RULE 39

Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. — Execution shall issue as a

matter of right, or motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or
proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been
duly perfected. (1a)

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith
be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting
therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders
sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so
requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.

Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. — A final and executory

judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its
entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations,
a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it
is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 7. Execution in case of death of party. — In case of the death of a party,

execution may issue or be enforced in the following manner:

(a) In case of the death of the judgment obligee, upon the application of his executor or
administrator, or successor in interest;

(b) In case of the death of the judgment obligor, against his executor or administrator
or successor in interest, if the judgment be for the recovery of real or personal
property, or the enforcement of a lien thereon;

(c) In case of the death of the judgment obligor, after execution is actually levied upon
any of his property, the same may be sold for the satisfaction of the judgment
obligation, and the officer making the sale shall account to the corresponding executor
or administrator for any surplus in his hands.

Section 8. Issuance, form and contents of a writ of execution. — The writ of execution

shall: (1) issue in the name of the Republic of the Philippines from the court which
granted the motion; (2) state the name of the court, the case number and title, the
dispositive part of the subject judgment or order; and (3) require the sheriff or other
proper officer to whom it is directed to enforce the writ according to its terms, in the
manner hereinafter provided:
xxxxxxx

(b) If it be against real or personal property in the hands of personal representatives,

heirs, devisees, legatees, tenants, or trustees of the judgment obligor, to satisfy the
judgment, with interest, out of such property;

xxxxxxx

Section 10. Execution of judgments for specific act. —

(a) Conveyance, delivery of deeds, or other specific acts; vesting title. — If a judgment

directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or personal property, or to deliver
deeds or other documents, or to perform, any other specific act in connection
therewith, and the party fails to comply within the time specified, the court may direct
the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person appointed
by the court and the act when so done shall have like effect as if done by the party. If
real or personal property is situated within the Philippines, the court in lieu of
directing a conveyance thereof may by an order divest the title of any party and vest it
in others, which shall have the force and effect of a conveyance executed in due form
of law. 

Section 14. Return of writ of execution. — The writ of execution shall be returnable to

the court issuing it immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full.
If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the
writ, the officer shall report to the court and state the reason therefor. Such writ shall
continue in effect during the period within which the judgment may be enforced by
motion. The officer shall make a report to the court every thirty (30) days on the
proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity
expires. The returns or periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the proceedings
taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies thereof promptly furnished the
parties. 

New Civil Code

Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the
right of action accrues:

(1) Upon a written contract;

(2) Upon an obligation created by law;

(3) Upon a judgment.

Article 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of

obligation declared by a judgment commences from the time the judgment became
final. 
G.R. No. 171626               August 6, 2014

OLONGAPO CITY, Petitioner,
vs.
SUBIC WATER AND SEWERAGE CO., INC., Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve in this petition for certiorari  under Rule 65 the challenge to the July 6, 2005
1

decision  and the January 3, 2006 resolution  (assailed CA rulings) of the Court of Appeals
2 3

(CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 80947.

These assailed CA rulings annulled and set aside: a) the July 29, 2003 order  of the 4

Regional Trial Court of Olongapo, Br. 75 (RTC Olongapo ), which directed the issuance of a
writ of execution in Civil Case No. 582-0-90, against respondent Subic Water and
Sewerage Co., Inc. (Subic Water); b) the July 31, 2003 writ of execution  subsequently
5

issued by the same court; and c) the October 7, 2003 order  of R TC Olongapo, denying
6

Subic Water's special appearance with motion to reconsider order dated July 29, 2003 and
to quash writ of execution dated July 31, 2003. 7

Factual Antecedents

On May 25, 1973, Presidential Decree No. 198  (PD 198) took effect. This law authorized
8

the creation of local water districts which may acquire, install, maintain and operate water
supply and distribution systems for domestic, industrial, municipal and agricultural uses. 9

Pursuant to PD 198, petitioner Olongapo City (petitioner) passed Resolution No. 161,
which transferred all itsexisting water facilities and assets under the Olongapo City Public
Utilities Department Waterworks Division, to the jurisdiction and ownership of the
Olongapo City Water District (OCWD). 10

PD 198, as amended,  allows local water districts (LWDs)which have acquired an existing
11

water system of a localgovernment unit (LGU) to enter into a contract to pay the concerned
LGU. In lieu of the LGU’s share in the acquired water utility plant, it shall be paid by the
LWD an amount not exceeding three percent (3%) of the LWD’s gross receipts from water
sales in any year.12

On October 24, 1990, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against
OCWD. Among others, petitioner alleged that OCWD failed to pay its electricity bills to
petitioner and remit its payment under the contract to pay, pursuant to OCWD’s
acquisition of petitioner’s water system. In its complaint, petitioner prayed for the following
reliefs:

"WHEREOF, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after due hearing and
notice, judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiff ordering the defendant to:

(a) pay the amount of ₱26,798,223.70 plus legal interests from the filing of the
Complaint to actual full payment;
 (b) pay the amount of its in lieu share representing three percent of the defendant’s
gross receipts from water sales starting 1981 up to present;

(c) pay the amount of ₱1,000,000 as moral damages; and

(d) pay the cost of suit and other litigation expenses." 13

In its answer,  OCWD posed a counterclaim against petitioner for unpaid water bills
14

amounting to ₱3,080,357.00. 15

In the interim, OCWD entered into a Joint Venture Agreement  (JVA) with Subic Bay
16

Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), Biwater International Limited (Biwater), and D.M.

Consunji, Inc. (DMCI) on November 24, 1996. Pursuant to this agreement, Subic Water– a
new corporate entity – was incorporated, withthe following equity participation from its
shareholders:

SBMA 19.99% or 20%

OCWD 9.99% or 10%

Biwater 29.99% or 30%

DMCI 39.99% or 40% 17

On November 24, 1996, Subic Water was granted the franchise to operate and to carry on
the businessof providing water and sewerage services in the Subic BayFree Port Zone, as
well as in Olongapo City.  Hence, Subic Water took over OCWD’s water operations in
18

Olongapo City. 19

To finally settle their money claims against each other, petitioner and OCWD entered into
a compromise agreement  on June 4, 1997. In this agreement, petitioner and OCWD offset
20

their respective claims and counterclaims. OCWD also undertook to pay to petitioner its
net obligation amounting to ₱135,909,467.09, to be amortized for a period of not exceeding
twenty-five (25) years at twenty-fourpercent (24%) per annum. 21

The compromise agreement also contained a provision regarding the parties’ requestthat
Subic Water, Philippines,which took over the operations of the defendant Olongapo City
Water District be made the co-makerfor OCWD’s obligations. Mr. Noli Aldip, then
chairman of Subic Water, acted as its representative and signed the agreement on behalf
of Subic Water.

Subsequently, the parties submitted the compromise agreement to RTC Olongapo for
approval. In its decision dated June 13, 1997,  the trial court approved the
22

compromiseagreement and adopted it as its judgment in Civil Case No. 580-0-90.

Pursuant to the compromise agreement and in payment of OCWD’s obligations to

petitioner,petitioner and OCWD executed a Deed of Assignment onNovember 24,
1997.  OCWD assigned all of its rights in the JVA in favor of the petitioner, including but
23

not limited to the assignment of its shares, lease payments, regulatory assistance fees and
other receivables arising out of or related to the Joint Venture Agreement and the Lease
Agreement.  On December 15,1998, OCWD was judicially dissolved.
24 25

On May 7, 1999, to enforce the compromise agreement, the petitioner filed a motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution  with the trial court. In its July 23, 1999 order,  the
26 27

trial court granted the motion, but did not issue the corresponding writ of execution.

Almost four years later, on May 30, 2003, the petitioner, through its new counsel, filed a
notice of appearance with urgent motion/manifestation  and prayed again for the issuance
28

of a writ of execution against OCWD. A certain Atty. Segundo Mangohig, claiming to be

OCWD’s former counsel, filed a manifestation alleging that OCWD had already been
dissolved and that Subic Water is now the former OCWD. 29

Because of this assertion, Subic Water also filed a manifestation informing the trial court
that as borne out by the articles of incorporation and general information sheet of Subic
Water x x x defendant OCWD is not Subic Water.  The manifestation also indicated that
30

OCWD was only a ten percent (10%) shareholder of Subic Water; and that its 10% share
was already inthe process of being transferred to petitioner pursuant to the Deed of
Assignment dated November 24, 1997. 31

The trial court granted the motion for execution and directed its issuance against OCWD
and/or Subic Water. Because of this unfavorable order, Subic Water filed a special
appearance with motion to: (1) reconsider order dated July29, 2003; and (2) quash writ of
execution dated July 31, 2003. 32

The trial court denied Subic Water’s special appearance, motion for reconsideration, and
its motion to quash. Subic Water then filed a petition for certiorari  with the CA, imputing
33

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to RTC Olongapo for
issuing its July 29, 2003 and October 7, 2003 orders aswell as the writ of execution dated
July 31, 2003. The CA’s Ruling

In its decision dated July 6, 2005,  the CA granted Subic Water’s petition for certiorariand
34

reversed the trial court’s rulings.

The CA found that the writ ofexecution dated July 31, 2003  did not comply with Section
35

6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 6. Execution by motion orby independent action. — A final and executory

judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its
entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a
judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is
barred by the statute of limitations. (6a)[emphasis ours]

A judgment on a compromiseagreement is immediately executory and is considered to

have been entered on the date it was approved by the trial court.  Since the compromise
36

agreement was approved and adoptedby the trial court on June 13, 1997, this should be
the reckoning date for the counting of the period for the filing of a valid motion for
issuance of a writ of execution. Petitioner thus had until June 13, 2002, to file its motion.
The CA further remarked that whileit was true that a motion for execution was filed by
petitioner on May 7, 1999, and the same was granted by the trial court in its July 23,
1999 order,  no writ of execution was actually issued.
37

As the CA looked at the case, petitioner, instead of following up with the trial court the
issuance ofthe writ of execution, did not do anything to secure its prompt issuance. It
waitedanother four years to file a second motion for execution on May 30, 2003.  By this
38

time, the allowed period for the filing of a motion for the issuance of the writ had already
lapsed. Hence, the trial court’s July 29, 2003 order granting the issuance of the writ was
null and void for having been issued by a court without jurisdiction.

The CA denied petitioner’s subsequentmotion for reconsideration. Petitioner is now before

us on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

The Petition

The petitioner acknowledged the rule that the execution of a judgment could no longer be
made by mere motion after the prescribed five-year period had already lapsed. However, it
argued that the delay for the issuance of the writ of execution was caused by OCWD and
Subic Water. The petitioner submitted that this Court had allowed execution by mere
motion even after the lapse ofthe five-year period, when the delay was caused or
occasioned by the actions of the judgment debtor. 39

Also, the petitioner asserted that although Subic Water was not a party in the case, it
could still be subjected to a writ of execution, since it was identified as OCWD’s co-maker
and successor-in-interest in the compromise agreement. 40

Lastly, the petitioner contended that the compromise agreement was signed by Mr. Noli R.
Aldip,then Subic Water’s chairman, signifying Subic Water’s consent to the agreement.

The Court’s Ruling

We DISMISSthe petition for being the wrong remedy and, in any case, for lack of merit;
what we have before us is a final judgment that we can no longer touch unless there is
grave abuse of discretion.

A. Procedural Law Aspect

Certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.

At the outset, we emphasize thatthe present petition, brought under Rule 65, merits
outright dismissal for having availed an improper remedy.

The instant petition should havebeen brought under Rule 45 in a petition for review on
certiorari. Section 1 of this Rule mandates:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan,
the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. (1a, 2a) [emphasis supplied]

Supplementing Rule 45 are Sections 3  and 4  of Rule 56 which govern the applicable
41 42

procedure in the Supreme Court.

Appeals from judgmentsor final orders or resolutions of the CA should be made through a
verified petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.  In this case, petitioner questioned
43

the July 6, 2005 decision  and the January 3, 2006 resolution  of the CA which declared
44 45

as null and void the writ of execution issued by the trial court. Since the CA’s
pronouncement completely disposed of the case and the issues raised by the parties, it
was the proper subject of a Rule 45 petition. It was already a final order that resolved the
subject matter in its entirety, leaving nothing else to be done.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is appropriate only if there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law available tothe aggrieved
party. As we have distinctly explained in the case of Pasiona v. Court of Appeals: 46

The aggrieved party is proscribed from assailing a decision or final order of the CA viaRule
65 because such recourse is proper only if the party has no plain,speedy and adequate
remedy in the course of law. In this case, petitioner had an adequate remedy, namely, a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 ofthe Rules of Court.A petition for review on
certiorari, not a special civil action for certiorari was, therefore, the correct remedy.

xxxx

Settled is the rule that where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the special civil
actionfor certiorari will not be entertained – remedies of appealand certiorari are mutually
exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute
for a lost appeal,especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy
occasioned such loss or lapse.  [emphasis ours]
47

The petitioner received the CA’s assailed resolution denying its motion for reconsideration
on January 9, 2006. Following Rule 45, Section 2 of the Rules of Court,  the petitioner
48

had until January 24, 2006 to file its petition for review. It could have even filed a motion
for a 30-day extension of time, a motion that this Court grants for justifiable reasons.  But
49

all of these, it failed to do. Thus, the assailed CA rulings became final and executory and
could no longer be the subject of an appeal.

Apparently, to revive its lost appeal, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari that –
under Rule 65 – may be filed within sixty days from the promulgation of the assailed CA
resolution (on January 3, 2006). A Rule 65 petition for certiorari, however, cannot be a
substitute for a lost appeal. With the lapse of the prescribed period for appeal without an
action from the petitioner, the present petition for certiorari– a mere replacement –must be
dismissed.

But even without the procedural infirmity, the present recourse to us has no basis on the
merits and must be denied.

Execution by motion is only available within the five-year period from entry of judgment.
Under Rule 39, Section 6,  a judgment creditor has two modes in enforcing the court’s
50

judgment. Execution may be either through motion or an independent action.

These two modes of execution are available depending on the timing when the judgment
creditor invoked its right to enforce the court’s judgment. Execution by motion is only
available if the enforcement of the judgment was sought within five (5) years from the date
of its entry. On the other hand, execution by independent action is mandatory if the five-
year prescriptive period for execution by motion had already elapsed.  However, for
51

execution by independent action to prosper – the Rules impose another limitation – the
action must be filed before it is barred by the statute of limitations which, under the Civil
Code, is ten (10) years from the finality of the judgment. 52

On May 7, 1999, within the five-year period from the trial court’s judgment, petitioner filed
its motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. However, despite the grant of the motion,
the court did not issue an actual writ. It was only on May 30, 2003 that petitioner filed a
second motion to ask again for the writ’s issuance. By this time, the allowed five-year
period for execution by motion had already lapsed.

As will be discussed below, since the second motion was filed beyond the five-year
prescriptive period set by the Rules, then the writ of execution issued by the trial court on
July 31, 2003 was null and void for having been issued by a court already ousted of its
jurisdiction.

In Arambulo v. Court of First Instance of Laguna,  we explained the rule that the
53

jurisdiction of a court to issue a writ of execution by motion is only effective within

the five-year period from the entry of judgment. Outside this five-year period, any writ
of execution issued pursuant to a motion filed by the judgment creditor, is null and void. If
no writ of execution was issued by the court within the five-year period, even a motion
filed within such prescriptive period would not suffice. A writ issued by the court after the
lapse of the five-year period is already null and void.  The judgment creditor’s only
54

recourse then is to file an independent action, which must also be within the
prescriptive period set by law for the enforcement of judgments.

This Court subsequently reiterated its Arambulo ruling in Ramos v. Garciano,  where we55

said:

There seems to be no serious dispute that the 4th alias writ of execution was issued eight
(8) days after the lapse of the five (5) year period from the date of the entry of judgment in
Civil Case No. 367. As a general rule, after the lapse of such period a judgment may be
enforced only by ordinary action, not by mere motion (Section 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court).

xxxx

The limitation that a judgment been forced by execution within five years, otherwise it
loses efficacy, goes to the very jurisdiction of the Court. A writ issued after such period is
void, and the failure to object thereto does not validate it, for the reason that jurisdiction of
courts is solely conferred by law and not by express or implied will of the
parties.  [emphasis supplied]
56

To clearly restate these rulings, for execution by motion to be valid, the judgment creditor
must ensure the accomplishment of two acts within the five-year prescriptive period.
These are: a) the filing of the motion for the issuance of the writ of execution; and b)
the court’s actual issuance of the writ . In the instances when the Court allowed
execution by motion even after the lapse of five years, we only recognized one
exception, i.e., when the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment
debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.  However, petitioner failed to
57

show or cite circumstances showing how OCWD or Subic Water caused it to belatedly
file its second motion for execution.

Strictly speaking, the issuance of the writ should have been a ministerial duty on the
partof the trial court after it gave its July 23, 1999 order, approving the first motion and
directing the issuance of such writ. The petitioner could have easily compelled the court to
actually issue the writ by filing a manifestation on the existence of the July 23, 1999
order. However, petitioner idly sat and waited for the five-year period to lapse before it filed
its second motion. Having slept on its rights, petitioner had no one to blame but itself.

A writ of execution cannot affect a non- party to a case.

Strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment rendered in it. Thus, a writ of
execution can only be issued against a party and not against one who did not have his day
in court.58

Subic Water never participated in the proceedings in Civil Case No. 580-0-90, where
OCWD and petitioner were the contending parties. Subic Water only came into the picture
when one Atty. Segundo Mangohig, claiming to be OCWD’s former counsel, manifested
before the trial court that OCWD had already been judicially dissolved and that Subic
Water assumed OCWD’s personality.

In the present case, the compromise agreement, although signed by Mr. Noli Aldip, did not
carry the express conformity of Subic Water. Mr. Aldip was never given any authorization
to conform to or bind Subic Water in the compromise agreement. Also, the agreement
merely labeled Subic Water as a co-maker. It did not contain any provision where Subic
Water acknowledged its solidary liability with OCWD.

Lastly, Subic Water did not voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction. In fact, the
motion it filed was only made as a special appearance, precisely to avoid the court’s
acquisition of jurisdiction over its person. Without any participation in the proceedings
below, it cannot be made liable on the writ of execution issued by the court a quo.

B. Substantive Law Aspect

Solidary liability must be expressly stated.

The petitioner also argued that Subic Water could be held solidarily liable under the writ of
execution since it was identified as OCWD’s co-maker in the compromise agreement. The
petitioner’s basis for this is the following provision of the agreement:

4. Both parties also request that Subic Water,Philippines which took over the operations of
the defendant Olongapo City Water District be made as co-maker for the obligation herein
abovecited.  [emphasis supplied]
59
As the rule stands, solidary liability is not presumed. This stems from Art. 1207 of the
Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 1207. x x x There is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or
when the law orthe nature of the obligation requires solidarity. [emphasis supplied]

In Palmares v. Court of Appeals,  the Court did not hesitate to rule that although a party
60

to a promissory note was only labeled as a comaker, his liability was that of a surety, since
the instrument expressly provided for his joint and several liability with the principal.

In the present case, the joint and several liability of Subic Water and OCWD was nowhere
clear in the agreement. The agreement simply and plainly stated that petitioner and
OCWD were only requesting Subic Water to be a co-maker, in view of its assumption of
OCWD’s water operations. No evidence was presented to show that such request was ever
approved by Subic Water’s board of directors.

Under these circumstances, petitioner cannot proceed after Subic Water for OCWD’s
unpaid obligations. The law explicitly states that solidary liability is not presumed and
must be expressly provided for. Not being a surety, Subic Water is not an insurer of
OCWD’s obligations under the compromise agreement. At best, Subic Water was merely a
guarantor against whom petitioner can claim, provided it was first shown that: a)
petitioner had already proceeded after the properties of OCWD, the principal debtor; b)
and despite this, the obligation under the compromise agreement, remains to be not fully
satisfied.  But as will be discussed next, Subic Water could not also be recognized as a
61

guarantorof OCWD’s obligations.

An officer’s actions can only bind the corporation if he had been authorized to do so.

An examination of the compromise agreement reveals that it was not accompanied by any
document showing a grant of authority to Mr. Noli Aldip to sign on behalf of Subic Water.

Subic Water is a corporation. A corporation, as a juridical entity, primarily acts through its
board of directors, which exercises its corporate powers. In this capacity, the general rule
is that, in the absence of authority from the board of directors, no person, not even its
officers, can validly bind a corporation.  Section 23 of the Corporation Code provides:
62

Section 23. The board of directors or trustees.– Unless otherwise provided in this Code, the
corporate powers of all corporations formed under this Code shall be exercised, all
business conducted and all property of such corporations controlled and held by the board
of directors or trustees to be elected from among the holders of stocks, or where there is no
stock, from among the members of the corporation, who shall hold office for one (1) year
until their successors are elected and qualified. (28a) [emphasis supplied]

In People’s Aircargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,  we held that under
63

Section 23 of the Corporation Code, the power and responsibility to decide whether a
corporation can enter into a binding contract is lodged with the board of directors, subject
to the articles of incorporation, by-laws, or relevant provisions of law. As we have clearly
explained in another case:

A corporate officer or agent may represent and bind the corporation in transactions with
third persons to the extent that [the] authority to do so has been conferred upon him, and
this includes powers which have been intentionally conferred, and also such powers as, in
the usual course of the particular business, are incidental to, or may be implied from, the
powers intentionally conferred, powers added by custom and usage, as usually pertaining
to the particular officer or agent,and such apparent powers as the corporation has caused
persons dealing with the officer or agent to believe that it has conferred.  [emphasis ours]
64

Mr. Noli Aldip signed the compromise agreement purely in his own capacity. Moreover, the
compromise agreement did not expressly provide that Subic Water consented to become
OCWD’s co-maker. As worded, the compromise agreement merely provided that both
parties [also]request Subic Water, Philippines, which took over the operations of Olongapo
City Water District be made asco-maker [for the obligations above-cited].This request was
never forwarded to Subic Water’s board of directors. Even if due notification had been
made (which does not appear in the records), Subic Water’s board does not appear to have
given any approval to such request. No document such as the minutes of Subic Water’s
board of directors’ meeting or a secretary’s certificate, purporting to be an authorization to
Mr. Aldip to conform to the compromise agreement, was ever presented. In effect, Mr.
Aldip’s act of signing the compromise agreement was outside of his authority to undertake.

Since Mr. Aldip was never authorized and there was no showing that Subic Water’s articles
of incorporation or by-laws granted him such authority, then the compromise agreement
he signed cannot bind Subic Water. Subic Water cannot likewise be made a surety or even
a guarantor for OCWD’s obligations. OCWD’s debts under the compromise agreement are
its own corporate obligations to petitioner.

OCWD and Subic Water are two separate and different entities.

Petitioner practically suggests that since Subic Water took over OCWD’s water operations
in OlongapoCity, it also acquired OCWD’s juridical personality, making the two entities
one and the same.

This is an interpretation that we cannot make or adopt under the facts and the evidence of
this case. Subic Water clearly demonstrated that it was a separate corporate entity from
OCWD. OCWD is just a ten percent (10%) shareholder of Subic Water. As a mere
shareholder, OCWD’s juridical personality cannot be equated nor confused with that
ofSubic Water. It is basic in corporation law that a corporation is a juridical entity vested
with a legal personality separate and distinct from those acting for and in its behalf and, in
general, from the people comprising it.  Under this corporate reality, Subic Water cannot
65

be held liable for OCWD’s corporate obligations in the same manner that OCWD cannot be
held liable for the obligations incurred by Subic Water as a separate entity. The corporate
veilshould not and cannot be pierced unless it is clearly established that the separate and
distinct personality of the corporation was used to justify a wrong, protect fraud, or
perpetrate a deception. 66

In Concept Builders, Inc. v. NLRC,  the Court enumerated the possible probative factors of
67

identity which could justify the application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.
These are:

(1) Stock ownership by one or common ownership of both corporations;

(2) Identity of directors and officers;

 (3) The manner of keeping corporate books and records; and

(4) Methods of conducting the business. 68

The burden of proving the presence of any of these probative factors lies with the one
alleging it. Unfortunately, petitioner simply claimed that Subic Water took over OCWD's
water operations in Olongapo City. Apart from this allegation, petitioner failed to
demonstrate any link to justify the construction that Subic Water and OCWD are one and
the same.

Under this evidentiary situation, our duty is to respect the separate and distinct
personalities of these two juridical entities.
1âwphi1

We thus deny the present petition. The writ of execution issued by RTC Olongapo, Br. 75,
in favor of Olongapo City, is hereby confirmed to be null and void. Accordingly, respondent
Subic Water cannot be made liable under this writ.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition. The Court of

Appeals' decision dated July 6, 2005 and resolution dated January 3, 2006, annulling and
setting aside the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo, Branch 75 dated July 29,
2003 and October 7, 2003, and the writ of execution dated July 31, 2003, are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against the City of Olongapo.

SO ORDERED.

November 7, 2017

G.R. No. 208614

SIMEON TRINIDAD PIEDAD (deceased) survived and assumed by his heirs,

namely: ELISEO PIEDAD (deceased)*, JOEL PIEDAD, PUBLIO PIEDAD, JR.,
GLORIA PIEDAD, LOT PIEDAD, ABEL PIEDAD, ALI PIEDAD, and LEE
PIEDAD, Petitioners
vs.
CANDELARIA LINEHAN BOBILLES and MARIANO BOBILLES, Respondents

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Courts should take to heart the principle of equity if the strict application of
the statute of limitations or laches would result in manifest wrong or injustice.

This resolves the Petition for Review1 filed by Eliseo Piedad, Joel Piedad, Publio
Piedad, Jr., Gloria Piedad, Lot Piedad, Abel Piedad, Ali Piedad, and Lee Piedad
(the Heirs of Piedad) assailing the Resolutions dated December 10, 2012 2 and
July 10, 20133 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07176.

The facts as established by the pleadings of the parties are as follows:

Sometime in 1974, Simeon Piedad (Piedad) filed a case for annulment of an

absolute deed of sale against Candelaria Linehan Bobilles (Candelaria) and
Mariano Bobilles (Mariano). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 435-T and
raffled to Branch 9, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, presided over by Judge
Benigno Gaviola (Judge Gaviola).4

On March 19, 1992, the trial court ruled in Piedad's favor and declared the
deed of sale as null and void for being a forgery. 5 The fallo of this Decision
read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered and by preponderance of evidence, the

Court hereby renders a Decision in favor of herein plaintiff Simeon Piedad and
against defendants Candelaria Linehan-Bobilles and Mariano Bobilles, by
declaring the deed of sale in question (Exhibit "A" or "5") to be NULL and VOID
for being a mere forgery, and ordering herein defendants, their heirs and/or
assigns to vacate the house and surrender their possession of said house and
all other real properties which are supposed to have been covered by the voided
deed of sale (Exhibit "A" or "5") to the administrator of the estate of spouses
Nemesio Piedad and Fortunata Nillas. Furthermore, herein defendants are
hereby ordered to pay plaintiff or his heirs the following: (1) ₱3,000.00 Moral
Damages; (2) ₱2,000.00 Exemplary Damages; and (3) ₱800.00 attorney's fees,
plus costs.

SO ORDERED.6

Candelaria and Mariano appealed the trial court Decision, but on September
15, 1998, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38652 dismissed the appeal
and affirmed the trial court ruling.7

The Court of Appeals Decision became final and executory on November 1,

1998.8 On October 22, 2001, Judge Gaviola issued an order for the issuance of
a writ of demolition.9 The dispositive portion of this Order read:

WHEREFORE, let a writ of demolition issue against Candelaria Linehan

Bobilles and Mariano Bobilles. The sheriff implementing the writ is ordered to
allow the defendants 10 days to remove their improvements in the premises
and for them to vacate. Should defendant still fail to do so within the period
aforestated, the sheriff may proceed with the demolition of the improvements
without any further order from this Court.

SO ORDERED.10
On November 26, 2001, Judge Gaviola denied Candelaria's Motion for
Reconsideration.11

On December 4, 2001, Judge Gaviola issued a Writ of Demolition against

Candelaria and Mariano and referred it to Sheriff Antonio A. Bellones (Sheriff
Bellones) for its implementation.12

That same day,13 in the same case, Candelaria filed a Petition for the Probate of
the Last Will and Testament of Simeon Piedad. Judge Gaviola ordered that the
petition be heard independently and that it be raffled to another branch. 14

Candelaria's Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Simeon
Piedad was eventually docketed as S.P. Proc. No. 457-T and raffled to Branch
59, Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, presided over by Judge Gaudioso D.
Villarin (Villarin).15

On May 16, 2002, Candelaria also filed a verified petition for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction against Sheriff
Bellones to restrain him from enforcing the writ of demolition. This was
docketed as S.P. Proc. No. 463-T.16

Judge Cesar 0. Estrera (Judge Estrera), Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Toledo City and Presiding Judge of Branch 29, ordered the raffle of the
petition against Sheriff Bellones. A few days later, after summarily hearing the
case, Judge Estrera issued a restraining order against Sheriff Bellones. 17

Upon Candelaria's motion, Judge Estrera consolidated S.P. Proc. No. 457-T
with S.P. Proc. No. 463-T before Branch 59, Regional Trial Court, Toledo City.18

On May 27, 2002, again upon Candelaria's motion, Judge Villarin of Branch 59
extended the temporary restraining order against Sheriff Bell ones for 17
days.19

The following motions were eventually filed before Judge Villarin, but he never
resolved them: (1) a motion to dismiss, as amended; (2) a motion requesting the
issuance of an order lifting the injunction order; and (3) a joint motion to
resolve the motions.20

On February 28, 2007, the Heirs of Piedad filed an administrative complaint

against Judges Estrera and Villarin. The administrative complaint charged
them with Issuing an Unlawful Order Against a Co-Equal Court and
Unreasonable Delay in Resolving Motions.21

On December 16, 2009, this Court found both Judges Estrera and Villarin
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, and Judge Villarin liable
for undue delay in rendering an order.22 The fallo of this Court's Decision read:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Cesar O. Estrera and Judge Gaudioso D.
Villarin of the RTC in Toledo City, Cebu, Branches 29 and 59, respectively,
GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW and imposes upon them a FINE
in the amount of twenty[-]one thousand pesos (PhP 21,000) each, with the
stern warning that a repetition of similar or analogous infractions in the future
shall be dealt with more severely. Also, the Court finds Judge Gaudioso D.
Villarin GUILTY of UNDUE DELAY IN RENDERING AN ORDER and imposes
upon him a FINE in the additional amount of eleven thousand pesos (PhP
11,000)[.]

SO ORDERED.23

Civil Case No. 435-T before Branch 9, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City was
eventually transferred to Branch 29, Regional Trial Court, Toledo City. 24

On July 12, 2010, the Heirs of Piedad filed their Motion Praying that an Order
Be Issued to Sheriff Antonio Bellones to Resume the Unfinished Writ of
Execution and/or Writ of Demolition before Regional Trial Court, Branch 29,
Toledo City.25

In his Order26 dated May 15, 2012, Presiding Judge Ruben F. Altubar (Judge
Altubar) of Branch 29, Regional Trial Court, Toledo City denied the motion.

Judge Altubar opined that since more than 12 years had passed since the
Court of Appeals September 15, 1998 Decision became final and executory, the
execution should have been pursued through a petition for revival judgment,
not a mere motion.27

On August 16, 2012, Judge Altubar denied the Motion for Reconsideration of
the Heirs of Piedad.28

The Heirs of Piedad appealed the denial of their motions with a petition under
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. On December 10, 2012, the Court of
Appeals29 dismissed the appeal for being the wrong remedy:

First, assailed in the instant petition are Orders denying petitioners' motion to

enforce a writ of execution and writ of demolition in Civil Case No. 435-T.

Second, the Orders assailed in this petition were not rendered in the exercise of
the RTC's appellate jurisdiction. In fact, Civil Case No[.] 435- T is an original
action for annulment of a Deed of Absolute Sale.

Under the Rules, appeals to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by
petition for review under Rule 42.
The appropriate course of action for the petitioner was to file a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the presiding judge who issued the
assailed Orders dated May 15, 2012 and August 16, 2012.30

On July 10, 2013, the Court of Appeals 31 denied the Heirs of Piedad's Motion
for Reconsideration.

On September 27, 2013, petitioners Heirs of Piedad filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari32 before this Court, where they adopted the findings of fact in the
administrative case against Judges Estrera and Villarin. 33

Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of

discretion when it denied their motion for the resumption of the writ of
demolition and their motion for reconsideration.34

Petitioners chide Judge Altubar for being equally ignorant of the law as Judges
Estrera and Villarin. They also point out that Court of Appeals Justice Gabriel
T. Ingles, who penned the dismissal of their appeal, presided over S.P. Proc No.
463-T when he was still the acting Regional Trial Court Judge of Branch 59,
Toledo City35 and even issued an Order36 dated July 9, 2008.

Petitioners pray for the resumption of the writ of demolition issued by Branch
9, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City.37

In its October 21, 2013 Resolution, 38 this Court granted petitioners' motion for
extension and directed respondents to comment on the Petition.

On January 15, 2014, respondents filed their Comment 39 to the Petition where
they claim that it cannot be determined if the Petition falls under Rule 45 or
Rule 65.40 Nonetheless, whether viewed as a petition under Rule 65 or an
appeal under Rule 45, respondents assert that the Petition was still devoid of
merit.41

Respondents opine that petitioners' motion for the implementation of the writ
of demolition was already barred by prescription since it was filed 12 years
after the Court of Appeals September 15, 1998 Decision, which upheld the
validity of the writ of demolition, became final and executory. 42

Respondents further claim that the ruling in the administrative case against
Judges Estrera and Villarin cannot bind them since they were not parties to
the case and the issue resolved was the administrative liability of these judges.
They emphasize that this Court did not rule on the validity of Judges Estrera's
and Villarin's issuances and orders in S.P. Proc No. 463-T and S.P. Proc. No.
457-T.43
Respondents also question the personality of petitioners to institute the case
on Piedad's behalf.44

Finally, respondents put petitioners to task for their disrespectful tone towards
the judges and justice invol_ved in this case. 45

On February 12, 2014, petitioners filed a Motion for Substitution of

Heirs,46 alleging that petitioner Eliseo Piedad died on January 8, 2014 and
would be substituted by his surviving spouse and their children. 47

In its July 14, 2014 Resolution, 48 this Court required petitioners to file a reply
to the Comment.

In their Reply,49 petitioners assert that their Petition was filed under Rule 65
because it alleges grave abuse of discretion 50 on the part of the Court of
Appeals.

Petitioners apologized for the confusion created by their former counsel in filing
the appeal before the Court of Appeals. They claimed that their former counsel,
now deceased, was almost 100 years old when he filed the appeal before the
Court of Appeals and Petition before this Court. However, petitioners insist that
considering the merit of their case, the Court of Appeals should not have
dismissed their appeal on mere technicalities. 51

Petitioners ask this Court for liberality for the procedural lapses committed by
their former counsel.52

The issues submitted for this Court's resolution are:

First, whether or not petitioners have duly established their personality to file
the petition as heirs of Simeon Piedad; and

Second, whether or not the. motion to revive judgment was timely filed.

Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides who may be a party
in interest in a civil action:

Section 2. Parties in interest - A real party in interest is the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Rule 3, Section 1653 then provides for the process of substitution of parties
when the original party to a pending action dies and death does not extinguish
the claim.

Petitioners claim to be Piedad's children; thus, they assert that they are the
real parties in interest to the action begun by their father. On the other hand,
respondents claim that petitioners did not properly substitute Piedad upon his
death; hence, they failed to substantiate their personality to move for the
revival of judgment.54

Respondents fail to convince. Petitioners have been repeatedly recognized as

Piedad's rightful heirs not only by the Court of Appeals but also by this Court.

In Heirs of Simeon Piedad v. Exec. Judge Estrera,55 petitioners filed an

administrative case in their capacity as Piedad's heirs and this Court
acknowledged their standing to sue in this capacity. The same is also true in
the assailed Court of Appeals September 15, 1998 Decision where petitioners
filed their appeal as Piedad's heirs and their personality to represent their
father was never questioned or assailed.

This Court upheld petitioners' personality to sue in Heirs of Simeon Piedad and

sees no reason to deny them the same recognition in the case at bar when the
current case is merely an offshoot of their father's original complaint for nullity
of deed of sale.

Furthermore, this Court takes judicial notice of how respondents, through

their counsels,56 deliberately and maliciously delayed the execution of a final
and executory judgment by filing patently dilatory actions. These actions
include the Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Simeon
Piedad,57 filed in the same case as Piedad's complaint for annulment of
absolute deed of sale. The Petition for Probate of the Last Will and Testament of
Simeon Piedad was filed in response to the Writ of Demolition issued on
December 4, 2001, pursuant to the final and executory Court of Appeals
September 15, 1998 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 38652.58

Respondents, through their counsels, further delayed the execution of the

judgment by filing a petition against Sheriff Bellones of Branch 9, Regional
Trial Court, Cebu City to restrain him from enforcing the writ of demolition. 59

The extent of the insidious machinations employed by respondents and their

counsels were highlighted when they assailed petitioners' motion for execution
for purportedly being filed beyond the prescriptive period of 10 years, when
they themselves were part of the reason for the delay in execution.

Counsels for respondents are "reminded that as officers of the law, they are
mandated by Rule 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to "not
unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court
processes." While counsels for respondents are expected to serve their clients
to the utmost of their ability, their duty to their clients does not include
disrespecting the law by scheming to impede the execution of a final and
executory judgment. As members of the Bar, counsels for respondents are
enjoined to represent their clients "with zeal within the bounds of the law." 60

Thus, counsels for respondents are given a stern warning to desist from
committing similar acts which undermine the law and its processes. Any
similar infractions in the future from counsels for respondents will be dealt
with more severely.

II

Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides the two (2) ways of
executing a final and executory judgment:

Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. - A final and

executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years
from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred
by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The
revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the
date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of
limitations.

Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court must be read in conjunction with
Articles 1144(3) and 1152 of the Civil Code, which provide:

Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the
time the right of action accrues:

....

(3) Upon a judgment.

....

Article 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of
obligation declared by a judgment commences from the time the judgment
became final.

Thus, the prevailing party may move for the execution of a final and
executory judgment as a matter of right within five (5) years from the
entry of judgment. If no motion is filed within this period, the judgment is
converted to a mere right of action and can only be enforced by instituting a
complaint for the revival of judgment in a regular court within 10 years from
finality of judgment.61

In the case at bar, the Court of Appeal's ruling on the nullity of the deed of
absolute sale executed between Piedad and respondents became final and
executory on November 1, 1998. Judge Gaviola, upon motion, then issued an
order for the issuance of a writ of demolition on October 22, 2001. 62

However, the writ of demolition was never served on respondents due to their
dilatory tactics and the gross ignorance of the law and undue delay caused by
Judges Estrera and Villarin. The case only began to gain traction on July 12,
2010,63 when petitioners filed their motion for the revival of judgment. But by
this time, almost 12 years had passed since the Court of Appeals September
15, 1998 Decision became final and executory. This led Branch 29, Regional
Trial Court, Toledo City, where the case was transferred from Branch 9,
Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, to deny the motion in its Order dated May 15,
2012 for being the wrong remedy. The Regional Trial Court stated:

In the instant case, reckoned from November 1, 1998, the date when the
Decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory, 12 years and 1
day had already elapsed when the instant motion was filed on November 2,
2010. There may be instances that execution may still pursue despite the lapse
of ten -years· from finality of judgment but it should be a result of a well-
justified action for revival of judgment, not a mere motion, as can be found in
the cited Supreme Court Decision.64

The Regional Trial Court likewise referred to Bausa v. Heirs of Dino 65 to support
its denial of petitioners' motion, claiming that the case at bar is very
similar66 with Bausa. However, a careful reading of Bausa shows that while it
contains similarities with the case at bar, the factual circumstances and ruling
in Baus a tend to support petitioners' motion for revival, not its denial.

In Bausa, the Decision declaring petitioners as the rightful owners of the

disputed property became final and executory on January 28, 1987. On May 8,
1987, petitioners filed a motion for execution which was granted by the trial
court but was not served on the respondent.67

Petitioners in Bausa subsequently applied for the issuance of an alias writ of

execution, which was likewise granted. The sheriff then executed a Delivery of
Possession, but respondents refused to sign the Delivery of Possession and
refused to vacate the premises. This prompted petitioners to apply for a writ of
demolition, which was again granted but could not be implemented due to
respondents' continued resistance. Finally, petitioners filed an action to
revive68 the judgment of the trial court, which respondents asserted was not
timely filed.
Bausa stated that the law set time limitations in the enforcement of
judgments "to prevent obligors from sleeping on their rights."69 Bausa then
held that considering petitioners' diligent efforts in the enforcement of what
was already rightfully theirs and respondents' machinations that prevented
petitioners from possessing their property, it cannot be said that petitioners
slept on their rights:

Despite diligent efforts and the final and executory nature of the Decision,
petitioners have yet to regain possession of what is legally their own. These
circumstances clearly demonstrate that the failure to execute the judgment
was due to respondents' refusal to follow the several writs ordering them to
vacate the premises. It would be unfair for the Court to allow respondents to
profit from their defiance of valid court orders. 70

Bausa likewise emphasized that if manifest wrong or injustice would result

with the strict adherence to the statute of limitations or doctrine of laches, it
would be better for courts to rule under the principle of equity:

It is a better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be
guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of
laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result. It would be
more in keeping with justice and equity to allow the revival of the judgment
rendered by Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon in Civil Case No.
639. To rule otherwise would result in an absurd situation where the rightful
owner of a property would be ousted by a usurper on mere technicalities.
Indeed, it would be an idle ceremony to insist on the filing of another action
that would only unduly prolong respondents' unlawful retention of the
premises which they had, through all devious means, unjustly withheld from
petitioners all these years.71

Just like in Bausa, it also cannot be said that petitioners slept on their rights.
Petitioners filed a motion for execution well within the five (5)-year period
prescribed by Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. However, their efforts
were thwarted by respondents' machinations and Judges Estrera's and
Villarin's illegal acts of issuing restraining orders against a coequal court.
Nonetheless, petitioners continued to persevere and filed several
motions72 before Judge Villarin, which the judge proceeded to ignore. This
Court recognized the illegality of the acts committed by Judges Estrera and
Villarin when this Court held them administratively liable for gross ignorance
of the law and undue delay in rendering an order, imposing upon them a fine
and a stem warning that a repetition of a similar act will be dealt with more
severely.73

In dismissing the motion for revival, the Regional Trial Court adopted a strict
interpretation of Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court because the proper
remedy was supposedly an action for revival of judgment, not just a mere
motion.74 The Court of Appeals, in turn, also dismissed the petition for being
the wrong remedy.75

The lower courts are mistaken.

In David v. Ejercito,76 for reasons of equity, this Court treated the motion for
execution, alias writ of execution, and motion for demolition as substantial
compliance with the requirement to file an action to revive judgment if no
motion for execution is filed within five (5) years from the date of its entry of
judgment.77 David pointed out that petitioner's deliberate efforts at delaying the
execution of a final and executory judgment should not be condoned:

It would be an idle ceremony to insist on the filing of a separate action that

would only unduly prolong petitioner's unlawful retention of the premises
which he has through all devious means unjustly withheld from respondents
all these years.78

This Court, in a long line of cases, 79 has allowed for the execution of a
final and executory judgment even if prescription has already set in, if the
delay was caused by the judgment obligor for his or her benefit or
advantage. The reason behind this exception was explained in Camacho v.
Court of Appeals:80

The purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments
or actions is to prevent obligors from sleeping on their rights.1âwphi1 Far from
sleeping on their rights, respondents persistently pursued their rights of
action. It is revolting to the conscience to allow petitioner to further avert the
satisfaction of her obligation because of sheer literal adherence to technicality.
After all, the Rules of Court mandates that a liberal construction of the Rules
be adopted in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding. This rule of construction is especially useful in the present case
where adherence to the letter of the law would result in absurdity and manifest
injustice.81

This Court has also interrupted82 the tolling of the prescriptive period or

deducted83 from the prescriptive period when the peculiar circumstances of the
case or the dictates of equity called for it. This Court held in Lancita v.
Magbanua:84

In computing the time limited for suing out of an execution, although there is
authority to the contrary, the general rule is that there should not be included
the time when execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a
definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to
operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party, or otherwise. Any
interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within
which the writ may be issued without scire facias.85

It is not disputed that the deed of absolute sale between Piedad and
respondents was declared null and void for being a forgery, and that the Court
of Appeals September 15, 1998 Decision became final and executory as early
as November 1, 1998. However, due to respondents' schemes and maneuvers,
they managed for many years to prevent Piedad and his heirs from enjoying
what had already been decreed to be rightfully theirs, leading to an empty
victory and petitioners' continued struggle for their rights.

Considering that the Regional Trial Court May 15, 2012 Order dismissing
petitioners' motion for revival was utterly devoid of legal or factual basis, it is
clear that it was attended by grave abuse of discretion for being issued
capriciously and with a gross misapprehension of the facts. 86

To reiterate, jurisprudence is consistent that when the delay in filing a

motion or action for execution could not be attributed to the prevailing
party, a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be resorted
to where a literal and strict adherence will most likely result in
miscarriage of justice.87

WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to GRANT the Petition. The assailed

Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated December 10, 2012 and July 10,
2013 in CA-G.R. SP No. 07176 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Writ of
Demolition issued on December 4, 2001 by Branch 9, Regional Trial Court,
Cebu City is ORDERED SERVED on Candelaria Linehan Bobilles and/or
Mariano Bobilles or any of their heirs, successors, or assigns to resume the
execution process against them.

SO ORDERED.

Actions to enforce a judgment:

1. “Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution”

2. “Petition for Revival of Judgment”

3. “Motion for Issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution”