Berbano vs Barcelona

1. Per Curiam. CJ, Davide but on leave.

2. Felicitas Barbano seeks the disbarment of Atty. Wenceslao Barcelona for Malpractice and Gross
Misconduct Unbecoming a Lawyer, Dereliction of Duty and Unjust Enrichment

3. Complaint alleges:

a) Barbano is one of the heirs of Rufino Esteban Hilapo, owner of a 244-hectare lot situated at
Alabang, Muntinlupa, which property was being claimed by Filinvest Dev. Corp in a case
pending with the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems. The heirs has
appoingted Porfirio Daen as an attorney-in-fact giving him authority to prosecute the case.

b) An attorney in fact takes two forms. The first type is a "general power of attorney," which
allows the attorney in fact to conduct all business and sign any document on behalf of the
principal. The second type is a "special power of attorney," which allows the person to sign
documents and conduct business on the principal's behalf only in specific situations. The
power of attorney document, in the case of a special power of attorney, outlines the
matters in which the attorney can act instead of the principal. It's important to note that an
attorney in fact does not need to be a practicing attorney, also known as an attorney at law.
As long as the power of attorney document is signed by the principal, it can appoint anyone
to be the attorney in fact, even family members.

c) January 26, 1999 - Daen was arrested by a Muntinlupa police on the strength of an expired
warrant of arrest issued on February 1990 (detained at Muntinlupa jail until February
February 18, 1999)

d) Complainants looked for a lawyer to assist in the release of Daen. Complainant’s friend
recommended Atty. Wenceslao Barcelona.

e) Subsequently, Daen engaged the services of Atty. Barcelona then Atty. Barcelona asked the
coplainant to produce P50K to cause the release of Daen from prison the following day.

f) Because it was already late in the evening, complainant can no longer produce said amount.
Complainant instead asked her relatives who were with her at that time to contribute. They
were able to raise the amount of P15,700.

g) When complainant haned the sum of money to Atty. Barcelona, the latter left because
accordinng to him, he would see a justice from the Supreme Court who could help the
release of Daen.

h) In their second meeting, Barcelona told them that he just came from the Supreme Court
where he fixed the case of Daen. However, he did not have with him any single document
at that time. Berbano then gave him a pay-to-cash check for P24K and told him that the
check can be encashed on the same day. Although he said that SC justices do not accept
check, he accepted it saying that he will have the same rediscounted.

i) Then the following morning, Barcelona called the complainant to sat that since he was
unable to have the check rediscounted, Berbano must produce the amount of P5K. In fact
Berbano did not only give P5K but P10K. The amount was given to the wife of Barcelona in
the presence of their daughter because Barcelona was not around when the complainants
went to the house of Barcelona.

j) When they arrived at Muntinlupa, there they saw Barcelona and informed him that the
amount of P10K was given to his wife. Barcelona informed them that he could not secure
the release of Daen because the check was not encashed. Gil Daen, a nephew of Daen, gave
him P15K in cash and Berbano gave him additional P1K for additional expenses.
 k) February 3, 1999 - the complainants saw Barcelona at Muntinlupa. Barcelona informed
them that he just came from the city jail where he had a conversation with Daen. Barcelona
told them that he was going to release from prison tomorrow. However, in the morning of
February 4, they were informed by the wife of Barcelona that Barcelona had left for
Mindana early on that morning on board a private plane allegedly to attend a peace talk
with the Muslims.

l) After more than a week, complainant went to Putatan, Muntinlupa and when she
confronted Barcelona, he told her not to worry and promised that he would return the
entire amount of P64K more or less. But the complainant never saw him since then.

3. Investigating Commissioner Virgilio Bautista of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP
required the respondent to submit his answer to the complaint. Despite due notice, respondent failed
to file his answer. Comm Bautista then was constrned to consider the respondent in default and
complainant was allowed to present her evidence ex parte.

4. Comm Bautista then found the respondent guilty of malpractice and serious breach of the CPR and
recommended that respondnet be disbarred and ordered to return the amount of P64K. The IBP
Board of Governors adopted Bautista’s findings but reduced the penalty to suspension from the
practice of law for six years.

5. Supreme Court:

a) SC disagreed with the penalty. Respondent must be disbarred from practice.

b) Complainant’s evidence consists solely of her Affidavit-Complaint and testimony before the
Commission attesting to the truth of the allegations in the affidavit. Bautista and IBP Board
of Governors found her testimony together with her affidavit sufficient to support the
finding that respondnet committed acts complained of.

c) The nonpresentation of the check given to respondnet does not affect the complainant’s
case as it will merely serve to corroborate her testimony and there is no law which requires
that the testimony of a signle witness needs corroboration except where the law expressly
mandates such corroboration which is not so required in administrative cases.

d) The act of respondent in not filing his answer and ignoring the hearings set by the
Commission, despite due notice, emphasized his contempt for legal proceedings. Thus, the
Court finds no compelling reason to overturn the Commissioner’s judgment.

e) Respondent is guilty of culpable violations of: Canons 1, 7, 11, and 16.

f) The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal processes and the
courts but also mandates the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with
clients and the moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary relationship. Instead
of promoting respect for law and the legal processes, respondent callously demeaned the
legal profession by taking money from a client under the pretext of having connections
with a member of the Court.

g) SC cited cases where it disbarred lawyers for violating the Code.

h) Respondent has demonstrated a penchant for misrepresenting to clients that he has the
proper connections to secure the relief they seek, and thereafter, ask for money, which will
allegedly be given to such connections. In this case, respondnet misrepresented to
complainant that he could get the release of Daen thru his connection with a SC justice. Not
only that, respondent had the audacity to tell complainant that justices of SC do not accept
checks.

i) Hence, Respondent placed the Court in dishonor and public contempt.

 j) The judiciary has been besieged enough with accusations of corruption and malpractice.
For a lawyer to stoke the embers of mistrust on the judicial system with such irresponsible
representations is reprehensible and cannot be tolerated.

k) When he misrepresented to complainant that he has connections with a member of the

court to accommodate his client and that justices of the court accept money.

6. DISPOSTIVE:

a) For gross misconduct, disbarred.

b) Ordered to return to complainant the amount of P64K within 30 days.

Licuanan vs Melo

1. CJ Fernan

2. November 11, 1981 -- An affidavit-complaint was filed by Leonila Licuanan with the Office of the
Court Administrator against respondent Manuel Melo for breach of professional ethics, alleging that
respondent, who was her counsel in an ejectment case filed against her tenant, failed to remit to
her the rentals collected by respondent on different dates over a 12-month period. It was only after
approximately a year from actual receipt that respondent turned over his collections to complainant
after the latter, through another counsel, acquired knowledge of the payment and had demanded the
same.

3. Respondent - admitted having received the payment of rentals from complainant’s tenant, Aida
Pineda, as alleged in the complaint, but explained that he kept this matter from the complainant for
the purpose of surprising her with his success in collecting the rentals.

4. The case was forwarded to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.

5. OSG:

a) ISSUE: whether there was unreasonable delay on the part of the respondent in accounting
for the funds collected by him from his former client.

b) Paragraph 11 of the Canons of Legal Ethics, he is obligated to report promptly the money of
client that has come to his possession and should not commingle it within his private
property or use it for his personal purpose without his client’s consent.

c) It is undisputed that the relation of attorney and client existed between Licuanan and Melo
at the time the incident took place.

d) August 1979 -- Licuanan’s lawyer obtained judgment in Licuanan’s favor against Aida Pineda
whereby the latter was directed by the City Court of Manila to pay Licuanan all her monthly
rentals from October 1978 and succeeding months thereafter.

e) After not hearing a word from Pineda, respondent sent a letter to her demanding that she
pay monthly rental of her apartment otherwise he will be constrained to take necessary
legal action against her to protect the interest of his client.

f) On February 1980, Pineda yielded to the demand of Melo. She went to respondent’s office
and paid him P3,060.00 for which respondent gave her receipt for the said amount
 representing her rental payments. At the end of March 1980, Pineda went again the
respondnet and paid the rentals of her apartment for the months of March and April in the
sum of P360.00. Respondent again received from Pineda rental payments ccovering May,
June, and July 1980 in the sum of P540. In September 1980, he received and issued Pineda
a receipt for P540 covering rentals for the months of Aug, Sept and Oct. After four months
had elapsed, he collected again from Pineda the total sum of P720 covering the months of
October, Nov, Dec and January.

g) During the entire 12 months that respondent had been receiving rental payments of
Pineda, he did not bother to inform or report to complainant about the said payments
and instead unnecessarily retained the money. He did not attempt to tell her about the
money that had come into his possession notwithstanding the fact that the complainant
used to call him and inquire regarding the case.

h) It was only when Atty. Ponciano Jacinto, the new counsel retained by complainant, wrote
respondent a letter advising him to surrender the money the complainant that he
accounted for it. But this was rather late because the complainant, not knowing that the
respondent had already been receiving rental payments from Pineda, had already filed a
complaint against Pineda.

i) This led Pineda to file a case against Licuanan for damages for she allegedly suffered
mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation arising
from the unfounded admin case Licuanan filed against Pineda.

j) Hence, it is very discernible that the respondent did not immediately surrender the money
to the complainant becayse he was using it for hiw own benefit. Common sense dictates
that by unnecessarily withholding the money for the complainant for such length of time,
respondent deprived her of the use of the same.

k) The respondent must know that the high fiduciary and confidential information of
attorney and client requires that the attorney should promptly account for all funds and
property received or held by him for the client’s benefit, and failure to do so constitutes
professional misconduct.

l) A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delat any many for money or malice and
is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. Money collected by a
lawyer in pursuant of a judgment in favor of his clients is held in trust and must be
immediately turned over to them.

m) The relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in its nature and of a
very delicate, exacting, and confidential in character requiring a high degree of fidelity
and good faith. In view of that relationship, lawyers are bound to promptly to account for
money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so
constitutes professional misconduct. The fact that a lawyer has a lien for fees on money in
his hands collected for his clients does not relieve him from the duty of promptly
accounting for the funds received.

n) By his deceitful conduct, he placed his client in jeopardy by becoming a defendant in a

damage suit; thus instead of being a help to his client, he became the cause of her misery.

o) Recommendation -- suspension from the practice of law for a period of not less than one
year.

5. Affirmed but modified the recommendation:

 a) Respondent has breached the trust reposed in him by his client. He has shown himself unfit
for the confidence and trust which should characterize an attorney-client relationship and
the practice of law.

b) By force of circumstances, complainant was further compelled to engage the services of

another counsel in order to recover the amount rightfully due her but which respondent
had unjustifiedly withheld from her.

c) Respondent is guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office.

d) Disbarred.

Sison vs Camacho

1. Actors:

a) Atty. Antero Sison, complainant, president of Marsman-Drysdale Agribusiness Holdings

(MDAHI)

b) Atty. Manuel Camacho

2. Complainant:

a) Sison was the counsel of MDAHI in an insurance claim action againts Pramount Life and
General Insurance Corp before the RTC.

b) Camacho met with Atty Enrique Dimaano, corporate secretary of MDAHI, and proposed to
increase their claim to P64M by taking into account the interests imposed. But such would
require additional docket fees in the amount of P1.2M. MDAHI agreed and granted the said
amount.

c) On May 27, 2011 Atty Dimaano gave the money for docket fees to Atty Camacho who
promised to issue a receipt for said amount, but never did.

d) May 26, 2011 -- RTC rendered a decision in favor of MDAHI granting its insurance claim plus
interests in the amount of P65M.

e) August 11, 2011 -- Atty camacho sent a letter to MDAHI recommending a settlement with
Paramount in the amount of P15M to prevent a protracted appeal with the appellate court.
MDAH refused the offer of compromise. Surprisingly, even without the written cconformity
of MDAHI, Camacho filed a Satisfaction of Judgment dated August 15, 2011, before the RTC
stating that the parties had entered into a compromise agreement.

f) August 18, 2011, Sison met with Camacho to clarify events that transpired. He asked
Camacho whether he paid the amount of P1.2M as additional docket fees, and the latter
replied that he simply gave it to the clerk of court as the payment period had lapsed.

g) Disappointed with the actions of Camacho, he sent a letter to Sison and that it was aganst
company policy to bribe any gvernment officia; and that MDAHI would only pay P200K to
Camacho as attorney’s fees.

3. Respondent’s Position:
 a) He stressed that he had authority to enter into the compromise agreement. The alleged
docket fees given to him by MDAHI formed part of his attorney’s fees.

b) He further stated that the judgment debt was paid and accepted by MDAHI without any
objection, as duly evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt. Thus there was no irregularity
in the compromise agreement.

c) With respect to the amount handed to him, Camacho averred that he filed a Motion to
Compel Plaintiff to Pay Attorney’s Fee on September 13, 2011 before the RTC. The Court
granted the motion on April 12, 2012 stating that the amount of P1.2M was considered as
part of his attorney’s fees.

d) June 6, 2012, RTC issued an order which said that only P300K was previously paid to
Camacho as fees and that the P1.2M which he received truly formed part of his unpaid
attorney’s fees. That the RTC order operated as res judicata in the present admin case. And
that MDAHI disregarded the RTC order as it filed an estafa case against him concerning the
amount of P1.2M.

4. Recommendations:

a) Respondent violated Rule 1.01 and Rule 16.01 of CP.

b) Recommending the imposition of the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of
law

c) Board of Governors adopted said recommendation.

d) Camacho filed a motion for reconsideration.

e) The Board partially granted the motion for reconsideration and dismissed, without
prejudice, the charge regarding the failure to account for the money, because it was
premature to act on such issue due to the pending criminal case against Atty. Camacho.

f) The penalty of one-year suspension imposed was lowered to six-month suspension from
the practice of law.

5. Supreme Court:

a) Camacho violated Rules 1.01 and 16.01.

b) These mandates apply especially to dealing of lawyers with their clients considering the
highly fiduciary nature of their relationship.

c) Article 1878 of the Civil Code -- special powers of attorney are necessary in: To compromise,
to submit questions to arbitration, to renounce the right to appeal from a judgment, to
waive objections to the venue of an action or to abandon a prescription already acquired.

d) Section 23, Rule 138, Rules of Court -- Attorney have authority to bind their clients in any
case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all
matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority,
compromise their client’s litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client’s claim but
the full amount in cash.

e) RTC awarded MDAHI P65M and when Paramount offered a compromise settlement in the
amount of P15M, MDAHI never consented to the offer. MDAHI did not sign the conforme
regarding the compromise agreement.

f) But despite lack of authority, Camacho agreed to a lower judgment award and filed a
satisafaction of judgment before the RTC, The pleading failed to bear the conformity of the
 client. MDAHI subsequently received the P15M from Paramount, but this does not erase
the transgression of Camacho in reaching the compromise agreement without prior
consent of his client.

g) Failing to account for the money of the client:

i. Sison alleged that MDAHI gave Camacho the amount of P1.2 M as payment of
additional docket fees but later failed to apply the same for its intended purpose.

ii. Camacho, on the other hand, invoked the RTC Order which declared the MDAHI
allegation as unsubstantiated, and claimed that the said amount formed part of his
attorney’s fees.

iii. The Board meanwhile opined that it was still premature to decide such issue because
of the pending estafa case filed by MDAHI against Camacho involving the amount of
P1.2M.

iv. SC: not premature because disbarment proceeding is not criminal in nature; it is
administrative requiring only substantial evidence. It only entails a determination of
whether Camacho violated his solemn oath by failing to account for the money of his
client. The adjudication of the issue on the admin case shall not in any way affect the
separate criminal proceedings.

v. When Sison confronted Camacho regarding the amount, the latter only replied that he
simply gave it to the clerk of court as the payment period had elapsed. Whether the
said amount was pocketed by him or improperly gven to the clerk of court as a form of
bribery, it was unmistakably clear that Camacho did not apply the amount given to
him by his client for its intended legal purpose.

vi. Camacho did not deny making the request to MDAHI for additional pocket fees and
receiving such amount from his client. Rather, he set up a defense that the said
amount formed part of his attorney’s fees. Such defense is grossly contradictory to
the established ppurpose of the P1.2M. It is plainly indicated therein that MDAHI
released the said amount only to be applied as payment for additional docket fees,
and not for any other purposes.

vii. The lame excuse of Camacho is bereft of merit because it constitutes a mere
afterthought and a manifest disrespect to the legal profession. Camacho is treading a
prelious path where the payment of his attorney’s fees is more important than his
fiduciary and faithful duty of accounting the money of his client. Well-settled is the
rule that lawyers are not entitled to unilaterally misappropriate their client’s money
for themselves by the mere fact that the clients owe them attorney’s fees.

viii. Also, Camacho failed to issue a receipt to MDAHI from the moment he received the
said amount. Pursuant to 16.01, a lawyer must be aware that he is accountable for
the money entrusted to him by the clients, and that his only means of ensuring
accountability is by issuing and keeping receipts.

ix. Worse, on May 26, 2011, the RTC already rendered its decision adjudging MDAHI
entitled to an isurance claim in the amount of approximately P65M. From that date on,
there was no more need for additional docket fees. Apparently, unaware of the
judgment, MDAHI subsequently released the money for additional docket fees to
Camacho on May 27, 2011.

x. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose
should be immediately returned. A lawyer’s failure, to return upon demand, the
funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has
 appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his
client.

h) DISBARRED. And ordered to return the amount of P1.2 Million.

Malangas vs Zaide

1. Complainant:

a) Datu Ismael Malangas

b) March 6, 2003 -- he figured in an accident while crossing Quezon Avenue, Iligan City, when
two vehicles hit and pinned him in between them, causing him to lose consciousness; he
was confined for four months; he underwent different major operations for which he spent
more than P1.5M; and he remained crippled and bed-ridden.

c) He engaged Atty. Paul Zaide’s services to prosecute his complaint for damages against Paul
Alfeche and NEMA Electrical and Industrial Sales.

d) He gave Zaide P20K acceptance fee and P50K filing fees; Zaide made him believe that the
P50K was needed as filing fees for the P5M-damage suit.

e) Zaide filed on his behalf the complaint before RTC and furnished Malangas with a copy of
said Complaint; and in order to assure him that the complaint was filed, it was stamped
“received” by the RTC.

f) Malangas later found out that his Complaint has been dismissed by the RTC becaue of
failure to prosecute on the ground that Zaide failed to attend two hearings in the case and
that Zaide did not submit an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss filed by NEMA; while
Malangas asked Zaide to file a Motion for Reconsideration, Zaide not only did not file an
MR, but worse, he filed a Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel leaving Malangas without
counsel to prosecute his case; Malangas then sent a relative to the RTC where he
discovered that the amount of damages sought in the Complaint filed by Zaide was only
P250K and not P5M.

2. Respondent:

a) Zaide averred that he Malangas was a client of Zaragoza-Macabangkit Law Offices and that
he was only a junior associate thereof. Zaide denied that he received the P20K acceptance
fee and that Malangas was already an established client of the law office.

b) As regards the amount of damages, Zaide claimed that he was even reluctant to ask for the
P250K damage as Malangas’ hospital bills did not reach this amount; but he nevertheless
prayed for the amount because he was anticipating that MAlangas would incur additional
expenses as a result of the accident. Also he argued that the page of the complaint bearing
the P5M statement of claim was only inserted after taking out a genuine page of the same.

c) Zaide further averred that his filing of no opposition to NEMA’s Motion to Dismiss was
initially agreed between him and the complainant. But Malangas allegedly insisted to sue
NEMA because it had more leviable properties than the other defendant Alfeche. And so
Malangas was allegedly under the compulsion of greed in pressing for the continuation of
the case against his adversaries and because of this he decided to withdraw from the case
as complainant’s counsel.

3. IBP Commission on Bar Discipline:

 a) Found Zaide guilty of dishonesty and breach of trust, for which he recommended a penalty
of two years suspension

4. Board of Governors:

a) Upheld the recommendation of the IBP CBD.

5. Supreme Court:

a) Zaide is guilty of violating Canons 1, 16, and 18.

b) That as a mere associate he had no participation whatsoever regarding fees is belied by the
fact that he admitted that he received P7K for docket fees and the rest was made as
advance fees for his services.

c) Belied by the replies also of Zaide to the demand letters of Malangas wherein Zaide did not
deny the receipt of money from Malangas.

d) Also statements from Zaide’s law partners belied the claim.

e) Zaide’s refusal to account for the funds given to him, especially his refusal to return the
amount paid in excess of what was required as docket fees violated Canon 16 (16.01 and
16.03)

f) His statements were contradictory considering that he claimed that he only knew of the
statement of claim amounting to P5M during the disbarment proceedings and also he
claimed that when he knew the amount of claim (P5M) he requested the clerk of the office
to change it to a more reasonable and realistic relief (250K)

g) Also his transgression is his failure to file a Comment or Opposition to NEMA’s Motion to
Dismiss and his failure to appear in hearings thereon which naturally arrested the progress
of the case. Also despite the 10-day extension given to him, Zaide failed to appear at the
hearings or file the appropriate pleading.

h) SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 2 years and ordered to return the sums given to
him as acceptance fees and docket fees of P70K.