AVIATION SECURITY
An Indian Perspective
Historical Development
In the early years of independence, India suffered a set back when AI’s
Kashmir Princess was lost as there was a bomb on board.
IA aircraft was hijacked and destroyed in the wake of 1971 war with
Pakistan.
The hijacking of Indian Airline aircraft in 1976 led to the establishment of
the Pande Committee.
Need to have a separate entity to over-see aviation security was felt by
the Committee.
Separate Cell within DGCA was created for looking into aviation security
AI aircraft crash of 1985 (Kanishka) led to establishment of the Bureau of
Civil Aviation Security independent of DGCA.
Historical Development (Contd.)
Increasing involvement of India with ICAO in matters relating to
aviation security.
Submission of the Kirpal Commission Report on Kanishka crash
identifying gaps in the aviation security procedures requiring re-
look into Annex 17.
Participation of India in the Diplomatic Conference on adoption of
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at
Airports Serving International Civil Aviation (Montreal Supplemen-
tary Protocol,1988) after Rome and Vienna terrorist
attacks in 1985.
Historical Development (Contd.)
The Minister of Civil Aviation attending the Council
Meeting of ICAO held in February 1989 after Pan Am crash
at Lockerbie.
India’s Representative on the Council of ICAO was actively
associated with the Committee on Unlawful Interference.
Aviation Security mechanism was created at ICAO level with
funding from selected group of member States including
India.
Historical Development (Contd..)
Commissioner of Civil Aviation Security became a member of the
Aviation Security Panel (AVSEC).
BCAS established separate Unit for bomb disposal and explosives
detection.
Expert from BCAS became a member of the Ad Hoc Group of
Specialists on Detection Explosives.
India’s participation on the Legal committee on the proposed
international legal instrument on Marking of Plastic Explosives for
Detection.
India’s role the Diplomatic conference on Convention on Marking
of Plastic Explosives.
Ratification of international multilateral legal
instruments
• The Tokyo Convention,1963 (Convention on offences and
certain other acts committed on board aircraft)
• The Tokyo Convention Act,1975
• The Hague Convention,1970(Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft)
• The Anti Hijacking Act,1982
• The Montreal Convention,1971(Convention on the Supresson of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation)
• The Suppression of Unlawful ,Acts against safety of Civil
Aviation,1982
• Insertion of ICAO Model Aviation Security Clause in the
Bilateral Air Services Agreement after Kanishka Crash – in 1988
with UK and 1991 with Canada
• Time lag between the adoption of international instrument and
domestic legislation.
Bureau of Civil Aviation Security
• Role of BCAS was establishment of standards, procedures, regulations and
rules, training, inspection, and monitoring.
• The State Police was kept in charge of airport security.
• Dedicated force to be in charge of aviation security not encouraged in the early
eighties even after spate of hijacking, Kanishka crash and Pan Am Lockerbie.
• BCAS coordinated with State police and other Central Government Security
Establishments like NSG, BSF, CRPF etc.
• Expansion of BCAS to include bomb disposal and detection of Explosives after
AI Kanishka Crash, and Pa Am Lockerbie Crash.
• Aircraft Hijacking IA 814 in 1999 brought back the concept of exclusive force
for airport security.
• CISF was put in charge of airport security etc.
Functions & Organisation
• The Bureau is headed by the by an officer of the rank of Director General of
Police with Additional Commissioner, Deputy Commissioners, Assistant
Commissioners Controller of Explosives, Regional Offices.
• Laying down of standards for implementation of Annex 17.
• All security agencies of airport operators and airlines operators come within
purview.
• Monitoring of implementation of rules of aviation security.
• Surprise dummy checks and mock exercises for professional efficiency.
• Dedicated CISF Contingent earmarked for aviation security.It has been notified
as Aviation Security Group (ASG) to bring in unified work culture.
Functions & Organisation ...Contd..
• BCAS Guidelines for passengers and users
• Travel tips
• Travel Smart and Safe
• Permitted and Prohibited items
• Transporting Special items
• Traveling with children
• Special considerations
• Persons with disabilities and medical conditions
• Security Awareness
Training
• Basic Avsec Course
• Avsec Instructor’s Course
• Avsec Management Course
• Auditor’s Course
• Avsec Air Cargo Course
• Crisis Management Course
• Avsec Supervisor Course
• Avsec Profile Screening
• Sky Marshall Awareness
• X-Ray BIS
• Screeners’ Certification
ICAO Security Audit
• Establishment of ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Programme
(A32/11) included initially audit of Annex 1, 2 and 8.
• IUSOAP has expanded to include Annex 14 and 17.
• Aviation security programme of India was subject to ICAO
audit.
• In January 2005,Indira Gandhi International Airport was visited
by the audit team
Modernisation
• CISF provides facilities in its National Industrial Security
Academy simulators for X-Ray BIS, Explosive Vapors Detector,
Explosive Trace Detector and HHMD and DFMD.
• Mock airport, mini-runways and reception and security hold
areas against anti-sabotage and anti-hijacking exercise.
• Biometric scanner specification determined.
• Special law to handle aviation security different from existing
legal regime (Aircraft Act etc) contemplated some years back.
• Need to reduce the gap between adoption and ratification of
international treaties
Special features of threat to aviation security
• Growing terrorism getting cross-border assistance. Shoulder
fired missiles were threat during turmoil in Afghanistan.
• Possibility of threat from infiltration into the aviation sector.
Need for background and antecedent verification of personnel
entering aviation sector.
• Increasing transparency due to democratic culture of
governance making the border line between what should be in
public domain what should not be getting blurred.
• Modern communication system available to all.
Conclusions
• India has in place necessary organization and regulatory
system to ensure protection of aviation from unlawful
interference.
• Commitment exists to bring into line all standards, procedures,
regulations and rules in line with Annex 17.
• ICAO policy related to unlawful interference envisages prompt
adherence to international legal instruments(A33/2).There is
need for serious attention to this.
• All the procedures laid out at international and national airports
are within the ambit of Annex 17 and also in harmony with
Annex 9 as is the expectation of ICAO policy.
Outlook for the future
• Strength of a chain is known from its weakest link.
• Level of preparedness of the States having aviation
connectivity with a particular State is most crucial.
• Some are soft in their approach by culture, some are soft by
design, and some are soft as they cannot afford the cost.
• ICAO has a role to play.
• India should be more proactive in the international forum.
• IFFAS and IUSOAP should go hand in hand.
