Merchandising Company
Computation of Net Income (Loss)
Sales ₱ xx
Less: Cost of Goods Sold
Purchases ₱ xx
Add: Merchandise Inventory – Beginning xx__
Cost of Goods Available for Sale (CGAS) ₱ xx
Less: Merchandise Inventory – End ₱ xx
Cost of Goods Sold (CGS) xx__
Gross Profit ₱ xx
Less: Operating Expenses xx__
Net Income (Loss) ₱ xx
ACCO 3043 COST ACCOUNTING Prof. Lilian Litonjua
Lecture: July 20, 2019
Merchandising Company
Computation of Net Income (Loss)
Sales ₱ xx
Less: Cost of Goods Sold
Purchases ₱ xx
Add: Merchandise Inventory – Beginning xx__
Cost of Goods Available for Sale (CGAS) ₱ xx
Less: Merchandise Inventory – End ₱ xx
Cost of Goods Sold (CGS) xx__
Gross Profit ₱ xx
Less: Operating Expenses xx__
Net Income (Loss) ₱ xx
Manufacturing Company
Computation of Net Income (Loss)
Sales ₱ 200,000
Less: Cost of Goods Sold 150,000_
Gross Profit ₱ 50,000
Less: Operating Expense 25,000
Net Income (Loss) ₱ 25,000
Computation of Total Manufacturing Cost
Raw Materials (RM) Beginning ₱ 40,000
Add: Raw Materials Purchases 46,000_
Cost of Materials Available for Use ₱ 86,000
Less: Raw Materials (RM) – Ending 50,000_
Cost of Raw Materials Used ₱ 36,000
Add: Direct Labor Cost (DLC) 84,000
Factory Overhead (FOH) 63,000
Total Manufacturing Cost ₱ 183,000_
Computation of Cost of Goods Manufactured
Total Manufacturing Cost ₱ 183,000
Add: Work In Process (WIP) – Beginning 80,000_
Cost of Goods Put into Process ₱ 263,000
Less: Work in Process (WIP) – Ending 95,000_
Cost of Goods Manufactured ₱ 168,000__
Computation of Cost of Goods Sold
Cost of Goods Manufactured ₱ 168,000
Add: Finished Goods (FG) – Beginning 60,000_
Cost of Goods Available for Sale ₱ 228,000
Less: Finished Goods (FG) – Ending 75,000_
Cost of Goods Sold ₱ 150,000_
ASSIGNMENT #2
Merchandising Company
Computation of Net Income (Loss)
Sales ₱ 280,000
Less: Cost of Goods Sold
Purchases ₱ 66,000
Add: Merchandise Inventory – Beginning 207,000_
Cost of Goods Available for Sale (CGAS) ₱ 273,000
Less: Merchandise Inventory – End _₱ 68,000_
Cost of Goods Sold (CGS) 205,000
Gross Profit ₱ 75,000
Less: Operating Expenses 35,000_
Net Income (Loss) ₱ 40,000
Manufacturing Company
Computation of Net Income (Loss)
Sales ₱ 280,000
Less: Cost of Goods Sold 205,000_
Gross Profit ₱ 75,000
Less: Operating Expense 35,000
Net Income (Loss) ₱ 40,000
Computation of Total Manufacturing Cost
Raw Materials (RM) Beginning ₱ 111,667
Add: Raw Materials Purchases 66,000_
Cost of Materials Available for Use ₱ 177,667
Less: Raw Materials (RM) – Ending 60,000_
Cost of Raw Materials Used ₱ 117,667
Add: Direct Labor 57,333
Factory Overhead (FOH) 43,000
Total Manufacturing Cost ₱ 218,000_
Computation of Cost of Goods Manufactured
Total Manufacturing Cost ₱ 218,000
Add: Work In Process (WIP) – Beginning 100,000
Cost of Goods Put into Process ₱ 318,000
Less: Work in Process (WIP) – Ending 85,000_
Cost of Goods Manufactured ₱ 233,000
Computation of Cost of Goods Sold
Cost of Goods Manufactured ₱ 233,000
Add: Finished Goods (FG) – Beginning 40,000_
Cost of Goods Available for Sale ₱ 273,000
Less: Finished Goods (FG) – Ending 68,000_
Cost of Goods Sold ₱ 205,000_
When the ‘Isles of Gold’ turn into Isles of Dissent:
A Case Study on the Philippine Mining Act of 1995
Over the past decade, a powerful bloc of institutions led by the World Bank have been
obstinately pushing for the development of the mining industry. The World Bank has, in
various ways (directly and indirectly) influenced the crafting of national mining codes
primarily within the framework of liberalization, privatization and deregulation.
The World Bank created in the Philippines and elsewhere an impetus for mining
legislation reform and liberalization. Its influence also led and even financed other
agencies (such as UNDP, NTCD, ADB) to support such programs. Yet in so doing this
section of the bank neither consulted with nor researched the impacts upon indigenous
peoples nor required any adequate safeguards. The role of World Bank in the
formulation of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 may not be as conspicuous as in other
countries (e.g. Africa). However, its influence over Asian Development Bank, UNTCD,
and the MGB-DENR, institutions that had a direct hand in the formulation of the mining
act, cannot be denied. In this study, we have tried to show the relationships and
connections between and among these actors, towards the final enactment of the law.
The impact of the Mining Act of 1995 was immediately felt by the sectors who were to
be directly affected by mining activities—the indigenous peoples and farmers. Even in
the initial stage of mining exploration, conflicts mainly over ownership and access over
land already emerged throughout the country. This is because, in almost all instances,
the areas being targeted for mining are the same areas being claimed by indigenous
peoples’ as their ancestral domain.
They were in fact supported by a more recent law, the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act
(IPRA) of 1997, in their claims. Besides conflict over the lands, the Mining Act of 1997
also engendered social tension and conflict within the indigenous/farming communities.
Mining companies used the provision of the Mining Act to seek the “Free and Prior
Informed Consent” especially of indigenous communities. The expansion of mining
activities is also vehemently opposed by local communities on account of actual and
potential threat to biodiversity and sustainable development of indigenous peoples’
territories. For indigenous peoples’, no amount of well-packaged Environmental Impact
Assessments- approved by the DENR- will cover up for the damage that TNC mining
would bring into their ecosystems. History and experience validate these fears.
In the light of strong civil society protests against TNC mining, proponents and
apologists of mining are now talking of “sustainable mining.” As of this writing, the
government is conducting regional and national consultations on its National Minerals
Policy (NMP). This policy has substantially discussed the environmental and social
costs and implications of mining. However, this is still within the framework of growth-
driven, profit-motivated export-oriented industrialization as encoded in the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995. This is the main reason why indigenous peoples’ organizations and
civil society organizations in the Philippines are skeptical of the National Mineral Policy
of the present administration.
Reflection:
In the course of the debate on the Mining Act and mining as an industry per se,
indigenous peoples’ organizations have always reiterated their pro-active positions.
They have said time and again that they are not anti-mining, nor anti-development. In
this final section of this paper, we put forward the following recommendations of
indigenous peoples.
1. Scrap the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations and all its anti-people mining laws
Effect a moratorium on the opening of new large mines and the expansion of
existing ones until such time that a new mining law is legislated. A new mining law
should be crafted within the framework of national industrialization and supportive of
advancing agriculture in order to contribute to food security, jobs and job security,
and just wages.
The new mining law should also:
a. Uphold the social, economic, civil and political rights of all democratic sectors of
Philippine society vis-à-vis the threat that mining poses to the exercise of these
rights.
b. Recognize and respect the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral
domain, to their ancestral lands, and to self-determination.
c. Uphold and recognize declarations by Local Government Units for a mining
moratorium or mining-free zones in their towns/provinces.
d. Recognize the right of the people to veto a mining project.
e. Ban open pit mining, submarine mine waste disposal methods and other
destructive mining technologies.
f. Ban mining where the ecosystem is fragile.
2. Cancel all Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements (FTAAs), Mineral
Production Sharing Agreements (MPSAs), Exploration Permits (EPs), and
other instruments, licenses, or contracts issued to foreign mining companies
and their domestic counterparts in large mining
a. Declare a moratorium on the processing of large mining applications.
b. Companies with bad record regarding IPs should not be promoted.
3. The historical baggage against mining companies could only be overcome if
they establish confidence-building measures, such as:
a. Guarantee adequate separation pay and benefits for workers retrenched from
mining operations that have been discontinued as a result of the cancellation
of mining contracts.
b. Guarantee justice and indemnification for all victims of mining-including
disabled workers; dispossessed peasants; displaced communities; persons
who have suffered diseases caused by mining operations; and persons who
have been harmed and have suffered death in their families from the violence
that has surrounded the mining projects.
c. Rehabilitate the land and other resources ravaged by mining operations,
including mined-out areas. Mining companies should be responsible for
these.
a. Rehabilitated land and other resources should be returned to the people in
order that they can make use of these productively.
