FELICIANO VS.

PASICOLAN

This is a petition for writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Judge to decide on the merits of
a motion filed by the petitioner in which he asks that the Court fix at P10,000.000 the amount of the
bail for his liberty pending trial.

Facts:
Petitioner was charged with the crime of kidnapping. When he found out that an Information had
been filed and that a warrant of arrest had been issued against him, he went into hiding. His lawyer,
at the instance of his wife, fined a motion asking that the Court fix the amount of the bond at
P10K for the petitioner’s release pending trial, but the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga opposed
the motion on the ground that the filing was premature because the petitioner had been arrested.
The respondent Judge dismissed the motion on the ground that the petitioner does not have the
right to ask for the court to admit him to bail pending his arrest or surrender.
The petitioner contends that as, under the Constitution, "all persons shall before conviction be
bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with
capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong," Article III, Section 1, paragraph (16),
Constitution of the Philippines, and that the words "all persons" used in said constitutional provision
have been interpreted to mean "all persons, without distinction, whether formally charged or not
yet so charged with any criminal offense"
.ISSUE: WON the judge erred in not granting the petition for admission to bail. HELD/RATIO: No.
There is no question as to the soundness of the rule invoked by petitioner. Such is the law in this
jurisdiction. But, the rule is subject to the limitation that the person applying for admission to bail
should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of his liberty. In the case of

Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634,

this Court held: xxx According to this provision, the general rule is that any person, before being
convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, except when he is charged with a capital
offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Of course, only those persons who have been arrested, detained or otherwise deprived of their
liberty will ever have occasion to seek the benefits of said provision.
But in order that a person can invoke the constitutional precept, it is not necessary that he
should wait until a formal complaint or information is filed against him.
From the moment he is placed under arrest, detention or restraint by the officers of the law, he can
claim this guarantee of the Bill of Rights, and this right he retains unless and until he is charged with
a capital offense and evidence of his guilt is strong.
And in the case of Manigbas vs. Luna, 52 O.G. 1405, it was held: xxx the right to bail only
accrues when a person is arrested or deprived of his liberty.
The purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one
who is free.
Thus, ‘bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the
law. ‘Without surrendering himself, he filed the motion in which he asks that the court fix the amount
of the bail bond for his release pending trial. It is, therefore, clear that the petitioner is a freeman and
is under the jurisprudence not entitled to admission to bail.

VILLASEÑOR VS. HON. ABAÑO, ET ALSANCHEZ, September 29, 196

NATURE
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
FACTS
-Petitioner, a mere government employee, earning but a monthly salary, of P210.00, and
the sole breadwinner of a family of five, was charged with the murder of a Boac police
sergeant. He was admitted to a P60k bail which was reduced to P40k. The petitioner on
May 29 posted a property bond and was set at provisional liberty.-However, respondent
Provincial Fiscal amended the information, now accusing the petitioner with “Direct
Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with Murder" before the arraignment on
the murder charge. So on August 7, respondent judge cancelled the petitioner’s bond and
ordered his immediate arrest.-On September 9 upon petitioner’s motion to reconsider, the
respondent judge resolved to admit petitioner to bail provided he puts up a cash bond
of P60k.-On September 15, on petitioner’s motion that original bond previously given be
reinstated, respondent judge resolved to fix "the bond anew in real property in the amount
of P60,000, but to be posted only by residents of the province of Marinduque actually
staying, therein" with properties which "must be in the possession and ownership of said
residents for five years."-On October 1, petitioner filed a prayer for prelim injunction to SC,
seeking to set aside respondent judge orders of August 7, September 9 and 15, and to
reinstate the bail bond approved on May 29(original bond), charging the respondent judge
of having acted w/o and/or in excess of his jurisdiction and w/grave abuse of discretion,
and w/ violation of the Consti and the ROC in issuing the disputed orders-Oct 3: the Court
issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon a P1k bond.-Nov 5: SC allowed continuation of
the proceedings of the criminal case to avoid delay in its prosecution.
ISSUES
1. WON the orders of August 7 and 9 should be setaside2. WON THE P60K bond fixed by
respondent judge transgress the constitutional injunction that"(e)excessive bail shall not
be required?3. WON the condition that the property bond be posted only by "residents of
the province of Marinduque actually staying therein" is within the power of the respondent
judge4. WON the requirement that properties to be offered as bond must be "in the
possession and ownership of the sureties for at least five years” is within the power of the
respondent judge

HELD1. NO NEED
Ratio
A rule of ancient respectability is that it is not the function of a court of justice to furnish
answers to purposeless questions that no longer exist.
Reasoning
 The said orders were replaced by the last order of September 15, 1964, by virtue of which
the cash bond required was reverted back to property bond. The two orders of August 7
and September 9, 1964 thus became functus offcio.
2. NO
Ratio
the principal factor considered, to the determination of which most other factors are
directed, is the probability of the appearance of the accused, or of his flight to avoid
punishment.
Reasoning
Guidelines in fixing bail: (1) ability of the accused to give bail; (2)) nature of the offense;
(3)penalty for the offense charged; (4) character and reputation of the accused; (5) health
of the accused;(6) character and strength of the evidence; (7)probability of the accused
appearing at trial; (8)forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the accused was a fugitive from
justice when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial
another cases.-
Section 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court (definition of bail):
"the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the
law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as
stipulated in the bailbond or recognizance."-Circular 47 of the Department of Justice,
reiterated in Circular 48, directed prosecuting attorneys to recommend bail at the rate of
P2,000.00 per year of imprisonment, corresponding to the medium period of the penalty
prescribed for the offense charged, unless circumstances warrant a higher penalty. Here,
petitioner is charged with a capital offense, direct assault upon an agent of a person in
authority with murder. A complex crime, it may call for the imposition of capital
punishment.
3. YES
Ratio
Bondsmen in criminal cases, residing outside of the Philippines, are not within the reach of
the processes of its courts.- Bail is given to secure appearance of the accused.
If bondsmen reside in far away places, even if within the Philippines, the purpose of bail
may be frustrated.
Reasoning
Weighing as heavily against petitioner's case is the fact that a reading of his petition fails
of an averment that the requisite exacted that bondsmen be residents of and actually
staying in Marinduque would cause him prejudice. The burden of his arguments solely is
that such a condition runs counter to the rules of court (Section 9, Rule 114,Rules of Court
1 ).-reason why respondent judge issued such condition: it is hard to send notices to
people outside of the province through registered mail accompanied by return cards which
in many instances have not beenreceived in court when trial comes and when theparties
fail to appear, there is no way of knowing whether the notices have been duly
received;therefore, he cannot order the confiscation of thebond and the arrest of the
accused because he is notsure whether the bondsmen have been duly notified;that
sending telegrams to people outside theprovince is costly, and the court cannot afford
toincur much expenses.
4. YES
Reasoning
Circular 2 of the Secretary of Justice,addressed, amongst others, to Judges of
FirstInstance recites that it had been brought to theattention of the Department of Justice
that in certainprovinces, unscrupulous persons who are spuriousland owners have been
accepted as sureties. TheSecretary then suggested that "(1)t may be a goodpolicy not to
accept as bail bonds real properties notcovered by certificates of title unless they have
beendeclared for taxation purposes in favor of the personoffering them as bond for at least
five (5) years."-rationale of Circular 2: prevent the commission of frauds in connection with
the posting of personal bailbonds and to protect the interests of theGovernment.- the order
of September 15, 1964 is to beunderstood as excluding properties covered by Torrens
titles from the requirement that properties tobe offered as bond must be "in the possession
andownership of the sureties for at least five years.
Disposition
With the observations heretoforeadverted to, we vote to dismiss the petition forcertiorari,
and to dissolve the writ of preliminaryinjunction issued herein. Costs against petitioner.
Soordered

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS. VASQUEZ [217 SCRA 633; G.R. NOS. 99289-90; 27 JAN
1993]
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: An information was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for violation of
the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The order of arrest was issued with bail for
release fixed at Php. 15,000 so she filed a motion for acceptance of cash bail bond. On
the same day the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing the petitioner to post
cash bond which the later filed in the amount of Php.15, 000. Her arraignment was set, but
petitioner asked for the cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowed provisional
release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred it. The Sandiganbayan issued a
hold departure order against petitioner, by reason of the announcement she made that
she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship a Harvard. In the instant motion
she submitted before the S.C. she argues that her right to travel is impaired.

Issue: Whether or Not the petitioner’s right to travel is impaired.

Held: The petitioner does not deny and as a matter of fact even made a public statement,
that she he every intension of leaving the country to pursue higher studies abroad. The
court upholds the course of action of the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such
fact of petitioners pal to go abroad and in thereafter issuing a sua sponte the hold
departure order is but an exercise of respondent court’s inherent power to preserve and to
maintain effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.
Also, the petitioner assumed obligations, when she posted bail bond. She holds herself
amenable at all times to the orders and process of eth court. She may legally be
prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case. (Manotoc v. C.A.)

Miranda vs. Tuliao G.R. # 158763, March 31, 2006

Facts: On Mar. 1996, 2 burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which were
later identified as the bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private
respondent Virgilio Tulio who is now under the witness protection program.
2 informations for murder were filed against the 5 police officer including SPO2 Maderal in
RTC of Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to Manila. RTC Manila convicted all
the accused and sentenced them 2 counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal
who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. Upon automatic review, the SC
acquitted the four accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.
In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and identified the
herein petitioner Miranda and 4 others responsible for the death of the victims.
Respondent Tuliao then filed a criminal complaint for murder against the petitioners.
Acting Presiding Judge Tumalian issued warrant of arrest against the petitioners and
SPO2 Maderal.
Petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate,
and to recall or quash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion, Judge
Tumalian noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint order denying the said
urgent motion on the ground that since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their
persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. The petitioners appealed the
resolution of the Public prosecutor to the DOJ.
The new Presiding Judge named Judge Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint
Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumalian. He also ordered the cancellation of the
warrant of arrest. Respondent Tulia filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition with a prayer for TRO seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding
of the case and seeking to nullify the Joint Orders of the said Judge. The SC issued a
resolution granting the prayer. Notwithstanding the said resolution, Judge Anghad issued a
Joint Order dismissing the information against the petition.
Respondent Tuliao filed a motion to cite Judge Anghad in contempt. The SC referred the
said motion to the CA. The CA rendered the assailed decision granting the petition and
ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City as well as the
issuance of warrant of arrest. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his
person to the jurisdiction of the court
Held: Petition is dismissed and cost against the petitioners.
It has been held that an accused cannot seek judicial relief is he does not submit his
person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the accused can be acquired either
through compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest or through his voluntary
appearance, such as when he surrender to the police or to the court. It is only when the
court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the
processes of the court. Since, petitioner were not arrested or otherwise deprived of their
liberty, they cannot seek judicial relief.

CORTES VS CATRAL279 SCRA 1 (1997)

FACTS: Cortes filed a complaint against Judge Catral for grantingbail without hearing.1.

Catral allegedly granted bail in two murder cases, acrime that is supposedly not bailable)
without hearing.Catral says:In one of them, the case was frustratedhomicide, and the prosecutor
recommended bail of 200K, plus the circumstantial evidence were weak.In the case of People v.
Rodrigo Bumanglag, CriminalCase 08-866 for murder, the inquest judge issued awarrant of
arrest for the accused with no bailrecommended. When the case was elevated to theRegional Trial
Court upon information filed by theprovincial prosecutor, the information made nomention of a
bailbond. In the hearing of the petition todetermine whether or not the evidence of guilt isstrong, the
fiscal opted not to introduce evidence andrecommended bail in the sum of P200,000.00 instead.
Respondent judge “acting on the said recommendation
and again guided by the provision of Section 9,Administrative Circular 12-94 in conjunction with
theevidence extant on the record approved the recommendation of Prosecutor Apolinar
Carrao.” Aduplicate copy of trial prosecutor Apolinar Carrao’s letter dated September 3,
1996 addressed to theprovincial prosecutor Romeo Sacquing was presentedby the respondent
to disprove the accusation that hegranted bail to the accused without conducting anyhearing.
2.Catral allegedly reduced bailbond for an illegalpossession of firearms case from 180K
(recommendedby prosecutor) to 30K without hearing.Catral says: bailbond recommended was
180K. accusedfiled for reduction and there was no opposition fromprosecutor.
3Barangay Captain Nilo de Rivera with a homicide casewas granted with a bailbond of
P14,800.00 by JudgeSegundo Catral. The amount is too low. It is becausethis Nilo de Rivera is
another goon of Julio BongDecierto.Catral says: he was acting on the recommendation of theOIC
provincial prosecutor and mindful of the guidelinesin fixing a reasonable amount of bailbond
coupled bythe fact that the evidence on record is merelycircumstantial and there was no
eyewitness to thecommission of crime granted bailbond in the sum of P14,800.00.
4.Jimmy Siriban the right hand man of Julio ‘Bong’
Dicierto was sued for concubinage and convicted byJudge Herminio del Castillo in MTC. Jimmy
Siribanappealed and it was elevated to the RTC Branch 08, thesala of Judge Segundo Catral.
Judge Segundo Catralacquitted Jimmy Siriban, rumors in Aparri spread that the wife of Judge
Segundo Catral went to Jimmy
Siriban’s house to get the envelop

ISSUE: WON the allegations of the complainant wouldwarrant the imposition of administrative
sanction against respondent judge
.HELD/RATIO: YES. Bail should be fixed according to the circumstances of each case. The
amount fixed should be sufficient to ensure the presence of the accused at the trial yet reasonable
enough to comply with the constitutional provision that bail should not be excessive. Therefore,
whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given
to the prosecutor or fiscal or at least he must be asked for his recommendation because in fixing
the amount of bail, the judge is required to take into account a number of factors such as the
applicant’s character and reputation, forfeiture of other bonds or whether he is a fugitive from
justice. When the accused is charged with an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in
the discretion of the court, not only to take into account the guidelines set forth in Section 9,
Rule 114 of theRules of Court, but primarily to determine the existence of strong evidence of guilt
or lack of it, against the accused.Respondent judge, in two instances, granted bail to anaccused
charged with murder, without having conductedany hearing as to whether the evidence of guilt
against theaccused is strong.In a crime of murder. The provincial prosecutor recommendedthe
sum of P200,000.00 as bailbond for each accused. Therecords do not reveal whether a
hearing was actually conductedon the application
for bail although respondent judge implies that there was one, stating that “acting on this
recommenda
tion of theprovincial prosecutor and taking into account the guidelinesprescribed in Section 9 of
Administrative Circular 12-94, thecourt issued a warrant of arrest and fixed the amount of P
200,000.00 for the provisional liberty of each of the accused.” Subsequently, counsel for
accused Ahmed Duerme filed a motionfor reduction of bail. The “hearing” of the motion was
conducted on August 21, 1995 with the prosecution, not having interposedany opposition, and
submitting the resolution of the motion tothe sound discretion of the court instead. Respondent
judge thenissued an order granting a reduced bailbond of P50,000.00 for accused Ahmed
Duerme inasmuch as “the evidence was not sostrong to warrant the fixation of said
amount.” The order granting the reduced bailbond, however, did not contain asummary of the
evidence for the prosecution.In another murder case, after conducting a preliminaryinvestigation,
the inquest judge issued a warrant of the arrest forthe accused with no bail recommended.
When the case waselevated to the Regional Trial Court, the information made nomention of a
bailbond. Consequently, accused through counsel filed a petition for bail. In the hearing of the
petition todetermine whether or not the evidence of guilt against theaccused was strong, the fiscal
opted not to introduce evidenceand recommended the sum of P200,000.00 instead. Respondent
judge, “acting on said recommendation and again guided by the provision of Section 9,
Administrative Circular 12-94 inconjunction
with the evidence extant on record,” issued an order granting bail to the accused in the sum of
P200,000.00. Unable topost the said bond, accused through counsel filed a motion toreduce bail. In
the course of the hearing of the petition, the publicprosecutor manifested that he had no objection to
the sum of P50,000.00 as bail for the accused. Respondent judge, then “guided by the
factual setting and the supporting evidence extant on record” reduced the bail bond from
P200,000.00 toP50,000.00 as recommended by the prosecutor. Once again, theorder granting
the bail of P200,000.00, as well as the reduced bailbond of P50,000.00, did not contain a
summary of the evidencepresented by the prosecution.the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing
even in cases wherethe prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave theapplication of bail to
the sound discretion of the court. A hearingis likewise required if the prosecution refuses to adduce
evidencein opposition to the application to grant and fix bail. Theimportance of a hearing has been
emphasized in not a few caseswherein the court ruled that, even if the prosecution refuses
toadduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motionfor bail, it is still mandatory for the
court to conduct a hearing orask searching questions from which it may infer the strength of
the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it against the accused.” The reason for this is plain.
Inasmuch as the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strongis a matter of judicial discretion, It may rightly be exercised onlyafter the evidence is
submitted to the court at the hearing. Sincethe discretion is directed to the weight of evidence and
sinceevidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited orproduced before the court, it is
obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt besubmitted
to the court, the petitioner having the right of crossexamination and to introduce evidence in his own
rebuttal.The procedural lapse of respondent judge is aggravated by thefact that even though the
accused in Criminal Case No. 07-874,People v. Ahmed Duerme, have yet to be arrested,
respondent already fixed bail in the sum of P200,000.00. Respondent evidently knew that the
accused were still at large as he even hadto direct their arrest in the same order where he
simultaneouslygranted them bail. At this juncture, there is a need to reiterate thebasic principle that
the right to bail can only be availed of by aperson who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived
of hisliberty and it would be premature, not to say incongruous, to filea petition for bail for some
whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.

PEOPLE VS. MANALLO 400 SCRA 129 (2003)

FACTS: Spouses Romeo Nabor and Liliosa Napay and their nine-year old daughter Rosaldiza
Nabor tenanted and lived in acoconut plantation located in Barangay Salugan, Camilig, Albay.
Rosaldiza helped in the household chores by washing the family’s dirty laundry every
Saturday at the barangay reservoir. The routeto the reservoir was uninhabited. Going there was
quite a longtrek. It usually took Rosaldiza fifteen minutes to negotiate thegrassy path from the
reservoir to their house.In 1989, Romeo engaged the services of Alex Manallo, as
coconut gatherer. Alex helped the Nabor couple gather coconut produceonce a week.One day, in
1992, Rosaldiza went to the reservoir to wash herclothes and to take a bath. On her way back
home, Manallosuddenly appeared from the bushes, grabbed her and raped her.Alex
dressed up and warned her not to tell her parents, brothersand sisters of the incident,
otherwise, he would kill them all.Rosaldiza put on her clothes and ran home. Rosaldiza related
toher mother what had happened to her.Medico-Legal. Then Rosaldiza and Liliosa went back to the
policestation and executed their respective sworn statements. Aninformation was filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, charging Alex with rape.
No bail was recommended for the provisional liberty of Alex.He filed, on May 8, 1992, a motion for
bail with no specific dateand time for the hearing thereof. Upon the filing of said motion,the
Executive Judge issued an order granting the motion andfixing his bail bond at P50,000.00.
On the same day, Alex posteda property bond which was immediately approved by the court . Alex
was forthwith released from detention.At his arraignment on June 17, 1992, Alex, duly
assisted bycounsel
de oficio, pleaded not guilty. Trial was set on June 18,1992. The prosecution prayed the trial court
to cancel the bond of Alex considering that his petition for bail was granted without due hearing.
However, the trial court held in abeyance resolutionof the motion until after the prosecutor shall
have presented itswitnesses on June 18, 1992. The trial court stated that theevidence to be
adduced by the prosecution would be its evidence in Alex’s petition for bail and trial on the
merits.
On June 18,1992, the trial court issued an order that Alex would remain freeon his bond until June
22, 1992, the date set for the hearing onhis petition for bail. However, Alex failed to attend the trial
onsaid date. The trial court issued and order for his arrest.However, Alex could no longer
be found at his address. It wasonly six years thereafter, or on January 22, 1998, that he
wasarrested.He denied raping Rosaldiza and claimed that they were lovers. Hewas found guilty.
(short story version.)

ISSUE (in the case): WON the trial court gravely erred inconvicting accused-appellant not on
the basis of the strength of the prosecution’s evidence but rather on the weakness of the
evidence for the defense

HELD/RATIO: NO. Even a cursory reading of the decision of thetrial court will readily show that it
convicted appellant of thecrime charged in light of the testimony of Rosaldiza and Dr. Loria-Florece
and the physical evidence adduced by the prosecution.
The trial court considered appellant’s flight from the scene of the crime, his having jumped
bail and for eluding arrest for six longyears as evidence of his guilt for the crime chargedBAIL-
RELATED (copy-paste):The Court cannot write finis to this case without making of recordits
concern and displeasure at the egregious procedural lapse of the trial court in granting bail to
appellant. It bears stressing that he was charged with rape punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of CriminalProcedure reads:SEC. 5.
Burden of proof in Bail application .–At the hearing of anapplication for admission to bail filed by
any person who is incustody for the commission of an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua
to death, the prosecution has the burden of showingthat evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence
presented duringthe bail hearings shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial,
but upon motion of either party, the court may recallany witness for additional examination
unless the witness isdead, outside of the Philippines or otherwise unable to testify.(please see
previous case for the duties of the trial court inresolving a motion or petition for bail)In this case, the
appellant filed his motion for bail on May 8,1992. There was no specific date and time for the
hearing of saidmotion. And yet, on
the same day that the motion was filed,the trial court granted the said motion and fixed the bailbond
for the provisional liberty of the appellant in theamount of P50,000.00 without any factual basis
thereforestated in the order
. Even when the public prosecutor prayedthe court on June 17, 1992, for the cancellation of the
propertybond of the appellant on the ground that the trial court grantedhis motion for bail without
even affording the prosecution achance to be heard thereon and adduce its evidence inopposition
thereto, the trial court held in abeyance resolutionthereof and even allowed the appellant to remain
free on hisbond in the amount of only P50,000.00. Patently, the prosecutionwas deprived of its right
to due process.A bail application does not only involve the right of the accused totemporary liberty,
but likewise the right of the State to protect the people and the peace of the community from
dangerouselements. These two rights must be balanced by a magistrate inthe scale of justice,
hence, the necessity for hearing to guide hisexercise of jurisdiction.
people vs nitcha -UNFOUND
People Vs. Judge Donato
198 SCRA 130
G.R. No.79269
June 5,1991
Facts:

Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for
acts committed before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to
Quash alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of
the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. This was
denied. May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that the
respondent is not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under
PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President
issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834
and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed
before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now granted the bail, which was fixed at
P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report to the court once every two
months within the first ten days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a supplemental
motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it to
present evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the
accused will not comply with this main condition of his bail. It was contended that:

1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from
detention when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA)
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and
presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false
address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose
identity and address were also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00
was offered and paid for his arrest.
This however was denied. Hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail.
Held: Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not a
capital offense, therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only when it is
a capital offense that the right becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge
to change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K without hearing the prosecution.

Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion
perpetua to the crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to
him.

Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas corpus).
Agreements were made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-
detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately, with a
condition that they will submit themselves in the jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for
HC was dismissed. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the
law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the
constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and
whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

LAVIDES VS CAG.R. 129670February 1, 2000

FACTS: Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for childabuse under R.A. No. 7610 (an act
providing for strongerdeterrence and special protection against child abuse,exploitation and
discrimination, providing penalties for itsviolation, and other purposes). His arrest was made without
awarrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the police. It appears that on April 3, 1997, the
parents of complainant LorelieSan Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then
16years old, had been contacted by petitioner for an assignation
that night at petitioner’s room at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently,
this was not the first time the police received reports of petitioner’s activities. When petitioner
opened the door, the police saw him withLorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and an
underwear,whereupon they arrested him. Based on the sworn statement of complainant and the
affidavits of the arresting officers, whichwere submitted at the inquest, an information for violation of
Art.III, §5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 was filed against petitioner.petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For
JudicialDetermination of Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate Releaseof the Accused Unlawfully
Detained on an Unlawful WarrantlessArrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of
the Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as aMatter of Right under the Law on Which
He is Charged.nine more informations for child abuse were filed against petitioner by the same
complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, and bythree other minor childrenNo bail was recommended.
Nonetheless, petitioner filed separateapplications for bail in the nine cases.TRIAL COURT: 2. The
accused is entitled to bail in all the above-entitled case. He is hereby granted the right to post bail in
theamount of P80,000.00 for each case or a total of P800,000.00 forall the cases under the
following conditions:a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiverof appearance during the trial of
these cases.He shall and must always be present at thehearings of these cases;b)
In the event that he shall not be able todo so, his bail bonds shall be automaticallycancelled and
forfeited, warrants for hisarrest shall be immediately issued and thecases shall proceed to trial in
absentia
;c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; andd)
Approval of the bail bonds shall be madeonly after the arraignment to enable thisCourt to
immediately acquire jurisdictionover the accused;
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations against him.Pending resolution of his motion, he
asked the trial court tosuspend the arraignment scheduled on May 23, 1997. He filed amotion in
which he prayed that the amounts of bail bonds bereduced to P40,000.00 for each case and that
the same be doneprior to his arraignment.
the trial court, in separate orders, denied petitioner’s
motions toreduce bail bonds, to quash the informations, and to suspendarraignment. Accordingly,
petitioner was arraigned during whichhe pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and then
orderedhim released upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject to the
conditions in the May 16, 1997 orderand the "hold-departure" order of April 10, 1997. The pre-
trialconference was set on June 7, 1997.The Court of Appeals declared conditions (a) and (b)
invalid but declined to pass upon the validity of condition (d) on the groundthat the issue had
become moot and academic. Petitioner takesissue with the Court of Appeals with respect to
its treatment of condition (d) of the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court which
makes petitioner’
s arraignment a prerequisite to the approval of his bail bonds. His contention is that this condition is
void andthat his arraignment was also invalid because it was heldpursuant to such invalid
condition.ISSUE: WON the condition is void and the arraignment invalid.HELD: CONDITION IS
VOID.bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accusedmay be precluded from
filing a motion to quash. For if theinformation is quashed and the case is dismissed, there
wouldthen be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the secondplace, the trial court could
ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering
hispresence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment.Under Rule 114, §2(b) of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall appear before
theproper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules,"while under Rule 116, §1(b)
the presence of the accused at thearraignment is requiredto condition the grant of bail to an
accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choosebetween
(1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his releaseon bail because until his motion to quash can
be resolved, hisarraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of amotion to quash so that
he can be arraigned at once andthereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly
undermine the accused’s constitutional right not to be put on
trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient tocharge him with a crime and his right to
bail.
The condition imposed in the trial court’s order of May 16, 1997
that the accused cannot waive his appearance at the trial but that he must be present at the
hearings of the case is valid and is inaccordance with Rule 114. For another condition of bail
underRule 114, §2(c) is that "The failure of the accused to appear at thetrial without
justification despite due notice to him or hisbondsman shall be deemed an express waiver of his
right to bepresent on the date specified in the notice. In such case, trial shallproceed
in absentia." JjscArt. III, §14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials
in absentia allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not at certainstages of the
proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea,whether of innocence or of guilt, (b) during trial
whenevernecessary for identification purposes, and (c) at the promulgationof sentence, unless it
is for a light offense, in which case theaccused may appear by counsel or representative. At
such stagesof the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot bewaived.IT DOES NOT
FOLLOW THAT THE ARRAIGNMENT OFPETITIONER ON MAY 23, 1997 WAS ALSO INVALID.
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the arraignment did not emanate fromthe invalid condition
that "approval of the bail bonds shall bemade only after the arraignment." Even without such a
condition,the arraignment of petitioner could not be omitted. In sum,although the condition for the
grant of bail to petitioner is invalid,his arraignment and the subsequent proceedings against him are
valid.

SERAPIO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

396 SCRA 443 (2003)

Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed bypetitioner Edward Serapio, assailing the
resolutions of the ThirdDivision of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail ,motion for a
reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a petition for habeas corpus, all in relation to Criminal
Case No. 26558 forplunder wherein petitioner is one of the accused together with former
President Joseph E. Estrada, Jose “Jinggoy” P. Estrada and
several others.Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and the LegalCounsel of the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock, non-profit foundation established in February 2000
ostensibly for thepurpose of providing educational opportunities for the poor
andunderprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and students, andsupport to research and
advance studies of young Muslimeducators and scientists.Petitioner, as trustee of the Foundation,
received on its behalf adonation in the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200 Million) from
Ilocos Sur Governor Luis “Chavit” Singson. Accused by Singson. Informations filed.The
Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused, includingpetitioner. In the meantime, on
April 27, 2001, petitioner filedwith the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for Bail which wasset
for hearing on May 4, 2001.
For his part, petitioner’s co-accused Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada filed on April 20, 2001 a Very
Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that he was entitled to bail as amatter of right. During the hearing
on May 4, 2001 on petitioner’s Urgent
Petition for Bail, the prosecution moved for the resetting of the arraignment of the accused earlier
than the June 27,2001 schedule. However, the Sandiganbayan denied themotion of the
prosecution and issued an order declaring that the petition for bail can and should be heard before
petitioner’s arraignment on June 27, 2001 and even beforethe other accused filed their respective
petitions for bail .Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set the hearing for the reception of evidence on
petitioner’s petition for bail on May 21 to 25, 2001.The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
requiring the attendanceof petitioner as well as all the other accused during the hearingson the
petitions for bail under pain of waiver of cross-examination. The Sandiganbayan, citing its inherent
powers toproceed with the trial of the case in the manner it determinesbest conducive to
orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case, directed the other accused to participate in
the said bailhearing considering that under Section 8, Rule 114 of the RevisedRules of Court,
whatever evidence is adduced during the bailhearing shall be considered automatically reproduced
at the trial.The bail hearing did not proceed because petitioner filed with theSandiganbayan a
motion to quash the amended Information onthe grounds that as against him, the amended
Information doesnot allege a combination or series of overt or criminal actsconstitutive of plunder;
as against him, the amended Informationdoes not allege a pattern of criminal acts indicative of an
overallunlawful scheme or conspiracy. By way of riposte, theprosecution objected to the holding of
bail hearing untilpetitioner agreed to withdraw his motion to quash.
The prosecution contended that petitioner’s motion to quash the amended Information was
antithetical to his petition forbail. He also filed a petition for Habeas Corpus.
Meanwhile, Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion praying that said
court resolve his motion to fix his bail.the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying
petitioner’s motion to quash the amended Information. The motion to fix bail filed by Jose
“Jinggoy” Estrada was also denied by the
Sandiganbayan. Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada filed a petition for certiorari for the nullification of a
resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying hismotion to fix bail.

ISSUES:(1) Whether or not petitioner should first be arraigned beforehearings of his petition
for bail may be conducted;
(2) Whether petitioner may file a motion to quash the amendedInformation during the pendency of
his petition for bail;
(3) Whether a joint hearing of the petition for bail of petitionerand those of the other accused is
mandatory;
(4) Whether the People waived their right to adduce evidence inopposition to the petition for
bail of petitioner and failed toadduce strong evidence of guilt of petitioner for the crimecharged

HELD/RATIO:
1.NO. The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisiteto the conduct of hearings on his petition
for bail. Aperson is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he isdeprived of his liberty by virtue of his
arrest or
voluntary surrender. An accused need not wait for hisarraignment before filing a petition for bail.in
cases where it is authorized, bail should be grantedbefore arraignment, otherwise the accused may
beprecluded from filing a motion to quash.However, the foregoing pronouncement should not
betaken to mean that the hearing on a petition for bailshould at all times precede arraignment,
because therule is that a person deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary
surrender may apply for bail assoon as he is deprived of his liberty, even before acomplaint or
information is filed against him. The Court’s pronouncement in Lavides should beunderstood in
light of the fact that the accused in saidcase filed a petition for bail as well as a motion to
quashthe informations filed against him. Hence, we explainedtherein that to condition the grant of
bail to an accusedon his arraignment would be to place him in a positionwhere he has to choose
between (1) filing a motion toquash and thus delay his release on bail because untilhis motion to
quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motionto
quash so that he can be arraigned at once andthereafter be released on bail. This would
underminehis constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon a valid complaint or Information
sufficient tocharge him with a crime and his right to bail.It is therefore not necessary that an accused
be first arraigned before the conduct of hearings on hisapplication for bail. For when bail is a matter
of right,an accused may apply for and be granted bail even priorto arraignment. The ruling in
Lavides also implies that an application for bail in a case involving an offensepunishable by
reclusion perpetua to death may also beheard even before an accused is arraigned. Further,
if the court finds in such case that the accused is entitledto bail because the evidence against him is
not strong,he may be granted provisional liberty even prior toarraignment; for in such a situation,
bail would be “authorized” under the circumstances. In fine, theSandiganbayan committed a
grave abuse of itsdiscretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction inordering the arraignment of
petitioner beforeproceeding with the hearing of his petition for bail.

2.YES. The Court finds that no such inconsistency existsbetween an application of an accused for
bail and hisfiling of a motion to quash. Bail is the security given forthe release of a person in
the custody of the law,furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee hisappearance before any
court as required under theconditions set forth under the Rules of Court. Itspurpose is to
obtain the provisional liberty of a personcharged with an offense until his conviction while at
thesame time securing his appearance at the trial. Asstated earlier, a person may apply for bail
from themoment that he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of hisarrest or voluntary surrender.On
the other hand, a motion to quash an Information isthe mode by which an accused assails the
validity of acriminal complaint or Information filed against him forinsufficiency on its face in point of
law, or for defectswhich are apparent in the face of the Information. Anaccused may file a motion to
quash the Information, as ageneral rule, before arraignment.These two reliefs have objectives
which are not necessarily antithetical to each other. Certainly, theright of an accused right to seek
provisional libertywhen charged with an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, or whencharged with an offense punishable by such penaltiesbut after
due hearing, evidence of his guilt is found not to be strong, does not preclude his right to assail
thevalidity of the Information charging him with suchoffense. It must be conceded, however, that if a
motionto quash a criminal complaint or Information on theground that the same does not charge
any offense isgranted and the case is dismissed and the accused isordered released, the
petition for bail of an accused maybecome moot and academic.

3.No. There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Rules of Procedure
of theSandiganbayan governing the hearings of two or morepetitions for bail filed by different
accused or that apetition for bail of an accused be heard simultaneouslywith the trial of the case
against the other accused. Thematter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of two or more
petitions for bail filed by two different accused or to conduct a hearing of said petition jointlywith the
trial against another accused is addressed tothe sound discretion of the trial court. Unless
graveabuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown, the Court will not
interfere withthe exercise by the Sandiganbayan of its discretion.It may be underscored that in the
exercise of itsdiscretion, the Sandiganbayan must take into account not only the convenience of the
State, including theprosecution, but also that of the accused and thewitnesses of both the
prosecution and the accused andthe right of accused to a speedy trial. TheSandiganbayan must
also consider the complexities of the cases and of the factual and legal issues involvingpetitioner
and the other accused. After all, if this Court may echo the observation of the United States
SupremeCourt, the State has a stake, with every citizen, in hisbeing afforded our historic individual
protections,including those surrounding criminal prosecutions.About them, this Court dares not
become careless orcomplacent when that fashion has become rampant over the earth.

4. No. Petitioner’s claim that the prosecution had refused

to present evidence to prove his guilt for purposes of hisbail application and that the
Sandiganbayan has refusedto grant a hearing thereon is not borne by the records.The prosecution
did not waive, expressly or evenimpliedly, its right to adduce evidence in opposition tothe petition for
bail of petitioner. It must be noted that the Sandiganbayan had already scheduled the hearing
dates for petitioner’s application for bail but the samewere reset due to pending incidents raised
in several motions filed by the parties, which incidents had to beresolved by the court prior to the
bail hearings. The bailhearing was eventually scheduled by theSandiganbayan on July 10, 2001
but the hearing did not push through due to the filing of this petition on June29, 2001.
The delay in the conduct of hearings on petitioner’s application for bail is therefore not
imputable solely tothe Sandiganbayan or to the prosecution. Petitioner isalso partly to blame
therefor, as is evident from thefollowing list of motions filed by him and by theprosecution. “When
the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence
of guilt against the accusedis strong. However, the determination of whether or not theevidence of
guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion,remains with the judge. This discretion by
the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence issubmitted to the court at
the hearing. Since the discretion isdirected to the weight of the evidence and since evidence
cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before thecourt, it is obvious
that a proper exercise of judicial discretionrequires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the
court, thepetitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in
rebuttal.” Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from detention untilthe Sandiganbayan
conducts a hearing of his application for bailand resolve the same in his favor. Even then, there
must first be afinding that the evidence against petitioner is not strong beforehe may be granted
bail.

Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons

(1946, Hilado)
Teehankee was detained by the US Intelligence Arm for conspiring with the Japanese
and was subsequently turned over to the Commonwealth Government for custody. No
information was filed against her in the People’s Court for about a year and she applied for
bail which was denied. She appealed to the SC assailing the People’s Court’s order on the
ground that she was not given a hearing. SC granted her appeal and a hearing was set.
The Solicitor General recommended a bail of PhP50K but the People’s Court did not rule
on the application for bail and merely concluded that the amount of bail really shows that
the charge against her is serious. Teehankee appealed to the SC again and prayed for it
to direct the People’s Court to render a judgment on her application for bail. SC granted
but the People’s Court instead of complying, set a third hearing where the Judge asked
the same questions tending to compel the prosecutor to produce evidence and when the
Special Prosecutor refused to adduce evidence stating that it would imperil the success of
the prosecution and jeopardize public interest, the Judge had the prosecutor arrested for
contempt of court. The prosecutor was released through habeas corpus. Teehankee again
asked the SC to decide on her application for bail and the SC again directed the People’s
Court to render a decision but in the resolution the SC declared that if the People’s Court
does not feel justified in the Special Prosecutor’s attitude of not opposing the petition for
bail by the petitioner and the Sol Gen files a statement that doing so would imperil the
success of the prosecution and jeopardize public interest, the People’s Court may not
inquire further into the prosecution’s evidence and the prosecutor may not be held guilty in
contempt of court for refusing to answer the PC’s question and that the hearing should be
made in the presence of the petitioner or with due notice to her. The People’s Court
however, instituted a fourth hearing, this time, when the prosecutor refused to adduce
evidence, the Judge called the prosecutor into a private conference where he allegedly
acquired strong evidence of Teehankee’s guilt. The People’s Court thereafter rendered a
decision based on the evidence acquired in the private conference denying the petition for
bail. Teehankee again filed a petition in the SC alleging that the People’s Court’s order
was issued with grave abuse of discretion and prayed for her provisional release under
bail as may be fixed by the SC.
The issue is whether the People’s Court may compel the prosecution to adduce evidence
in the petitioner’s application for bail.
 In resolving the issue, the SC clarified that the Constitutional provision gives all
persons the right to bail except those charged with a capital offense or when evidence of
guilt is strong. All persons mean everyone, not only those who have been charged but
also those which have only been arrested, detained, or restrained and all persons before
conviction retain this right until charged with a capital offense and when evidence of guilt is
strong. This is because of the presumption of innocence. If the presumption of innocence
is available to a person already charged or accused more so for a person who was merely
arrested or detained. The Constitution does not qualify because to limit it to those charged
would be a curtailment of individual freedom. The right to bail is therefore available to
Teehankee especially because she has not been charged of any offense yet.
The SC then proceeded to rule that the People’s Court has the discretion after due
notice and hearing to allow political prisoners to be released on bail even before
presentation of the information unless it sees strong evidence for the commission of a
capital offense. But this judicial discretion to grant bail must be within reasonable bounds
guided by the Constitution, statutes, rules of court, and principles of equity and justice.
The Sol Gen is empowered to oppose the application for bail and to adduce evidence
based on the State’s interest. If it refuses to do so, then the People’s Court must rule on
what it was presented and in the absence of strong evidence of guilt, the People’s Court
must grant the bail. Hence, the People’s Court cannot coerce the prosecution if it does not
oppose the application for bail of the petitioner and refuses to adduce evidence because it
might imperil the success of the prosecution and jeopardize public interest. The People’s
Court must therefore grant the petition for bail.
 Also, the SC held that the People’s Court deprived Teehankee of substantive due
process when it violated the SC’s order to conduct the hearing in her presence and
instead received evidence in a private conference because it deprived Teehankee of the
opportunity to be heard in defense and such private conference is in the nature of the
Judge’s personal knowledge which he has no right to act.