Economics 201BSecond Half

Lecture 4, 3/18/10

The Robinson Crusoe Model: Simplest Model Incorporating Production

1 consumer

1 rm, owned by the consumer

Both the consumer and rm act as price-takers (silly in this model, but it shows how equilibrium

operates)

2 goods:

Leisure x1 , endowment L (24 hours per day)

Consumption goood x2 bananas, endowment = 0

p: price of bananas

q: quantity of bananas produced by rm

w: wage rate = price of labor

Production function f(z): z units of labor produces q = f(z) bananas. We assume f is strictly

concave; rst gather low-hanging bananas, then start climbing trees to gather, then tend plants to

increase yield

Firms prot: pq wz. Note that prot is a linear function of (q, z), the vector of inputs and outputs,

whether or not (q, z) is feasible. The rm maximizes prot over the feasible set, taking prices as

given

Labor demand z(p, w) chosen to maximize

pq wz = pf(z) wz

1
 taking p, w as given. First order condition

pf  (z) w = 0

Output q(p, w) = f(z(p, w))

Prot (p, w) = pq(p, w) wz(p, w)

Consumer owns rm, so receives the prot. Crusoes budget constraint is

px2 w(L x1) + (p, w)

Walrasian equilibrium prices are (p , w) such that markets clear:

x2 (p , w ) = q(p, w ) (banana market)

z(p , w ) = L x1(p , w ) (labor market)

In the previous diagram showing the rms problem, lines perpendicular to the price vector (w, p)

(note this is labelled incorrectly as (p, w) in MWG) are isoprot lines. Any two points on a given

isoprot line yield the same prot; this is true whether or not the point on the isoprot line is a feasible

production. In particular, if we consider the isoprot line through the rms prot-maximizing point
(p,w)
on its production set, the x2 intercept of this line must be p
.

The previous diagram superimposes the consumers problem on the rms problem. If x1 = L
(p,w)
(Crusoe gets no labor income), Crusoes income is (p, w), so Crusoe can purchase p
bananas,
 
so L, (p,w)
p
lies in Crusoes budget frontier. The isoprofit line through the firms profit-mazimizing

production is the consumers budget frontier!

2
 The previous diagram does not show an equilibrium conguration. For market clearing, require

x2 (p , w ) = q(p, w ) (banana market)

z(p , w ) = L x1(p , w ) (labor market)

Markets clear if and only if the firms profit-maxizing point and Crusoes demand point coincide. In

the diagram, Crusoe is supplying less labor than the rm is demanding, and Crusoe is consuming

fewer bananas than the rm is selling

In the following diagram, we dispense temporarily with the rm and look at the consumers overall

problem, in which Crusoe applies the technology directly without going through the structure of the

rm

Notice that Crusoes feasible set is just given by the production technology, so the feasible set is

nonlinear; it is not a budget set; each point in the feasible set is a feasible consumption for Crusoe.

What consumption would Crusoe choose? The economy has a unique(!) Pareto optimum, given by

the point of tangency between the feasible set and Crusoes indierence curve.

Second Welfare Theorem: If we choose (p , w) such that (w , p ) is perpendicular to the common

tangent at the Pareto Optimum, then rms prot-maximizing production and Crusoes demand

point coincide, so the unique Pareto Optimum is a Walrasian Equilibrium (without transfers); thats

the Second Welfare Theorem.

3
 First Welfare Theorem: If (p , w ) is a Walrasian Equilibrium Price, then rms prot-maximizing

point and Crusoes demand point coincide, (p , w ) supports this common point, so it is Pareto

Optimal

Arrow-Debreu Economy

L commodities, indexed by  = 1, . . . , L

I consumers, indexed by i = 1, . . . , I

Consumption sets Xi RL+

Endowments i RL+

Preference relations i on Xi , assumed complete and transitive

Social endowment

I

= i
i=1

= (1 , . . . , L )

J rms, indexed by j = 1, . . . , J

Production Sets Yj RL assumed closed and nonempty

Shareholdings: Consumer i owns share ij of rm j,

I

ij = 1 (for each j)
i=1

Income Transfer: An income transfer is T RI such that

I

Ti = 0 (Budget Balance)
i=1

Budget set:

J

Bi (p, y, T ) = x Xi : p x p i + ij p yj + Ti

j=1

Note the budget set depends on prices, the income transfer, and on the firms production decisions

4
 Demand:
 
Di (p, y, T ) = x Bi (p, y, T ) : x Bi(p,y,T ) x i x

An allocation

(x, y) = (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ )

is a specication of xi Xi (i = 1, . . . , I) and yj Yj (j = 1, . . . , J ); the allocation is feasible if

I
 J

xi = + yj
i=1 j=1

Notice that this is a vector equation (one equation for each of the L goods) and that we require

equality. The set of feasible allocations is denoted by A

Walrasian Equilibrium with Transfers: In the Arrow-Debreu economy, a Walrasian Equilibrium with

Transfers is a 4-tuple (p , x, y , T ) such that

1. T RI is an income transfer. We dont put an on T because T is not determined endogenously

by market-clearing

2. p is a price, i.e. p RL (dont require p RL+ )

3. for j = 1, . . . , J , yj Yj and

yj Yj p yj p yj (price-taking prot maximization)

4.

xi Di (p , y , T ) (price-taking preference maximization)

5
 5. (x , y ) is a feasible allocation, i.e.

I
 J

xi = + yj (market-clearing)
i=1 j=1

Pareto Optimality: A feasible allocation (x, y) is

Pareto Optimal if there is no other feasible allocation (x, y ) such that

xi i xi (i = 1, . . . , I)

xi
i xi (some i)

weakly Pareto Optimal if there is no other feasible allocation (x, y ) such that

xi
i xi (i = 1, . . . , I)

Note that the rms prots or preferences are not taken into account; only the welfare of the

consumers matters. But of course the production technology does play a role in determining whether

an allocation and a proposed Pareto improvement are feasible.