G.R. No.

88211, September 15, 1989

Marcos, petitioner
VS.
Manglapus, respondent (Part 1)
Facts:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people
power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to
the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of
his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the
economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of
Marcos and his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:

1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders

2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer. This
is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar
4. Honasan’s failed coup
5. Communist insurgency movements
6. secessionist movements in Mindanao
7. devastated economy because of

1. accumulated foreign debt

2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies

Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel
documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning
in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned
the claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety and
health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due
process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which
according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.
Issue:

1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit
the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

Decision:
No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article
VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines.” However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in the same article
it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of
the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the
Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to
protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the
Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do
anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary
powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to maintain peace
during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the circumstances. The
request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely
of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain
exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the
present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office
to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the
exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or
denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for
the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the
Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that
happened before her decision are factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the self-
preservation of the country & protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.

Ang Tibay vs. CIR - GR No. 46496, February 27, 1940

G.R. NO. L-46496 FEBRUARY 27, 1940
ANG TIBAY, REPRESENTED BY TORIBIO TEODORO, MANAGER AND PROPIETOR, AND
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, PETITIONERS, VS.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., RESPONDENTS.
69 Phil. 635 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Due Process in Administrative Bodies

Facts:

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due
to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees. However, the
National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees
laid off were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor union National Workers Brotherhood
(NWB) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting
NLU.

The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU
went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.

HELD:
Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they
attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that
even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-
reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal
of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts by
Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but already existing).

The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of
Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For administrative bodies,
due process can be complied with by observing the following:
 The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
 Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
 While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A
decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
 Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must
be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
 The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
 The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.
 The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

ROSALINDA A. PENERA v. COMELEC, GR No. 181613, 2009-09-11

Facts:
Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar (Andanar) were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica
Andanar filed... a Petition for Disqualification... against Penera... for unlawfully engaging in election
campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the commencement of the campaign period.
Andanar claimed... that... before the start of the authorized campaign period
Penera and her partymates went around the different barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their
candidacies and requesting the people to vote for them on the... day of the elections.
Penera admitted that a motorcade did take place, she explained that it was simply in accordance with the
usual... practice in nearby cities and provinces, where the filing of certificates of candidacy (COCs) was
preceded by a motorcade... the COMELEC... disqualified Penera from continuing as a mayoralty
candidate... for engaging in premature campaigning
Whether or not [Penera] has engaged in an election campaign or partisan political activity outside the
campaign period.
Issues:
Whether or not [Penera] has engaged in an election campaign or partisan political activity outside the
campaign period.
Ruling:
We find no merit in the instant Petition.
under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code
It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of
persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan... political activity except during the campaign
period
If the commission of the prohibited act of premature campaigning is duly proven, the consequence of the
violation is clearly spelled out in Section 68... which reads:
Any candidate who... violated any of Sections 80... shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or
if he has been elected, from holding the office.
In the case at bar, it had been sufficiently established
, not just by Andanar's evidence, but also those of Penera herself, that Penera and her partymates,...
participated in a motorcade which passed through the different barangays... of Sta. Monica, waived their
hands to the public, and threw candies to the onlookers.
Additionally, the Joint Affidavit... gave an even more straightforward account of the events, thus:... after
actual registration with the COMELEC... the motorcade proceeded to three (3) barangays out of the 11
barangays while supporters were throwing sweet candies to the crowd;... there was merriment and
marching music
For violating Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, proscribing election campaign or partisan political
activity outside the campaign period, Penera must be disqualified from holding the office of Mayor of Sta.
Monica.
In Penera vs. COMELEC (G.R. 181613; 25 November 2009), the Supreme Court reversed its earlier
decision (dated 11 September 2009) to disqualify a candidate (Penera) for premature campaigning.
According to the High Court, at the time the supposed premature campaigning took place, Penera was
not officially a “candidate” albeit she already filed her certificate of candidacy. Under Section 15 of
Republic Act 8436, as amended by Republic Act 9369, a person who files his certificate of candidacy is
considered a candidate only at the start of the campaign period, and unlawful acts applicable to such
candidate take effect only at the start of such campaign period. Construing this law, the Supreme Court
concluded that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign period,
not before. Before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be committed and any
partisan political activity is lawful
G.R. No. 178413 March 13, 2008
AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL III, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC SITTING AS THE NATIONAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS, THE SPECIAL PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS FOR MAGUINDANAO
CHAIRED BY ATTY. EMILIO S. SANTOS, and JUAN MIGUEL F. ZUBIRI, respondents.

Facts : The Petition stemmed from the 14 May 2007 national elections for 12 senatorial posts. At the time
of filing of the Petition, around two months after the said elections, the 11 candidates with the highest
number of votes had already been officially proclaimed and had taken their oaths of office as Senators.
With other candidates conceding, the only remaining contenders for the twelfth and final senatorial post
were Pimentel and private respondent Juan Miguel F. Zubiri (Zubiri). Public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) en banc, acting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBC), continued to conduct
canvass proceedings so as to determine the twelfth and last Senator-elect in the 14 May 2007 elections.
Pimentel assailed the proceedings before the NBC and its constituted Special Provincial Board of
Canvassers for Maguindanao (SPBOC-Maguindanao) in which the Provincial and Municipal Certificates of
Canvass (PCOC and MCOCs) from the province of Maguindanao were respectively canvassed. The
SPBOC-Maguindanao was created because the canvass proceedings held before the original Provincial
Board of Canvassers for Maguindanao (PBOC-Maguindanao)

Task Force Maguindanao, headed by COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. and Commissioner
Nicodemo T. Ferrer, retrieved and collected 21 MCOCs from the municipalities of Maguindanao, mostly
copy 2, or the copy intended to be posted on the wall. Due to the consistent denial by the SPBOC-
Maguindanao of the repeated and persistent motions made by Pimentel’s counsel to propound questions
to PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao regarding the due execution and
authenticity of the Maguindanao MCOCs, Pimentel’s counsel manifested her continuing objection to the
canvassing of the said MCOCs.

On 29 June 2007, the SPBOC-Maguindanao submitted to the NBC the second PCOC for Maguindanao. In
the proceedings before the NBC, Pimentel’s counsel reiterated her request to propound questions to PES
Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and the SPBOC-Maguindanao. The NBC,
however, refused to grant her request. Pimentel’s counsel thereafter moved for the exclusion of the second
Maguindanao PCOC from the canvass

Pimentel averred that said canvass proceedings were conducted by the NBC and SPBOC-Maguindanao
in violation of his constitutional rights to substantive and procedural due process and equal protection of
the laws, and in obvious partiality to Zubiri

In the meantime, without any TRO and/or Status Quo Ante Order from the Court, the canvass proceedings
before the NBC continued, and by 14 July 2007, Zubiri (with 11,004,099 votes) and Pimentel (with
10,984,807 votes) were respectively ranked as the twelfth and thirteenth Senatorial candidates with the
highest number of votes in the 14 May 2007 elections.

After a close scrutiny of the allegations, arguments, and evidence presented by all the parties before this
Court, this Court rules to dismiss the present Petition

ISSUE

HELD : A pre-proclamation controversy has been defined by Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known
as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, as follows:

SEC. 241. Definition. – A pre-proclamation controversy is any question pertaining to or affecting the
proceeding of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political
party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised
under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appearance of the election returns.

Under Republic Act No. 7166, providing for synchronized national and local elections, pre-proclamation
controversies refer to matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appearance of
election returns and certificates of canvass

Similarly, the COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC for the election for Senators, did not violate Section
30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, when it denied Pimentel’s request to
question PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and SPBOC-Maguindanao, and
his subsequent motion to exclude the second Maguindanao PCOC.
The SPBOC-Maguindanao, in the conduct of its canvass proceedings, properly refused to allow Pimentel
to contest the Maguindanao MCOCs at that stage by questioning PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the
MBOCs-Maguindanao and presenting evidence to prove the alleged manufactured nature of the said
MCOCs, for such would be tantamount to a pre-proclamation case still prohibited by Section 15 of Republic
Act No. 7166, even after its amendment by Republic Act No. 9369.
According to Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, Congress and
the COMELEC en banc, acting as the NBC, shall determine the authenticity and due execution of the
certificates of canvass for President, Vice-President and Senators, respectively, as accomplished and
transmitted to them by the local boards of canvassers. For the province of Maguindanao, it is the PBOC
which transmits the PCOC to the NBC.

Given the foregoing, there is indeed no merit in Pimentel’s request before the NBC to still question PES
Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and SPBOC-Maguindanao regarding the
Maguindanao MCOCs. There is also no reason to exclude the second Maguindanao PCOC from the
national canvass of votes for Senators after its authenticity and due execution had been determined by the
NBC in accordance with the criteria provided by the law.

This Court finds Pimentel’s argument of deprivation of due process problematic since he has not
established what he is being deprived of: life, liberty, or property. He was a candidate in the senatorial
elections. At the time he filed the instant Petition, he might have been leading in the canvassing of votes,
yet the canvass proceedings were still ongoing, and no winner for the twelfth and last senatorial post had
been proclaimed. May he already claim a right to the elective post prior to the termination of the canvass
proceedings and his proclamation as winner, and may such a right be considered a property right which he
cannot be deprived of without due process? These were clearly substantial and weighty issues which
Pimentel did not address. Unfortunately, this Court cannot argue and settle them for him.

Finally, while Section 15, in relation to Section 30, of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act
No. 9369, did introduce an additional exception to the prohibition against pre-proclamation controversies in
elections for President, Vice-President, and Senators, this Court has already established in the preceding
discussion that Pimentel cannot invoke the same in his Petition. The provisions in question did not materially
change the nature of canvass proceedings before the boards of canvassers, which still remain summary
and administrative in nature for the purpose of canvassing the votes and determining the elected official
with as little delay as possible and in time for the commencement of the new term of office

ELECTION LAW: MIRIAM DEFENSOR–SANTIAGO versus FIDEL RAMOS (253 SCRA 559)
MIRIAM DEFENSOR – SANTIAGO versus FIDEL RAMOS (253 SCRA 559)

Facts:
The protestant, Miriam Defensor-Santiago ran for presidency and lost in the May 1992 election. In her
Motion on the 16th day of August in the year 1995, reiterated in her comment of the 29th of August of the
same year, protestant Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision in the remaining precincts of the pilot
areas be dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed computed.

The Court deferred action on the motion and required, instead, the protestant and protestee to submit
their respective memoranda. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the election protest filed by Defensor-Santiago is moot and academic by her election as a
Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office as such on the 30th of June in the year
1995.
Held:
YES. The Court held that the election protest filed by Santiago has been abandoned or considered
withdrawn as a consequence of her election and assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of the
duties and functions thereof.

The protestant abandoned her “determination to protest and pursue the public interest involved in the
matter of who is the real choice of the electorate.

Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of
uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential elections, thereby enhancing the all too crucial
political stability of the nation during this period of national recovery.

Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the protestant to inform the PET within 10 days if after the
completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, she still wishes to present evidence. Since
DS has not informed the Tribunal of any such intention, such is a manifest indication that she no longer
intends to do so.

Case Digest: P.E.T. CASE No. 002. March 29, 2005

Ronald Allan Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., protestant, vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, protestee.

Facts: GMA was proclaimed by the congress as duly elected President of the Philippines. Refusing to
concede defeat, the second-placer in the elections, FPJ, filed an election protest before the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal. However, the protestant died in the course of his medical treatment at St. Luke’s
Hospital. Now, the widow of FPJ, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe submitted a manifestation with urgent
petition/motion to intervene as a substitute for deceased protestant FPJ.

Issue: Whether the widow may substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the
latter’s protest case.

Ruling: No. The court held in Vda. de De Mesa that while the right to a public office is personal and
exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or
to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest
proceedings. Hence, substitution and intervention is allowed but only by a real party in interest. A real party
in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party who is entitled to
the avails of the suit. Herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any claim to the august office of
President. Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we can conclude that protestant’s widow is not a
real party in interest to this election protest.

N G L AD L AD P AR T Y VS C OM EL EC ( 2010)

16 Nov 2017
[G.R. No. 190582; April 8, 2010] Constitutional Law| Political Law| Party List

FACTS:
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Ang Ladlad applied for registration with the COMELEC
in 2006. The application was first denied on the ground that it has no substantial membership base and
on second, was dismissed based on moral grounds.

ISSUE:
Whether COMELEC erred in denying Ang Ladlad as Party-List Representative.

RULING:
Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation.
Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in
the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list
organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The
difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlad’s morality, or lack thereof.

The Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “no law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy
of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some
justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government
must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects.

From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same
interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly
situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should
apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same
basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.

The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioner’s application for party-list accreditation.