G.R. No.

79974 December 17, 1987 Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says:
ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners, The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
vs. Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE executive departments, ambassadors, other public
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from
as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, respondents, the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor. whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
PADILLA, J.: whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
Once more the Court is called upon to delineate constitutional boundaries. law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
In this petition for prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment
members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from courts, or in the heads of the departments, agencies,
performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of commissions or boards.
Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the The President shall have the power to make appointments
Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only
as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The until the next adjournment of the Congress.
respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution,
respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the just quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall
Commission on Appointments. appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time
Because of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability to time, are:
in the public service, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition First, the heads of the executive departments,
and decide, setting aside the finer procedural questions of whether ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers
prohibition is the proper remedy to test respondent Mison's right to the of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and of whether the captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested
petitioners have a standing to bring this suit. in him in this Constitution; 2
By the same token, and for the same purpose, the Court allowed the Second, all other officers of the Government whose
Commission on Appointments to intervene and file a petition in appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; 3
intervention. Comment was required of respondents on said petition. The Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law
comment was filed, followed by intervenor's reply thereto. The parties to appoint;
were also heard in oral argument on 8 December 1987. Fourth, officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the
This case assumes added significance because, at bottom line, it involves a Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
conflict between two (2) great departments of government, the Executive The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the
and Legislative Departments. It also occurs early in the life of the 1987 Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated
Constitution. by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on
The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of relatively clear Appointments, the President appoints. 5
provisions in the Constitution. In cases like this, we follow what the Court, The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of
speaking through Mr. Justice (later, Chief Justice) Jose Abad Santos stated contention. Should they be appointed by the President with or without the
in Gold Creek Mining Corp. vs. Rodriguez, 1 that: consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments? By following
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an
to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would
law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the
force is to be given is that which is embodied and first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. Appointments. But we need not rely solely on this basic rule of
The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in constitutional construction. We can refer to historical background as well
accordance with how the executive or the legislative department may want as to the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to determine,
them construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide. with more accuracy, if not precision, the intention of the framers of the
1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, on whether the Thus, in the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments
appointments by the President, under the second, third and fourth groups, required the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. It is now a sad part of our political history that the power of confirmation
Again, in this task, the following advice of Mr. Chief Justice J. Abad Santos by the Commission on Appointments, under the 1935 Constitution,
in Gold Creek is apropos: transformed that commission, many times, into a venue of "horse-trading"
In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a and similar malpractices.
constitutional provision must be presumed to have been On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian
framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior pattern in which it was molded and remolded by successive amendments,
and existing laws and with reference to them. "Courts are placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any
bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution check on the part of the legislature.
are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the
subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that
they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption." the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a
(Barry vs. Truax 13 N.D., 131; 99 N.W., 769,65 L. R. A., "middle ground" by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the
762.) 6 Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and
It will be recalled that, under Sec. 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of
it is provided that — other officers, i.e., those in the second and third groups as well as those in
xxx xxx xxx the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank.
(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this
the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads conclusion. The original text of Section 16, Article VII, as proposed by the
of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Committee on the Executive of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, read
army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces as follows:
from the rank of captain or commander, and all other Section 16. The president shall nominate and, with the
officers of the Government whose appointments are not consent of a Commission on Appointment, shall appoint
herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be the heads of the executive departments and bureaus,
authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. naval captain and all other officers of the Government
(4) The President shall havethe power to make whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by appoint. The Congress may by law vest the appointment of
the Commission on Appointments or until the next inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in
adjournment of the Congress. the heads of departments 7 [Emphasis supplied].
xxx xxx xxx The above text is almost a verbatim copy of its counterpart provision in
(7) ..., and with the consent of the Commission on the 1935 Constitution. When the frames discussed on the floor of the
Appointments, shall appoint ambassadors, other public Commission the proposed text of Section 16, Article VII, a feeling was
ministers and consuls ... manifestly expressed to make the power of the Commission on
Upon the other hand, the 1973 Constitution provides that- Appointments over presidential appointments more limited than that held
Section 10. The President shall appoint the heads of by the Commission in the 1935 Constitution. Thus-
bureaus and offices, the officers of the Armed Forces of the Mr. Rama: ... May I ask that Commissioner
Philippines from the rank of Brigadier General or Monsod be recognized
Commodore, and all other officers of The government The President: We will call Commissioner
whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, Davide later.
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. Mr. Monsod: With the Chair's indulgence, I
However, the Batasang Pambansa may by law vest in the just want to take a few minutes of our time
Prime Minister, members of the Cabinet, the Executive to lay the basis for some of the
Committee, Courts, Heads of Agencies, Commissions, and amendments that I would like to propose
Boards the power to appoint inferior officers in their to the Committee this morning.
respective offices. xxx xxx xxx
 On Section 16,  I would like to suggest that the power of from staff directors who only stay in the
the Commission on Appointments be limited to the office.
department heads, ambassadors, generals and so on but MR. FOZ: Yes, but the regional directors
not to the levels of bureau heads and colonels. are under the supervisiopn of the staff
xxx xxx xxx 8 (Emphasis supplied.) bureau directors.
In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were two (2) xxx xxx xxx
major changes proposed and approved by the Commission. These were (1) MR. MAAMBONG: May I direct a question
the exclusion of the appointments of heads of bureaus from the to Commissioner Foz? The Commissioner
requirement of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and (2) proposed an amendment to delete 'and
the exclusion of appointments made under the second sentence 9 of the bureaus on Section 16. Who will then
section from the same requirement. The records of the deliberations of the appoint the bureau directors if it is not the
Constitutional Commission show the following: President?
MR. ROMULO: I ask that Commissioner Foz MR. FOZ: It is still the President who will
be recognized appoint them but their appointment shall
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is no longer be subject to confirmation by the
recognized Commission on Appointments.
MR. FOZ: Madam President, my proposed MR. MAAMBONG: In other words, it is in
amendment is on page 7, Section 16, line line with the same answer of Commissioner
26 which is to delete the words "and de Castro?
bureaus," and on line 28 of the same page, MR. FOZ: Yes.
to change the phrase 'colonel or naval MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.
captain to MAJOR GENERAL OR REAR THE PRESIDENT: Is this clear now? What is
ADMIRAL. This last amendment which is the reaction of the Committee?
co-authored by Commissioner de Castro is xxx xxx xxx
to put a period (.) after the word ADMIRAL, MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the
and on line 29 of the same page, start a Committee feels that this matter should be
new sentence with: HE SHALL ALSO submitted to the body for a vote.
APPOINT, et cetera. MR. DE CASTRO: Thank you.
MR. REGALADO: May we have the MR. REGALADO: We will take the
amendments one by one. The first amendments one by one. We will first vote
proposed amendment is to delete the on the deletion of the phrase 'and bureaus
words "and bureaus" on line 26. on line 26, such that appointments of
MR. FOZ: That is correct. bureau directors no longer need
MR. REGALADO: For the benefit of the confirmation by the Commission on
other Commissioners, what would be the Appointment.
justification of the proponent for such a Section 16, therefore, would read: 'The President shall
deletion? nominate, and with the consent of a Commission on
MR. FOZ: The position of bureau director is Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive
actually quite low in the executive departments, ambassadors. . . .
department, and to require further THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to
confirmation of presidential appointment of delete the phrase 'and bureaus' on page 7,
heads of bureaus would subject them to line 26? (Silence) The Chair hears none;
political influence. the amendments is approved.
MR. REGALADO: The Commissioner's xxx xxx xxx
proposed amendment by deletion also MR. ROMULO: Madam President.
includes regional directors as distinguished THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader
from merely staff directors, because the is recognized.
regional directors have quite a plenitude of THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is
powers within the regions as distinguished recognized
 MR. FOZ: Madam President, this is the THE PRESIDENT: Does the Committee
third proposed amendment on page 7, line accept?
28. 1 propose to put a period (.) after MR. REGALADO: Just for the record, of
'captain' and on line 29, delete 'and all' and course, that excludes those officers which
substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT the Constitution does not require
ANY. confirmation by the Commission on
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Appointments, like the members of the
Committee accepts the proposed judiciary and the Ombudsman.
amendment because it makes it clear that MR. DAVIDE: That is correct. That is very
those other officers mentioned therein do clear from the modification made by
not have to be confirmed by the Commissioner Bernas.
Commission on Appointments. THE PRESIDENT: So we have now this
MR. DAVIDE: Madam President. proposed amendment of Commissioners
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Davide is Foz and Davide.
recognized. xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to
MR. DAVIDE: So would the proponent this proposed amendment of
accept an amendment to his amendment, Commissioners Foz and Davide as accepted
so that after "captain" we insert the by the Committee? (Silence) The Chair
following words: AND OTHER OFFICERS hears none; the amendment, as amended,
WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN is approved 10 (Emphasis supplied).
HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION? It is, therefore, clear that appointments to the second and
FR. BERNAS: It is a little vague. third groups of officers can be made by the President
MR. DAVIDE: In other words, there are without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
positions provided for in the Constitution Appointments.
whose appointments are vested in the It is contended by amicus curiae, Senator Neptali
President, as a matter of fact like those of Gonzales, that the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII
the different constitutional commissions. reading-
FR. BERNAS: That is correct. This list of He (the President) shall also appoint all other officers of
officials found in Section 16 is not an the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
exclusive list of those appointments which provided for by law and those whom he may be authorized
constitutionally require confirmation of the by law to appoint . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Commission on Appointments, with particular reference to the word "also," implies that the President
MR. DAVIDE: That is the reason I seek the shall "in like manner" appoint the officers mentioned in said second
incorporation of the words I proposed. sentence. In other words, the President shall appoint the officers
FR. BERNAS: Will Commissioner Davide mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner as he appoints
restate his proposed amendment? officers mentioned in the first sentence, that is, by nomination and with
MR. DAVIDE: After 'captain,' add the the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
following: AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE Amicus curiae's reliance on the word "also" in said second sentence is not
APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN necessarily supportive of the conclusion he arrives at. For, as the Solicitor
THIS CONSTITUTION. General argues, the word "also" could mean "in addition; as well; besides,
FR. BERNAS: How about:"AND OTHER too" (Webster's International Dictionary, p. 62, 1981 edition) which
OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS meanings could, on the contrary, stress that the word "also" in said second
REQUIRE CONFIRMATION UNDER THIS sentence means that the President, in addition to nominating and, with the
CONSTITUTION"? consent of the Commission on Appointments, appointing the officers
MR. DAVIDE: Yes, Madam President, that enumerated in the first sentence, can appoint (without such consent
is modified by the Committee. (confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentence-
FR. BERNAS: That will clarify things. Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings of the
word "also" as used in the context of said second sentence, the Court has
chosen to derive significance from the fact that the first sentence speaks The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the third sentence of Sec.
of nomination by the President and appointment by the President with the 16, Article VII, abovequoted, merely declares that, as to lower-ranked
consent of the Commission on Appointments, whereas, the second officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President,
sentence speaks only of appointment by the President. And, this use of in the courts, or in the heads of the various departments, agencies,
different language in two (2) sentences proximate to each other commissions, or boards in the government. No reason however is
underscores a difference in message conveyed and perceptions submitted for the use of the word "alone" in said third sentence.
established, in line with Judge Learned Hand's observation that "words are The Court is not impressed by both arguments. It is of the considered
not pebbles in alien juxtaposition" but, more so, because the recorded opinion, after a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission clearly and expressly Constitutional Commission, that the use of the word alone" after the word
justify such differences. "President" in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than
As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 anything else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship. It will be recalled that, in
Constitution, there are officers whose appointments require no the 1935 Constitution, the following provision appears at the end of par. 3,
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, even if such officers section 1 0, Article VII thereof —
may be higher in rank, compared to some officers whose appointments ...; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of
have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments under the first inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in
sentence of the same Sec. 16, Art. VII. Thus, to illustrate, the the heads of departments. [Emphasis supplied].
appointment of the Central Bank Governor requires no confirmation by the The above provision in the 1935 Constitution appears immediately after
Commission on Appointments, even if he is higher in rank than a colonel in the provision which makes practically all presidential appointments subject
the Armed Forces of the Philippines or a consul in the Consular Service. to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, thus-
But these contrasts, while initially impressive, merely underscore the 3. The President shall nominate and with the consent of
purposive intention and deliberate judgment of the framers of the 1987 the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads
Constitution that, except as to those officers whose appointments require of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the
the consent of the Commission on Appointments by express mandate of Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces
the first sentence in Sec. 16, Art. VII, appointments of other officers are from the rank of captain or commander, and all other
left to the President without need of confirmation by the Commission on officers of the Government whose appointments are not
Appointments. This conclusion is inevitable, if we are to presume, as we herein provided for, and those whom he may be authorized
must, that the framers of the 1987 Constitution were knowledgeable of by law to appoint; ...
what they were doing and of the foreseable effects thereof. In other words, since the 1935 Constitution subjects, as a general rule,
Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in presidential appointments to confirmation by the Commission on
character. Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly Appointments, the same 1935 Constitution saw fit, by way of an exception
construed against them. Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly to such rule, to provide that Congress may, however, by law vest the
stated in order to be recognized. But, it is only in the first sentence of Sec. appointment of inferior officers (equivalent to 11 officers lower in rank"
16, Art. VII where it is clearly stated that appointments by the President to referred to in the 1987 Constitution) in the President alone, in the courts,
the positions therein enumerated require the consent of the Commission or in the heads of departments,
on Appointments. In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and
As to the fourth group of officers whom the President can appoint, the expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments
intervenor Commission on Appointments underscores the third sentence in from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except
Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads: appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other 16, Article VII. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word "alone" after the word "President"
or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-
boards. [Emphasis supplied]. ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of
and argues that, since a law is needed to vest the appointment of lower- departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the
ranked officers in the President alone, this implies that, in the absence of President) may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the
such a law, lower-ranked officers have to be appointed by the President President, without need of confirmation by the Commission on
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and, if this is Appointments, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII.
so, as to lower-ranked officers, it follows that higher-ranked officers should Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could have stated
be appointed by the President, subject also to confirmation by the merely that, in the case of lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law
Commission on Appointments. vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of
various departments of the government. In short, the word "alone" in the After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No. 1937
third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as a literal and PD No. 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the
import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an appointment he is
of Sec. 16, Article VII. And, this redundancy cannot prevail over the clear authorizedby law to make, such appointment, however, no longer needs
and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence of Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within
Sec. 16, Article VII, are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on her constitutional authority and power in appointing respondent Salvador
Appointments. Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his
Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident that nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. He is
the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to
not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
of the Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention should be, as they
already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of are, hereby DISMISSED. Without costs.
bureaus" among those officers whose appointments need the consent of SO ORDERED.
the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the other Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin and Cortes, JJ.,
hand, deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from concur.
appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.
Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. The original text of Sec. 601 of
Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as the Tariff and Customs Code of
the Philippines, which was enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on
22 June 1957, reads as follows:
601. Chief Officials of the Bureau.-The Bureau of Customs
shall have one chief and one assistant chief, to be known
respectively as the Commissioner (hereinafter known as
the 'Commissioner') and Assistant Commissioner of
Customs, who shall each receive an annual compensation
in accordance with the rates prescribed by existing laws.
The Assistant Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed
by the proper department head.
Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, was amended on 27 October 1972 by
Presidential Decree No. 34, amending the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines. Sec. 601, as thus amended, now reads as follows:
Sec. 601. Chief Officials of the Bureau of Customs.-The
Bureau of Customs shall have one chief and one assistant
chief, to be known respectively as the Commissioner
(hereinafter known as Commissioner) and Deputy
Commissioner of Customs, who shall each receive an
annual compensation in accordance with the rates
prescribed by existing law. The Commissioner and the
Deputy Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by
the President of the Philippines (Emphasis supplied.)
Of course, these laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34) were approved
during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the President
may nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs.
G.R. NO. L-69137 August 5, 1986 1983. 7 What was temporary was the approval of the appointment, not the
FELIMON LUEGO, petitioner-appellant, appointment it sell And what made the approval  temporary was the fact
vs. that it was made to depend on the condition specified therein and on the
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and FELICULA TUOZO, respondents- verification of the qualifications of the appointee to the position.
appellees. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or
Jose Batiquin for petitioner-appellant. nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority
Fausto F. Tugade for private respondent-appellee. being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the
requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and
CRUZ, J.: authorizing the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has
Stripped of irrelevant details and impertinent incidents that have cluttered no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil
the voluminous record, the facts of this case may be briefly narrated as Service Laws.
follows: As Justice Ramon C. Fernandez declared in an earlier case:
The petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer 11, Office of the City It is well settled that the determination of the kind of
Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on February 18, 1983. 1 The appointment to be extended lies in the official vested by
appointment was described as permanent" but the Civil Service law with the appointing power and not the Civil Service
Commission approved it as "temporary," subject to the final action taken Commission. The Commissioner of Civil Service is not
in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee, and empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
provided "there (was) no pending administrative case against the appointment extended by the appointing officer. When the
appointee, no pending protest against the appointment nor any decision appointee is qualified, as in this case, the Commissioner of
by competent authority that will adversely affect the approval of the Civil Service has no choice but to attest to the
appointment." 2 On March 22, 1984, after protracted hearings the legality appointment. Under the Civil Service Law, Presidential
of which does not have to be decided here, the Civil Service Commission Decree No. 807, the Commissioner is not authorized to
found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the curtail the discretion of the appointing official on the
contested position and, accordingly, directed "that Felicula Tuozo be nature or kind of the appointment to be extended. 8
appointed to the position of Administrative Officer 11 in the Administrative Indeed, the approval is more appropriately called an attestation, that is, of
Division, Cebu City, in place of Felimon Luego whose appointment as the fact that the appointee is qualified for the position to which he has
Administrative Officer II is hereby revoked." 3 The private respondent was been named. As we have repeatedly held, such attestation is required of
so appointed on June 28, 1984, by the new mayor, Mayor Ronald the Commissioner of Civil Service merely as a check to assure compliance
Duterte. 4 The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, is with Civil Service Laws.9
now before us to question that order and the private respondent's title. Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed
The issue is starkly simple: Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only
disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications
better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the
his replacement by the latter? ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
The Solicitor General, rather than face the question squarely, says the preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom
petitioner could be validly replaced in the instant case because his which only the appointing authority can decide.
appointment was temporary and therefore could be withdrawn at will, with It is different where the Constitution or the law subjects the appointment
or without cause. Having accepted such an appointment, it is argued, the to the approval of another officer or body, like the Commission on
petitioner waived his security of tenure and consequently ran the risk of an Appointments under 1935 Constitution. 10 Appointments made by the
abrupt separation from his office without violation of the Constitution. 5 President of the Philippines had to be confirmed by that body and could
While the principle is correct, and we have applied it many times, 6 it is not not be issued or were invalidated without such confirmation. In fact,
correctly applied in this case. The argument begs the question. The confirmation by the Commission on Appointments was then considered
appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was part of the appointing process, which was held complete only after such
therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated confirmation. 11
that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the Moreover, the Commission on Appointments could review the wisdom of
respondent Civil Service Commission to reverse him and call it temporary. the appointment and had the power to refuse to concur with it even if the
The stamping of the words "APPROVED as TEMPORARY" did not change the President's choice possessed all the qualifications prescribed by law. No
character of the appointment, which was clearly described as "Permanent" similar arrangement is provided for in the Civil Service Decree. On the
in the space provided for in Civil Service Form No. 33, dated February 18, contrary, the Civil Service Commission is limited only to the non-
discretionary authority of determining whether or not the person appointed WHEREFORE, the resolution of the respondent Commission on Civil Service
meets all the required conditions laid down by the law. dated March 22, 1984, is set aside, and the petitioner is hereby declared
It is understandable if one is likely to be misled by the language of Section to be entitled to the office in dispute by virtue of his permanent
9(h) of Article V of the Civil Service Decree because it says the appointment thereto dated February 18, 1983. No costs.
Commission has the power to "approve" and "disapprove" appointments. SO ORDERED.
Thus, it is provided therein that the Commission shag have inter alia the
power to:
9(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or
promotional to positions in the civil service, except those
presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and jailguards,
and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess
appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. (emphasis
supplied)
However, a full reading of the provision, especially of the underscored
parts, will make it clear that all the Commission is actually allowed to do is
check whether or not the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service
eligibility or the required qualifications. If he does, his appointment is
approved; if not, it is disapproved. No other criterion is permitted by law
to be employed by the Commission when it acts on--or as the Decree
says, "approves" or "disapproves" an appointment made by the proper
authorities.
Significantly, the Commission on Civil Service acknowledged that both the
petitioner and the private respondent were qualified for the position in
controversy. 12 That recognition alone rendered it functus officio in the
case and prevented it from acting further thereon except to affirm the
validity of the petitioner's appointment. To be sure, it had no authority to
revoke the said appointment simply because it believed that the private
respondent was better qualified for that would have constituted an
encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.
In preferring the private respondent to the petitioner, the Commission was
probably applying its own Rule V, Section 9, of Civil Service Rules on
Personnel Actions and Policies, which provides that "whenever there are
two or more employees who are next-in-rank, preference shall be given to
the employee who is most competent and qualified and who has the
appropriate civil service eligibility." This rule is inapplicable, however,
because neither of the claimants is next in rank. Moreover, the next-in-
rank rule is not absolute as the Civil Service Decree allows vacancies to be
filled by transfer of present employees, reinstatement, re-employment, or
appointment of outsiders who have the appropriate eligibility. 13
There are apparently no political overtones in this case, which looks to be
an honest contention between two public functionaries who each sincerely
claims to be entitled to the position in dispute. This is gratifying for politics
should never be permitted to interfere in the apolitical organization of the
Civil Service, which is supposed to serve all the people regardless of
partisan considerations. This political detachment will be impaired if the
security of tenure clause in the Constitution is emasculated and
appointments in the Civil Service are revoked and changed at will to suit
the motivations and even the fancies of whatever party may be in power.
G.R. No. L-3081             October 14, 1949 it to him periodically up to the present time. Their action was based on a
ANTONIO LACSON, petitioner, reply given to their query, by the Secretary of Justice to the effect that
vs. Romero, was the provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental. This is the reason
HONORIO ROMERO, ET AL., respondents. Cruz, Puno and Lacson for why the Auditor and the Treasurer of Negros Oriental were likewise made
petitioner. respondents in these proceedings.
The respondent Provincial Fiscal in his own behalf. The purpose of the present action is to establish the right of the petitioner
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Assistant Solicitor to the post of provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental and to oust the
Inocencio Rosal for respondent Judge. respondent Romero therefrom. The petition and the memorandum in
Avena, Villaflores and Lopez for other respondents. support thereof among other things contain the following prayer:
(1) Recognizing the right of petitioner Antonio Lacson to hold and
occupy the position of provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental;
MONTEMAYOR, J.: (2) Declaring the respondent Honorio Romero guilty of usurpation,
Involved in these quo warranto proceedings filed directly with this Court is unlawful holding and exercise of the functions and duties of
the Office of Provincial Fiscal of Negros Oriental, and the right to said provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental; ordering the exclusion of said
position as between the petitioner Antonio Lacson and the respondent from said office; and ordering him to surrender to
respondent Honorio Romero. herein petitioner all records and papers appertaining to said office
The facts necessary for the decision in this case may be stated as follows: that may have come into his possession;
Petitioner Lacson was on July 25, 1946, appointed by the President of the (3) Ordering respondents provincial treasurer L. J. Alfabeto and
Philippines, provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental. The appointment was provincial auditor Angel Paguia, or their successors in office, to pay
confirmed by the Commission on Appointment on August 6, 1946. He took herein petitioner his salary commencing June 16, 1949, up to the
his oath of office on August 10, 1946, and thereafter performed the duties present time and until herein petitioner shall have legally ceased to
of that office. be the incumbent of said office; and
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice, on May 17, 1949, the (4) Ordering respondent Honoro Romero pay the costs.
President nominated petitioner Lacson to the post of provincial fiscal of Incidentally, and to serve as background in the consideration of this case,
Tarlac. On the same date, the President nominated for the position of it may be stated that when the nominations of Lacson and Romero to the
provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental respondent Romero. Both nominations posts of Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and Negros Oriental, respectively, were
were simultaneously confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on made in May, 1949, Negros Oriental was a second class province with a
May 19, 1949. salary of P5,100 per annum for the post of provincial fiscal, while Tarlac
Lacson neither accepted the appointment nor assumed the office of fiscal was first class simple with a higher salary of P5,700 per annum for its
of Tarlac. But respondent Romero took his oath of office (the post of fiscal provincial fiscal. There is therefore reason to believe that the nomination
of Negros Oriental) in Manila on June 16, 1949, notified the Solicitor of Lacson to Tarlac or rather his attempted transfer from Negros Oriental
General of the fact, and thereafter proceeded to his station. Upon arrival to Tarlac was intended and considered as a promotion. At least, there is
at Dumaguete City, capital of Negros Oriental, he notified Lacson of his nothing in the record to show that he was being deliberately eased out of
intention to take over the office the following day, but Lacson objected. On or removed from his post in Negros Oriental. However, the appointments
June 24, 1949, Romero appeared in criminal case No. 4433 before Judge and confirmations, the President raised the province of Negros Oriental to
Gregorio S. Narvasa. In said appearance, petitioner Lacson filed his the category of First Class A province with retroactive effect as of January
objection and asked that Romero's appearance be stricken from the 1, 1949. It is alleged by respondent Romero that after the filing of the
record. After Romero had exhibited his credentials as required by the present petition, Tarlac was likewise raised to the category of First Class B
court, Judge Narvasa on the same day denied the petition of Lacson and province on July 15, 1949 so that thereafter the salary for provincial fiscal
recognized respondent Romero as the provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental. in both province is the same, namely, P6,000 each. This might be one of
On June 27, 1949, Romero appeared in Special Proceedings No. 630 the reasons why petitioner to the Province of Tarlac, preferring accept his
before Judge Felicisimo Ocampo. Lacson again objected to said appearance nomination to the Province of Tarlac, preferring to remain at his old post of
but the court overruled his objection. This will explain why Judges Narvasa provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental.
and Ocampo were made respondents in these quo warranto proceedings. The determination as to who is entitled to the position of provincial fiscal
When petitioner Lacson requested payment of his salary for the period of Negros Oriental, depends upon the correct answers to several queries
from June 16 to June 23, 1949 as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental, such as: (1) Did the Commission on Appointments alone, without his
Angel Paguia, Provincial Auditor and L. J. Alfabeto, Provincial Treasurer acceptance nomination of Lacson to Tarlac and its confirmation by the
turned down his claim and instead paid respondent Romero the salary for thereof create a vacancy in the post of provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental
the position of provincial fiscal from June 16, 1949, and continued paying so that Romero could be lawfully appointed to said vacancy? (2) Does the
nomination of Lacson to Tarlac and its confirmation by the Commission on same Code provides that "person in the Philippine Civil Service pertain
Appointments serve as and is equivalent to a removal of Lacson as fiscal of either to the classified or unclassified service." Section 671 of the same
Negros Oriental? If in the affirmative, was that removal and lawful? (3) code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 177, section 8 in part
Could the President who appointed Lacson as provincial fiscal of Negros provides as follows:
Oriental remove him at will and without cause, or did the post of provincial Sec. 671. Person embraced in unclassified. — The following officers
fiscal in general have attached to it a tenure of office during which the and employees constitute the unclassified service:.lawphi1.nêt
incumbent may not be removed except for cause? (a) A secretary, a sergeant-at-arm, and such other officers as may
The appointment to a government post like that of provincial fiscal to be be required and chosen by the National Assembly in accordance
complete involves several steps. First, comes the nomination by the with the Constitution.
President. Then to make that nomination valid and permanent, the (b) Officers, other than the provincial treasurers and Assistant
Commission on Appointments of the Legislature has to confirm said Directors of Bureaus or Offices, appointed by the President of the
nomination. The last step is the acceptance thereof by the appointee by Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments
his assumption of office. The first two steps, nomination and confirmation, of the National Assembly, and all other officers of the Government
constitute a mere offer of a post. They are acts of the Executive and whose appointments are by law vested in the President of the
Legislative departments of the Government. But the last necessary step to Philippines alone.
make the appointment complete and effective rests solely with the (c) Elective officers.
appointee himself. He may or he may not accept the appointment or xxx     xxx     xxx
nomination. As held in the case of Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil., 327, From the foregoing, We find that the post of provincial fiscal in the
"there is no Power in this country which can compel a man to accept an Philippines is included in subsection (b) above-quoted particularly the
office." Consequently, since Lacson has declined to accept his appointment underlined portion thereof. The law regarding appointment to the post of
as provincial fiscal of Tarlac and no one can compel him to do so, then he provincial fiscal is contained in section 66 of the Administrative Code which
continues as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental and no vacancy in said provides that "the Governor-General (now the President) shall appoint
office was created, unless Lacson had been lawfully removed as Such fiscal among other officials, Secretaries to Departments, Provincial
of Negros Oriental. Treasurers, Provincial Fiscals, Register of Deeds, etc." And, Article VII,
As to the second question, it is obvious that the intended transfer of section 10(3) of the Constitution provides that the President shall
Lacson to Tarlac on the basis of his nomination thereto, if carried out, nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments shall
would be equivalent to a removal from his office in Negros Oriental. To appoint among other officials, "all other officers of the Government whose
appoint and transfer him from one province to another would mean his appointments are not herein otherwise provided for" which clearly includes
removal or separation from the first province. The reason is that a fiscal is the office of provincial fiscal. It is therefore clear that a provincial fiscal
appointed for each province (see. 1673, Rev. Adm. Code), and Lacson who is nominated and appointed by the President with the consent of the
could not well and legally hold and occupy the two posts of fiscal of Tarlac Commission on Appointments, as was petitioner Lacson, is, under section
and Negros Oriental simultaneously. To be fiscal for Tarlac must mean his 671 (b) above-quoted, included in the unclassified service of the Civil
removal from Negros Oriental. Service.
In the case of Nicolas vs. Alberto, 51 Phil., 370, this Court held that "a The next question arises as to whether the President even with the
transfer of a Justice of the Peace outside of the municipality of which he is concurrence or consent of the Commission on Appointments may remove a
appointed is in legal effect a combined removal and appointment." provincial fiscal without cause. The Constitution itself denies said right.
(Decision in this case was reversed by the U. S. Supreme Court [279 U. S., Article XII, section 4 of said instrument provides that "no officer or
1411, but on other grounds, leaving the doctrine on transfer and removal employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for
undisturbed.) When the transfer is consented to and accepted by the cause as provided by law." This constitutional provision is reproduced word
transferees, then there would be no question; but where as in the present for word in the in the paragraph of sec. 694 of the Rev. Adm. Code, as
case, the transfer is involuntary and objected to, then it is necessary to amended by Commonwealth Act No. 177, section 22.
decide whether the removal is lawful. In order to better appreciate the meaning of this constitutional provision
What is the nature of the office of provincial fiscal? Is it included in the as well as the purpose behind it, it is necessary to delve, though ever so
Civil Service? The answer is, undoubtedly, in the affirmative. Article XII, lightly into the framing of this basic instrument. The Committee on Civil
section 1 of our Constitution provides that "a Civil Service embracing all Service of the Constitutional Convention which drafted the Constitution in
branches and subdivisions of the Government shall be provided by law." its report and in advocating the merit system in connection with a civil
Section 668 of the Administrative Code as amended by Com. Act No. 177, service system among other things stated the following:
sec. 6, provides that "the Philippine Civil Service shall embrace all The adoption of the "merit system" in government service has
branches and subdivisions of the Government;" and section 670 of the secured efficiency and social justice. It eliminates the political
 factor in the selection of civil employees which is the first essential the reason why we find the American cases cited in support of
to an efficient personnel system. It insures equality of opportunity respondent's theory to be inapplicable. The prohibition against removal
to all deserving applicants desirous of a career in the public except for cause contained in our Constitution has no counterpart in the
service. It advocates a new concept of the public office as a career Federal Constitution of the United States.
open to all and not the exclusive patrimony of any party or faction Again, it is contended that the provincial fiscal is not appointed for a fixed
to be doled out as a reward for party service. (Arnego's Framing of term and that there is no tenure of office attached to the post. This
the Constitution, Vol. II, p. 886.) contention is without merit. As we have already stated, a provincial fiscal
The "merit system" was adopted only after the nations of the world as a civil service official may not be removed from office even by the
took cognizance of its merits. Political patronage in the President who appointed him, and even with the consent of the
government service was sanctioned in 1789 by the constitutional Commission on Appointments, except for cause. Considering this security
right of the President of the United States to act alone in the and protection accorded a provincial fiscal from arbitrary and illegal
matter of removals. From the time of Andrew Jackson, the removal from office, and considering the provisions of section 1673 of the
principle of the "To the victor belong the spoils" dominated the Administrative Code which among other things provides, that "after
Federal Government. The system undermined moral values and December 31, 1932 any city fiscal or assistant city fiscal of
destroyed administrative efficiency. . . . . (Ibid, p. 886.) Manila,  provincial fiscal or deputy provincial fiscal over 65 years of age
Since the establishment of the American Regime in the Philippines shall vacate his office, the logical inference is that a provincial fiscal duly
we have enjoyed the benefits of the "merit system." The appointed, until he reaches the age of 65 has the right to continue in office
Schurman Commission advocated in its report that "the greatest unless sooner removed for cause. In other words, he enjoys tenure of
care should be taken in the selection of officials for administration. office, which is duly protected by statute and by the Constitution.
They should be men of the highest character and fitness, and The last part of the report of the Committee on Civil Service of the
partisan politics should be entirely separated from the Constitutional Convention which we have reproduced mentions this tenure
government." The Governor-General after William Taft adopted the of office in its last sentence, — "This affords public employees reasonable
policy of appointing Filipinos in the government regardless of their security or tenure." Speaking of tenure of office of members of the civil
party affiliation. As the result of these "the personnel of the Civil service in the Philippines, Professor Sinco in his book on Philippine Political
Service had gradually come to be one of which the people of the Law has the following to say:
United States could feel justly proud. Security of Tenure.
Necessity for Constitutional Provisions. — The inclusion in the Nothing can be more demoralizing to a group of civil servants than
constitution of provisions regarding the "merit system" is a the fear that they might be removed from their posts any time at
necessity of modern times. As its establishment secures good the pleasure of their superiors. It goes without saying that a
government, the citizens have a right to expect its guarantee as a demoralized force is an inefficient form Security of tenure is
permanent institution. . . . . (Ibid. p. 887.) necessary in order to obtain efficiency in the civil service. For this
Separations, Suspensions, Demotion, and Transfers. — The "merit purpose the Constitution provides that "no officer or employee in
system" will be ineffective if no safeguards are placed around the the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause
separation and removal of public employees. The Committee's as provided by law." (Philippine Political Law by Sinco, p. 350.)
report requires that removals shall be made only for "causes and In our discussion of the functions of the President, it was there
in the manner provided by law." This means that there should be shown that the President's power of removal which is implied from
bona fide reasons and action may be taken only after the his power of appointment, is very comprehensive and almost
employee shall have been given a fair hearing. This affords to unlimited when it affects officers holding purely executive
public employees reasonable security of tenure. (Ibid. p. 890.) positions. This class of officers, under the rule laid down in the
It is contended on of the respondent that the power of removal is inherent Meyers case, may be removed by the President at practically any
in the power to appoint and that consequently, the President had the right time and for any cause. No statutory check, such as a requirement
to remove the petitioner as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental and transfer that his order of removal should be subject to the previous consent
him to Tarlac. Ordinarily, where there is no constitutional limitation the of the senate or the Commission on Appointments before it could
contention of the respondent would be tenable; but where as in the be effective, may be validly placed upon his right to exercise this
Philippines and as already stated the Constitution forbids the removal of a power. But the provision of the Constitution of the Philippines,
civil service official or employee like the petitioner except for cause as which has no counterpart in the Constitution of the United States,
provided by law, said right of the Chief Executive is qualified and limited. makes the tenure of officers and employees in the Civil Service
That constitutional prohibition is a limitation to the inherent power of the secure even against the President's power of removal  and even if
Executive to remove those civil service officials whom he appoints. This is the officers should hold purely executive offices. The result is that
 the scope of the rule established in the Meyers case is considerably Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, providing for the particular
modified and reduced when applied in this jurisdiction. It may only powers and duties of the Governor-General, now the President of the
apply in case of executive officers appointed by the President and Republic, in part reads as follows:
not belonging to the Civil Service as established by the xxx     xxx     xxx
Constitution. (Ibid. pp. 350-351.). (b) To remove officials from office conformably to law and to
It is also contended by the respondent that neither the Constitution nor declare vacant the offices held by such removed officials.
the laws passed by the Legislature mention or enumerate the cause or For disloyalty  to the United States (now the Philippines), the
causes for which a civil service official may be removed from office. We Governor-General (now the President) may at any time remove a
find this claim untenable. Section 686 of the Revised Administrative Code, person from any position of trust or authority under the
as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 177, section 18 provides that Government of the Philippine Islands.
falsification by a civil service official of his daily time record shall render (c) To order, when in his opinion the good of the public service so
him liable to summary removal and subject him to prosecution as provided requires, an investigation or any action or the conduct of any
by law. A like provision for removal and prosecution is found in section 687 person in the Government service, and in connection therewith to
of the same Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act 177, section 19 designate the official, committee, or person by whom such
which deals with political activity and contribution to political fund by civil investigation shall be conducted.
service employees. Then we have Rule XIII, section 6 of the Civil Service xxx     xxx     xxx
Rules providing thus: Section 694 of the Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act
6. Discourtesy to private individuals or to Government officers or No. 177, section 22, reads as follows:
employees, drunkenness, gambling, dishonesty, repeated or Sec. 694. Removal or suspension. — No officer or employee in the
flagrant violation or neglect of duty, notoriously disgraceful or civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as
immoral conduct, physical incapacity due to immoral or vicious provided by law.
habits, incompetency, inefficiency, borrowing money by superior The President of the Philippines may suspend any chief or assistant
officers from subordinates or lending money by subordinate to chief of a bureau or office, and in the absence of special provision,
superior officers, lending money at exhorbitant rates of interest, any other officer appointed by him, pending an investigation of
willful failure to pay just debts, contracting loans of money or charges against such officer or pending an investigation of his
other property from merchants or other persons with whom the bureau or office. With the approval of the head of department, the
bureau of the borrower is in business relations, pecuniary chief of a bureau or office may likewise suspend any subordinate
embarrassment arising from reprehensible conduct, the pursuits of or employee in his bureau or under his authority pending an
private business, vocation, or profession without permission in investigation, if the charge against such subordinate or employee
writing from the chief of the bureau or office in which employed involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct or neglect in
and of the Governor-General (now the President)or proper head of the performance of duty.
Department, disreputable or dishonest conduct committed prior to From the sections above-quoted, the inference is inevitable that before a
entering the service, insubordination, pernicious political activity, civil service official or employee can be removed, there must first be an
offensive political partisanship or conduct prejudicial to the best investigation at which he must be given a fair hearing and an opportunity
interest of the service, or the willful violation by any person in the to defend himself. In the case of petitioner Lacson, the record fails to
Philippine civil service of any of the provisions of the Revised Civil show, neither is there any claim that he has been charged with any
Service Act or rules, may be considered reasons demanding violation of law or civil service regulation, much leas investigated and
proceedings to remove for cause, to reduce in class or grade, or to thereafter found guilty so as to authorize or warrant removal from office.
inflict other punishment as provided by law in the discretion of the In view of the foregoing, we are constrained to find and to hold that the
Governor-General (now the President) or proper head of transfer of Lacson to Tarlac by his nomination to the post of provincial
Department. No chief of a bureau or office shall knowingly fiscal of that province was equivalent to and meant his removal as
continue in the public service any subordinate officer or employee provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental; that said removal was illegal and
who is inefficient or who is guilty of any of the above-named unlawful for lack of valid cause as provided by law and the Constitution;
derelictions, without submitting the facts through the Director to that the confirmation of the nomination by the Commission on
the Governor-General (now the President) or proper head of Appointments did not and could not validate the removal, since the
Department. Constitution is equally binding on the Legislature; that a provincial fiscal is
The law and civil service rules above referred to clearly provide the causes a civil service official or employee whose tenure of office is protected by
or some of the causes for removal of civil service officials; and they the Constitution; and that Antonio Lacson could not be compelled to
answer the contention of the respondent on this point. accept his appointment as provincial fiscal of Tarlac; that having declined
said appointment, he continued as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental; that the Government as register of deeds of Negros Oriental, then was
inasmuch as he neither left, abandoned nor resigned from his post as promoted to the post of fiscal, first of the Province of Palawan, then of
provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental, there was no vacancy in said post to Surigao, later of Antique and lastly of Negros Oriental in 1946. He does not
which the respondent could be legally appointed; and that consequently, want to accept the transfer to the Province of Tarlac. His only alternative
the appointment of the respondent was invalid. would be to resign, sacrifice his twenty years of continuous, faithful service
In this connection we may point out that the Constitution having clearly and his career, and perchance his hope that some day, he might yet be
limited and qualified the Presidential power of removal in order to protect promoted to the judiciary. Not a very bright prospect or picture, not only
civil service officials and employees, secure to them a reasonable tenure of to him but to other civil service officials in like circumstance.
office and thus give the country the benefit of an efficient civil service But in justice to the President and the Commission on Appointments, let it
based on the merit system, this Court could do no less than give effect to be stated once again that it would seem that the transfer of the petitioner
the plain intent and spirit of the basic law, specially when it is to Tarlac was not meant and intended as a punishment, a disciplinary
supplemented and given due course by statutes, rules and regulations. To measure or demotion. It was really a promotion, at least at the time the
hold that civil service officials hold their office at the will of the appointing appointment was made. Only, that later, due to a change in the category
power subject to removal or forced transfer at any time, would demoralize of Oriental Negros as a province, the transfer was no longer a promotion in
and undermine and eventually destroy the whole Civil Service System and salary. And yet the respondent and the Solicitor General insisted in the
structure. The country would then go back to the days of the old transfer despite the refusal of the petitioner to accept his new
Jacksonian Spoils System under which a victorious Chief Executive, after appointment.
the elections could if so minded, sweep out of office, civil service In conclusion, we find and declare the petitioner to be the provincial fiscal
employees differing in political color or affiliation from him, and sweep in of Negros Oriental, and the respondent not being entitled to said post, is
his political followers and adherents, especially those who have given him hereby ordered to surrender to the petitioner all the records or papers
help, political or otherwise. A Chief Executive running for re-election may appertaining to said office that may have come into his possession. The
even do this before election time not only to embarrass and eliminate his respondent provincial auditor and provincial treasurer, are hereby ordered
political enemies from office but also to put his followers in power so that to pay to the herein petitioner his salary from June 16, 1949, and as long
with their official influence they could the better help him and his party in as said petitioner continues to be the legal incumbent to the office in
the elections. As may be gathered from the report of the Committee of the question. Considering that the respondent appears to have acted in good
Constitutional Convention which we have reproduced at the beginning of faith and relied upon his nomination by the President and the confirmation
this opinion, the framers of our Constitution, at least the Civil Service thereof by the Commission on Appointments, as well as the position taken
Committee thereof, condemned said spoils system and purposely and by the Solicitor-General, who sustained his appointment, we make no
deliberately inserted the constitutional prohibition against removal except pronouncement as to costs.
for cause, which now forms the basis of this decision.
There are hundreds, yea, thousands of young, ambitious people who enter
the Civil Service not temporarily or as a makeshift, but to make a career
out of it. They give the best years of their lives to the service in the hope
and expectation that with faithful service, loyalty and some talent, they
may eventually attain the upper reaches and levels of official hierarchy.
To permit circumvention of the constitutional prohibition in question by
allowing removal from office without lawful cause, in the form or guise of
transfers from one office to another, or from one province to another,
without the consent of the transferee, would blast the hopes of these
young civil service officials and career men and women, destroy their
security and tenure of office and make for a subservient, discontented and
inefficient civil service force that sways with every political wind that blows
and plays up to whatever political party is in the saddle. That would be far
from what the framers of our Constitution contemplated and desired.
Neither would that be our concept of a free and efficient Government
force, possessed of self-respect and reasonable ambition.
Incidentally, it happens that the petitioner is one of those we had in mind
as making a career of the Government service. He claims and it is not
denied by the respondent, that twenty years ago he entered the service of
 [G.R. No. L-32271. January 27, 1983.] certification by the Commissioner of Civil Service that Mr. Verra possessed
the qualifications and the eligibility, doubtful though the latter may be, for
MARCIAL COSTIN, ESTANISLAO LAJER, LIONEL KANEN as Chief of the position of chief of police could not have made the proceedings in court
Police; FRANCISCO TISADO, OCTAVIO TRAYA as Municipal Mayor; moot and academic much less rendered inutile the 1966 decision of the
DOMINGO IPONG as Municipal Treasurer; and THE MUNICIPAL Court of Appeals granting the petition for a writ of mandamus in Lajer’s
COUNCIL OF ABUYOG, LEYTE, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE LOPE C. favor.
QUIMBO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, and
HIGINIO VERRA, Respondents. 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURE OF POSITION OF APPOINTEE WHILE ACTION
FOR REINSTATEMENT OF PREDECESSOR IS BEING LITIGATED. — At most
Zoila M. Redoña and Bonifacio M. Batol, for Petitioners. private respondent was a de facto officer during the years when petitioner
was litigating his action for reinstatement in the Court of First Instance
Leonardo L. Leonida and Francisco Aurillo for Private Respondent. and in the Court of Appeals.

SYLLABUS 5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID; EQUITIES BASED ON QUALIFICATIONS; CASE AT

BAR. — While there is no point in resolving the issue as to who has better
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS; APPOINTMENTS; NOT qualifications and more nearly appropriate eligibility for the position of
POSSIBLE IN A NON-VACANT POSITION; CASE AT BAR. — It is elementary chief of police — a police sergeant with ten years experience and
in the law of public officers that no person, no matter how qualified and patrolman’s eligibility or a school teacher with a senior teacher’s eligibility,
eligible he is for a certain position may be appointed to an office which is the equities of the case do not lean towards respondent Verra. Estanislao
not vacant. There can be no appointment to a non-vacant position. The Lajer had been a member of the Abuyog police force since January 1,
incumbent must first be legally removed or his appointment validly 1949. He had passed the patrolman’s examination, was promoted to
terminated. In the case at bar, since petitioner Lajer was not validly corporal, later to sergeant, and finally to chief of police in his tenth year of
terminated from public office and, as a matter of fact, was ordered service. On the other hand, Higinio Verra was a school teacher with
reinstated through a writ of mandamus, by no less than the Court of apparently no police experience whatsoever when he was appointed chief
Appeals, it follows that there was no vacancy in the office of chief of police of police on January 14, 1960.
on January 14, 1960 and there was no office to which respondent Higinio
Verra could have been appointed. 6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DECISION OF THE COURT BINDS ANY OTHER
APPOINTEE IN FAVOR OF OFFICER ADJUDGED ENTITLED TO IT. — Where
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE FOR FINALITY AND COMPLETENESS; DEFECT the issue before the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals was
CANNOT BE INVOKED BY APPOINTEE WHO CAUSED NON-COMPLIANCE whether or not the Mayor, Municipal Council, Municipal Treasurer, and the
THEREWITH; CASE AT BAR. — While private respondent is correct in Municipality of Abuyog, Leyte illegally terminated the chief of police,
asserting that when the promotional appointment of petitioner was made sergeant of police, and six other members of the police from their
in 1959, it could not be considered final or complete under Section 2 (a) of respective offices and whether or not mandamus may issue to compel
Rule VI, the Civil Service Rules implementing Section 16 (b) of Republic their reinstatement mandamus having issued, any person whether Mr.
Act 2260 and under Section 20 of the same Republic Act, respondent Verra Higinio Verra who was not a party to the case or any other appointee to
cannot rely on the absence of an attestation from the provincial treasurer the contested position must give up the office in favor of the officer
and a certification from the Civil Service Commissioner insofar as Lajer’s adjudged by the courts to be entitled to it.
appointment is concerned because by the fact of Verra’s appointment,
these requirements could no longer be fulfilled. Mayor Octavio Traya took
the appointments away from the office of the Provincial Treasurer before DECISION
they could be acted upon. The Commissioner could no longer act within
180 days.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTESTED APPOINTMENTS; DECISION OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS SUPERSEDES ANY DECISION OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OR THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONER ON THE SAME ISSUE
AND FACTS. — The decision of the Court of Appeals superseded any In this petition for review, the petitioners seek the annulment or reversal
decision that the Court of First Instance or the Civil Service Commissioner of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in Civil Case No.
could have rendered on the same issue and the same facts. The 3606, entitled Higinio Verra v. Marcial Costin, Et. Al. In that case for a writ
of quo warranto with mandamus, the respondent court declared Verra reinstated Lajer as chief of police on April 1, 1966.
entitled to reinstatement with payment of salaries for the whole period
from his illegal separation from the service to the date of his On July 24, 1966, respondent Verra amended his petition in Civil Case No.
reinstatement.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary 3606, impleading Lajer as additional respondent therein.

Petitioner Estanislao Lajer was a member of the municipal police force of On November 7, 1968, respondent Verra filed a second amended petition
Abuyog, Leyte since January 1, 1949. He was extended a promotional including as respondents the following: Octavio Traya, who succeeded
appointment as sergeant of police on October 15, 1958. On November 25, Tisado as mayor; Lionel Kanen who succeeded Lajer as chief of police
1959, the outgoing municipal mayor of Abuyog accorded Lajer another (Lajer retired from the service on February 1, 1968); Domingo Ipong who
promotional appointment as chief of police. This last appointment was not succeeded Cuyno (deceased) as municipal treasurer; and the Municipal
attested and approved as required by law. Council of Abuyog, which appropriates funds for the office in question.

On January 14, 1960, the new municipal mayor dismissed Lajer and eight On December 2, 1969, respondent judge rendered his decision in Civil
other members of the police department. On the same day, the municipal Case No. 3606, declaring that Verra is entitled to reinstatement with salary
mayor extended to respondent Higinio Verra a permanent appointment as to be paid to him for the whole period of his illegal separation to the date
Chief of Police of Abuyog with a salary of P2,280.00 per annum. Verra of his reinstatement. The court also ordered the municipal mayor to
immediately took over the position. His appointment was eventually reinstate Verra immediately and the municipal treasurer to pay his salary.
approved as permanent under Section 24 (b) of Republic Act 2260 by the This decision is now before us for review.
Commissioner of Civil Service.
Hence, the present petition with the following assignments of
On January 19, 1960, Lajer and the eight members of the police force filed errors:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
an action for mandamus (Civil Case No. 2713) against the municipal
mayor, municipal treasurer and the municipal council of Abuyog, "I. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE
contesting their separation from the service. COURT OF APPEALS IN ITS DECISION ON CIVIL CASE C.A. G.R. NO.
29313-R (Civil Case No. 2713), CFI, LEYTE) ORDERED THE
While this petition for mandamus was pending, there was again a change REINSTATEMENT OF PETITIONER ESTANISLAO LAJER TO THE POSITION
in the municipal administration of Abuyog, Leyte as a result of the 1963 OF SERGEANT OF POLICE OF ABUYOG, LEYTE AND NOT TO THE POSITION
local elections. The newly elected municipal mayor dismissed respondent OF CHIEF OF POLICE;
Verra from office on January 16, 1964. Verra was replaced by Victoriano
Silleza, officer-in-charge, on January 17, 1964 until October, 1964 when "II. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT DECLARING
petitioner Marcial Costin was appointed chief of THAT THERE WAS NO VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF CHIEF OF POLICE OF
police.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary ABUYOG, LEYTE TO WHICH RESPONDENT HIGINIO VERRA COULD HAVE
BEEN VALIDLY AND EFFECTIVELY APPOINTED;
On December 29, 1964, respondent Verra filed Civil Case No. 3606 for quo
warranto with mandamus against Marcial Costin, the municipal mayor, and "III. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
the municipal treasurer, questioning the legality of his separation alleging ISSUE INVOLVED IN THIS CASE IS THE LEGALITY OF RESPONDENT
that he could not be dismissed as chief of police because he was a civil HIGINIO VERRA’S REMOVAL FROM THE SERVICE AS CHIEF OF POLICE
service eligible and in possession of an appointment to the position of chief AND NOT THE VALIDITY OF HIS APPOINTMENT THERETO;
of police of Abuyog, Leyte duly attested "Permanent" by the Civil Service
Commission. "IV. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
SEPARATION OF RESPONDENT HIGINIO VERRA FROM THE OFFICE OF THE
On January 22, 1966, the mandamus suit (Civil Case No. 2713) filed by CHIEF OF POLICE WAS ILLEGAL;
Lajer and his companions, which had been appealed was decided by the
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 29313-R). The appellate court found that "V. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
Lajer, Tomines, and Jervoso "were illegally removed from office and are, RESPONDENT HIGINIO VERRA, NOT BEING A PARTY IN CIVIL CASE NO.
therefore, entitled to reinstatement to their respective positions with 2713 (CFI, LEYTE) FOR MANDAMUS, IS NOT BOUND BY ITS DECISION
payment of the salaries they failed to receive."cralaw virtua1aw library THEREON;

As a result of the appellate decision, petitioner (then mayor) Tisado "VI. THAT, FINALLY, THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING
THE REINSTATEMENT OF OFTMENTIONED HIGINIO VERRA TO THE
POSITION OF CHIEF OF POLICE."cralaw virtua1aw library The lower court’s error lies in its looking at the issues primarily from the
viewpoint of Verra’s removal, his qualifications and eligibility for the
The foregoing assignments of errors may be narrowed down to the position, and whether or not his dismissal was valid. In the process, the
following issues:chanrobles virtualawlibrary lower court overlooked the fact that Verra could not have been
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph permanently appointed to the contested position because no less than the
Court of Appeals had declared that his predecessor, Estanislao Lajer was
1. Whether or not the appointment of respondent Higinio Verra to the illegally terminated from office and must be reinstated to his former
position of Chief of Police of Abuyog, Leyte, was valid and consequently his position.
removal therefrom illegal.
Respondent Verra argues that Lajer’s appointment as chief of police was
2. Whether the Court of Appeals in its decision in C.A.-G.R. No. 29313-R temporary and terminable at the pleasure of the appointing power.
(Civil Case No. 2713-CFI, Leyte) ordered the reinstatement of petitioner
Lajer to the position of Sergeant of Police or Chief of Police. The private respondent is correct in asserting that when the promotional
appointment of Lajer was made in 1959, it could not be considered final or
3. Whether or not respondent Verra is bound by the decision of the lower complete. Under Section 2(a) of Rule VI, the Civil Service Rules
court in Case No. 2713-CFI, Leyte, for mandamus, not being a party to it. implementing Section 16(g) of Republic Act 2260, an appointment
extended by an officer duly empowered to make it is not final and
With respect to the first issue, the petitioners argue that the appointment complete until after the Commissioner of Civil Service has certified that
issued in favor of respondent Verra as chief of police on January 14, 1960, such an appointment may be made. (Gorospe v. Secretary of Public Works
was invalid and ineffective because the said position was not vacant from and Communications Et. Al., 105 Phil. 129)chanrobles.com : virtual law
the time Lajer was illegally separated on January 14, 1960, up to the time library
he was actually reinstated. This is, according to the petitioners, premised
on the fact that the Court of Appeals in deciding Civil Case No. 2713, CFI- It is likewise true that under Section 20 of Republic Act 2260 which, in
Leyte, ordered Lajer’s reinstatement which also legalized the dismissal of part, provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
respondent Verra.
"‘SEC. 20. Delegation in the Civil Service Commission and to the Agencies.
Respondent Verra, on the other hand, contends that the office in question — . . . Appointments by . . . municipal mayors shall become effective upon
was legally vacant when he was appointed thereto because Lajer’s issuance of such appointments and upon attestation by the provincial
appointment was never attested as required by law or incomplete, and, treasurer in the case of appointments made by . . . municipal mayors . . .
therefore, never became effective. It is further contended that Lajer’s All appointments made by the . . . municipal mayors . . . shall, after being
appointment as chief of police was temporary in character and terminable attested to by the respective provincial treasurer . . . be forwarded within
at the pleasure of the appointing authority and when Lajer was separated ten days to the Commissioner of Civil Service for review pursuant to Civil
from the office of chief of police, the position became legally and physically Service law and rules. If within one hundred eighty days after receipt of
vacant. Verra also claims that since he is a civil service eligible and his said appointments, the Commissioner of Civil Service shall not have made
appointment as chief of police was attested as permanent under Section any correction or revision, then such appointments shall be deemed to
20 of Republic Act 2260 and served as such for four (4) years and two (2) have been properly made. . . .’"
days when he was dismissed without cause, his dismissal is illegal.
the attestation by the provincial treasurer of Leyte was necessary to make
We find the petition meritorious. the appointment of petitioner Lajer effective. * However, these
requirements could not be complied with because Lajer, who had been
When respondent Verra was appointed chief of police on January 14, 1960, appointed on November 25, 1959 was replaced on January 14, 1960 by
Lajer had just been dismissed from office with several other members of the new mayor of the municipality who appointed Verra in his stead. As
the police force. The validity of Verra’s appointment, therefore, hinges on pointed out in Dichoso v. Valdepenas (5 SCRA 1069, 1075), the incoming
the legality of Lajer’s removal. It is elementary in the law of public officers mayor should have awaited the action of the provincial treasurer and later,
that no person, no matter how qualified and eligible he is for a certain the Commissioner of Civil Service, before appointing his own protege to a
position may be appointed to an office which is not vacant. There can be position with an incumbent occupying it. Respondent Verra cannot rely on
no appointment to a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be the absence of an attestation from the provincial treasurer and a
legally removed or his appointment validly terminated. certification from the Civil Service Commissioner insofar as Lajer’s
appointment is concerned because by the fact of Verra’s appointment, there was no office from which he was illegally dismissed. At most, he was
these requirements could no longer be fulfilled. Mayor Octavio Traya took a de facto officer during the years when Lajer was litigating his action for
the appointments away from the office of the Provincial Treasurer before reinstatement in the court of first instance and in the court of appeals. And
they could be acted upon. The Commissioner could no longer act within as earlier stated, the certification by the Commissioner of Civil Service that
180 days.chanrobles.com : virtual law library Mr. Verra possessed the qualifications and the eligibility, doubtful though
the latter may be, for the position of chief of police could not have made
The insuperable factor, however, which stands in the way of Verra’s the proceedings, in court moot and academic much less rendered inutile
reinstatement with backwages for eighteen (18) years from 1964 to the the 1966 decision of the Court of Appeals granting the petition for a writ of
present is the Court of Appeals decision in Lajer Et. Al. v. Traya Et. Al. mandamus in Lajer’s favor.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
(CA-G.R. No. 29313-R, January 22, 1966). The Court of Appeals was
presented squarely with the issue of whether or not Estanislao Lajer and Moreover, the equities of the case do not lean towards respondent Verra.
seven other petitioners were illegally separated from the service by Mayor Estanislao Lajer had been a member of the Abuyog police force since
Octavio Traya. In a decision penned by Justice Salvador V. Esguerra, January 1, 1949. He had passed the patrolman’s examination, was
concurred in by Presiding Justice Conrado V. Sanchez and Justice Magno S. promoted to corporal, later to sergeant, and finally to chief of police in his
Gatmaitan, the First Division of the Court of Appeals ruled that Estanislao tenth year of service. On the other hand, Higinio Verra was a school
Lajer, Mariano Tomines, and Melecio Jervoso were illegally removed from teacher with apparently no police experience whatsoever when he was
office and must be reinstated. appointed chief of police on January 14, 1960. It is too late in the day now
to debate the correctness of the Court of Appeals decision that non-
Respondent’s Verra now contends that Lajer was ordered reinstated to the attestation was not sufficient cause for outright removal. The decision has
position of sergeant and not chief of police. Mr. Verra cannot read into a long been final and was implemented in 1966. There is similarly no point
Court of Appeals decision something which is not there. in resolving the issue as to who has better qualifications and more nearly
appropriate eligibility for the position of chief of police - a police sergeant
Mr. Lajer did not go to court to contest the position of police sergeant or to with ten years experience and patrolman’s eligibility or a school teacher
question his removal as police sergeant. He was never removed from a with a senior teacher’s eligibility.
position as sergeant of police. Lajer filed a petition for mandamus to be
reinstated as chief of police. The January 30, 1961 decision of Judge S. C. Verra asks if he should be bound by the decision of the Court of Appeals,
Moscoso of the Court of First Instance of Leyte discusses an appointment not having been a party to the case. The issue before the Court of First
as chief of police. When the decision ordering Lajer’s reinstatement was Instance and the Court of Appeals was whether or not the Mayor,
appealed to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court specifically described Municipal council, Municipal Treasurer and the Municipality of Abuyog,
petitioner Lajer as chief of police and petitioner Mariano Tomines, as police Leyte illegally terminated the chief of police, sergeant of police, and six
sergeant. When Lajer and Tomines were ordered reinstated, it was to the other members of the police force from their respective offices and
said positions as chief of police and police sergeant respectively. whether or not mandamus may issue to compel their reinstatement.
Mandamus having issued, any person whether Mr. Higinio Verra or any
The argument of respondent Verra that Mayor Tisado should have other appointee to the contested position must give up the office in favor
refrained from reinstating Lajer as chief of police notwithstanding the of the officer adjudged by the courts to be entitled to
decision of the Court of Appeals because he, Verra, had filed a case with it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
the Court of First Instance contesting the same position betrays a lack of
understanding of a final and executory decision of an appellate tribunal. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted. The decision of the
The decision of the Court of Appeals superseded any decision that the respondent court in Civil Case No. 3606 is reversed and set aside and the
Court of First Instance or the Civil Service Commissioner could have petition for quo warranto with mandamus filed in the court a quo is
rendered on the same issue and the same facts. It was precisely the ordered dismissed.
termination of Lajer’s promotional appointment as chief of police which the
appellate court struck down. Since Lajer was not validly terminated from
public office and, as a matter of fact, was ordered reinstated through a
writ of mandamus, it follows that there was no vacancy in the office of
chief of police on January 14, 1960 and there was no office to which
Higinio Verra could have been appointed. The discussions in the decision of
the respondent judge on whether or not Higinio Verra was validly removed
from office are all beside the point. Never having been validly appointed,
 holds more positions than what is allowed in Section 1 hereof, they
G.R. No. 83896             February 22, 1991 (sic) must relinquish the excess position in favor of the
subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner, official hold more than two positions other than his primary
vs. position.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent. Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in
G.R. No. 83815             February 22, 1991 government-owned or controlled corporations, at least one-third
ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and CRISPIN T. (1/3) of the members of the boards of such corporation should
REYES, petitioners, either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
vs. Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows
PHILIP ELLA C. JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform; CARLOS members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries
DOMINGUEZ, as Secretary of Agriculture; LOURDES QUISUMBING, to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary
as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports; FULGENCIO positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to
FACTORAN, JR., as Secretary of Environment and Natural Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, 2 which provides as follows:
Resources; VICENTE V. JAYME, as Secretary of Finance; SEDFREY Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
ORDOÑEZ, as Secretary of Justice; FRANKLIN N. DRILON, as Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
Secretary of Labor and Employment; LUIS SANTOS, as Secretary of otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
Local Government; FIDEL V. RAMOS, as Secretary of National employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
Defense; TEODORO F. BENIGNO, as Press Secretary; JUANITO tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
FERRER, as Secretary of Public Works and Highways; ANTONIO participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
ARRIZABAL, as Secretary of Science and Technology; JOSE contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
CONCEPCION, as Secretary of Trade and Industry; JOSE ANTONIO the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
GONZALEZ, as Secretary of Tourism; ALFREDO R.A. BENGZON, as thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
Secretary of Health; REINERIO D. REYES, as Secretary of their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the
Transportation and Communication; GUILLERMO CARAGUE, as conduct of their office.
Commissioner of the Budget; and SOLITA MONSOD, as Head of the It is alleged that the above-quoted Section 13, Article VII prohibits public
National Economic Development Authority, respondents. respondents, as members of the Cabinet, along with the other public
Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David officials enumerated in the list attached to the petitions as Annex "C" in
for petitioners in 83896. G.R. No.
Antonio P. Coronel for petitioners in 83815. 838153 and as Annex "B" in G.R. No. 838964 from holding any other office
or employment during their tenure. In addition to seeking a declaration of
the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284, petitioner Anti-Graft
League of the Philippines further seeks in G.R. No. 83815 the issuance of
FERNAN, C.J.:p
the extraordinary writs of prohibition and mandamus, as well as a
These two (2) petitions were consolidated per resolution dated August 9,
temporary restraining order directing public respondents therein to cease
19881 and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the
and desist from holding, in addition to their primary positions, dual or
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon
multiple positions other than those authorized by the 1987 Constitution
C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. The pertinent provisions of the assailed
and from receiving any salaries, allowances, per diems and other forms of
Executive Order are:
privileges and the like appurtenant to their questioned positions, and
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his
compelling public respondents to return, reimburse or refund any and all
position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant
amounts or benefits that they may have received from such positions.
secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department
Specifically, petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines charges that
may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two
notwithstanding the aforequoted "absolute and self-executing" provision of
positions in the government and government corporations and
the 1987 Constitution, then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez,
receive the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that
construing Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article
this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to
IX-B, rendered on July 23, 1987 Opinion No. 73, series of 1987, 5 declaring
boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman.
that Cabinet members, their deputies (undersecretaries) and assistant
Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant
secretaries may hold other public office, including membership in the
secretary or other appointive official of the Executive Department
boards of government corporations: (a) when directly provided for in the
Constitution as in the case of the Secretary of Justice who is made an ex- Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under Section 8, paragraph (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
1, Article VIII; or (b) if allowed by law; or (c) if allowed by the primary Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
functions of their respective positions; and that on the basis of this Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in Section 7,
Opinion, the President of the Philippines, on July 25, 1987 or two (2) days par. (2), Article I-XB on the Civil Service Commission applies to officers
before Congress convened on July 27, 1987: promulgated Executive Order and employees of the Civil Service in general and that said exceptions do
No. 284.6 not apply and cannot be extended to Section 13, Article VII which applies
Petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines objects to both DOJ Opinion specifically to the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and
No. 73 and Executive Order No. 284 as they allegedly "lumped together" their deputies or assistants.
Section 13, Article VII and the general provision in another article, Section There is no dispute that the prohibition against the President, Vice-
7, par. (2), Article I-XB. This "strained linkage" between the two President, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants
provisions, each addressed to a distinct and separate group of public from holding dual or multiple positions in the Government admits of
officers –– one, the President and her official family, and the other, public certain exceptions. The disagreement between petitioners and public
servants in general –– allegedly "abolished the clearly separate, higher, respondents lies on the constitutional basis of the exception. Petitioners
exclusive, and mandatory constitutional rank assigned to the prohibition insist that because of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
against multiple jobs for the President, the Vice-President, the members of Constitution" used in Section 13 of Article VII, the exception must be
the Cabinet, and their deputies and subalterns, who are the leaders of expressly provided in the Constitution, as in the case of the Vice-President
government expected to lead by example."7 Article IX-B, Section 7, par. being allowed to become a Member of the Cabinet under the second
(2)8 provides: paragraph of Section 3, Article VII or the Secretary of Justice being
Sec. 7. . . . . . designated an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his Article VIII, Sec. 8 (1). Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in the Constitution" in Section
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or 13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled as the appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned.
corporations or their subsidiaries. The threshold question therefore is: does the prohibition in Section 13,
The Solicitor General counters that Department of Justice DOJ Opinion No. Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their
73, series of 1987, as further elucidated and clarified by DOJ Opinion No. deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made
129, series of 19879 and DOJ Opinion No. 155, series of 1988, 10 being the for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB
first official construction and interpretation by the Secretary of Justice of which, for easy reference is quoted anew, thus: "Unless otherwise allowed
Section 13, Article VII and par. (2) of Section 7, Article I-XB of the by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official
Constitution, involving the same subject of appointments or designations shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
of an appointive executive official to positions other than his primary subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
position, is "reasonably valid and constitutionally firm," and that Executive owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries."
Order No. 284, promulgated pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 73, series of We rule in the negative.
1987 is consequently constitutional. It is worth noting that DOJ Opinion A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
No. 129, series of 1987 and DOJ Opinion No. 155, series of 1988 underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that
construed the limitation imposed by E.O. No. 284 as not applying to ex- the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object
officio positions or to positions which, although not so designated as ex- sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to
officio are allowed by the primary functions of the public official, but only be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the
to the holding of multiple positions which are not related to or necessarily light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances
included in the position of the public official concerned (disparate under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the
positions). reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the
In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in
challenged by petitioners on the principal submission that it adds order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that
exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in the reason and calculated to effect that purpose. 11
Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
otherwise provided in this Constitution," the only exceptions against assistants as members of the governing bodies or boards of various
holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided government agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned
in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-President may be appointed as a and controlled corporations, became prevalent during the time legislative
powers in this country were exercised by former President Ferdinand E. assistants from holding any other office or employment during their
Marcos pursuant to his martial law authority. There was a proliferation of tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.
newly-created agencies, instrumentalities and government-owned and Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the
controlled corporations created by presidential decrees and other modes of constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the
presidential issuances where Cabinet members, their deputies or Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his
assistants were designated to head or sit as members of the board with official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the
the corresponding salaries, emoluments, per diems, allowances and other government or elsewhere is concerned.
perquisites of office. Most of these instrumentalities have remained up to Moreover, such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section 13,
the present time. Article VII with other provisions of the Constitution on the disqualifications
This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government of certain public officials or employees from holding other offices or
soon led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took advantage of employment. Under Section 13, Article VI, "(N)o Senator or Member of the
this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. In fact, the holding of House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
multiple offices in government was strongly denounced on the floor of the Government . . .". Under Section 5(4), Article XVI, "(N)o member of the
Batasang Pambansa.12 This condemnation came in reaction to the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed in any
published report of the Commission on Audit, entitled "1983 Summary capacity to a civilian position in the Government, including government-
Annual Audit Report on: Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations, owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries." Even
Self-Governing Boards and Commissions" which carried as its Figure No. 4 Section 7 (2), Article IX-B, relied upon by respondents provides "(U)nless
a "Roaster of Membership in Governing Boards of Government-Owned and otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
Controlled Corporations as of December 31, 1983." appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Particularly odious and revolting to the people's sense of propriety and Government."
morality in government service were the data contained therein that It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to hold
Roberto V. Ongpin was a member of the governing boards of twenty-nine other office or employment, the prohibition pertains to an office or
(29) governmental agencies, instrumentalities and corporations; Imelda R. employment in the government and government-owned or controlled
Marcos of twenty-three (23); Cesar E.A. Virata of twenty-two (22); Arturo corporations or their subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the wording of
R. Tanco, Jr. of fifteen (15); Jesus S. Hipolito and Geronimo Z. Velasco, of Section 13, Article VII which states that "(T)he President, Vice-President,
fourteen each (14); Cesar C. Zalamea of thirteen (13); Ruben B. Ancheta the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
and Jose A. Roño of twelve (12) each; Manuel P. Alba, Gilberto O. unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
Teodoro, and Edgardo Tordesillas of eleven (11) each; and Lilia Bautista employment during their tenure." In the latter provision, the
and Teodoro Q. Peña of ten (10) each.13 disqualification is absolute, not being qualified by the phrase "in the
The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes Government." The prohibition imposed on the President and his official
of discontent with the Marcos regime. It was therefore quite inevitable and family is therefore all-embracing and covers both public and private office
in consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of the people that the or employment.
1986 Constitutional Commission, convened as it was after the people Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides:
successfully unseated former President Marcos, should draft into its "They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any
proposed Constitution the provisions under consideration which are other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in
envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils that flow from the holding of any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
multiple governmental offices and employment. In fact, as keenly Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
observed by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz during the deliberations in these including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
cases, one of the strongest selling points of the 1987 Constitution during subsidiaries." These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the
the campaign for its ratification was the assurance given by its proponents President and his official family, which prohibitions are not similarly
that the scandalous practice of Cabinet members holding multiple positions imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of
in the government and collecting unconscionably excessive compensation Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the
therefrom would be discontinued. armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the
But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article I- President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said
XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple class stricter prohibitions.
offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and Such intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to be stricter with the
appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit President and his official family was also succinctly articulated by
to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting Commissioner Vicente Foz after Commissioner Regalado Maambong noted
the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and during the floor deliberations and debate that there was no symmetry
between the Civil Service prohibitions, originally found in the General It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no one
Provisions and the anticipated report on the Executive Department. provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be
Commissioner Foz Commented, "We actually have to be stricter with the considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular
President and the members of the Cabinet because they exercise more subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to
powers and, therefore, more cheeks and restraints on them are called for effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. 17 Sections bearing on a
because there is more possibility of abuse in their case." 14 particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution 18 and one section is not to
hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two
when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, can be made to stand together.19
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must
when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative,
Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory. 20
all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to
Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of
the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple
This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in offices or employment in the government during their tenure, the
this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face,
broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article I-XB of the 1987 the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be
Constitution. To construe said qualifying phrase as respondents would understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the
have us do, would render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment. Verily,
and purpose of the framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter wherever the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be
prohibition on the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation. 21 The
deputies and assistants with respect to holding other offices or phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a
employment in the government during their tenure. Respondents' literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the
interpretation that Section 13 of Article VII admits of the exceptions found Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member
in Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B would obliterate the distinction so of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President
carefully set by the framers of the Constitution as to when the high- in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII;
ranking officials of the Executive Branch from the President to Assistant and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and
Secretary, on the one hand, and the generality of civil servants from the Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
rank immediately below Assistant Secretary downwards, on the other, may The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment
hold any other office or position in the government during their tenure. under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be
Moreover, respondents' reading of the provisions in question would render construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified
certain parts of the Constitution inoperative. This observation applies therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
particularly to the Vice-President who, under Section 13 of Article VII is provided by law and as required22 by the primary functions of said officials'
allowed to hold other office or employment when so authorized by the office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office"
Constitution, but who as an elective public official under Sec. 7, par. (1) of within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly
Article I-XB is absolutely ineligible "for appointment or designation in any an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. 23 To
capacity to any public office or position during his tenure." Surely, to say characterize these posts otherwise would lead to absurd consequences,
that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" found in among which are: The President of the Philippines cannot chair the
Section 13, Article VII has reference to Section 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB National Security Council reorganized under Executive Order No. 115
would render meaningless the specific provisions of the Constitution (December 24, 1986). Neither can the Vice-President, the Executive
authorizing the Vice-President to become a member of the Cabinet, 15 and Secretary, and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice, Labor and
to act as President without relinquishing the Vice-Presidency where the Employment and Local Government sit in this Council, which would then
President shall not nave been chosen or fails to qualify. 16 Such absurd have no reason to exist for lack of a chairperson and members. The
consequence can be avoided only by interpreting the two provisions under respective undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, would also be
consideration as one, i.e., Section 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB providing the prohibited.
general rule and the other, i.e., Section 13, Article VII as constituting the The Secretary of Labor and Employment cannot chair the Board of
exception thereto. In the same manner must Section 7, par. (2) of Article Trustees of the National Manpower and Youth Council (NMYC) or the
I-XB be construed vis-a-vis Section 13, Article VII. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), both of which are
attached to his department for policy coordination and guidance. Neither Transportation and Communications acting as Chairman of the Maritime
can his Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries chair these agencies. Industry Authority34 and the Civil Aeronautics Board.
The Secretaries of Finance and Budget cannot sit in the Monetary If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental, remotely
Board.24 Neither can their respective undersecretaries and assistant related, inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien to the primary
secretaries. The Central Bank Governor would then be assisted by lower function of a cabinet official, such additional functions would fall under the
ranking employees in providing policy direction in the areas of money, purview of "any other office" prohibited by the Constitution. An example
banking and credit.25 would be the Press Undersecretary sitting as a member of the Board of the
Indeed, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended such Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation. The same rule applies to
absurd consequences. A Constitution, viewed as a continuously operative such positions which confer on the cabinet official management functions
charter of government, is not to be interpreted as demanding the and/or monetary compensation, such as but not limited to chairmanships
impossible or the impracticable; and unreasonable or absurd or directorships in government-owned or controlled corporations and their
consequences, if possible, should be avoided. 26 subsidiaries.
To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be Mandating additional duties and functions to the President, Vice-President,
interpreted as covering positions held without additional compensation Cabinet Members, their deputies or assistants which are not inconsistent
in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary with those already prescribed by their offices or appointments by virtue of
functions of the concerned official's office. The term ex-officio means "from their special knowledge, expertise and skill in their respective executive
office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official offices is a practice long-recognized in many jurisdictions. It is a practice
character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, justified by the demands of efficiency, policy direction, continuity and
but rather annexed to the official position." Ex-officio likewise denotes an coordination among the different offices in the Executive Branch in the
"act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and discharge of its multifarious tasks of executing and implementing laws
without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the affecting national interest and general welfare and delivering basic services
office."27 An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by to the people. It is consistent with the power vested on the President and
virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or his alter egos, the Cabinet members, to have control of all the executive
appointment.28 To illustrate, by express provision of law, the Secretary of departments, bureaus and offices and to ensure that the laws are faithfully
Transportation and Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the executed.35 Without these additional duties and functions being assigned to
Board of the Philippine Ports Authority, 29 and the Light Rail Transit the President and his official family to sit in the governing bodies or boards
Authority.30 of governmental agencies or instrumentalities in an ex-officio capacity as
The Court had occasion to explain the meaning of an ex-officio position provided by law and as required by their primary functions, they would be
in Rafael vs. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board, 31 thus: supervision, thereby deprived of the means for control and resulting in an
"An examination of section 2 of the questioned statute (R.A. 3137) reveals unwieldy and confused bureaucracy.
that for the chairman and members of the Board to qualify they need only It bears repeating though that in order that such additional duties or
be designated by the respective department heads. With the exception of functions may not transgress the prohibition embodied in Section 13,
the representative from the private sector, they sit ex-officio. In order to Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, such additional duties or functions
be designated they must already be holding positions in the offices must be required by the primary functions of the official concerned, who is
mentioned in the law. Thus, for instance, one who does not hold a to perform the same in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law, without
previous appointment in the Bureau of Customs, cannot, under the act, be receiving any additional compensation therefor.
designated a representative from that office. The same is true with respect The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the
to the representatives from the other offices. No new appointments are principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive
necessary. This is as it should be, because the representatives so additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is
designated merely perform duties in the Board in addition to those already that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation
performed under their original appointments."32 attached to his principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, the
The term "primary" used to describe "functions" refers to the order of Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-
importance and thus means chief or principal function. The term is not officio member thereof, he is actually and in legal contemplation
restricted to the singular but may refer to the plural. 33 The additional performing the primary function of his principal office in defining policy in
duties must not only be closely related to, but must be required by the monetary and banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his
official's primary functions. Examples of designations to positions by virtue department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect
of one's primary functions are the Secretaries of Finance and Budget any extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per them or an
sitting as members of the Monetary Board, and the Secretary of honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism. By whatever
name it is designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be
Constitution. had only when other guides fail42 as said proceedings are powerless to
It is interesting to note that during the floor deliberations on the proposal vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
of Commissioner Christian Monsod to add to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX- clear.1âwphi1 Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as
B, originally found as Section 3 of the General Provisions, the exception showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the
"unless required by the functions of his position," 36 express reference to reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the
certain high-ranking appointive public officials like members of the Cabinet large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow
were made.37 Responding to a query of Commissioner Blas Ople, citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
Commissioner Monsod pointed out that there are instances when although fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what
not required by current law, membership of certain high-ranking executive appears upon its face."43 The proper interpretation therefore depends more
officials in other offices and corporations is necessary by reason of said on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's
officials' primary functions. The example given by Commissioner Monsod understanding thereof.44
was the Minister of Trade and Industry. 38 It being clear, as it was in fact one of its best selling points, that the 1987
While this exchange between Commissioners Monsod and Ople may be Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of
used as authority for saying that additional functions and duties flowing the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure
from the primary functions of the official may be imposed upon him multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases
without offending the constitutional prohibition under consideration, it specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to
cannot, however, be taken as authority for saying that this exception is by posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
virtue of Section 7, par. (2) of Article I-XB. This colloquy between the two provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office,
Commissioners took place in the plenary session of September 27, 1986. the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during
Under consideration then was Section 3 of Committee Resolution No. 531 the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive
which was the proposed article on General Provisions. 39 At that time, the officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot
article on the Civil Service Commission had been approved on third override the constitution's manifest intent and the people' understanding
reading on July 22, 1986,40 while the article on the Executive Department, thereof.
containing the more specific prohibition in Section 13, had also been In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation
earlier approved on third reading on August 26, 1986. 41 It was only after to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive
the draft Constitution had undergone reformatting and "styling" by the Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly
Committee on Style that said Section 3 of the General Provisions became restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members,
Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B and reworded "Unless otherwise allowed undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their
by law or by the primary functions of his position. . . ." primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the government and
What was clearly being discussed then were general principles which would government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to
serve as constitutional guidelines in the absence of specific constitutional hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express
provisions on the matter. What was primarily at issue and approved on mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting
that occasion was the adoption of the qualified and delimited phrase them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution
"primary functions" as the basis of an exception to the general rule itself.
covering all appointive public officials. Had the Constitutional Commission The Court is alerted by respondents to the impractical consequences that
intended to dilute the specific prohibition in said Section 13 of Article VII, will result from a strict application of the prohibition mandated under
it could have re-worded said Section 13 to conform to the wider exceptions Section 13, Article VII on the operations of the Government, considering
provided in then Section 3 of the proposed general Provisions, later placed that Cabinet members would be stripped of their offices held in an ex-
as Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B on the Civil Service Commission. officio capacity, by reason of their primary positions or by virtue of
That this exception would in the final analysis apply also to the President legislation. As earlier clarified in this decision, ex-officio posts held by the
and his official family is by reason of the legal principles governing executive official concerned without additional compensation as provided
additional functions and duties of public officials rather than by virtue of by law and as required by the primary functions of his office do not fall
Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B At any rate, we have made it clear that only under the definition of "any other office" within the contemplation of the
the additional functions and duties "required," as opposed to "allowed," by constitutional prohibition. With respect to other offices or employment held
the primary functions may be considered as not constituting "any other by virtue of legislation, including chairmanships or directorships in
office." government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries,
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and suffice it to say that the feared impractical consequences are more
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the apparent than real. Being head of an executive department is no mean
job. It is more than a full-time job, requiring full attention, specialized
knowledge, skills and expertise. If maximum benefits are to be derived
from a department head's ability and expertise, he should be allowed to
attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other
governmental offices or employment. He should be precluded from
dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too many positions of
responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency. Surely
the advantages to be derived from this concentration of attention,
knowledge and expertise, particularly at this stage of our national and
economic development, far outweigh the benefits, if any, that may be
gained from a department head spreading himself too thin and taking in
more than what he can handle.
Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be constitutionally infirm, the court
hereby orders respondents Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., Secretary of Local Government 45 Luis
Santos, Secretary of National Defense Fidel V. Ramos, Secretary of Health
Alfredo R.A. Bengzon and Secretary of the Budget Guillermo Carague to
immediately relinquish their other offices or employment, as herein
defined, in the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries. With respect to the other named
respondents, the petitions have become moot and academic as they are
no longer occupying the positions complained of.
During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be
considered de facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual
services rendered.46 It has been held that "in cases where there is no de
jure, officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of
the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally
entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action
recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office.
This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it
seems unjust that the public should benefit by the services of an officer de
facto and then be freed from all liability to pay any one for such
services.47 Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments received by the
respondents by virtue of actual services rendered in the questioned
positions may therefore be retained by them.
WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification above-stated, the petitions are
GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void and is
accordingly set aside.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989 For his part, the private respondent denies that the filing fee was paid out
RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner, of time. In fact he says, it was flied ahead  of time. His point is that when
vs. he filed his "Petition for Quo Warranto with Prayer for Immediate
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC AND LUIS Annulment of Proclamation and Restraining Order or Injunction" on
L. LARDIZABAL, respondents January 26, 1988, the COMELEC treated it as a pre-proclamation
Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner. controversy and docketed it as SPC Case No. 88-288. No docket fee was
Rillera and Quintana for private respondent. collected although it was offered. It was only on February 8, 1988, that
the COMELEC decided to treat his petition as solely for quo warranto and
CRUZ, J.: re-docketed it as EPC Case No. 88-19, serving him notice on February 10,
The petitioner asks this Court to restrain the Commission on Elections from 1988. He immediately paid the filing fee on that date.
looking into the question of his citizenship as a qualification for his office The private respondent argues further that during the period when the
as Mayor of Baguio City. The allegation that he is a foreigner, he says, is COMELEC regarded his petition as a pre-proclamation controversy, the
not the issue. The issue is whether or not the public respondent has time for filing an election protest or quo warranto  proceeding was deemed
jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this matter, considering that the suspended under Section 248 of the Omnibus Election Code. 2 At any rate,
petition for quo warranto against him was not filed on time. he says, Rule 36, Section 5, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure cited by
It is noteworthy that this argument is based on the alleged tardiness not of the petitioner, became effective only on November 15, 1988, seven days
the petition itself but of the payment of the filing fee, which the petitioner after publication of the said Rules in the Official Gazette pursuant to
contends was an indispensable requirement. The fee is, curiously enough, Section 4, Rule 44 thereof. 3 These rules could not retroact to January
all of P300.00 only. This brings to mind the popular verse that for want of 26,1988, when he filed his petition with the COMELEC.
a horse the kingdom was lost. Still, if it is shown that the petition was In his Reply, the petitioner argues that even if the Omnibus Election Code
indeed filed beyond the reglementary period, there is no question that this did not require it, the payment of filing fees was still necessary under Res.
petition must be granted and the challenge abated. No. 1996 and, before that, Res. No. 1450 of the respondent COMELEC,
The petitioner's position is simple. He was proclaimed mayor-elect of promulgated on January 12, 1988, and February 26, 1980, respectively.
Baguio City, on January 20, 1988. The petition for quo warranto  was filed To this, the private respondent counters that the latter resolution was
by the private respondent on January 26, 1988, but no filing fee was paid intended for the local elections held on January 30, 1980, and did not
on that date. This fee was finally paid on February 10, 1988, or twenty- apply to the 1988 local elections, which were supposed to be governed by
one days after his proclamation. As the petition by itself alone was the first-mentioned resolution. However, Res. No. 1996 took effect only on
ineffectual without the filing fee, it should be deemed filed only when the March 3, 1988, following the lapse of seven days after its publication as
fee was paid. This was done beyond the reglementary period provided for required by RA No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of
under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code reading as follows: 1987, which became effective on January 5, 1988. Its Section 30 provides
SEC. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any voter in part:
contesting the election of a Member of the Batasang Sec. 30. Effectivity of Regulations and Orders of the
Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the Commission. — The rules and regulations promulgated by
ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the the Commission shall take effect on the seventh day after
Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with their publication in the Official Gazette or in at least (2)
the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of daily newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
the result of the election. The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that the
The petitioner adds that the payment of the filing fee is required under petition for quo warranto was filed on time. We agree with the
Rule 36, Section 5, of the Procedural Rules of the COMELEC providing that respondents that the fee was paid during the ten-day period as extended
— by the pendency of the petition when it was treated by the COMELEC as a
Sec. 5. No petition for quo warranto  shall be given due pre-proclamation proceeding which did not require the payment of a filing
course without the payment of a filing fee in the amount of fee. At that, we reach this conclusion only on the assumption that the
Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) and the legal research fee requirement for the payment of the fees in quo warranto proceedings was
as required by law. already effective. There is no record that Res. No. 1450 was even
and stresses that there is abundant jurisprudence holding that the published; and as for Res. No. 1996, this took effect only on March 3,
payment of the filing fee is essential to the timeliness of the filling of the 1988, seven days after its publication in the February 25, 1988 issues of
petition itself. He cites many rulings of the Court to this effect, the Manila Chronicle and the Philippine Daily Inquirer, or after the petition
specifically Manchester v. Court of Appeals. 1 was filed.
The petitioner forgets Tañ;ada v. Tuvera 4 when he argues that the competent counsel, and we feel we can better serve the
resolutions became effective "immediately upon approval" simply because interests of justice by broadening the scope of our inquiry,
it was so provided therein. We held in that case that publication was still for as the record before us stands, we see that there is
necessary under the due process clause despite such effectivity clause. enough basis for us to end the basic controversy between
In any event, what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and the parties here and now, dispensing, however, with
whatever delay there may have been is not imputable to the private procedural steps which would not anyway affect
respondent's fault or neglect. It is true that in the Manchester Case, we substantially the merits of their respective claims. 6
required the timely payment of the filing fee as a precondition for the xxx
timeliness of the filing of the case itself. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. While it is the fault of the petitioner for appealing to the
Asuncion, 5 however this Court, taking into account the special wrong court and thereby allowing the period for appeal to
circumstances of that case, declared: lapse, the more correct procedure was for the respondent
This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court acquires court to forward the case to the proper court which was
jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the the Court of Appeals for appropriate action. Considering,
prescribed filing fee. However, the court may allow the however, the length of time that this case has been
payment of the said fee within a reasonable time. In the pending, we apply the rule in the case of Del Castillo v.
event of non-compliance therewith, the case shall be Jaymalin, (112 SCRA 629) and follow the principle
dismissed. enunciated in Alger Electric, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, (135
The same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of the COMELEC Rules SCRA 37) which states:
of Procedure adopted on June 20, 1988, thus: ... it is a cherished rule of procedure for
Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed fees. — If the fees this Court to always strive to settle the
above prescribed are not paid, the Commission may refuse entire controversy in a single proceeding
to take action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds
the action or the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.) of future litigation. No useful purpose will
The Court notes that while arguing the technical point that the petition be served if this case is remanded to the
for quo warranto  should be dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee on trial court only to have its decision raised
time, the petitioner would at the same time minimize his alleged lack of again to the Intermediate Appellate Court
citizenship as "a futile technicality," It is regrettable, to say the least, that and from there to this Court. (p. 43)
the requirement of citizenship as a qualification for public office can be so Only recently in the case of Beautifont, Inc., et al. v. Court
demeaned. What is worse is that it is regarded as an even less important of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 50141, January 29, 1988), we
consideration than the reglementary period the petitioner insists upon. stated that:
This matter should normally end here as the sole issue originally raised by ... But all those relevant facts are now before this Court.
the petitioner is the timeliness of the quo warranto  proceedings against And those facts dictate the rendition of a verdict in the
him. However, as his citizenship is the subject of that proceeding, and petitioner's favor. There is therefore no point in referring
considering the necessity for an early resolution of that more important the case back to the Court of Appeals. The facts and the
question clearly and urgently affecting the public interest, we shall directly legal propositions involved will not change, nor should the
address it now in this same action. ultimate judgment. Considerable time has already elapsed
The Court has similarly acted in a notable number of cases, thus: and, to serve the ends of justice, it is time that the
From the foregoing brief statement of the nature of the controversy is finally laid to rest. (See Sotto v. Samson, 5
instant case, it would appear that our sole function in this SCRA 733; Republic v. Paredes, 108 Phil. 57; Lianga
proceeding should be to resolve the single issue of whether Lumber Co. v. Lianga Timber Co., Inc., 76 SCRA 197; Erico
or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the motion v. Heirs of Chigas, 98 SCRA 575; Francisco v. City of
for new trial of the GSIS in question should indeed be Davao, 12 SCRA 628; Valencia v. Mabilangan, 105 Phil.
deemed pro forma. But going over the extended pleadings 162).lâwphî1.ñèt Sound practice seeks to accommodate
of both parties, the Court is immediately impressed that the theory which avoids waste of time, effort and expense,
substantial justice may not be timely achieved, if we both to the parties and the government, not to speak of
should decide this case upon such a technical ground delay in the disposal of the case (cf. Fernandez v. Garcia,
alone. We have carefully read all the allegations and 92 Phil. 592, 597). A marked characteristic of our judicial
arguments of the parties, very ably and comprehensively set-up is that where the dictates of justice so demand ...
expounded by evidently knowledgeable and unusually the Supreme Court should act, and act with finality.'  (Li
 Siu Liat v. Republic, 21 SCRA 1039, 1046, citing Samal v. inferred from the fact that he had married an Australian citizen, obtained
CA, 99 Phil. 230 and U.S. v. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74). In this an Australian passport, and registered as an alien with the CID upon his
case, the dictates of justice do demand that this Court act, return to this country in 1980.
and act with finality. 7 On the other hand, the decision of the CID took into account the official
xxx statement of the Australian Government dated August 12, 1984, through
Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception its Consul in the Philippines, that the petitioner was still an Australian
of evidence is not necessary where the court is in a citizen as of that date by reason of his naturalization in 1976. That
position to resolve the dispute based on the records before statement 12 is reproduced in full as follows:
it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and I, GRAHAM COLIN WEST, Consul of Australia in the Philippines, by virtue of
the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved a certificate of appointment signed and sealed by the Australian Minister of
actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the State for Foreign Affairs on 19 October 1983, and recognized as such by
trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends Letter of Patent signed and sealed by the Philippines Acting Minister of
of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the Foreign Affairs on 23 November 1983, do hereby provide the following
case or when public interest demands an early disposition statement in response to the subpoena Testificandum dated 9 April 1984
of the case or where the trial court had already received all in regard to the Petition for disqualification against RAMON LABO, JR. Y
the evidence of the parties. 8 LOZANO (SPC No. 84-73), and do hereby certify that the statement is true
This course of action becomes all the more justified in the present case and correct.
where, to repeat for stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding a public STATEMENT
office. A) RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO, date of birth 23
We also note in his Reply, the petitioner says: December 1934, was married in the Philippines to an
In adopting private respondent's comment, respondent Australian citizen. As the spouse of an Australian citizen,
COMELEC implicitly adopted as "its own" private he was not required to meet normal requirements for the
respondent's repeated assertion that petitioner is no longer grant of citizenship and was granted Australian citizenship
a Filipino citizen. In so doing, has not respondent by Sydney on 28 July 1976.
COMELEC effectively disqualified itself, by reason of B) Any person over the age of 16 years who is granted
prejudgment, from resolving the petition for quo warranto Australian citizenship must take an oath of allegiance or
filed by private respondent still pending before it? 9 make an affirmation of allegiance. The wording of the oath
This is still another reason why the Court has seen fit to rule directly on of affirmation is: "I ..., renouncing all other allegiance ..."
the merits of this case. etc. This need not necessarily have any effect on his
Going over the record, we find that there are two administrative decisions former nationality as this would depend on the citizenship
on the question of the petitioner's citizenship. The first was rendered by laws of his former country.
the Commission on Elections on May 12, 1982, and found the petitioner to C) The marriage was declared void in the Australian
be a citizen of the Philippines. 10 The second was rendered by the Federal Court in Sydney on 27 June 1980 on the ground
Commission on Immigration and Deportation on September 13, 1988, and that the marriage had been bigamous.
held that the petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines. 11 D) According to our records LABO is still an Australian
The first decision was penned by then COMELEC Chigas, Vicente Santiago, citizen.
Jr., with Commissioners Pabalate Savellano and Opinion concurring in full E) Should he return to Australia, LABO may face court
and Commissioner Bacungan concurring in the dismissal of the petition action in respect of Section 50 of Australian Citizenship Act
"without prejudice to the issue of the respondent's citizenship being raised 1948 which relates to the giving of false or misleading
anew in a proper case." Commissioner Sagadraca reserved his vote, while information of a material nature in respect of an
Commissioner Felipe was for deferring decision until representations shall application for Australian citizenship. If such a prosecution
have been made with the Australian Embassy for official verification of the was successful, he could be deprived of Australian
petitioner's alleged naturalization as an Australian. citizenship under Section 21 of the Act.
The second decision was unanimously rendered by Chairman Miriam F) There are two further ways in which LABO could divest
Defensor-Santiago and Commissioners Alano and Geraldez of the himself of Australian citizenship:
Commission on Immigration and Deportation. It is important to observe (i) He could make a declaration of Renunciation of
that in the proceeding before the COMELEC, there was no direct proof that Australian citizenship under Section 18 of the Australian
the herein petitioner had been formally naturalized as a citizen of Citizenship Act, or
Australia. This conjecture, which was eventually rejected, was merely
 (ii) If he acquired another nationality, (for example, 223809. 17 He also categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia
Filipino) by a formal and voluntary act other than in a number of sworn statements voluntarily made by him and. even
marriage, then he would automatically lose as Australian sought to avoid the jurisdiction of the barangay court on the ground that
citizenship under Section 17 of the Act. he was a foreigner. 18
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MAY HAND The decision of the COMELEC in 1982 quaintly dismisses all these acts as
AND SEAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY, MANILA, THIS "mistakes" that did not divest the petitioner of his citizenship, although, as
12th DAY OF APRIL 1984. DONE AT MANILA IN THE earlier noted, not all the members joined in this finding. We reject this
PHILIPPINES. ruling as totally baseless. The petitioner is not an unlettered person who
(Signed) GRAHAM C. WEST Consul was not aware of the consequences of his acts, let alone the fact that he
This was affirmed later by the letter of February 1, 1988, was assisted by counsel when he performed these acts.
addressed to the private respondent by the Department of The private respondent questions the motives of the COMELEC at that time
Foreign Affairs reading as follows: 13 and stresses Labo's political affiliation with the party in power then, but we
Sir: need not go into that now.
With reference to your letter dated 1 February 1988, I There is also the claim that the decision can no longer be reversed
wish to inform you that inquiry made with the Australian because of the doctrine of res judicata, but this too must be dismissed.
Government through the Embassy of the Philippines in This doctrine does not apply to questions of citizenship, as the Court has
Canberra has elicited the following information: ruled in several cases. 19 Moreover, it does not appear that it was properly
1) That Mr. Ramon L. Labo, Jr. acquired Australian and seasonably pleaded, in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, having
citizenship on 28 July 1976. been invoked only when the petitioner filed his reply 20 to the private
2) That prior to 17 July 1986, a candidate for Australian respondent's comment. Besides, one of the requisites of res judicata, to
citizenship had to either swear an oath of allegiance or wit, identity of parties, is not present in this case.
make an affirmation of allegiance which carries a The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in
renunciation of "all other allegiance. 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant.
Very truly yours, For the Secretary of Foreign Affairs: There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino
(SGD) RODOLFO SEVERINO, JR. Assistant Secretary because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was
The decision also noted the oath of allegiance taken by every naturalized naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his
Australian reading as follows: case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for
OATH OF ALLEGIANCE such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, swear by Almighty the Affirmation of Allegiance, both quoted above. Renouncing all other
God that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her allegiance, he swore "to be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty
Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia, Her Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia ..." and to fulfill his duties "as an
heirs and successors according to law, and that I will Australian citizen."
faithfully observe the laws of Australia and fulfill my duties The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at
as an Australian citizen. 14 worst only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine
and the Affirmation of Allegiance, which declares: citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot stand against the clear
AFFIRMATION OF ALLEGIANCE provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes by which Philippine
I, A.B.,  renouncing all other allegiance, solemnly and citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign
sincerely promise and declare that I will be faithful and country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an
bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country,
Queen of Australia, Her heirs and successors according to all of which are applicable to the petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in
law, and that I will faithfully observe the Laws of Australia this connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of the present
and fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen. 15 Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
The petitioner does not question the authenticity of the above evidence. and shall be dealt with by law."
Neither does he deny that he obtained Australian Passport No. 754705, Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in
which he used in coming back to the Philippines in 1980, when he declared Australia was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the
before the immigration authorities that he was an alien and registered as Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance alone did not
such under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-323985. 16 He later automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of Australian
asked for the change of his status from immigrant to a returning former citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between him and his
Philippine citizen and was granted Immigrant Certificate of Residence No. adopted country. What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and
freely rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of
the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he may have been the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have
has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines. done so in the belief that he was qualified only strengthens the conclusion
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be that the results of the election cannot nullify the qualifications for the
reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. office now held by him. These qualifications are continuing requirements;
It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is
reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He does not deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting
point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly requirements were not subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in
conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner was disqualified
has complied with PD No. 725, providing that: from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve
... (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine as such.
citizenship may reacquire Philippine citizenship through Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent,
repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor.
Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second
and, if their applications are approved, taking the highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of
necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the the people of Baguio city.
Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on
reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Elections  22 decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed
Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who
certificate of registration. (Emphasis supplied.) was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all
That is why the Commission on Immigration and Deportation rejected his disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That
application for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration. And decision was supported by eight members of the Court then 23 with three
that is also the reason we must deny his present claim for recognition as a dissenting 24 and another two reserving their vote. 25 One was on official
citizen of the Philippines. leave. 26
The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be
January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos,  27 Which
qualified voter under the Constitution itself because of his alienage. 21 He represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which
was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City, under reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio vs.
Section 42 of the Local Government Code providing in material part as Paredes 28 was supported by ten members of the Court 29 without any
follows: dissent, although one reserved his vote, 30 another took no part 31 and two
Sec. 42. Qualifications. — An elective local official must be others were on leave. 32 There the Court held:
a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-three years of ... it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of
age on election day, a qualified voter registered as such in the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
the barangay, municipality, city or province where he candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of
proposes to be elected, a resident therein for at least one votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
year at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, representative of a constituency, the majority of which
and able to read and write English, Filipino, or any other have positively declared through their ballots that they do
local language or dialect. not choose him.
The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a "futile Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled
technicality" that should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio by those who have received the highest number of votes
City, who elected him by a "resonant and thunderous majority." To be cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental
accurate, it was not as loud as all that, for his lead over the second-placer Idea in all republican forms of government that no one can
was only about 2,100 votes. In any event, the people of that locality could be declared elected and no measure can be declared
not have, even unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of
Government Code and the Constitution. The electorate had no power to the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S
permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or 243, p. 676.)
at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not
 eligible for the office to which he was elected does not
necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the
elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or
non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner
into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence
of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and
legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in
the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or
eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.
It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride in
his status as such and cherish this priceless gift that, out of more than a
hundred other nationalities, God has seen fit to grant him. Having been so
endowed, he must not lightly yield this precious advantage, rejecting it for
another land that may offer him material and other attractions that he
may not find in his own country. To be sure, he has the right to renounce
the Philippines if he sees fit and transfer his allegiance to a state with
more allurements for him. 33 But having done so, he cannot expect to be
welcomed back with open arms once his taste for his adopted country
turns sour or he is himself disowned by it as an undesirable alien.
Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily
recovered after its renunciation. It may be restored only after the
returning renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to the country he
has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total and exclusive
loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be accomplished by
election to public office.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a
citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to
serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is ordered to VACATE his office and
surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, once this decision
becomes final and executory. The temporary restraining order dated
January 31, 1989, is LIFTED.
Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griñ;o-Aquino Medialdea and Regalado,
JJ., concur.
 
 9. That Special Order No. 296 of the Division Superintendent of
G.R. No. L-16924             April 29, 1963 Schools of Antique (Annex A) the ruling of the Director of Public
ANTONIA A. YEE, petitioner-appellee, Schools in his 2nd indorsement dated October 14, 1957 (Annex B),
vs. and Circular No. 40, series of 1947 (Annex C) had never been
THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS, The Division Superintendent appealed by the petitioner to the Secretary of Education;
of Schools of Antique, 10. That when this case was filed sometime on October 11, 1958,
HON. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, and Hon. COMMISSIONER OF the original respondents were only the Director of Public Schools
CIVIL SERVICE, respondents-appellants. and the Division Superintendent of Schools of Antique;
Acsay and Associates and Silvestre E. Untaran, Jr. for petitioner-appellee. 11. That the petitioner came to know for the first time of the
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents-appellants. actions taken on her letter of October 25, 1957 (Annex D) herein,
PADILLA, J.: sometime on January 9, 1959 when the respondents Division
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance Superintendent of Schools and the Director of Public Schools
of Antique — submitted their evidence in support of their motion to dismiss and
. . . declaring illegal and contrary to law the removal of the which documents are hereto attached as Annexes F, F-1, F-2, F-3,
petitioner from her position as school teacher in the Division of F-4, F-5 and F-6 wherein it appears that the Secretary of
Antique on October 28, 1957, and ordering the respondents to Education in its 3rd indorsement dated March 17, 1958 (Annex F-
reinstate the petitioner forthwith to her former position, with all 3) concurs with the recommendation of the Director of Public
the privileges appurtenant thereto, and to cause to be paid her Schools for denial of the reinstatement of the petitioner to the
salary of P140.00 a month from November 1, 1957 until the date service (Annex F-4) and that on August 26, 1958, in its 4th
of her reinstatement, without pronouncement as to costs (Civil indorsement the Commissioner of Civil Service likewise concurs in
Case No. 12) the action separating Mrs. Antonio A. Yee from the teaching
upon a stipulation of facts submitted by the parties which is, as follows: service(Annex F-2);
1. That the petitioner was a public school teacher and had been 12. That petitioner learned of the actions taken by the respondents
appointed as such teacher in the Division of Antique in 1951; on her letter dated September 26, 1958 (Annex E) sometime in
2. That the petitioner was a civil service eligible as a regular May, 1959 and which actions are embodied in the indorsements
national teacher having passed the Junior Teachers' (Regular) hereto attached as Annexes G, G-1, G-2, G-3, G4, G-5, G-6 and G-
Examination that was given on or about December 29, 1955; 7 indicating that in the 3rd indorsement dated February 2, 1959
3. That the petitioner was receiving a monthly salary of P140.00 as (Annex G-4) the Secretary of Education ruled that Mrs. Antonia A.
such teacher; Yee is still disqualified from holding any position in the teaching
4. That in the school year 1957-1958 the petitioner was actually service reiterating its position previously stated in the 3rd
teaching in the Buhang Elementary School, Buhang Hamtic, indorsement dated March 17, 1958 relative to the same matter
Antique; (Annex F-3), and that this reiterated ruling of the Secretary of
5. That petitioner having married Mr. Ng Foo alias Pio Chet Yee, a Education was duly noted by the Commissioner of Civil Service on
Chinese citizen, on August 10, 1957 is presently a Chinese citizen; March 24, 1959 (Annex G-3);
6. That effective sometime on October 28, 1957 the petitioner was 13. That the original petition for mandamus was filed on October
removed from her teaching service by virtue of Special Order No. 11, 1958 against the Director of Public Schools and the Division
296, series of 1957, dated October 25, 1957, issued by the Superintendent of Schools as the stated respondents; that by
Division Superintendent of Schools of Antique hereto attached as virtue of the order of the Court, dated February 16, 1959,
"Annex A", and this was pursuant to the 2nd indorsement of the deferring the determination of said motion to dismiss, respondents'
Director of Public Schools dated October 14, 1957, hereto attached answer to the original petition was submitted to the Court on
(as) "Annex B", disauthorizing the continuance in the service of the February 16, 1959; that on February 18, 1959 petitioner filed a
petitioner on account of Circular No. 40, series of 1947, hereto motion for leave to include the Secretary of Education and the
attached as "Annex C"; Commissioner of Civil Service as co-respondents; that to this
7. That prior to the effectivity of the order of removal the motion, an opposition to the same was filed on February 20, 1959
petitioner wrote a letter to the Commissioner of Civil Service dated by the original respondents; that in its order of February 23, 1959
October 25, 1957 hereto attached as "Annex D"; the Court ordered the joining of the Secretary of Education and the
8. That petitioner wrote another letter dated September 26, 1958 Commissioner of Civil Service as additional respondents;
addressed to the Division Superintendent of Schools of Antique 14. That on February 23, 1959, petitioner submitted her amended
asking for reinstatement which is hereto attached as "Annex E"; petition for mandamus wherein the additional respondents have
 been included, to which a motion to dismiss dated April 7, 1959 In making selection from lists of certified eligibles furnished by the
was filed by the respondents and said motion to dismiss was Commissioner, appointing officer shall, when other qualifications
denied by the Court in its order of July 24, 1959, but in that same are equal, prefer:
order, petitioner was directed to amend its petition to include First. Citizens of the Philippines.
averments of the cause of action against the Secretary of Second. Honorably discharged soldiers, sailors, and mariners of
Education and the Commissioner of Civil Service; that on July 30, the United States,
1959, an amended petition for mandamus was filed by the is no argument against the limitation of holding public offices to citizens of
petitioner against all the herein respondents and the corresponding the Philippines. The preference provided for in the section quoted above
answer to the amended petition was submitted in behalf of the was operative during the period before 4 July 1946 or before the
same respondents on July 31, 1959 Philippines became an independent nation.
xxx     xxx     xxx IN VIEW OF THE CONCLUSION ARRIVED AT, the point of exhaustion of
The questions to determine are whether the appellee's removal as public administrative remedy need not be passed upon.
school teacher from the Buhang Elementary School, Hamtic, Antique, is The judgment appealed from is reversed and petition denied, without
illegal; whether she has a cause of action against the appellants and by pronouncement as to costs in both instances.
mandamus proceedings may secure reinstatement to her former position;
and whether she has exhausted all administrative remedies.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of
facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice
to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by
this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
A cause of action exists if upon the facts alleged in a complaint admitted
by the adverse party or proved by admissible and credible evidence a valid
judgment may be rendered by a competent court. In her petition for
mandamus the appellee alleges that she was illegally removed from her
teaching position. If that allegation be established or proved, a valid
judgment may be rendered reinstating her to her position. Hence, a cause
of action exists against those responsible for her removal from her position
and the remedy of mandamus is available to secure her reinstatement
thereto.
There is, however, no doubt that her removal as a public school teacher
because of loss of Filipino citizenship is legal. Not being included in section
671 of the Revised Administrative Code which enumerates the officers and
employees constituting the unclassified service, teaching in a public school
is in the classified service — a public function which may be performed by
Filipino citizens only. An applicant for admission to examination for
entrance into the civil service must be a citizen of the Philippines (section
675 of the Revised Administrative Code). And after he had qualified
himself to be eligible for appointment to a civil service position and had
been appointed to such position, he must continue to be such citizen. A
voluntary change of citizenship or a change thereof by operation of law
disqualifies him to continue holding the civil service position to which he
had qualified and had been appointed. Such being the case, upon the
appellee's marriage on 10 August 1957 to Ng Foo alias Pio Chet Yee, a
Chinese citizen, the appellee ceased to be a citizen of the Philippines, and
for that reason she is no longer qualified to continue holding the civil
service position to which she had qualified and had been appointed.
Section 681 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that —
G.R. No. 145368            April 12, 2002 Economic Zone. Upon motion of Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator
SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, Coseteng’s privilege speech was referred to the Committee on
vs. Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation (The Blue Ribbon
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Committee) and several other Senate Committees for investigation.
Ombudsman, respondent. On February 24, 1999, President Joseph Estrada issued Administrative
KAPUNAN, J.: Order No. 35, creating an ad hoc and independent citizens’ committee to
On June 13, 1991, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding the Philippine
Order No. 223 "constituting a Committee for the preparation of the centennial projects, including its component activities. Former Senator
National Centennial Celebration in 1998." The Committee was mandated Rene A.V. Saguisag was appointed to chair the Committee.
"to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration On March 23, 1999, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed with the
of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence Secretary of the Senate its Committee Final Report No. 30 dated February
and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress."1 26, 1999. Among the Committee’s recommendations was "the prosecution
Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128, by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of NCC and of
"reconstituting the Committee for the preparation of the National EXPOCORP for violating the rules on public bidding, relative to the award
Centennial Celebrations in 1988." It renamed the Committee as the of centennial contracts to AK (Asia Construction & Development Corp.); for
"National Centennial Commission." Appointed to chair the reconstituted exhibiting manifest bias in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to Proceed) to
Commission was Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel. Presidents Diosdado AK to construct the FR (Freedom Ring) even in the absence of a valid
M. Macapagal and Corazon C. Aquino were named Honorary Chairpersons. 2 contract that has caused material injury to government and for
Characterized as an "i body," the existence of the Commission "shall participating in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of the funds infused
terminate upon the completion of all activities related to the Centennial by the government for the implementation of the said contracts all in
Celebrations."3 Like its predecessor Committee, the Commission was violation… of the anti-graft law."5
tasked to "take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Later, on November 5, 1999, the Saguisag Committee issued its own
Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine report. It recommended "the further investigation by the Ombudsman, and
Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress." indictment, in proper cases of," among others, NCC Chair Salvador H.
Per Section 6 of the Executive Order, the Commission was also charged Laurel for violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, Section 4(a) in
with the responsibility to "prepare, for approval of the President, a relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, and Article 217 of the Revised
Comprehensive Plan for the Centennial Celebrations within six (6) months Penal Code.
from the effectivity of" the Executive Order. The Reports of the Senate Blue Ribbon and the Saguisag Committee were
E.O. No. 128 also contained provisions for staff support and funding: apparently referred to the Fact-finding and Intelligence Bureau of the
Sec. 3. The Commission shall be provided with technical and Office of the Ombudsman. On January 27, 2000, the Bureau issued its
administrative staff support by a Secretariat to be composed of, Evaluation Report, recommending:
among others, detailed personnel from the Presidential 1. that a formal complaint be filed and preliminary investigation be
Management Staff, the National Commission for Culture and the conducted before the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation
Arts, and the National Historical Institute. Said Secretariat shall be Bureau (EPIB), Office of the Ombudsman against former NCC and
headed by a full time Executive Director who shall be designated EXPOCORP chair Salvador H. Laurel, former EXPOCORP President
by the President. Teodoro Q. Peña and AK President Edgardo H. Angeles for violation
Sec. 4. The Commission shall be funded with an initial budget to of Sec. 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended in relation to
be drawn from the Department of Tourism and the president’s PD 1594 and COA Rules and Regulations;
Contingent Fund, in an amount to be recommended by the 2. That the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau of this Office, act
Commission, and approved by the President. Appropriations for as the nominal complainant.6
succeeding years shall be incorporated in the budget of the Office In an Order dated April 10, 2000, Pelagio S. Apostol, OIC-Director of the
of the President. Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau, directed petitioner to
Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo ’98 submit his counter-affidavit and those of his witnesses.
Corporation (Expocorp) was created.4 Petitioner was among the nine (9) On April 24, 2000, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a
Expocorp incorporators, who were also its first nine (9) directors. Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of said office.
Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer. In an Order dated June 13, 2000, the Ombudsman denied petitioner’s
On August 5, 1998, Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a privilege motion to dismiss.
speech in the Senate denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction On July 3, 2000, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the June 13,
and operation of the Centennial Exposition Project at the Clark Special 2000 Order but the motion was denied in an Order dated October 5, 2000.
On October 25, 2000, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari. Sandiganbayan under Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 ("An Act
On November 14, 2000, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the
Bureau issued a resolution finding "probable cause to indict respondents Office of the Ombudsman, and for other purposes") which vests
SALVADOR H. LAUREL and TEODORO Q. PEÑA before the Sandiganbayan upon the Ombudsman "primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable
for conspiring to violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation by the Sandiganbayan…" And this is further buttressed by Section
to Republic Act No. 1594." The resolution also directed that an information 11 (4a) of R.A. 6770 which emphasizes that the Office of the
for violation of the said law be filed against Laurel and Peña. Ombudsman Special Prosecutor shall have the power to "conduct preliminary
Aniano A. Desierto approved the resolution with respect to Laurel but investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of
dismissed the charge against Peña. the Sandiganbayan." Thus, repeated references to the
In a Resolution dated September 24, 2001, the Court issued a temporary Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction clearly serve to limit the
restraining order, commanding respondents to desist from filing any Ombudsman’s and Special Prosecutor’s authority to cases
information before the Sandiganbayan or any court against petitioner for cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. [Emphasis in the original.]
alleged violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices The foregoing ruling in Uy, however, was short-lived. Upon motion for
Act. clarification by the Ombudsman in the same case, the Court set aside the
On November 14, 2001, the Court, upon motion of petitioner, heard the foregoing pronouncement in its Resolution dated March 20, 2001. The
parties in oral argument. Court explained the rationale for this reversal:
Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the
is not a public officer because: Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or
A. omission of any public officer or employee when such act or
EXPOCORP, THE CORPORATION CHAIRED BY PETITIONER LAUREL WHICH omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The
UNDERTOOK THE FREEDOM RING PROJECT IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the
VIOLATIONS OF THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES WERE Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has
ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED, WAS A PRIVATE CORPORATION, NOT A been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public
GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION. official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a
B. public officer or employee.
THE NATIONAL CENTENNIAL COMMISSION (NCC) WAS NOT A PUBLIC The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the
OFFICE. Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1) giving the
C. Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
PETITIONER, BOTH AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NCC AND OF EXPOCORP WAS Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor
NOT A "PUBLIC OFFICER" AS DEFINED UNDER THE ANTI-GRAFT & the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT.7 criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should
In addition, petitioner in his reply8 invokes this Court’s decision in Uy vs. not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory and
Sandiganbayan,9 where it was held that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.
was limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, i.e., over public Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction
officers of Grade 27 and higher. As petitioner’s position was purportedly over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such
not classified as Grade 27 or higher, the Sandiganbayan and, primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over,
consequently, the Ombudsman, would have no jurisdiction over him. at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government,
This last contention is easily dismissed. In the Court’s decision in Uy, we the investigation of such cases." The grant of this authority does
held that "it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases
to file the corresponding information/s against petitioner in the regional involving public officers and employees by other courts. The
trial court. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan." cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the
In its Resolution of February 22, 2000, the Court expounded: discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses
The clear import of such pronouncement is to recognize the committed by public officers and employees. Indeed, it must be
authority of the State and regular provincial and city prosecutors stressed that the powers granted by the legislature to the
under the Department of Justice to have control over prosecution Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of
of cases falling within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public
investigation and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman relate officers and employees during their tenure of office.
to cases rightfully falling within the jurisdiction of the
 Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every
not be equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient
under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor service by the Government to the people.
is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the
only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee,
of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal
confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over
Ombudsman to these types of cases. The Ombudsman is cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this
mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any
employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such
civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence cases;
warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the x x x.
personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor The coverage of the law appears to be limited only by Section 16, in
or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator relation to Section 13, supra:
or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of SEC 16. Applicability. – The provisions of this Act shall apply to all
certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him work kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance that have
under his supervision and control. The law likewise allows him to been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in
direct the Special Prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office.
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11 (4c) of In sum, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance,
RA 6770. misfeasance and non-feasance by a public officer or employee of the
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
employees is one of the most important functions of the including government-owned or controlled corporations. 12
Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however,
endowed the Ombudsman with such power to make him a more defines who public officers are. A definition of public officers cited in
active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability jurisprudence13 is that provided by Mechem, a recognized authority on the
in public office. A review of the development of our Ombudsman subject:
law reveals this intent. [Emphasis in the original.] A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and
Having disposed of this contention, we proceed to the principal grounds conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law
upon which petitioner relies. We first address the argument that petitioner, or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is
as Chair of the NCC, was not a public officer. invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
The Constitution10 describes the Ombudsman and his Deputies as government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
"protectors of the people," who "shall act promptly on complaints filed in The individual so invested is a public officer. 14
any form or manner against public officials or employees of the The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the
government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract,
including government-owned or controlled corporations." Among the an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the
awesome powers, functions, and duties vested by the Constitution 11 upon designation of the position as an office.15
the Office of the Ombudsman is to "[i]nvestigate… any act or omission of Petitioner submits that some of these characteristics are not present in the
any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission position of NCC Chair, namely: (1) the delegation of sovereign functions;
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient." (2) salary, since he purportedly did not receive any compensation; and (3)
The foregoing constitutional provisions are substantially reproduced in R.A. continuance, the tenure of the NCC being temporary.
No. 6770, otherwise known as the "Ombudsman Act of 1989." Sections 13 Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of the
and 15(1) of said law respectively provide: sovereign functions of government as "[t]he most important characteristic"
SEC. 13. Mandate. – The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as in determining whether a position is a public office or not.
protectors of the people shall act promptly on complaints file in The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office
any form or manner against officers or employees of the from an employment or contract is that the creation and conferring
Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the
 benefit of the public; – that some portion of the sovereignty of the The NCC was precisely created to execute the foregoing policies and
country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the objectives, to carry them into effect. Thus, the Commission was vested
time being, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the with the following functions:
powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public (a) To undertake the overall study, conceptualization, formulation
officer.16 and implementation of programs and projects on the utilization of
Did E.O. 128 delegate the NCC with some of the sovereign functions of culture, arts, literature and media as vehicles for history,
government? Certainly, the law did not delegate upon the NCC functions economic endeavors, and reinvigorating the spirit of national unity
that can be described as legislative or judicial. May the functions of the and sense of accomplishment in every Filipino in the context of the
NCC then be described as executive? Centennial Celebrations. In this regard, it shall include a Philippine
We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power National Exposition ’98 within Metro Manila, the original eight
"is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is provinces, and Clark Air Base as its major venues;
the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their (b) To act as principal coordinator for all the activities related to
due observance."17 The executive function, therefore, concerns the awareness and celebration of the Centennial;
implementation of the policies as set forth by law. (c) To serve as the clearing house for the preparation and
The Constitution provides in Article XIV (Education, Science and dissemination of all information about the plans and events for the
Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports) thereof: Centennial Celebrations;
Sec. 15. Arts and letters shall enjoy the patronage of the State. (d) To constitute working groups which shall undertake the
The State shall conserve, promote, and popularize the nation’s implementation of the programs and projects;
historical and cultural heritage and resources, as well as artistic (e) To prioritize the refurbishment of historical sites and structures
creations. nationwide. In this regard, the Commission shall formulate
In its preamble, A.O. No. 223 states the purposes for the creation of the schemes (e.g. lease-maintained-and-transfer, build-operate-
Committee for the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998: transfer, and similar arrangements) to ensure the preservation and
Whereas, the birth of the Republic of the Philippines is to be maintenance of the historical sites and structures;
celebrated in 1998, and the centennial presents an important (f) To call upon any government agency or instrumentality and
vehicle for fostering nationhood and a strong sense of Filipino corporation, and to invite private individuals and organizations to
identity; assist it in the performance of its tasks; and,
Whereas, the centennial can effectively showcase Filipino heritage (g) Submit regular reports to the President on the plans,
and thereby strengthen Filipino values; programs, projects, activities as well as the status of the
Whereas, the success of the Centennial Celebrations may be preparations for the Celebration.18
insured only through long-range planning and continuous It bears noting the President, upon whom the executive power is
developmental programming; vested,19 created the NCC by executive order. Book III (Office of the
Whereas, the active participation of the private sector in all areas President), Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Section 2 describes the nature of
of special expertise and capability, particularly in communication executive orders:
and information dissemination, is necessary for long-range SEC. 2. Executive Orders. – Acts of the President providing for
planning and continuous developmental programming; rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or
Whereas, there is a need to create a body which shall initiate and execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be
undertake the primary task of harnessing the multisectoral promulgated in executive orders. [Underscoring ours.]
components from the business, cultural, and business sectors to Furthermore, the NCC was not without a role in the country’s economic
serve as effective instruments from the launching and overseeing development, especially in Central Luzon. Petitioner himself admitted as
of this long-term project; much in the oral arguments before this Court:
x x x. MR. JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO:
E.O. No. 128, reconstituting the Committee for the National Centennial And in addition to that expounded by Former President
Celebrations in 1998, cited the "need to strengthen the said Committee to Ramos, don’t you agree that the task of the centennial
ensure a more coordinated and synchronized celebrations of the Philippine commission was also to focus on the long term over all
Centennial and wider participation from the government and non- socio economic development of the zone and Central Luzon
government or private organizations." It also referred to the "need to by attracting investors in the area because of the eruption
rationalize the relevance of historical links with other countries." of Mt. Pinatubo.
FORMER VICE PRESIDENT SALVADOR H. LAUREL:
 I am glad Your Honor touched on that because that is Torio, however, did not intend to lay down an all-encompassing doctrine.
something I wanted to touch on by lack of material time I Note that the Court cautioned that "there can be no hard and fast rule for
could not but that is a very important point. When I was purposes of determining the true nature of an undertaking or function of a
made Chairman I wanted the Expo to be in Batangas municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to be
because I am a Batangeño but President Ramos said Mr. considered and will be decisive." Thus, in footnote 15 of Torio, the Court,
Vice President the Central Luzon is suffering, suffering citing an American case, illustrated how the "surrounding circumstances
because of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo let us try to plus the political, social, and cultural backgrounds" could produce a
catalize [sic] economic recovery in that area by putting conclusion different from that in Torio:
this Expo in Clark Field and so it was done I agreed and We came across an interesting case which shows that surrounding
Your Honor if I may also mention we wanted to generate circumstances plus the political, social, and cultural backgrounds
employment aside from attracting business investments may have a decisive bearing on this question. The case of Pope v.
and employment. And the Estrada administration decided City of New Haven, et al. was an action to recover damages for
to junk this project there 48, 40 thousand people who lost personal injuries caused during a Fourth of July fireworks display
job, they were employed in Expo. And our target was to resulting in the death of a bystander alleged to have been caused
provide 75 thousand jobs. It would have really calibrated, by defendants’ negligence. The defendants demurred to the
accelerated the development of Central Luzon. Now, I complaint invoking the defense that the city was engaged in the
think they are going back to that because they had the performance of a public governmental duty from which it received
airport and there are plan to revive the Expo site into key no pecuniary benefit and for negligence in the performance of
park which was the original plan. which no statutory liability is imposed. This demurrer was
There can hardly be any dispute that the promotion of industrialization and sustained by the Superior Court of New Haven Country. Plaintiff
full employment is a fundamental state policy.20 sought to amend his complaint to allege that the celebration was
Petitioner invokes the ruling of this Court in Torio vs. Fontanilla21 that the for the corporate advantage of the city. This was denied. In
holding by a municipality of a town fiesta is a proprietary rather than a affirming the order, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
governmental function. Petitioner argues that the "holding of a nationwide held inter alia:
celebration which marked the nation’s 100th birthday may be likened to a Municipal corporations are exempt from liability for the negligent
national fiesta which involved only the exercise of the national performance of purely public governmental duties, unless made
government’s proprietary function."22 In Torio, we held: liable by statute….
[Section 2282 of the Chapter on Municipal Law of the Revised A municipality corporation, which under permissive authority of its
Administrative Code] simply gives authority to the municipality to charter or of statute, conducted a public Fourth of July celebration,
[celebrate] a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to including a display of fireworks, and sent up a bomb intended to
observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to explode in the air, but which failed to explode until it reached the
commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in ground, and then killed a spectator, was engaged in the
essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for performance of a governmental duty. (99 A.R. 51)
the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a This decision was concurred in by three Judges while two
policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed, dissented.
was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide At any rate the rationale of the Majority Opinion is evident from
entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For [this] excerpt:
instance, the maintenance of parks is not a source of income for "July 4th, when that date falls upon Sunday, July 5th, is made a
the town, nonetheless it is [a] private undertaking as distinguished public holiday, called Independence Day, by our statutes. All or
from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which nearly all of the other states have similar statutes. While there is
are for public service. no United States statute making a similar provision, the different
As stated earlier, there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes departments of the government recognize, and have recognized
of determining the true nature of an undertaking or function of a since the government was established, July 4th as a national
municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case holiday. Throughout the country it has been recognized and
are to be considered and will be decisive. The basic element, celebrated as such. These celebrations, calculated to entertain and
however beneficial to the public the undertaking may be, is that it instruct the people generally and to arouse and stimulate patriotic
is government in essence, otherwise, the function becomes private sentiments and love of country, frequently take the form of literary
or propriety in character. Easily, no governmental or public policy exercises consisting of patriotic speeches and the reading of the
of the state is involved in the celebration of a town fiesta. Constitution, accompanied by a musical program including patriotic
 air sometimes preceded by the firing of cannon and followed by office expires as soon as the one act is done, or is to be held for
fireworks. That such celebrations are of advantage to the general years or during good behavior."25
public and their promotion a proper subject of legislation can Our conclusion that petitioner is a public officer finds support in In Re
hardly be questioned. x x x" Corliss.26 There the Supreme Court of Rhode Island ruled that the office of
Surely, a town fiesta cannot compare to the National Centennial Commissioner of the United States Centennial Commission is an "office of
Celebrations. The Centennial Celebrations was meant to commemorate the trust" as to disqualify its holder as elector of the United States President
birth of our nation after centuries of struggle against our former colonial and Vice-President. (Under Article II of the United States Constitution, a
master, to memorialize the liberation of our people from oppression by a person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States is
foreign power. 1998 marked 100 years of independence and sovereignty disqualified from being appointed an elector.)
as one united nation. The Celebrations was an occasion to reflect upon our x x x. We think a Commissioner of the United States Centennial
history and reinvigorate our patriotism. As A.O. 223 put it, it was a Commission holds an office of trust under the United States, and
"vehicle for fostering nationhood and a strong sense of Filipino identity," that he is therefore disqualified for the office of elector of President
an opportunity to "showcase Filipino heritage and thereby strengthen and Vice-President of the United States.
Filipino values." The significance of the Celebrations could not have been The commission was created under a statute of the United States
lost on petitioner, who remarked during the hearing: approved March 3, 1871. That statute provides for the holding of
Oh, yes, certainly the State is interested in the unity of the people, an exhibition of American and foreign arts, products, and
we wanted to rekindle the love for freedom, love for country, that manufactures, "under the auspices of the government of the
is the over-all goal that has to make everybody feel proud that he United States," and for the constitution of a commission, to consist
is a Filipino, proud of our history, proud of what our forefather did of more than one delegate from each State and from each
in their time. x x x. Territory of the United States, "whose functions shall continue until
Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public close of the exhibition," and "whose duty it shall be to prepare and
office, and petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer. superintend the execution of the plan for holding the exhibition."
That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation during his Under the statute the commissioners are appointed by the
tenure is of little consequence. A salary is a usual but not a necessary President of the United States, on the nomination of the governor
criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not conclusive. of the States and Territories respectively. Various duties were
The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office. Where a imposed upon the commission, and under the statute provision
salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or was to be made for it to have exclusive control of the exhibit
honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public before the President should announce, by proclamation, the date
good.23 Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized and place of opening and holding the exhibition. By an act of
as an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of profit, Congress approved June 1st, 1872, the duties and functions of the
i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are attached. 24 But it is a commission were further increased and defined. That act created a
public office, nonetheless. corporation, called "The Centennial Board of Finance," to cooperate
Neither is the fact that the NCC was characterized by E.O. No. 128 as an with the commission and to raise and disburse the funds. It was to
"ad-hoc body" make said commission less of a public office. be organized under the direction of the commission. The seventh
The term office, it is said, embraces the idea of tenure and section of the act provides "that the grounds for exhibition shall be
duration, and certainly a position which is merely temporary and prepared and the buildings erected by the corporation, in
local cannot ordinarily be considered an office. "But," says Chief accordance with plans which shall have been adopted by the
Justice Marshall, "if a duty be a continuing one, which is defined by United States Centennial Commission; and the rules and
rules prescribed by the government and not by contract, which an regulations of said corporation, governing rates for entrance and
individual is appointed by government to perform, who enters on admission fees, or otherwise affecting the rights, privileges, or
the duties pertaining to his station without any contract defining interests of the exhibitors, or of the public, shall be fixed and
them, if those duties continue though the person be changed, -- it established by the United States Centennial Commission; and no
seems very difficult to distinguish such a charge or employment grant conferring rights or privileges of any description connected
from an office of the person who performs the duties from an with said grounds or buildings, or relating to said exhibition or
officer." celebration, shall be made without the consent of the United
At the same time, however, this element of continuance can not States Centennial Commission, and said commission shall have
be considered as indispensable, for, if the other elements are power to control, change, or revoke all such grants, and shall
present "it can make no difference," says Pearson, C.J., "whether appoint all judges and examiners and award all premiums." The
there be but one act or a series of acts to be done, -- whether the tenth section of the act provides that "it shall be the duty of the
 United States Centennial Commission to supervise the closing up corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
of the affairs of said corporation, to audit its accounts, and submit concessions.
in a report to the President of the United States the financial A "public officer," under R.A. No. 3019, is defined by Section 2 of said law
results of the centennial exhibition." as follows:
It is apparent from this statement, which is but partial, that the SEC. 2. Definition of terms. – As used in this Act, the term –
duties and functions of the commission were various, delicate, and xxx
important; that they could be successfully performed only by men (b) "Public officer" includes elective and appointive officials and
of large experience and knowledge of affairs; and that they were employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or
not merely subordinate and provisional, but in the highest degree unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even
authoritative, discretionary, and final in their character. We think nominal, from the government as defined in the preceding
that persons performing such duties and exercising such functions, paragraph. [Emphasis supplied.]
in pursuance of statutory direction and authority, are not to be It is clear from Section 2 (b), above, that the definition of a "public officer"
regarded as mere employees, agents, or committee men, but that is expressly limited to the application of R.A. No. 3019. Said definition
they are, properly speaking, officers, and that the places which does not apply for purposes of determining the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction,
they hold are offices. It appears, moreover, that they were as defined by the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
originally regarded as officers by Congress; for the act under which Moreover, the question of whether petitioner is a public officer under the
they were appointed declares, section 7, that "no compensation for Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act involves the appreciation of evidence
services shall be paid to the commissioners or other officers, and interpretation of law, matters that are best resolved at trial.
provided for in this act, from the treasury of the United States." To illustrate, the use of the term "includes" in Section 2 (b) indicates that
The only other officers provided for were the "alternates" the definition is not restrictive.28 The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is
appointed to serve as commissioners when the commissioners just one of several laws that define "public officers." Article 203 of the
were unable to attend. Revised Penal Code, for example, provides that a public officer is:
Having arrived at the conclusion that the NCC performs executive x x x any person who, by direct provision of law, popular election
functions and is, therefore, a public office, we need no longer delve at or appointment by competent authority, takes part in the
length on the issue of whether Expocorp is a private or a public performance of public functions in the Government of Philippines,
corporation. Even assuming that Expocorp is a private corporation, or performs in said Government or in any of its branches public
petitioner’s position as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Expocorp arose duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any rank or
from his Chairmanship of the NCC. Consequently, his acts or omissions as class.
CEO of Expocorp must be viewed in the light of his powers and functions Section 2 (14) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of
as NCC Chair.27 1987,29 on the other hand, states:
Finally, it is contended that since petitioner supposedly did not receive any Officer – as distinguished from "clerk" or "employee", refers to a
compensation for his services as NCC or Expocorp Chair, he is not a public person whose duties not being of a clerical or manual nature,
officer as defined in Republic Act No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt involves the exercise of discretion in the performance of the
Practices Act) and is, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the functions of the government. When used with reference to a
Ombudsman. person having authority to do a particular act or perform a
Respondent seeks to charge petitioner with violation of Section 3 (e) of particular person in the exercise of governmental power, "officer"
said law, which reads: includes any government employee, agent or body having
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or authority to do the act or exercise that function.
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the It bears noting that under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713 (The
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees),
are hereby declared to be unlawful: one may be considered a "public official" whether or not one receives
xxx compensation, thus:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the "Public Officials" include elective and appointive officials and
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the career or
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, non-career service including military and police personnel, whether
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, or not they receive compensation, regardless of amount.
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision Which of these definitions should apply, if at all?
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
Assuming that the definition of public officer in R.A. No. 3019 is exclusive,
the term "compensation," which is not defined by said law, has many
meanings.
Under particular circumstances, "compensation" has been held to
include allowance for personal expenses, commissions, expenses,
fees, an honorarium, mileage or traveling expenses, payments for
services, restitution or a balancing of accounts, salary, and
wages.30
How then is "compensation," as the term is used in Section 2 (b) of R.A.
No. 3019, to be interpreted?
Did petitioner receive any compensation at all as NCC Chair? Granting that
petitioner did not receive any salary, the records do not reveal if he
received any allowance, fee, honorarium, or some other form of
compensation. Notably, under the by-laws of Expocorp, the CEO is entitled
to per diems and compensation.31 Would such fact bear any significance?
Obviously, this proceeding is not the proper forum to settle these issues
lest we preempt the trial court from resolving them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction issued
in the Court’s Resolution dated September 24, 2001 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.