and kick her.

At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened

to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were not spared
from physical violence.

Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to
live in the house of her sister in Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent
ways. Two months later, petitioner decided to forgive respondent, and she returned
home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out
as expected. Indeed, matters became worse.
THIRD DIVISION
On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight o'clock, respondent assaulted
G.R. No. 136921       April 17, 2001 petitioner for about half an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered
black and blue. She submitted herself to medical examination at the Quezon City
LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner  General Hospital, which diagnosed her injuries as contusions and abrasions.
vs. Petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay authorities, and a case was filed
ZOSIMO A PESCA, respondent. against respondent for slight physical injuries. He was convicted by the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment.
VITUG, J.:
This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed with
Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 May her sister. Eventually, they decided to rent an apartment. Petitioner sued respondent
1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No. 52374, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking
("RTC") of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has declared the marriage between psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought the custody of her minor children
petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological and prayed for support pendente lite .
incapacity on the part of respondent.
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on respondent on 25
Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in April 1994 by personal service by the sheriff. As respondent failed to file an answer
1975 while on board an inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind or to enter his appearance within the reglementary period, the trial court ordered the
courtship, they got married on 03 March 1975. Initially, the young couple did not live city prosecutor to look into a possible collusion between the parties. Prosecutor Rosa
together as petitioner was still a student in college and respondent, a seaman, had to C. Reyes, on 03 August 1994, submitted her report to the effect that she found no
leave the country on board an ocean-going vessel barely a month after the marriage. evidence to establish that there was collusion between the parties. 1âwphi1.nêt
Six months later, the young couple established their residence in Quezon City until
they were able to build their own house in Caloocan City where they finally resided. It On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of court, an answer,
was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that they could and the same, although filed late, was admitted by the court. In his answer,
stay together - when respondent was on vacation. The union begot four children, 19- respondent admitted the fact of his marriage with petitioner and the birth of their
year old Ruhem, 17-year old Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie. children. He also confirmed the veracity of Annex "A" of the complaint which listed
the conjugal property. Respondent vehemently denied, however, the allegation that
It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly he was psychologically incapacitated.
showed signs of "psychological incapacity" to perform his marital covenant. His "true
color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court rendered its
apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and
daily from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and
cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that "It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and
the trial court erred, particularly, in holding that there was legal basis to declare the most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee
marriage null and void and in denying his motion to reopen the case. itself, that the use of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' under Article 36 of
the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
marriage between petitioner and respondent valid and subsisting. The appellate extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr.
court said: Artemio Balumad's 'Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and
their Parallels in Canon Law,' quoting form the Diagnostic Statistical Manuel
"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the appellant of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward
showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive Hudson's 'Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases'). Article 36 of the Family.
of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in
Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a 'psychological incapacity' should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity has incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature. parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
"The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity."1 incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court of Appeals significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time
reversed on the thesis that the doctrine enunciated in Santos vs. Court of the marriage is celebrated."
Appeals,2 promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the guidelines set out in
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina,3 promulgated on 13 February 1997, The- "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that
should have no retroactive application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system
could be applied retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim - "legis interpretado legis
merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the vim obtinet" - that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court
application of the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only a remand of the has the force of law.3 The interpretation or construction placed by the courts
case to the trial court for further proceedings and not its dismissal. establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so
interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the
Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in its assailed statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later
decision for there is absolutely no evidence that has been shown to prove overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be
psychological incapacity on his part as the term has been so defined in Santos. applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have
acted in good faith in accordance therewith5 under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit,
non respicit."
Indeed, there is no merit in the petition.
The phrase "psychological incapacity ," borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely
The term "psychological incapacity," as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a
novel provision in our statute books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, has been explained by the Court,
Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when,
in Santos and reiterated in Molina. The Court, in Santos, concluded:
for the first time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has
additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in
trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological
incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos.

At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and
in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of
respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a
declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,
invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.

The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and
the foundation of the family6 that the State cherishes and protects. While the Court
commisserates with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with respondent,
totally terminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting
denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite given up, neither should we.

WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, J.C.; Melo, J.A.R; Panganiban, A.V.; Gonzaga-Reyes, M.P.; Sandoval-

Gutierez, A., Concur.

Footnotes:

1 
Rollo. pp. 42-43

2 
240 SCRA 20.

3 
268 SCRA 198.

4 
People vs. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607

5
 Unciano Paramedical College, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 285;
Tanada vs. Guingona, 235 SCRA 507; Columbia Pictures, Inc., vs. Court of
Appeals, 261 SCRA 144.

6 
See Section 2, Article XV, 1987 Constitution.
 Republic of the Philippines The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged "open and
SUPREME COURT continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children" as stated in paragraphs
Manila 6 and 7 of the Complaint, to wit:

FIRST DIVISION 6. The plaintiffs' father, Jose M. Aruego, acknowledged and

recognized the herein plaintiffs as his children verbally among
  plaintiffs' and their mother's family friends, as well as by myriad
different paternal ways, including but not limited to the following:
G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996
(a) Regular support and educational expenses;
JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO, MA. IMMACULADA T.
ALANON, ROBERTO A. TORRES, CRISTINA A. TORRES, JUSTO JOSE (b) Allowance to use his surname;
TORRES and AGUSTIN TORRES, petitioners, 
vs. (c) Payment of maternal bills;
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DIVISION and ANTONIA
ARUEGO, respondents. (d) Payment of baptismal expenses and attendance therein;

  (e) Taking them to restaurants and department stores on occasions of

family rejoicing;
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p
(f) Attendance to school problems of plaintiffs;
On March 7, 1983, a Complaint1 for Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of
Successional Rights was filed before Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (g) Calling and allowing plaintiffs to his office every now and then;
by the minors, private respondent Antonia F. Aruego and her alleged sister Evelyn F.
Aruego, represented by their mother and natural guardian, Luz M. Fabian. Named (h) Introducing them as such children to family friends.
defendants therein were Jose E. Aruego, Jr. and the five (5) minor children of the
deceased Gloria A. Torres, represented by their father and natural guardian, Justo P. 7. The plaintiffs are thus, in continuous possession of the status
Torres, Jr., now the petitioners herein. of (illegitimate) children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego who
showered them, with the continuous and clear manifestations of
In essence, the complaint avers that the late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married man, paternal care and affection as above outlined.2
had an amorous relationship with Luz M. Fabian sometime in 1959 until his death on
March 30, 1982. Out of this relationship were born Antonia F. Aruego and Evelyn F. Petitioners denied all these allegations.
Aruego on October 5, 1962 and September 3, 1963, respectively. The complaint
prayed for an Order praying that herein private respondent and Evelyn be declared After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, dated June 15, 1992, the dispositive
the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego, Sr.; that herein petitioners portion of which reads:
be compelled to recognize and acknowledge them as the compulsory heirs of the
deceased Jose M. Aruego; that their share and participation in the estate of their
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered —
deceased father be determined and ordered delivered to them.
1. Declaring Antonia Aruego as illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego
and Luz Fabian;
 2. Evelyn Fabian is not an illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with A
Luz Fabian;
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF
3. Declaring that the estate of deceased Jose Aruego are the SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS
following: DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE DECISION
ALREADY ISSUED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
xxx xxx xxx
B
4. Antonia Aruego is entitled to a share equal to 1/2 portion of share of
the legitimate children of Jose Aruego; RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION
FILED BY PETITIONERS BEFORE IT DOES NOT INVOLVE A
5. Defendants are hereby ordered to recognize Antonia Aruego as the QUESTION OF JURISDICTION.
illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz Fabian;
C
6. Defendants are hereby ordered to deliver to Antonia Aruego (her)
share in the estate of Jose Aruego, Sr.; RESPONDENT COURT HAD CLEARLY ERRED IN RULING THAT
THERE IS NO PERCEPTIBLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CIVIL
7. Defendants to play (sic) plaintiffs (Antonia Aruego) counsel the sum CODE PROVISION AND THOSE OF THE FAMILY CODE ANENT
of P10,000.00 as atty's fee; THE TIME AN ACTION FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION MAY
BE MADE AND THAT THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE UNDER THE
8. Cost against the defendants.3 CIVIL CODE FROM THAT OF THE FAMILY CODE CONCERNING
THE REQUIREMENT THAT AN ACTION FOR COMPULSORY
Herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the decision alleging RECOGNITION ON THE GROUND OF CONTINUOUS
loss of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the complaint by virtue of the POSSESSION OF THE STATUS OF AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
passage of Executive Order No. 209 (as amended by Executive Order No. 227), SHOULD BE FILED DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE PUTATIVE
otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August PARENT, IN UTTER DISREGARD OF THE RULING OF THIS
3, 1988. This motion was denied by the lower court in the Order, dated January 14, HONORABLE COURT IN THE UYGUANGCO CASE THAT THE
1993. CIVIL CODE PROVISION HAD BEEN SUPERSEDED OR AT LEAST
MODIFIED BY THE CORRESPONDING ARTICLES IN THE FAMILY
Petitioners interposed an appeal but the lower court refused to give it due course on CODE.
the ground that it was filed out of time.
D
A Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
was filed by herein petitioners before respondent Court of Appeals, the petition was RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS'
dismissed for lack of merit in a decision promulgated on August 31, 1993. A Motion PETITION FOR PROHIBITION AND IN HOLDING THAT
for Reconsideration when filed was denied by the respondent court in a minute PETITIONERS REMEDY IS THAT OF AN APPEAL WHICH
resolution, dated October 13, 1993. ALLEGEDLY HAD ALREADY BEEN LOST.4

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 alleging the following Private respondent's action for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child was
grounds: brought under Book I, Title VIII of the Civil Code on PERSONS, specifically Article
285 thereof, which state the manner by which illegitimate children may prove their The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article
filiation, to wit: 173 [during the lifetime of the child], except when the action is based
on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the
following cases: In the case at bench, petitioners point out that, since the complaint of private
respondent and her alleged sister was filed on March 7, 1983, or almost one
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which (1) year after the death of their presumed father on March 30, 1982, the
case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years action has clearly prescribed under the new rule as provided in the Family
from the attainment of his majority; . . . . Code. Petitioners, further, maintain that even if the action was filed prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code, this new law must be applied to the instant
Petitioners, on the other hand, submit that with the advent of the New Family case pursuant to Article 256 of the Family Code which provides:
Code on August 3, 1988, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint of
private respondent on the ground of prescription, considering that under This Code shall, have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
Article 175, paragraph 2, in relation to Article 172 of the New Family Code, it prejudice or impair vested of acquired rights in accordance with the
is provided that an action for compulsory recognition of illegitimate filiation, if Civil Code or other laws.
based on the "open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child," must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent without any The basic question that must be resolved in this case, therefore, appears to be:
exception, otherwise the action will be barred by prescription.
Should the provisions of the Family Code be applied in the instant case? As a
The law cited reads: corollary Will the application of the Family Code in this case prejudice or impair any
vested right of the private respondent such that it should not be given retroactive
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the effect in this particular case?
following:
The phrase "vested or acquired rights" under Article 256, is not defined by the Family
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final Code. "The Committee did not define what is meant by a 'vested or acquired right,'
judgment; or thus leaving it to the courts to determine what it means as each particular issue is
submitted to them. It is difficult to provide the answer for each and every question
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a that may arise in the future."5
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In Tayag vs. Court of Appeals,6 a case which involves a similar complaint
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall denominated as "Claim for Inheritance" but treated by this court as one to compel
be proved by: recognition as an illegitimate child brought prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
by the mother of the minor child, and based also on the "open and continuous
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate possession of the status of an illegitimate child," we had occasion to rule that:
child; or
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. right of action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the
complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in effectivity of the Family Code. We herein adopt our ruling in the recent
the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of
 Appeals, et. al. 7 where we held that the fact of filing of the petition SO ORDERED.
already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same
proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the Padilla, Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the
enactment of a new law. Separate Opinions

xxx xxx xxx VITUG, J., concuring:

Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper I also believe that the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the petition before it
application to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely did not involve a question of jurisdiction and cannot thus be a substitute for a lost
a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of the minor child appeal.
she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the
complaint in court. The trial court is, therefore, correct in applying the  
provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private
respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed. Separate Opinions
Tayag applies four-square with the case at bench. The action brought by private VITUG, J., concuring:
respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and enforcement of
successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must be
I also believe that the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the petition before it
governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the
did not involve a question of jurisdiction and cannot thus be a substitute for a lost
Family Code. The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the
appeal.
instant case is concerned, as its application will prejudice the vested right of private
respondent to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right
was vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Footnotes
Code. Prescinding from this, the conclusion then ought to be that the action was not
yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative father was 1 Docketed as Civil Case No. 83-16093.
already deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor when it was filed,
an exception to the general rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence, 2 Rollo, p. 45.
the trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint,
never lost jurisdiction over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also 3 Rollo, pp. 10-11.
known as the Family Code of the Philippines.
4 Rollo, p. 55.
Our ruling herein reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in
criminal or civil cases, once attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or 5 Sempio-Diy, Alicia V, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines,
events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from 1988 ed., p. 325.
attaching in the first instance, and it retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the
case. 8 6 209 SCRA 665 [1992].

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals 7 205 SCRA 356 [19921.
dated August 31, 1993 and its Resolution dated October 13, 1993 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
8 Regalado, Florenz D., Remedial Law Compendium, Volume One, Fifth
Revised Edition, p. 9 citing Ramos, et al. v. Central Bank, L-29352, October
4, 1971; Dioquino v. Cruz, et al., L-38579, September 9, 1982; Republic v.
Pielago, et al., G.R. No. 72218, July 21, 1986.
 Republic of the Philippines Petitioner is the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco (Eusebio)
SUPREME COURT by his second marriage. Private respondents Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F.
Manila Marilla and Antonio Francisco are children of Eusebio by his first marriage.

FIRST DIVISION Petitioner alleges that since their marriage on February 10, 1962, she and
Eusebio have acquired the following: (1) a sari-sari store, a residential house
  and lot, and an apartment house, all situated at Col. S. Cruz St., Barangay
Balite, Rodriguez (formerly Montalban), Rizal, and; (2) a house and lot at Barrio
G.R. No. 102330 November 25, 1998 San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal. Petitioner further avers that these properties were
administered by Eusebio until he was invalidated on account of tuberculosis,
TERESITA C. FRANCISCO, petitioner,  heart disease and cancer, thereby, rendering him unfit to administer them.
vs. Petitioner also claims that private respondents succeeded in convincing their
HON. COURT OF APPEALS; and CONCHITA EVANGELISTA and Her Husband father to sign a general power of attorney which authorized Conchita
SIMEON EVANGELISTA; ARACELI F. MARILLA and Her Husband FREDDY Evangelista to administer the house and lot together with the apartments
MARILLA; ANTONIO V. FRANCISCO; and EUSEBIO FRANCISCO, respondents. situated in Rodriguez, Rizal.

On August 31, 1988, petitioner filed a suit for damages and for annulment of
said general power of attorney, and thereby enjoining its enforcement.
QUISUMBING, J.: Petitioner also sought to be declared as the administratrix of the properties in
dispute. In due course, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of private
respondents. It held that the petitioner failed to adduce proof that said
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse respondent appellate court's
properties were acquired during the existence of the second conjugal
decision1 promulgated on October 7, 1991, affirming in toto the judgment of the
partnership, or that they pertained exclusively to the petitioner. Hence, the
Regional Trial Court which ruled,2 thus:
court ruled that those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio, and that he
has the capacity to administer them.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court renders judgment
in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, as follows:
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition.
1) Ordering the dismissal of the Complaint with
costs against the plaintiff;
Petitioner raised the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate
court:
2) Declaring the defendant Eusebio Francisco the
administrator of the properties described in
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
paragraph eight (8) of the Complaint; and
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLES 160 AND
3) Sentencing the plaintiff to pay the defendants
158, UNDER TITLE VI OF THE (NEW) CIVIL CODE BECAUSE
the sum of P10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
SAID TITLE, TOGETHER WITH THE OTHERS, HAVE (SIC)
ALREADY BEEN REPEALED BY ARTICLE 253 OF THE FAMILY
SO ORDERED. CODE.
 SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was
acquired during the marriage. 12 Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a
RESPONDENT COURT FURTHER ERRED IN NOT APPLYING condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the
ARTICLE 124 OF THE FAMILY CODE. 3 conjugal partnership. 13 The party who asserts this presumption must first
prove said time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the
But in her reply, petitioner posed the sole issue "whether or not Article 116 of property acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no
the Family Code applies to this case because Article 253 of the same Code showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. 14 Moreover,
[which] expressly repeals Arts. 158 and 160 of the Civil Code"4 this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong,
clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive
To our mind, the crucial issue in this petition is whether or not the appellate ownership of one of the spouses. 15
court committed reversible error in affirming the trial court's ruling that the
properties, subject matter of controversy, are not conjugal but the capital In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that the
properties of Eusebio exclusively. properties which she claimed to be conjugal were acquired during her
marriage with Eusebio.
Indeed, Articles 1585 and 1606 of the New Civil Code have been repealed by the
Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988. The With respect to the land at Col. Cruz St., Balite, Rodriguez, Rizal, petitioner
aforecited articles fall under Title VI, Book I of the New Civil Code which was failed to refute the testimony of Eusebio that he inherited the same from his
expressly repealed by Article 2547 (not Article 253 as alleged by petitioner in parents. Interestingly, petitioner even admitted that Eusebio brought into their
her petition and reply) of the Family Code. Nonetheless, we cannot invoke the marriage the said land, albeit in the concept of a possessor only as it was not
new law in this case without impairing prior vested rights pursuant to Article yet registered in his name.
2568 in relation to Article 1059 (second paragraph) of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the repeal of Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code does not Whether Eusebio succeeded to the property prior or subsequent to his second
operate to prejudice or otherwise affect rights which have become vested or marriage is inconsequential. The property should be regarded as his own
accrued while the said provisions were in force. 10 Hence, the rights accrued exclusively, as a matter of law, pursuant to Article 14816 of the New Civil Code.
and vested while the cited articles were in effect survive their repeal. 11We shall
therefore resolve the issue of the nature of the contested properties based on Essentially, property already owned by a spouse prior to the marriage, and
the provisions of the New Civil Code. brought to the marriage, is considered his or her separate
property. 17 Acquisitions by lucrative title refers to properties acquired
Petitioner contends that the subject properties are conjugal, thus, she should gratuitously and include those acquired by either spouse during the marriage
administer these on account of the incapacity of her husband. On the other by inheritance, devise, legacy, or donation. 18 Hence, even if it be assumed that
hand, private respondents maintain that the assets in controversy claimed by Eusebio's acquisition by succession of the land took place during his second
petitioner as "conjugal" are capital properties of Eusebio exclusively as these marriage, the land would still be his "exclusive property" because it was
were acquired by the latter either through inheritance or through his industry acquired by him, "during the marriage, by lucrative title." 19
prior to his second marriage. Moreover, they stress that Eusebio is not
incapacitated contrary to petitioner's allegation. As regards the house, apartment and sari-sari store, private respondents aver
that these properties were either constructed or established by their father
We find petitioner's contention lacks merit, as hereafter elucidated. during his first marriage. On the other hand, petitioner insists that the said
assets belong to conjugal partnership. In support of her claim, petitioner relied
Art. 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is on the building permits for the house and the apartment, with her as the
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it applicant although in the name of Eusebio. She also invoked the business
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife". However, the party who license for the sari-sari store issued in her name alone.
It must be emphasized that the aforementioned documents in no way prove registration thereof are two different acts. 21 It is well settled that registration
that the improvements were acquired during the second marriage. And the fact does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. 22 The phrase
that one is the applicant or licensee is not determinative of the issue as to "married to" preceding "Teresita Francisco" is merely descriptive of the civil
whether or not the property is conjugal or not. As the appellate court aptly status of Eusebio Francisco. 23
noted:
In the light of the foregoing circumstances, the appellate court cannot be said
. . . . And the mere fact that plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] to have been without valid basis in affirming the lower court's ruling that the
is the licensee of the sari-sari store (Exhibit "F-3"; Exhibit "G", properties in controversy belong exclusively to Eusebio.
pp. 44-47, Record) or is the supposed applicant for a building
permit does not establish that these improvements were Now, insofar as the administration of the subject properties is concerned, it
acquired during her marriage with Eusebio Francisco, especially follows that Eusebio shall retain control thereof considering that the assets are
so when her exhibits ("D-1", "E", "E-I", "T", "T-1", "T-2", "U", "U- exclusively his capital. 24 Even assuming for the sake of argument that the
l" and "U-2"; pp. 38-40; 285-290, Record; TSN, January 17, 1989, properties are conjugal, petitioner cannot administer themn inasmuch as
page 6-7) are diametrically opposed to her pretense as they all Eusebio is not incapacitated. Contrary to the allegation of petitioner, Eusebio,
described Eusebio Francisco as the owner of the structures as found by the lower court, is not suffering from serious illness so as to
(Article 1431, New Civil Code; Section 4. Rule 129, Revised Rules impair his fitness to administer his properties. That he is handicapped due to a
on Evidence). leg injury sustained in a bicycle accident, allegedly aggravated when petitioner
pushed him to the ground in one of their occasional quarrels, did not render
Neither is it plausible to argue that the sari-sari store constructed him, in the Court's view, incapacitated to perform acts of administration over
on the land of Eusebio Francisco has thereby become conjugal his own properties.
for want of evidence to sustain the proposition that it was
constructed at the expense of their partnership (second WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
paragraph, Article 158, New Civil Code). Normally, this absence is AFFIRMED.
of evidence on the source of funding will call for the application
of the presumption under Article 160 of the New Civil Code that Costs against petitioner.
the store is really conjugal but it cannot be so in this particular
case again, by reason of the dearth in proof that it was erected SO ORDERED.
during the alleged second marriage (5 Sanchez Roman 840-841;
9 Manresa; cited in Civil Code of the Philippines by Tolentino, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Volume 1, 1983 Edition, page
421).20
Footnotes
Regarding the property at San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal, private respondents
1 Penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice (now supreme
assert that their father purchased it during the lifetime of their mother. In
Court Associate Justice) Jose A.R. Melo and concurred in by JJ.
contrast, petitioner claims ownership over said property in as much as the title
Regina G. Ordonez-Benitez and Felimon H. Mendoza.
thereto is registered in the name of "Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita
Francisco."
2 RTC Decision, p. 6; CA Rollo.
It must be stressed that the certificate of title upon which petitioner anchors
her claim is inadequate. The fact that the land was registered in the name of 3 Petition, pp. 9-10; Rollo, pp. 15-16.
"Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco", is no proof that the
property was acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition of title and 4 Reply, p. 1; Rollo, p. 61.
5 Art. 158. Improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made 11 Ibid.
on the separate property of the spouses through advancements
from the partnership or through the industry of either the 12 Jocson vs. Court of appeals, 170 SCRA 333 (1989) at p.
husband or the wife, belong to the conjugal partnership. 344 citing Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin, 23 SCRA 637 (1968).

Buildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during 13 ibid.

the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses, also
pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be 14 Cuenca vs. Cuenca, 168 SCRA 335 (1988) at p.
reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same. 344 citing Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 153
SCRA 435 (1987); Magallon vs. Montejo, 146 SCRA 282 (1986);
6 Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to and Maramba vs. Lozano, 20 SCRA 474 (1967).
the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. 15 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 1985, p.
427, citing Magnolia Pet. Co. vs. Crigler. (La. App.) 12 So. (2d)
7 Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI, and of Book I or 511; Succession of Burke, 107 La. 82, 31 So. 391.
Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the
Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 16 Art. 148. The following shall be the exclusive property of each
31, 39, 40, 41, and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise spouse:
known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and all
laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and (1) That which is brought to the
regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby marriage as his or her own;
repealed.
(2) That which each acquires, during
8 Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it the marriage, by lucrative title;
does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. (3) That which is acquired by right of
redemption or by exchange with
9 Art. 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage other property belonging to only one
settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall of the spouses;
govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in
this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.(n) (4) That which is purchased with
exclusive money of the wife or of the
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal husband.
partnerships of gains already established between spouses
before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested 17 Tolentino, supra at p. 395.
rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws, as provided in Article 256.
18 Tolentino, supra at p. 396.
10 Villones vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, 92 SCRA
19 Villanueva vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 192 SCRA 21
320 (1979) at p. 328 citing 82 Corpus Juris Secundum 1010.
(1990) at p. 26.
20 CA Decision, p. 3; Rollo, p. 27.

21 Jocson vs. Court of Appeals, supra, at p. 345.

22 Ibid., citing Torela vs. Torela, 93 SCRA 391 (1979).

23 Ibid., citing Litam vs. Rivera, 100 Phil. 394 (1956); Stuart vs.

Yatco, 4 SCRA 1143 (1962); Magallon vs. Montejo, 146 SCRA 282
(1986).

24 Vitug Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 ed.,

p. 71
 the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In
the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.

Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that
petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal
complaint for falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-6463) against the petitioner.

Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of

THIRD DIVISION Republic Act No. 9225,4 (R.A. 9225) as evidenced by Identification Certificate No.
266-10-075 issued by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Toronto) on October
11, 2007.
March 18, 2015
In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had
G.R. No. 199113
intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by a
CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that he
RENATO M. DAVID, Petitioner, 
bought the property from the Agbays who misrepresented to him that the subject
vs.
property was titled land and they have the right and authority to convey the same.
EDITHA A. AGBAY and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
The dispute had in fact led to the institution of civil and criminal suits between him
and private respondent’s family.
DECISION
On January 8, 2008,6 the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its
VILLARAMA, JR., J.: Resolution7 finding probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Article 172 of
the RPC and recommending the filing of the corresponding information in court.
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the Order1 dated Petitioner challenged the said resolution in a petition for review he filed before the
October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, Department of Justice (DOJ).
which denied the petition for certiorari filed by Renato(petitioner)M. David. Petitioner
assailed the Order2 dated March 22, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner’s MLA. It ruled that
Socorro, Oriental Mindoro denying his motion for redetermination of probable cause. petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect
in his MLA which was void ab initio.8
The factual antecedents:
In the meantime, on July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed by petitioner was
In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by denied by the DOJ which held that the presence of the elements of the crime of
naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the falsification of public document suffices to warrant indictment of the petitioner
Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600-square meter lot along the notwithstanding the absence of any proof that he gained or intended to injure a third
beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential person in committing the act of falsification.9 Consequently, an information for
house. However, in the year 2004, they came to know that the portion where they Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC (Criminal Case No. 2012)
built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone. and a warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner.

On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application3 (MLA) over the
subject land with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at
On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the Information and before his arrest, ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. At any rate petitioner is not left
petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Re-Determination of Probable Cause10 in the without any remedy or recourse because he can proceed to trial where he can make
MTC. Interpreting the provisions of the law relied upon by petitioner, the said court use of his claim to be a Filipino citizen as his defense to be adjudicated in a full
denied the motion, holding that R.A. 9225 makes a distinction between those who blown trial, and in case of conviction, to appeal such conviction.
became foreign citizens during its effectivity, and those who lost their Philippine
citizenship before its enactment when the governing law was Commonwealth Act No. SO ORDERED.17
6311 (CA 63). Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was alleged and
admitted to have been committed on April 12, 2007 before he had re- acquired his Petitioner is now before us arguing that –
Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time still a
Canadian citizen. Thus, the MTC ordered: A. By supporting the prosecution of the petitioner for falsification, the lower
court has disregarded the undisputed fact that petitioner is a natural-born
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, and for lack of Filipino citizen, and that by re-acquiring the same status under R.A. No. 9225
merit, the motion is DENIED. he was by legal fiction "deemed not to have lost" it at the time of his
naturalization in Canada and through the time when he was said to have
SO ORDERED.12 falsely claimed Philippine citizenship.

In his motion for reconsideration,13 petitioner questioned the foregoing order denying B. By compelling petitioner to first return from his legal residence in Canada
him relief on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and insisted that the issue raised is and to surrender or allow himself to be arrested under a warrant for his
purely legal. He argued that since his application had yet to receive final evaluation alleged false claim to Philippine citizenship, the lower court has pre-empted
and action by the DENR Region IV-B office in Manila, it is academic to ask the the right of petitioner through his wife and counsel to question the validity of
citizenship of the applicant (petitioner) who had re-acquired Philippine citizenship six the said warrant of arrest against him before the same is implemented, which
months after he applied for lease of public land. The MTC denied the motion for is tantamount to a denial of due process.18
reconsideration.14
In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that petitioner’s argument regarding
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition15 for certiorari the retroactivity of R.A. 9225 is without merit.1âwphi1 It is contended that this Court’s
under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. He rulings in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections19 and Altarejos v. Commission on
asserted that first, jurisdiction over the person of an accused cannot be a pre- Elections20 on the retroactivity of one’s re- acquisition of Philippine citizenship to the
condition for the re-determination of probable cause by the court that issues a date of filing his application therefor cannot be applied to the case of herein
warrant of arrest; and second, the March 22, 2011 Order disregarded the legal fiction petitioner. Even assuming for the sake of argument that such doctrine applies in the
that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in another country present situation, it will still not work for petitioner’s cause for the simple reason that
re-acquires his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed he had not alleged, much less proved, that he had already applied for reacquisition
not to have been lost on account of said naturalization. of Philippine citizenship before he made the declaration in the Public Land
Application that he is a Filipino. Moreover, it is stressed that in falsification of public
In his Comment and Opposition,16 the prosecutor emphasized that the act of document, it is not necessary that the idea of gain or intent to injure a third person be
falsification was already consummated as petitioner has not yet re-acquired his present. As to petitioner’s defense of good faith, such remains to be a defense which
Philippine citizenship, and his subsequent oath to re-acquire Philippine citizenship may be properly raised and proved in a full- blown trial.
will only affect his citizenship status and not his criminal act which was long
consummated prior to said oath of allegiance. On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of accused (petitioner), the Solicitor
General opines that in seeking an affirmative relief from the MTC when he filed his
On October 8, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying the petition for Urgent Motion for Re-determination of Probable Cause, petitioner is deemed to have
certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower court, submitted his person to the said court’s jurisdiction by his voluntary appearance.
thus: Nonetheless, the RTC correctly ruled that the lower court committed no grave abuse
of discretion in denying the petitioner’s motion after a judicious, thorough and have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-
personal evaluation of the parties’ arguments contained in their respective pleadings, acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic
and the evidence submitted before the court. of the Philippines. The second paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who
became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their Philippine
In sum, the Court is asked to resolve whether (1) petitioner may be indicted for citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required for
falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign
despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the provisions of country, but the terminology used is different, "re-acquired" for the first group, and
R.A. 9225; and (2) the MTC properly denied petitioner’s motion for re-determination "retain" for the second group.
of probable cause on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused (petitioner). The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re- acquisition Act of Section 3 is "Retention of Philippine Citizenship", the authors of the law intentionally
2003," was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, employed the terms "re-acquire" and "retain" to describe the legal effect of taking the
2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law read: oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident from the title
of the law using both re-acquisition and retention.
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to
have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act. have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under
which naturalization in a foreign country is one of the ways by which Philippine
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of law to the contrary citizenship may be lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine with the provision in the old law which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries and allowing dual
hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the citizenship,21 and also provides for the procedure for re-acquiring and retaining
following oath of allegiance to the Republic: Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A.
9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired
"I ______________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new law.
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and
legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I Petitioner insists we should not distinguish between re-acquisition and retention in
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines R.A. 9225. He asserts that in criminal cases, that interpretation of the law which
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation favors the accused is preferred because it is consistent with the constitutional
upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion." presumption of innocence, and in this case it becomes more relevant when a
seemingly difficult question of law is expected to have been understood by the
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, accused, who is a non-lawyer, at the time of the commission of the alleged offense.
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon He further cites the letter-reply dated January 31, 201122 of the Bureau of
taking the aforesaid oath. (Emphasis supplied) Immigration (BI) to his query, stating that his status as a natural-born Filipino will be
governed by Section 2 of R.A. 9225.
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens
of another country shall be deemed "not to have lost their Philippine citizenship," These contentions have no merit.
such is qualified by the phrase "under the conditions of this Act." Section 3 lays down
such conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention of Philippine
second paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who citizenship was made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference
Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No.
2130 held on August 18, 2003, where Senator Franklin Drilon was responding to the THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). That is correct.
query of Representative Exequiel Javier:
REP. JAVIER. ...positions under the Constitution and under the law.
REP. JAVIER. I have some questions in Section 3. Here, under Section 3 of the
Senate version, "Any provision of law on the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Yes. We can get to that later on. It’s one of the
citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, shall… and so forth, provisions, yes. But just for purposes of the explanation, Congressman Javier, that is
ano, shall retain their Philippine citizenship. our conceptualization. Reacquired for those who previously lost [Filipino
citizenship] by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63, and retention for those in the
Now in the second paragraph, natural-born citizens who have lost their citizenship by future. (Emphasis supplied)
reason of their naturalization after the effectivity of this Act are deemed to have
reacquired… Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the
effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural- born Filipinos
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Prior to the effectivity. under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization
in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-
REP. JAVIER. Well, you have two kinds of natural-born citizens here. Natural-born acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.
citizens who acquired foreign citizenship after the effectivity of this act are
considered to have retained their citizenship. But natural-born citizens who lost their For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his
Filipino citizenship before the effectivity of this act are considered to have reacquired. MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the
May I know the distinction? Do you mean to say that natural-born citizens who retroactivity of such reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his
became, let’s say, American citizens after the effectivity of this act are considered category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those
natural-born? natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force.
In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became
Now in the second paragraph are the natural-born citizens who lost their citizenship foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read
before the effectivity of this act are no longer natural born citizens because they have together with Section 3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that such policy
just reacquired their citizenship. I just want to know this distinction, Mr. Chairman. governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). The title of the Senate version is precisely As to the letter-reply of BI, it simply quoted Section 2 of R.A. 9225 without any
retention and reacquisition. The reacquisition will apply to those who lost their reference to Section 3 on the particular application of reacquisition and retention to
Philippine citizenship by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63.Upon the effectivity -- Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225.
assuming that we can agree on this, upon the effectivity of this new measure
amending Commonwealth Act 63, the Filipinos who lost their citizenship is deemed Petitioner’s plea to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the accused is likewise
to have reacquired their Philippine citizenship upon the effectivity of the act. misplaced. Courts adopt an interpretation more favorable to the accused following
the time-honored principle that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State
The second aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship applying to future and liberally in favor of the accused.23 R.A. 9225, however, is not a penal law.
instances. So that’s the distinction.
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 17224 in relation to Article
REP. JAVIER. Well, I’m just asking this question because we are here making 17125 of the RPC refers to falsification by a private individual, or a public officer or
distinctions between natural-born citizens. Because this is very important for certain employee who did not take advantage of his official position, of public, private, or
government positions, ‘no, because natural-born citizens are only qualified for a commercial documents. The elements of falsification of documents under paragraph
specific… 1, Article 172 of the RPC are:
 (1)that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and
did not take advantage of his official position; jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act
upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs
(2)that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of
of the RPC; and the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law
is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the
(3)that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can
document.26 be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over
his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to
Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law,
still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being in
naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his
ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re- own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of
acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited
already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his to, detention.
dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding
probable cause for falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1. xxxx

The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner accused as While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we
ground for denying petitioner’s motion for re- determination of probable cause, as the clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to
motion was filed prior to his arrest. However, custody of the law is not required for have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the aforecited
the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail.27 In Miranda v. case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or
Tuliao,28 which involved a motion to quash warrant of arrest, this Court discussed the criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person, and held that
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived when he files any xxxx
pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special
jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Thus: To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over
the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the
by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his
through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez: person.Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can
invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction
over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the
filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s law.29 (Emphasis supplied)
jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On
the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for re-
accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has determination of probable cause, the MTC clearly erred in stating that it lacked
been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender. jurisdiction over his person. Notwithstanding such erroneous ground stated in the
MTC's order, the RTC correctly ruled that no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the MTC in denying the said motion for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October 8, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro in Civil Case No. SCA-07-11
(Criminal Case No. 2012) is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
Footnotes
With costs against the petitioner.
*
 Designated additional member per Raffle dated March 9, 2015.
SO ORDERED.
1
 Rollo, pp. 26-29. Penned by Presiding Judge Recto A. Calabocal.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice 2
 Id. at 67-71. Penned by Acting MTC Judge Benuardo B. Manalo.

WE CONCUR: 3
 Id. at 32.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. 4

 AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO
Associate Justice ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT, AMENDING FOR THE
Chairperson PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63, AS AMENDED, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice Associate Justice 5
 Rollo, p. 33.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*  6
 Should be January 8, 2009, id. at 13 & 50; records, pp. 6 &30.
Associate Justice
7
 Rollo, pp. 36-38.
ATTESTATION
8
 Id. at 34-35.
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. 9
 Id. at 50-53.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. 10

 Id. at 54-58.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division 11
 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE WAYS IN WHICH PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP MAY BE LOST OR REACQUIRED, approved on October 21,
CERTIFICATION 1936.

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the Division 12
 Rollo, p. 71.
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the 13
 Id. at 72-75.
opinion of the Court's Division.
14
 Id. at 76.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice
15
 Records, pp. 1-16. exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or
notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document
16
 Id. at 65-67. by committing any of the following acts:

17
 Rollo, p. 29. 1.Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;

18
 Id. at 16. 2.Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
19
 327 Phil. 521 (1996).
3.Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding
20
 484 Phil. 609 (2004). statements other than those in fact made by them;

21
 AASJS (Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School Teachers 4.Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
and Allied Workers) v. Datumanong, 551 Phil. 110, 117-118 (2007).
5.Altering true dates;
22
 Rollo, p. 59.
6.Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which
23
 People v. Temporada, 594 Phil. 680, 735 (2008), citing People v. changes its meaning;
Ladjaalam, 395 Phil. 1, 35 (2000).
7.Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy
24
 Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. of an original document when no such original exists, or including in
– The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the
a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon: genuine original; or

1.Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications 8.Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof
enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official in a protocol, registry, or official book.
document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial
document; and The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister
who shall commit any of the offenses enumerated in the preceding
2.Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to paragraphs of this article, with respect to any record or document of
cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the such character that its falsification may affect the civil status of
acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article. persons.

26
Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial  Panuncio v. People, 610 Phil. 595, 603-604 (2009).
proceeding or to the damage of another or who, with the intent to
27
cause such damage, shall use any of the false documents embraced  Jimenez v. Sorongon, G.R. No. 178607, December 5, 2012, 687 SCRA
in the next preceding article, or in any of the foregoing subdivisions of 151, 161, citing Alawiya, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 603 Phil. 264, 276
this article, shall be punished by the penalty next lower in degree. (2009); and Miranda v. Tuliao, 520 Phil. 907, 919 (2006).

28
25
 ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or  Id. at 919 & 921.
ecclesiastical minister. — The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to
29
 Id. at 918-922.
 nominees have aligned with the Nieto family against the group of Africa and Ilusorio
(Africa-Bildner), in the ensuing battle for control over the respective boards of POTC,
PHILCOMSAT and PHC.  Benito Araneta was also a nominee of PCGG during the
term of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada.

On August 31, 2004, the following were elected during the annual stockholders’
THIRD DIVISION meeting of PHC conducted by the Nieto-PCGG group:  Locsin (Director and Acting
Chairman); Oliverio Laperal (Director and Vice-Chairman); Manuel H. Nieto, Jr.
G.R. No. 200620, March 18, 2015 (Director, President and Chief Executive Officer); Philip G. Brodett (Director and
Vice-President); Andal (Director, Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer); Roberto V.
ROBERTO L. ABAD, MANUEL D. ANDAL, BENITO V. ARANETA, PHILIP G. San Jose (Director and Corporate Secretary); Jalandoni, Lokin, Jr., Prudencio
BRODETT, ENRIQUE L. LOCSIN AND ROBERTO V. SAN Somera, Roberto Abad and Benito Araneta as Directors.  Said election at PHC was
JOSE, Petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE the offshoot of separate elections conducted by the two factions in POTC and
CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY VICTOR AFRICA, Respondent. PHILCOMSAT, the Africa-Bildner group and the Nieto-PCGG group.

DECISION In the July 28, 2004 stockholders’ meetings of POTC and PHILCOMSAT, Victor
Africa was among those in the Africa-Bildner group who were elected as Directors. 
He was designated as the POTC proxy to the PHILCOMSAT stockholders’ meeting. 
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
While Locsin, Andal and Nieto, Jr. were also elected as Directors, they did not accept
their election as POTC and PHILCOMSAT Directors. Instead, the Nieto-PCGG group
This case is a remnant of the multiple suits generated by the two factions battling for
held the stockholders’ meeting for PHILCOMSAT on August 9, 2004 at the Manila
control of two sequestered corporations since 2004, a controversy we already
Golf Club. Immediately after the stockholders’ meeting, an organizational meeting
resolved with finality in 2013.
was held, and Nieto, Jr. and Locsin were respectively elected as Chairman and
President of PHILCOMSAT. At the same meeting, they issued a proxy in favor of
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 are the Decision1 dated October 21,
Nieto, Jr. and/or Locsin authorizing them to represent PHILCOMSAT and vote the
2011 and Resolution2 dated February 10, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
PHILCOMSAT shares in the stockholders’ meeting of PHC scheduled on August 31,
G.R. SP No. 99789.  The CA reversed the Order3 dated June 21, 2007 of the
2004.
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 149 in Civil Case No. 06-095.
Thereafter, the two factions took various legal steps including the filing of suits and
Respondent Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), along
countersuits to gain legitimacy for their respective election as directors and officers of
with Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC) were among
POTC and PHILCOMSAT.  The Africa group had sought the invalidation of the proxy
those private companies sequestered by the Philippine Commission on Good
issued in favor of Nieto, Jr. and/or Locsin and consequent nullification of the
Government (PCGG) after the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986.
elections held during the annual stockholders’ meeting of PHC on August 31, 2004
PHILCOMSAT owns 81% of the outstanding capital stock of Philcomsat Holdings
(Civil Case No. 04-1049 of RTC, Makati City, Branch 138).  Prior to this, there was
Corporation (PHC).  The majority shareholders of PHILCOMSAT are also the seven
the pending case involving the compromise agreement dated June 28, 1996 entered
families who have owned and controlled POTC (Ilusorio, Nieto, Poblador, Africa,
into by Atty. Potenciano Ilusorio with the Republic of the Philippines and the PCGG
Benedicto, Ponce Enrile and Elizalde).
relative to the Ilusorio family’s shareholdings in POTC, including those shares
forcibly taken from him by former President Ferdinand Marcos which were placed in
During the administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Enrique L. Locsin
the name of Independent Realty Corporation (IRC) and Mid-Pasig Land
and Manuel D. Andal, along with Julio Jalandoni, were appointed nominee-directors
Development (Mid-Pasig).  By Decision dated June 15, 2005, this Court affirmed the
representing the Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG in the board of
validity of the said compromise agreement in G.R. Nos. 141796 and 141804.  As a
directors of POTC and the board of directors of PHILCOMSAT. These PCGG
result of the compromise agreement, the Ilusorio, Africa, Poblador, Benedicto and that it is the RTC and not Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the case
Ponce Enrile families gained majority control (51.37%) and the Nieto family and involving a stockholder’s right to inspect corporate books and records.  Petitioners
PCGG became the minority. countered that the main controversy is rooted upon the issue of who are the rightful
representative and board of directors of PHILCOMSAT. Accordingly,
On November 17, 2005, Africa in his capacity as President and CEO of PHILCOMSAT’s right of inspection hinges on the resolution of the ongoing power
PHILCOMSAT, and as stockholder in his own right, wrote the board and struggle within PHILCOMSAT, specifically on the issue of who between the Africa
management of PHC that PHILCOMSAT will exercise its right of inspection over the and Nieto-Locsin groups is the legitimate board of directors.  It was further pointed
books, records, papers, etc. pertinent to the business transactions of PHC for the out that POTC and PHILCOMSAT were both under sequestration by the PCGG, and
3rdquarter of 2005, specifically the company’s financial documents.4cralawred hence all issues and controversies arising therefrom or related or incidental thereto
fall under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.  Petitioners
In his letter dated November 22, 2005, Nieto, Jr. said that Africa’s request will be also contended that the petition should be dismissed on the ground of litis
referred to the PHC Board of Directors or Executive Committee in view of the several pendentia as the CA may take judicial notice of the fact that many cases involving
pending cases involving the Africa and Nieto-PCGG groups on one hand, and the Africa’s purported authority to represent PHILCOMSAT are pending before several
PHC and its board of directors on the other.  He further advised Africa to inform them courts, which issue must necessarily be resolved to determine who possesses the
in writing of his reasons and purposes for such inspection.5  In reply, Africa reiterated right of inspection of PHC’s books and records.
his request for inspection asserting that the PHILCOMSAT board of directors was
elected on September 22, 2005 under circumstances in consonance with the final Finding merit in petitioners’ arguments, the CA granted the petition, as
decision of this Court and that there is no case against its legitimacy.6cralawred follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On the day of the scheduled inspection, PHILCOMSAT sent its representatives, Atty. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED.  The Order of dismissal dated 21
Samuel Divina and Enrico Songco.  However, Brodett disallowed the conduct of the June 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149, in Civil Case No.
inspection which prompted PHILCOMSAT through its counsel to make a written 06-095, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  Accordingly, the case is remanded to the
query whether the refusal of Brodett to permit the conduct of PHC’s inspection of court a quo for further proceedings.  The court a quo is reminded to hear and decide
corporate books and financial documents was with the knowledge and authority of the case with dispatch.
PHC’s board of directors.  But no reply or communication was received by Africa
from the PHC.7cralawred SO ORDERED.11cralawred
cralawlawlibrary
On February 2, 2006, PHILCOMSAT filed in the RTC a Complaint8 for Inspection of
Books against the incumbent PHC directors and/or officers, to enforce its right under With the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners are now before this
Sections 74 and 75 of the Corporation Code of the Philippines.  The original Court.
defendants were Julio J. Jalandoni, Luis K. Lokin, Jr., Oliverio G. Laperal, Nieto, Jr.,
Prudencio C. Somera, and herein petitioners Andal, Locsin, Brodett, San Jose and The issues submitted for our resolution are: (1) whether it is the Sandiganbayan or
Araneta. RTC which has jurisdiction over a stockholders’ suit to enforce its right of inspection
under Section 74 of the Corporation Code; and (2) whether the complaint failed to
In its Order dated June 21, 2007, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of state a cause of action considering that PHILCOMSAT never authorized Africa or
jurisdiction. Citing Del Moral v. Republic of the Philippines9 and Olaguer v. RTC, any other person to file the said complaint.
National Capital Judicial Region, Br. 48, Manila,10 said court ruled that it is the
Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction considering that plaintiff is a sequestered The petition has no merit.
corporation of the Republic through the PCGG alleging a right of inspection over
PHC but which right or authority was being raised as a defense by the defendants. Both issues presented in this case pertaining to the jurisdiction of the RTC in intra-
corporate disputes within the sequestered corporations of PCGG, and who between
PHILCOMSAT appealed to the CA thru a petition for review under Rule 43 arguing the contending groups held the controlling interest in POTC, and consequently in
PHILCOMSAT and PHC, have already been resolved in the consolidated petitions Upon the enactment of Republic Act No. 8799 (The Securities Regulation Code),
docketed as G.R. No. 184622 (Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corp. effective on August 8, 2000, the jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-corporate
[POTC] and Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation [PHILCOMSAT] v. controversies and the other cases enumerated in Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A was
Victor Africa, et al.), G.R. Nos. 184712-14 (POTC and PHILCOMSAT v. Hon. Jenny transferred to the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 5.2 of the law, which
Lin Aldecoa-Delorino, Pairing Judge  of RTC Makati City, Br. 138, et al.), G.R. No. provides:
186066 (Philcomsat Holdings Corp., represented by Concepcion Poblador v. 5.2. The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated in Section 5 of
PHILCOMSAT, represented by Victor Africa),  and G.R. No. 186590 (Philcomsat Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general
Holdings Corp., represented by Erlinda I. Bildner v. Philcomsat Holdings Corp., jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court; Provided, That the Supreme
represented by Enrique L. Locsin).12cralawred Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court
branches that shall exercise  jurisdiction over these cases. The Commission shall
On the first issue, we ruled that it is the RTC and not the Sandiganbayan which has retain jurisdiction over pending cases involving intra-corporate disputes submitted for
jurisdiction over cases which do not involve a sequestration-related incident but an final resolution which should be resolved within one (1) year from the enactment of
intra-corporate controversy. this Code. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending suspension of
payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June 2000 until finally disposed.
Originally, Section 5 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A vested the original and To implement Republic Act No. 8799, the Court promulgated its resolution of
exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the following in the SEC, to wit: November 21, 2000 in A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC designating certain branches of the
xxxx RTC to try and decide the cases enumerated in Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A. Among
the RTCs designated as special commercial courts was the RTC (Branch 138) in
(a) Devices or schemes employed by, or any acts of the board of directors, business Makati City, the trial court for Civil Case No. 04-1049.
associates, its officers or partners, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which
may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholder, partners, On March 13, 2001, the Court adopted and approved the Interim Rules of Procedure
members of associations or organization registered with the for Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 in A.M. No. 01-2-04-
Commission;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary SC, effective on April 1, 2001, whose Section 1 and Section 2, Rule 6 state:
Section 1. Cases covered. – The provisions of this rule shall apply to election
(b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, contests in stock and non-stock corporations.
between and among stockholders, members or associates; between any or all
of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are Section 2. Definition. – An election contest refers to any controversy or dispute
stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, involving title or claim to any elective office in a stock or non-stock corporation, the
partnership or association and the State insofar as it concerns their individual validation of proxies, the manner and validity of elections, and the qualifications of
franchise or right as such entity;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary candidates, including the proclamation of winners, to the office of director, trustee or
other officer directly elected by the stockholders in a close corporation or by
(c) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers or members of a non-stock corporation where the articles of incorporation or by-laws so
managers of such corporations, partnership or provide. (bold underscoring supplied)
associations;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Conformably with Republic Act No. 8799, and with the ensuing resolutions of
the Court on the implementation of the transfer of jurisdiction to the Regional
(d) Petitions of corporations, partnerships or associations to be declared in the state Trial Court, the RTC (Branch 138) in Makati had the authority to hear and
of suspension of payment in cases where the corporation, partnership or association decide the election contest between the parties herein. There should be no
possesses sufficient property to  cover all its debts but foresees the impossibility of disagreement that jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action, being conferred
meeting them when they respective fall due or in cases where the corporation, by law, could neither be altered nor conveniently set aside by the courts and the
partnership or association has no sufficient assets to cover its liabilities but is under parties.
the management of a Rehabilitation Receiver or Management Committee created
pursuant to this Decree. To buttress its position, however, the Nieto-Locsin Group relied on Section 2 of
Executive Order No. 14, which expressly mandated that the PCGG “shall file all such may be detrimental to the interest of the stockholders, or is one arising out of
cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan, which shall have exclusive intra-corporate relations between and among stockholders, or between any or
and original jurisdiction thereof.” all of them and the corporation of which they are stockholders.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has been held not to extend
The reliance was unwarranted. even to a case involving a sequestered company notwithstanding that the
majority of the members of the board of directors were PCGG nominees. The
Section 2 of Executive Order No. 14 had no application herein  simply because the Court marked this distinction clearly in Holiday Inn (Phils.), Inc. v. Sandiganbayan,
subject matter involved was an intra-corporate controversy, not any incidents arising holding thusly:
from, incidental to, or related to any case involving assets whose nature as ill-gotten The subject-matter of petitioner’s proposed complaint-in-intervention involves
wealth was yet to be determined. In San Miguel Corporation v. Kahn, the Court held basically, an interpretation of contract, i.e., whether or not the right of first refusal
that: could and/or should have been observed, based on the Addendum/Agreement of
The subject matter of his complaint in the SEC does  not therefore fall within the July 14, 1988, which extended the terms and conditions of the original agreement of
ambit of this Court’s Resolution of August 10, 1988 on the cases just mentioned, to January 1, 1976. The question of whether or not the sequestered property was
the effect that, citing PCGG v. Pena, et al., all cases of the Commission regarding lawfully acquired by Roberto S. Benedicto has no bearing on the legality of the
‘the funds, moneys, assets, and properties illegally acquired or misappropriated by termination of the management contract by NRHDC’s Board of Directors. The two
former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close are independent and unrelated issues and resolution of either may proceed
relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees, independently of each other. Upholding the legality of Benedicto’s acquisition of the
whether civil or criminal, are lodged within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of sequestered property is not a guarantee that HIP’s management contract would be
the Sandiganbayan,’ and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such upheld, for only the Board of Directors of NRHDC is qualified to make such a
cases necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan’s exclusive and original determination.
jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court.” His
complaint does not involve any property illegally acquired or misappropriated by Likewise, the Sandiganbayan correctly denied jurisdiction over the proposed
Marcos, et al., or “any incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to” any case complaint-in-intervention. The original and exclusive jurisdiction given to the
involving such property, but assets indisputably belonging to San Miguel Corporation Sandiganbayan over PCGG cases pertains to (a) cases filed by the PCGG, pursuant
which were, in his (de los Angeles') view, being illicitly committed by a majority of its to the exercise of its powers under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2 and 14, as amended
board of directors to answer for loans assumed by a sister corporation, Neptunia Co., by the Office of the President, and Article XVIII, Section 26 of the Constitution, i.e.,
Ltd. where the principal cause of action is the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, as well as all
incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to such cases and (b) cases filed by
De los Angeles’ complaint, in fine, is confined to the issue of the validity of the those who wish to question or challenge the commission’s acts or orders in such
assumption by the corporation of the indebtedness of Neptunia Co., Ltd., allegedly cases.
for the benefit of certain of its officers and stockholders, an issue evidently distinct
from, and not even remotely requiring inquiry into the matter of whether or not the Evidently, petitioner’s proposed complaint-in-intervention is an ordinary civil case that
33,133,266 SMC shares sequestered by the PCGG belong to Marcos and his does not pertain to the Sandiganbayan. As the Solicitor General stated, the
cronies or dummies (on which, issue, as already pointed out, de los Angeles, in complaint is not directed against PCGG as an entity, but against a private
common with the PCGG, had in fact espoused the affirmative). De los Angeles’ corporation, in which case it is not per se, a PCGG case.
dispute, as stockholder and director of SMC, with other SMC directors, an intra- In the cases now before the Court, what are sought to be determined are
corporate one, to be sure, is of no concern to the Sandiganbayan, having no the propriety of the election of a party as a Director, and his authority to act in
relevance whatever to the ownership of the sequestered stock. The contention, that capacity. Such issues should be exclusively determined only by the RTC
therefore, that in view of this Court's ruling as regards the sequestered SMC stock pursuant to the pertinent law on jurisdiction because they did not concern the
above adverted to, the SEC has no jurisdiction over the de los Angeles complaint, recovery of ill-gotten wealth.13  (Emphasis supplied)cralawlawlibrary
cannot be sustained and must be rejected. The dispute concerns acts of the
board of directors claimed to amount to fraud and misrepresentation which In the case at bar, the complaint concerns PHILCOMSAT’s demand to exercise its
right of inspection as stockholder of PHC but which petitioners refused on the ground With the imprimatur of no less than the former President Fidel V. Ramos and the
of the ongoing power struggle within POTC and PHILCOMSAT that supposedly approval of the Sandiganbayan, the Compromise Agreement must be accorded
prevents PHC from recognizing PHILCOMSAT’s representative (Africa) as utmost respect. Such amicable settlement is not only allowed but even encouraged.
possessing such right or authority from the legitimate directors and officers.  Clearly, Thus, in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, we held:
the controversy is intra-corporate in nature as they arose out of intra-corporate xxxx
relations between and among stockholders, and between stockholders and the
corporation. The authority of the PCGG to enter into Compromise Agreements in civil cases and
to grant immunity, under certain circumstances, in criminal cases is now settled and
As to the issue of whether the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a established. In Republic of the Philippines and Jose O. Campos, Jr. vs.
cause of action since PHILCOMSAT never authorized Africa to file it, we rule in the Sandiganbayan, et al. (173 SCRA 72 [1989]), this Court categorically stated that
negative. amicable settlements and compromises are not only allowed but actually encouraged
in civil cases. A specific grant of immunity from criminal prosecutions was also
A complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency of cause of action if it appears sustained. In Benedicto vs. Board of Administrators of Television Stations RPN,
clearly from the complaint and its attachments that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.  BBC, and IBC (207 SCRA 659 [1992]), the Court ruled that the authority of the
Conversely, a complaint may be dismissed for lack of cause of action if it is obvious PCGG to validly enter into Compromise Agreement for the purpose of avoiding
from the complaint and its annexes that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief.14  litigation or putting an end to one already commenced was indisputable. x x x (italics
Here, attached to the complaint is the Board Secretary’s Certificate15 stating, among supplied)
others, that PHILCOMSAT board of directors had authorized its President to exercise Having been sealed with court approval, the Compromise Agreement has the force
the right of inspection in its subsidiary PHC, and to file a case in court in case of of res judicata between the parties and should be complied with in accordance with
refusal by PHC. its terms. Pursuant thereto, Victoria C. de los Reyes, Corporate Secretary of the
POTC, transmitted to Mr. Magdangal B. Elma, then Chief Presidential Legal Counsel
Petitioners insist that the board meeting held on September 22, 2005 where the and Chairman of PCGG, Stock Certificate No. 131 dated January 10, 2000, issued in
aforesaid resolution was approved, is void for want of a quorum “as the majority of the name of the Republic of the Philippines, for 4,727 POTC shares. Thus, the
the legitimate directors of PHILCOMSAT were not present at and notified of the Compromise Agreement was partly implemented.cralawlawlibrary
meeting.” This clearly alludes to the Nieto-PCGG group’s non-recognition of the
election of the board of directors of POTC and PHILCOMSAT conducted by the As a result of the Government having expressly recognized that 673 POTC
Africa-Bildner group. shares belonged to Atty. Ilusorio, Atty. Ilusorio and his group gained the
majority control of POTC.
The issue thus boils down to the legitimacy of the Africa-Bildner group as the
controlling interest in PHILCOMSAT. Applying the ruling in G.R. No. 141796 and G.R. No. 141804 to Civil Case No. 04-
1049, the RTC (Branch 138) correctly concluded that the Nieto-PCGG Group,
In the same cited case of Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corp. (POTC) v. because it did not have the majority control of POTC, could not have validly
Africa,16 we have further settled with finality, under the doctrine of stare decisis, the convened and held the stockholders’ meeting and election of POTC officers on
question of who between the contending factions (Africa-Bildner) and (Nieto-PCGG) August 5, 2004 during which Nieto, Jr. and PCGG representative Guy De Leon
held the controlling interest in POTC, and consequently PHILCOMSAT and PHC.  were respectively elected as President and Chairman; and that there could not
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary be a valid authority for Nieto, Jr. and/or Locsin to vote the proxies of the group
in the PHILCOMSAT meeting.
The question of who held the majority shareholdings in POTC and
PHILCOMSAT was definitively laid to rest in G.R. No. 141796 and G.R. No. For the same reason, the POTC proxies used by Nieto, Jr. and Locsin to elect
141804, whereby the Court upheld the validity of the compromise agreement themselves respectively as Chairman and President of PHILCOMSAT; and the
the Government had concluded with Atty. Ilusorio. Said the Court: PHILCOMSAT proxies used by Nieto, Jr. and Locsin in the August 31, 2004
PHC elections to elect themselves respectively as President and Acting
Chairman of PHC, were all invalid for not having the support of the majority
4
shareholders of said corporations.  Id. at 102-103.
5
While it is true that judicial decisions should be given a prospective effect, such  Id. at 104.
prospectivity did not apply to the June 15, 2005 ruling in G.R. No. 141796 and G.R.
6
No. 141804 because the ruling did not enunciate a new legal doctrine or change the  Id. at 105.
interpretation of the law as to prejudice the parties and undo their situations
7
established under an old doctrine or prior interpretation. Indeed, the ruling only  Id. at 106-122.
affirmed the compromise agreement consummated on June 28, 1996 and approved
8
by the Sandiganbayan on June 8, 1998, and accordingly implemented through the  Id. at 75-82.
cancellation of the shares in the names of IRC and MLDC and their registration in the
9
names of Atty. Ilusorio to the extent of 673 shares, and of the Republic to the extent  496 Phil. 657 (2005).
of 4,727 shares. In a manner of speaking, the decision of the Court in G.R. No.
10
141796 and G.R. No. 141804 promulgated on June 15, 2005 declared the  252 Phil. 495 (1989).
compromise agreement valid, and such validation properly retroacted to the date of
11
the judicial approval of the compromise agreement on June 8, 1998. Rollo, p. 59.
12
Consequently, although the assailed elections were conducted by the Nieto-PCGG  Decided July 3, 2013, 700 SCRA 453.
group on August 31, 2004 but the ruling in G.R. No. 141796 and G.R. No. 141804
13
was promulgated only on June 15, 2005, the ruling was the legal standard by which  Id. at 513-519.
the issues raised in Civil Case No. 04-1049 should be resolved.17  (Emphasis
14
supplied)cralawlawlibrary Fluor Daniel, Inc.-Philippines v. E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co. Ltd., 555 Phil. 295,
301 (2007), citing Alberto v. Court of Appeals, 390 Phil. 253, 268 (2000).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.  The Decision dated October
15
21, 2011 and Resolution dated February 10, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA- Rollo, p. 84.
G.R. SP No. 99789 are hereby AFFIRMED.
16
 Supra note 12.
No pronouncement as to costs.
17
 Id. at 523-526.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 54-59-A. Penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao and
concurred in by Associate Justices Stephen C. Cruz and Ramon A. Cruz.
2
 Id. at 61-63.
3
 Id. at 64-65. Penned by Presiding Judge Cesar O. Untalan.
 Republic of the Philippines and delivery of about sixty thousand (60,000) pieces of woodpoles and twenty
SUPREME COURT thousand (20,000) pieces of crossarms needed in the country’s Rural Electrification
Baguio Project. The said contract consisted of four (4) components, namely: PIA, PIB and
PIC or woodpoles and P3 or crossarms, necessary for NEA’s projected allocation for
FIRST DIVISION Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. In response to the said invitation, bidders, such as
private respondent [Nerwin], were required to submit their application for eligibility
G.R. No. 167057               April 11, 2012 together with their technical proposals. At the same time, they were informed that
only those who would pass the standard pre-qualification would be invited to submit
NERWIN INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, Petitioner,  their financial bids.
vs.
PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and ESTER R. GUERZON, Following a thorough review of the bidders’ qualifications and eligibility, only four (4)
Chairman, Bids and Awards Committee, Respondents. bidders, including private respondent [Nerwin], qualified to participate in the bidding
for the IPB-80 contract. Thereafter, the qualified bidders submitted their financial bids
DECISION where private respondent [Nerwin] emerged as the lowest bidder for all
schedules/components of the contract. NEA then conducted a pre-award inspection
BERSAMIN, J.: of private respondent’s [Nerwin’s] manufacturing plants and facilities, including its
identified supplier in Malaysia, to determine its capability to supply and deliver NEA’s
requirements.
Republic Act No. 89751 expressly prohibits any court, except the Supreme Court,
from issuing any temporary restraining order (TRO), preliminary injunction, or
preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain, prohibit or compel the Government, or In the Recommendation of Award for Schedules PIA, PIB, PIC and P3 - IBP No. 80
any of its subdivisions or officials, or any person or entity, whether public or private, [for the] Supply and Delivery of Woodpoles and Crossarms dated October 4, 2000,
acting under the Government’s direction, from: (a) acquiring, clearing, and NEA administrator Conrado M. Estrella III recommended to NEA’s Board of Directors
developing the right-of-way, site or location of any National Government project; (b) the approval of award to private respondent [Nerwin] of all schedules for IBP No. 80
bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the National Government; (c) on account of the following:
commencing, prosecuting, executing, implementing, or operating any such contract
or project; (d) terminating or rescinding any such contract or project; and (e) a. Nerwin is the lowest complying and responsive bidder;
undertaking or authorizing any other lawful activity necessary for such contract or
project. b. The price difference for the four (4) schedules between the bid of Nerwin
Industries (lowest responsive and complying bidder) and the second lowest
Accordingly, a Regional Trial Court (RTC) that ignores the statutory prohibition and bidder in the amount of $1.47 million for the poles and $0.475 million for the
issues a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction crossarms, is deemed substantial and extremely advantageous to the
against a government contract or project acts contrary to law. government. The price difference is equivalent to 7,948 pcs. of poles and
20.967 pcs. of crossarms;
Antecedents
c. The price difference for the three (3) schedules between the bids of Nerwin
The following antecedents are culled from the assailed decision of the Court of and the Tri-State Pole and Piling, Inc. approximately in the amount of $2.36
Appeals (CA) promulgated on October 22, 2004,2 viz: million for the poles and $0.475 million for the crossarms are equivalent to
additional 12.872 pcs. of poles and 20.967 pcs. of crossarms; and
In 1999, the National Electrification Administration ("NEA") published an invitation to
pre-qualify and to bid for a contract, otherwise known as IPB No. 80, for the supply
 d. The bidder and manufacturer are capable of supplying the woodpoles and Respondents sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 03106921, stating that the
specified in the bid documents and as based on the pre-award inspection complaint averred no cause of action, violated the rule that government infrastructure
conducted. projects were not to be subjected to TROs, contravened the mandatory prohibition
against non-forum shopping, and the corporate president had no authority to sign
However, on December 19, 2000, NEA’s Board of Directors passed Resolution No. and file the complaint.3
32 reducing by 50% the material requirements for IBP No. 80 "given the time
limitations for the delivery of the materials, xxx, and with the loan closing date of On June 27, 2003, after Nerwin had filed its rejoinder to respondents’ reply, the RTC
October 2001 fast approaching". In turn, it resolved to award the four (4) schedules granted a TRO in Civil Case No. 03106921.4
of IBP No. 80 at a reduced number to private respondent [Nerwin]. Private
respondent [Nerwin] protested the said 50% reduction, alleging that the same was a On July 30, 2003, the RTC issued an order,5 as follows:
ploy to accommodate a losing bidder.
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing considerations, an order is hereby issued by this
On the other hand, the losing bidders Tri State and Pacific Synnergy appeared to Court:
have filed a complaint, citing alleged false or falsified documents submitted during
the pre-qualification stage which led to the award of the IBP-80 project to private 1. DENYING the motion to consolidate;
respondent [Nerwin].
2. DENYING the urgent motion for reconsideration;
Thus, finding a way to nullify the result of the previous bidding, NEA officials sought
the opinion of the Government Corporate Counsel who, among others, upheld the 3. DISQUALIFYING Attys. Michael A. Medado, Datu Omar S. Sinsuat and
eligibility and qualification of private respondent [Nerwin]. Dissatisfied, the said Mariano H. Paps from appearing as counsel for the defendants;
officials attempted to seek a revision of the earlier opinion but the Government
Corporate Counsel declared anew that there was no legal impediment to prevent the 4. DECLARING defendants in default;
award of IPB-80 contract to private respondent [Nerwin]. Notwithstanding, NEA
allegedly held negotiations with other bidders relative to the IPB-80 contract,
5. GRANTING the motion for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction.
prompting private respondent [Nerwin] to file a complaint for specific performance
with prayer for the issuance of an injunction, which injunctive application was granted
by Branch 36 of RTC-Manila in Civil Case No. 01102000. Accordingly, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue enjoining the defendant PNOC-
EDC and its Chairman of Bids and Awards Committee Esther R. Guerzon from
continuing the holding of the subject bidding upon the plaintiffs filing of a bond in the
In the interim, PNOC-Energy Development Corporation purporting to be under the
amount of ₱200,000.00 to answer for any damage or damages which the defendants
Department of Energy, issued Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 or an invitation to pre-
may suffer should it be finally adjudged that petitioner is not entitled thereto, until
qualify and to bid for wooden poles needed for its Samar Rural Electrification Project
final determination of the issue in this case by this Court.
("O-ILAW project").
This order shall become effective only upon the posting of a bond by the plaintiffs in
Upon learning of the issuance of Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 for the O-ILAW
the amount of ₱200,000.00.
Project, Nerwin filed a civil action in the RTC in Manila, docketed as Civil Case No.
03106921 entitled Nerwin Industries Corporation v. PNOC-Energy Development
Corporation and Ester R. Guerzon, as Chairman, Bids and Awards Committee, Let a copy of this order be immediately served on the defendants and strict
alleging that Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 was an attempt to subject a portion of the compliance herein is enjoined. Furnish the Office of the Government Corporate
items covered by IPB No. 80 to another bidding; and praying that a TRO issue to Counsel copy of this order.
enjoin respondents’ proposed bidding for the wooden poles.
SO ORDERED.
Respondents moved for the reconsideration of the order of July 30, 2003, and also to III. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case considering that it is
set aside the order of default and to admit their answer to the complaint. also one for damages.

On January 13, 2004, the RTC denied respondents’ motions for reconsideration, to Ruling
set aside order of default, and to admit answer.6
The petition fails.
Thence, respondents commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action
for certiorari (CA-GR SP No. 83144), alleging that the RTC had thereby committed In its decision of October 22, 2004, the CA explained why it annulled and set aside
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that the assailed orders of the RTC issued on July 20, 2003 and December 29, 2003, and
Nerwin had been entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction despite why it altogether dismissed Civil Case No. 03106921, as follows:
the express prohibition from the law and from the Supreme Court; in issuing the TRO
in blatant violation of the Rules of Court and established jurisprudence; in declaring It is beyond dispute that the crux of the instant case is the propriety of respondent
respondents in default; and in disqualifying respondents’ counsel from representing Judge’s issuance of a preliminary injunction, or the earlier TRO, for that matter.
them.7
Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in entertaining an application for
On October 22, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision,8 to wit: TRO/preliminary injunction, and worse, in issuing a preliminary injunction through the
assailed order enjoining petitioners’ sought bidding for its O-ILAW Project. The same
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated July 30 and is a palpable violation of RA 8975 which was approved on November 7, 2000, thus,
December 29, 2003 are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case already existing at the time respondent Judge issued the assailed Orders dated July
No. 03106921, private respondent’s complaint for issuance of temporary restraining 20 and December 29, 2003.
order/writ of preliminary injunction before Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Section 3 of RA 8975 states in no uncertain terms, thus:

SO ORDERED. Prohibition on the Issuance of temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunctions

and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. – No court, except the Supreme Court, shall
Nerwin filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on February issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary
9, 2005.9 mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials, or
any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the government’s
Issues direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:

Hence, Nerwin appeals, raising the following issues: xxx

I. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the basis of Rep. Act (b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as
8975 prohibiting the issuance of temporary restraining orders and preliminary defined under Section 2 hereof;
injunctions, except if issued by the Supreme Court, on government projects.
xxx
II. Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the entire case on
the basis of Rep. Act 8975 which prohibits the issuance only of a preliminary This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a
injunction but not injunction as a final remedy. private party, including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to
have rights through such bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition
shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional
issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and notwithstanding that Nerwin was thereby contravening the express provisions of
irreparable injury will arise. xxx Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 for its seeking to enjoin the bidding
out by respondents of the O-ILAW Project; and, secondly, when it issued the TRO
The said proscription is not entirely new. RA 8975 merely supersedes PD 1818 and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction.
which earlier underscored the prohibition to courts from issuing restraining orders or
preliminary injunctions in cases involving infrastructure or National Resources Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 provide:
Development projects of, and public utilities operated by, the government. This law
was, in fact, earlier upheld to have such a mandatory nature by the Supreme Court in Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary
an administrative case against a Judge. Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. – No court, except the Supreme
Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or
Moreover, to bolster the significance of the said prohibition, the Supreme Court had preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions,
the same embodied in its Administrative Circular No. 11-2000 which reiterates the officials or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the
ban on issuance of TRO or writs of Preliminary Prohibitory or Mandatory Injunction in government’s direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
cases involving Government Infrastructure Projects. Pertinent is the ruling in National
Housing Authority vs. Allarde "As regards the definition of infrastructure projects, the (a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or
Court stressed in Republic of the Phil. vs. Salvador Silverio and Big Bertha location of any national government project;
Construction: The term ‘infrastructure projects’ means ‘construction, improvement
and rehabilitation of roads, and bridges, railways, airports, seaports, communication (b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as
facilities, irrigation, flood control and drainage, water supply and sewerage systems, defined under Section 2 hereof;
shore protection, power facilities, national buildings, school buildings, hospital
buildings and other related construction projects that form part of the government (c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of
capital investment." any such contract or project;

Thus, there is nothing from the law or jurisprudence, or even from the facts of the (d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and
case, that would justify respondent Judge’s blatant disregard of a "simple,
comprehensible and unequivocal mandate (of PD 1818) prohibiting the issuance of (e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for
injunctive writs relative to government infrastructure projects." Respondent Judge did such contract/project.
not even endeavor, although expectedly, to show that the instant case falls under the
single exception where the said proscription may not apply, i.e., when the matter is of
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a
extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary
private party, including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to
restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise.
have rights through such bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition
shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional
Respondent Judge could not have legally declared petitioner in default because, in issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and
the first place, he should not have given due course to private respondent’s irreparable injury will arise. The applicant shall file a bond, in an amount to be fixed
complaint for injunction. Indubitably, the assailed orders were issued with grave by the court, which bond shall accrue in favor of the government if the court should
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. finally decide that the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought.
Perforce, this Court no longer sees the need to resolve the other grounds proffered If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and void, the
by petitioners.10 court may, if appropriate under the circumstances, award the contract to the qualified
and winning bidder or order a rebidding of the same, without prejudice to any liability
The CA’s decision was absolutely correct. The RTC gravely abused its discretion, that the guilty party may incur under existing laws.
firstly, when it entertained the complaint of Nerwin against respondents
Section 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders. - Any temporary restraining order, preliminary his January 21, 1997 Order extending the dubious TRO is but a contrived subterfuge
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction issued in violation of Section 3 hereof to evade administrative liability.
is void and of no force and effect.
In resolving matters in litigation, judges should endeavor assiduously to
The text and tenor of the provisions being clear and unambiguous, nothing was left ascertain the facts and the applicable laws. Moreover, they should exhibit
for the RTC to do except to enforce them and to exact upon Nerwin obedience to more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules.
them. The RTC could not have been unaware of the prohibition under Republic Act Also, they are expected to keep abreast of and be conversant with the rules
No. 8975 considering that the Court had itself instructed all judges and justices of the and the circulars which the Supreme Court has adopted and which affect the
lower courts, through Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, to comply with and disposition of cases before them.
respect the prohibition against the issuance of TROs or writs of preliminary
prohibitory or mandatory injunction involving contracts and projects of the Although judges have in their favor the presumption of regularity and good faith in
Government. the performance of their judicial functions, a blatant disregard of the clear and
unmistakable terms of the law obviates this presumption and renders them
It is of great relevance to mention at this juncture that Judge Vicente A. Hidalgo, the susceptible to administrative sanctions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Presiding Judge of Branch 37 of the RTC, the branch to which Civil Case No.
03106921 had been raffled, was in fact already found administratively liable for gross The pronouncements in Caguioa apply as well to respondent.
misconduct and gross ignorance of the law as the result of his issuance of the
assailed TRO and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. The Court could only fine The questioned acts of respondent also constitute gross ignorance of the law for
him in the amount of ₱40,000.00 last August 6, 2008 in view of his intervening being patently in disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules which judges
retirement from the service. That sanction was meted on him in A.M. No. RTJ-08- are expected to know and apply properly.
2133 entitled Sinsuat v. Hidalgo,11 where this Court stated:
IN FINE, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the
The Court finds that, indeed, respondent is liable for gross misconduct. As the CA law, which are serious charges under Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
explained in its above-stated Decision in the petition for certiorari, respondent failed He having retired from the service, a fine in the amount of ₱40,000 is imposed upon
to heed the mandatory ban imposed by P.D. No. 1818 and R.A. No. 8975 against a him, the maximum amount fixed under Section 11 of Rule 140 as an alternative
government infrastructure project, which the rural electrification project certainly was. sanction to dismissal or suspension.12
He thereby likewise obstinately disregarded this Court’s various circulars enjoining
courts from issuing TROs and injunctions against government infrastructure projects Even as the foregoing outcome has rendered any further treatment and discussion of
in line with the proscription under R.A. No. 8975. Apropos are Gov. Garcia v. Hon. Nerwin’s other submissions superfluous and unnecessary, the Court notes that the
Burgos and National Housing Authority v. Hon. Allarde wherein this Court stressed RTC did not properly appreciate the real nature and true purpose of the injunctive
that P.D. No. 1818 expressly deprives courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs remedy. This failing of the RTC presses the Court to use this decision to reiterate the
against the implementation or execution of a government infrastructure project. norms and parameters long standing jurisprudence has set to control the issuance of
TROs and writs of injunction, and to now insist on conformity to them by all litigants
Reiterating the prohibitory mandate of P.D. No. 1818, the Court in Atty. Caguioa v. and lower courts. Only thereby may the grave misconduct committed in Civil Case
Judge Laviña faulted a judge for grave misconduct for issuing a TRO against a No. 03106921 be avoided.1âwphi1
government infrastructure project thus:
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding
xxx It appears that respondent is either feigning a misunderstanding of the law or prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or person, to
openly manifesting a contumacious indifference thereto. In any case, his disregard of refrain from a particular act or acts.13 It is an ancillary or preventive remedy resorted
the clear mandate of PD 1818, as well as of the Supreme Court Circulars enjoining to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests during the pendency of the
strict compliance therewith, constitutes grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to case. As such, it is issued only when it is established that:
the proper administration of justice. His claim that the said statute is inapplicable to
 (a) The applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the
such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or merits. This should really be so since our concern here involves only the
acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either propriety of the preliminary injunction and not the merits of the case still
for a limited period or perpetually; or pending with the trial court.

(b) The commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts Thus, to be entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction, the private respondent needs
complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the only to show that it has the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in its
applicant; or complaint xxx.18

(c) A party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to In this regard, the Rules of Court grants a broad latitude to the trial courts
do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in considering that conflicting claims in an application for a provisional writ more often
violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or than not involve and require a factual determination that is not the function of the
proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.14 appellate courts.19 Nonetheless, the exercise of such discretion must be sound, that
is, the issuance of the writ, though discretionary, should be upon the grounds and in
The existence of a right to be protected by the injunctive relief is indispensable. In the manner provided by law.20 When that is done, the exercise of sound discretion by
City Government of Butuan v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), Inc.,15 the the issuing court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with except when there
Court elaborated on this requirement, viz: is manifest abuse.21

As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a Moreover, judges dealing with applications for the injunctive relief ought to be wary of
party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to improvidently or unwarrantedly issuing TROs or writs of injunction that tend to
be protected. It is proper only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the relief dispose of the merits without or before trial. Granting an application for the relief in
demanded in the complaint, which must aver the existence of the right and the disregard of that tendency is judicially impermissible,22 for it is never the function of a
violation of the right, or whose averments must in the minimum constitute a prima TRO or preliminary injunction to determine the merits of a case,23 or to decide
facie showing of a right to the final relief sought. Accordingly, the conditions for the controverted facts.24 It is but a preventive remedy whose only mission is to prevent
issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie; threatened wrong,25 further injury,26 and irreparable harm27 or injustice28 until the rights
(b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that there is an of the parties can be settled. Judges should thus look at such relief only as a means
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. An injunction to protect the ability of their courts to render a meaningful decision.29 Foremost in
will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely contingent and their minds should be to guard against a change of circumstances that will hamper or
may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or prevent the granting of proper reliefs after a trial on the merits.30 It is well worth
to prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by statute. Indeed, a right, to be remembering that the writ of preliminary injunction should issue only to prevent the
protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is threatened continuous and irremediable injury to the applicant before the claim can
enforceable as a matter of law.16 be justly and thoroughly studied and adjudicated.31

Conclusive proof of the existence of the right to be protected is not demanded, WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals; and
however, for, as the Court has held in Saulog v. Court of Appeals,17 it is enough that: ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

xxx for the court to act, there must be an existing basis of facts affording a The Court Administrator shall disseminate this decision to the lower courts for their
present right which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. And guidance.
while a clear showing of the right claimed is necessary, its existence need not
be conclusively established. In fact, the evidence to be submitted to justify SO ORDERED.
preliminary injunction at the hearing thereon need not be conclusive or complete but
need only be a "sampling" intended merely to give the court an idea of the
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Justice) and Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a Member of this
Associate Justice Court).

3 
WE CONCUR: Id., p. 14.

4 
RENATO C. CORONA Id., pp. 14-15.
Chief Justice
Chairperson 5 
Id., p. 15.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE 6 
Id., p. 16.
ARTURO D. BRION*
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice 7 
Id., p. 60.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. 8 

Supra, note 2.
Associate Justice
9 
Rollo pp. 67-69; penned by Associate Justice Magdangal De Leon, and
CERTIFICATION concurred in by Associate Justice Brawner and Associate Justice Del
Castillo.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned 10 
Bold underscoring is part of original text.
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
11 
561 SCRA 38.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice 12 
Sinsuat v. Hidalgo, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2133, August 6, 2008, 561 SCRA 38,
48-50.

13 
Sec. 1, Rule 58, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Footnotes 14 
Sec. 3, Rule 58, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

* Vice Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo who concurred with the 15 
G.R. No. 157315, December 1, 2010, 636 SCRA 320.
decision of the Court of Appeals, pursuant to the raffle of April 11, 2012.
16 
City Government of Butuan v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (BS),
1 
An Act to Ensure the Expeditious Implementation and Completion of Inc., G.R. No. 157315, December 1, 2010, 636 SCRA 320, 336-337 (Bold
Government Infrastructure Projects by Prohibiting Lower Courts from issuing emphasis supplied).
Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions or Preliminary
Mandatory Injunctions, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for 17 
Saulog v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119769, September 18, 1996, 262
Other Purposes. SCRA 51.
2 
Rollo, pp. 11-21; penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon, and 18 
Id., p. 60 (Bold emphasis supplied).
concurred in by Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner (later Presiding
19  28 
Urbanes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117964, March 28, 2001,355 City of Cleveland v. Division 268 of Amalgamated Association of St. Elec.
SCRA 537, 548. Ry. & Motor Coach Emp. Of America, 81. N. E. 2d 310, 84 Ohio App. 43;
Slott v. Plastic Fabricators, Inc., 167 A. 2d 306, 402 Pa. 433.
20 
Republic Telecommunications Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
29 
135074, January 29, 1999, 302 SCRA 403, 409. Meis v. Sanitas Service Corporation, C. A. Tex., 511 F. 2d 655; Gobel v.
Laing, 12 Ohio App. 2d 93.
21 
Searth Commodities Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 64220, March 31,
30 
1992, 207 SCRA 622, 628; S & A Gaisano, Inc. v. Judge Hidalgo; G.R. No. United States v. Adler’s Creamery, C. C. A. N. Y., 107 F. 2d 987; American
80397, December 10, 1990, 192 SCRA 224, 229; Genoblazo v. Court of Mercury v. Kiely, C. C. A. N. Y., 19 F. 2d 295.
Appeals, G.R. No. 79303, June 20, 1989, 174 SCRA 124, 133.
31 
Republic v. Silerio, G.R. No. 108869, May 6, 1997, 272 SCRA 280, 287.
22 
Searth Commodities Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 64220,
March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 622, 629-630; Rivas v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, G.R. No. 53772, October 4, 1990,190 SCRA 295,
305; Government Service Insurance System v. Florendo, G.R. No. 48603,
September 29, 1989, 178 SCRA 76, 88-89; Ortigas v. Co. Ltd. Partnership v.
Court of Appeals, No. L-79128, June 16, 1988, 162 SCRA 165, 169.

23 
43 CJS Injunctions § 5, citing B. W. Photo Utilities v. Republic Molding
Corporation, C. A. Cal., 280 F. 2d 806; Duckworth v. James, C. A. Va. 267 F.
2d 224; Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. Free Sewing Machine Co., C.
A. Ill, 256 F. 2d 806.

24 
43 CJS Injunctions § 5, citing Lonergan v. Crucible Steel Co. of America,
229 N. E. 2d 536, 37 Ill. 2d 599; Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co., 285
N.E. 2d 574, 580.

25 
Doeskin Products, Inc. v. United Paper Co., C. A. Ill., 195 F. 2d 356;
Benson Hotel Corp. v. Woods, C. C. A. Minn., 168 F. 2d 694; Spickerman v.
Sproul, 328 P. 2d 87, 138 Colo. 13; United States v. National Plastikwear
Fashions, 368 F. 2d 845.

26 
Career Placement of White Plains, Inc. v. Vaus, 354 N. Y. S. 2d 764, 77
Misc. 2d 788;Toushin v. City of Chicago, 320 N. E. 2d 202, 23 Ill. App. 3d
797; H. K. H. Development Corporation v. Metropolitan Sanitary District of
Greater Chicago, 196 N. E., 2d 494, 47 Ill. App. 46.

27 
Exhibitors Poster Exchange, Inc. v. National Screen Service Corp., C. A.
La., 441 F. 2d 560; Marine Cooks & Stewards, AFL v. Panama S. S. Co., C.
A. Wash., 362 U.S. 365.