1. Marcos v.

Manglapus (September 1989) – residual power

Art. 7, Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines.

 FACTS:

• The SC starts with: This case is unique. It should not create a precedent. 

• On his deathbed, Ferdinand Marcos wished to return to the Philippines.

• But Pres. Cory denied his request, on the ground that such would be a threat to the
stability of the government.

• Petition for mandamus and prohibition, asking the SC to order respondents

(Secretaries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, National Defense, the Executive
Secretary, Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of Staff of DND), to issue
travel documents to Ferdinand Marcos and his immediate family members and to
enjoin Pres. Cory’s decision to bar their return to the PH.

• The Marcoses claim that under the Bill of Rights, UDHR and ICCPR, their right to
return to the Philippines is guaranteed. o Sec. 1: No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.

o Sec. 6: The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by
law.

• They contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of
the Marcoses because only a court may do so “within the limits prescribed by
law.”

• Nor may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized
her to do so.

• OSG: the issue involves a political question which is non-justiciable. o The main
issue is: Is there a danger to national security and public safety if Ferdinand
Marcos and his family shall return to the PH and establish their residence here?

o Resolution of this allegedly falls within the exclusive authority and

competence of the President.

o There is a primacy of the right of the State to national security over

individual rights.
ISSUES/HELD:

Is the right to travel the individual right involved in this case? – NO 

• Right to travel would normally connote travel from the PH to other countries or
within the PH.

• The right involved is the right to return to one’s country, which is a different right
under international law.

• The right to return to one’s country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed
in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to
travel, but the right to return may be considered as a generally accepted principle
of international law and under the Constitution, is part of the law of the land.

Does the President have the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses
from returning to the PH? – YES 

Did the framers of the Constitution, by enumerating certain powers of the

President, intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no
other? – NO 

• The Constitution provides that “the executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines.”

• However, it does not define what it meant by “executive power” although in the
same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e.: o
the power to control over all executive depts., bureaus, and offices o power to
execute laws o appointing power o powers under the commander-in-chief clause
o power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons o power to grant amnesty
with the concurrence of Congress o power to contract or guarantee foreign loans
o power to enter into treaties or international agreements

o submit the budget to Congress o address Congress

• It would not be accurate to state that “executive power” is the power to enforce the
laws, for the President is head of state, as well as head of government.

• Whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the
Constitution itself withholds it.

• ALSO, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of
the powers of the President.

• It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any
provision of law, e.g. his power over the country’s foreign relations.
• Executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. 

• In the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of govt, and in directing

implementing action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making any
decision as President of the Republic, the President has to consider:

o Service and protection of the people o Maintenance of peace and order

o Protection of life, liberty and property o The promotion of the general

welfare.

• The President must consider these principles in arriving at a decision when faced
with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to
return to the PH.

• The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to
return to the country are the deposed dictator and his family at whose door the
travails of the country are laid and from whom billions of dollars believed to be
illgotten wealth are sought to be recovered.

• The constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible.

• To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the
common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals.

• (Syllabus topic) The power involved is the President’s residual power to

protect the general welfare of the people. o It is a power borne by the
President’s duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. 

o May also be viewed as a power implicit in the President’s duty to take care
that the laws are faithfully executed. 

• The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the
commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against
external and internal threats to its existence. 

• Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of
peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency
specified in the commander-in-chief provision. 

• For in making the President Commander-in-Chief, the enumeration of powers that

follow cannot be said to exclude the President’s exercising as Commander-in-
Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace,
and maintain public order and security. 

• That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from
returning has been recognized by members of the Legislature, and is manifested
 by the Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives and signed by 103
of its members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return. 

• The Resolution does not question the President’s power to bar the Marcoses from
returning to the PH, rather, it appeals to the President’s sense of compassion to
allow a man to come home to die in his country. 

Did the President act arbitrarily or with GADALEJ when she denied the Marcoses’
return? – NO 

• It is the catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove to be the
proverbial final straw that would break the camel’s back. 

• With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and
capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses
a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their
return. 

• The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre-
emptive action against threats to its existence, if, though still nascent they are
perceived as apt to become serious and direct. 

• The country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by
the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates
and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to
destabilize the country. 

• The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the
Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and
lead to total economic collapse.

*N.B. Court voted 8 to 7. Petition dismissed.

Motion for Reconsideration (October 1989)

Is there basis for Pres. Cory’s bar to the return of the Marcos family to the PH? –
YES 

• [By this time, Ferdinand Marcos had already died. But his family filed an MR so
they can return.]
 • (IMPT) It cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is
vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of
executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties
under the Constitution.

• The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in
the article on the Executive Department an in scattered provisions of the
Constitution.

• This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the
abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of
specific power of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-
in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power. 

• That the President has powers other than those expressly stated in the Constitution
is nothing new.

• Myers v. US: Unlike the Congress, the federal executive could exercise power from
sources not enumerated, so long as not forbidden by the constitutional text: the
executive power was given in general terms, strengthened by specific terms
where emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and was limited by direct
expressions where limitation was needed.

Is a recognition of the President’s implied or residual powers tantamount to

setting the stage for another dictatorship? – NOPE 

• The residual powers of the President under the Constitution should not be
confused with the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate
pursuant to Amendment No. 6:

o “Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a

grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the
interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is
unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment
requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue
the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, which shall form
part of the law of the land.

• There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President under the 1987
Constitution and the power of the President under the 19873 Constitution
pursuant to Amendment No. 6.

• FIRST, Amendment No. 6 refers to an express grant of power.

• SECOND, it refers to a grant to the President of the specific power of legislation.

 • MR denied.

 2. Province of North Cotabato v. GRP, 568 SCRA 402 (2008)

This is a consolidatiosn of a number of cases regarding the issues, mostly in relation to

its constitutionality, surrounding the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
Domain (MOA-AD) between the Government of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the issue regarding the extent of the powers of
the President in pursuing the peace process. The following are the cases that have
been consolidated:

 G.R. 183591 – (23 July 2008) the Province of North Cotabato and Vice Governor
Emmanuel Piñol (Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and TRO) sought to compel respondents to disclose the
MOA-AD and attachments, prohibit the signing, hold a public consultation and
declare the MOA-AD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
 G.R. 183752 – the City of Zamboanga  (Mandamus and Prohibition and similar
injunctive reliefs) prayed that Zamboanga City be excluded from the Bangsamoro
Homeland and/or Bangasmoro Judicial Entity (BJE) and that the MOA-AD be
declared null and void
 G.R. 183893 – City of Iligan (Injunction and Declaratory Relief) sought to enjoin
respondents from signing the MOA-AD and if it has been signed, from
implementing it. Additionally impleaded ES Eduardo Ermita as respondent.
 G.R. 183951 - the Province of Zamboanga del Norte et al (petition for Certiorari,
Mandamus and Prohibition), prayed to declare null and void the MOA-AD and
without operative effect and those respondents enjoined from executing the
MOA-AD
 G.R. 183962 – Maceda, Binay, Pimentel III filed a petition for Prohibition, praying
for a judgment prohibiting and permanently enjoining respondents from formally
signing and executing the MOA-AD as well as to nullify the MOA-AD for being
unconstitutional and illegal. Additionally impleaded as responded the MILF Peace
Negotiating Panel (represented by Chairman Iqbal.
 Various parties moved to intervene and were granted to file their
petitions/comments in-intervention.

Important People:

 Aforementioned petitioners and respondents

 Hermogenes Esperon Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP)
 GRP Peace Panel (GRPPP) on Ancestral Domain

FACTS (In order of chronological events) AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE MOA-AD

1.  1996 – the beginning of the long process of GRP-MILF peace negotiation
2.                18 July 1997 – the GRP and the peace panel signed the Agreement on the
General Cessation of Hostilities
3.                27 August 1998 – signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent
 

4.                1999 to early 2000 – numerous municipalities in Central Mindanao were

attacked by the MILF which affected the peace negotiations; MILF took control of the
town hall in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in March 2000 and in response, then
President Estrada declared an “all-out-war” against the MILF
5.                2001 – President GMA assumed office and suspended the military offense
against the MILF and sought a resumption of the peace negotiations; MILF was first
apprehensive but were convinced when GMA asked the Government of Malaysia
through Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help convince them, the MILF convened
its Central Committee seriously to discuss the matter and eventually met with the GRP
6.                28 February 2001 – GRP Negotiating Panel was established through
Executive Order No. 3 s. 2001
7.                24 March 2001 – parties met in Kuala Lumpur with talks facilitated by the
Malaysian Government; parties signed the Agreement on the General Framework and
the Resumption of Peace Talks. The MILF thereafter suspended all its military actions.
8.                20-22 June 2001 – formal peace talks held in Tripoli, Libya the outcome of
which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace Process which contained the
following basic principles and agenda on the negotiations: security aspect,
rehabilitation aspect, and ancestral domain aspect (this aspect had a colatilla saying
that it “shall be discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting”)
9.  5-7 August 2001 – second round of peace talks in Cyberjaya, Malaysia which
ended in the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the
Tripoli Agreement 2001 which led to a ceasefire between parties
10.   7 May 2002 – signed the Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian
Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001
11.   13 July 2003 – Chairman Salamat Hashim of the MILF passed away and
subsequently replaced by Al Haj Murad (previously chair peace negotiator). His
position was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal.
12.             2005 – exploratory talks between parties in Malaysia, to draft the MOA-AD
13.             23 July 2008 – the Province of North Cotabato file with the Supreme
Court and was docketed as G.R. 183591
14.             04 August 2008 – the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
commanding and directing respondents and agents to cease and desist from formally
signing the MOA-AD. Court also required SolGen to submit to the court and petitioners
the official copy of the MOA-AD
15.   05 August 2008 – scheduled signing date for the final form of Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement on Peace
(MOA-AD) 
16.   15, 22, 29 August 2008 – cases were heard on oral argument with the
following issues discussed:
a.                Whether the petitions have become moot and academic
   i.Insofar as mandamus is concerned in view of the disclosure of the official
copies of the MOA-AD
ii.Insofar as prohibition aspect is concerned if consultation has become fait
accompli with the finalization of the draft
b.                Whether the constitutionality and legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication
C.  Whether respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated the MOA vis-à-vis ISSUES (d) and
(e)
d.                Whether there is a violation of the people’s right to information. If   yes,
whether prohibition is an appropriate remedy
e.                Whether by signing the MOA the GRP would be binding itself to:
 Create and recognize the BJE as a separate state/ juridical, territorial, political
subdivision not recognized by law
 Revise or amend the constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA-AD
 Concede/ recognize claim of MILF for ancestral domain in violation of IPRA
 If yes, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to bind the GRP
Whether the inclusion of North Cotabato, Zamboanga City, Iligan and Isabela and
Linamon, Lanao del Norte in the Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question

g.                Whether not signing the MOA derogates any valid prior commitment of the
GRP
17.   19 August 2008 - Maceda, Binay, Pimentel III filed with the SC
18.   19 August 2008 – Respondents (through Manifestation by Motion) stated that
the Executive Department shall thoroughly review the MOA-AD and pursue further
negotiations to address the issues raised and thus moved to dismiss the cases

OVERVIEW OF THE MOA-AD

 Parties: GRP (used interchangeably with CENTRAL GOVERNMENT)  and the

MILF
 Main body is divided into four (4) strands: CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES,
TERRITORY, RESOURCES, AND GOVERNANCE

CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES

 Defines Bangsamoro People as natives or original inhabitants  of Mindanao and

adjacent islands (including Palawan and Sulu archipelago) at the time of
conquest/ colonization and their descendants and spouses
  Not only Moros but included indigenous peoples of Mindanao and adjacent
islands (adds that the freedom of choice of the IPs shall be respected)
 MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro Homeland” – the ownership of
which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior
rights of occupation; both parties acknowledge that ancestral domain does not
form part of the public domain.
 Bangsamoro people have a right to self-governance
 Describes Bangsamoro as the “First Nation” – suggests exclusive entitlement to
that designation (departs from Canadian usage – used to refer to their
indigenous collectively as First Nations – plural)

 TERRITORY
  Land mass, maritime, terrestrial, fluvial, alluvial including aerial domain and
atmospheric space embracing Mindanao- Sulu-Palawan geographic region
 Present geographic area of ARMM including certain Municipalities in Lanao del
Norte voted for in the 2001 plebiscite
 Outside this, the BJE is to cover other provinces and municipalities grouped into
Category A (to be subjected to plebiscite not later than 12 months after MOA-AD
signing) and B [subjected to a plebiscite twenty-five (25) years from the signing of
a separate agreement – the Comprehensive Compact]
 BJE shall have jurisdiction (did not say joint with GRP) over all natural resources
within its internal waters (15km from coastline) and territorial waters from beyond
this up to baselines of RP – South East and South West of mainland Mindanao;
within territorial waters, there is joint jurisdiction with GRP
 Indicates sharing of minerals on the territorial waters in favor of BJE. Nothing
said about sharing the minerals in the internal waters

 RESOURCES
 BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation/ trade relations with foreign
countries and can establish foreign trade missions to other countries
 External defense remain the duty and obligation of GRP
 GRP should take steps to include BJE in international meetings and events such
as but not limited to ASEAN events
 Exploring, producing, obtaining potential sources of energy jurisdiction and
control is under the BJE but in times of national emergency, when public interest
requires, the GRP may, for a fixed period and reasonable terms agreed by both
parties, assume or direct the operation of such resources
 The sharing between the GRP and the BJE of total production pertaining to
natural resources is 75:25 in favor of BJE.
 BJE may modify or cancel forest concessions, timber licenses, mining
concessions, Mineral Production and Sharing Agreements (MPSA) Industrial
Forest Management Agreements (IFMA) and the like, granted by the GRP,
including those issued by the present ARMM.

 GOVERNANCE
 Binds parties to invite a multinational third-party to observe and monitor
implementation of COMPREHENSIVE COMPACT – a compact to embody the
“details for effective enforcement” and “mechanisms and modalities of actual
implementation” of the MOA-AD but explicitly says that the participation of the
third party shall not in any way affect the relationship of the GRP and BJE
 Defines relationship of Central Government and BJE as “associative” [take
note of this as this will be an issue tackled later on] characterized by shared
authority and responsibility
  Provides that provisions requiring “amendments to the existing legal framework”
shall take effect upon signing of the comprehensive compact and upon effecting
the aforesaid amendments with due regard to the non-derogation of prior
agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be indicated in the
comprehensive compact [take note as the legality of this provision is one of the
main points of the controversy – violates Constitution]
 BJE can build, develop, maintain own institutions (banking, education, legislation,
judiciary etc.) details will be discussed in the negotiation of the comprehensive
compact

 Annexed to the MOA-AD are documents containing the lists and maps of the
places included under Categories A and B mentioned under TERRITORY

ISSUES AND HOLDING:

I.WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONS HAVE COMPLIED WITH THE PROCEDURAL

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

a.                RIPENESS – COURT RULES THAT IT IS RIPE.

·   Petitions allege acts or omissions by respondents exceed their authority by violating their
duty under EO No. 3, the Constitution and statutes. There is a prima facie case for
Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus and thus an actual case for controversy ripe for
adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute.
·   Concrete acts not necessary; cites Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre: “…mere enactment of the
questioned law/ approval of the challenged action the dispute is said to have ripened
into judicial controversy even without any overt act. Indeed even a singular violation of
the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.” Also cites Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe: US SC held that challenge for the
constitutionality of the school’s policy on student-led prayers/ speeches before games
was ripe even without it happening because it is the policy being challenged, not the
concrete acts per se
·   When law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness; cites New
York v. United States: action of New York challenging a radioactive waste policy was
ripe in order to avoid the provision’s consequences

2. LOCUS STANDI
·   Province of North Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga del Norte, City of Iligan, City of
Zamboanga and petitioners-in-intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and
Municipality of Linamon have locus standi in view of the direct and substantial injury that
they as LGUs would suffer as their territories are to be included in the intended
domain of the BJE
·   Petitioners allege that they did not vote for their inclusion
·   Maceda, Binay, Pimentel III would have no standing for their failure to specify that they
would have rights that will be denied or that there is a wastage of public funds BUT court
grants them standing due to their invocation of the transcendental importance of the issue
·   Intervenors Drilon and Tamayo can be given standing in their claim as tax payers and that
government funds will be used to conduct an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite;
transcendental importance argument also gives them standing
·   Intervenor Mar Roxas has standing as his premise is that he is a member of the Senate and
a citizen (public’s right to be informed on the MOA-AD) and has genuine legal interest in
the matter in litigation (personally, we no idea why the last one gives him standing)
·   Intervenors Lopez, Ridao, Gomez, and Buxani failed to allege any proper legal interest in
the present petitions
·   Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development and Muslim Legal Assistance
Foundation may be prejudiced and therefore they have standing

3. MOOTNESS

·   COURT RULES THAT PETITIONS ARE NOT MOOTED

1. Non-signing and eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace
Panel did not moot the petitions. It bears emphasis that the signing did not push
through due to the TRO issued by this Court
2. Cannot be mere consensus points given the nomenclature
and need to have it initialed by involved parties + far reaching constitutional
implications
3. As discussed, there is a commitment to change statutes and
possibly amend the constitution in order to conform to the MOA-AD; consequently,
present petitions are not confined to the terms and provisions of the MOA-AD but to
other on-going and future negotiations and agreements necessary for its realization
4. It is of paramount public interest.

2. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS HAVE VIOLATED CONSTITUTIONAL

AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS ON PUBLIC CONSULTATION AND THE
RIGHT TO INFORMATION WHEN THEY NEGOTIATED THE MOA-AD

a.                Constitutional right to information on matters of public concern as

provided in Section 7, Article III Bill of Rights as is complimented by Section 28,
 Article II, Declaration of Principles and State Policies (“splendid symmetry” in the
words of Commissioner Blas Ople)
·        It is a self-executory constitutional right (Legazpi v. Civil Service Commission)
·        There can be no realistic perception and participation by the public of the nation’s
problems nor meaningful democratic decision-making if the public is denied access of
information of general interest (Baldoza v. Judge Dimaano)
·        The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern, and matters of public concern covered by the
right to information contemplates inclusion of  steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the contract/ transaction (Chavez v. PEA)
·        Effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not wait for a passing of a statute.
Respondents cannot point to the absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in
not effecting such policy (merely provided for “reasonable safeguards” in the
implementation but not a necessity for the policy to be in effect)

B. Three pertinent laws [EO No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government
Code), and Republic Act No. 8371 (IPRA)] animate petitioner’s right to be
consulted on the peace agenda corollary to the constitutional right to information
and disclosure.
·   E.O. No. 3
1. In the perambulatory clauses (the first WHEREAS clauses in the
EO) it is stated that there is a need to enhance contribution of CSOs by
institutionalizing people’s participation
2. Enumerates responsibilities of the PAPP such as conducting
regular dialogues with the National Peace Forum and other peace partners

·   Local Government Code

1. Requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any
project or program critical to environment and human ecology which the MOA-AD
falls under as it vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people which
could result to the diaspora of a great number of inhabitants from the said
environment

·   IPRA
1. Entails the observance of prior informed consent of the indigenous
cultural communities (ICCs) and indigenous peoples (IPs) (under IPRA)

·   PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion

1. No consultation/ lack of information – cannot invoke “executive
privilege” doctrine since copies of the MOA-AD were given upon request of the Court
anyway
2. Lacked prior consent/ informing of ICCs and indigenous peoples
IPs (under IPRA)
3. MOA AD recognition of ancestral domains seems to delineate
ancestral domains which IPRA does not grant the Executive Department thus
respondents clearly transcended the boundaries of their authority
  

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONTENTS OF THE MOA-AD ARE IN VIOLATION

OF THE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES

a.                MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and Laws as presently

worded.
·   Powers of BJE exceed those granted to any LGU under present laws
·   The international law concept of association is discussed in length as it is envisioned to be
the relationship between the BJE and the Central Government
·   Quotes Keitner and Reisman (authors of Free Association: The United States Experience):
[a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntary establish durable
links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the
other, the principal while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations
represent a middle ground between integration and independence. xxx (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
·   Free association is understood as an international association between sovereigns

·   The MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with the international
legal concept of association
1. BJE’s capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with
foreign countries
2. Commitment of the Central Government to ensure participation of
BJE in ASEAN events and UN agencies
3. BJE’s right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on
negotiation of border agreements
4. Sharing of revenues
5. These resemble rights of governments of the Federated States of
Micronesia (an example of an associated state in the US)

·   Concept of ASSOCIATION is not recognized in our Constitution

1. No province, city or municipality has an “associative” relationship
with the national government
2. Court says: “even the mere concept of animating many of the MOA-
AD’s provisions already require for the amendment of constitutional provisions, such as
in Article X”

·   It violates of a number of articles in the Constitution

 
 1. Article X, Section 20 (defines the powers of autonomous
regions)

Section 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution
and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative
powers over:

(1) Administrative organization;

(2) Creation of sources of revenues;

xxx

(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare
of the people of the region. (Underscoring supplied)

2.                It is only the President who has the power to enter into treaties however,
paragraph 3 under RESOURCES in the MOA-AD states that “the BJE is free to enter
into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries:
provided however that such relationships and understandings do not include
aggression against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines x x x”

3.                Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended to effect
the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD.

“The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous

cultural communities within the framework of national unity
and development”

Court says that because of the associative ties between the

BJE and the national government, the act of placing a
portion of Philippine territory in a status which in
international practice has generally been a preparation
for independence, is certainly not conducive to national
unity.

 
 ·   MOA-AD is also not in consonance with a number of statutes.

1. Article X Section 3 of the Organic Act of the ARMM is a bar to

the adoption of the definition of “Bangsamoro people” used in the
MOA

MOA-AD lumps together the identities of the Bangsamoro

with the other indigenous peoples living in Mindanao (the
Organic Act of the ARMM distinguishes between Bangsa
Moro people and Tribal peoples)

2.                Chapter VII Section 52 of the IPRA lays down a detailed procedure in the
delineation and recognition of ancestral domains which is not what is in the MOA-AD

MOA-AD simply states in Paragraph 1 TERRITORY, “[t]he

Bangsamoro homeland and historic territory refer to the land
mass as well as the maritime x x x embracing the Mindanao-
Sulu-Palawan geographic region.”

·   The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD is

UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

1. Paragraph 7 in GOVERNANCE section of the MOA-AD states:

“7. Parties agree that the mechanisms and modalities for the
actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in
the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to
enable it to occur effectively.

Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the

existing legal framework shall come into force upon effecting
the necessary changes to the legal framework with due
regard to non-derogation of prior agreements and within the
 stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive
Compact.”

2.                Court opines that this stipulation does not bear a mark of a “suspensive”
condition – defined in civil law as a future and uncertain event – but of a term. It is not
a question of whether the necessary changes to the legal framework will be
effected but WHEN. There is no uncertainty, thus pursuant to this, it is mandatory for
the GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework.

This is inconsistent with the limits of the President’s authority

to propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual
guarantee that the Constitution and other laws will
certainly be adjusted to conform to the MOA-AD.

3.                Upholding such would be authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers

vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention or the people themselves through
initiative because the only way that the Executive can guarantee these amendments is
through undue influence and interference with the legislative process. Thus, it should
be struck down as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

VERDICT:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss is DENIED. Main and intervening petitions are

GRANTED.
2. The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-
MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared CONTRARY TO LAW
AND THE CONSTITUTION.

Concept of “Association” under International Law

The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and the BJE as
“associative,” characterized by shared authority and responsibility.

 
In the international legal context, an association is formed "when two states of unequal
power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate,
delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal,while maintaining its
international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground between
integration and independence"

In international practice, the “associated state” arrangement has usually been used as a
transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence.

The concept of Association is not recognized under the 1987 Constitution

The MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal
concept of association, specifically the following:

(a) the BJE’s capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with
foreign countries,

(b) the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE’s

participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN
agencies, and

(c) the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external

defense, etc.

These provisions of the MOA indicate that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the
status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.

Creation of an autonomous region

The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is
covered by the term “autonomous region”, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with the
Constitution.

 
 Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that “[t]he creation of the
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes
cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that
only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite
shall be included in the autonomous region.”

The MOA-AD, in delineating the territorial boundaries of the BJE, provided that
the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the
ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite shall be automatically part of the BJE
without need of another plebiscite.

Under the Constitution, a separate plebiscite is still required because what

these areas voted for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.

Bangsamoro People

The definition of “Bangsamoro people” used in the MOA-AD is inconsistent with the
Organic Act of the ARMM and the IPRA.

Under the MOA-AD, Bangsamoro people refers to those who are natives or
original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and
the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization of its descendants
whether mixed or of full blood.

The Organic Act, in contrast, does not lump together the identities of the
Bangsamoro and other indigenous peoples living in Mindanao, but instead
makes a distinction between Bangsamoro people and Tribal peoples.

Right to Self-determination under International Law

The right of a people to self-determination has acquired a status beyond ‘convention’

and is considered a general principle of international law
 

The people’s right to self-determination should not be understood as extending to a

unilateral right of secession. A distinction should be made between the right of internal
and external self-determination.

internal self-determination – a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social

and cultural development within the framework of an existing state.

external self-determination – (which potentially takes the form of the assertion of

a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and,
even then, under carefully defined circumstances.

Positive International Law does not recognize the right of national groups, as such, to
separate themselves from the State of which they form part by the simple expression of
a wish. The grant or refusal of the right to a portion of its population of determining its
own political fate by plebiscite or by some other method, is, exclusively, an attribute of
the sovereignty of every State

3. Sanlakas v. Angelo Reyes (G.R. No. 159085)

February 3, 2004 | G.R. No. 159085

FACTS:

On July 27, 2003, some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City. Bewailing
the corruption in the AFP, the soldiers demanded, among other things, the resignation
of President Gloria Arroyo, Secretary of Defense Angelo Reyes, and PNP Chief
Hermogenes Ebdane. 

In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued later in the day
Proclamation No. 427 ("Declaring a State of Rebellion") and General Order No. 4
("Directing the AFP and the PNP to Suppress the Rebellion"), both declaring “a state of
rebellion” and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.

By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood occupation had ended. After hours-long
negotiations, the soldiers agreed to return to barracks. The President, however, did not
immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion and did so only on August 1, 2003,
through Proclamation No. 435 ("Declaring that the State of Rebellion Has Ceased to
Exist").
Subsequently, several petitions have been filed challenging the constitutionality of the
President Arroyo's declaration of state of rebellion. These were: 

• G.R. No. 159085 (Sanlakas and PM v. Executive Secretary, et al.) - Party-list

organizations Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (PM), contend that Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to
call out the armed forces. They further submit that, because of the cessation of the
Oakwood occupation, thereexists no sufficient factual basis for the proclamation by the
President of a state of rebellion for an indefinite period.

• G.R. No. 159103 (SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al.) -

Officers/members of the Social Justice Society (SJS), “Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law
professors and bar reviewers" claim that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does
not authorize the declaration of a state of rebellion. They contend that the declaration is
a “constitutional anomaly” that “confuses, confounds and misleads” because
“[o]verzealous public officers, acting pursuant to such proclamation or general order, are
liable to violate the constitutional right of private citizens.” Petitioners also submit that
the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section
18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48
hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential
issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has
not delegated any such power to the President.

• G.R. No. 159185 (Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive
Secretary Romulo) - petitioners brought suit as citizens and as Members of the House
of Representatives whose rights, powers and functions were allegedly affected by the
declaration of a state of rebellion. Petitioners do not challenge the power of the
President to call out the Armed Forces. They argue, however, that the declaration of a
state of rebellion is a “superfluity,” and is actually an exercise of emergency
powers.Such exercise, it is contended, amounts to a usurpation of the power of
Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution.

• G.R. No. 159196 (Pimentel v. Romulo, et al.) - Senator Pimentel  assails the subject
presidential issuances as “an unwarranted, illegal and abusive exercise of a martial law
power that has no basis under the Constitution.” In the main, petitioner fears that the
declaration of a state of rebellion “opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation
of warrantless arrests” for the crime of rebellion.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the case is moot and academic, given that the President has already
declared the cessation of the state of rebellion. 
2. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to file the instant petitions. 
3. Whether or not Section 18, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution grants the President the
power to declare a state of rebellion.
4. Whether or not the declaration of a state of rebellion is a mere superfluity.
5. Whether or not the declaration of a state of rebellion has an effect on the rights of the
citizens. 

HELD: 

1. Yes, the Court held that the case is moot and academic, judicial power being limited
to the determination of "actual controversies." However, the Court treated the immediate
case as one that is "capable of repetition yet evading review." Hence, the discussion of
the merits and demerits of the issues presented. 

2. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress,
have standing to challenge the subject issuances. To the extent the powers of Congress
are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. An act of the Executive which
injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury,
which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of
Congress can have a resort to the courts.

3. Yes, the Court held that it is within her prerogative as Chief Executive for the
President to declare a state of rebellion. For the fact is, the Constitution vests the
President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with
Executive powers.

Section 18, Art. VII reads in part: "The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out
such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." This
provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of “graduated
power[s].” From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial
law. The only criterion is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call
the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’”

It is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President
from declaring a state of rebellion. The President’s authority to declare a state of
rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time,
draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers. The Solicitor General points out
the statutory authority for such a declaration may be found in Section 4, Chapter 2
(Ordinance Power), Book III (Office of the President) of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, which states: 

SEC. 4. Proclamations. – Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or

condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a
specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations
which shall have the force of an executive order. 

4. Yes, the declaration of a state of rebellion is a mere superfluity. At most, it only gives
notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to
prevent or suppress it. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written.

5. No. Apprehensions that the military and police authorities may resort to warrantless
arrests are unfounded. In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only
resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The
warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a state
of rebellion. In other words, a person may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the
crime of rebellion whether or not the President has declared a state of rebellion, so long
as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are present.

The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of

martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of
logic. There is no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts in the
“theater of war” or that military authorities have taken over the functions of civil
government. There is no allegation of curtailment of civil or political rights. There is no
indication that the President has exercised judicial and legislative powers. In short, there
is no illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial
law powers.

Rubrico vs. Arroyo

February 18, 2010

FACTS:

Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men belonging to the
301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine Air Force Field Station at
Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During her detention, the petitioner added, her daughters
Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel and Jean Rubrico Apruebo were harassed by Senior Insp. Arsenio
Gomez and that there were also armed men following them. The petitioners prayed that a writ of
amparo be issued, ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing any threatening act
against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file
an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended
party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of
them on the case of Lourdes.
The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory
averments against them. Respondents interposed the defense that the President may not be sued
during her incumbency.

Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the President, et al.

By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case .

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and dropping
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.

HELD:

The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not
expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986
Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be
sued during his or her tenure.

Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not
be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.
It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged
into court litigations while serving as such. 

The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the amparo case against other respondents for failure of the
petition to  allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the enforced
disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed.

BIRAOGO VS PTC
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of
2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the
primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-
level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has
all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it
cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes
between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence
of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena
powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their
arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if
probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of
law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the

PTC from performing its functions. They argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative
Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of
the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an
entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth
Commission.”

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested
the “Truth Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not
superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987
Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous
administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes
those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and

argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s
executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power
to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that,
in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No.
141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the
President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds
because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already
appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-
judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s
jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because
it was validly created for laudable purposes.

ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E.
O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping
the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices,
agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be
an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of
the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a
body to which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress
are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a
right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus,
they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their
mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of
sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation
of E. O. No. 1.

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”

In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It
provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.”

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff
who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does
so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled
to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or
“taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain
direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s
assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to
justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues
in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers
under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted
pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine
if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc
investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the
President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in
the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the
laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of

existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the
Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to
specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission
because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount
that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules
and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective
powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement
those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the
filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the
DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining
facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his
duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order

No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause
enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in
a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its
improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid

classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The
test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are
not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal

protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and
find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during
the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal
protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and
selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at
least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to

which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private
rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not
conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby

declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.

7 Soliven v. Makasiar
This resolution by the Court consolidated three cases, which have three principal
issues. All of these started when President Cory Aquino asked for the prosecution of
members of the press for alleged libel. The Court said that: (1) on the issue if the
petitioners were denied due process: it is moot and academic because the petitioners
clearly availed of administrative remedies; (2) the constitutional rights of Beltran were
not violated when RTC Judge Makasiar issued a warrant of arrest because Beltran
misunderstood the Const. when he said that the Judge requires a “personal
examination” the complainant and witnesses—the Court said that the Const. only
wanted to emphasize the exclusive and personal responsibility of the judge to satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause; and (3) the President may initiate criminal
proceedings. 

IMPORTANT PEOPLE

L-82585—

Petitioners: Maximo Soliven, Antonio Roces, Frederick Agcaoli, Godofredo Manzanas

Respondents: Hon. Ramon Makasiar of Manila RTC, Undersec. Silvestre Bello of

DOJ, Luis Victor (City Fiscal of Manila), and Pres. Cory Aquino

L-82827—

Petitioners: Luis Beltran

Respondents: Hon. Ramon Makasiar of Manila RTC

L-83979—

Petitioners: Luis Beltran

Respondents: Hon. Ramon Makasiar of Manila RTC, Undersec. Silvestre Bello of

DOJ, Jesus Guerrero (City Fiscal of Manila), and Exec. Sec. Cataleno Macaraig

FACTS 

1. The President asked for the prosecution of a newspaper columnist, the

publisher, and chairman of the editorial board, the managing editor, and the
business manager in a case for alleged libel. (Beltran said Pres. Aquino hid
 under her bed during a coup d’etat attempt).
2. 30 March 1988: Secretary of Justice denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice
sustaining the City Fiscal’s finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. 
3. 07 April 1988: A second MR was filed but was denied by the Secretary of
Justice.
4. 02 May 1988: The President, through the Exec. Sec., affirmed the resolution of
the Sec. of Justice. 
5. 16 May 1988: MR denied by Exec. Secretary.

ISSUE with HOLDING

1. WON petitioners were denied due process when information for libel were filed
against them, although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was
still under review by the Secretary of Justice and the President – ISSUE MOOT
AND ACADEMIC

a.                See facts 2 up to 5: The petitioners have availed of 2 MR but both were
denied by the Secretary of Justice and the President; thus due process was freely
available because they clearly used administrative remedies.

b.                With respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due

process in the preliminary investigation is not true: instead of submitting counter-
affidavits, he filed a “Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed”, tantamount to waiving
his right to refute the complaint. The only requirement of due process is that the
petitioner was given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits should he want to. 

2.                WON the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when RTC judge
Makasiar issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant
and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause - NO

a.                This concerns Art. III, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Const. Beltran believes that the
present Const. requires judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrests (see bold/underlined text)

2. The Court does not agree What the Const. simply emphasizes is the
exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying
 himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. 

i.The judge shall: 

1. Evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by

the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and issue a
warrant of arrest if applicable
2. If the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause. 

3. The respondent judge in this case did not deviate from this prescribed
procedure. Therefore, no grave abuse of discretion was committed.

3.                W/N the President, under the Const., may initiate criminal proceedings
against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit – YES

a.                Petitioner Beltran argues that “the reasons which necessitate presidential
immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit”. He says if criminal
proceedings ensue by virtue of the President’s filing of her complaint-affidavit, she
may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the
trial court’s jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of
immunity from suit: by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing
herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

2. Court says: Rationale of the Presidential privilege of immunity from suit

is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from
any hindrance or distraction. 

i.This privilege however may only be invoked by the holder of the office; not by any
other person in the President’s behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in
which the President is the complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege
as a defense.
ii.There is also nothing in the laws that would prevent President from waiving that
privilege; the President may waive it if she wants to. The choice remains solely on her
prerogative. 

3. Re: Beltran’s claim that he could not be held liable for libel because of
the privilegesd character of the publication, and that to allow it would
produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom, the Court finds no basis at
this stage because a trial court is appropriate for the proceedings.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

Court resolved to DISMISS the petitions. 

J. GUTIERREZ: Separate Concurring Opinion

He reserves his vote re: the libel case; he says that it would produce a “chilling effect”
on press freedom. He wanted to emphasize that the Court should not hesitate to
quash a criminal prosecution in the interest of press freedom. This is a special case
because the complainant is the President who is powerful and popular and heads the
investigation and prosecution service and appoints members of appellate courts. He
says that criticism is good, citing US v Bustos (1918) and People v. Perfecto (1922).
The Court should have drawn the fine line of when a high government official can sue
the press instead of leaving it to lower tribunals.

DOCTRINE

The existence of the doctrine of Presidential immunity was confirmed in the case of
Soliven v. Makasiar (1987) and Beltran v. Makasiar (1988), where the Court ruled that
the President enjoys immunity from suit in order to ensure that he/she is free to see to
the daily needs of the administration of the government without having to deal with a
multiplicity of suits.

8. De Lima v. Pres. Rodrigo R. Duterte

G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019

Lessons Applicable: Writ of Habeas Data, Presidential Immunity from Suit

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:

§  May 9, 2016: Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Roa Duterte was elected as the 16th
President of the Philippines with a key agenda of his Administration was the
relentless national crackdown on illegal drugs.
§  August 2, 2016: Sen. De Lima delivered a privilege speech on the floor of the
Senate calling a stop to the alleged extrajudicial killings committed in the
course of the crackdown.
§  Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data seeking to enjoin President
Rodrigo Roa Dutete from committing acts allegedly violative of her right to
life, liberty and security through his public statements: 
§  August 11, 2016 public statement of President Duterte: “I know I’m the
favorite whipping boy of the NGOs and the human rights stalwarts. 
But, I have a special ano kaya no.  She is a government official.  One
day soon I will – bitiwan ko yan in public and I will have to destroy her
in public.”  Incidentally, in the same event, President Duterte
insinuated that with the help of another country, he was keeping
surveillance of her.  “Akala nila na hindi rin ako nakikinig sa kanila.  So
while all the time they were also listening to what I’ve done, I’ve also
been busy, and with the help of another country, listening to them.
§  The statement uttered in a briefing at the NAIA Terminal 3, Pasay City
in August 17, 2016 wherein President Duterte named Sen. De Lima as
the government office he referred to earlier at the same time accused
her of living an immortal life by having a romantic affair with her driver,
a married man, and of being involved in illegal drugs.  “There’s one
crusading lady, whose even herself led a very immoral life, taking his
driver as her lover… Paramour niya ang driver nya nagging hooked rin
sa drugs because of the close association.  You know, when you are
an immoral, dirty woman, the driver was married.  So you live with the
driver, its concubinage.
§  The statements that described her an immoral woman; that publicized
her intimate and personal life, starting from her new boyfriend to her
sexual escapades; that told of her being involved in illegal drugs as
well as in activities that included her construction of a house for her
driver/lover with financing from drug-money
§  Statements that threatened her (“De Lima, you are finished”) and
demeaned her womanhood and humanity.  If I were De Lima, ladies
and gentlemen, I’ll hang myself.  Your life has been, hindi lang life, the
innermost of your core as a female is being serialized everyday. 
Dapat kang mag-resign.  You resign.  And “De Lima better hang
yourself… Hindi ka na naghiya sa sarili mo.  Any other woman would
have slashed her throat.  You?  Baka akala mo artista ka.  Mga
artistang x-rated paglabas sa, paktapos ng shooting, nakangiti…”
 §  Sen. De Lima traces his animosity towards her when she 1st encountered
President Durterte while he was still the City Mayor of Davao and she the
Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights investigating the existence
of the so-called “Davao Death Squad.”

ISSUE: W/N Presidential’s immunity from suit can shield the President from being haled
to court

HELD: Dismissed even without the President invoking the privilege of immunity from
suit.

YES.

G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019

§  Immunity can be classified either by: a. extent i.e. absolute or qualified or b.

duration i.e. permanent or temporary
§  Extent: 
§  Absolute immunity is granted to a government official who has proven
that his actions fell within the scope of his duties, and that his actions
are discretionary rather than ministerial – conduct or the action
performed must not involve insignificant or routinely office work but
rather the challenged action must involve personal judgment.  It
attaches to the function instead of the office.
§  Qualified immunity was initially given to a government official who was
able to prove that at the time of commission of the act complained of,
he possessed a good faith that his actions were lawful – subjective
element determined with the two-tier test:
§  If the statutory or constitutional right asserted by the plaintiff was clear at the
time of the alleged wrongful action
§  Whether the official should reasonably have known the action was contrary to
law
§  Duration:
§  Permanent or the immunity for speech or debate – immunity from
liability in law suits that arise out of the performance of public duties of
democratic deliberation
§  Temporary or congressional immunity from arrest – to legislators from
litigating even private suits while “at Session” of Congress as public
officers
§  Estrada v. Desierto (G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001): Being a former
President, President Estrada no longer enjoyed immunity from suit
§  David v. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006): Improper to
implead President Arroyo in a consolidated petition disputing the factual
bases for Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5
declaring a state of national emergency and called out the Armed Forces of
the Philippines in her capacity as Commander-in-Chief to maintain law and
 order throughout the country and to suppress acts of lawless violence,
insurrection or rebellion.  
§  Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. No. 183871, February 18, 2010): 
Court upheld the exclusion of President  Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
maintaining that presidential immunity from suit despite not being expressly
reserved in the 1987 Constitution and declared that the President could not
be sued during her tenure in a petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo
against military, police personnel and the Office of the Ombudsman and
including President Arroyo.
§  Balao v. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. 186050, December 13, 2011): Court
ruled that RTC had erred in holding that Presidential immunity could not be
invoked in amparo proceedings
§  While the concept of immunity from suit originated elsewhere, the ratification of
the 1981 constitutional amendments and the 1987 Constitution made our
version of presidential immunity unique.  Section 15, Article VII of the 1973
Constitution, as amended, provided for immunity at two distinct points in time:
1. Immunity during the tenure of the President 2. Thereafter.  Framer’s
intended during tenure.  
§  Presidential immunity does not hinge on the nature of the suit.  It is not
intended to immunize the President from liability or accountability.
§  Rationale for the grant of immunity stated in Soliven v. Makasiar (G.R.
No. 82585, 82827, 83979, November 14, 1988): To assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions fee from any hindrance of
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that aside from requiring all of the office-holder’s
time, also demands undivided attention.
§  Rationale expanded in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo: It will degrade the
dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can
be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it
is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance
or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his
official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch,
only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs
his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties
imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the
operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the
President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he
remains accountable to the people but he may be removed from office
only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment.
§  Passage in Soliven was made only to point out that it was the President
by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the
office; not by any other person in the President’s behalf and that it was
the President who had gone to court as the complainant
§  If the Court were to first require the President to respond to each and
every complaint brought against him, and then avail himself of
presidential immunity on a case to case basis, then the rationale for
 the privilege – protecting the President from harassment, hindrance or
distraction in the discharge of his duties – would very well be defeated.
§  Constitution provides remedies for violations committed by the Chief Executive
except an ordinary suit before the courts.  The Chief Executive must 1st be
allowed to end his tenure (not his term) either through resignation or removal
by impeachment. 

9 Balao v Macapagal Arroyo

Facts:

·        A petition for the Issuance of Writ of Amparo was filed with the RTC La Trinidad,
Benguet.

·        It was filed against

o   Pres. GMA

o   Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita

o   Defense Secretary Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.

o   Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo V. Puno

o   National Security Adviser (NSA) Norberto B. Gonzales

o   Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Alexander B.

Yano

o   Philippine National Police (PNP) Police Director General Jesus A. Verzosa

o   Philippine Army (PA) Chief Brig. Gen. Reynaldo B. Mapagu

o   PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) Chief Lt.

P/Dir. Edgardo Doromal

o   Northern Luzon Command (NOLCOM) Commander Maj. Gen. Isagani C.

Cachuela

o   PNP-Cordillera Administrative Region Regional Director Police Senior

Supt. Eugene Gabriel Martin

o   the Commanding Officer of the AFP Intelligence Service Unit (AFP-ISU)

based in Baguio City and

o   several John Does

·        Filed by Arthur Balao, Winston Balao, Nonette Balao and Jonily Balao – siblings of
petitioner Hames

·        James Balao:

o   Psychology and Economics graduate of the University of the Philippines-

Baguio (UP-Baguio)

o   One of the founders of Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA), a coalition of

non-government organizations (NGOs) working for the cause of
indigenous peoples in the Cordillera Region

o   As head of CPA’s education and research committee, James actively

helped in the training and organization of farmers

o   President of Oclupan Clan Association which undertakes the registration

and documentation of clan properties to protect their rights over ancestral
lands.

o   988, while working for the CPA, he was arrested on the charge of violation
of the Anti-Subversion Law but the case was eventually dismissed for lack
of evidence

·        According to the petitioners (testimonies and affidavits of eyewitnesses)

o   Sept. 17, 2008 at around 8:30 in the morning

o   a man clad in black jacket, black shirt, black visor and gray pants was
standing infront of Saymor’s Store at Tomay, La Trinidad

o   A white van then arrived and stopped in front of the store.

o   Five men in civilian clothes who were carrying firearms alighted from the
van and immediately approached the man poking their guns on him. They
grabbed and handcuffed him.

o   The man was asking why he was being apprehended. He was being
apprehended for illegal drugs.

o   One of the armed men addressed the people witnessing the incident,
saying they were policemen.

o   One of them was also heard that they are going to proceed to Camp
Dangwa.

o   The witnesses were able to identify James after seeing his photographs in
the posters announcing him as missing.
·        According to his sister, Nonette. James informed her that he was going to their
ancestral home to do his laundry but he never reached their parents’ house.

·        Also, the petitioners claimed different instances of surveillances on James and on his
family and other members of the CPA.

·        They went to AFP-ISU om Navy Base but they denied any knowledge.

·        They also went to Baguio Police Station 9 but no developments.

·        The Petition prays for the

o   Issuance of Writ of Amparo

o   an inspection order for the inspection of at least 11 military and police

facilities which have been previously reported as detention centers for
activists abducted by military and police operatives

o   a production order for all documents that contain evidence relevant to the
petition, particularly the Order of Battle List and any record or dossier
respondents have on James

o   a witness protection order

·        Respondents’ contentions:

o   President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is immune from suit and should thus

be dropped as party-respondent

o   only Arthur Balao should be named petitioner and the rest of the other
petitioners dropped

o   no allegation of specific wrongdoing against respondents that would show

their knowledge, involvement or participation in the abduction of James

o   Exec. Sec. Ermita, Sec. Teodoro, Sec. Puno, Sec. Gonzales, Gen. Yano,
Gen. Cachuela, Gen. Mapagu and Gen. Verzosa in their respective
affidavits denied having such participation or knowledge of James’s
abduction

o   Supt. Martin already ordered an investigation, came up with interviews of

several witnesses, and held a dialogue with the Commander of the Military
Intelligence Group I (MIG1) and the Commanding Officer of the Internal
Service Unit-Internal Security Group, Philippine Army

o   petitioners themselves did not cooperate with police authorities in the

investigation and neither did they ask the National Bureau of Investigation
to locate James
 o   petition failed to meet the requirement in the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
that claims must be established by substantial evidence

§  no mention in anyway the manner, whether directly or indirectly, the

alleged participation of respondents in the purported abduction of
James

§  Nonette and Beverly do not have personal knowledge of the

circumstances surrounding the abduction of James, hence, their
statements are hearsay with no probative value

§   allegations in the petition do not show the materiality and relevance

of the places sought to be searched/inspected and documents to
be produced, specifically the requirement that the prayer for an
inspection order shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of
witnesses having personal knowledge of the whereabouts of the
aggrieved party.

Actions of the respondents

Executive issued of a letter addressed to the PNP Chief and AFP Chief of Staff
Secretary for the purpose of inquiring and establishing the circumstances
Ermita surrounding the alleged disappearance of James Balao

Secretary issued "Policy Directive on the Actions and Defenses Under the
Teodoro Amparo Rule" which instructed members of the AFP to undertake
specific measures even without waiting for the filing of an amparo
petition

Secretary he will write to the PNP Chief to call for pertinent reports relative to the
Puno circumstances of the alleged "taking" of the person in whose favor the
writ of amparo was sought

NSA Presumption of regularity

Gonzales
issued letters/communications to the Director General of the National
Intelligence Coordinating Agency, the PNP Chief and the AFP Chief of
Staff for the purpose of making active inquiries and establishing the
circumstances of the alleged disappearance insofar as the possible
involvement of military/police personnel is concerned. 

General directed by radio message the NOLCOM Commander to conduct a

 Yano thorough investigation on the matter and to submit the result thereof to
the AFP General Headquarters

Lt. Gen. directed by Higher Headquarters to conduct a thorough investigation

Cachuela on the alleged abduction of James Balao.

BGen. called the attention of the "concerned staff" to give some information
Mapagu regarding the case and directed them to submit a report if they are able
to obtain information.

Pol. Dir. set forth the actions and steps taken by the PNP
General
Verzosa

·          Send flash alarm to all lower units to locate James

Pol. Chief ·          Conducted inquiries
Supt. Martin ·          Created Task Force Balao
·          Constant coordination with the CPA and Balao Family
·          Able to obtain the plate number of the vehicle allegedly
conducting surveillance on Balao and his family (owned by Magno
from Tanauan Batangas)
·          In-depth investigation
·          Able to convinced eyewitnesses (storeowner and others)

·        The neighbors of James in Fairview Baguio offered their testimonies through affidavits
claiming that they did not see any suspicious van in their area; James was not the
lessor but a certain Uncle John and usually there were unidentified persons bringing in
and out several boxes.

·        One of the members of the CPA, claimed that the members of AFP harassed them
and committed various human rights violations. Allegedly, in an AFP community
meetings, AFP claimed that CPA as one of the organizations under the National
Democratic Font.

·        RTC issued the Writ but denied the issuance of the inspection order. It also ruled that
President Arroyo should not be dropped as the respondent. A writ of amparo is not "by
any stretch of imagination a niggling[,] vexing or annoying court case" from which she
should be shielded. It also ruled that “more than likely or not” the motive of James’
disappearance is his activist/political leanings. Lastly, it ruled that the investigations of
the respondents were limited, superficial and one-sided and that after 4 months of
James’ disappearance, no reports were issued.
·        Both parties appealed directly to SC. The petitioners were assailing the denial of the
interim reliefs while, the respondents were assailing the granting of the Writ of Amparo.

·        Respondents’ arguments:

o   Merely hearsay and conjectures

o   Had observed extra ordinary diligence in the performance of their official

duties

ISSUES:

·        WON the Writ of Amparo was correctly issued. NO.

·        WON PGMA enjoys immunity in suit in the case at bar. YES

RULING:

1.  The totality of evidence does not satisfy the degree of proof required by the Amparo rule
which is substantial evidence to establish an enforced disappearance.

·        We hold that such documented practice of targeting activists in the military’s counter-
insurgency program by itself does not fulfill the evidentiary standard provided in the
Amparo Rule to establish an enforced disappearance.

·        Roxas v Macapagal-Arroyo: the Court noted that the similarity between the
circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with those surrounding previous
instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to
prove that the government orchestrated such abduction. Accordingly, the trial court in
this case cannot simply infer government involvement in the abduction of James from
past similar incidents in which the victims also worked or affiliated with the CPA and
other left-leaning groups.

·        Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo expounded the doctrine of command responsibility

which is "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members
of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflict."

·        The doctrine of command responsibility has been codified in the ICC. However, the
Congress has not yet formally bound the country.

·        It would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command

responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through
omission, for individual respondents’ criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the
reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any
issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an
administrative rule may have been committed.
·        In Razon v Tagitis, the nature and role of amparo was expounded. It does not
determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance [threats thereof or
extrajudicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the
enforced disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings] for purposes of
imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance [or extrajudicial
killings].

o   Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by

substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or
omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies
this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate
criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper
courts.

o   Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that

should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating
to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or
those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.

·        HOWEVER, the SC agreed with the TC that the actions of the respondents were very
limited, superficial and one-sided.

·        In Rubrico, As police officers, though, theirs was the duty to thoroughly investigate
the abduction of Lourdes, a duty that would include looking into the cause, manner, and
like details of the disappearance; identifying witnesses and obtaining statements from
them; and following evidentiary leads, such as the Toyota Revo vehicle with plate
number XRR 428, and securing and preserving evidence related to the abduction and
the threats that may aid in the prosecution of the person/s responsible. As we said in
Manalo, the right to security, as a guarantee of protection by the government, is
breached by the superficial and one-sided––hence, ineffective––investigation by the
military or the police of reported cases under their jurisdiction.

·        The respondents

o   Did not pursue the investigation using the cartographic sketches obtained
from the eyewitnesses

o   Merely denied owing the vehicle that was seen surveilling James and his
family

o   No investigation efforts on the other vehicle found to be owned by a

resident in Batangas
 o   The reports do not contain meaningful results or details on the depth and
the extent of the investigation made.

2.  we hold that the trial court clearly erred in holding that presidential immunity cannot be
properly invoked in an amparo proceeding. As president, then President Arroyo was
enjoying immunity from suit when the petition for a writ of amparo was filed. Moreover,
the petition is bereft of any allegation as to what specific presidential act or omission
violated or threatened to violate petitioners’ protected rights.

REMAND THE CASE to TC.

10. Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers G.R. No. 180643,
March 25, 2008
(Topic: Executive Privilege – Constitutional Law 1)

Petitioner: Romulo L. Neri

Respondents: Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, Senate

Committee on Trade and Commerce, and Senate Committee on National Defense and Security

Facts:

Petitioner Romulo Neri, then Director General of the National Economic and Development Authority
(NEDA), was invited by the respondent Senate Committees to attend their joint investigation on the
alleged anomalies in the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project. This project was contracted by
the Philippine Government with the Chinese firm Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE),
which involved the amount of US$329,481,290. When he testified before the Senate Committees, he
disclosed that then Commission on Elections Chairman Benjamin Abalos, brokering for ZTE, offered
him P200 million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he
informed President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him
not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege.” In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on 1.) whether or not the President followed up the NBN Project, 2.) whether or not she
directed him to prioritize it, and 3.) whether or not she directed him to approve it.

Later on, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to
appear and testify on 20 November 2007. However, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita sent a letter
dated 15 November to the Committees requesting them to dispense with Neri’s testimony on the
ground of executive privilege. Ermita invoked the privilege on the ground that “the information sought
to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of
China,” and given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the President,
Neri “cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the
very thing the privilege is designed to protect.” Thus, on 20 November, Neri did not appear before the
respondent Committees.

On 22 November, respondents issued a Show Cause Letter to Neri requiring him to show cause why he
should not be cited for contempt for his failure to attend the scheduled hearing on 20 November. On
29 November, Neri replied to the Show Cause Letter and explained that he did not intend to snub the
Senate hearing, and requested that if there be new matters that were not yet taken up during his first
appearance, he be informed in advance so he can prepare himself. He added that his non-appearance
was upon the order of the President, and that his conversation with her dealt with delicate and
sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal
involving high government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders
in the Philippines. Respondents found the explanation unsatisfactory, and later on issued an Order
citing Neri in contempt and consequently ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate
Sergeant-At-Arms until he appears and gives his testimony.

Neri filed the petition asking the Court to nullify both the Show Cause Letter and the Contempt Order
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
stressed that his refusal to answer the three questions was anchored on a valid claim to executive
privilege in accordance with the ruling in the landmark case of Senate vs. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777, 20
April 2006). For its part, the Senate Committees argued that they did not exceed their authority in
issuing the assailed orders because there is no valid justification for Neri’s claim to executive privilege.
In addition, they claimed that the refusal of petitioner to answer the three questions violates the
people’s right to public information, and that the executive is using the concept of executive privilege as
a means to conceal the criminal act of bribery in the highest levels of government.

Issue:

Whether or not the three questions that petitioner Neri refused to answer were covered by executive
privilege, making the arrest order issued by the respondent Senate Committees void.

Discussion:

Citing the case of United States vs. Nixon (418 U.S. 683), the Court laid out the three elements needed
to be complied with in order for the claim to executive privilege to be valid. These are: 1.) the protected
communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power; 2.) it must be
authored, solicited, and received by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The
judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President; and, 3.) it may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important
evidence,” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita claimed executive privilege on the argument that the
communications elicited by the three questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between
the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process,”
and that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic
relations with the People’s Republic of China.” It is clear then that the basis of the claim is a matter
related to the quintessential and non-delegable presidential power of diplomacy or foreign relations.

As to the second element, the communications were received by a close advisor of the President. Under
the “operational proximity” test, petitioner Neri can be considered a close advisor, being a member of
the President’s Cabinet.

And as to the third element, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the
limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority. Presidential communications are presumptive privilege and that the
presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to
such conversations. In the present case, respondent Committees failed to show a compelling or critical
need for the answers to the three questions in the enactment of any law under Sec. 21, Art. VI. Instead,
the questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function under Sec. 22, Art. VI.
As ruled in Senate vs. Ermita, “the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory
process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.”

Neri’s refusal to answer based on the claim of executive privilege does not violate the people’s right to
information on matters of public concern simply because Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution itself
provides that this right is “subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.”

Held:

The divided Supreme Court (voting 9-6) was convinced that the three questions are covered by
presidential communications privilege, and that this privilege has been validly claimed by the executive
department, enough to shield petitioner Neri from any arrest order the Senate may issue against him
for not answering such questions.

The petition was granted. The subject Order dated January 30, 2008, citing petitioner in contempt of
the Senate Committee and directing his arrest and detention was nullified.

13. AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. versus JOINT COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS TO CANVASS

THE VOTES FOR PRESIDENT & VICE PRESIDENT IN THE MAY 10 2004 ELECTIONS

Facts:
By a petition for prohibition, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment
declaring null and void the continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress to
determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and
 preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates in
the May 10 2004 elections following the adjournment of Congress on June 11 2004.

The petition corollarily prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint
Committee to cease and desist from conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the
Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing.

Issue:
Whether or not legislative procedure, precedent or practice as borne out by the rules of
both Houses of Congress supports Pimentel’s arguments against the existence and
proceedings of the Joint Committee of Congress after the adjournment of Congress.

Held:
NO. Pimentel’s claim that his arguments are buttressed by “legislative procedure,
precedent or practice as borne out by the rules of both Houses of Congress” is directly
contradicted by Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted by the Senate, of which he
is an incumbent member.

Moreover, the precedents set by the 1992 and 1998 Presidential Elections do not
support the move to stop the ongoing canvassing by the Joint Committee. Thus, during
the 1992 Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned on 25 May 1992.
Thereafter, on 22 June 1992, the Eight Congress convened in joint public session as
the National Board of Canvassers, and on even date proclaimed Fidel V. Ramos and
Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Vice President, respectively.

14 Estrada v. Desierto

JOSEPH ESTRADA v. ANIANO DESIERTO

Puno, J., 3 April 2001 GR No. 146738

Summary Erap claims he remained president despite his ouster at EDSA II.
The Court said that he had resigned, as his intent was proved by
his actions, and no longer possessed any immunity from suit.
Facts POST-EDSA FACTS TAKEN FROM FIRST ESTRADA v. DESIERTO
CASE

 On January 20, 2001, Joseph Estrada was ousted from

Malacanang due to People Power II over charges of bribery,
plunder, graft and corruption. After GMA was sworn in as
president, he released two statements questioning the
legality of the oath.
 The Supreme Court later released a circular, in which it
explained that as an administrative matter, they confirmed
the authority of Chief Justice Hilario Davide to swear in
GMA as president. Said resolution, they said, was also
without prejudice to a case filed by a proper party.
 While Arroyo began exercising her powers as president,
cases were filed against Estrada with the Ombudsman. 
 On February 5 and 6, Estrada filed for injunctions against
the cases until “his term as president is over and only if
legally warranted.” He also asked to be confirmed as the
lawful and incumbent president, albeit temporarily unable
to discharge his duties, and to have GMA declared only as
an acting president.

CURRENT CASE

MR/Omnibus motion assailing the Court’s decision in the first

case.
Ratio/Issue  
s
I.Whether the investigation should be enjoined in due to
prejudicial publicity (NO)

1. Estrada submits that the current political climate is not

conducive to a fair trial. The Court cited a litany of events
(exposes, letters demanding resignation, the resignations
of other government officials, defections of partymates,
etc) and gave them judicial notice. They are not
inadmissible on the grounds of hearsay, rather, news
reports only buttressed them as facts. Nor did Estrada
contest any of these facts as false.
2. Estrada claims that the events caused him to resign under
duress. The Court also examined the voluntariness of the
resignation, citing a three-part test from Am Jur.

a.                Whether one side involuntarily accepted the other’s

terms

b.                Whether circumstances permitted no alternative

c.                Whether such circumstances where the result of the

other side’s coercive acts

3. The Court also applied another test, the totality of

circumstances test:

 .                 Whether he had an alternative to resignation

a.                Whether the he understood the nature of the choice

given

b.                Whether he had a reasonable time to choose

c.                Whether he was permitted to select a date for

resignation.

4. That Estrada perceives resignation as an only option due

to pressures to reputation is irrelevant and is not a factor in
duress.
4. The Court said that Estrada indeed have options which he
discussed—snap election, not resign, leave temporarily,
etc. there was no duress as no tanks or planes or large
scale violence, but only verbal violence (lol) coerced him to
resign.

 
 2. Whether the Angara Diary is admissible (YES)

1. The Angara Diary (published in PDI from Feb. 4-6, 2001) is

not an out of court statement, but was made part of the
pleadings of the petitioners.
2. Even if it were, it is not covered by the hearsay rule.
Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends, in
whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some
persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to
produce it.
3. There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1)
absence of cross examination; (2) absence of demeanor
evidence, and (3) absence of the oath. Not at all hearsay
evidence, however, is inadmissible as evidence.
4. The Court, after an academic discussion on the criticisms
against the hearsay rule, as it prevents the [judge] from
evaluating the strength of a legitimate inference that may
be drawn from the excluded testimony, and strikes at the
[judge’s] power to process evidence.
5. The Angara Diary is admissible for containing admissions
made by Estrada. The Court gave weight to the following
narrations of the events of January 19 (from first case):

a.                Estrada contemplated a snap election in May during

which he would not run. This indicated that he intended to give
up the presidency even before leaving Malacanang.

b.                When AFP Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes joined the

crowd in EDSA, Estrada listened to Senator Aquilino Pimintel’s
proposal of a possible of a dignified exit or resignation. He did
not object, but said he would never leave the country. This is
proof that Estrada already reconciled with the reality of his
impending resignation.

c.                Angara and former President Ramos agreed to

negotiations for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. At this
stage, the resignation was already implied and such discussion
was about implementing said resignation.

d.                In the first negotiation re: 5-day transition period,

safety of Estrada and his family, and the opening of the second
envelope (the evidence against Estrada in the impeachment court
which the senators voted not to open, which led to the outrage
which triggered the revolution), Estrada said, “Pagod na pagod
na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red
tape, bureaucracy, intriga.” The Court took Ayoko na as words of
resignation.

e.                In the second negotiation, Estrada met with opposition

leaders to formalize his resignation and transition to Arroyo. This
document was signed by their side, but not signed by the Arroyo
side because the swearing in had already taken place before it
was faxed to her. Angara said at this point, they decided to delete
the provision in the document regarding Estrada’s resignation
because it was considered moot and academic by the swearing-
in.

f.                 In the first letter of Estrada himself (see Footnote 2),

he acknowledged the oath-taking, albeit with a reservation as to
its legality; he did not say he was leaving due to any Whether
Estrada is only temporarily unable to act as president, or is
immune from suit (NO)

g.                 

h.                Re: temporary ability, Sec. 11, Art VII places such
determination in the hands of Congress. In this case, both
houses have passed a resolution pursuant to said Article,
confirming GMA as president. This is a political judgment which
cannot be assailed by the Court. 

i.                   inability; he emphasized leaving the presidency; his

gratitude was without a doubt in reference to his newly-finished
opportunity to serve as president; future challenges refer to
those post-presidency; his call for unity could not be attained if in
fact he did not give up the residency. The press release was a
final act of farewell.

6.                Estrada argues that it is not binding on him as it is not

his diary. The Court explained the doctrine of adoptive
admission, where a party’s admission is a party’s reaction to a
statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to
treat the party’s reaction as an admission of something stated or
implied by the other person, and applied them to the above
admissions.

 
7.                Estrada argues that the admissions violate the res
inter alios acta rule. However, an exception to this are those
made to co-partners or co-agents.

a.                Angara was the alter ego of the president and

authorized to act for him in the critical hours and days before
leaving Malacanang. According to the Angara Diary, the petitioner
told Secretary Angara: “Mula umpisa pa lang ng kampanya, Ed,
ikaw na lang pinakikinggan ko. At hanggang sa huli, ikaw pa rin.”
This is a statement of full trust.

b.                During the second round of negotiations, Estrada

asked Angara if he had to go. Angara affirmed this, and Estrada
left. The Diary shows that Angara briefed him of the negotiations
and acted on his behalf. Thus he is bound by Angara’s acts and
declarations as his principal.

8.                The ban on hearsay does not cover independently

relevant statements, or those which are relevant whether or not
they are true. Two classes exist: 1) statements which are the facts
in issue, and 2) statements circumstantial of the facts in issue.
Under the second class are the following:

 .                 Statement of a person showing his state of mind, that

is, his mental condition, knowledge, belief, intention, ill will and
other emotions;

a.                Statements of a person which show his physical

condition, as illness and the like;

b.                Statements of a person from which an inference may

be made as to the state of mind of another, that is, the
knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad faith, etc. of the latter;

c.                 Statements which may identify the date, place and

person in question; and

d.                Statements showing the lack of credibility of a

witness.

9.                Independently relevant statements are not covered by

the hearsay rule:

 .                 “For example, where any mental state or condition is

in issue, such as motive, malice, knowledge, intent, assent or
dissent, unless direct testimony of the particular person is to be
taken as conclusive of his state of mind, the only method of proof
available is testimony of others to the acts or statements of such
person. Where his acts or statements are against his interest,
they are plainly admissible within the rules hereinabove
announced as to admissions against interest. And even where
not against interest, if they are so closely connected with the
event or transaction in issue as to constitute one of the very facts
in controversy, they become admissible of necessity.”

10.             Estrada argues that by reproducing the newspaper

articles, they violate the best evidence rule. While the Court
admits that they did not rely on the original documents, but citing
American commentaries, production of best evidence may be
dispensed with at the court’s discretion “when the opponent
does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no
other useful purpose will be served by requiring its production.”

11.             With regard to the authentication of private writings,

the Court held that if a party does not deny the genuineness of
evidence offered may not object that it was not properly
identified.

12.             Finally, the Court distinguished this from the case of

State Prosecutors v. Muro, in which Judge Muro dismissed the
cases against Imelda Marcos by relying on a newspaper account.
In that case, the prosecution was not granted the opportunity to
be heard by comment or oral argument. In this case, Estrada did
not take the opportunity to object to the admissibility of the
Angara diary but only did so when contesting the Ombudsman’s
decision. He was not denied due process.

3. Whether Estrada is only temporarily unable to act as

president, or is immune from suit (NO)

1. Re: temporary ability, Sec. 11, Art VII places such

determination in the hands of Congress. In this case, both
houses have passed a resolution pursuant to said Article,
confirming GMA as president. This is a political judgment
which cannot be assailed by the Court. 
 

2.                Re: impeachment and absolute immunity:

3.                Estrada cannot command the continuation of the

aborted impeachment proceedings as a condition precedent to
his prosecution.  They are now functus officio, and he has
already resigned.

4.                There is no double jeopardy, as there was no

conviction, acquittal, or dismissal without his express consent.
At most there is only a failure to prosecute, which amounts to a
dismissal on the merits. However, Estrada did not show that the
postponement of the impeachment proceedings was unjustified,
nor that it was for an unreasonable length of time.

5.                (From first case) Estrada said the Anti-Graft and

Corrupt Practices Act prohibit a public officer from resigning
pending an investigation for offenses under the act. He was
legally barred from doing so.

a.                In reading the deliberations behind the law, the intent

of said provision was to prevent officers from using resignation
as a shield from prosecution and to abate the investigation.

b.                Secondly, the cases against Estrada were filed while

he was in office but the Ombudsman was barred from
investigating a sitting president. So technically they weren’t
pending cases, and the provision would not apply.

6.                Incumbent presidents enjoy immunity during the

period of their incumbency but not beyond. But as to its scope,
the Court said that it cannot be extended to acts of the president
which are criminal in character. The Court said (in the first case)
that to do so, parallelizing it to the investigation against former
US President Nixon, would be to hold that immunity is an
inoculation from liability for unlawful acts or omissions. Unlawful
acts are not acts of the State. A public officer acting illegally is
not acting on behalf of the state but stands on the same footing
as any other trespasser.

4. On prejudicial publicity
  

1. The right to a fair trial is not incompatible with the right to a

free press. Publicity is not in itself prejudicial to the
accused, nor is it in itself a cause for the judge’s
impartiality. Further, there is no proof of any actual
prejudice against Estrada.

Held Petition DENIED.

15.  Legarda v. De Castro, 542 SCRA 125 (2008)

Facts:
 
On June 23, 2004, Congress sitting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBC)
proclaimed protestee Noli L. de Castro the duly elected Vice-President of the Republic
of the Philippines. The official count of the votes cast for Vice-President in the May 10,
2004 elections showed that the protestee obtained the highest number of votes,
garnering 15,100,431 votes as against the 14,218,709 votes garnered by the protestant
Loren B. Legarda, who placed second, in a field consisting of four candidates for Vice
President.
 
Loren B. Legarda filed an election protest against Noli L. de Castro before the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). De Castro filed a motion for its outright dismissal
but the PET confirmed its jurisdiction over the protest. De Castro filed a motion for
reconsideration assailing the PET resolution. He argues that where the correctness of
the number of votes is the issue, the best evidence are the ballots; that the process of
correcting the manifest errors in the certificates of canvass or election returns is a
function of the canvassing bodies; that once the canvassing bodies had done their
functions, no alteration or correction of manifest errors can be made; that since the
authority of the Tribunal involves an exercise of judicial power to determine the facts
based on the evidence presented and to apply the law based on the established facts, it
cannot perform the ministerial function of canvassing election returns; that the
averments contained in the protest are mere conclusions of law which are inadequate to
form a valid cause of action; and that the allegations are not supported by facts. He also
contends that the Tribunal cannot correct the manifest errors on the statements of votes
(SOV) and certificates of canvass (COC).  
 
Issues:
 
1. Can the PET correct the manifest errors in the SOV and COC?
 
 2. Is there a need to resort to revision of ballots?
 
3. Was the election protest sufficient in form and substance?
 
Held: 
 
1. The constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of the President and Vice-
President is expressly vested in the PET, in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
Included therein is the duty to correct manifest errors in the SOVs and COCs. 
 
2. We agree that the ballots are the best and most conclusive evidence in an election
contest where the correctness of the number of votes of each candidate is involved.
However, we do not find any reason to resort to revision in the first part of the protest,
considering that the protestant concedes the correctness of the ballot results,
concerning the number of votes obtained by both protestant and protestee, and
reflected in the election returns. Protestant merely seeks the correction of manifest
errors, that is, errors in the process of different levels of transposition and addition of
votes. Revision of ballots in case of manifest errors, in these circumstances, might only
cause unwarranted delay in the proceedings.
 
3. In the instant protest, protestant enumerated all the provinces, municipalities and
cities where she questions all the results in all the precincts therein. The protest here is
sufficient in form and substantively, serious enough on its face to pose a challenge to
protestee's title to his office. The instant protest consists of alleged ultimate facts, not
mere conclusions of law, that need to be proven in due time. 
 
Considering that we find the protest sufficient in form and substance, we must again
stress that nothing as yet has been proved as to the veracity of the allegations. The
protest is only sufficient for the Tribunal to proceed and give the protestant the
opportunity to prove her case pursuant to Rule 61 of the PET Rules. Although said rule
only pertains to revision of ballots, nothing herein prevents the Tribunal from allowing or
including the correction of manifest errors, pursuant to the Tribunals rule-making power
under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution

16 Pormento v. Estrada, 629 SCRA 530 (2010)

Facts:

·        Joseph "Erap" Ejercito Estrada was elected President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998.

·        He sought the presidency again in the general elections held on May 10, 2010.

·        Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed private respondent’s candidacy and filed a
petition for disqualification.
 ·        However, COMELEC Second Division denied his petition. His motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc.

·        Atty Pormento filed a petition for certiorari.

Issue: What is the proper interpretation of the following provision of Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution: "[t]he President shall not be eligible for any reelection?"

whether private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada is covered by the ban on the
President from "any reelection."

Ruling: The case is already mooted.

·        Under the Rules of Court, the filing of such petition would not stay the execution of the
judgment, final order or resolution of the COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed.
Besides, petitioner did not even pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or
writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, private respondent was able to participate as a
candidate for the position of President in the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered
the second highest number of votes.

·        No definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal

relations of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be
decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties herein. As
such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the
existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case.

·        Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a

President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer
true today. Following the results of that elections, private respondent was not elected
President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his "reelection" will simply be
hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.

17. Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010

Petitioner: Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal

Respondents: Presidential Electoral Tribunal
Facts:
            Atty. Macalintal filed a petition that question the constitutionality of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progency of Sec. 4,
Article VII of the Constitution.
 
The petitioner highlighted the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Buac vs.
COMELEC which declared that contests involving the President and the Vice-President
fell within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the PET, in the exercise of quasi-judicial
power. On this point, petitioner reiterated that the constitution of PET, with the
designation of the Members of the Court as Chairman and Members thereof,
contravenes Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which prohibits the designation
of Members of the Supreme Court and of other Courts established by law to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
 
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) commented that the petition was unspecified
and without statutory basis and that the liberal approach in its preparation is a violation
of the well-known rules of practice and pleading in this jurisdiction.           
Issue:

1. Whether or not Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the
creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
2. Whether or not the PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Discussion:
            A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of
authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method
by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the
grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court’s exercise thereof.
The Supreme Court’s method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election
contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the constitutional provision.
The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full
authority conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, i.e., the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
Petitioner still claims that the PET exercises quasi-judicial power and, thus, its members
violate the proscription in Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which reads:
SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law
shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.
The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution which provides that the power “shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.” Consistent with our presidential
system of government, the function of “dealing with the settlement of disputes,
controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally
demandable and enforceable” is apportioned to courts of justice. With the advent of the
1987 Constitution, judicial power was expanded to include “the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.” The power was expanded, but it remained absolute.
 The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of
electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power.
At the barangay and municipal levels, original and exclusive jurisdiction over election
contests is vested in the municipal or metropolitan trial courts and the regional trial
courts, respectively.
At the higher levels — city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and
senatorial — exclusive and original jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC and in the
House of Representatives and Senate Electoral Tribunals, which are not, strictly and
literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless,
empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of
judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section
2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and
House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC, the
HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their decisions are still subject to judicial
review — via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper party — if there is a showing that
the decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or
vice-presidential election disputes, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.
The present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter’s
exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and
vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power
wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law,
expressly provided in the Constitution.
The PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated. As
intended by the framers of the Constitution, the PET is to be an independent institution,
but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
Held:
            The petition was dismissed.

20. Bautista vs. Salonga

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads
of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until after
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress. (Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution) 

Facts: 

 
In August 1987, President Cory Aquino designated petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as "Acting
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. In December 1987, she extended to Bautista a
permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission. Bautista took her oath of office and
immediately discharged her functions and duties.
 
In January 1989, President Aquino extended an "ad interim appointment" to Bautista.
 
In February 1989, the Commission on Appointments, requested Bautista's presence along with
documents as required by its rules in connection with the confirmation of her appointment. Bautista
refused to be placed under CA's review. She then filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the
immediate issuance of a TRO before the SC, to declare "as unlawful and unconstitutional and without
any legal force and effect any action of the CA on her lawfully extended appointment on the ground
that they have no lawful and constitutional authority to confirm and to review her appointment.
 
Meanwhile, the CA wrote a letter to Executive Secretary Macaraig informing him that the CA
disapproved Bautista's "ad interim appointment" as Chairperson of the CHR.
 
Pending the resolution of Bautista's case, President Aquino designated Mallillin as "Acting Chairman of
the CHR".
 
Bautista filed a supplemental urgent ex-parte motion seeking to restrain Mallillin from continuing to
exercise the functions of chairman. The SC issued a TRO.
 
CA contends that, granting that Bautista's appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights is one that, under Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, as interpreted in the Mison case, is solely
for the President to make, yet, it is within the president's prerogative to voluntarily submit such
appointment to the CA for confirmation.
 
Malilin invoked EO 163-A which provides that the tenure of the Chairman and the Commissioners of
the CHR shall be at the pleasure of the President.
 
 
Issues:
 
1. Does the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR require the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments?
 
2. After Bautista took an oath and discharged the functions of the office, could the President extend an
"ad interim appointment" or any other kind of appointment that called for confirmation by the CA?
 
3. Was the appointment or re-appointment of Bautista on January 14, 1989 an ad interim
appointment? Does an ad interim appointments apply to appointments solely for the President to
make, i.e., without the participation of the CA?
 
4. Can the tenure in office of said Chairman (and Members) be made dependent on the pleasure of the
President?
 
5. Can Bautista be removed from office?
 
 
Held:
 
1. No. Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not among the positions
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, it follows that the
appointment by the President of the Chairman of the (CHR), is to be made without the review or
participation of the Commission on Appointments.
 
To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights is not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the
Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose
appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments.
 
 
2. Neither the Executive nor the Legislative (Commission on Appointments) can create power where
the Constitution confers none. The evident constitutional intent is to strike a careful and delicate
balance, in the matter of appointments to public office, between the President and Congress (the latter
acting through the Commission on Appointments). To tilt one side or the other of the scale is to disrupt
or alter such balance of power. In other words, to the extent that the Constitution has blocked off
certain appointments for the President to make with the participation of the Commission on
Appointments, so also has the Constitution mandated that the President can confer no power of
participation in the Commission on Appointments over other appointments exclusively reserved for her
by the Constitution. The exercise of political options that finds no support in the Constitution cannot be
sustained.
 
Nor can the Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited power
to review presidential appointments, create power to confirm appointments that the Constitution has
reserved to the President alone. Stated differently, when the appointment is one that the Constitution
mandates is for the President to make without the participation of the Commission on Appointments,
the executive's voluntary act of submitting such appointment to the Commission on Appointments and
the latter's act of confirming or rejecting the same, are done without or in excess of jurisdiction.
 
Even if the president may voluntarily submit to the commission on appointments an appointment that
under the constitution solely belongs to her, still, there was no vacancy to which an appointment could
be made on 14 January 1989. When Her Excellency, the President converted Bautista's designation
as Acting Chairman to a permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights,
significantly she advised Bautista (in the same appointment letter) that, by virtue of such appointment,
she could qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office of Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights. All that remained for Bautista to do was to reject or accept the
appointment. Obviously, she accepted the appointment by taking her oath of office before the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, Hon. Marcelo B. Fernan and assuming immediately thereafter the
functions and duties of the Chairman of the CHR. Bautista's appointment therefore on 17 December
1988 as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights was a completed act on the part of the
President.
 
 
3. No. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely
for the President to make, i.e., without the participation of the Commission on Appointments. Ad
interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments
where the review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments
are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment
of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is, without the
participation of the Commission on Appointments, can not be ad interim appointments.
 
 
4. No. Previous to Executive Order No. 163-A, or on 5 May 1987, Executive Order No. 163 was issued
by the President, Sec. 2(c) of which provides:

Sec. 2(c). The Chairman and the Members of the Commission on

Human Rights shall be appointed by the President for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Appointments to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor.

It is to be noted that, while the earlier executive order (No. 163) speaks of a term of office of the
Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights — which is seven (7) years without
reappointment — the later executive order (163-A) speaks of the tenure in office of the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Human Rights, which is "at the pleasure of the President."
 
Tenure in office should not be confused with term of office. As Mr. Justice (later, Chief Justice)
Concepcion in his concurring opinion in Alba vs. Evangelista, stated:
 
The distinction between "term" and "tenure" is important, for, pursuant to the Constitution, "no officer or
employee in the Civil Service may be removed or suspended except for cause, as provided by law"
(Art. XII, section 4), and this fundamental principle would be defeated if Congress could legally make
the tenure of some officials dependent upon the pleasure of the President, by clothing the latter with
blanket authority to replace a public officer before the expiration of his term.
 
When Executive Order No. 163 was issued, the evident purpose was to comply with the constitutional
provision that "the term of office and other qualifications and disabilities of the Members of the
Commission (on Human Rights) shall be provided by law" (Sec. 17(2), Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).
 
As the term of office of the Chairman (and Members) of the Commission on Human Rights, is seven
(7) years, without reappointment, as provided by Executive Order No. 163, and consistent with the
constitutional design to give the Commission the needed independence to perform and accomplish its
functions and duties, the tenure in office of said Chairman (and Members) cannot be later made
dependent on the pleasure of the President.
 
Executive Order No. 163 was declared unconstitutional.
 
 
5. Bautista is the lawful incumbent of the office of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights by
virtue of her appointment, as such, by the President on 17 December 1988, and her acceptance
thereof, is not to say that she cannot be removed from office before the expiration of her seven (7)
year term. She certainly can be removed but her removal must be for cause and with her right to due
process properly safeguarded. (Bautista vs. Salonga, G.R. No. 86439, April 13, 1989)
21 De Castro v. JBC
 
Chief Justice Puno is set to retire a week after the 2010 presidential elections, during
which the president is supposedly not allowed to make appointments except
temporary ones to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The Court must now decide
whether Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo can appoint the next Chief Justice. (Spoiler: She
can.)
 
IMPORTANT PEOPLE
- The Judicial and Bar Council
- Everyone else: Arturo M. De Castro, PHILCONSA, Estelito Mendoza, IBP, and a
shitload of intervenors
 
FACTS 

1. Chief Justice Reynato Puno was up for compulsory retirement seven days after
the 2010 presidential election. Pursuant to Section 4(1) in relation to Section 9,
Article VIII, the vacancy “shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof” from “a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy.”
2. This was a problem because there was a general prohibition in the Constitution
against the President from making any appointments from two months before
the presidential elections up to the end of her term. (One of the main questions
here is whether the ban applies to the judiciary.)
3. Ex officio JBC member Rep. Matias V. Defensor wrote to the JBC in December
2009 requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief
Justice be commenced immediately. The JBC decided to open applications
and announced this in PDI and PhilStar.
4. The five most senior justices were automatically considered for the post:
Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Corona, Velasco, and Nachura.
5. Among those who applied or were nominated, Corona, Leonardo-De Castro,
and Brion accepted their nominations without conditions. Carpio and Carpio-
Morales accepted with conditions. Velasco and Nachura declined.
6. The JBC, as of the promulgation of this decision (17 March 2010), was still
undecided as to when to submit the list to the President.

 
7.                On appointments:
                     Section 15, Article VII:
         “Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.”
                     Section 4(1), Article VIII:
         “ xxxx Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.”
                     Case law: In re Valenzuela
         The Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the
President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed.
At issue here was the appointment of judges to the RTC.
 
ISSUE with HOLDING
 
Procedural Issues
 

1. Locus standi – they have standing, and even if they didn’t,

transcendental importance

         - The petitioners sued as citizens, taxpayers, and people who have an interest
in upholding the Constitution.
         - The Court did not go into the details of whether citizen, taxpayer, or guardian-
of-the-Constitution standing was enough, but simply said that the petitioners have
each demonstrated adequate interest in the controversy so as to vest them with locus
standi.
         - In any case, this is an issue of transcendental importance, so even if they
didn’t have standing, the Court would still be justified in settling the issue at hand.
 
2.                Justiciability – Yes, this issue is justiciable
         - Intervenors for both sides aver that there is no actual case for the ff. reasons:
         i.) Although the selection process has begun, there is no final list of nominees
yet and the question of when to submit the list to the President remains hypothetical; 
         ii.) There is no conflict of legal claims alleged in the petitions and the
petitioners are merely seeking an advisory opinion;
         iii.) The Court is only limited to supervision over the JBC, which means that it
cannot tell the JBC what to do but can only make the JBC redo an action to conform
to the prescribed rules when it acts out of accordance with them.
         - The Court rules that the issue is ripe because the JBC has already
started the nomination process. In fact, it must also be resolved whether the JBC
properly initiated the process in the first place, whether it may resume its process until
the short list is prepared, and whether, in the event that PGMA can appoint, the list
should be given to her before the vacancy actually occurs on 17 May 2010.
         - A reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to a
constitutional interest is sufficient to afford a basis for bringing a challenge,
provided the Court has sufficient facts before it to enable it to intelligently adjudicate
the issues.
Substantive Issues
 
         1. Whether the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII applies to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to
the Judiciary – NO
         - The petitioners say that the incumbent President can appoint the successor of
the Chief Justice on the ground that the prohibition against presidential appointments
under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary. The
Court agrees on six levels of analysis:
 
         i.) The framers meant for the 90-day period for filling a vacancy to be a
definite mandate to the President. It is supposed to be a special provision to be
construed as independent of, and not falling under, Section 15, Article VII. This is
shown by the usage of the word “shall” in Section 4(1), Article VIII.
         Section 15 was initially ruled in Valenzuela as prevailing over Section 4(1)
because it was “couched in stronger negative language,” but such an interpretation
cannot hold as it renders the President unable to fulfill a constitutional duty.
Valenzuela was a misinterpretation, and is hereby reversed. (“Consequently,
Valenzuela now deserves to be quickly sent to the dustbin of the unworthy and
forgettable.” Digester’s note: Napakasakit naman po.)
 
         ii). Section 15, Article VII does not apply to the Judiciary as a whole; the
existence of the JBC insulates judicial appointments from politics. Section 15 is
there to eliminate midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief
Executive (for example, in Aytona v. Castillo, 350 appointments were made in one
night and inducted a few hours before the inauguration of the new President). But
some appointments have to be made, and as long as they are “few and so spaced as
to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need
for the appointment and the appointee’s qualifications,” the outgoing President can
make them.
         The Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to those appointments
made in the Executive Department, and this interpretation makes sense because of
the establishment of the JBC. The screening of candidates for judicial positions
ensures that there would no longer be appointments to the Judiciary made in haste
and with irregularity or because of partisanship. Neither is there any danger of
appointments as an avenue for vote buying, because even if one is backed by people
close to the President, one has to get past the JBC first.
 
         iii.) In a meeting with the JBC on 9 March 1988 regarding appointments to
the Court of Appeals, Justice Regalado confirmed that “on the basis of the
(Constitutional) Commission’s records, the election ban had no application to
appointments to the Court of Appeals.” Justice Regalado was a member of the
Constitutional Commission, and Valenzuela was mistaken to have not acknowledged
such an admission.
 
         iv.) Sections 14, 15, and 16 of Article VII apply to the President’s
appointing powers. Sections 14 and 16 refer only to appointments within the
Executive Department. To interpret parts of a statute in reference to its context
would support the position that Section 15 also refers only to appointments within the
Executive Department, as it would have been absurd for the framers to insert a
general prohibition between two provisions of limited scope. Anyway, if they wanted
the ban to apply to the judiciary, they would have inserted a similar prohibition under
Article VIII.
 
         v.) To uphold Valenzuela would undermine the independence of the
Judiciary, as it would tie the courts to the political leaders vying for the
Presidency. In any case, appointments by a new President would be suspect
because the appointee can also become beholden to the appointing authority. No risk
if the outgoing President makes the appointment precisely because her term is about
to end.
        
         vi.) That there is no need for the incumbent President to appoint the next
Chief Justice because there will still be 45 days of the 90 days remaining for the
the next President to appoint is not the point. The maximum prohibition period is
115 days (elections held on May 8), and the minimum is 109 days (elections held on
May 14), and both periods are longer than the full mandatory 90-day period to fill the
vacancy in the Supreme Court. The framers did not discuss this anymore, precisely
because Section 15, Article VII was not meant to apply to Section 4(1), Article VIII.
 
         vii.) (PURE OBITER) The President might not even need a JBC list to
appoint the Chief Justice if she decides to appoint someone who is already a
justice of the Supreme Court. This is not an issue, but the Court says this as
something to think about in case the question comes up.
 
2. Whether there is an urgent need for the President to appoint the successor
when the Judiciary Act of 1948 provides for an Acting Chief Justice – NOT THE
POINT OF THIS ISSUE
         - Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948:
         Vacancy in office of Chief Justice. - In case of a vacancy in the office of Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court or of his inability to perform the duties and powers of his
office, they shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in precedence, until
such disability is removed, or another Chief Justice is appointed and duly qualified.
This provision shall apply to every Associate Justice who succeeds to the office of
Chief Justice.
         - The framers intended for the Chief Justice to be permanent, never taking the
post only in a temporary or acting capacity. If they wanted it to be so, they could have
easily said so in the Constitution. The Judiciary Act of 1948 only responds to rare
situations where the Chief Justice is not yet appointed, or is unable to perform his or
her duties. Also, it was enacted under the 1935 Constitution when the appointment
process would have taken longer because of the need for the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments. Such confirmation is no longer required for judicial
appointments under the present Constitution; consequently, there has been no wide
gap between the retirement and the resignation of an incumbent Chief Justice and the
appointment of his successor.
        
3. Whether the JBC may be compelled to submit the list of nominees to the
President through a writ of mandamus – NO
         - The mandatory 90-day period is directed at the President, and it starts to run
from the day the post is vacated. The JBC has no discretion to submit the list to the
President after the vacancy occurs, as that would shorten the 90-day period. But the
JBC does not have a ministerial duty to submit the list before the vacancy occurs.
         - The JBC still has until 17 May 2010 at the latest to submit the list to the
President. The action prayed for is premature.
 
4. Whether the JBC can be prohibited from intervening in the process of
nominating the successor of Chief Justice Puno – NO
         - This springs from a challenge of constitutionality: the JBC was composed in
such a way as to allocate one vote each to ex officio members from the Senate and
the House of Representatives. This allegedly prejudiced the chances of some
candidates for nomination by raising the minimum number of votes required in
accordance with the rules of the JBC.
         - The Court simply ruled that the petitioners did not have locus standi on this
issue, as they did not allege in their petition that they were nominated to the JBC and
thus failed to show any actual interest.
 
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Petitions dismissed on the ground of prematurity and lack of merit, except for that of
Estelito Mendoza (A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC). The JBC is directed to resume its
proceedings for filling vacancies in the entire Judiciary, prepare the short list of
nominees for Chief Justice, and submit the list to the incumbent President on or
before 17 May 2010.
 
 
DOCTRINE
The election ban in Section 15, Article VII does not apply to judicial appointments.
 
RELEVANCE TO THE LESSON
         Well, the whole case is about the power of appointment.
 
OTHER NOTES
         - It was argued by the petitioners that the position of Chief Justice needed to be
filled as soon as possible in the interest of public service, because delaying the
appointment would make it difficult for the Supreme Court to decide cases, especially
those involving election contests which they would have to decide as the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal. Respondents said that the world would not cease to exist (not
anyone’s actual words) if there was no Chief Justice for some time, so there was no
urgency to appoint.
         - It was pointed out by an oppositor that the JBC as neither a judicial or quasi-
judicial body has no authority to resolve constitutional issues and therefore cannot
give the list to the President if the Constitution does not clearly allow it to.
 
SEPARATE OPINIONS
 
Carpio-Morales
 
         Constitutional draftmanship style is the weakest aid in arriving at a
constitutional construction. There is still the need for an election ban on judicial
appointments, and a mere inference that the establishment of the JBC could
depoliticize the process of judicial appointments does not justify the conclusion arrived
at by the ponencia.
         The establishment of the JBC is not sufficient to curtail the evils of
midnight appoinments in the judiciary. Beholdenness to the appointing authority is
mitigated by the risk of impeachment. Judicial independence can also be
compromised when the outgoing President faces the Court in charges filed against
her and when the appointing President is up for reelection.
         All rules of statutory construction revolt against the interpretation arrived
at by the ponencia. It is simplistic for the majority to say that the framers would have
said something about an election ban in Article VIII if they intended to include the
judiciary in the general election ban. Likewise, had the framers intended to exclude
the judiciary from the general election ban, they would have said so in Article VII in
the excepting proviso therein. The general rule of a ban on midnight appointments is
clear. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. The exception to the rule is
also clear. Expressio unius et exclusio alterius. Also, Valenzuela was a unanimous
opinion by the Court, and such should not be reversed solely on the basis of what
Justice Regalado thinks. If constitutional issues were to be resolved that way, we
might as well reconvene al the ConCom members and have them vote instead.
         The 90-day period to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court is suspended
during the ban on midnight appointments. It makes more sense this way, because
neither Section 15 nor Section 4(1) is undermined and they can coexist. Since there is
a ban, there is no duty to appoint as the power to appoint doesn’t even exist. Also, the
seventh point raised by the ponencia is a non-issue; it is necessary that the
appointment should come from a list prepared by the JBC.
         The Supreme Court can function effectively during the midnight
appointments ban without an appointed Chief Justice. The 90-day period of
vacancy provided for in the Constitution just goes to show that no one is going to die if
there is no Chief Justice for a few days. Besides, judicial power is vested upon the
Supreme Court as a collegial body and not on the Chief Justice. The competence,
probity, and independence of the Court, whether en banc or in division, is not
contingent on the existence of a Chief Justice.
 
Nachura
 
         There is no justiciable controversy for determination. Move along, people.
         (Points v and vi of the ponencia are reiterated here. Estelito Mendoza’s
petition is likewise deemed not justiciable because it is in the nature of a petition for
declaratory relief, over which the Court has no jurisdiction. Besides, the Court does
not adjudicate academic questions.)
 
Brion
 
          The President can appoint justices to the Supreme Court within the period
concerned, but the authority to appoint does not extend to the whole Judiciary. Mass
appointments may harm the integrity of our elections if they are allowed before the
May 2010 elections, given that judges exert power and influence over their local
communities. (At the time of this petition, according to the Mendoza petition, there are
around 537 vacancies, a 24.5% vacancy rate at the first and second level courts.)
         Personal bias of a Supreme Court justice is an objection either way, whether
the justice is appointed by an outgoing President or an incoming one. Points made on
this issue are conjectural and speculative and cannot be made the basis for
adjudication on the merits.
 

 
22.  Rufino vs Endriga G.R. No. 139554, July 21, 2006

FACTS: 
On 25 June 1966, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order
No. 30 (EO 30) creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines as a trust governed by a
Board of Trustees of seven members to preserve and promote Philippine culture.
On 5 October 1972, or soon after the declaration of Martial Law,    President
Marcos issued PD 15, the CCP’s charter, which converted the CCP under EO 30 into a
non-municipal public corporation free from the “pressure or influence of politics.” PD 15
increased the members of CCP’s Board from seven to nine trustees.  Later, Executive
Order No. 1058, issued on 10 October 1985, increased further the trustees to 11.  
 
After the People Power Revolution in 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino
asked for the courtesy resignations of the then incumbent CCP trustees and appointed
new trustees to the Board.   Eventually, during the term of President Fidel V. Ramos,
the CCP Board included Endriga, Lagdameo, Sison,  Potenciano,  Fernandez, Lenora 
A. Cabili (“Cabili”), and  Manuel T. Mañosa (“Mañosa”).
 
            On 22 December 1998, then President Joseph E. Estrada appointed seven new
trustees to the CCP Board for a term of four years to replace the Endriga group as well
as two other incumbent trustees. The seven new trustees were:
 
1.  Armita B. Rufino        -     President, vice Baltazar                       
                                  N. Endriga
 
2.  Zenaida R. Tantoco      -     Member, vice Doreen Fernandez
 
3.  Federico Pascual        -      Member, vice Lenora A. Cabili
 
4.  Rafael Buenaventura     -     Member, vice Manuel T. Mañosa
 
5.  Lorenzo Calma           -     Member, vice Ma. Paz D. Lagdameo
 
6.  Rafael Simpao, Jr.      -     Member, vice Patricia C. Sison
 
7.     Freddie Garcia       -     Member, vice Irma Ponce-Enrile
                                        Potenciano
 
 

Except for Tantoco,  the Rufino group  took  their  respective oaths of office and
assumed  the performance of their duties in early January 1999.
 
On 6 January 1999, the Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto before this
Court questioning President Estrada’s appointment of   seven new members to the CCP
Board.  The Endriga group alleged that under Section 6(b) of PD 15, vacancies in the
CCP Board “shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at the
next regular meeting x x x.”   In case “only one trustee survive[s], the vacancies shall be
filled by the surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the
[CCP].”  The Endriga group claimed that it is only when the CCP Board is entirely
vacant may the President of the Philippines fill such vacancies, acting in consultation
with the ranking officers of the CCP.
 
The Endriga group asserted that when former President Estrada appointed the
Rufino group, only one seat was vacant due to the expiration of Mañosa’s term.  The
CCP Board then had 10 incumbent trustees.
The Endriga group refused to accept that the CCP was under the supervision
and control of the President.  The Endriga group cited Section 3 of PD 15, which states
that the CCP “shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation x x x.”
 
On 14 May 1999, the Court of Appeals granted the quo warranto petition.  The
Court of Appeals declared the Endriga group lawfully entitled to hold office as CCP
trustees.  On the other hand, the appellate court’s Decision ousted the Rufino group
from the CCP Board.
 
In their motion for reconsideration, the Rufino group asserted that the law could
only delegate to the CCP Board the power to appoint officers lower in rank than the
trustees of the Board.  The law may not validly confer on the CCP trustees the authority
to appoint or elect their fellow trustees, for the latter would be officers of equal rank and
not of lower rank.   Section 6(b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their
fellow trustees should be declared unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allowing the appointment only of “officers lower in
rank” than the appointing power.
 
 On 3 August 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the Rufino group’s motion for
reconsideration.  The Court of Appeals also denied the Endriga group’s motion for
immediate execution of the 14 May 1999 Decision.
         
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.  
ISSUE: 
Whether or not Sec. 6 (b) of PD 15 is constitutional and CCP trustees have the
authority to appoint and elect their fellow trustees when there is vacancy. 
 
RULING:
NO. The SC ruled that Sec. 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15 as amended  which authorizes
the remaining trustees to fill by election vacancies in the Board of Trustees of CCP is
unconstitutional.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to
fill vacancies in the Board, runs afoul with the President’s power of control under
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.   The intent of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD
15 is to insulate the CCP from political influence and pressure, specifically from the
President. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP a self-perpetuating entity,
virtually outside the control of the President.  Such a public office or board cannot
legally exist under the 1987 Constitution.  
 
Section 3 of PD 15, as amended, states that the CCP “shall enjoy autonomy of
policy and operation x x x.”  This provision does not free the CCP from the President’s
control, for if it does, then it would be unconstitutional.  This provision may give the CCP
Board a free hand in initiating and formulating policies and undertaking activities, but
ultimately these policies and activities are all subject to the President’s power of
control. 
 
The CCP is part of the Executive branch. No law can cut off the President’s
control over the CCP in the guise of insulating the CCP from the President’s influence. 
By stating that the “President shall have control of all the executive x x x offices,” the
1987 Constitution empowers the President not only to influence but even to control all
offices in the Executive branch, including the CCP.  Control is far greater than, and
subsumes, influence.  

23. Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the PH

FACTS:

·        Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled “An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the
Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National
and Local Elections and for Other Purposes” was enacted.
 o   Reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of August 2011, to the second
Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with
the country’s regular national and local elections.
o   granted the President the power to “appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for
the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the
functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the
May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.”

·        SC issued a temporary restraining order

o   enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153
o   ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform
their functions should these cases not be decided by the end of their term
on September 30, 2011.

·        ARMM History Time:

o On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress
acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act
for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.”

§ A plebiscite was held on November 6, 1990 as required by Section 18(2), Article X of

RA No. 6734,

thus fully establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

§ The initially assenting provinces were

• Lanao del Sur,

• Maguindanao,

• Sulu and

• Tawi-tawi.

§ RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the regional officials of the
ARMM on a date not

earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its ratification.

o RA No. 9054 (entitled “An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing
for the Autonomous

Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended”) was the next legislative act passed.
§ This law provided further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first defined in the
original organic

act, and

§ reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of
September 2001.

o RA No. 9140 was passed on June 22, 2001.

§ This law reset the first regular elections originally scheduled under RA No. 9054, to
November 26,

2001.

§ It set the plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054 to not later than August 15, 2001.

o RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001.

§ The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to join ARMM on the same date.

o RA No. 9333 was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional
elections to

§ the 2nd Monday of August 2005, and

§ on the same date every 3 years thereafter.

§ Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.

o Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on
August 8, 2011.

§ COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies

for the various regional offices to be elected.

o But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted,

§ resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and
local elections of

the country.

ISSUES/HELD:
 A.     Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections?
– YES.

• Synchronization of national and local elections is a constitutional mandate that

Congress must provide for and this synchronization must include the ARMM elections.

• On this point, an existing law in fact already exists – RA No. 7166 – as the forerunner
of the current RA No. 10153.

• RA No. 7166 already provides for the synchronization of local elections with the
national and congressional elections.

• Thus, what RA No. 10153 provides is an old matter for local governments (with the
exception of barangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections where the terms are not
constitutionally provided) and is technically a reiteration of what is already reflected in
the law, given that regional elections are in reality local elections by express
constitutional recognition.

 
B.     Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate Art. VI, Sec. 26(2) of the
Constitution? – NO.

• In the Tolentino ruling, the SC ruled that the President’s certification of the necessity
of the bill’s immediate enactment

exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate
readings requirement. (Sec. 26(2)

Art. VI)

 
C.      Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute an
amendment to Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No. 9054? – NO.

• Neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054.

• As an examination of these laws will show, RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule
of the first ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the regular elections.

• A need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the date of the subsequent ARMM
regular elections, which it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153.

 
D.     Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or
revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution and the corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws? –
YES.
• Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a “majority of each House
shall constitute a quorum to do business.”

o In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of Representatives or

the Senate are present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and
hold session.

o Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve

acts.

• In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than two-
thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting
separately, in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054.

o Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for
the passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend,
revise or repeal the laws it had passed.

• Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in

excess of what the Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is constitutionally
obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future legislators’ room for action and
flexibility.

Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of

autonomous regions under paragraph 2, Section 18, Article X of the 1987
Constitution? – YES.

• Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is required only for
the creation of autonomous regions and for determining which provinces, cities and
geographic areas will be included in the autonomous regions.

• While the settled rule is that amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the
plebiscite requirement in order to become effective, o questions on the extent of the
matters requiring ratification may unavoidably arise because of the seemingly general
terms of the Constitution and the obvious absurdity that would result if a plebiscite were
to be required for every statutory amendment.

Does RA No. 10153 violate the autonomy granted to the ARMM? – NO.

• Synchronization of national and local elections is a constitutional mandate that

Congress must provide for and this synchronization must include the ARMM elections.

o To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to reconcile the schedule of the

ARMMs regular elections (which should have been held in August 2011 based on RA No.
 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to
be held in May 2013).

• During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in
order to resolve this problem:

o to allow the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity,
pursuant to Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office;

§ However, this is unconstitutional since it is an act of Congress that extends the term of
the officials.

o to hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when
those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; or

§ But, COMELEC cannot conduct special elections and Congress would shorten the
terms of those

elected from such special election if they pass a law calling for such.

o to authorize the President to appoint OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also
until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office.

§ Congress correctly chose this option.

• The limited circumstances contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the period is fixed
and, more importantly, the terms of governance – both under Section 18, Article X of
the Constitution and RA No. 9054 – will not systemically be touched nor affected at all.

o To repeat what has previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged and
continuously, with full effect in accordance with the Constitution, save only for the
interim and temporary measures that synchronization of elections requires.

• Finally, on the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, SC reiterates the
established rule that every statute is presumed valid.

o Congress, thus, has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality of its acts, and the
party challenging the validity of a statute has the onerous task of rebutting this
presumption.

24. Velicaria-Garafil vs. Office of the President

G.R. No. 203372               June 16, 2015

 
ATTY. CHELOY E. VELICARIA-GARAFIL, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ,
Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 206290
ATTY. DINDO G. VENTURANZA, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Justice, CLARO A. ARELLANO, in his capacity as the Prosecutor General, and
RICHARD ANTHONY D. FADULLON, in his capacity as the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209138
IRMA A. VILLANUEVA and FRANCISCA B. ROSQUITA, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 212030
EDDIE U. TAMONDONG, Petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondent.
 
The present consolidated cases involve four petitions: G.R. No. 203372 with Atty. Cheloy E. Velicaria-
Garafil (Atty. Velicaria-Garafil), who was appointed State Solicitor II at the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), as petitioner; G.R. No. 206290 with Atty. Dindo G. Venturanza (Atty. Venturanza), who
was appointed Prosecutor IV (City Prosecutor) of Quezon City, as petitioner; G.R. No. 209138 with
Irma A. Villanueva (Villanueva), who was appointed Administrator for Visayas of the Board of
Administrators of the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA), and Francisca B. Rosquita
(Rosquita), who was appointed Commissioner of the National Commission of Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP), as petitioners; and G.R. No. 212030 with Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong (Atty. Tamondong), who
was appointed member of the Board of Directors of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), as
petitioner. All petitions question the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 2 (EO 2) for being
inconsistent with Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
 
Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President
Macapagal-Arroyo) issued more than 800 appointments to various positions in several government
offices.
 
The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
 
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
 
Thus, for purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March 2010 was the cutoff date for valid appointments
and the next day, 11 March 2010, was the start of the ban on midnight appointments. Section 15,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution recognizes as an exception to the ban on midnight appointments
only "temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety." 
None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this exception.
 
On 30 June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) took his oath of office as
President of the Republic of the Philippines. On 30 July 2010, President Aquino issued EO 2 recalling,
withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo which violated the
constitutional ban on midnight appointments.
 
Issue:
(1) whether petitioners' appointments violate Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, and
(2) whether EO 2 is constitutional.
 
Held:
 
The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should be understood as
both complete and effective) appointment:
 
(1)   authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority;
 
The President's exercise of his power to appoint officials is provided for in the Constitution and laws.
Discretion is an integral part in the exercise of the power of appointment. Considering that appointment
calls for a selection, the appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion.
 
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice which
he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among
those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.
 
(2)   transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal;
 
It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There should be evidence that the
President intended the appointment paper to be issued. It could happen that an appointment paper
may be dated and signed by the President months before the appointment ban, but never left his
locked drawer for the entirety of his term. Release of the appointment paper through the MRO is an
unequivocal act that signifies the President's intent of its issuance.
 
For purposes of verification of the appointment paper's existence and authenticity, the appointment
paper must bear the security marks (i.e., handwritten signature of the President, bar code, etc.) and
must be accompanied by a transmittal letter from the MRO.
 
(3)   a vacant position at the time of appointment; and
 
Petitioners have failed to raise any valid ground for the Court to declare EO 2, or any part of it,
unconstitutional. Consequently, EO 2 remains valid and constitutional.
 
(4)   receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
 
Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. Assuming office and taking the oath amount
to acceptance of the appointment. An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office, a
prerequisite to the full investiture of the office.
 
Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four elements of a valid appointment. They cannot
prove with certainty that their appointment papers were transmitted before the appointment ban took
effect. On the other hand, petitioners admit that they took their oaths of office during the appointment
ban.
 
Petitioners have failed to raise any valid ground for the Court to declare EO 2, or any part of it,
unconstitutional. Consequently, EO 2 remains valid and constitutional.

27. EDCEL LAGMAN, ET AL VS. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, ET AL

FACTS:
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President
Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial
law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao.
In accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President, on
May 25, 2017, submitted to Congress a written Report on the factual basis of
Proclamation No. 216.
The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with
rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the
passing of time.
On May 23, 2017, as the President stated in his Report, the Maute terrorist
group took over a hospital in Marawi City; established several checkpoints
within the city; burned down certain government and private facilities and
inflicted casualties on the part of Government forces; and started flying the flag
of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas, thereby indicating
a removal of allegiance from the Philippine Government and their capability to
deprive the duly constituted authorities – the President, foremost – of their
powers and prerogatives.
The Report also highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City; the role it
plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole; and the possible tragic
repercussions once it falls under the control of the lawless groups.
After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate declared that
it found “no compelling reason to revoke Proclamation 216.
The Lagman Group, the Cullamat Group and the Mohamad Group petitioned
the Supreme Court, questioning the factual basis of President Duterte’s
Proclamation of martial law.
 ISSUES:
[1] W/N the petitions are the “appropriate proceeding” covered by paragraph 3,
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of
review required by the Court;
[2] A. Is the President required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his
appreciation of facts? B. Is the President required to obtain the favorable
recommendation thereon bf the Secretary of National Defense? C. Is the
President is required to take into account only the situation at the time of the
proclamation, even if subsequent events prove the situation to have not been
accurately reported?
[3] Is the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is independent of the actual actions that have been taken by
Congress jointly or separately;
[4] W/N there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; A. What are the
parameters for review? B. Who has the burden of proof? C. What is the
threshold of evidence?
[5] Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court involves
the calibration of graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-
Chief?
[6] W/N Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 may be considered, vague and
thus null and void: a. with its inclusion of “other rebel groups;” or b. since it has
no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire
Mindanao region;
[7] W/N the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the
Report of the President to Congress are sufficient bases: a. for the existence of
actual rebellion; or b. for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region;
[8] W/N terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism are equivalent to actual
rebellion and the requirements of public safety sufficient to declare martial law
or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and
[9] W/N nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of23 May 2017 will: A. have the effect
of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or B. also nullify the acts of the
President in calling out the armed forces to quell lawless violence in Marawi
and other parts of the Mindanao region.
 

RULING:

1. The Court agrees that the jurisdiction of this Court under the third paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII is sui generis. It is a special and specific jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII.
The phrase “in an appropriate proceeding” appearing on the third paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of
questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief
Executive’s emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a
complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.

2. a.) In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the
suspension, the Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual
basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute
correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the
President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts
reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To require him otherwise would
impede the process of his decision-making.

b.) The recommendation of the Defense Secretary is not a condition for the
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the
President’s power to declare martial law is not subject to any condition except for
the requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires it.
Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if the decision of the President is
made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego. Only on the
President can exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief.

c.) As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial
law and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the
revocation of Congress and the review of this Court. Since the exercise of these
powers is a judgment call of the President, the determination of this Court as to
whether there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such, must be based only
on facts or information known by or available to the President at the time he made
the declaration or suspension which facts or information are found in the
proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress. These
may be based on the situation existing at the time the declaration was made or past
events. As to how far the past events should be from the present depends on the
President.

3. The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is independent of the
actions taken by Congress.
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack sufficient factual basis. On the
other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. The power to review by the Court
and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally different but likewise
independent from each other although concededly, they have the same trajectory,
which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation.

4. The parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: l)
actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements
must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there
is actual rebellion or invasion.

The President needs only to satisfy probable cause as the standard of proof in
determining the existence of either invasion or rebellion for purposes of declaring
martial law, and that probable cause is the most reasonable, most practical and
most expedient standard by which the President can fully ascertain the existence or
non-existence of rebellion necessary for a declaration of martial law or suspension
of the writ. To require him to satisfy a higher standard of proof would restrict the
exercise of his emergency powers.

5. The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual basis of the declaration of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not
extend to the calibration of the President’s decision of which among his graduated
powers he will avail of in a given situation. To do so would be tantamount to an
incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the
prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the President.

6. a.) Inclusion of “other rebel groups ” does not make Proclamation No. 216 vague.
The term “other rebel groups” in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when
viewed in the context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of
Proclamation No. 216 refers to “other rebel groups” found in Proclamation No. 55,
which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas clauses.

b.) Lack of guidelines/operational parameters does not make Proclamation No. 216
vague. Operational guidelines will serve only as mere tools for the implementation
of the proclamation.
There is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the implementing
and/or operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued
after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Any act committed under the
said orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws should be resolved in a
separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades into these areas,
it would be deemed as trespassing into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for
Congress in the exercise of its power to revoke.

7. There is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. By a review of the facts available to him
that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to
remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory
and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his power and prerogatives, leading the
President to believe that there was probable cause that the crime of rebellion was
and is being committed and that public safety requires the imposition of martial law
and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause
for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.

8. Terrorism neither negates nor absorbs rebellion. Rebellion may be subsumed

under the crime of terrorism, which has a broader scope covering a wide range of
predicate crimes. In fact, rebellion is only one of the various means by which
terrorism can be committed.

Meanwhile, public safety requires the declaration of martial law and the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. For a
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
to be valid, there must be concurrence of 1.) actual rebellion or invasion and 2.) the
public safety requirement.

In his report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG
and the Maute Group were directed not only against government forces or
establishment but likewise against civilians and their properties. There were bomb
threats, road blockades, burning of schools and churches, hostages and killings of
civilians, forced entry of young male Muslims to the group, there were hampering of
medical services and delivery of basic services, reinforcement of government
troops, among others. These particular scenarios convinced the President that the
atrocities had already escalated to a level that risked public safety and thus
impelled him to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.

9. a.) The calling out power is in a different category from the power to declare
martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
nullification of Proclamation No. 216 will not affect Proclamation No. 55.

The President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently
of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare
martial law. Even so, the Court’s review of the President’s declaration of martial law
and his calling out the Armed Forces necessarily entails separate proceedings
instituted for that particular purpose.

b.) Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in the nullification
of the acts of the President done pursuant thereto. Under the operative fact
doctrine,” the unconstitutional statute is recognized as an “operative fact” before it is
declared unconstitutional.

***

Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao
region. The Court FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance of Proclamation
No. 216 and DECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly, the consolidated
Petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

29. LAGMAN vs MEDIALDEA

G.R. No. 243522, February 19, 2019

FACTS:

1.On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216,
declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the whole of Mindanao to address the rebellion mounted by members of
the Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), for a period not exceeding sixty
(60) days.

2.On May 25, 2017, within the 48-hour period set in Section 18, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, the President submitted to the Senate and the House of
Representatives his written Report, citing the factual events and reasons that
impelled him to issue the said Proclamation. Both Houses expressed their full
support to the Proclamation, under the Senate P.S. Resolution No. 388 and House
Resolution No. 1050, finding no cause to revoke the same.

3.Subsequently, three (3) consolidated petitions assailing the sufficiency of the

factual basis of Proclamation No. 216 were filed before this Court. But in a Decision
dated July 4, 2017, the Court in  Lagman, et al. v. Medialdea, et al., (G.R. Nos.
231658) found sufficient factual bases for the issuance of Proclamation No. 216 and
declared it constitutional.

4.On July 18, 2017, the President requested Congress to extend the effectivity of
Proclamation No. 216. In a Special Joint Session on July 22, 2017, the Congress
adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 2, which extended Proclamation No. 216
until December 31, 2017.

5.Acting on the recommendations of the DND Secretary Lorenzana and the then
(AFP) Chief of Staff General Guerrero in a letter dated December 8, 2017, the
President again asked both the Senate and the House of Representatives to extend
the Proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to
December 31, 2018.

6.Thereafter, four (4) consolidated petitions were filed before this Court assailing
the constitutionality of the second extension of Proclamation No. 216. But in a
Decision dated February 6, 2018, this Court in  Lagman, et al. v. Pimentel III, et al.,
(G.R. Nos. 235935) found sufficient factual bases for the second extension of the
Proclamation from January 1 to December 31, 2018, and declared it constitutional.

7.Before the expiration of the second extension of Proclamation No. 216 or on

December 4, 2018, Secretary Lorenzana in a letter to the President, recommended
the third extension of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year from January 1, 2019 up to
December 31, 2019, recommending to the President to put an end to the continuing
rebellion in Mindanao waged by the DAESH-inspired groups and its local and
foreign allies, particularly the Daulah Islamiyah (DI), and the threat posed by the
Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army Terrorists (CNTs).
8.Likewise, AFP Chief of Staff General Galvez and Chief of the PNP Director-
General Albayalde recommended the further extension of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for
one year beginning January 1, 2019 up to December 31, 2019, based on current
security assessment for the total eradication of the Local Terrorist Groups (LTG),
ASG, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), DI, and other lawless armed
groups and the CNTs, their foreign and local allies, supporters, financiers, in order
to fully contain the continuing rebellion in Mindanao and to prevent it from
escalating to other parts of the country,

9.Acting on these recommendations, the President, in a letter dated December 6,

2018 to the Senate and the House of Representatives, requested for the third
extension of Proclamation No. 216 from January 1, 2019 to December 31, 2019.
The President cited the following essential facts to extend the proclamation:

a.The Abu Sayyaf Group, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, Daulah Islamiyah
(DI), and other terrorist groups (collectively labeled as LTG) which seek to promote
global rebellion, continue to defy the government by perpetrating hostile activities
during the extended period of Martial Law. At least four (4) bombings/ Improvised
Explosive Device (IED) explosions had been cited in the AFP report, killing and
wounding several people.

b.DI forces continue to pursue their rebellion against the government and continuing
to recruit new members, especially in vulnerable Muslim communities.

c.CTG, which has publicly declared its intention to seize political power through
violent means and supplant the country's democratic form of government with
Communist rule. Records disclosed that at least three hundred forty-two (342)
violent incidents, ranging from harassments against government installations,
liquidation operations, and arson attacks as part of extortion schemes.

d.Major Abu Sayyaf Group factions in Sulu continue to pursue kidnap for ransom
activities to finance their operations. As of counting, there are a total of eight (8)
kidnappings that have occurred involving a Dutch, a Vietnamese, two (2)
Indonesians, and four (4) Filipinos.

10.On December 12, 2018, the Senate and the House of Representatives, in a joint
session, adopted Resolution No. 6, entitled "Declaring a State of Martial Law and
Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao
for another period of one (1) year from January 1, 2019 to December 31, 2019."

11.PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS:
a.The Court is mandated to independently determine the sufficiency of factual
bases of the extension of martial law and it must not limit its review on the basis of
the declaration presented by the Executive and Legislative branches of the
government.

b.The present factual situation of Mindanao no longer calls for a third extension of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus because
no actual rebellion persists in Mindanao.

c.The absence of the requirement of public safety is underscored by the very

absence of an actual rebellion consisting of an armed uprising against the
government for the purpose of removing Mindanao or a portion thereof from the
allegiance to the Republic.

d.Proclamation No. 216 has become functus officio and the extension is no longer
necessary, considering the deaths of the leaders of the ASG and the Maute
brothers, and the cessation of combat operations and the liberation of Marawi City.

e.Congress committed grave abuse of discretion in approving the third extension

hastily despite the absence of sufficient factual basis.

f.The third extension violates the constitutional proscription against a long duration
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.30 The
constitutional limitations on the period of martial law must be for a short or limited
duration, which must not exceed sixty (60) days, and should the third extension be
granted, the martial law regime would have lasted 951 days.

g.The "justifications" proffered by the President in his letter merely illustrates in

general terms, lacking in specifics to support the claim that rebellion persists in
Mindanao, and the President undertook to submit to the Congress a more detailed
report which he failed to do.

h.The resolutions and recommendations for martial law extension by the Regional
and Provincial Peace and Order Councils were due only to their desire for peace
and order, economic development, and not because rebellion persists in Mindanao.

i.The third extension of martial law will lead to further violation of citizens' political,
civil, and human rights.

12.RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS:
a.The Court's power of judicial review under Section 18, Article VII is limited to the
determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis of the extension of martial law
and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

b.There is sufficient factual basis to extend the effectivity of Proclamation No. 216
as rebellion persists in Mindanao, and public safety requires it. The President and
both Houses of Congress found that there is probable cause or evidence to show
that rebellion persists in Mindanao. 

c.The events happening in Mindanao strongly indicate that the continued

implementation of martial law is necessary to protect and insure public safety.

d.The deaths of the leaders of the ASG, the Maute brothers and the cessation of
the Marawi siege did not render functus officio the declaration of martial law under
Proclamation No. 216. Although the Marawi siege ended, the factual circumstances
which became the basis for the second extension still exists and continuously
threaten the peace and order situation in Mindanao.

e.Congress has the sole prerogative to extend martial law and the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus since the 1987 Constitution does not limit
the period of extension and suspension, nor prohibit further extensions or
suspensions.

f.Congress has the absolute discretion in determining the rules of procedure with
regard to the conduct and manner by which Congress deliberates on the
President's request for extension of martial law, and therefore is not subject to
judicial review.

g.The alleged human rights violations do not warrant the nullification of martial law
and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. There are sufficient
legal safeguards to address human rights abuses.

h.Petitioners failed to prove that they are entitled of injunctive relief.

ISSUES:

1.Whether there exists sufficient factual basis for the extension of martial law in
Mindanao.
2.Whether the Constitution limits the number of extensions and the duration for
which Congress can extend the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

3.Whether Proclamation No. 216 has become functus officio with the cessation of
Marawi siege that it may no longer be extended.

4.Whether the manner by which Congress approved the extension of martial law is
a political question and is not reviewable by the Court

5.Whether the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or extension thereof may be reversed by a finding of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of Congress. If so, whether the extension of martial
law was attended by grave abuse of discretion.

6.Whether the allegations of human rights violations in the implementation of martial

law in Mindanao is sufficient to warrant nullification of its extension.

RULING:

1.The requirements of rebellion and public safety are present to uphold the
extension of martial law in Mindanao from January 1, 2019 to December 31, 2019.
Since the Court must determine the sufficiency of the factual basis for the
declaration as well as the extension of martial law and suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus, the standard of review under Section 18, Article VII is not grave
abuse of discretion.

The sufficiency of the factual basis for the extension of martial law in Mindanao
must be determined from the facts and information contained in the President's
request, supported by reports submitted by his alter egos to Congress. These are
the bases upon which Congress granted the extension. The Court cannot expect
exactitude and preciseness of the facts and information stated in these reports, as
the Court's review is confined to the sufficiency and reasonableness thereof. While
there may be inadequacies in some of the facts, i.e., facts which are not fully
explained in the reports, these are not reasons enough for the Court to invalidate
the extension as long as there are other related and relevant circumstances that
support the finding that rebellion persists and public safety requires it.

The cited events demonstrate the spate of violence of rebel groups in Mindanao in
pursuit of the singular objective to seize power over parts of Mindanao or deprive
the President or Congress of their power and prerogatives over these areas. The
absence of motives indicated in several reports does not mean that these violent
acts and hostile activities committed are not related to rebellion which absorbs other
common crimes.

In addition, these violent incidents should not be viewed as isolated events but in
their totality, showing a consistent pattern of rebellion in Mindanao. As explained by
the AFP Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (OJ2) in its letter to the OSG,
the violent incidents cannot be viewed in isolation:

[T]he events in the lists were not selected but rather constitute the complete record
of all violent incidents that occurred in 2018 that are attributed to a specific threat
group or any of its members. The argument advanced is that these incidents should
be viewed in their totality and not as unrelated, isolated events. These violent
incidents, when combined with the recorded armed encounters or clashes between
government troops and rebel groups, and taking into account the substantial
casualties resulting from these combined events, show a consistent pattern of
armed uprising or rebellion in Mindanao.52 (Emphasis Ours)

The test of sufficiency is not accuracy nor preciseness but reasonableness of the
factual basis adopted by the Executive in ascertaining the existence of rebellion and
the necessity to quell it.

2.The Congress has the prerogative to extend the martial law and the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as the Constitution does not limit the
period for which it can extend the same. This Court in the case of Lagman v.
Medialdea71 explained the only limitations to the exercise of congressional
authority to extend such proclamation or suspension: a) the extension should be
upon the President's initiative; b) it should be grounded on the persistence of the
invasion or rebellion and the demands of public safety; and c) it is subject to the
Court's review of the sufficiency of its factual basis upon the petition of any citizen.

The records of the Constitutional Commission show that Commissioner Suarez's

proposal to add a similar 60-day limitation to the extension of an initial proclamation
of martial law was not adopted by a majority of the members of the Commission.
The framers evidently gave enough flexibility on Congress to determine the duration
of the extension.

The Constitutional limits/checks set by the Constitution to guard against the

whimsical or arbitrary use of the extra ordinary powers of the Chief Executive under
Section 18, Article VII are well in place and are working. At the initial declaration of
the martial law, the President observed the 60-day limit and the requirement to
report to Congress. In this initial declaration as well as in the extensions, the
President's decision was based on the reports prepared by the different specialized
agencies of the Executive branch charged with external and internal security of the
whole country. These were the same reports submitted to Congress which were
deliberated on, no matter how brief the time allotment was for each of the law
makers' interpellations. Yet the evidence or basis to support the extension of martial
law passed through the scrutiny of the Chief Executive and through several more of
the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Court must remember that We
are called upon to rule on whether the President, and this time with the concurrence
of the two Houses of Congress, acted with sufficient basis in approving anew the
extension of martial law. We must not fall into or be tempted to substitute Our own
judgment to that of the People's President and the People's representatives. We
must not forget that the Constitution has given us separate and quite distinct roles
to fill up in our respective branches of government.

3.Proclamation No. 216 has not become functus officio with the cessation of the
Marawi siege. While Proclamation No. 216 specifically cited the attack of the Maute
group in Marawi City as basis for the declaration of martial law, rebellion was not
necessarily ended by the cessation of the Marawi siege. Rebellion in Mindanao still
continues, as shown by the violent incidents stated in reports to the President, and
was made basis by the Congress in approving the third extension of martial law.
These violent incidents continuously pose a serious threat to security and the peace
and order situation in Mindanao.

Martial law in Mindanao should not be confined to the Marawi siege. Despite the
death of Hapilon and the Maute brothers, the remnants of their groups have
continued to rebuild their organization through the recruitment and training of new
members and fighters to carry on the rebellion. Clashes between rebels and
government forces continue to take place in other parts of Mindanao. Kidnapping,
arson, robbery, bombings, murder - crimes which are absorbed in rebellion -
continue to take place therein. These crimes are part and parcel of the continuing
rebellion in Mindanao.

Be it noted that rebellion is a continuing crime.73 It does not necessarily follow that
with the liberation of Marawi, rebellion no longer exists. It will be a tenuous
proposition to confine rebellion simply to a resounding clash of arms with
government forces.

In sum, Proclamation No. 216 did not become functus officio with the cessation of
the Marawi siege. Considering that rebellion persists and that the public safety
requires it, there is sufficient factual basis to extend martial law in Mindanao for the
third time.

4.The manner by which Congress approved the extension of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is a political question that is
not reviewable by the Court. This freedom from judicial interference was explained
in the 1997 case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, wherein the Court declared that:“But the
cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts
the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress
failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a
violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals.

In other words, the Court cannot review the rules promulgated by Congress in the
absence of any constitutional violation. Petitioners have not shown that the above-
quoted rules of the Joint Session violated any provision or right under the
Constitution.”

5.The allegations of human rights violations in the implementation of martial law in

Mindanao is not sufficient to warrant a nullification of its extension. A declaration of
martial law does not suspend fundamental civil rights of individuals as the Bill of
Rights enshrined in the Constitution remain effective. Civil courts and legislative
bodies remain open. While it is recognized that, in the declaration of martial law and
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the powers given to
officials tasked with its implementation are susceptible to abuses, these instances
have already been taken into consideration when the pertinent provisions on martial
law were drafted. Safeguards within the 1987 Constitution and existing laws are
available to protect the people from these abuses. In Lagman v. Medialdea,80 the
Court emphasized that:

It was the collective sentiment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that sufficient
safeguards against possible misuse and abuse by the Commander-in-Chief of his
extraordinary powers are already in place and that no further emasculation of the
presidential powers is called for in the guise of additional safeguards.

In Lagman v. Pimentel III,81 the Court discussed these safeguards to wit:

Nevertheless, cognizant of such possibility of abuse, the framers of the 1987

Constitution endeavored to institute a system of checks and balances to limit the
President's exercise of the martial law and suspension powers, and to establish
safeguards to protect civil liberties. Thus, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution:

(a) The President may declare martial law or suspend of the privilege of the writ of
the privilege of habeas corpus only when there is an invasion or rebellion and public
safety requires such declaration or suspension.

(b) The President's proclamation or suspension shall be for a period not exceeding
60 days.

(c) Within 48 hours from the proclamation or suspension, the President must submit
a Report in person or in writing to Congress.
(d) The Congress, voting jointly and by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members, can revoke the proclamation or suspension.

(e) The President cannot set aside the Congress' revocation of his proclamation or
suspension.

(f) The President cannot, by himself, extend his proclamation or suspension. He

should ask the Congress' approval.

(g) Upon such initiative or request from the President, the Congress, voting jointly
and by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members, can extend the proclamation
or suspension for such period as it may determine.

(h) The extension of the proclamation or suspension shall only be approved when
the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires it.

(i) The Supreme Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension or the extension thereof, in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen.

(j) The Supreme Court must promulgate its decision within 30 days from the filing of
the appropriate proceeding.

(k) Martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution.

Accordingly, the Bill of Rights remains effective under a state of martial law. Its
implementers must adhere to the principle that civilian authority is supreme over the
military and the armed forces is the protector of the people. They must also abide
by the State's policy to value the dignity of every human person and guarantee full
respect for human rights.

(l) Martial law does not supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative
assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function.

(m) The suspension of the privilege of the writ applies only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

(n) Finally, during the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus
arrested or detained should be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he
should be released.82
 In addition to the safeguards provided by the Constitution, adequate remedies in the
ordinary course of law against abuses and violations of human rights committed by
erring public officers are available including the following:

1. R.A. No. 7438 (An Act Defining Certain Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or
Under Custodial Investigation as Well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining and
Investigating Officers, and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof);

2. R.A. No. 9372 or the Human Security Act of 2007;

3. R.A. No. 9745 or the Anti-Torture Act of 2009; and

4. Writs of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC) and Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-
SC); and

5. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance of
Resolution of Both Houses No. 6 and DECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL.
Accordingly, the consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

30. Lansang v. Garcia

FACTS

·        This case involves the Plaza Miranda bombing incident on August 21, 1971 where in
the middle of the public meeting conducted by the Liberal Party, two hand grenades
were thrown at the platform where the candidates of LP for the 1971 general elections
were.
o   8 persons were killed and many more sustained serious injuries which
could have been fatal had it not been for the timely medical assistance.

·        On August 23, 1971, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 889, in response to the
lawless elements, which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for the
persons presently detained as well as others who may be thereafter similarly detained
for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion.

·        Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were then filed by persons who were arrested
without warrant and then detained upon the authority of said proclamation. o These
petitions assailed the validity of the proclamation and of their detention. o Respondents
filed their returns stating that the continued detention is justified pursuant to the
proclamation, that there is a state of insurrection or rebellion, and that the public safety
and security required the suspension of the privilege.
·        On August 30, 1971, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 889-A, amending the
previous proclamation. It was further amended on September 18, 1971, this time lifting
the suspension in some of the provinces and cities.
 
ISSUE: Was the proclamation formally valid? — Moot and Academic.

·        Petitioners question the formal validity of the original proclamation that it did not
comply with the pertinent constitutional provisions, namely Par. 14, Sec. 1, Art. III6 and
par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. VII7 of the Constitution.
o   They maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence
of actual invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof.
Consequently, the proclamation was invalid.
o   This contention was predicated on its first whereas clause stating, “lawless
elements had entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded
their forces together with the avowed purpose of actually staging,
undertaking and waging an armed insurrection and rebellion.”
o   The actuality so alleged refers to the existence of a conspiracy and the
intent to rise in arms (not of an uprising that constitutes the essence of a
rebellion or insurrection).

·        The Court held that regardless of the merit of the said contention, it has been rendered
moot and academic by Proclamation No. 889-A which reads now: “lawless elements had
entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their forces together with
the avowed purpose of actually staging, undertaking, waging and are actually engaged in
an armed insurrection and rebellion...”
o   In other words, apart from adverting to the existence of actual conspiracy
and of the intent to rise in arms to overthrow the government,
Proclamation No. 889A asserts that the lawless elements "are actually
engaged in an armed insurrection and rebellion" to accomplish their
purpose.

·        Proclamation No. 889A has superseded the original proclamation and that the flaws
attributed thereto are purely formal in nature.

Are the findings of the Executive as to the basis for suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are conclusive upon the Court? — No.

·        Pursuant to the Constitution, two conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the
authority to suspend the privilege of the writ: 1. there must be invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion OR imminent danger thereof; AND 2. public safety must require the
suspension of the privilege.

·        The Court held that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual
bases in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof.
 o   Article VII of the Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions.
o   What goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under
which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege,
but only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic
Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is
vested in the Judicial Department, which in this respect is constitutionally
supreme.
o   The function of the Court is merely to check (not supplant) the Executive
or to ascertain merely whether he had gone beyond the constitutional
limits of his jurisdiction. It is neither to exercise the power vested in him
nor to determine the wisdom of his act.

·        Petitioners contend that public safety did not require the suspension of the privilege
based on the following grounds: o That there is no rebellion;
o   That prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the
Government has been functioning normally;
o   That no untoward incident has actually taken place after August 21, 1971;
o   That the President’s alleged apprehension is non-existent and unjustified;
and
o   That the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and weak to
jeopardize the public safety.

·        The Court, however, stated that the existence of rebellion is obvious.

o   The alleged absence of untoward incident after August 21 is attributable to
the logical effect of the suspension of the privilege of the writ – to compel
those connected with the rebellion or insurrection to go into hiding.
o   Records also show that the President had received intelligence information
that there was a July-August plan involving a wave of assassinations,
kidnappings, terrorism and mass destruction of property and an
extraordinary occurrence would signal the beginning of said event.
o   Moreover, the serious condition of peace and order situation in Mindanao
and the expansion of CPP activities from Central Luzon to other parts of
the country required the armed forces to be spread over the country. o
Based on such data, the Court held that the Executive did not act
arbitrarily or gravely abused its discretion when the President concluded
that public safety and national security required the suspension of the
privilege of the writ.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered:

·        Declaring that the President did not act arbitrarily in issuing Proclamation No. 889, as
amended, and that, accordingly, the same is not unconstitutional;
 ·        Dismissing the petitions in L-33964, L-33965, L-33982, L-34004, L-34013, L-34039
and L-34265, insofar as petitioners Teodosio Lansang, Bayani Alcala, Rogelio Arienda,
Vicentellao, Juan Carandang, Nemesio E. Prudente, Gerardo Tomas, Reynaldo
Rimando, Filomeno M. de Castro, Barcelisa C. de Castro and Antolin Oreta, Jr. are
concerned;

·        The Court of First Instance of Rizal is hereby directed to act with utmost dispatch in
conducting the preliminary examination and/or investigation of the charges for
violation of the Anti-Subversion Act filed against herein petitioners Luzvimindo David,
Victor Felipe, Gary Olivar, Angelo de los Reyes, Rodolfo del Rosario and Teresito Sison,
and to issue the corresponding warrants of arrest, if probable cause is found to exist
against them, or, otherwise, to order their release; and

·        Should there be undue delay, for any reason whatsoever, either in the completion of
the aforementioned preliminary examination and/or investigation, or in the issuance of
the proper orders or resolution in connection therewith, the parties may by motion seek
in these proceedings the proper relief. 5. Without special pronouncement as to costs. It
is so ordered. 

31. Constitutional Law Case: RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL. VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 171396

RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL. VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL. G.R. No. 171396,
171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424 May 3, 2006 
 
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017
 

 
Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress
acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The Office of the President announced the
cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa
People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments and
dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S.
David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was
his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in
Manila and attempt to arrest was made against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN
MUNA whom suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo
issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed
seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court and three (3) of those petitions impleaded President
Arroyo as respondent questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the
emergency powers of Congress and it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press,
of speech and assembly.
 
Issue:
1.) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?
2.) Whether or not the warantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas and the dispersal of
KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during rallies were valid?
3.) Whether or not proper to implead President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as respondent in the
petitions?
4.) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the constitutionality of the
proclamation?
5.) Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident
to Martial Law are used?
 
Ruling:
 
1.) The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the
President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as
prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, there were extraneous
provisions giving the President express or implied power
(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section
1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.")
(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as
well as decrees promulgated by the President[The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may
result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military]; and
(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and
unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the
President, in the absence of legislative legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility
and private business affected with public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly
unconstitutional.
2.) The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless
arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies are illegal, in the absence of proof
that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and
violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as
well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for
publication and other materials, are declared unconstitutional because there was no clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.
3.) It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the
President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal
case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.
4.) This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” Therefore, the court ruled
that the petitioners have a locus standi, for they suffered “direct injury” resulting from “illegal
arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
5.) Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in times of national emergency,
when the public interest so requires, the President may temporarily take over a privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest only if there is congressional authority or
approval. There must enactment of appropriate legislation prescribing the terms and conditions
under which the President may exercise the powers that will serves as the best assurance that due
process of law would be observed.

34. Ampatuan vs. Puno

 
Facts: 
 
On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo
issued Proclamation 1946, placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat
and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency.” She directed the AFP and the
PNP “to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to
prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence” in the named places. Three days
later, she also issued AO 273 “transferring” supervision of the ARMM from the Office of
the President to the DILG. She subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the
former AO (the term “transfer” used in AO 273 was amended to “delegate”, referring to
the supervision of the ARMM by the DILG). 
 
Claiming that the President’s issuances encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy,
petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale,
all ARMM officials, filed this petition for prohibition under Rule 65. They alleged that the
President’s proclamation and orders encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy as these
issuances empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMM’s operations and to seize
the regional government’s powers. They also claimed that the President had no factual
basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat
and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred and that the
deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of
the President’s emergency powers. Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as
AOs 273 and 273-A be declared unconstitutional.
 
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) insisted that the President issued
Proclamation 1946, not to deprive the ARMM of its autonomy, but to restore peace and
order in subject places. She issued the proclamation pursuant to her calling out power
as Commander-in-Chief. The determination of the need to exercise this power rests
solely on her wisdom. The President merely delegated her supervisory powers over the
ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any way. The delegation was
necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killing.
 
Issues: 
 
1. Whether Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local
autonomy under the Constitution and The Expanded ARMM Act
 
2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she
called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless
violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City
 
3.  Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions
 
Held:
 
1. The principle of local autonomy was not violated. DILG Secretary did not take over
control of the powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement agents took the respondent
Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao Massacre,
the ARMM Vice‐Governor, petitioner Adiong, assumed the vacated post on 10 Dec.
2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found in Sec. 12 Art.VII of RA 9054. In turn,
Acting Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly,
petitioner Sahali‐Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. The DILG Secretary therefore
did not take over the administration or the operations of the ARMM. 
 
2. The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood
under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:

SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the

Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and

subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers

necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner

withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the

next adjournment thereof.

The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the
three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress
that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the
Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority
to exercise the same.
 
3. The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence
springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution,
which provides:

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed

forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call

out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or

rebellion. x x x

While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President’s
exercise of the above power, it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As
the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly
to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling
out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that
such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord
respect to the President’s judgment. Thus, the Court said:
 
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted
without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation
beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily
quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for
satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible
to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge
necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove
unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or
wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the
President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a
nature not constituting technical proof.
 
On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence
network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or
affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot
decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of
human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the
military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it
were to have any effect at all. x x x. 
 
Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the
Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the
President’s exercise of the “calling out” power had no factual basis. They simply alleged
that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it
follows that the takeover of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.
  
The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation
1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and
hostilities in the places mentioned.  Progress reports also indicated that there was
movement in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic
to the two clans.  Thus, to pacify the people’s fears and stabilize the situation, the
President had to take preventive action.  She called out the armed forces to control the
proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that continuously
threatened the peace and security in the affected places.
 
Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of
emergency in the subject places and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence there have clearly no factual bases, the Court must respect
the President’s actions. (Ampatuan vs Puno, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011)

36. Kulayan v. Tan G.R. No. 187298, [July 3, 2012] PONENTE: SERENO, J.

DOCTRINE: The Local Government Code does not involve the diminution of central
powers inherently vested in the National Government, especially not the prerogatives
solely granted by the Constitution to the President in matters of security and defense.

FACTS: On 15 January 2009, members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) kidnapped
three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in the vicinity
of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Following the incident, Governor Tan of Sulu
organized the Sulu Crisis Management Committee, which included the forming of the
Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of armed male civilians coming from different
municipalities, who were redeployed to surrounding areas of Patikul. The organization
of the CEF was embodied in a “Memorandum of Understanding” entered into between
three parties: the provincial government of Sulu; the AFP; and the PNP. The Whereas
clauses of the Memorandum alluded to the extraordinary situation in Sulu, and the
willingness of civilian supporters of the municipal mayors to offer their services in order
that “the early and safe rescue of the hostages may be achieved.”

On 31 March 2009, Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009

(Proclamation 1-09), declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. It cited the
kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act
pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial
Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural
disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement
agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence. In the same Proclamation,
Governor Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF to set up checkpoints and chokepoints,
conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to
ensure public safety. Subsequently, a Guideline on the implementation of Proclamation
1-09 was issued which included among others suspension of all Permits to Carry
Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFORs) issued by the Chief of the PNP, and
allowed civilians to seek exemption from the gun ban only by applying to the Office of
the Governor and obtaining the appropriate identification cards. The said guidelines also
allowed general searches and seizures in designated checkpoints and chokepoints.

Petitioners, who are residents of Patikul, Sulu, filed this Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition.

Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were
issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of
the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency
powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-
in-chief of the armed forces. Additionally, petitioners claim that the Provincial Governor
is not authorized by any law to create civilian armed forces under his command, nor
regulate and limit the issuances of PTCFORs to his own private army.

Respondents deny that Proclamation 1-09 was issued ultra vires, as Governor Tan
allegedly acted pursuant to Sections 16 and 465 of the Local Government Code, which
empowers the Provincial Governor to carry out emergency measures during calamities
and disasters, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to
suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion or sedition. Furthermore, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sulu authorized the declaration of a state of emergency
as evidenced by Resolution No. 4, Series of 2009 issued on 31 March 2009 during its
regular session.

ISSUE: WON Section 465, in relation to Section 16, of the Local Government Code
authorizes the respondent governor to declare a state of emergency, and exercise the
powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09, specifically the conduct of general
searches and seizures. Subsumed herein is the secondary question of whether or not
the provincial governor is similarly clothed with authority to convene the CEF under the
said provisions.

HELD: NO. Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the commander-in-
chief of the Republic. Springing from the well-entrenched constitutional precept of One
President is the notion that there are certain acts which, by their very nature, may only
be performed by the president as the Head of the State. One of these acts or
prerogatives is the bundle of Commander-in-Chief powers to which the “calling-out”
powers constitutes a portion.

In the discussions of the Constitutional Commission regarding executive power it is

clear that the framers never intended for local chief executives to exercise unbridled
control over the police in emergency situations.

Given the foregoing, respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power to
call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation,
Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and
called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The
calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An
 exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may
not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code, as will
be discussed subsequently.

Section 465 of the Local Government Code cannot be invoked to justify the powers
enumerated under Proclamation 1-09. Respondent governor characterized the
kidnapping of the three ICRC workers as a terroristic act, and used this incident to
justify the exercise of the powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09. 56 He invokes
Section 465, in relation to Section 16, of the Local Government Code, which purportedly
allows the governor to carry out emergency measures and call upon the appropriate
national law enforcement agencies for assistance. But a closer look at the said
proclamation shows that there is no provision in the Local Government Code nor in any
law on which the broad and unwarranted powers granted to the Governor may be
based. Respondent governor has arrogated unto himself powers exceeding even the
martial law powers of the President.

Petitioners rightly assert that the implementation of “General Search and Seizure
including arrests in the pursuit of the kidnappers and their supporters,” would be
sufficient to render the proclamation void, as general searches and seizures are
proscribed, for being violative of the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights.

The Local Government Code does not involve the diminution of central powers
inherently vested in the National Government, especially not the prerogatives solely
granted by the Constitution to the President in matters of security and defense.

The intent behind the powers granted to local government units is fiscal, economic, and
administrative in nature. The Code is concerned only with powers that would make the
delivery of basic services more effective to the constituents, and should not be unduly
stretched to confer calling-out powers on local executives.

37 Villena v Secretary of Interior

Facts:

·        Secretary of Interior requested the Division of Investigation of the DOJ to conduct

inquiry into the conduct of the petitioner

·        Petitioner Jose D. Villena, Mayor of Makati, Rizal, was found to have committed
bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority and unauthorized practice of the law
profession.

·        Respondent recommended to the President of the PHL the suspension of Mayor

Villena which was granted verbally.

·        The Secretary of the Interior suspended the petitioner from office

·        Petitioner’s contentions
o   Secretary has no jurisdiction to suspend an elective official
 o   Has not power to control LGU
o   Even if the Sec has the power, it should have been in accordance with the
Administrative Code
o   Exercised an arbitrary power by converting himself into a complainant and
at the same time judge of the charges he has preferred against the
petitioner
o   The action of the respondent was not based on any sworn statement

·        Petitioner’s prayers:
o   To issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondent
o   To declare, after the hearing of this petition, that the respondent is without
authority or jurisdiction
o   To declare that the respondent has no authority to prefer charges against
the petitioner and to investigate those charges for the grant him that power
the respondent would be acting as prosecutor and judge of the case of his
own creation.

·        The respondent’s contentions:

o   the Revised Administrative Code expressly empowers the respondent as
Secretary of the Interior to "order the investigation of any act or conduct of
any person in the service of any bureau or office under his department"
and in connection therewith to "designate an official or person who shall
conduct such investigation
o   the Revised Administrative Code, invoked by the petitioner, empowers the
provincial governor to `receive and investigate complaints made under
oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption
or other form of maladministration of office', said section does not preclude
the respondent as Secretary of the Interior from exercising the power
vested in him by section 79 (C) in relation with section 86 of the Revised
Administrative Code
o   at the commencement of the investigation the petitioner did not question
the power or jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior to investigate the
administrative charges against him
o   the authority of a department head order the investigation of any act or
conduct of any person under his department necessarily carries with it by
implication the authority to take such measures as he may deem
necessary to accomplish the purpose of the investigation
o   petition does not allege facts and circumstances that would warrant the
granting of the writ of preliminary injunction under section 164 of the Code
of Civil Procedure
o   that courts of equity have no power to restrain public officers by injunction
from performing any official act which they are by law required to perform,
or acts which are not in excess of the authority and discretion reposed in
them

 
 ISSUE: WON the Secretary of the Interior has the legal authority (a) to order an
investigation, by a special investigation appointed by him, of the charges of corruption
and irregularity brought to his attention against the mayor of the municipality of Makati,
Province of Rizal, who is the petitioner herein, and (b) to decree the suspension of the
said mayor pending the investigation of the charges.

RULING: Yes. There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend
a mayor of a municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power
appears lodged in the provincial governor by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code which
provides that “The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints made
under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other
form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime
involving moral turpitude. The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly
granted by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial governor does not
mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the Interior
from exercising a similar power. For instance, counsel for the petitioner admitted in the
oral argument that the President of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner
from office in virtue of his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, as amended,
Administrative Code) to be exercised conformably to law. Indeed, if the President could,
in the manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal official, it would be a legal
incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the
incongruity would be more patent if, possessed of the power both to suspend and to
remove a provincial official (sec. 2078, Administrative Code), the President were to be
without the power to suspend a municipal official. Here is, parenthetically, an instance
where, as counsel for petitioner admitted, the power to suspend a municipal official is
not exclusive. Upon the other hand, it may be argued with some degree of plausibility
that, if the Secretary of the Interior is, as we have hereinabove concluded, empowered
to investigate the charges against the petitioner and to appoint a special investigator for
that purpose, preventive suspension may be a means by which to carry into effect a fair
and impartial investigation

            The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency which provides that “the acts of
the department secretaries, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the President, presumptively the
acts of the President.” The power to suspend may be exercised by the President. It
follows that the heads of the Department under her may also exercise the same, unless
the law required the President to act personally or that situation demanded him so,
because the heads of the departments are assistants and agents of the President.

38.  
Ang-Angco vs, Castillo (DIGEST) CONSTI LAW 1

 –
2013
G.R. No. L-17169 - November 30, 1963 -aleah-
PETITIONER: ISIDRO C. ANG-ANGCO
 
RESPONDENT: HON. NATALIO P. CASTILLO, ET AL.
 
PONENTE:
 
BAUTISTA ANGELO,
 J.:
FACTS:
1. On October 8, 1956, Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development Co., Inc. wrote
a letter to the Secretary of Commerce
and Industry requesting for special permit to withdraw 1,188 units of Pepsi-cola
concentrates from the customs
house which were imported without any dollar allocation or remittance of foreign
exchange and were not covered by
any Central Bank release certificate.
2. Failing to secure the necessary authority from the Central Bank on October
13, 1956, the counsel of the Pepsi-Cola
Far East Trade Development Co., Inc., approached Collector of Customs Isidro
Ang-Angco in an attempt to secure
from him the immediate release of the concentrates. Seeing that the importation
did not carry any release
certificate from the Central Bank, Mr. Ang-Angco advised the counsel to try to
secure the necessary release
certificate from the
No-Dollar Import Office
that had jurisdiction over the case.
 
3. Mr. Aquiles J. Lopez, from the
No-Dollar Import Office
, wrote a letter addressed to Mr. Ang-Angco, stating that his
office had no objection to the release of the 1,188 units of concentrates but that
it could not take action on the
request as "the same is not within the jurisdiction of the
No-Dollar Import Office
within the contemplation of R.A. No.
1410."
 
4. Pepsi-Cola Co. counsel showed to Mr. Ang-Angco the letter from Mr. Lopez.
But upon perusing it, Mr. Ang-Angco still
hesitated to grant the release. He suggested instead amending the letter in order
to remove the ambiguity appearing
therein, but Mr. Lopez refused to amend the letter stating that the same was
neither a permit nor a release.
 
5. Mr. Ang-Angco contacted Secretary of Finance Hernandez via telephone and
read to him the letter, to which the
Secretary verbally expressed his approval of the release on the basis of said
certificate. Collector Ang-Angco, though
still in doubt as to the propriety of the suggested action, finally authorized the
release of the concentrates upon
payment of the corresponding duties, customs charges, fees and taxes.

6. Upon knowing the release of the concentrates, Commissioner of Customs

Manuel P. Manahan immediately ordered
their seizure but only a negligible portion thereof remained in the warehouse. And
he filed an administrative
complaint against Collector of Customs Ang-Angco charging him of grave neglect of
duty and observed a conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the customs service. On the strength of this
complaint, President Ramon Magsaysay
constituted an investigating committee to investigate Ang-Angco
, resulting to the latter’s suspension.
But on April 1,
1957, Collector Ang-Angco was reinstated to his office by Secretary Hernandez.
The decision, however, on the
administrative case
against him remained pending until the death of President Magsaysay.
 
7. After around three years from the termination of the investigation during
which period Ang-Angco had already been
discharging the duties of his office, Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo, by
authority of President Garcia, rendered
a decision on the case on February 12, 1960
 finding Ang-Angco "guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of 
the service", and considering him resigned effective from the date of notice, with
prejudice to reinstatement in the
Bureau of Customs.
 
8. Upon knowing this decision from the newspapers, Collector Ang-Angco wrote
a letter to President Carlos P. Garcia
calling attention to the fact that the action taken by Secretary Castillo in
removing him from office.
 
9. Denied of his Motions, Ang-Angco filed before this Court the present
petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with a petition for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction.
The Court gave due course to the
petition, but denied the request for injunction.
 
10. The herein action of Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo as authorized by
the President was questioned by the
Petitioner:
 
That the Exec. Secretary violated Section 16 (i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959
which vests in the Commissioner of 
Civil Service the original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases
against officers and employees in the
classified service
;
 
That he deprived him of his right to appeal under Section 18 (b) of the same Act
to the Civil Service Board of Appeals
whose decision on the matter is final;
 
That he removed him from service without due process, which is in violation of
Section 32 of the same Act which
expressly provides that the removal or suspension of any officer or employee from
the civil service shall be
accomplished only after due process, and also in violations of Section 4, Article
XII of our Constitution which provides
that "No officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed except for cause
as provided for by law."
 
That since petitioner is an officer who belongs to the classified civil service and is
not a presidential appointee, but
one appointed by the Secretary of Finance under the Revised Administrative Code,
he cannot be removed from the
service by the President in utter disregard of the provisions of the Civil Service
Act of 1959.
 
11. Respondent Castillo contended that the power of control given by the
Constitution to the President over officers and
employees in the executive department can only be limited by the Constitution and
not by Congress, for to permit
Congress to do so would be to diminish the authority conferred on the President by
the Constitution which is
tantamount to amending the Constitution itself (Hebron v. Reyes, L- 9124, July 28,
1958).
 
ISSUE:
 
“Whether the President has the power to take direct action on the case of
petitioner Ang-Angco even if he
belongs to the
classified service
in spite of the provisions now in force in the Civil Service Act of 1959.

Decision
 
“ 
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that petitioner be immediately reinstated to
his office as Collector of 
Customs for the Port of Manila, without prejudice of submitting his case to the
Commissioner of Civil Service to be
dealt with in accordance with law. No costs.
” 
 
RATIO DECIDENDI:
Here, we have
two provisions of our Constitution which are apparently in conflict 
 ,
the power of control by the
President embodied in Section 10 (1), Article VII, and the protection extended to
those who are in the civil service of 
our government embodied in Section 4, Article XII. It is our duty to reconcile and
harmonize these conflicting
 provisions in a manner that may give to both full force and effect and the only
logical, practical and rational way is to
interpret them in the manner we do it in this decision. There is some point in the
argument that the Power of control 
of the President may extend to the Power to investigate, suspend or remove
officers and employees who belong to the
executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the
classified service for such can be
 justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to
appoint (Lacson V. Romero, supra),
but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified
service for as to them that inherent 
 power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution
which says that 
"the Congress may by 
law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in
the courts, or in heads of department" 
 
(Article VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution).
 
With regard to these officers whose appointments are vested on heads of
departments,
Congress has provided by 
law for a procedure for their removal precisely in view of this constitutional
authority. One such law is the Civil 
Service Act of 1959.
Thus,
“ 
the action taken by respondent Executive Secretary, even with the authority of
the President, in taking direct 
action on the administrative case of petitioner, without submitting the same to the
Commissioner of Civil Service, is
contrary to law and should be set aside.
” 
 
 
43. Bayan v. Executive Secretary, 342 SCRA 449 (2000)
 
 
BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a Junk VFA Movement, Bishop Tomas
Millamena (Iglesia Filipina Independiente), Bishop Elmer Bolocan (United Church of
Christ of the Phil.), Dr. Reynaldo Legasca, Md, Kilusang Mambubukid Ng Pilipinas,
Kilusang Mayo Uno, Gabriela, Prolabor, and The Public Interest Law Center,
petitioners, vs. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Foreign Affairs Secretary
Domingo Siazon, Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado, Brig. Gen. Alexander
Aguirre, Senate President Marcelo Fernan, Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Blas
Ople, Senator Rodolfo Biazon, And Senator Francisco Tatad, respondents.
 
 
Facts:
 On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a
Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations
in the Philippine territory by United States military personnel. In view of the
impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the
Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the
military bases agreement. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected
the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in
effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines.
On July 18, 1997, the United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel,
headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange
notes on “the complementing strategic interests of the United States and the
Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region.” Both sides discussed, among other things,
the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity).
Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was
respectively signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States
Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada,
 through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6,
1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of
Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to
Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
 
Issues (justiciable controversy): (1) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing
as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of
the VFA; (2) whether the VFA is governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article
VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution; (3) and whether or not
the Supreme Court has jurisdiction.
 
Ruling: (1) No. Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained, or are in danger
of sustaining any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As
taxpayers, petitioners have not established that the VFA involves the exercise by
Congress of its taxing or spending powers. On this point, it bears stressing that a
taxpayer’s suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the
illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.
 
(2) Yes.The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section
21, Article VII, and that the Senate extended its concurrence under the same
provision, is immaterial. For in either case, whether under Section 21, Article VII
or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline that the
concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional
requirements.
 
(3) No. In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of respondents, the Court as the final arbiter of legal controversies and staunch
sentinel of the rights of the people is then without power to conduct an incursion
and meddle with such affairs purely executive and legislative in character and
nature. For the Constitution no less, maps out the distinct boundaries and limits
the metes and bounds within which each of the three political branches of
government may exercise the powers exclusively and essentially conferred to it by
law.
 
44. Akbayan v Aquino
FACTS:
• JPEPA case.5 Diplomatic negotiations are privileged. Secrecy of on-going negotiations not violative of
Constitutional right to information (the President is the sole organ of foreign relations).
• Petitioners (non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers) filed a petition
for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from respondents Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
Undersecretary Thomas Aquino, et al. the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership
Agreement (JPEPA)6 including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation
process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.
• Background:
o On January 2005, Cong. Tañada and Aguja filed House Resolution No. 551 calling for an inquiry into
the JPEPA, then being negotiated by the PH government.
§ In the course of its inquiry, the House Special Committee on Globalization requested herein
respondent
Usec. Aquino to furnish the Committee with a copy of the latest draft of the JPEPA.
§ However, Usec. Aquino did not heed the request.
o The same request was again made by Congressman Aguja, but Usec. Aquino replied that a copy will
be provided only after negotiations have been completed.
o In a separate move, the House Committee requested Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita to furnish
it with “all
documents on the subject including the latest draft of the proposed agreement, the requests and offers
etc.
o Secretary Ermita replied that it has been a work in progress for three years and a copy will be goven
once the
negotiations are complete.
o Congressman Aguja also requested NEDA Director-General Neri and Tariff Commission Chairman
Abon for
copies of the JPEPA.
o Chairman Abon replied, however, that the Tariff Commission does not have a copy of the documents
being
requested.
o In its third hearing, the House Committee was supposed to issue a subpoena for the most recent draft
of the
JPEPA, but the same was not pursued because by Committee Chairman Congressman Teves’
information, then
House Speaker Jose de Venecia had requested him to hold in abeyance the issuance of the subpoena
until the
President gives her consent to the disclosure of the documents.
o Then the present petition was filed on December 9, 2005.
• JPEPA was signed on September 9, 2006 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Japanese Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi in Helsinki, Finland, following which the President endorsed it to the
Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution.
• The final text of JPEPA was made accessible to the public on September 11, 2006.
• To date (July 16, 2008), the JPEPA is still being deliberated upon by the Senate.
• This Petition is brought with the following contentions:
o The refusal of the government to disclose the said agreement violates their right to information on
matters of
public concern and of public interest.
o The non-disclosure of the same documents undermines their right to effective and reasonable
participation in all levels of social, political and economic decision-making.
o Divulging the contents of the JPEPA only after the agreement has been concluded will effectively
make the Senate into a mere rubber stamp of the Executive, in violation of the principle of separation
of powers.

ISSUES/HELD:
Is the petition moot and academic? Not entirely.
• SC ruled that the principal relief is the disclosure of the contents of the JPEPA prior to its finalization
between two State parties. Although it has been largely moot because the JPEPA has already been
made accessible to the public, it is still not moot as to the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course
of the negotiations.

Do petitioners have standing? Yes, because it is based on the right of the people on
matters of public concern.
• It is sufficient to show that they are citizens and, therefore, part of the general public which possesses
the right
• Legaspi vs Civil Service Comission - it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether
the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
• From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine
and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public
concern.
• Respondents only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by executive privilege, thus
constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure.

Are the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA covered by
the doctrine of executive privilege? -YES 
• The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction:
o Chavez v. PCGG: “information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and
executive
agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest.”
o PMPF v. Manglapus – petitioners therein were President’s representatives on the state of the then
on-going
negotiations of the RP- US Military Bases Agreement.
§ The Court denied the petition, stressing that “secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not
violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of
access to information.” The Resolution went on to state, thus:
• The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of authority and expedition of decision which are
inherent in executive action. Another essential characteristic of diplomacy is its confidential nature.
• Delegates from other countries come and tell you in confidence of their troubles at home and of their
differences with other countries and with other delegates; they tell you of what they would do under
certain circumstances and would not do under other circumstances … If these reports … should
become public … who would ever trust American Delegations in another conference? (United States
Department of State, Press Releases, June 7, 1930, pp. 282-284.)
§ Court adopted the doctrine in U.S. v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp. that the President is the sole organ
of the nation in its negotiations with foreign countries, viz:
• The President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.
• He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates.
• Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.
• As Marshall said, “The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign nations.”
• Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the
JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential – since there should be “ample opportunity for
discussion before [a treaty] is approved” – the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations
continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. 
o It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the
understanding that “historic confidentiality” would govern the same.
§ Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with
other foreign governments in future negotiations.
o A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should now be open to public scrutiny would
discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations.
o While it appears wise to deter PH representatives from entering into compromises, it bears noting
that treaty
negotiations, or any negotiation for that matter, normally involve a process of quid pro quo, and
oftentimes
negotiators have to be willing to grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain
more
favorable terms in an area of greater national interest.
• Indeed, by hampering the ability of our representatives to compromise, we may be jeopardizing
higher national goals for the sake of securing less critical ones.
o Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA
negotiations
constituting no exception.
o It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds,
recognizing
a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances.
o Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a
public
interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its
traditionally
privileged status.
• Communications can be privileged even if they don’t involve national security
o Examples: “Informer’s privilege” – privilege of the Gov not to disclose identity of a person or persons
who furnish info of law violations to law enforcers. The suspect involved need not be so notorious as to
be a threat to national  security for privilege to apply.
o “presidential communications” which are presumed privileged without distinguishing between those
which
involve matters of national security and those which do not. Privileged because “frank exchange of
exploratory
ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to
protect
the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial
power.”
• Closely related to pres. comms privilege is the “deliberative process privilege,” which covers
documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a
process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.
o The privileged status of such documents rests, not on the need to protect national security but, on the
obvious
realization that officials will not communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential
item of
discovery and front page news, the objective of the privilege being to enhance the quality of agency
decisions.
o The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative process and
presidential
communications privilege.
§ The privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations follows as a logical consequence from the
privileged
character of the deliberative process.
§ Fullbright case: “Exposure of the pre-agreement positions of the French negotiators might well
offend
foreign governments and would lead to less candor by the U.S. in recording the events of the
negotiations process.
§ xxx Finally, releasing these snapshot views of the negotiations would be comparable to
releasing drafts of the treaty, particularly when the notes state the tentative provisions and language
agreed on. As drafts of regulations typically are protected by the deliberative process privilege, drafts
of treaties should be accorded the same protection.”
o Since, in this jurisdiction, there is no counterpart of the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, nor is there
any statutory requirement similar to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Exemption 5 in particular7,
Philippine courts, when assessing a claim of privilege for diplomatic negotiations, are more free to
focus directly on the issue of whether the privilege being claimed is indeed supported by public policy,
without having to consider if these negotiations  fulfill a formal requirement of being “inter-agency.”
• The privileged character accorded to diplomatic negotiations does not ipso facto lose all force and
effect simply because the same privilege is now being claimed under different circumstances –
o The privilege for diplomatic negotiations may be invoked not only against citizens’ demands for
information,
but also in the context of legislative investigations;
o It is the President alone who negotiates treaties, and not even the Senate or the House of
Representatives, unless asked, may intrude upon that process.

Does the privilege apply only at certain stages of the negotiation process? – No.
• The duty to disclose “definite propositions of the government” does not apply to diplomatic
negotiations such as JPEPA.
• In Chavez v. PEA and Chavez v. PCGG, the SC held that: the constitutional right to information
includes official
information on on-going negotiations before a final contract.
• The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not
cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar
matters affecting national security and public order.
• It follows from this ruling that even definite propositions of the government may not be disclosed if
they fall under “recognized exceptions.” The privilege for diplomatic negotiations is clearly among the
recognized exceptions.

Is there sufficient public interest to overcome the claim of privilege? –No.

• The standard to be employed in determining whether there is a sufficient public interest in favor of
disclosure is the strong and “sufficient showing of need.”
• Arguments of the petitioners fail to establish their entitlement to the subject documents.