Case: 61CI1:19-cv-00282-a Document #: 26 Filed: 01/10/2020 Page 1 of 7

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RANKIN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI

LAKEBEND HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION

a/k/a LAKEBEND PROPERTY OWNERS
ASSOCIATION Civil Action No.1:19-cv-00282-A

Plaintiff,
v.

RIDGWAY, LANE & ASSOCIATES, INC.,

DAVID L. LANE, DAVID W. LANE, AND JOHN
DOE DEFENDANTS NOS. 1 - 10

Defendants.

-and-

BRIDGEWATER OWNERS ASSOCIATION,

INC., BRIDGEWATER II OWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., DINSMOR PROPERTY
ASSOCIATION, INC., AND PALISADES
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.

Interested Parties and Putative

Intervenors.

JOINT MOTION OF BRIDGEWATER OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,

BRIDGEWATER II OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., DINSMOR PROPERTY
ASSOCIATION, INC., AND PALISADES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. TO
INTERVENE FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF FILING MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 24, Bridgewater Owners Association,

Inc. (“BOA”), Bridgewater II Owner’s Association, Inc. (“BOA II”), Dinsmor Property

Association, Inc. (“Dinsmor”), and Palisades Homeowners Association, Inc. (“Palisades”)

(collectively, “Intervenors”) jointly move this Court to intervene for the limited purpose of filing

a motion to set aside a default judgment. In support thereof, Intervenors state as follows:
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1. On November 6, 2019, BOA filed suit against Ridgway, Lane & Associates, Inc.

(“Ridgway Lane”), David L. Lane (“David Lane”), and David W. Lane (“David W. Lane”)

(collectively, “Defendants”) alleging, inter alia, that Defendants converted or misappropriated at

least $500,000 that was held in accounts at Community Bank in trust for the benefit of BOA.

See BOA v. Ridgway Lane, et al., 1:19-cv-272-A (Rankin Cnty. Cir. Ct.).

2. On November 8, 2019, BOA II filed suit against Ridgway Lane and David Lane

alleging, inter alia, that they converted or misappropriated at least $343,000 that was held in

accounts at Community Bank in trust for the benefit of BOA II. See BOA II v. Ridgway Lane, et

al., 1:19-cv-276-A (Rankin Cnty. Cir. Ct.).

3. On November 14, 2019, Dinsmor filed suit against Ridgway Lane and David

Lane alleging, inter alia, that they converted or misappropriated at least $216,000 that was held

in accounts at Community Bank in trust for the benefit of Dinsmor. See Dinsmor v. Ridgway

Lane, et al., 1:19-cv-283-A (Rankin Cnty. Cir. Ct.)

4. On November 22, 2019, Palisades filed suit against Defendants alleging, inter

alia, that Defendants converted or misappropriated at least $87,000 that was held in accounts at

Community Bank in trust for the benefit of Palisades. See Palisades v. Ridgway Lane, et al.,

1:19-cv-291-A (Rankin Cnty. Cir. Ct.).

5. BOA and BOA II—the first two plaintiffs to file complaints against Defendants—

have taken extraordinary action to preserve Defendants’ assets so they and other aggrieved

homeowners’ associations in the area can maximize recovery on what appears to be a $2.5

million aggregate loss.

6. For instance, BOA and BOA II each obtained a temporary restraining order

(“TRO”) against Defendants to prevent dissipation of assets. See, e.g., TRO, 1:19-cv-276-A

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(Nov. 12, 2019) [MEC No. 14]. That TRO was twice extended. See, e.g., First Modified TRO,

1:19-cv-276-A (Nov. 19, 2019) [MEC No. 18]; Second Modified TRO, 1:19-cv-276-A (Nov. 27,

2019) [MEC No. 19].

7. BOA’s and BOA II’s joint efforts proved effective and necessary. For instance,

on November 12, 2019, David W. Lane transferred his principal residence to his wife by

quitclaim deed, presumably to protect his assets from a future judgment. Further, BOA’s and

BOA II’s TROs prevented David Lane from accessing funds—which include funds possibly

stolen from homeowners’ associations or comingled with associations’ funds—from local bank

accounts.

8. On December 12, 2019, BOA and BOA II obtained a preliminary injunction to

preserve Defendants’ assets and maintain the status quo until the litigation is ultimately resolved.

See, e.g., Preliminary Injunction Order, 1:19-cv-276-A (Dec. 12, 2019) [MEC No. 24].

9. To date, 11 homeowners’ associations have sued Defendants for conversion or

misappropriation of association funds, among other things. All these associations, Lakebend

included, have directly benefited from BOA’s and BOA II’s joint efforts—undertaken

early, with alacrity, and at significant expense—to prevent dissipation of Defendants’ assets

and preserve them for the benefit of all.

10. Additionally, and in connection with their preliminary injunctive relief, BOA and

BOA II have received sworn statements from David Lane and David W. Lane that disclose the

identity and value of assets that may be used to satisfy judgments. Roughly speaking, such

assets appear to have a combined value of a few hundred thousand dollars, only a fraction of the

associations’ aggregate loss.

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11. On December 20, 2019, Lakebend Homeowners Association (“Lakebend”)

obtained default judgments against Defendants in the amount of $1,238,500. [MEC No. 19]

Both David Lane and David W. Lane have since answered and have filed motions to set aside the

default judgment, but Lakebend is contesting the Lanes’ motion. [MEC Nos. 21 – 25]

12. Intervenors do not know why or how Defendants failed to answer Lakebend’s

complaint within the allotted time, particularly because Defendants appear to have timely

answered every other complaint with which they have been served and have defended BOA’s

and BOA II’s efforts to obtain preliminary injunctive relief.

13. Whatever the cause, be it excusable neglect or otherwise, Intevenors (and all other

homeowners’ associations injured by Defendants’ conduct) risk aggravated injury if Lakebend’s

default judgment is not set aside.

14. Defendants do not have the assets to satisfy a $1,238,500 judgment. But this

much is clear: even partial satisfaction of that judgment—which includes a $1,000,000 punitive

award—would leave Intervenors without any hope of recovery or even partial recovery from

Defendants.

15. Intervenors would be severely prejudiced if not permitted the opportunity to

intervene and move this Court to set aside the default judgment. To be sure, it would be unjust

and inequitable for Lakebend’s default judgment to foreclose Intervenors’ opportunity to recover

even a fraction of their losses from Defendants, particularly and especially because Defendants

fortuitously failed to timely respond to Lakebend’s complaint.

16. Intervenors have an unqualified right to intervene. Mississippi Rule of Civil

Procedure 24(a)(2) (Intervention of Right) states:

Upon timely application, anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action:

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When the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which
is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action
may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest,
unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.

17. Intervention should be permitted when the putative intervenor’s “interest would

be prejudiced substantially if [a] judgment against [a party] remained final.” Guaranty Nat. Ins.

Co. v. Pittman, 501 So. 2d 377, 383 (Miss. 1987).

18. When “the potential for prejudice to [the intervenor] [i]s sufficiently great at the

time the motion for leave to intervene [i]s filed,” the “motion should…be[] granted.” Id.

19. For intervention under Rule 24, “[a]ll that is necessary is that [the intervenor]

establish an interest in the rights that are at issue in the litigation.” Id. at 384.

20. Further, intervention should be allowed by “those who might, in a practical sense,

be disadvantaged by the disposition of the action.” Id.

21. Courts should give “the benefit of the doubt to the one seeking intervention,

particularly where intervention of right under Rule 24(a)(2) is claimed.” Id. at 385; see also id.

at 386 (circuit court abused its discretion by denying intervention for the purpose of moving to

set aside a default judgment).

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Intervenors respectfully request this Court

permit them to intervene in this action for the limited purpose of filing a motion to set aside

Lakebend’s default judgment against Defendants.

* * * *

This, the 10th day of January, 2020.

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Respectfully submitted,

BRIDGEWATER II OWNERS BRIDGEWATER OWNERS

ASSOCIATION, INC. ASSOCIATION, INC.

DINSMOR PROPERTY ASSOCIATION, PALISADES HOMEOWNERS

INC. ASSOCIATION, INC.

By: /s/ Chadwick M. Welch ___________ By: /s/ Roy H. Liddell____________

Chadwick M. Welch (MSB No. 105588) Roy H. Liddell (MSB No. 1252)
Their Attorney Their Attorney

OF COUNSEL: OF COUNSEL:

C. Maison Heidelberg (MSB# 9559) Roy H. Liddell (MSB# 1252)

Chadwick M. Welch (MSB# 105588) Wells Marble & Hurst
WATSON HEIDELBERG PLLC 300 Concourse Blvd., Suite 200
2829 Lakeland Drive, Suite 1502 Ridgeland, Mississippi 39157
Flowood, Mississippi 39232 Telephone: (601)-605-6900
Telephone: (601) 939-8900 Facsimile: (601)-605-6901
Facsimile: (601) 932-4400 Email: [email protected]
Email: [email protected]
[email protected]

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Certificate of Service

I, Chadwick M. Welch, do hereby certify that I have this day caused a copy of the

foregoing Joint Motion of Bridgewater Owners Association, Inc., Bridgewater II Owners

Association, Inc., Dinsmor Property Association, Inc., and Palisades Homeowners Association,

Inc. to Intervene for the Limited Purpose of Filing Motions to Set Aside Default Judgment to be

filed with the Clerk of Court on the MEC System, which caused notification to be delivered to all

counsel of record.

Dated: January 10, 2020 /s/ Chadwick M. Welch

Chadwick M. Welch

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RANKIN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI

LAKEBEND HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION

a/k/a LAKEBEND PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION PLAINTIFF

v. CAUSE NO: 19-282

RIDGWAY, LANE & ASSOCIATES, INC.,

DAVID L. LANE, DAVID W. LANE,
AND JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS 1 - 10 DEFENDANTS

RESPONSE TO MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT

(Motions Docketed as 20 and 24)

COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Lakebend Homeowners Association by and through counsel, and

Responds to the Defendants Motions to Set Aside Default (docket number 20 and 24), to wit:

The Default Judgment was entered against the Defendants Ridgeway, Lane & Associates,

David L. Lane, and David W. Lane, were properly taken, now each of the defendants seeks to set

aside the default against each, yet each of the defendants sit differently in their failure to respond

to the Complaint.

David W. Lane

Counsel for David W. Lane, (the son) argues, to his credit, that he spoke with the below

signed counsel prior to the entry of the default judgment and that such communication manifested

an intention to respond. (Though the reliance on BB Buggies, Inc. v. Leon, 150 So. 3d 90 (2014)

is misplaced, as discussed below).

Admittedly a phone call was had between counsel, during which time Counsel for David

W. Lane, (the son) did express that his client claims to have had no knowledge of the massive

scheme to steal from this Plaintiff, or from others, but rather that the theft was committed by David

L. Lane, (the father), and that David L. Lane would be accepting responsibility for his terrible

betrayal of the trust that so many had placed in him. During that call the below signed counsel
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also inquired about insurance and other sources which may be available to satisfy any judgement

against the defendants. Counsel for the Defendant expressed that they were presently not aware

of any insurance. At no time during that conversation was the question of default, or extension,

raised by either party.

The only logical inferences that were drawn from that call between Counsel were that the

father would not actually be presenting a defense, and that if money was being spent by any party

to defend against the criminal acts, it was money already stolen from the Plaintiff and others.

That being said, with regard to David W. Lane (the son), the Plaintiff takes the position

that if he is now pleading that he has a colorable defense, then this matter of setting aside the

default should be left to the sound discretion of the Court.

David L Lane, (the father), and Ridgeway Lane & Associates

However, with regard to Defendants David L Lane, (the father), and Ridgeway Lane &

Associates, the Plaintiff is of the position that setting aside the Judgment is not reasonable under

the circumstances. While pursuant to Mississippi Rules 55 and 60(b), a default judgement may be

set aside as a result of accident and/or mistake, in these circumstances the course of conduct of

embezzling funds took place for decades, and default after admission of that crime does not justify

setting aside the default.

Mississippi Courts typically uses a three prong analysis when considering setting aside a

default, and analyze “(1) the nature and legitimacy of the defendant's reasons for his default, i.e.,

whether the defendant has good cause for default, (2) whether [the] defendant in fact has a

colorable defense to the merits of the claim, and (3) the nature and extent of prejudice which may

be suffered by the plaintiff if the default judgment is set aside.” Emery v. Greater Greenville Hous.

& Revitalization Ass'n, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 15 (2019).

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1. The reasons for allowing the default are not compelling. It is suggested that Defendant

was ill and somehow this illness prevented him from responding, while simultaneously

arguing that they were represented and were responding to other suits. Clearly, these

Defendants illness did not preclude participation in litigation, and there is no good

cause for failing to answer.

2. Colorable defense is the most important element to be demonstrated by a defendant

seeking to set aside a default. (See BB Buggies, Inc. v. Leon, 150 So. 3d 90 (2014)).

And while affidavits are no longer needed to demonstrate a colorable defense, more

than a “wing and a prayer” is required. These Defendants have offered no colorable

defense to the long running scheme of stealing the money they were entrusted to

protect. In fact, the only information given to these Plaintiffs is that David L Lane, (the

father), and Ridgeway Lane & Associates, have admitted the wrongdoing.

3. Nature and Extent of Prejudice. With the operations of the business shut down, and no

apparent insurance, collection of this embezzled money by this Plaintiff will only be

made more difficult with time, and the defendants squander, hide, and spend any

remaining wealth. Further, if the claim of Defendant illness is of merit, then there is

concern that such illness will make it impossible for the Defendant to satisfy judgment,

assuming there is no imprisonment.

Where David L Lane, (the father), and Ridgeway Lane & Associates’ only possible reason

to attempt to set aside the Judgment is to delay recovery of funds belonging to the Plaintiffs, which

are surely being spent to further support the country club life style of David L. Lane, it will operate

continuing and extreme prejudice to set aside the default judgment.

Finally, relying on BB Buggies, Inc. v. Leon, 150 So. 3d 90 (2014), the Defendants argue

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that they did not have notice under the relaxed appearance standards of Rule 55(b), because the

appeared in other matters which this Plaintiff is not a party. However, this argument is misplaced,

as the court in BB Buggies actually found that the party did not manifest a clear intent to the

Plaintiff the intent to appear. The Court in BB Buggies stated “The one phone call and one email

from the Textron Parties' Louisiana attorney, who did not represent them in the Mississippi case,

did not indicate a clear intent to defend and did not constitute an appearance for Rule 55(b)

purposes. In the precedent cases in which the courts found that the parties had appeared for Rule

55(b) purposes, the attorneys had extended conversations, exchanged multiple letters, discussed

the need for more time to answer, or the parties actually filed something with the court.” Id at 100.

(See also Kumar v. Loper, 80 So. 3d 808, 813-14 (Miss. 2012) (letter sent before case was filed

and one phone call from former attorney did not constitute an appearance); American States Ins.

Co. v. Rogillio, 10 So. 3d 463 (Miss. 2009). (one phone conversation between insurance company's

claims specialist and plaintiff's attorney, the content of which was disputed, did not constitute an

appearance); Williams v. Kelly, 872 So. 2d 783, 785-86 (¶¶ 11-14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004)

(defendant had not appeared for Rule 55(b) purposes even though he attended a deposition

pursuant to a subpoena prior to being named as a party in the case, and even though his attorney

attempted to contact plaintiff's attorney).

There was no communication between parties indicating an intent to appear, and as such

the default was reasonably taken.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Plaintiff prays that the motions be

dismissed, and for such other relief as just and reasonable.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the 7th day of January, 2020.

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LAKEBEND HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION

a/k/a LAKEBEND PROPERTY OWNERS
ASSOCIATION, PLAINTIFF

BY: /s/ Michael J. Wolf

MICHAEL J. WOLF

OF COUNSEL:

MICHAEL J. WOLF – (MSB# 99406)

RESNICK & LOUIS, P.C.
101 Highpointe Court, Suite C
Brandon, MS 39042
Telephone: (601) 213-9636
Direct Tel/Fax: (601) 371-3939
Email: [email protected]

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that I filed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document

to the Clerk of Court using the MEC electronic filing system which sent notification to all counsel

of record.

This the 7th day of January, 2020.

__/s/ Michael J. Wolf__________

MICHAEL J. WOLF

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RANKIN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI

LAKEBEND HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION PLAINTIFF

a/k/a LAKEBEND PROPERTY OWNERS
ASSOCIATION

V. CAUSE NO. 19-282

RIDGWAY, LANE & ASSOCIATES, INC.,

DAVID L. LANE, DAVID W. LANE AND JOHN DOE
DEFENDANTS 1 THROUGH 10 DEFENDANTS

MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT

JUDGMENT AND FOR OTHER RELIEF

COMES NOW Defendants, David L. Lane and Ridgway, Lane & Associates, Inc., by and

through counsel, and file this their Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and For Other Relief,

and in support thereof would show unto the Court the following:

I.

Rule 55(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

For good cause shown, the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment
by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).

David L. Lane and Ridgway, Lane & Associates, Inc. would show that good cause exists to set

aside the Docket Entry of Default [Doc. No. 16] and the Default Judgment [Doc. No. 19].

II.

Specifically, David L. Lane and Ridgway, Lane & Associates, Inc. would show that said

Docket of Entry of Default [Doc. No. 16] and the Default Judgment [Doc. No. 19] should be set

aside pursuant to Miss. R. Civ. P. 55 and Miss. R. Civ. P 60(b) (1)(2)(4) and (6). David L. Lane

and Ridgway, Lane & Associates, Inc. would show that said default judgment is based upon

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Plaintiff’s accident and/or mistake, and that but for such, the Default Judgment would not have

been entered. Mr. Lane will proffer in camera or offer under a sealed record, his serious and

permanent medical problems that have affected his memory and judgements at times.

David L. Lane and Ridgway, Lane & Associates, Inc. would further show that David W.

Lane’s counsel spoke with Plaintiff’s counsel prior to the entry of default. David W. Lane’s

counsel manifested to Plaintiff’s counsel a clear intent to defend Plaintiff against the alleged

claims. Additionally, the news was replete with notice that David L. Lane and Ridgeway Lane &

Associates, Inc., were represented by Merrida Coxwell, and that answers had been filed by him in

similar civil actions. As such, Plaintiff’s counsel had notice that David L. Lane and Ridgway,

Lane & Associates, Inc. appeared for Rule 55(b) purposes. BB Buggies, Inc. v. Leon, 150 So.3d

90, 99 (Miss. 2014). It is certainly a well-known custom and professional courtesy in these types

of cases to call an attorney who might be counsel for another before taking a Default Judgement.

David L. Lane and Ridgway, Lane & Associates, Inc. would further show that they have a

colorable defense to the claims brought by Plaintiff, and Plaintiff would not be prejudiced if the

Default Judgment is vacated. Additionally, Defendants would show that, pursuant to Rule

60(b)(6), other reasons justify relief from the judgment, including serious and permanent health

conditions affecting Mr. David L. Lane.

III.

In the alternative, David L. Lane and Ridgway, Lane & Associates, Inc. respectfully

requests that this Court rescind its Default Judgment and grant a full hearing so they may be given

the opportunity to properly defend themselves.

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WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendant, David L. Lane and Ridgway,

Lane & Associates, Inc. respectfully requests that this Honorable Court receive and file their

Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and For Other Relief and, upon a hearing on said motion,

set aside the Default Judgment and grant any other relief allowed by law.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the 26th day of December 2019.

DAVID L. LANE and RIDGWAY, LANE &

ASSOCIATES, INC.

/s/ Mérrida (Buddy) Coxwell

Attorney for David L. Lane and
Ridgway, Lane & Associates, Inc.

MÉRRIDA (BUDDY) COXWELL (MB# 7782)

COXWELL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
Post Office Box 1337
Jackson, Mississippi 39215-1337
Telephone: (601) 948-1600

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Mérrida (Buddy) Coxwell, attorney for Defendant, David L. Lane and Ridgway, Lane &
Associates, Inc., do hereby certify that I have this day filed with the clerk of court, via the MEC
system, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment
And for Other Relief, which sent electronic notification of such filing to all counsel of record.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the 26th day of December 2019.

/s/ Mérrida (Buddy) Coxwell

MÉRRIDA (BUDDY) COXWELL

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RANKIN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI

LAKEBEND HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION PLAINTIFF

a/k/a LAKEBEND PROPERTY OWNERS
ASSOCIATION

V. CAUSE NO. 19-282

RIDGWAY, LANE & ASSOCIATES, INC.,

DAVID L. LANE, DAVID W. LANE AND JOHN DOE
DEFENDANTS 1 THROUGH 10 DEFENDANTS

ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

COMES NOW Defendant, David W. Lane, and files this his Answer and

Affirmative Defenses in response to Plaintiff=s Complaint, and in support thereof, would

show the following:

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

David W. Lane affirmatively asserts all defenses available under Rules 8 and 12 of

the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure and reserves the right to assert additional defenses

as discovery progresses.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The assessment of punitive damages, if any, violates David W. Lane=s

constitutional rights under Article I, ' 8 and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and the United States

Supreme Court=s decisions in Pacific Mutual Ins. Co. v. Haslip, State Farm Mut. Auto

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Ins. Co. v. Campbell, and BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, and the Mississippi

Constitution.

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

David W. Lane would affirmatively show that at all times complained of herein,

he, along with several others, was solely an employee of Ridgway Lane, was never a

stockholder or principal of Ridgway Lane, never entered into a contract with the Plaintiff,

and never made or participated in business decisions or negotiated with Plaintiff, and that

all actions taken by him were pursuant to instructions from his superiors and that all

funds or other remunerations received by him were solely from his employer, Ridgway

Lane.

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

David W. Lane affirmatively asserts his constitutional rights, including but not

limited to his 5th Amendment rights against self-incrimination. David W. Lane

specifically reserves said rights and does not waive his 5th Amendment rights in this

action or any other civil or criminal action by this Answer.

ANSWER

Without waiving his 5th Amendment rights and all other constitutional rights

David W. Lane now responds to Plaintiff=s Complaint, as follows:

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1. David W. Lane is without sufficient knowledge or information to confirm

or deny the allegations of Paragraph 1 of the Complaint.

2. Paragraph 2 of Plaintiff=s Complaint contains allegations against a

defendant other than David W. Lane, which requires no response from David W. Lane.

To the extent that a response is required, David W. Lane denies such allegations.

3. Paragraph 3 of the Complaint contains allegations against a defendant other

than David W. Lane, which requires no response from David W. Lane. To the extent

that a response is required, David W. Lane denies such allegations.

4. David W. Lane admits the allegations of Paragraph 4 of the Complaint.

5. Paragraph 5 of the Complaint contains allegations against fictitious

defendants, which requires no response from David W. Lane. To the extent that a

response is required, David W. Lane denies such allegations.

6. David W. Lane does not dispute jurisdiction but denies any wrongdoing or

that any alleged duty to the Plaintiffs have been breached.

7. David W. Lane does not dispute venue but denies any wrongdoing or that

any alleged duty to the Plaintiffs have been breached.

8-26. David W. Lane denies the allegations made in paragraphs 8-26 of the

Complaint.

27-30. David W. Lane denies the allegations made in paragraphs 27-30 of the

Complaint.

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31-33. David W. Lane denies the allegations made in paragraphs 31-33 of the

Complaint.

34-38. David W. Lane denies the allegations made in paragraphs 34-38 of the

Complaint.

39-43. David W. Lane denies the allegations made in paragraphs 39-43 of the

Complaint.

44-49. David W. Lane denies the allegations made in paragraphs 44-49 of the

Complaint.

50-54. David W. Lane denies the allegations made in paragraphs 50-54 of the

Complaint.

55-59. David W. Lane denies the allegations made in paragraphs 55-59 of the

Complaint.

60-62. David W. Lane denies the allegations made in paragraphs 60-62 of the

Complaint.

63-67. David W. Lane denies the allegations made in paragraphs 63-67 of the

Complaint.

68-71. David W. Lane denies the allegations made in paragraphs 68-71 of the

Complaint.

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David W. Lane denies all the allegations in the un-numbered Paragraph following

Paragraph 71 of the Complaint, beginning, AACCORDINGLY,@ and further denies the

un-numbered paragraphs A. through E. and specifically denies that Plaintiff is entitled to

any of the requested relief or any relief whatsoever.

WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, David W. Lane respectfully requests

that this, his Answer and Affirmative Defenses be received and filed, that the Court would

deny Plaintiff any relief as requested in Plaintiff=s Complaint, and that the Court will

dismiss said Complaint with prejudice.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this the 23rd day of December, 2019.

DAVID W. LANE

By:/s/ Michael J. Malouf, Jr.

Attorney for David W. Lane

MICHAEL J. MALOUF, JR., ESQ.

MSB NO. 10466
Malouf & Malouf
501 E. Capitol Street
Jackson, MS 39201
(601) 948-4320
[email protected]

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Michael J. Malouf, Jr., attorney for David W. Lane, hereby certify that I have
this day filed with the clerk of court, via the MEC system, a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing Answer and Affirmative Defenses which sent electronic notification
of such filing to all counsel of record.
DATED this the 23rd day of December, 2019.

/s/ Michael J. Malouf, Jr.

Michael J. Malouf, Jr.

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 Case: 61CI1:19-cv-00282-a Document #: 20 Filed: 12/23/2019 Page 1 of 3

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RANKIN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI

LAKEBEND HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION PLAINTIFF

a/k/a LAKEBEND PROPERTY OWNERS
ASSOCIATION

V. CAUSE NO. 19-282

RIDGWAY, LANE & ASSOCIATES, INC.,

DAVID L. LANE, DAVID W. LANE AND JOHN DOE
DEFENDANTS 1 THROUGH 10 DEFENDANTS

MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT

JUDGMENT AND FOR OTHER RELIEF

COMES NOW Defendant, David W. Lane, by and through counsel, and file this his

Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and For Other Relief, and in support thereof would show

unto the Court the following:

I.

Rule 55(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

For good cause shown, the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance
with Rule 60(b).

David W. Lane would show that good cause exists to set aside the Docket Entry of Default [Doc.

No. 16] and the Default Judgment [Doc. No. 19].

II.

Specifically, David W. Lane would show that said Docket of Entry of Default [Doc. No.

16] and the Default Judgment [Doc. No. 19] should be set aside pursuant to Miss. R. Civ. P. 55

and Miss. R. Civ. P 60(b) (1)(2)(4) and (6). David W. Lane would show that said default

judgment is based upon Plaintiff’s misrepresentations, accident and/or mistake, and that but for

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such, the Default Judgment would not have been entered. David W. Lane would further show

that his counsel spoke with Plaintiff’s counsel prior to the entry of default, during which David

W. Lane’s counsel manifested to Plaintiff’s counsel a clear intent to defend Plaintiff against the

alleged claims. As such, David W. Lane appeared for Rule 55(b) purposes. BB Buggies, Inc. v.

Leon, 150 So.3d 90, 99 (Miss. 2014). David W. Lane would further show that he has a

colorable defense to the claims brought by Plaintiff, and Plaintiff would not be prejudiced if the

Default Judgment is vacated. Additionally, David W. Lane would show that, pursuant to Rule

60(b)(6), other reasons justify relief from the judgment.

III.

In the alternative, David W. Lane respectfully requests that this Court rescind its Default

Judgment, and grant a full hearing so he may be given the opportunity to properly defend

himself.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendant, David W. Lane, respectfully

requests that this Honorable Court receive and file his Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and

For Other Relief and, upon a hearing on said motion, set aside the Default Judgment and grant

any other relief allowed by law.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the 23rd day of December, 2019.

DAVID W. LANE

/s/ Michael J. Malouf, Jr.

Attorney for David W. Lane

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MICHAEL J. MALOUF, JR., ESQ.

MSB NO. 10466
Malouf and Malouf
501 E. Capitol Street
Jackson, MS 39201
(601) 948-4320
[email protected]

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Michael J. Malouf, Jr., attorney for Defendant, David W. Lane, do hereby certify that I
have this day filed with the clerk of court, via the MEC system, a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment And for Other Relief, which sent
electronic notification of such filing to all counsel of record.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the 23rd day of December, 2019.

/s/ Michael J. Malouf, Jr.

Michael J. Malouf, Jr.

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 Case: 61CI1:19-cv-00282-a Document #: 17 Filed: 12/17/2019 Page 1 of 2

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RANKIN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI

LAKEBEND HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION

a/k/a LAKEBEND PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION PLAINTIFF

v. CAUSE NO: 19-282

RIDGWAY, LANE & ASSOCIATES, INC.,

DAVID L. LANE, DAVID W. LANE,
AND JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS 1 - 10 DEFENDANTS

MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Lakebend Homeowners Association a/k/a Lakebend Property

Owners Association, by and through counsel, and moves the Court for Judgment by default and in

support of said Motion would show unto the Court that the Defendants, Ridgway Lane &

Associates, Inc., David L. Lane and David W. Lane, were served with process on November 15,

2019 and that more than thirty (30) days have expired since the date of said service, and the

Defendants made neither answer nor defense and are wholly in default.

1. On December 17, 2019, the Clerk of the Court entered default as against these

Defendants. Judgment is now sought against these Defendants and each of them in an amount of

Two Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars and 00/100 ($235,000.00), plus punitive damages in

the amount of One Million Dollars and 00/100 ($1,000,000.00), and attorneys fees and costs in an

amount of Three Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and 00/100 ($3,500.00).

2. The Plaintiff requests that a hearing be held at the earlies opportunity pursuant to

MRCP Rule 55(b), and that a judgment be entered in the amount of One Million Two Hundred

Thirty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and 00/100 ($1,238,500.00).

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Plaintiff prays judgment in the amount

of One Million Two Hundred Thirty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and 00/100
 Case: 61CI1:19-cv-00282-a Document #: 17 Filed: 12/17/2019 Page 2 of 2

($1,238,500.00) be entered against the Defendants, Ridgway Lane & Associates, Inc., David L.

Lane and David W. Lane

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the 17th day of December, 2019.

LAKEBEND HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION

a/k/a LAKEBEND PROPERTY OWNERS
ASSOCIATION, PLAINTIFF

BY: /s/ Michael J. Wolf

MICHAEL J. WOLF

OF COUNSEL:

MICHAEL J. WOLF – (MSB# 99406)

RESNICK & LOUIS, P.C.
101 Highpointe Court, Suite C
Brandon, MS 39042
Telephone: (601) 213-9636
Direct Tel/Fax: (601) 371-3939
Email: [email protected]

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