second issue is whether petitioner has a
superior legal right over the SSS benefits as against the illegitimate minor children
of the deceased.

There is no merit in the petition.

We deemed it best not to disturb the findings of fact of the SSS which are
supported by substantial evidence[22] and affirmed by the SSC and the Court of
Appeals. Moreover, petitioner ought to be reminded of the basic rule that this
Court is not a trier of facts.[23]

It is a well-known rule that in proceedings before administrative bodies,

technical rules of procedure and evidence are not binding.[24] The important
consideration is that both parties were afforded an opportunity to be heard and they
availed themselves of it to present their respective positions on the matter in
dispute.[25] It must likewise be noted that under Section 2, Rule 1[26] of the SSC
Revised Rules of Procedure, the rules of evidence prevailing in the courts of
law shall not be controlling. In the case at bar, the existence of a prior

subsisting marriage between the deceased and Editha is supported by substantial

evidence. Petitioner, who has fully availed of her right to be heard, only relied on
the waiver of Editha and failed to present any evidence to invalidate or otherwise
controvert the confirmed marriage certificate registered under LCR Registry No.
2083 on 21 November 1967. She did not even try to allege and prove any infirmity
in the marriage between the deceased and Editha.

As to the issue of who has the better right over the SSS death benefits,
Section 8(e) and (k) of R. A. No. 8282[27] is very clear. Hence, we need only apply
the law. Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. This plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the
maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention), rests on the valid
presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly
express its intent by the use of such words as are found in the
statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or, from the words of a statute there
should be no departure.[28]

Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282 provides:

SEC. 8. Terms Defined.For the purposes of this Act, the following

terms shall, unless the context indicates otherwise, have the following
meanings:

xxx

(e) Dependents The dependent shall be the following:

 (1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the
member;

2) The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted, and illegitimate

child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached
twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age,
he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently
incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and

3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the

member.

xxx

(k) Beneficiaries The dependent spouse until he or she remarries,

the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate
children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries of the
member: Provided, That the dependent illegitimate children shall be
entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the share of the legitimate, legitimated
or legally adopted children: Provided, further, That in the absence of the
dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children of the
member, his/her dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to one
hundred percent (100%) of the benefits. In their absence, the dependent
parents who shall be the secondary beneficiaries of the member. In
the absence of all of the foregoing, any other person designated by
the member as his/her secondary beneficiary.

SEC. 13. Death Benefits. Upon the death of a member who has
paid at least thirty-six (36) monthly contributions prior to the semester of
death, his primary beneficiaries shall be entitled to the monthly
pension: Provided, That if he has no primary beneficiaries, his
secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit
equivalent to thirty-six (36) times the monthly pension. If he has not paid
the required thirty-six (36) monthly contributions, his primary or
secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit
equivalent to the monthly pension times the number of monthly
contributions paid to the SSS or twelve (12) times the monthly pension,
whichever is higher. (Emphasis supplied).
 Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish
his or her right thereto by substantial evidence. Since petitioner is disqualified to
be a beneficiary and because the deceased has no legitimate child, it follows that
the dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased shall be entitled to the
death benefits as primary beneficiaries. The SSS Law is clear that for a minor child
to qualify as a dependent,[29] the only requirements are that he/she must be below
21 years of age, not married nor gainfully employed.[30]

In this case, the minor illegitimate children Ginalyn and Rodelyn were born
on 13 April 1996 and 20 April 2000, respectively. Had the legitimate child of the
deceased and Editha survived and qualified as a dependent under the SSS
Law, Ginalyn and Rodelyn would have been entitled to a share equivalent to only
50% of the share of the said legitimate child. Since the legitimate child of the
deceased predeceased him, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, as the only qualified primary
beneficiaries of the deceased, are entitled to 100% of the benefits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals is AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.