CANADIAN

MILITAR
JOURNAL
Y
Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019
Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 CONTENTS

3 EDITOR’S CORNER

COMMAND AND RESPONSIBILITY

4 Military Commanders’ Responsibility
for Members’ Health
by Marc Bilodeau

TECHNOLOGY AND ETHICS

Cover 14 Future Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAV)
Noble Eagles
and the Ethics of Responsibility
Credit ~ © Charles Vinh
by Mark A. Sandner

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

23 “A Truly Global Approach”: Opportunities for Increased Internationalization
in Professional Military Education
by Steven Paget

MILITARY HISTORY
31 Devil Copper: War and the Canadian Nickel Industry, 1883–1970
by Scott Miller
40 When Johnny (Canuck) Comes Marching Home Again: Canadians in the
Military Commanders’ American Civil War, 1861–1865
Responsibility for by Geoff Tyrell
Members’ Health
VIEWS AND OPINIONS
49 “Parallel Warfare” in Conflicts with Limited Political Aims
by Andrew McNaughton
58 Legal Implications of Canadian Foreign Fighters
by Michael Wickson
65 Strengthening the Canadian Armed Forces Capacity to
Address Child Soldiers
by Alan Okros

COMMENTARY
70 Missing in Action: The Troubling Case of Defence and the Election of 2019
by Martin Shadwick
76 Book Reviews
Future Unmanned
Combat Air Vehicles
(UCAVs) and the Ethics
of Responsibility

Canadian Military Journal/Revue militaire canadienne is the official professional journal of the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of
National Defence. It is published quarterly under authority of the Minister of National Defence. Opinions expressed or implied in this publication are
those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Armed Forces, Canadian Military
Journal, or any agency of the Government of Canada. Crown copyright is retained. Articles may be reproduced with permission of the Editor, on
condition that appropriate credit is given to Canadian Military Journal. Each issue of the Journal is published simultaneously in print and electronic
versions; it is available on the Internet at www.journal.forces.gc.ca.

ISSN 1492-465X

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 1

 CANADIAN
How to Contact Us
Canadian Military Journal
PO Box 17000, Station Forces
MILITARY JOURNAL
Kingston, Ontario
www.journal.forces.gc.ca
CANADA, K7K 7B4
E-mail: [email protected]
Editor-in-Chief Translation
David L. Bashow Translation Bureau,
(613) 541-5010 ext. 6148 Public Services and Procurement Canada
[email protected]

Publication Manager Commentary

Claire Chartrand Martin Shadwick
(613) 541-5010 ext. 6837
[email protected]

Editorial Advisor
Michael Boire

Text
“A Truly Global
Approach”: Oversight Committee
Opportunities Chairman
for Increased
Internationalization Rear-Admiral L. Cassivi, Commander, Canadian Defence Academy (CDA)
in Professional
Members
Military Education
Mr. David L. Bashow, Editor-in-Chief, Brigadier-General S. Bouchard, Commandant
Canadian Military Journal (CMJ) Royal Military College of Canada (RMC)

Colonel Marty Cournoyer, representing Major Chris Young, representing

Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) Chief of Staff Army Strategy

Dr. H.J. Kowal, Principal, Lieutenant-Colonel Brent Clute,

Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) Director Canadian Forces Military Law Centre
(CFMLC), Canadian Defence Academy (CDA)
Captain (N) David Patchell, representing
Text Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS) Ms. Hanya Soliman, representing Chief of the
Defence Intelligence (CDI)

Devil Copper: War and Editorial Board

the Canadian Nickel
Dr. Douglas Bland Professor Hamish Ion
Industry, 1883–1970
Major (ret’d) Michael Boire Philippe Lagassé
Dr. Andrea Charron Lieutenant-Colonel (ret’d) David Last
Lieutenant-Colonel (ret’d) Douglas Delaney Dr. Chris Madsen
Chief Petty Officer 1st Class Mike Dionne Dr. Sean Maloney
Dr. Rocky J. Dwyer Professor Brian McKercher
Lieutenant-Colonel (ret’d) Michael Goodspeed Dr. Paul Mitchell
Major-General (ret’d) Daniel Gosselin Dr. Nezih Mrad
Major Tanya Grodzinski Dr. Scot Robertson
Text Dr. David Hall Professor Stéphane Roussel
Professor Michael Hennessy Professor Elinor Sloan
Colonel (ret’d) Bernd Horn Colonel (ret’d) Randall Wakelam

When Johnny (Canuck)

Comes Marching Home NOT E TO R E A D ER S
Again: Canadians in
the American Civil War, As a bilingual journal, readers should take note that where citations are translated from their original language, the
abbreviation [TOQ] at the end of the note, which stands for “translation of original quote”, indicates to the readers
1861–1865 that the original citation can be found in the published version of the Journal in the other official language.

2 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 Editor’s Corner

W
elcome to another frosty winter edition in the conflict. Exact numbers are impossible to determine, but
of the Canadian Military Journal, as we conventional estimates suggest that somewhere between 35,000
stand upon the threshold of entering our and 50,000 Canadians bore arms in the American Civil War, the
20th year in print. Time certainly does vast majority donning Union blue.”
fly by…
Just as the chosen subjects of our five major articles in this
Taking point this time out, Brigadier-General Marc Bilodeau, issue are quite eclectic, so are the topics addressed in our three
the Canadian Armed Forces Deputy Surgeon General, laments the opinion pieces. In the first, Chinook helicopter pilot Andrew
high release rate of well-trained Regular Force members, many of McNaughton defines and discusses the concept of parallel warfare
which are due to preventable illnesses or injuries. He maintains as it applies to conflicts with limited political aims. In his words:
that health and wellness is a shared responsibility between the “After defining the theoretical concepts, this article will analyze
member, the Canadian Forces Health Services Group, and the the promise of parallel warfare and strategic paralysis against three
military Chain of Command (CoC), with the leadership required limited operations that saw the decisive application of air power;
of the CoC being the most critical part of the equation. To that end, Desert Storm in Iraq, Allied Force in Kosovo, and Unified Protector
his article addresses the following questions: “Are CAF military over Libya.” Next, former infantry officer and current lawyer
commanders given the appropriate tools to effectively achieve their Michael Wickson discusses the legal implications and possible
responsibility for improving the health of their members? If not, consequences for Canadian Foreign Fighters who become involved
how can the organization better support its leaders? in foreign wars. In so doing, Wickson specifically homes in on
the case of Canadian Dillon Hillier’s experiences fighting ISIS in
Next, Major Mark Sandner, an air combat systems officer Kurdistan. Lastly in this section, Dr. Alan Okros, a former naval
who has worked extensively with remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs), officer and currently a Professor in the Royal Military College
explores the ethics of responsibility with respect to the usage of Department of Defence Studies, discusses the recent establishment
unmanned combat air vehicles, and how much machine autonomy of the Dallaire Centre of Excellence for Peace and Security, and
is both realistic and desired. Sandner posits that while there are the impact it will hopefully have with respect to addressing the
significant advantages yielded by this new technology, “…current issue of child soldiers, upon children and soldiers generally, and
technology is still in its infancy in terms of machine learning, and upon global peace and security, writ large.
there are still questions to be considered in terms of responsibility
and ethics when a machine makes decisions to kill autonomously.” Then, our own Martin Shadwick examines our recent federal
Then, with respect to Professional Military Education (PME), election in the Great White North, from the vantage point of both
Dr. Steven Paget of the University of Portsmouth, argues the Canada’s foreign and defence policies. Martin spends the bulk
essentiality of the scholarly pursuit of the profession of arms of the column capsulizing the stated defence policy priorities
in lockstep with the pursuit and mastering of the warrior skills of each of the contesting parties in the election. And while he
for today’s fighting men and women. Further, Paget asserts that applauds some relatively-recent initiatives, such as the Liberal’s
the internationalization of PME can generate highly-significant 2017 policy statement, Strong, Secure, Engaged, Martin also
dividends. “The prevalence of multinational operations means cautions: “…[it] needs to be revisited, and where appropriate,
that, although it may seem less pressing for militaries, interna- modified or enhanced in light of an even more challenging and less
tionalization is both necessary and beneficial.” predictable geo-strategic environment.” He also maintains that “…
questions will surround the timely availability of adequate capital
We have two very different articles offered in our military and other funding. The answers, as always, will reflect political
history section of this issue. First, historian and civil servant will, competing fiscal priorities, and the health of the economy,
Scott Miller, a native of Sudbury, Ontario, often referred to as but the minority government dynamic could raise new issues.”
the ‘Nickel Capital,’ based upon its historical association with
the metal, “…traces the evolution of the Canadian nickel industry Finally, we close with a pair of book reviews that hopefully
from relative obscurity to an essential wartime enterprise [during will pique the interest of our readership during the cold winter
the First World War. – Ed.].” He then highlights how this rise to months ahead, which appears to be a ‘lead pipe cinch,’ at least,
prominence influenced both domestic and international affairs according to the trusty Farmers’ Almanac…
from the late-1800s until the mid-1950s. Next, logistics officer and
American Civil War aficionado Major Geoff Tyrell chronicles the Until the next time.
little-known history of Canadian participation in that war between
1861 and 1865. In Tyrell’s words, “Despite Anglo-American ani- David L. Bashow
mosity, tens of thousands of Canadians crossed the border to fight Editor-in-Chief
Canadian Military Journal

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 3

D N D p h o t o X A 01- 2 019 - 0 0 3 5 - 9 0 5

Military Commanders’ Responsibility

for Members’ Health
by Marc Bilodeau

Brigadier-General Marc Bilodeau is a Medical Officer who Leadership, beginning at the highest levels of the
currently serves as the Canadian Armed Forces’ Deputy Surgeon organization, is a vital force in influencing the health of CAF
General. He graduated from Université Laval in 1998 with a members. This article addresses the following questions: Are
Doctorate in Medicine, and from RMC in 2019 with a Master CAF military commanders given the appropriate tools to
of Public Administration. This manuscript is effectively achieve their responsibility for
inspired by an academic paper submitted on improving the health of their members?
27 May 2019 as a required assignment for the If not, how can the organization better
Canadian Forces College’s National Security “In addition to genetics support its leaders?
Programme. The author would like to acknowl- and social habits, health
edge Dr. Richard Goette, Dr. Robert Engen, The article argues that the health and the
is also influenced by
Colonel Dave Abboud, Commander Rob Briggs, operational readiness of CAF members could
and Major-General (ret’d) Daniel Gosselin the social determinants be enhanced if the CoC would be enabled
for their generous contributions in review- of health.” with the appropriate tools to do so. It will first
ing this manuscript and providing meaningful describe the concepts of individual health and
suggestions with respect to its content. institutional military readiness, exposing how
both concepts are inexorably linked to each
Introduction other. The shared responsibilities of the individual, the CF H Svcs

T
Gp, and the CoC for health in the CAF will then be presented.
he recent Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Using the institutional analysis model,1 I will then establish the
refocus upon people highlights the importance institutional gaps in the existing CAF health governance structure
of human resources as the most crucial asset of that could explain the sub-optimal health trends within the CAF.
a military organization. Yet, more than a thou- Finally, I will propose a realistic and comprehensive way ahead
sand well-trained CAF Regular Force members that could reverse those trends, and improve the overall health
are released from the military in any given year, many of and operational readiness of the CAF.
them due to preventable illnesses or injuries. We have more
opportunities than we are taking advantage of to optimize Health and Readiness
the health and resiliency of CAF members and preserve this
precious asset. The health and wellness of CAF members is a
shared responsibility between the member, the Canadian Forces Defining health and readiness will expose the linkages
between the two concepts while explaining their
Health Services Group (CF H Svcs Gp), and the military chain importance in CAF’s recent increased focus on its people.
of command (CoC). The CoC is the most critical part of the
health and wellness equation.

4 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 COMMAND AND RESPONSIBILITY
stating that to be healthy, “…an
individual or group must be able to
ltural and env
mic, cu iron identify and to realize aspirations,
Da h l g r e n , G . a n d W h i t e h e a d , M . ( 19 9 1 ) . P o l i c i e s a n d S t r a t e g i e s t o P r o m o t e S o c i a l

no me to satisfy needs, and to change or

co nta
ioe Living and lc cope with the environment.”3
c working o
so conditions In addition to genetics and

nd
l
ra
Unemployment social habits, health is also influ-

itio
Work
ne

mmunity
d co
E q u i t y i n H e a l t h . S t o c k h o l m : I n s t i t u t e fo r Fu t u r e s S t u d i e s .

environment enced by the social determinants

ns
ne
Ge

n tw
ala l lifestyl
Water and of health. These determinants
Education i a e fac have been adopted by the Public
du
sanitation

or
c ivi
So
Health Agency of Canada, and

ks
to
Ind are illustrated in Figure 1.4 The

rs
Health care
services concept of total health, described
Agriculture as “a dynamic state of wellbeing
and food characterized by a physical, men-
production
Housing tal and social potential,”5 has also
Age, sex and emerged over the last decades.
constitutional
factors In the Canadian military context,
health goes beyond the period of
service, and it is approached from
Figure 1: The Main Determinants of Health7
a lifelong perspective.6

The concept of resilience has

also gained traction lately. It is defined as “the
S u r g e o n G e n e r a l ’ s I n t e g r a t e d H e a l t h S t r a t e g y – 2 0 1 7 I n t e g r a t i o n f o r B e t t e r H e a l t h , N a t i o n a l D e fe n c e , p. 14

capacity to recover quickly from difficulties.”8

Resilience is closely linked to fitness, which itself
is defined as “a state of adaptation in balance with

H
the conditions at hand.”9 These two concepts are
influenced by many domains: medical, nutritional,
environmental, physical, social, spiritual, behav-
Enhanced ioural, and psychological, and are interdependent
Healthy Patient with the notion of health.10 Someone can be fit to
Population Experience achieve a task but still be unhealthy, which could
negatively impact their resilience. Conversely, a

E
disability for which an individual has been compen-
O sated does not mean that this person is unhealthy
or even unfit; many amputees are fully functional
and highly resilient.
Operational Resource
Excellence Stewardship Defining Readiness

In a military setting, collective readiness

R means having “…enough of the right types of
skilled and adequately trained personnel, and […]
adequate stocks of equipment in good working
order.”11 This definition does not, however, capture
the qualitative component of individual readiness.
A more useful definition incorporating this com-
Figure 2: CF H Svcs Gp’s Quadruple Aim.14
ponent would be: “a combination of a soldier’s
willingness and ability to do his job and cope in
Defining Health peacetime and during combat.”12

As per the World Health Organization (WHO) constitution, The United States Military Health System was first to adopt
health is defined as “a state of complete physical, mental and social a framework, called the Quadruple Aim that identifies population
well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.”2 health as a critical component of medical readiness. This concept
The WHO considers health as a fundamental human right, and is defined as “ensuring that the total military force is medically
its constitution highlights governments’ responsibility for the ready to deploy.”13 The CF H Svcs Gp has recently adapted the
health of their people. The 1986 Ottawa Charter re-emphasized Quadruple Aim framework, conveying readiness as Operational
the importance of social well-being as a component of health, Excellence (Figure 2).

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 5

Linking Health to Military Readiness critical in achieving better health, and this is independent of the
health services offered by the CAF. The military code of conduct
Based upon the definitions of health, resilience and as described in Duty with Honour expects each CAF member “…
fitness proposed above and the introduction of the Quadruple to be held accountable for his or her performance, always acting in
Aim framework, one can draw obvious parallels between these compliance with the law and maintaining the highest standards with
concepts and military readiness. As stated by Physical Medicine respect to all the professional attributes.”21 One of these attributes
and Rehabilitation specialist Dr. Gregory D. Powell, “combat is physical fitness.22 The expectation towards greater engagement
readiness and levels of fitness are intimately related.”15 It can of members is also part of a novel health care approach associated
be argued that the social determinants of health, as much as the with better health outcomes that the CF H Svcs Gp has adopted
resiliency and fitness domains, are also factors under its Patient-Partnered Care Framework.23
of readiness.
Health Services Group Responsibility
There is historical evidence that readiness “CAF leaders who
is negatively impacted by sub-optimal health. exercise authority for The role of the CF H Svcs Gp in
Observations from recent conflicts indicate improving health is challenging for many
their members are
that about 80% of hospital admissions are the reasons. First, the Canada Health Act excludes
consequence of disease and non-battle injuries, responsible and CAF members from the provincial respon-
many of them preventable.16 Therefore, the bet- accountable for the sibility to provide health services to their
ter the total health of its serving members, the citizens, creating the requirement for the CAF
implementation and
higher the readiness of a military organization. to build its own health care system.24 The
The healthier the soldiers of a nation are, the enforcement of the National Defence Act itself is, however, silent
more likely its military will have a competitive CAF General regarding health care.25
advantage over an adversary. Safety Standards.”
The CF H Svcs Gp is, therefore, de facto,
Furthermore, the cost of poor health mandated to provide health services, includ-
cannot be ignored. For example, obesity, which ing deployable capabilities in support of CAF
is associated with personal life habits, is a predisposing condition operations.26 Its mandate is similar to the Canadian provinces and
for many diseases, such as high blood pressure, diabetes, heart territories’ responsibility to provide care to their citizens. Based
disease, and osteoarthritis. An individual’s medical readiness is upon Canadian Medical Association statistics, the lack of access
not the only aspect impacted by obesity. The costs associated with to health services represents only 25% of what makes Canadians
treating obesity, and the medical consequences of this condition, sick (Figure 4). There are several other ways to improve health
have a significant financial impact upon the CAF, preventing the that do not involve the provision of health care at all.
organization from using these funds somewhere else, thus, indi-
rectly impacting readiness.17 There is also evidence, according to Secondly, instead of being a reactive system which
a study done by Dr. Anthony Tvaryanas, an American aerospace provides acute or episodic care to ill and injured personnel, the
medicine specialist, that “…the cost of lost pro-
ductivity secondary to health-related conditions

S u r g e o n G e n e r a l ’ s I n t e g r a t e d H e a l t h S t r a t e g y – 2 0 1 7 I n t e g r a t i o n f o r B e t t e r H e a l t h , N a t i o n a l D e fe n c e , p. 11
(presenteeism) exceeds the costs of direct medical
care.”18 In addition to absenteeism, this notion is
not insignificant for such issues as mental illnesses.

Responsibility for Health

H ealth is a complex notion influenced by

many interrelated domains. Such a level
of complexity justifies a partnership to obtain
better health results. The importance of integra-
tion and partnership to improve health has long
been recognized within the CAF. This integra-
tion is captured in the Triad of Responsibility,
illustrated in Figure 3. This section will describe
the role played by each of these stakeholders to
achieve better health.

Individual Responsibility

As described in the Surgeon General Integrated

Health Strategy, “CAF members and their families
must be fully engaged as a partner in their health,
[…] so that they can improve their quality of life,
long-term wellbeing and resilience, as well as their
operational readiness.”20 Member engagement is Figure 3: Triad of Responsibility.19

6 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 COMMAND AND RESPONSIBILITY
WHAT MAKES
CANADIANS SICK?
INCOME
EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT
DISABILITY
EDUCATION
SOCIAL EXCLUSION

50%
SOCIAL SAFETY NET
YOUR LIFE GENDER
EMPLOYMENT/WORKING CONDITIONS
RACE
ABORIGINAL STATUS
SAFE AND NUTRITIOUS FOOD
HOUSING/HOMELESSNESS
COMMUNITY BELONGING

25%
ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE
YOUR HEALTH CARE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
WAIT TIMES
C a n a d i a n M e d i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n , 2 013

15% YOUR BIOLOGY BIOLOGY

GENETICS

10% YOUR ENVIRONMENT

AIR QUALITY
CIVIC INFRASTRUCTURE

THESE ARE CANADA’S SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH #SDOH

Figure 4: Canada’s Social Determinants of Health.27

CF H Svcs Gp has favoured programs which prevent illness and Command Responsibility
injuries and promote healthy lifestyles.28 Strengthening the Forces
(StF) is a voluntary health promotion program delivered on CAF In his Guidance to Commanding Officers (CO) and their
bases and wings, focusing upon addiction, injury prevention, Leadership Teams, the CDS expressed: “The CAF must be fit
inactivity, and social wellness.29 This program is aligned with the to fight. COs and their leadership teams are responsible for the
principle that preventive health care is significantly more efficient promotion of health and fitness within their units.”35 He also
than curative health care. expects his leadership teams to be “…working closely with our
medical professionals to develop and maintain the climate of
Finally, the CAF has a legal obligation under the Canada trust and understanding required to support healthy lifestyles.”36
Labour Code (CLC) and the Canada Occupational Health and Command responsibility is central to ensuring fitness to fight,
Safety Regulations “…to ensure that the health and safety at work which depends highly upon health and fitness.
of every person employed by the employer is [sic] protected.”30
CAF leaders who exercise authority for their members are respon- The Guidance’s chapter on physical fitness explains that “…
sible and accountable for the implementation and enforcement of it is about cultivating and promoting a culture that values health
the CAF General Safety Standards.31 Chapter 34 of the Queen’s and wellness, and recognizes how this contributes to operational
Regulations and Orders (QR&O) states that “…the senior medi- readiness, resilience and the long-term health of our personnel and
cal officer at all levels of command is the responsible adviser their families.”37 It similarly addresses the mental health aspect
[sic] to the senior officer exercising the function of command of command responsibility.38 Finally, the document highlights
or executive authority on all matters pertaining to the health the importance of creating a climate of trust and confidence in
and physical efficiency of all personnel under his jurisdiction.”32 facilitating access to health services.
By extension, the Surgeon General, the top CAF physician, is,
therefore, the health advisor to the Chief of the Defence Staff The leadership team’s obligation regarding members’ health
(CDS). The QR&O also explicitly state that “…a commanding is also mentioned in several other doctrinal documents. The
officer is responsible for the whole of the organization and the QR&O define a specific role for the non-commissioned members
safety of the commanding officer’s base, unit or element.”33 The in promoting “…the welfare, efficiency and good discipline of all
CF H Svcs Gp supports CAF leadership in meeting these critical who are subordinate to the member.”39 Duty with Honour assigns
Force Health Protection functions, as a sub-component of Force to the profession of arms the responsibility to “…ensure the care
Protection which is “essential to operations—and, therefore, a and well-being of subordinates.”40 The Conceptual Foundations
clear responsibility of command.”34 of Leadership in the Canadian Forces identifies member well-being

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 7

 the needs of Canada
and Canadians before
their own. In turn,
CAF members expect
to be given appropriate
benefits and support
for themselves and
their families. As the
doctrine states, “This
social contract is an
unbreakable common
bond of identity, loy-
alty and responsibility
which has sustained
the military forces of
Canada throughout
their already signifi-
cant involvements on
the world stage.”46
D N D p h o t o X A 01- 2 019 - 0 0 3 5 - 8 8 6 , b y C o r p o r a l S t u a r t E va n s

There is, how-

ever, a tension between
mission requirements
and the well-being
of members. 47 This
tension, defined as
the concept of unlim-
ited liability, will
sometimes force com-
manders to place their
subordinates in harm’s
way, therefore putting
their health at risk. It
also drives the con-
stant requirement of
and commitment as one of three value dimensions critical to effec- military leaders to “…balance mission accomplishment with
tiveness and mission success.41 This notion is expanded further in members’ well-being.”48 The primacy of operational effectiveness
Leading the Institution by calling for a transformation to a culture and mission accomplishment assigned by the Canadian govern-
of understanding where “…leaders emphasize ment cannot be ignored, and, according to the
proactive influence behaviours such as facilita- CDS, “…is the fundamental criterion against
tion, support, participation and delegation.”42 “Members still need to which all personnel functions and supporting
instead of a culture of rules-based compli- policies must be developed and evaluated.”49 It
spend a significant
ance. The latter also links members’ quality requires the delicate balancing of the individu-
of life with optimal performance.43 Centuries amount of time away als’ needs against the collective needs. This
of lessons learned have also shown that the from work.” tension was reaffirmed when the CDS launched
conditions of the workplace are more impor- Operation Honour in 2015, declaring “People
tant in motivating soldiers than many human First, Mission Always.” This focus upon people
resources programs. Dr. Alan Okros, a professor at the Canadian was also confirmed in our Canadian defence policy, Strong, Secure,
Forces College, states that loyalty and obligations to their peers Engaged (SSE), with its first chapter dedicated to people.50
are inspiring factors for employees, hence the importance of “…
behavioural influences from leadership, institutional culture and Finally, the approach of making the COs and their teams
team climate” to achieve sustained commitment.44 responsible for the health of their members is not unique to
the CAF, as shown in the NATO Field Hygiene and Sanitation
According to the CAF, “…honouring the social contract is standards that make unit commanders “…responsible for all
essential to maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the public,” aspects of health and sanitation.”51 Most contemporary military
articulating the moral responsibility that CAF members have organizations proclaim a similar intent. While an essential com-
towards Canadians.45 This societal framework between Canadians ponent of command, this responsibility aspect of the Defence
and their military stems from the CAF members’ willingness to put Scientists’ Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann Competency, Authority,

8 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 COMMAND AND RESPONSIBILITY
and Responsibility (CAR) model seems insufficient to make trends need to be analyzed to understand the underlying reasons
commanders effective in achieving the desired outcomes.52 for them in order to develop potential solutions.

Improving Health to Enhance Readiness Gap Analysis

D espite the conditions being in place to ensure optimal

health and fitness levels for our members, the current
health status of the CAF, and its trends over the last few
Using American sociologist Dr. Richard Scott’s institutional
analysis model, a gap analysis was conducted to understand the
reasons for the sub-optimal health trends of the CAF population.59
decades are not encouraging. They will now be discussed.
Scott’s regulative pillar refers to institutions’ ability to
Current CAF Health Status and Trends establish rules, monitor conformity, and use sanctions and rewards
to influence behaviour compliance.60 Most CAF rules are clear,
The most recent Health and Lifestyle Information Survey such as what is stated under the Universality of Service principles,
(HLIS)53 revealed that the overall perceived health status, health- stipulating that every member must “be physically fit, employ-
related activity limitations, chronic conditions, and rate of acute able and deployable.”61 A clearly-defined process also exists to
injuries have not changed compared to previous surveys.54 describe the consequences of a failure to achieve the Physical
Fitness Standards when it is determined to
Members still spend a significant amount be within the member’s control. Such failure,
of time away from work. Indeed, 18.4% of when recurrent, could ultimately result in a
Regular Force members had missed a minimum “It might be worth release from the CAF.62
of a day of work as a result of illness or disabil- re-assessing the
ity in the month before the questionnaire was resonance of the There is a requirement for a member to
answered. This number translates to about eight be assessed by a CAF health care provider
workdays per year, which is slightly above the military ethos in whenever there are indications of a health
Canadian population average of 7.7 days.55 the context of problem on the screening questionnaire con-
today’s society.” ducted before a fitness test. This evaluation
Stigmas related to mental health issues, could subsequently result in the assignment
while significantly reduced, still exist. Only of Medical Employment Limitations, which
60% of personnel who contemplated suicide may preclude the member from attempting the
in the previous 12 months sought mental health support, and only test. It could also, ultimately, result in a medical release from the
50.9% of those knew where to find help after hours. As well, about CAF. A more extensive suite of benefits accompanies this type
20% of CAF members are still engaged in high risk or harmful of release, compared to non-medical releases. This phenomenon
drinking activities.56 could be a partial explanation of the proportion of members being
released for medical reasons, and the difficulty in returning mem-
The survey further demonstrated an increase in repetitive bers to work after an illness or injury.63 Finally, while medical and
strain injuries from 22.6% to about one-third. Two-thirds of physical fitness is monitored individually for each member and
members have engaged in unsafe physical training practices, reported to their commanding officer, there is currently no easy
resulting in an injury for 12.5% of them. Obesity and overweight way to track the fitness level from a unit, formation, or service
rates (25% and 49% respectively) have also increased among perspective. The HLIS is the only tool available that provides a
CAF personnel in the last decade. The smoking rate is otherwise snapshot every four-to-five years, which informs CAF leaders.64
steadily decreasing, but 18.5% of current smokers started smok-
ing after joining the CAF, 57.1% of them during basic training.57 There is a pressing need for military leaders to have better
and timelier access to information about the health status of
There seems to be a better awareness of Strengthening the their members at the population level. Also, there may be too
Forces programs, mainly for the 40 to 60-year-old group. The many incentives to remain sick or disabled, in comparison to
18 to 29-year-old group does not appear to be adopting healthy staying healthy or recovering actively from an illness or injury.
lifestyle changes. The number of hours spent on sedentary activi- U.S. Army General William Westmoreland stated in 1963:
ties increased by more than three hours since the previous survey, “…the effective platoon leader (1) clearly and consistently
and six hours from the one before that. Finally, only 28.7% of emphasized performance as the basis of reward and punishment;
personnel consumed more than six servings of vegetables and (2) used punishment instructively and for motivational failure and
fruits per day, and more than half underestimated Canada’s Food (3) communicated clearly about the standards he desired.”65 The
Guide recommendations for this food group.58 These negative absence of health information does not allow for the development

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 9

 of evidence-informed policy to adequately influence health-related to a strong emotional reaction: “Actors who align themselves with
behaviours. The CAF narrative would also benefit from a more prevailing cultural beliefs are likely to feel competent and con-
positive approach to health and wellness. nected; those who are at odds are regarded as, at best, clueless or,
at worst, crazy.”71 In the military context, this pillar is powerful
The normative pillar, based upon societal values and norms, for influencing behaviours. The significant reduction of smoking
refers to the roles given by society to people, and expected behav- in the military could be explained by the successful information
iours devolved from such responsibility.66 The military mandate, campaigns related to the risk of smoking, combined with peer
duties and privileges relate to the social contract associated with pressure resulting from smoking being no longer considered
the profession of arms described earlier. It also speaks to the CAF culturally acceptable.
ethos of “duty, loyalty, integrity, and courage.”67 The concept of
duty relates to the performance expected from members, which is The CAF, therefore, needs to capitalize upon the power of
closely associated with courage, which requires both physical and culture in creating peer pressure to influence behaviours. Inter-unit
moral capacity. The notion of integrity refers to the obligations competitions need not be only related to elite performance, but
towards responsibility and being held respon- can be applied to simple health habits related
sible, while loyalty, is directed both towards to physical activity, diet, stress management,
the CoC and peers.68 The current version of “This article has smoking, and sleep. These would be instru-
Duty with Honour is ten years old. Younger attempted to mental in creating that new culture of health
CAF members do not seem as responsive to and fitness that would ultimately enhance the
the recommendations to adopt healthier life- demonstrate that military organization. It might also be worth
styles as older members. Is this an indication military commanders considering changing the lens through which
that these generations do not connect with the are currently not being the organization looks at health issues.
way the military ethos is presented to them?
It might be worth re-assessing the resonance provided with all the Consideration should be given to switching
of the military ethos in the context of today’s tools they need to from a paternalistic, disease-centric, acute care
society. Its modernization might be required model, to a partnership model, focusing upon
influence the health
to reinforce these essential principles. This prevention and health optimization. This new
review could incorporate gender and diversity of their members.” perspective would replace the emphasis upon
concepts in the post-Operation Honour era. It sickness, with a focus upon wellness.
could underscore the importance of leadership
in reducing stigma, as shown within the mental health domain. It Scott’s model allows for a detailed assessment of the potential
could also expand further upon the crucial role of the NCMs as gaps in optimizing health in support of military readiness. The
transformational leaders.69 The next edition of Duty with Honour proposed tools, summarized in Table 1, could if implemented, offer
is in development.70 This review would be an excellent opportu- a stronger alignment of the CAF institutional pillars, ultimately
nity to incorporate the value of health and fitness, ensuring it is leading to better health outcomes. These tools would provide
being reinforced as a critical component of our military identity. commanders with the authority component of the Competency,
Authority and Responsibility (CAR) model to positively impact
Finally, the cultural-cognitive pillar refers to the cultural the health of their members, using their position of influence and
systems that drive shared understanding and ideologies, creating assuming their assigned responsibility for health.72
collective meaning that results in actions. This pillar is attached

Regulative pillar Normative pillar Cultural-cognitive pillar

• Universality of Service and • Social contract of the • Strong culture of conformity

Physical Fitness Standards profession of arms • The importance of the team
Currently in place • Periodic Health and • Military ethos
Lifestyle Information
Survey
• Incentives for health • Modernization of the • Healthy inter-unit
and recovery military ethos for the competitions
What’s missing • Real-time health younger generations • A more positive
Au t h o r

status monitoring health narrative

Table 1: Gap Analysis using Scott’s Model.

10 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 COMMAND AND RESPONSIBILITY
A Proposed Way Forward The culture change that could result from such initiatives in
targeting healthy behaviours has the potential to become one of
Based upon previous successes, such as reducing the stigmas the most significant outcomes of this re-alignment. It might also
related to mental health issues or reducing smoking rates, the result in the re-framing of the narrative from disease and sickness
evidence available fully supports the possibility of behavioural to health and wellness. A strong commander’s voice, such as the
change. Top leadership involvement and buy-in are critical to suc- one expressed by General Westmoreland, is an essential aspect of
cess; without them, no meaningful change is possible. Fortunately, stigma-reducing efforts.88 The current refresh of the military ethos
CAF leadership buy-in should not be problematic. A few notable documentation to better align with younger generations will also
examples are the Canadian Army Integrated Performance Strategy, be beneficial in capitalizing upon the changes described herein.
launched in 2015,73 and the Royal Canadian Navy Health and
Wellness Strategy, implemented around 2012, which have led to Finally, and perhaps most importantly, sustained leadership
significant improvements.74 Other promising improvements came commitment and role modelling are crucial to affect change.
with the release, on January 2017, of a strategic initiating direc- This component feeds into the competency domain of the CAR
tive by the CDS and the Deputy Minister of National Defence model.89 As stated by a United States Army Medical Corps colonel
on total health and wellness.75 This direction was subsequently in 1951: “The greatest responsibilities of the commander is that
reinforced in Strong, Secure, and Engaged,’ wherein $198.2 mil- once having initiated an action designed to maintain the health
lion was promised to “favour a more comprehensive approach to of his men, he himself must always be the shining example of
care—known as ‘Total Health and Wellness’—which will consider compliance with that action. […] The personal responsibility
psychosocial well-being in the workplace, the physical environ- and self-discipline displayed by a commander in health measures
ment, and the personal health of members.”76 It will also “support cannot be overestimated because, if he himself fails, so will the
health and resilience; promote a culture of healthy behaviour; and measures.”90 This quote reinforces the importance of role model-
support military families.”77 A strategic framework is currently ling and testimonials by senior military personnel sharing their
being developed; the most recent draft consulted addresses the own story of health struggles to further reduce stigma.
crucial role of leadership in such an endeavour.78 The framework
will ultimately lead to the release of a strategy and action plan.79 Conclusion

Finally, BALANCE, the CAF Physical Performance Strategy

was recently published, and it focuses upon critical elements,
such as “…be trained and fit, properly fueled, well-rested, and
T he recent CAF focus upon people has led to the release
of several closely aligned strategic documents aimed at
improving the health of the CAF population, and thus, CAF
free from injury” that drive performance and operational readi- operational readiness. This re-alignment creates the ideal condi-
ness.80 Physical activity, nutrition, sleep and injury prevention tions to undertake coordinated actions. While health is a shared
constitute the Performance 4 (P4) behaviours as the foundation of responsibility between members, the CF H Svcs Gp and the
this strategy. It recognizes the importance of building a culture of CoC, CAF leadership is the critical component of this equation.
fitness within appropriate policy, social and physical environments
to support it.81 As well, it highlights the shared accountability This article has attempted to demonstrate that military com-
between the institution, its leaders and its individuals for achiev- manders are currently not being provided with all the tools they
ing the desired outcomes.82 Finally, it relies upon a decentralized need to influence the health of their members. It also argued that
execution by allowing each Level 1 command to provide their own they would be in a stronger position to affect the overall health
implementing directions, thus enabling a more targeted approach status of the CAF, and ultimately, its operational readiness if
to various sub-groups of the CAF.83 they were provided additional tools. Improving the collective
CAF health requires a robust measurement framework that would
The alignment of these initiatives creates a clear and explicit allow real-time monitoring of population health status. It also calls
common intent, which is “key to co-ordinated military action,” for a cultural change towards health and wellness in contrast to
as proposed by Pigeau and McCann.84 The current conditions disease and sickness, and the appropriate incentives to support
seem optimal to fill the gaps identified above by providing the such an approach. The refresh of our military ethos could better
CoC with the tools they require for success. Historically a topic communicate its relevance for younger generations.
rarely written about by military leaders, health is now becoming
a key message with the potential to “…have a significant impact Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a strong and sustained
on the attitudes and behaviors of military personnel.”85 BALANCE leadership commitment will be the critical enabler in balancing
also provides a measurement framework that could monitor the the command envelope required for any effective command-driven
total health and offer a transparent dashboard for all levels of change.91 The voices and actions of commanders need to be heard
command. This tool could be modelled on the US Army Medical and felt to maintain the momentum established by the recent stra-
Readiness Assessment Tool.86 There is also a need to capitalize tegic documents. These actions will result in healthier behaviours
further upon positive incentives, such as the FORCE Rewards and enhanced operational readiness for the CAF.
program, to remain fit or to recover from an illness or injury.87

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 11

D N D p h o t o K W 0 6 - 2 017- 0 0 6 7- 015

NOTES
1. W. Richard Scott, Institutions and Organizations: 10. Sean Robson, Psychological Fitness and 17. Canadian Forces Health Services Group,
Ideas, Interests, and Identities, 4th Edition, Resilience: A Review of Relevant Constructs, “Surgeon General’s Integrated Health Strategy,”
(Los Angeles: SAGE, 2014). Measures, and Links to Well-Being, RAND pp. 4–5.
2. World Health Organization, “Constitution,” Project Air Force Series on Resiliency (Santa 18. Anthony P Tvaryanas et al., “The Commander’s
accessed 3 May 2019 at: <https://www.who.int/ Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014), p. iv. Wellness Program: Assessing the Association
about/who-we-are/constitution>. 11. Jason Forrester, Michael O’Hanlon, and Micah between Health Measures and Physical Fitness
3. World Health Organization, “WHO | The Ottawa Zenko, “Measuring U.S. Military Readiness,” in Assessment Scores, Fitness Assessment
Charter for Health Promotion,” accessed 3 May National Security Studies Quarterly VII, No. 2 Exemptions, and Duration of Limited Duty,”
2019, at: <http://www.who.int/healthpromotion/ (Spring 2001), pp. 99–100. in Military Medicine Vol. 183, No. 9–10 (1
conferences/previous/ottawa/en/> 12. Robert J. Schneider and James A. Martin, September 2018) p. e612.
4. Public Health Agency of Canada, “Social “Military Families and Combat Readiness,” in 19. Canadian Forces Health Services Group, Surgeon
Determinants of Health and Health Inequalities,” Military Psychiatry Preparing in Peace for War, General’s Integrated Health Strategy – 2017
25 November 2001. Chapter 2, 1994, p. 20. Integration for Better Health, National Defence,
5. Johannes Bircher, “Towards a Dynamic Definition 13. Military Health System, MHS Quadruple Aim p. 11.
of Health and Disease,” in Medicine, Health Care (United States, 2013), at: <https://health.mil/ 20. Ibid.
and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 3 (November 2005), Reference-Center/Glossary-Terms/2013/04/09/ 21. National Defence, Duty with Honour: The
p. 335. MHS-Quadruple-Aim.> Profession of Arms in Canada, (Kingston, ON,
6. Canadian Forces Health Services Group, 14. Canadian Forces Health Services Group, Canadian Defence Academy, 2009), p. 14.
“Surgeon General’s Integrated Health Strategy,” Surgeon General’s Integrated Health Strategy  – 22. Ibid., p. 29.
(National Defence, 2017), p. 2. 2017 Integration for Better Health, National 23. Canadian Forces Health Services Group, “Patient-
7. Dahlgren G., Whitehead M. (1991). Policies and Defence, p. 14. Partnered Care Framework,” 2018.
Strategies to Promote Social Equity in Health. 15. Gregory D. Powell, Daniel Dumitru, and Jeffery 24. Minister of Justice, “Canada Health Act”
Stockholm, Sweden: Institute for Futures Studies. J. Kennedy, “The Effect of Command Emphasis (Government of Canada, 12 December 2017).;
8. Oxford Dictionaries, “Definition of Resilience,” and Monthly Physical Training on Army Physical Chief of the Defence Staff, “CFJP 1.0 Military
Oxford Dictionaries | English, accessed 3 May Fitness Scores in a National Guard Unit,” in Personnel Management Doctrine,” Canadian
2019, at:<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/ Military Medicine, Vol. 158, No. 5 (1 May 1993), Forces Joint Publication (Government of Canada,
definition/resilience.> p. 296. June 2008), pp. 2–3.
9. Michael Mullen, “On Total Force Fitness in War 16. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Field 25. Minister of Justice, “National Defence Act,” (Ottawa:
and Peace,” in Military Medicine, Vol. 175, No. Hygiene and Sanitation,” Standards Related Government of Canada, 18 December 2018).
8:1 (2010), p. 1. Document (NATO Standardization Office, July 26. National Defence, “Surgeon General’s Report
2018), pp. 1-1,1-2. 2014,” 2014, p. 4.
27. Canadian Medical Association, 2013.

12 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 COMMAND AND RESPONSIBILITY
28. Canadian Forces Health Services Group, 48. National Defence, “Ensuring Member 73. Canadian Army, “Canadian Army Integrated
“Surgeon General’s Integrated Health Strategy,” Well-Being and Commitment,” p. 113. Performance Strategy (CAIPS) – MISSION:
p. 2. 49. Chief of the Defence Staff, “CFJP 1.0 Military Ready,” 24 November 2015.
29. National Defence, “Strengthening the Forces Health Personnel Management Doctrine,” pp. 2–3. 74. Royal Canadian Navy, “RCN Executive Plan
Promotion Program,” accessed 3 May 2019, at: 50. National Defence, Strong, Secure, Engaged. 2013-2017” (National Defence, 2013), 4;
<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national- Canada’s Defence Policy, 2017. MARPAC, “MARPAC Health and Wellness
defence/programs/strengthening-forces.html.> 51. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Field Strategy Report Card 2018,” 2018.
30. Minister of Justice, “Canada Occupational Health Hygiene and Sanitation,” pp. 1–2. 75. J. Foster and J. H. Vance, “Strategic Initiating
and Safety Regulations” (Ottawa: Government of 52. The three dimensions of command capability Directive - Defence Team Total Health and
Canada, 23 November 2018); Minister of Justice, were identified as Competency, Authority and Wellness Strategy,” 31 January 2017.
“Canada Labour Code” (Ottawa: Government of Responsibility (CAR) in Ross Pigeau and Carol 76. National Defence, Strong, Secure, Engaged.
Canada, 17 March 2019), p. 101. McCann, “Re-Conceptualizing Command and Canada’s Defence Policy, p. 12.
31. Ibid., pp. 1–6. Control,” in Canadian Military Journal Vol. 3, 77. Ibid., p. 25.
32. National Defence, “Chapter 34: Medical No. 1 (2002), p. 57; Ross Pigeau, “Authority, 78. Gareth Doherty, “Defence Team Total Health
Services,” in Queen’s Regulations and Orders Responsibility and Accountability in Professional and Wellness Strategic Framework” (HFM-
for the Canadian Forces, Vol. 2, 2001. Militaries,” 2017, p. 4. 302 Symposium on Evidence-Based Leader
33. National Defence, “Chapter 4: Duties and 53. This self-reported survey of CAF members’ Intervention for Health and Wellness, Berlin,
Responsibilities of Officers,” in Queen’s health is administered every four-to-five years. Germany, 10 April 2019).
Regulations and Orders, Vol. 1, 2014. The 2013/14 is the last one from which results 79. Discussions with Dr. Gareth Doherty and Ms.
34. Andrew Gale and Wayne Pickering, “Force were available at the time this article was written. Annie Cowham, January and July 2019.
Protection,”in Canadian Military Journal,Vol. 8, 54. National Defence, “Health and Lifestyle 80. Moral and Welfare Services, “BALANCE,”
No. 2 (Summer 2007), pp. 37, 42. Information Survey of Canadian Armed Forces accessed 7 May 2019, at: <https://www.caf-
35. Chief of the Defence Staff, “Chief of the Defence Personnel: 2013/2014,” September 2016, pp. v–vi. connection.ca/National/Programs-Services/
Staff Guidance to Commanding Officers and 55. Ibid., pp. 17–18. For-Military-Personnel/Military-Fitness/FORCE-
Their Leadership Teams” (Canadian Armed 56. Ibid., pp. vi–viii. Program/BALANCE.aspx.>
Forces, 7 February 2019), pp. 11–47, 11–48. 57. Ibid. 81. Canadian Forces Morale and Welfare Services,
36. Ibid. 58. Ibid., pp. vi–vii. “BALANCE: The Canadian Armed Forces
37. Ibid., pp. 12–51. 59. Scott’s model is based upon three pillars, which Physical Performance Strategy” (Ottawa:
38. Ibid., pp. 13–54. are the regulative, the normative and the cul- Department of National Defence, 2018), p. 20.
39. National Defence, “Chapter 5: Duties and tural-cognitive pillars. See Scott, Institutions and 82. Ibid., pp. 31, 34, 40–43.
Responsibilities of Non-Commissioned Organizations: Ideas, Interests, and Identities. 83. Ibid., 32.
Members,” in Queen’s Regulations and Orders, 60. Ibid., p. 9. 84. Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann, “Establishing
Vol. 1-Administration, 2015. 61. National Defence, “DAOD 5023-0, Universality Common Intent: The Key to Co-Ordinated
40. National Defence, Duty with Honour: The of Service,” 13 November 2013. Military Action,” in The Operational Art:
Profession of Arms in Canada, p. 14. 62. National Defence, “DAOD 5023-2, Physical Canadian Perspectives: Leadership and
41. National Defence, “Chapter 4: Responsibilities Fitness Program,” 13 November 2013. Command, Allan D. English (ed.), (Kingston,
of CF Leaders,” in Leadership in the Canadian 63. John Geddes, “The Number of Soldiers Citing ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006),
Forces: Conceptual Foundations (Ottawa: Medical Reasons for Leaving the Military Is pp. 85, 91.
Published under the auspices of the Chief of Soaring,” in Macleans, 14 March 2018. 85. Walker S.C. Poston et al., “A Content Analysis of
the Defence Staff by the Canadian Defence 64. HLIS has recently been replaced by the CAF Military Commander Messages About Tobacco
Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, Health Survey. and Other Health Issues in Military Installation
2005), p. 20. 65. W. C. Westmoreland, “Mental Health—an Aspect Newspapers: What Do Military Commanders Say
42. National Defence, “Ensuring Member of Command,” in Military Medicine, Vol. 128, About Tobacco?,” in Military Medicine, Vol. 180,
Well-Being and Commitment,” in Leadership in No. 3 (1 March 1963), p. 211. No. 6 (June 2015), p. 2.
the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution 66. Scott, Institutions and Organizations: Ideas, 86. Kirk Frady, “Medical Readiness Assessment Tool
(Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy, Interests, and Identities, p. 64. (MRAT),”24 November 2015.
Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2006), 67. National Defence, “DND and CF Code of Values 87. Moral and Welfare Services, “FORCE
p. 111. and Ethics | DND CAF,” 15 July 2013. Rewards Program,” accessed 7 May 2019, at:
43. Ibid., p. 117. 68. National Defence, “Code of Values and Ethics” <https://www.cafconnection.ca/National/
44. Alan Okros, “Chapter 7: Becoming an Employer (Department of National Defence and Canadian Programs-Services/For-Military-Personnel/
of Choice: Human Resource Challenges within Forces, 2012), pp. A-2/3-A-3/3. Military-Fitness/FORCE-Program/FORCE-
DND and the CF,” in Public Management of 69. Alena Mondelli, “Non-Commissioned Members Rewards-Program.aspx.>
Defence in Canada, Craig Stone (ed.), (Toronto: as Transformational Leaders: Socialization of a 88. Westmoreland, “Mental Health—an Aspect
Breakout Educational Network in association Corps,” in Canadian Military Journal Vol. 18, of Command.”
with the School of Policy Studies, Queen’s No. 4 (2018), p. 30. 89. Pigeau, “Authority, Responsibility and
University, 2009), p. 172. 70. Discussion with Dr. Alan Okros, Canadian Forces Accountability in Professional Militaries,” p. 2.
45. National Defence, “Ensuring Member Well-Being College, 22 May 2019. 90. Perrin H. Long, “Disease and Command
and Commitment,” p. 17; National Defence, 71. Scott, Institutions and Organizations: Ideas, Responsibility,” in Military Medicine, Vol. 108,
“Chapter 4: Responsibilities of CF Leaders,” p. 20. Interests, and Identities, pp. 66–70. No. 2 (1 February 1951), p. 107.
46. Ibid. 72. Pigeau, “Authority, Responsibility and 91. Pigeau, “Authority, Responsibility and
47. National Defence, “Chapter 4: Responsibilities of Accountability in Professional Militaries,” p. 3. Accountability in Professional Militaries,” p. 5.
CF Leaders,” p. 24.

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 13

W E N N R i g h t s L t d / A l a m y S t o c k P h o t o / BY N N W X

The X-45 Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle technology demonstrator that is eventually intended to fly high-risk air combat missions.

Future Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAV)

and the Ethics of Responsibility
by Mark A. Sandner

Major Mark Sandner is an Air Combat Systems Officer Captain Michael Byrnes, also of the USAF, who in his article
currently posted to VX-1 Air Test and Evaluation Squadron at “Nightfall: Machine Autonomy in Air-to-Air Combat,” argues
Naval Air Station Pax River, in Maryland, USA. He recently that a fully- autonomous unmanned aircraft will bring new
completed the RCAF Aerospace Studies Program at the RCAF unparalleled lethality to the air-to-air combat world.1
William Barker V.C. College at 17 Wing, Winnipeg, and has
worked extensively with remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) in the Although the authors of both articles agree that the future of
past while posted to Australia from 2015–2017. air power lies in autonomous UCAVs taking centre stage, Byrnes
goes slightly further in stating that the technical and performance
Introduction aspects of UCAVs will inevitably lead to a UCAV-dominant air

I
environment. Helms and Helms, by contrast, argue that manned
n the article “The Swarm, The Cloud, and the supervision will most likely always be required, and the degree
Importance of Getting There First,” Major Blair of autonomy that should be given to UCAVs will benefit greatly
Helms and Captain Nick Helms of the United States from having manned supervision. In a purely air-to-air combat
Air Force (USAF) push for a manned-unmanned scenario, where the UCAV will primarily be used, I argue that
synergy of operations that allows technology and the realistic view of the future of air combat is unmanned, due to
automation to amplify what is currently possible in the world the rapidly-increasing developments in technology, as well as the
of remotely piloted air power. They argue that the limiting pure economics of fielding an air force of unmanned aircraft. And
factor for achieving true operational fusion is cultural, not yet, current technology is still in its infancy in terms of machine
technological. Once the cultural acceptance of remotely-piloted learning, and there are still questions to be considered in terms
aircraft (RPAs) and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) of responsibility and ethics when a machine makes decisions to
catches up with the technology, then true breakthroughs in kill autonomously.
capability can be realized. Semi-contrasting this belief is

14 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 TECHNOLOGY AND ETHICS
Background feasible and credible UCAVs optimized for air combat. The reason
for this technology being as-of-yet undeveloped lies in the sheer

R PAs and UCAVs have evolved considerably over the complexity of the machine logic required to make combat decisions
past one hundred years. The first unmanned aircraft was as well as a pilot with years of training and experience. USAF
flown in 1916, less than fifteen years after the Wright brother’s fighter pilot training is, according to Major Kreuzer of the USAF,
historic flight.2 The Hewitt-Sperry Airplane, named after the “largely an algorithmic function.”4 Junior pilots learn the basics of
two inventors, was a project funded by the air combat first: manoeuvres straight from the
United States Navy (USN). Evolution from textbook designed to instill a form of muscle
the Hewitt-Sperry Airplane has spawned “Current technologies memory in pilots when certain circumstances
a diverse range of modern RPAs, leading occur in the air. This gives junior pilots the
for UCAVs, although
to the first trans-Pacific UAS flight that intuition in the air that is such an advantage for
occurred in 2001,3 performed by a USAF greatly advanced in the an experienced air force. As pilots gain more
Global Hawk from Edwards Air Force last ten years, are still in experience and training, the wisdom of being in
Base, USA to Royal Australian Air Force the aviation world comes into play, and pilots
their infancy in terms of
Base Edinburgh, Australia. The flight dem- develop an advanced knowledge of air-to-air
onstrated an RPA capability to fly for an full automation and combat that one cannot truly learn in a book;
extended period at high altitude without machine learning.” the knowledge that comes from hundreds of
ground radar coverage, autonomously. The hours of mastering a craft, when the basics
Global Hawk flight was a milestone for of flight have become second-nature, and the
unmanned aircraft, and was a precursor of what the future held mind can concentrate on higher-order demands. The tactics and
for the unmanned aerial systems (UAS) industry. Since that experience that a fighter pilot develops over the many years of
flight, leaps in technology have allowed for greater autonomy scenarios in which one may find themselves would be something
for RPAs and UCAVs. However, true breakthroughs are that any form of artificial intelligence (AI) would have to master
not yet present with respect to UCAVs replacing manned in order to truly be considered more worthwhile than having a
fighter aircraft. manned aircraft in the air.

Current technologies for UCAVs, although greatly advanced In their current state, UCAVs are only now being certified for
in the last ten years, are still in their infancy in terms of full flight outside military controlled airspace, meaning autonomous
automation and machine learning. To date, there does not exist flight where the aircraft itself is responsible for safety-of-flight
DV I D S / U. S . A i r Fo r c e p h o t o / 5 5 176 2 4

An RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft flying over Patuxent River, Maryland.

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 15

 duties. These duties refer to the requirements of an aircraft to Discussion on Responsibility
maintain level altitude, airspeed, on a flight path, and to be able
to avoid traffic that is either emitting a GPS position or not doing
so. The technology required for a UCAV to monitor its own flight
path and make deviations based upon other air traffic is called a
T he ability for a UCAV to differentiate between a civilian
and a military target is easier said than done. Considering
the altitudes at which an aircraft flies, it is a difficult and a
sense-and-avoid (SAA) system. The goal of an SAA system is time-consuming task for even a manned aircraft to discern
to enable “…current and future UCAVs to be able to replicate whether a person on the ground is friend or foe. To ask a
the human see-and-avoid capability at a comparable or superior machine to do the same would require an incredibly-complex
level upon replacing the onboard pilot.”5 Accomplishing this level of machine learning that currently does not exist. If
goal means that UCAVs will be permitted to operate around the something like that were to become available, however, the
world in any airspace, provided it has the necessary equipment political and legal framework for governing it would need to
onboard, something that is also under development. The SAA be in place and ready to accept the technology. Again, easier
system becomes the eyes of the UCAV. It is therefore vital for said than done. Tactical autonomy, as Byrnes calls it, is the
matters of flight safety and future combat operations for a UCAV ability for a UCAV to make a decision to fire weapons or to
to have a robust sensor suite to detect possible air traffic and enemy perform a set of manoeuvres in response to an enemy’s own
intruders, which will allow it to take corrective action while still manoeuvres and weapons. The ability to do so at a level of
operating within international flight rules. skill higher than that of a human requires an incredible amount
of information coming from many different sources outside
The next step for UCAVs once SAA technology becomes the aircraft.
commonplace is to develop a machine algorithm that is capable
of fighting and winning in an air combat environment against Critics of tactical autonomy state that the information a
manned aircraft. Byrnes outlines a hypothetical UCAV in his UCAV would gather to make tactical decisions on its own is
article which, due to its lack of reliance upon a human pilot, is subject to spoofing and jamming by the enemy, and thus, the
able to outperform a manned aircraft. The exploitation of a smaller information gleaned and the resultant decision can never be
cross-section, lighter weight, and the ability to pull larger positive trusted.7 Although this is a legitimate consideration, the same can
and negative “Gs,” permit this hypothetical aircraft to close in and be said for the information being received by a manned aircraft,
win a dogfight with 5th generation fighters.6 The decision-making and the subsequent decisions made by the pilot, based upon that
process for an aircraft envisioned by Byrnes would be significantly information. In this age of connectivity and cyber-warfare in
more complex than current RPAs and UCAVs. The ability for a which the world presently exists, it is increasingly important to
UCAV to learn and adapt to situations based upon the tactics of protect systems against such jamming or spoofing, and there is
enemy aircraft is a major challenge for the future of UCAVs. no doubt that any future UCAV would include protection from
D N D p h o t o B N 2 011- 0 0 2 8 - 5 4

16 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 TECHNOLOGY AND ETHICS
DV I D S / U. S . N a v y p h o t o b y M a s s C o m m u n i c a t i o n S p e c i a l i s t S e a m a n Ke e n a n Da n i e l s / 5 4 0 2 6 4 5
A Phalanx Close-In Weapon System being fired aboard USS Nimitz.

such attacks, given the direction of the evolving technology. No cheap-but-effective landmine, to the complex technology of a
machine is completely jam-resistant, which can be a problem Phalanx close-in-weapon-system, humans have constantly been
when that machine is expected to make decisions regarding life looking for ways to increase security by offloading some duties
and death. If an enemy were to jam a friendly UCAV, that UCAV to machines and equipment. An automated weapon means that it
could begin to make erroneous decisions with respect to who is capable of acting independently of immediate human control,
is friendly, who is an enemy, and who is a something of a fire-and-forget system. Weapons
civilian. The link between the UCAV and its such as this have been used for many years and
human operator is also at risk, and the sever- do not raise any ethical questions beyond that
“Responsibility for a
ing of such a link would cause the UCAV to of traditional long range weapons.8 In 2012,
operate on pre-programmed settings. Errors weapon lies with the Human Rights Watch, a group that “regularly
such as this could have vast repercussions, not officer or official in addresses the issue of robotics and warfare,”9
just at the tactical level, but also strategically examined the difference between an automatic
charge, be they the
and politically. Strategically, UCAV assets weapon, and an autonomous machine, such
could not be seen as reliable, and might be aircraft captain in as a UCAV. The group found there was an
removed from the battlefield entirely until relation to an aircraft, or acceptable distinction between autonomous
either the electronic warfare (EW) threat is weapons that were human-supervised, and
a base commander if it
removed, or the UCAV can be proven to be automated weapons. Given this finding, UCAV
making the correct decisions. Until that point, is a stationary weapon.” find themselves in less questionable territory
friendly units would face a serious detriment in in terms of ethics, as long as there is a certain
terms of air support. Politically, a country with level of human control in place. The human
easily-jammable UCAVs would be more of a liability than an asset. element becomes important, not only in terms of the ethics of
This could have repercussions in terms of where allies will want machine killing, but of who is responsible for a UCAV taking a life.
the country to operate, and which operations the country would
not be allowed to mount, due to national security considerations. Responsibility for a weapon lies with the officer or official
in charge, be they the aircraft captain in relation to an aircraft, or
Giving tactical autonomy to a UCAV brings about another a base commander if it is a stationary weapon. This responsibility
set of questions regarding the ethics of permitting a machine is fed back to the state to which the individual belongs, and is tied
to make a decision to kill or to cause harm. Autonomous to the laws that govern warfare for allied states. If states were to
machines being given the ability to kill is nothing new. From the use UCAVs in a killing role, the responsibility for those weapons

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 17

K h a l e d A b d u l l a h A l i A l M a h d i / R e u t e r s / RT R 3 D E 6 9

Wreckage of a car destroyed by a US drone air strike that targeted al Qaeda militants in August 2012 in al-Qatn, Yemen.

and the decisions of the autonomous systems still needs to fall The Programmer
upon the parent state.10 This is an important specific requirement
for state users of UCAVs, because it will stop states from shirk- Sparrow posits that it could be easy to blame the person who
ing responsibility when a UCAV fires a weapon at the wrong designed or programmed the UCAV’s decision-making algorithm,
target. An example of this would be if a UCAV fired a weapon at since they are the ones that incorrectly designed the system. He
a target and unintended civilians were hit. It would be a legally then argues that this is not the case for two reasons: the possibil-
grey area regarding the state responsibility, and thus, specificity ity that the UCAV may attack wrong targets could be a known
in this area will become extremely important. Another example limitation of the UCAV (it was designed with these limitations,
would be if a UCAV fired a weapon when it was not supposed to and they were not an oversight), or the possibility that the UCAV
do so, based upon an error in an algorithm, or upon its machine made a choice other than that programmed or predicted, due to
learning. This would present a difficult situation in deciding just its autonomous, machine learning nature.11 The fact that in this
who is responsible for the accidental deaths, since the officer in case, the UCAV made a choice autonomously proves that the
charge did not intend upon firing the weapon, and the UCAV did choice was not an original design, which would prove that it is
it autonomously. truly autonomous. It would not be feasible that the programmer
would be at fault for designing a system that makes its own deci-
Robert Sparrow is an Adjunct Professor in the Centre for sions, even if sometimes those decisions are erroneous, for that
Human Bioethics at Australia’s Monash University, where he works was the stated requirement at the outset.
on ethical issues raised by new technologies. A leading authority
in the field, his book, “Killer Robots,” provides some interesting The Commanding Officer
discussion regarding who should be held responsible for possible
war crimes in a situation that involves a UCAV making incorrect Sparrow states that the argument for the commanding offi-
decisions with respect to taking lives. cer to have responsibility for UCAV decisions lies in the fact
that traditionally, “…the officer who ordered the deployment

18 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 TECHNOLOGY AND ETHICS
of the weapons system should instead be held responsible for human ideals of good and evil are too complex for a machine, and
the consequences of its use.”12 This seems to be preferred for thus, we cannot hold a machine guilty for something of which
states utilizing UCAVs, since it fits in with the traditional rules it has no understanding. Sparrow raises the point that to hold a
that govern conflict of modern militaries, and it makes the most machine morally responsible for an action, there must exist a
sense. The officers that use these weapons should be the ones held possibility that it can be rewarded or punished for good or bad
responsible for their misuse. However, this argument’s flaw is that behaviour. This is another difficult concept to consider, for pun-
it does not take into account the autonomous, ‘smart’ natures of ishment and reward stem from being satisfied with an outcome,
future UCAVs. The prime advantage of future UCAVs will be or from feeling a sense of suffering. How to ensure a machine
that they can make their own decisions, sometimes with better is punished or rewarded for right or wrong actions is an entirely
information than the commander. If future UCAVs are treated in different discussion that borders upon the futuristic, or the realm
the same way as ‘dumb bombs,’ then there is no real difference of science fiction, and it introduces further complexities to the
between the two, and the advantage of using such weapons is discussion at hand. It may be possible at some point in the future
gone. In order to have effective autonomous UCAVs, with the that machine AI could be held responsible for its actions, based
ability to make their own decisions with respect to where to drop upon the moral beliefs of the machine, and the human operators/
weapons, the military must accept that sometimes it will make supervisors would then be absolved of responsibility. However,
mistakes, just as with any manned weapon. The more autonomous UCAV technology is nowhere close to being evolved to that point.
a UCAV becomes, the more risk the military must accept regard-
ing its independent decisions being right or wrong. However, the The three arguments that Sparrow advances all lead to issues
smarter these UCAVs become, the higher the probability that regarding the technology used, and they do not offer a clear-cut
the decision they make will eventually be the correct one. And solution to the issue of responsibility. The programmer is one
at some point, it will likely not be fair to hold the commanding that can be ruled out; just as a tradesman does not blame the
officer responsible for the UCAV’s decisions.13 manufacturer of his tools for the tradesman’s improper use of
them, one cannot blame the programmer for designing a UCAV
The Machine with an AI that makes its own decisions. An AI making mistakes
proves that it is truly autonomous. Placing responsibility on
Sparrow’s third discussion point regarding responsibility the UCAV is also not a solution that would work, given present
submits that the UCAV itself should be responsible for its own deci- technology. The idea of a morally-responsible machine simply is
sions. The idea that a machine could be held morally responsible not possible just yet. Machines are not at a point where the ideals
for causing a death is an odd one, for machines do not (presently) of good and bad can be taught to them. Thus, the only practical,
understand the difference between right and wrong, good or bad. responsible solution at this point in time is for UCAVs to have a
They merely understand what they are taught or programmed. The human being be responsible for its actions, and then to be held
DV I D S / U. S . A i r Fo r c e / A i r m a n 1 s t C l a s s W i l l i a m R i o R o s a d o / 5 6 2 5 9 6 0

An MQ-9 Reaper flies a training mission over the Nevada Test and Training Range, 15 July 2019.

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 19

LO U C o l l e c t i o n / A l a m y S t o c k P h o t o / F F H 3 E N

Major Bishane, a 432nd Aircraft Maintenance Squadron MQ-9 Reaper pilot, controls an aircraft from Creech Air Force Base, Nevada, 6 May 2015.

accountable or rewarded as appropriate.14 This is a requirement, systems leading to less human labour requirements, and the abil-
not just in accordance with the laws of armed conflict, but for the ity to field more assets simultaneously. If autonomous UCAVs
public to provide support for the use of such weapons. Admittedly, develop past a certain technological milestone, manned operators
this is not the perfect solution. The fact that a human being could or supervisors could very well be either the weak-point, or simply
be responsible for the actions of a UCAV that he or she did not serve as a disadvantage in conflict.15 If enemy states develop the
personally order is unjust, and it sparks other moral discussions. same technology, the ability to have autonomous machines make
However, in comparison to the other options, it presents the most split-second decisions would be of even more importance, and
feasible alternative until technology provides the ‘human behind the screen’ would be even
more effective options. more of a liability. Requiring a communica-
“Requiring human tion link with a manned operator would also
Requiring human operators and officers continue to serve as a weakness or challenge
to be responsible, and to approve all decisions operators and officers to in future autonomous UCAV operations. The
made by UCAVs, will appease most critics of be responsible, and to ideal situation would be to leave the UCAV to
current UCAV operations. The problem in the approve all decisions make its own decisions, regardless of whether
future, however, is when technology reaches a a human is supervising it or not. This would
point where machines are able to make deci- made by UCAVs, will negate the need for a constant satellite link,
sions on life and death, due to the fact that they appease most critics of and it would shore up a known weakness or
simply have more information than the human current UCAV limitations of UCAVs.
supervisor. The advantage of having a fully-
autonomous UCAV will not be fully realized operations.” To keep a human in a future unmanned
if that capability cannot be fully exercised. system is also a weakness for other, less-visible
There would be no point to developing the reasons. While the psychological stressors on
technology if a military did not intend to use it to its full potential. operators of UCAVs and other unmanned systems has become
If resources were heavily invested in developing fully-autonomous a talking point with various users of the technology throughout
UCAVs, there would be immense political and military pressures the world, the main research on this subject has been in the
to use them as intended. The advantages of having autonomous USA. Studies conducted by the United States Air Force School
UCAVs would be clear upon first use; quicker decision making, of Aerospace Medicine (USAFSAM) have produced interest-
possible savings in human life, less supervision for automated ing results regarding the mental health of prolonged operations

20 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 TECHNOLOGY AND ETHICS
be diminished if the person
understands that they did not
give the order to kill.17

It is unknown at this
time whether taking the
human completely out of
UCAV operations is the best
course of action for future
autonomous flight. Filtering
war down to reports of con-
PJF Militar y Collection/Alamy Stock Photo/HE94PM

firmed kills and data being

read back from a UCAV
seems like a dark moral and
ethical path for humans to
take, and it may make states
more likely to wage war if
they know that they would
not have to experience it
first hand, or risk the lives
of their own soldiers on
the front lines. One of the
items that receives the most
A remotely piloted aircraft crew flies a simulated training mission on an MQ-9 Reaper, Creech Air Force Base, 8 May 2014. public outcry when a state
is waging war or conflict is
when the public sees sol-
of unmanned systems in conflict areas. The most recent study diers returning home in coffins. This is a stark reminder that war
conducted in 2014 from USAFSAM reported that 10.72% of is real, and it can have repercussions affecting all the citizens of
operators self-reported experiencing high levels of mental distress, a nation, not just those personally involved in war. Although it
partially from the shift work, long hours, and low unit manning cannot be denied that having less soldiers die in conflict is a good
that results from the high operational tempo of UCAV squadrons.16 thing, the risk of de-sensitization to conflict through the use of
Mental issues such as this cost the US Government millions of fully autonomous UCAVs and other machines is something that
dollars a year in support expenditures, as well as lost man-hours. may come to fruition in the future. At this time, it is difficult to
Increased support for these personnel at risk is an effective mea- predict the ramifications of such technology, and it would be an
sure. However, this appears to be a ‘band aid solution.’ A more interesting point of research going into the future.
effective solution would probably be to address the operational
tempo required of UCAVs. Conclusion

With respect to this last point, autonomous UCAVs would

be able to address the operational tempo as well as the mental
distress of UCAV operators because of the minimal supervision
T his article has briefly discussed the genesis of UCAV
autonomous technology: from where it exists today in the
form of sense-and-avoid technology where manned supervision
and personnel required to operate them, compared to present day of basic duties is still required, but is in the process of being
aircraft. UCAVs that are able to operate autonomously without phased out, to a future that would include fully-autonomous
human supervision, to make decisions for themselves, and then UCAVs being given the responsibility and the authority to make
report back automatically regarding the results of remote opera- decisions with respect to the lives of humans. The technology
tions would significantly reduce the workload of current unmanned that will enable UCAVs that can think for themselves remains
aircraft personnel. Fully autonomous UCAVs would also require a future prospect, but it can be said with certainty that this
less analysts and intelligence personnel tasked with observing technology will be developed eventually. The issue, then, will
sometimes gruesome deaths or dismemberments of enemy forces. not be when the technology is developed, but how it is used,
A smaller number of personnel exposed to such images would given the current laws of armed conflict and the rules of a just
equate to less risk of mental disorders, such as post-traumatic- war. Who or what will be given the responsibility for decisions
stress-disorder (PTSD). Taking the human out of the decision to kill regarding life and death is still a very grey area, and several
reduces stress in response to such traumatic events. Since stressors options have been laid out this article. None of them have
related to being either a witness or a participant in traumatic events provided a concrete solution to the problem as it is perceived
varies greatly, the preference would be to involve personnel where today. If a more viable solution cannot be argued with confi-
the risk of mental stress is less. Acting as a witness to killing, dence, then most likely it would be best to leave the system
but not being a participant is suggested to evoke less stress from in status quo for the time being and keep the responsibility
members. This is not to suggest that watching war-like images will for killing with commanding officers and operators of nation’s
not have some form of effect upon a person, but the effect would militaries around the world. This is a system with which

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 21

 states are familiar, and it is one that works. Until autonomous Increasing the use of autonomous UCAVs will also bear
UCAVs reach a point of intelligence where they are able to witness to an equal increase in moral or ethical concerns. The
make equal-or-better decisions than the human operators, the desensitization of conflict to military and public alike could pos-
proven system in place should be the one that the world uti- sibly make countries more likely to wage war, or be willing to enter
lizes. The more autonomous a system becomes, the less that into conflict. This could present completely unknown problems
one can reasonably argue that the person who designed it or as the world forges into a future where machines and not humans
the human in charge could be responsible for its actions. Either become the decider of who lives and who dies. Militaries will
militaries continue to hold officers responsible for deaths that need to carefully consider these trade-offs when the time comes
were not their decision, or they accept the fact that there may for fleets of fully autonomous UCAVs to take flight.
be unwanted deaths on the battlefield where the only one to
blame is a machine that processed information incorrectly.
DV I D S / U. S . A i r Fo r c e / S t a ff S e r g e a n t R a m o n A . A d e l a n / 4 9 0 9 2 8 6

1st Lieutenant Murphy, a 7th Reconnaissance Squadron RQ-4 Global Hawk pilot, reviews pre-flight checklists, 24 October 2018, at Naval Air Station
Sigonella, Italy.

NOTES
1 Captain Michael W. Byrnes, “Machine Autonomy Sense-and-Avoid in the CNS+A Context: A doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5930.2007.00346, p. 69.
in Air-to-Air Combat,” 2014, p. 49. Unified Methodology,” in 2016 International 12 Sparrow, pp. 169–187, at: https://doi.org/10.1007/
2 Kimon P. Valavanis, and George J. Vachtsevanos, Conference on Unmanned Aircraft Systems s11948-008-9107-0 , p. 70
(eds.), Handbook of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. (ICUAS), pp. 531–539, 2016, at: https:/doi. 13 Ibid, p. 71.
Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2015, at: org/10.1109/ICUAS.2016.7502676, p. 532. 14 Ibid, p. 74.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9707-1, p. 60. 6 Kreuzer, p. 51. 15 Ibid, p. 68.
3 “Global Hawk Unmanned Reconnaissance 7 Ibid, p. 57. 16 Wayne L. Chappelle, Kent D. McDonald,
System Sets Aviation Record with Deployment 8 Robert Sparrow, “Building a Better WarBot: Lillian Prince, Tanya Goodman, Bobbie N. Ray-
to Australia.” Northrop Grumman Newsroom. Ethical Issues in the Design of Unmanned Sannerud, and William Thompson. “Symptoms
Accessed 15 January 2018 at: https://news. Systems for Military Applications.” in Science of Psychological Distress and Post-Traumatic
northropgrumman.com/news/releases/global- and Engineering Ethics 15, No. 2 (June 2009), Stress Disorder in United States Air Force
hawk-unmanned-reconnaissance-system-sets- pp. 169–187 at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948- ‘Drone’ Operators.” in Military Medicine 179,
aviation-record-with-deployment-to-australia. 008-9107-0, p. 65. No. 8S (August 2014), pp. 63–70, at: https://doi.
4 Major Michael Kreuzer, “Nightfall and the 9 Kreuzer, p. 65. org/10.7205/MILMED-D-13-00501, p. 67
Cloud,” n.d., p. 59. 10 Ibid, p. 64. 17 Ibid, p. 10.
5 S. Ramasamy, R. Sabatini, and A. Gardi. 11 “Killer Robots.” Journal of Applied Philosophy
“Cooperative and Non-Cooperative 24, No. 1 (February 2007), pp. 62–77 at: https://

22 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
DV I D S / 5 8 3 7 8 3

Admiral James Stavridis, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, speaks to a group of students, professors and guests at the Kellogg School of
Management, Northwestern University, 18 May 2012.

“A Truly Global Approach”: Opportunities for

Increased Internationalization in Professional
Military Education
by Steven Paget

Dr. Steven Paget is a Principal Lecturer at the University line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking
of Portsmouth. Prior to that, he was a Lecturer in Strategy and man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking
Operations at the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) Command done by cowards.”1 More recently, and perhaps more gener-
and Staff College, and an NZDF Teaching Fellow at the Centre ously, the American four-star Admiral James Stavridis, who
for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University. He has also was, until recently, Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and
taught at the Australian National University, and the University Diplomacy at Tufts University, argued: “As military men and
of Canberra. women, ours is the profession of arms. But it’s also a scholarly
pursuit…The scholar and the warrior are thus inseparable—one
Background and the same.”2 Professional military education (PME) is a

E
vital aspect of the “conceptual component” of military power
ducation is an essential aspect of the development and its potential must be harnessed.3 The importance of PME
of military personnel, alongside training and prompted Lieutenant General Michael Hood, then-Commander
experience. The notion that militaries produce Royal Canadian Air Force, to emphasize that there is “…a
automatons that follow a formulaic approach is an requirement to continually review the training and education
anachronism at best. It has long been understood we give to all ranks to ensure that it is configured to deliver
that the ability to think critically is a vital skill for military what we need within the contemporary environment.”4 Indeed,
personnel. Lieutenant-General Sir William Francis Butler, the all aspects of PM—both formal and informa—are worthy of
Irish 19th Century British Army officer, writer and adventurer review on a rolling basis.
wrote famously: “The nation that will insist on drawing a broad

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 23

 Dr. Tammy Schultz, Director of National Security and Joint Internationalization of civilian education has involved a
Warfare, and a Professor of Strategic Studies at the United States range of endeavours, including opening international campuses,
Marine Corps War College, has proposed that PME staff should recruiting foreign students and staff, using international research as
“strive for the kind of nuance we demand from our students when teaching aids and arranging overseas guest lectures.9 The concept of
confronting today’s and tomorrow’s wicked problems.”5 Analyses internationalization has found favour amongst civilian universities,
of PME have tended to focus on how much is required, who needs it but it is also part of the stated mission of some PME institutions.
and when, by whom it should be delivered and what material should The U.S. Naval War College, for example, conducts “a series of
be studied. While the debate about the relative initiatives undertaken in the spirit of…interna-
merits of PME is contentious and continues to tionalization” to “promote ever-greater levels
proliferate, its significance transcends the of cooperation and interoperability among
learning process.6 Internationalization schol- “The concept of the world’s navies and coast guards.”10 The
ars Hilary Kahn and Melanie Agnew have internationalization has prevalence of multinational operations means
observed: “Knowledge is produced collec- found favour amongst that, although it may seem less pressing for
tively in the 21st Century. Scholarship no longer militaries, internationalization is both neces-
emerges from singular and isolated sources civilian universities, but sary and beneficial.
of deep knowledge, but from international it is also part of the
partnerships, communities of exchange, and stated mission of some PME can serve as an important means
interdisciplinary conversations.”7 The gen- to increase multinational interoperability if
eration of knowledge—whether produced PME institutions.” its potential is maximized. In advocating a
in a civilian or PME environment—is a “truly international exchange of ideas,” emi-
collaborative activity. Globalization and inter- nent maritime historian Frank Broeze opined:
nationalization have intersected to shape the development of “It is extremely useful and worthwhile comparing one’s own
contemporary education. Additional subject matter authorities service with one’s allies and opponents, learning to view issues
Philip Altbach and Jane Knight pointed out that globalization and from their viewpoints.”11 While defines diplomacy is often per-
internationalization are “related but not the same thing,” noting: ceived as the principal driver for military educational exchanges,
“Globalization is the context of economic and academic trends the advancement of interoperability should not be underesti-
that are part of the reality of the 21st Century. Internationalization mated. Carol Atkinson has written that exchange programs “build
includes the policies and practices undertaken by academic systems understanding and trust necessary for effective cooperation and
and institutions—and even individuals—to cope with the global interoperability.”12 Even though discussions of interoperability
academic environment.”8
U. S . N a va l Wa r C o l l e g e Pu b l i c A ffa i r s / 18 0 5 15 N - F C 12 9 - 0 8 2

U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.

24 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
dbimages/Alamy Stock Photo/PKJGCN

Harvard University, Boston.

have tended to focus on technological issues, the conceptual There is no reason why an analogous course/module sharing
elements are at least as important. initiative could not be established by PME institutions. Lectures
could be delivered in a synchronous (live via video teleconferenc-
This article will examine a number of potential options to ing) or asynchronous (pre-recorded) format.15 Either format would
further internationalize PME and, consequently, improve mul- afford an opportunity for networked seminar discussions involving
tinational interoperability, including an expansion of current multinational participants following the lecture. Internationalized
international PME exchanges, using technology to create a net- on-line courses could be provided to broader or restricted groups
worked international learning environment and the establishment of institutions based upon the desirability and suitability of sharing
of writing contests that accompany major exercises. Increasing the material. For example, it may be deemed prudent for particular
internationalization within PME would be both feasible and ben- classes or courses to be restricted to established relationships,
eficial. The civilian university sector offers a number of valuable such as NATO or the Five Eyes network. Entire programs or
precedents that could be embraced by the military, albeit in an degrees would not need to be standardized, but it may be ben-
amended fashion. Internationalization of both formal and informal eficial for certain topics, such as multinational operations, to
PME has the potential, ultimately, to produce better informed be considered from a range of perspectives. Any such initiative
personnel and improve multinational interoperability. would not be without cost, as it would need to be underpinned
by highly-qualified teaching staff with a sound understanding of
It’s a Small World and Getting Smaller the pedagogy of distance learning, but it would bring a number
of benefits, including generating diplomatic capital. Networked

T he comedian Steven Wright once joked: “It’s a small world,

but I wouldn’t want to have to paint it.”13 The process of glo-
balization and advancements in technology have ensured that the
multinational classes, most importantly, would enable students to
reach beyond cloistered national viewpoints and better understand
the perspectives of allies and adversaries alike—either through
world is emblematically getting smaller by the day, but its physi- the teaching of international staff, or the input of students from
cal magnitude remains and militaries are not able to shy away various nations. Civilian education is now operating at the cutting
from it. Notably, universities are increasingly seeking to diver- edge of technology, and PME needs to do the same.
sify and embrace internationalization. Perhaps one of the best
examples is the emergence of massively open on-line courses While formal PME at military institutions dominates the
(MOOCs), which attract students of diverse backgrounds from debate, locally-organized initiatives (such as at unit level) and
around the world. Universities have not only sought to reach informal endeavours provide a number of valuable opportunities.
out to a broader range of students, but they have also moved to The Australian website, The Cove, for example, has organized a
collaborate with each other. By way of example, the joint initia- series of talks delivered by eminent academics from around the
tive between Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute world.16 International lectures can be observed live via video
of Technology, known as edX, offers a large variety of courses teleconferencing to enable participants to pose questions and to
in a broad range of subjects that are delivered by faculty from interact with the speaker, but they can also be recorded to enable
universities around the world.14 personnel that cannot ‘attend’ to benefit from the activity.

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 25

d p a p i c t u r e a l l i a n c e / A l a m y S t o c k P h o t o / R AC 2 M H

NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium.

Equally, there is ongoing disagreement about the merits of

civilian teaching staff delivering PME, as evidenced by Lieutenant
Colonel Ralph Peters’ particularly pointed description of academics
as “professors who couldn’t swim in real world currents without
dragging down every lifeguard in sight,” and his assertion that
“you should never let a rising officer near a professor.”17 Murray
Simons, New Zealand Defence Force, has contended, conversely,
that academics are “…good for developing deeper cognitive
skills and promoting a holistic understanding of the profession
from the civilian academic perspective.”18 The existence of a
civilian-military divide is both unnecessary and detrimental to
the provision of PME.19

Military personnel—either serving or retired—are not the

sole arbiters of PME, but they do have a wealth of professional
experience that they can share with students, where it is relevant.
Videoconferencing technology offers an opportunity to bridge
another divide, as military personnel with relevant experience
can contribute to the students’ understanding of particular topics
in both a domestic and an international context. An academic
PA i m a g e s / A l a m y S t o c k P h o t o / G 6 B 2 9 R

lecture—delivered by a civilian academic or a serving or retired

practitioner—on a particular multinational operation, for example,
can be supplemented by presentations by senior national com-
manders from the key participating nations. Increased participation
by guest speakers would enable students to reap the benefits of
presentations from a diverse array of staff and practitioners. Each
contributor would have a role to play as part a collective whole.
The maximization of technology would enhance both the formal
and informal learning experience, and increase opportunities for
cross-cultural multinational understanding.
Air Chief-Marshal Sir Brian Burridge prior to promotion.

26 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
Have Lecture, Will Travel junior contributors. Dr. Erik Hedlund, an associate professor at the
Swedish National Defence University, has assessed that:

T he increasing involvement of international students or

lecturers within physical classrooms, while more expen-
sive, has been advantageous. The RAF’s Air Chief-Marshal Sir
“…the fact that most nations need help from other
nation’s armed forces to defend themselves and partici-
Brian Burridge observed, while serving as the Commandant pate in international operations…requires some kind of
of the Joint Services Command and Staff College in the UK convergence, harmonization, and transparency of officer
as an air vice-marshal in 2001, that officers “…need to rec- competence and officer education to achieve interoper-
ognise that other nations may approach problems differently, ability and be effective.”23
a particular requirement in the context of multinational crisis
management.”20 Establishments, such as the Daniel K. Inouye The “bedrock for human and cultural interoperability” is,
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii, which ultimately, being “consciously or, in some cases, subconsciously
facilitates an expansive educational program to encourage developed” during exchanges between multinational personnel
exchanges between military and civilian representatives from in the PME environment.24 Even though only a small number of
Asia-Pacific nations, affords a valuable precedent. international personnel, relative to the overall size of militaries,
will participate in overseas PME, the selection of the most able
The current system of military exchanges in the PME officers to attend the most prestigious institutions means that a
environment is long-established and extensive. The unfettered disproportionate effect upon interoperability can be achieved
exchange of ideas and beliefs through a variety as those individuals rise to the top of their
of means—from small group work to social respective services.25
interaction—provides a platform to enhance
“The current system A straightforward enhancement of PME—
cultural understanding. One study assessed
that sustained contact between “culturally of military exchanges for both staff and students alike—could be
dissimilar people” in a PME context creates in the PME environment achieved through an expansion of exchange
an opportunity to develop “cross-cultural programs, which are currently focused on
is long-established students predominantly. A coordinated and sys-
competence.” Dr. Charles Moskos, a distin-
21

guished sociologist and policy advisor, has and extensive.” tematic exchange of staff at PME institutions
argued that interaction between multinational could contribute to breaking down cultural
personnel can “make a big difference” in inval- barriers and increasing understanding between
idating hostile feelings and building bridges.22 nations. That idea is not new to PME institutions, as demonstrated
by the engagement of Royal Navy officers as faculty on exchange at
Smaller nations can obtain a better appreciation of the culture the US Naval War College, and the establishment of visiting chairs
and approach of likely multinational partners through PME, while at the US war colleges. There is scope, however, to expand both
larger nations that are likely to lead coalitions are provided with international inclusivity and the scale of exchanges, particularly in
an indication of the viewpoints, skills and limitations of potential relation to civilian staff.

In reference to the creation

of the Fulbright Commission,
which was established by treaty in
1948, Senator William Fulbright
declared: “The simple purpose
of the exchange program…is to
erode the culturally rooted mis-
trust that sets nations against one
another. The exchange program
is not a panacea but an avenue of
hope.”26 A coordinated exchange
E ve r e tt C o l l e c t i o n H i s t o r i c a l / A l a m y S t o c k P h o t o / F 2 B 0 5 B

program for PME, supported by

each of the nations involved,
would facilitate increased oppor-
tunities for internationalization.
Importantly, while students can
choose to limit interaction with
classmates from overseas, the
involvement of international
faculty is a forcing function for
multinational engagement in the
PME environment. Ideas are
both disseminated and absorbed
through the medium of teaching
Senator J. William Fulbright as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 27

 reputation of academics and improve their future career prospects.
The end result of such an exchange program, ultimately, would be
a broader, more varied education for students, and better-equipped
and more-knowledgeable staff.

Exercising the Body and the Mind

E mphasizing that soldiers write more and better in their

daily operations, as well as professionally, is a way for the
Army to maximize returns—in the form of increased soldier
competence, innovation, and critical thinking—on its invest-
ments in education. Major Hassan Kamara, US Army, who
recently served as a Strategic Study Fellow on the Army Future
Studies Group, believes that the encouragement of military
personnel to “write more and better” is occurring around the
world. The education of military personnel must operate on a
‘push and pull’ basis. While information and knowledge will
be imparted by teaching staff at PME institutions, it must also
Newscom/Alamy Stock Photo/JN304N

be drawn out by personnel through a process of interrogation,

discussion, and reflection. The process may rely more upon
pushing than pulling (although in an ideal world the balance
would be shifted) during formal PME, but outside of the
classroom, the emphasis must be upon self-development.29

New Zealander Dr. Emmet McElhatton has concluded that

“…career-long professional reading, by supplying content in
breadth and depth, clearly offers an important supplement to the
General James N. Mattis. professional content gained through formal education, training
and experience.”30 This has been borne out by the experience
by faculty and students alike. The regular interchange of teaching of personnel during recent operations. The former soldier and
personnel—either military, civilian or both—offers the potential to US Defense Secretary General James Mattis asserted:
reap mutual benefits for both individuals and institutions. Without
any desire to generate uniformity, academic exchanges between “Thanks to my reading, I have never been caught
PME institutions could enlighten perspectives and improve efforts flat-footed by any situation, never at a loss for how any
to enhance the delivery of education in the military environment. problem has been addressed (successfully or unsuccess-
Equally, the presence of international exchange faculty from civil- fully) before. It doesn’t give me all the answers, but it
ian universities that are partnered with particular PME institutions lights what is often a dark path ahead.31
may help to erode any tendency towards insularism, and assist in
breaking down the “sealed-in military culture.”27 Although militaries can attempt to push learning through
projects such as the provision of reading lists by senior commanders,
As a subsidiary benefit, the establishment of a regular it is incumbent on personnel to seize the initiative and broaden their
exchange initiative would demonstrate a genuine commitment knowledge of issues both inside and outside of the military domain.
to promoting progress in education, a notion that has been met Captain Andrew Hastie, Australian Defence Force, has advocated
with a significant degree of scepticism in some “a self-directed program of education where
quarters. Furthermore, in an effort to dimin- students are imbued with more responsibility
ish staff turnover, which can be ‘conveyor “Personal drive and for their own learning, promoting both ini-
belt-like’ in PME, the prospect of interna- tiative and independent thought.”32 Personal
tional collaboration and research would help self-direction are drive and self-direction are important, but there
with the retention of high-performing faculty important, but there are opportunities to accompany them with
who are sometimes drawn to the often more are opportunities to structure, even in an informal manner.
bountiful opportunities offered by traditional
civilian universities. Canadian researchers accompany them with The role of essay competitions in
with international experience in the academic structure, even in an encouraging writing has a long lineage in
world, Harald Bauder, Charity-Ann Hannan informal manner.” the US military, but the approach could be
and Omar Lujan, have summarized that “… broadened. Multinational exercises such as
international experience and mobility can pro- RIMPAC, for example, offer opportunities
vide the producers of this knowledge—that is, academics—with for personnel to write about relevant issues. Voluntary writing
prestige and symbolic value.”28 Aside from encouraging research competitions that encourage self-reflection, including the benefits
and teaching collaboration, exchanges would help to boost the and challenges of working with multinational partners, and essay

28 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
DV I D S / U. S . N a v y / C h i e f M a s s C o m m u n i c a t i o n S p e c i a l i s t J a m e s E . Fo e h l / 2 14 6 3 01

U.S. Naval War College students.

contests that tackle issues of the author’s choosing that are relevant Conclusion
to the particular exercise have great potential. By incentivizing
participation through professional recognition, essay competitions
offer an opportunity to develop the writing skills of personnel.
It would also help to generate multinational thinking on issues
I nternationalization has already begun to shape the PME
environment, but there are opportunities for it to be
embraced more fully. The exchange of PME staff offers the
of relevance, as well as encourage a multinational mind-set. same benefits as military personnel, but it potentially has
Former US military strategist, now the Director of the Business greater reach due to the capacity of educators to access entire
and Organizational Leadership at the Kansas University School student cohorts. Nevertheless, technological developments
of Business, Steve Leonard, has pointed out that “writing can mean that the physical movement of people is not a necessary
influence change,” and the generation of differing viewpoints from precursor to making PME more multinational. The rise of
personnel of varying ranks and from diverse countries can only MOOCs is a clear demonstration of the potential of technology
be beneficial.33 Furthermore, essay competitions that are opened to network a global educational environment. Essay contests
to entrants from all participating nations would have inherent attached to major multinational exercises would incentivize
diplomatic value. The ongoing debate about balancing training continuing professional development and encourage thinking
and education will inevitably continue, but there is the potential across cultural boundaries. Existing precedents could be built
to combine both in some areas. In merging the education and upon and tailored to the PME environment to suit contemporary
training elements of personal and organizational development, military needs.
writing competitions based around multinational endeavours
would offer an opportunity to exercise both the body and the Internationalization endeavours are not about “absolutes
mind in a practical setting. and forced homogenization,” as it must be recognized that each
PME institution is different from another—whether domestically
or internationally.34 Internationalization endeavours are intended

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 29

to complement rather than supersede the domestic emphasis of multinational classes, PME staff exchanges and multinational writ-
PME, which will remain the primary focus. PME institutions, ing contests paired to exercises provide opportunities to promote
equally, need not replicate civilian universities, as they are not the cross-cultural thinking and conceptual interoperability. These
same thing, and direct comparisons are not valid. That does not endeavours, taken collectively, merge the military and civilian;
mean, however, that civilian academia does not offer important the formal and informal; and the practical and the academic.
lessons that could enhance the PME experience. In the quest to Internationalization of PME, ultimately, offers an opportunity to
improve PME, no stone should remain unturned. Commitments to adopt a “truly global approach,” which has the potential to result
students and staff alike in the form of time, financial investment, in ‘multinationally-minded’ personnel.35
and innovation will be essential in improving the PME experience.
While far from an exhaustive list of ideas, technologically-enabled

NOTES
1 James Toner, True Faith and Allegiance: The Internationalization,” in Naval War College 24 Steven Paget, “‘Interoperability of the Mind’:
Burden of Military Ethics (Lexington: University Review, 70:4 (Autumn 2017), p. 2. Professional Military Education and the
Press of Kentucky, 1995), p. 134. 11 Frank Broeze, “The Royal Australian Navy in Development of Interoperability,” in The RUSI
2 Admiral James Stavridis, “Let Us Dare,” in World War II: A Summary,” in David Stevens Journal, 161:4 (September 2016), p. 48.
Australian Defence Force Journal, 181 (2010), p.72. (ed.), The Royal Australian Navy in World War II 25 Carol Atkinson, Military Soft Power: Public
3 Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996), p. 185. Diplomacy through Military Educational
Joint Doctrine Publication 0-30: UK Air and 12 Carol Atkinson, “Global Networks, Soft Power Exchanges (Lanham, MD: Rowman and
Space Power (Shrivenham UK: Ministry of and the US Military,” in Ludovic Tournès and Littlefield, 2014), p. 103.
Defence, 2017), pp. 2-5. Giles Scott-Smith (eds.), Global Exchanges: 26 Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs,
4 Dr Brad Gladman et al., “Airpower Mastery Scholarships and Transnational Circulations in “Senator Fulbright on International Exchange:
and the Royal Canadian Air Force: Rethinking the Modern World (New York: Berghahn Books, Selected Quotations by J. William Fulbright on
Airpower Education and Professional 2018), p. 262. International Educational Exchange,” at https://
Development,” in Royal Canadian Air Force 13 Brian K. Payne, “It’s a Small World, but I Wouldn’t eca.state.gov/fulbright/about-fulbright/history/j-
Journal, 5:1 (Winter 2016), p. 9. Want to Paint it: Learning from Denmark’s william-fulbright/j-william-fulbright-quotes.
5 Tammy S. Schultz, “The Road Less Travelled: Experience with Electronic Monitoring,” in Accessed 25 July 2018.
Both Sides are Right about Professional Military Criminology & Public Policy, 13:3 (2014), p. 381. 27 Frank Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars: British
Education,” in War on the Rocks, 30 July 2018, at 14 “About edX,” undated, at https://www.edx.org/ Military Failure in the 9/11 Wars (New Haven,
https://warontherocks.com/2018/07/approaching- about-us. Accessed 25 July 2018. CT: Yale University Press, 2017), p. 12. Notably,
a-fork-in-the-road-professional-education-and- 15 Marigee Bacolod and Latika Chaudhary, the US Army War College took the oppor-
military-learning/. Accessed 9 August 2018. “Distance to Promotion: Evidence from Military tunity to obtain the insights of Dr. Jennifer
6 For examples of the discussion about the utility of Graduate Education,” in Contemporary Economic Mittelstadt (Rutgers University) on the role of
PME, see: David Morgan-Owen, “Approaching Policy, (2018), p.3. civilians within PME during her time as the
a Fork in the Road: Professional Education and 16 “Cove Talks,” The Cove, undated, at https:// Harold K. Johnson Chair in Military History.
Military Learning,” in War on the Rocks, 25 www.cove.org.au/category/unit-pme/covetalks/. Jennifer Mittelstadt, “Too Much War, Not Enough
July 2018, at https://warontherocks.com/2018/07/ Accessed 22 July 2018. College,” in War Room, 20 June 2018, at https://
approaching-a-fork-in-the-road-professional-edu- 17 Ralph Peters, “Learning to Lose,” in The warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/too-much-
cation-and-military-learning/. Accessed 25 July American Interest, 2:6, 1 July 2007, at http:// war-not-enough-college/. Accessed 25 July 2018.
2018. Paula Thornhill, “To Produce Strategists, www.the-american-interest.com/2007/07/01/ 28 Harald Bauder, Charity-Ann Hannan and Omar
Focus on Staffing Senior Leaders,” in War on the learning-to-lose/. Accessed 26 July 2018. Lujan, “International Experience in the Academic
Rocks, 20 July 2018, at https://warontherocks. 18 Murray Vaughan Simons, “Holistic Professional Field: Knowledge Production, Symbolic Capital,
com/2018/07/to-produce-strategists-focus-on- Military Development: Growing Strategic and Mobility Fetishism,” in Population, Space
staffing-senior-leaders/. Accessed 25 July 2018. Artists,” Ph.D Thesis, Massey University, 2009, and Place, (2017), p. 1.
Douglas Orsi, “Professional Military Education p. 227. 29 Major Hassan Kamara, “Writing: A Way to
and Broadening Assignments: A Model for the 19 For an explanation of this divide, see: John R. Maximize Returns on the Army’s Investments
Future,” JFQ, 86 (3rd Quarter 2017), pp. 41-48; Schindler and Joan Johnson-Freese, “‘Civilian’ in Education,” in Military Review, (January-
Rhonda Keister, Robert Slanger, Matthew Bain, Faculty in Professional Military Education: February 2017), p. 120.
and David Pavlik, “Joint PME Closing the Gap Just what does that Mean?,” in Foreign 30 Emmet James McElhatton, “Professional Reading
for Junior Officers,” in JFQ, 74 (3rd Quarter Policy, 3 October 2013, at http://foreignpolicy. and the Education of Military Leaders,” Ph. D
2014), pp. 65-71. com/2013/10/03/civilian-faculty-in-professional- Thesis, Victoria, NZ, University of Wellington,
7 Hilary E. Kahn and Melanie Agnew, “Global military-education-just-what-does-that-mean/. 2014, p. 274.
Learning through Difference: Considerations for Accessed 26 July 2018. 31 Geoffrey Ingersoll, “General James ‘Mad Dog’
Teaching, Learning, and the Internationalization 20 Air Vice-Marshal Brian Burridge, “Post-Modern Mattis Email About Being ‘Too Busy to Read’ is
of Higher Education,” in Journal of Studies in Military Education: Are We Meeting the a Must-Read,” in Business Insider, 9 May 2010,
International Education, 21:1 (2017), p. 52. Challenge?,” in Defence Studies, 1:1 (2001), pp. at http://www.businessinsider.com/viral-james-
8 Philip G. Altbach and Jane Knight, “The xvii-xviii. mattis-email-reading-marines-2013-5?IR=T.
Internationalization of Higher Education: 21 Allison Abbe and Stanley M. Halpin, “The Accessed 3 August 2018.
Motivations and Realities,” in Journal of Studies Cultural Imperative for Professional Military 32 Captain Andrew Hastie, “PowerPoint Does Not
in International Education, 11:3/4 (Fall/Winter Education and Leader Development,” in Become Us: In Search of a New Teaching Method
2007), p. 290. Parameters, (Winter 2009-2010), p. 27. in Junior Officer Education,” in Australian
9 Sonal Minocha, Chris Shiel & Dean Hristov, 22 Charles Moskos, International Military Education Defence Force Journal, 181 (2010), p. 37.
“International Academic Staff in UK Higher and Multinational Military Cooperation 33 Steve Leonard, “Four Little Words: Why I
Education: Campus Internationalisation and (Alexandria, VA: US Army Research Institute for Write,” in Wavell Room, 24 July 2018, at https://
Innovation in Academic Practice,” in Journal of the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2004), p. 2. wavellroom.com/2018/07/24/why-i-write/.
Further and Higher Education, (2018), pp. 1-2. 23 Erik Hedlund, “A Generic Pedagogic Model Accessed 25 July 2018.
10 These initiatives include the involvement of for Academically Based Professional Officer 34 Schultz, “The Road Less Travelled.”
international personnel in the Naval Command Education,” in Armed Forces & Society, (2018), 35 Kahn and Agnew, “Global Learning through
College, Naval Staff College and Combined p. 13. Difference,” p. 53.
Force Maritime Component Commander Flag
Course. Rear Admiral Jeffrey A. Harley, “On

30 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 MILITARY HISTORY
U n i v e r s i t y o f O tt a w a / U n i ve r s i t y o f To r o n t o, G u i d e N o . 7 E x c u r s i o n s , h tt p s : / / a r c h i ve . o r g / s t r e a m / exc u r s i o n s 0 7 c a n a /
exc u r s i o n s 0 7 c a n a # p a g e / n 6 / m o d e / 1 u p

Workers at INCO’s Creighton Mine in Sudbury (c. 1914).

Devil Copper: War and the Canadian Nickel

Industry, 1883–1970
by Scott Miller

Scott Miller is a civil servant and historian from Sudbury, mineral and mining sectors.2 The following article attempts
Ontario. He completed his MA in History at Laurentian University. to address, albeit briefly, this gap in the historical literature.
Scott’s work has been published by the Canadian Historical Review, More specifically, it traces the evolution of the Canadian nickel
and by the Forest History Society of Ontario. industry from relative obscurity to an essential wartime enter-
prise, and highlights how it, in turn, influenced domestic and
Introduction international affairs from the late-19th-to-mid-20th Centuries.

L
ocated in the heart of northeastern Ontario, the Birth of an Industry: Canadian Nickel and the
city of Sudbury is often referred to as the ‘Nickel United States Navy, 1883–1898
Capital’ for its historic relationship with this
particular metal. Indeed, by the eve of the First
World War, it had become the world’s leading
producer of nickel, and by 1950, its share of the global supply
T he discovery of Sudbury’s wealth of nickel initially
aroused feelings of uncertainty, rather than excitement.
The town itself began in 1883 as merely a camp for workers
peaked at 95 percent.1 Also known as ‘devil copper,’ worldwide who were building the Canadian Pacific Railway, but within
demand for nickel remained strong throughout much of the a few short years, it was realized that the area possessed
20th Century, largely as a result of its far-reaching military valuable copper ore bodies. By January 1886, Sudbury’s first
applications. While the citizens of Sudbury are generally well mining firm, the Canadian Copper Company (CCC), had
aware of this mining legacy, others may not be as familiar been formed by Ohio businessman Samuel J. Ritchie. Within
with the significance of nickel in Canadian political and mili- a matter of months, however, the nature of the situation had
tary history. This is hardly surprising. As renowned historian changed entirely. A substantial amount of nickel was found
J.L. Granatstein once asserted, there is a lack of “…serious in the copper ores taken from Sudbury’s mines, a realization
scholarship on Canada’s industrial [war effort],” including its that was problematic for two main reasons. First, there was

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 31

O n t a r i o S e s s i o n a l P a p e r s , 1 9 1 7 , n o . 5 8 - 5 9 , h tt p s : / / a r c h i ve . o r g / s t r e a m / n 11 o n t a r i o s e s s i o n a l 4 9 o n t a u o ft / n 11 o n t a r i o s e s s i o n a l 4 9 o n t a u o ft # p a
g e / n 17 5 / m o d e / 1 u p

Map of Sudbury’s nickel-copper area (1917), Ontario, Canada, showing the location of the mines. The outlines of the norite-micropegmatite are also indicated.

virtually no demand for nickel at the time. Second, the standard By 1889, Ritchie had communicated this revelation to General
refining process could not effectively separate nickel from Benjamin F. Tracy, Secretary of the USN, who was immediately
copper ore bodies. For the time being, the situation looked intrigued. That summer, Ritchie, accompanied by former Prime
bleak for the CCC.3 Minister Sir Charles Tupper, then the Canadian High Commissioner
in London, and Lieutenant B.H. Buckingham of the USN, trav-
Ritchie managed to find a solution to both of these problems elled to Europe to study the utility of nickel-steel as a strategic
by using his connections within the United States Navy (USN). war metal. Following their return, the American government
The only known method for separating nickel-copper ores was conducted test trials comparing nickel-steel versus plain steel
held in secrecy by the Orford Copper Company armour. The results were ground-breaking;
in New Jersey, an organization headed by nickel-steel was deemed far superior to its
senior Navy officer Robert M. Thompson. “The United States’ traditional counterpart. As Ritchie himself
Ritchie successfully orchestrated a deal with recounted: “Tracy, by this Government test,
Thompson whereby the CCC would ship its nickel-plated warships sent all the common steel armour plate to the
product to New Jersey to be refined.4 With were put to their first junk heap, and completely revolutionized the
this technical issue solved, Ritchie turned his major test in the offensive and defensive efficiency of the navies
attention toward the market itself. Upon the of the world.” The United States government
discovery of Sudbury’s nickel deposits, he Spanish-American War promptly committed a sum of $1,000,000 to
immediately recalled having personally wit- of 1898.” purchase nickel from Sudbury to construct
nessed an experiment conducted in Washington nickel-steel armour for its Navy.6 This marked
in 1876, which apparently demonstrated the the beginning of a massive modernization pro-
incredible durability of nickel-steel alloys. Ritchie claimed that gram for the USN, which had been rather stagnant since the Civil
it “…occurred to me that nickel could be used with success in War. Over the next fifteen years, the United States embarked upon
the manufacture of guns and for many other purposes as an alloy a shipbuilding spree which culminated in a fresh fleet of twenty
with iron and steel.”5 battleships, twenty coastal defence vessels, and sixty cruisers.7

32 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 MILITARY HISTORY
ultimately became a reality. The USN
was a dominant force throughout the
war, led by first-class ships such as the
Indiana, Iowa, and Massachusetts.10
One of the Navy’s most notable accom-
plishments came on 3 July, when it
soundly defeated Spanish forces at
the Battle of Santiago de Cuba and
essentially secured an American vic-
tory. By August the conflict was over,
and the resulting 1898 Treaty of Paris
transferred the territories of Puerto
Rico, Guam, and the Philippine Islands
to the United States. For the USN in
particular, the Spanish-American
War was “one of remarkable
achievement.”11 Indeed, the United
States’ modernized battleships, forged
with Canadian nickel, had certainly
been a critical factor in its triumph
over the Spanish Empire.

Era of Expansion: Sudbury

Nickel on the World Stage,
D e p t o f M i n e s a n d Te c h n i c a l S u r v e y s / L i b r a r y a n d A r c h i v e s C a n a d a / PA- 015 3 13

1901–1939

T he early-20 th Century was an

eventful period for Sudbury’s
nickel companies. The British-
owned Mond Nickel Company
emerged as the first serious chal-
lenger to the CCC’s stranglehold
over the Sudbury area when it began
operations in 1901. Then, in 1902,
a new mining giant burst onto the
scene. Formed through an amal-
gamation of the CCC, Orford, and
other operating firms, International
Nickel (INCO) was an American
corporation headed by the legend-
ary New York magnate J.P. Morgan.
INCO Creighton Mine, method of drilling in stopes. For much of the early-20th Century,
INCO practically held a monopoly
in the nickel industry, in large part
Years later, Ritchie proclaimed that this deal with the USN had due to its ability to cartelize [combine to form a business
“…advertised the Sudbury mines all over the commercial world cartel – Ed.] the market. In 1928, it firmly established itself
… In short, the Government’s action through the Secretary of the as the absolute global power in the nickel business. That year,
Navy put a new enterprise upon its feet.”8 INCO absorbed Mond as a wholly-owned subsidiary, and then
engaged in an “intricate but ingenious corporate gymnastic
The United States’ nickel-plated warships were put to their exercise” to circumvent anti-trust laws in the United States.12
first major test in the Spanish-American War of 1898. Mainly Another noteworthy Sudbury-based company, Falconbridge
centered upon the issue of Cuban independence, the two nations Nickel, was also founded in 1928, but INCO would still main-
went to war in April after years of political and diplomatic ten- tain its elite position for the next number of decades.13
sion. Although the conflict did not directly involve Canada, and
was taking place thousands of kilometers away in the Caribbean The onslaught of the First World War generated an
and the Pacific, the nation’s nickel industry was nonetheless unprecedented demand for the precious minerals and ores found
interested in its outcome. In May 1898, The Globe stated: “…the in Canada’s mines. Home to approximately 80 percent of the
good people of Sudbury … would like to see the nickel of Uncle world’s nickel, the city of Sudbury proved to be an invaluable asset
Sam’s armour plate, the chief alloy of which comes from this to the Allied war effort, providing much-needed material for the
place, make a good showing against Spanish shells.”9 This vision production of armour plate, guns, and other military equipment.

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 33

 the local Sudbury Star noted that the possibility of an
injunction being issued against either INCO or Mond was
not even “…entertained by the trial judge on account of
the pressing need for the unimpaired production of nickel
as a war metal.”17 That same year, the Royal Ontario
Nickel Commission also made numerous references to
its military significance.18 In terms of employment, both
the CCC and Mond expanded their work force to meet
growing wartime demand, reaching a combined total of
about 5,000 men by 1918. Within six months of the war’s
end, however, the number of workers at both CCC and
Mond decreased by more than half.19

Despite receiving widespread recognition for its

indispensable role in helping fight the Great War, INCO
found its reputation in jeopardy when a serious scandal
arose during the summer of 1916. In July, an American
newspaper reported that the Deutschland, a German
cargo submarine, had transported Sudbury nickel from
the United States to Germany, apparently without INCO’s
knowledge.20 The situation was especially suspicious,
given that Germany had been INCO’s second-largest
customer during the pre-war years.21 Over the course of
two trips, the Deutschland allegedly delivered 500 tons
of Canadian nickel to its motherland.22

Unsurprisingly, INCO and both the Canadian and

Ontario governments faced swift public and political back-
lash. On 15 August 1916, G. Howard Ferguson, Ontario’s
Minister of Lands, Forests and Mines, downplayed the
A l p h a S t o c k / A l a m y S t o c k P h o t o / WA 1 H W R

scenario in front of a congregation of concerned citizens

in Toronto and affirmed that the “Dominion and Provincial
governments today know just how much nickel there was
on the Deutschland … and we know it never came from
INCO.”23 The people of Canada were not so easily con-
vinced, however. Later that winter, The Globe challenged
Prime Minister Robert Borden’s government to prove to
“…the public that Germany is not using Canadian nickel
to shoot down Canadian soldiers.”24 INCO attempted to
General Benjamin F. Tracy.
draw attention away from the controversy by announc-
ing that it was going to start refining its ores in Ontario,
something it had long resisted in the face of protectionist
From 1914 to 1918, annual nickel extraction in Ontario more than pressures at both the federal and provincial levels.25 Nevertheless,
doubled, while its corresponding yearly value increased from even with the Allied victory in 1918, the Deutschland affair did
$5.7 million to over $27 million.14 The conflict also solidified a not fade completely from public consciousness. In 1919, for
profound shift in production from New Caledonia, a French terri- instance, an organization representing Great War veterans lamented
tory which had previously supplied much of the world’s nickel, to the idea that “…during the war Canadian nickel came ‘right out of
Sudbury, and thereby further concentrated control of the market Sudbury mines and through Germany right into us Canadians in
in the hands of INCO.15 Flanders.’” The group consequently insisted that the government
conduct a public enquiry into the situation.26
The importance of this particular sector of the economy dur-
ing wartime did not go unnoticed by contemporaries. In August Nickel continued to have an impact upon Canada’s military
1916, for example, The Globe explained that INCO had the and political landscape during the inter-war years. The years
capacity “…to provide all the refined nickel required in the British immediately following the First World War revealed that peacetime
Empire for the manufacture of munitions of war and for industrial applications for nickel had yet to be fully developed, with demand
purposes.”16 Likewise, with regard to a landmark 1917 trial deal- for this mineral declining considerably in the early-1920s.27
ing with the damaging effects of mining pollution in Sudbury, Nonetheless, technological advancements, ranging from motor

34 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 MILITARY HISTORY
Nor th Wind Picture Archives/Alamy Stock Photo/DBE0DT

U.S. battleship Indiana during sea trials, 1895.

vehicles to home appliances, allowed the international nickel insightfully pronounced: “Modern war is a war of metals
market to remain relatively solid during this period, and remark- as much as of men, and with the outbreak of the present
ably so in the wake of the Great Depression.28 Furthermore, the conflict last September, it was not surprising prospectors across
Canadian government found that nickel could still serve as a the Dominion foresaw an immediate demand and renewed
point of contention in political and diplomatic search for minerals of strategic impor-
matters, even when the nation was not at war. tance in waging today’s kind of war.” 30
In 1934, Parliament introduced legislation to “Nickel continued With vast stores of nickel that had a com-
ban the export of nickel for “war purposes,” bined market share of nearly 90  percent,
but the bill never passed because there was to have an impact INCO and Falconbridge soon found them-
concern it might offend the interests of the upon Canada’s military selves under great pressure to provide this
industry. When Italy invaded Ethiopia the fol- and political military necessity.31
lowing year, the government of Canada faced
internal and international pressure to levy landscape during the Canada’s politicians and its mining
economic sanctions against Italy, Japan, and inter-war years.” industrialists forged a tight-knit relationship
Hitler’s Germany. It ultimately refused to do so, throughout the war. Gleaning from the lessons
citing already high unemployment rates as the of the Great War, the federal government made a
main reason why it did not want to decrease the country’s nickel concerted effort to oversee the economic allocation of the nation’s
exports.29 The Canadian government would seriously reconsider resources during the Second World War, which included nickel.
its position on nickel exports just five years later, when another The Government of Canada exercised strict control over this
record-setting war broke out in Europe. strategic war metal and the companies that cultivated it, largely
in order to limit the supply available to the Axis powers. It also
Coming of Age: Canada’s Nickel Industry Reaches helped INCO address its labour shortage, leading to the creation
its Peak, 1939–1970 of 5,000 new jobs at the company between December 1939 and
April 1944.32 In return, INCO, as well as Falconbridge, undertook

T he military needs of the Second World War led to another costly expansion programs to meet pressing wartime require-
boom in armament manufacturing and subsequent soar- ments, and fully cooperated with the Canadian and American
ing demand for nickel. In August 1940, The Sudbury Star authorities in all aspects of policy. In fact, it has been suggested

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 35

 of INCO’s mining operations in northern Finland. In 1934, the
company acquired the rights to a valuable nickel concession from
the Finnsh government in the Petsamo district. INCO established
a Finnish subsidiary referred to as Petsamon Nikkeli O.Y. (PNO)
to handle this overseas operation. Over the next number of years,
INCO invested considerable money and manpower at Petsamo,
culminating in the construction of sophisticated mining and smelt-
ing facilities in the area by the late-1930s.36 The company was
now in firm control of what was reported to be the largest nickel
mine outside of Canada.37

The outbreak of war in Europe altered the course of INCO’s

Petsamo project. Specifically, the Russian invasion of Finland and
the commencement of the Winter War in November 1939 brought
the venture to a sudden halt. Fortunately, the Red Army did not
cause irreparable damage to PNO’s property, and by the time the
conflict had concluded in March 1940, the Soviets had restored
Petsamo to Finland. Shortly thereafter, however, Germany began
demanding access to Petsamo nickel. The initially-reluctant Finnish
government eventually started pressuring INCO to concede to this
request, or threatened it would take over the concession itself.38

Predictably, INCO was hesitant to provide the Nazis with

Petsamo nickel, but the Finns soon found an unexpected ally
in the negotiations: Great Britain. Indeed, the United Kingdom
asserted that it preferred if INCO delivered nickel to the Germans
and maintained its control over Petsamo, as opposed to potentially
losing its hold over the area altogether. Moreover, it reasoned
that this would allow the company to restrict the flow of ore to
Germany, rather than give it unfettered access. Interestingly, a
E v e r e tt C o l l e c t i o n I n c . / A l a m y S t o c k P h o t o / B T K 4 J G

similar situation had played out in 1939, when Falconbridge agreed

to provide the Germans with a limited amount of nickel from its
refinery in Norway. This arrangement had been fully supported
by Canada and the United Kingdom.39

Petsamo, on the other hand, was a different story. Perhaps

due to the drastically-changed circumstances of the war, or pos-
sibly because it was INCO instead of Falconbridge involved,
the Canadian government was not so convinced of the United
Kingdom’s plan this time around. When Prime Minister William
Lyon Mackenzie King caught wind of Britain’s stance in June
John Pierpont Morgan, financier/banker (c. 1900).
1940, he made it clear he was firmly opposed, undoubtedly with
the Deutschland incident of 1916 still fresh in his mind. Soon
thereafter, INCO’s senior management concluded it would not
that the companies practically acted as “agents of the government
co-operate with the Germans. Cognisant of the fact that INCO was
rather than private sector corporations” during the Second World
clearly following the Canadian Prime Minister’s lead, the British
War, especially INCO.33 Indeed, INCO went so far as to investi-
tried their best to sway King, but to no avail. He argued that the
gate and report upon its own trading partners that were suspected
“political and psychological effects” of the arrangement would
of violating the Canadian government’s wartime nickel export
be far too damaging, and that in any event, the Germans would
regulations. On numerous occasions, this led to certain entities
struggle to mine the ores efficiently without INCO’s expertise.40
being barred from accessing further nickel supplies.34 More gener-
ally, by 1943, INCO had raised its production by approximately
What followed was the exact opposite of what the British had
50 million pounds over its 1940 level, and was responsible for
hoped. On 23 July 1940, the government of Finland ordered PNO
refining virtually all Allied nickel for the duration of the war.35
to prepare Petsamo ore for sale to Germany. Although PNO was
not officially acquired by the Finnish government until August
A significant episode relating to nickel production during
1941, communications between PNO and INCO formally ceased
the Second World War was the controversy surrounding one
during the summer of 1940. By the following February, Finland

36 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 MILITARY HISTORY
LO C / A l a m y S t o c k P h o t o / E 0 9 6 7 9
The German cargo submarine Deutschland.

and Germany, drawn together by a mutual desire to defeat Russia, The two decades immediately following the Second World
had signed a nickel agreement, leading to the German occupationWar witnessed the final phase of the Canadian nickel industry’s
of Petsamo.41 golden age. The policies of the United States government were
once again a crucial factor in this prosperity.
The Petsamo affair and its aftermath is American defence officials believed nickel was
noteworthy for a number of reasons. First, “The two decades “the world’s most critical material,” leading the
on 8 October 1944, the Soviet Union was country to spend $789 million between 1950
granted title to INCO’s Petsamo properties in immediately following and 1957 to stockpile nickel and diversify its
exchange for a modest sum of $20 million, a the Second World War suppliers through special purchase agreements.
deal which was brokered by the Canadian and witnessed the final
British governments.42 In the ensuing decades, Moreover, both INCO and Falconbridge
INCO’s shares of the international nickel phase of the Canadian benefitted greatly from the outbreak of the
market plummeted, while Russia’s mines nickel industry’s Korean War, with the latter receiving a lucra-
in Pechenga (formerly Petsamo) allowed it golden age.” tive multimillion dollar contract from the
to blossom into a leading nickel producer.43 United States as a result.44 The full-scale par-
More importantly, the diplomatic battle over ticipation of the United States in the Vietnam
Petsamo provided an early indication of Canada’s rising middle War after 1965 brought even more activity and massive profits to
power status. The Government of Canada’s refusal to bend to the Canadian nickel industry. However, during the 1960s, INCO
the whims of foreign governments, particularly the British, was expanded its operations abroad, namely in Indonesia, Australia,
partly a result of its gradual maturation from a former colony into and New Caledonia, leading Canada in general and Sudbury in
a truly independent nation. Finally, the case of Petsamo further particular to lose a sizeable share of the world supply.45 In fact,
illustrates just how vital nickel was as a militaristic metal to in 1970, INCO chairman Henry S. Wingate openly acknowledged:
countries worldwide. “Canada’s dominant position in the world nickel industry will

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 37

be reduced during the next decade.” While
the country still held about 65 percent of
the global nickel supply, Wingate predicted
that its “…contribution to non-Communist
world nickel supplies will be down to about
50 per cent” in a matter of years.46 As the
global economy increasingly shifted toward
plastics and Third World nickel sources, by
the early-1980s INCO’s powerful monop-
oly had vanished. The city of Sudbury,
meanwhile, “…had been failed by nickel,
a glittering false idol,” and rapidly began
looking toward more diverse economic
pillars to sustain itself.47

Conclusion

E vidently, the nickel industry pro-

foundly shaped Canada’s military,
political, and diplomatic development
throughout the 20th Century. Along with
strengthening the national economy,
Sudbury’s rich nickel supply helped bring,
however minimally, international recog-
nition to Canada. It helped foster closer
economic ties with the United States, and
on many occasions, it influenced how the
Canadian government handled aspects of

L i b r a r y a n d A r c h i v e s C a n a d a / C - 0 2 76 4 5
international affairs. Most of all, Canada’s
almost-exclusive access to one of the
planet’s most essential strategic war metals
made it the envy of governments world-
wide for many decades. With the country’s
grip over the international nickel market
long since released, it is time for historians
to take a more thorough look at how this
industry shaped Canadian political and
military history.
Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King in 1945.

NOTES
1 Gwenda Hallsworth and Peter Hallsworth, “The 6 Ibid., 170-172. 14 Ian M. Drummond, Progress without Planning:
1960s,” in Sudbury: Rail Town to Regional Capital, 7 J. Andrew Byers, “The Sailors of 1898: Identity, The Economic History of Ontario from
C.M. Wallace and Ashley Thomson (eds.),(Toronto: Motivations, and Experiences of Naval Enlisted Confederation to the Second World War (Toronto:
Dundurn Press Limited, 1993), p. 216. Personnel at the Dawn of an Age of American University of Toronto Press, 1987), p. 382.
2 J.L. Granatstein, “‘What is to be Done?’: The Empire,” in International Journal of Naval 15 O.W. Main, The Canadian Nickel Industry:
Future of Canadian Second World War History,” History 7, No. 2 (August 2008), p. 3. A Study in Market Control and Public Policy
in Canadian Military Journal Vol. 11, No. 2 8 Coleman, p. 172. (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1955), pp. 65-74.
(Spring 2011), p. 56. 9 “Rich Places in Ontario,” in The Globe, 28 May 16 “Canada’s Interest in Nickel,” in The Globe, 3
3 Peter V. Krats, “All That Glitters: Speculation 1898, p. 9. August 1916, p. 4.
and Development in the ‘Minor’ Minerals of the 10 David F. Trask, The War with Spain in 1898 17 “Injunction Is Sought to Stop Open Roasting:
Sudbury Area,” in At the End of the Shift: Mines (University of Nebraska Press, 1996), pp. 66-67. Contentious Question Is Again Launched in Local
and Single-Industry Towns in Northern Ontario, 11 Ibid., pp. 484-486. Court,” in The Sudbury Star, 19 March 1919, p. 2.
Matt Bray and Ashley Thomson, (eds.), (Toronto: 12 Matt Bray, “INCO’s Petsamo Venture, 1933- 18 Report of the Royal Ontario Nickel Commission
Dundurn Press Limited, 1992), p. 47. 1945: An Incident in Canadian, British, Finnish, (Toronto: Printer to the King’s Most Excellent
4 H.V. Nelles, The Politics of Development: and Soviet Relations,” in International Journal of Majesty, 1917).
Forests, Mines, and Hydro-Electric Power in Canadian Studies 9 (Spring 1994), pp. 174-175. 19 Matt Bray, “1910-1920,” in Sudbury: Rail Town
Ontario, 1849-1941 (McGill-Queen’s University 13 Oiva Saarinen, “Sudbury: A Historical Case Study to Regional Capital, C.M. Wallace and Ashley
Press, 2005), p. 88. of Multiple Urban-Economic Transformation,” in Thomson (eds.), (Toronto: Dundurn Press
5 A.P. Coleman, The Sudbury Nickel Field (Toronto: Ontario History LXXXII, No. 1 (March 1990), p. 57 Limited, 1993), p. 93.
King’s Printer, 1905), pp. 168-170. 20 Ibid., p. 100.

38 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 MILITARY HISTORY
Ke y s t o n e Pr e s s / A l a m y S t o c k P h o t o / E 0 M T 3 7
A 1956 industry exhibition commissioned by the INCO-Mond Group of Companies. Henry S. Wingate of New York is second from left.

21 Ibid., p. 92. 30 “Modern War Is One of Metals,” in The Sudbury 42 Government of Canada, Protocol between
22 Main, p. 85. Star, 12 August 1940, p. 7. Canada, the United Kingdom and the Union
23 “Minister Disproves Charge Krupps Own Nickel 31 White, pp. 1-7. of Soviet Socialist Republics providing for the
Stock,” in The Sudbury Star, 16 August 1916, p. 1. 32 Graeme S. Mount, “The 1940s,” in Sudbury: Payment of a Compensation to Canada For Nickel
24 “Hon. Arthur Meighen’s Defence [sic],” in The Rail Town to Regional Capital, C.M. Wallace and Mines at Petsamo: Signed at Moscow, October 8,
Globe, 25 November 1916, page 6. Ashley Thomson (eds.), (Toronto: Dundurn Press 1944 (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1949), at: http://gac.
25 Main, 85. Limited, 1993), p. 175. canadiana.ca/view/ooe.b1631895/2?r=0&s=1.
26 “An Inquiry as to Nickel,” The Globe, 2 August 33 White, p. 31. 43 Bray, “INCO’s Petsamo Venture,” p.190.
1919, p. 6. 34 Ibid., pp. 45-47. 44 O.W. Saarinen, “The 1950s,” in Sudbury: Rail
27 A.D. Gilbert, “The 1920s,” in Sudbury: Rail Town 35 Ibid., pp. 10-11. Town to Regional Capital, C.M. Wallace and
to Regional Capital, edited by C.M. Wallace 36 Bray, “INCO’s Petsamo Venture,” pp. 175-179. Ashley Thomson (eds.), (Toronto: Dundurn Press
and Ashley Thomson (Toronto: Dundurn Press 37 “Nickel’s Petsamo Property Held out Some High Limited, 1993), pp. 190-192.
Limited, 1993), 119. Hopes,” in The Globe and Mail, 25 October 1944, 45 Hallsworth and Hallsworth, p. 216.
28 C.M. Wallace, “The 1930s,” in Sudbury: Rail p. 20. 46 “Wingate expects ’72 end of nickel shortage,
Town to Regional Capital, C.M. Wallace and 38 Bray, “INCO’s Petsamo Venture,” pp. 180-183. reduction of Canada’s dominant situation,” in The
Ashley Thomson (eds.), (Toronto: Dundurn Press 39 Ibid., pp. 183-185. Globe and Mail, 23 April 1970, p. B1.
Limited, 1993), p. 138. 40 Ibid., pp. 185-187. 47 C.M. Wallace, “The 1980s,” in Sudbury: Rail
29 Daryl White, “Coincident Interest: The Canadian 41 Ibid., p. 188. Town to Regional Capital, C.M. Wallace and
Nickel Industry and Second World War,” (Honours Ashley Thomson (eds.), (Toronto: Dundurn Press
Essay, Laurentian University, 2000), pp. 33-34. Limited, 1993), p. 276.

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 39

H a r p e r ’ s W e e k l y , D e c e m b e r 2 1 , 18 6 1.

Colonel Rankin’s lancer regiment, sketched at Detroit in 1861 by Mr. B.R. Erman.

When Johnny (Canuck) Comes Marching Home

Again: Canadians in the American Civil War,
1861–1865
by Geoff Tyrell

Major Geoff Tyrell is a logistics officer serving at 7 Canadian Over the next four years, more than three million Americans
Forces Supply Depot. A graduate of the Royal Military College, served in either the Union or Confederate armies. Of those who
he has deployed to Afghanistan and Ukraine. bore arms, more than 600,000—or twenty percent of the total
number of enlistees—lost their lives to combat, wounds sustained
Introduction in battle, or disease.1 It was a transformative event in the history

D
of America, and it can be regarded as the first modern war of
uring the 19th Century, Canadians fought the Industrial Age. Many of the key hallmarks of the struggle—
on numerous foreign battlefields, ranging conscription, strategic use of railways, and armoured warships,
from the Crimean Peninsula to the South to name but a few—would come to feature prominently in major
African veldt. Less well-known is the story of conflicts throughout the rest of the 19th Century, and on into the
Canadians serving south of the border during First World War.
the American Civil War. Between 1861 and 1865, Americans
fought a bloody conflict that was the culmination of decades The nation of Canada was still in its infancy during this time,
of contention over both the state of the nation and its future. and Canadian2 attitudes with respect to the Civil War were com-
At its heart was the question of slavery, and whether African- plex. The British government abolished slavery across its empire
Americans would live as free men or spend their lives in fear in 1834, and popular Canadian sentiment opposed the continued
of forced bondage. The combination of westward expansion, practice of human bondage in the United States.3 Cross-border
the growing momentum of the Abolitionist movement, and economic and cultural links between Canada and America were
increasingly-fractious debates over the limits of federal and strong, and more than 250,000 Canadians were living in the United
state law finally exploded in the first shots fired by Confederate States as of 1860.4 While this suggests a prevailing affinity for
secessionists at Fort Sumter on 12 April 1861. the Union cause, support for the Confederacy was unabashed

40 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 MILITARY HISTORY
An Ambitious Failure: Arthur Rankin’s Lancers

A rthur Rankin, the son of an Irish schoolteacher and the

American-born daughter of a British Army officer, pres-
ents a fascinating character study. Born in Montreal in 1816,
Rankin ran away from home as a young teenager to work as
a cabin boy on a trans-Atlantic packet boat.8 He returned to
Canada four years later, failed as a farmer and land surveyor,
fought a duel with a Detroit lawyer over a woman’s affections,
and obtained an ensign’s commission in the local militia. In
September 1837, he achieved some notoriety when he freed
a recaptured slave at gunpoint aboard a Cleveland-bound
steamship.9 Rankin saw active service during the Patriot War of
1838, and fought against the insurgents of the Hunters’ Lodges
during the Battle of Windsor. Discharged from the militia
five years later, he toured the British Isles with a group of
Ojibway, worked as a mining surveyor and railroad investor,10
and entered local politics. Rankin was a well-known figure in
Canada West by the time of the Civil War’s outbreak.

In July 1861, Arthur Rankin was elected as Member of

Provincial Parliament for Essex County. However, his interests
lay beyond the mere representation of his constituents. That
same month, he met with prominent Detroit Unionists and state
government officials to explore ways in which he—and by exten-
M c C o r d M u s e u m / I - 17 9 01. 1

sion, Canada—could come to the aid of the Union cause. Rankin

planned to raise a regiment of cavalry for service in the Union
Army, to be known as the First Michigan Regiment of Lancers.11
Envisioned as a 1,600-man unit, the Lancers were to be led by
Canadian officers with British Army experience and the ranks
were to be filled by eager Canadian volunteers. Rankin’s Michigan
Arthur Rankin in Montréal, 1865. compatriots were so impressed by his proposal that he was taken
to Washington in late-August to present his idea to no less a
in many quarters of Canadian society. With Britain and her pair of prominent figures than President Lincoln and Secretary
colonies officially neutral, but benefiting from commerce of State Seward. Lincoln was apparently charmed by Rankin’s
with the Confederacy, anti-British—and by extension, anti- enthusiasm, and on 11 September 1861, a warrant was issued
Canadian—sentiment swelled throughout the Union states. 5 for the creation of the regiment.12 Among varied (but limited)
Diplomatic incidents such as the Trent Affair, efforts by Canadians to create volunteer units
[discussed in depth later – Ed.] exacerbated for service during the Civil War, the Lancers
tensions between the British and Union gov- were the most successful.
ernments, and fears of an American invasion
“Canadian reasons for
prompted the hasty reinforcement of Canada’s participating in the The Lancers were not Rankin’s first
defences. The spectre of another American brush with military adventurism. In 1854, at
struggle varied from the outbreak of the Crimean War, he wrote to
invasion was daunting for Canadians, as
America’s Civil War threatened to spill beyond
belief in the cause, a senior British officials offering to raise a bat-
its national borders. desire for adventure or talion of Canadian volunteers for service in the
campaign. In the end, he was not taken up on
money, or victimization his offer. Throughout his life, Arthur Rankin
Despite Anglo-American animosity, tens
of thousands of Canadians crossed the border at the hands of developed a reputation for being a showman,
to fight in the conflict. Exact numbers are ruthless recruiters.” revelling in public attention and notoriety.
impossible to determine, but conventional
6 It should therefore come as no surprise that
estimates suggest that somewhere between word of his Lancers was almost immediately
35,000 and 50,000 Canadians bore arms in the American Civil leaked to the press, prompting mixed reactions on both sides of
War, the vast majority donning Union blue.7 Canadian reasons the border. For instance, the Toronto Globe enthused about the
for participating in the struggle varied from belief in the cause, romantic image of the Canadian volunteer cavalryman, who “…
a desire for adventure or money, or victimization at the hands of with…revolver in his left hand, his sabre in his right, guiding his
ruthless recruiters. It is impossible to examine in detail the experi- lance mainly with his leg, and a horse under good training can
ences of all those Canadians who served. Instead, this article will deal out death upon the front and each flank at the same time.”
13

examine three examples of the many ways in which Canadians, The Montreal Gazette was somewhat more circumspect: “There
by one road or another, became caught up in the conflict.

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 41

 militia commission. Following the Trent Affair, he resigned his
American commission, writing to the Detroit Free Press that the
possibility of a war between Great Britain and the United States
forced him to return to his first loyalty as a British subject.16

But what of his Lancers? Despite official condemnation by

Canadian officials, the regiment mustered more than six hundred
men by December 1861. Bereft of its leader, the unit began to lose
cohesion, and escalating hostilities between the United States and
Britain deterred more Canadians from volunteering for service
with the regiment. Between January and March 1862, it quietly
disbanded and its soldiers either transferred to other Union cavalry
regiments, or were discharged from service.

In the end, Arthur Rankin’s Lancers never fought in defence

of the Union, and created an embarrassing episode for both
Canadian and British governments.17 Questions still linger over
Rankin’s motivation as, despite the Cleveland incident, he was
never vocally abolitionist in his opinions. Most likely, the desire
for fame and military glory influenced his enthusiasm, and ulti-
Librar y and Archives Canada, e000755406

mately condemned his Lancers to defeat without ever setting foot

on the battlefield.

A Family Enterprise: The Wolverton Brothers Go

to War

A s Arthur Rankin concocted his plan to raise a volunteer

cavalry unit for the Union Army in the summer of 1861,
thousands of his countrymen were already south of the border
Recruiting poster, Rankin Lancers (c.1861). and wearing federal blue. In the decade preceding the war,
more than 100,000 Canadians had immigrated to the United
are not many men in Canada better known, for his somewhat States, largely in search of economic opportunity.18 This cadre
Quixotic eccentricities than Arthur Rankin.”14 furnished a number of volunteers for service during the con-
flict, among which were four brothers from the small village
The regiment’s organizers embarked upon an ambitious of Wolverton in Oxford County, Canada West: Alfred, Alonzo,
recruiting program, distributing handbills calling for volunteers, Jasper, and Newton Wolverton.
and making arrangements to stand up the
unit in Detroit. Meanwhile, Rankin became The four Wolverton brothers were the
the subject of furious debate in the leading sons of an American immigrant who had left
“The prospect of war New York State in the 1820s and settled south
Canadian newspapers of the day. The pro-Con-
federate Toronto Leader denounced him for between their of present-day Kitchener.19 To support their
father’s cross-border lumber business and
violating the Foreign Enlistment Act, prompt- motherland and the
ing Rankin to defend himself in print. On 5 further their education, the brothers moved
nation in whose army to Cleveland in 1858. On 21 July 1861—the
October 1861, he wrote a rebuttal letter to the
Leader denouncing it as “a tool of Jefferson they served was day on which Union and Confederate forces
Davis,”15 and claimed that the Act applied only clashed in the war’s first major battle at Bull
unsettling for the
to the British government and not to private Run—Alfred, Jasper, and Newton enlisted as
thousands of Canadians teamsters in the Union Army.20 They ultimately
British subjects. Despite censure in the press,
Rankin was determined to press ahead with in the Union Army.” found themselves serving in Washington with
his regiment of volunteers. the Quartermaster’s Department, transporting
ammunition to the newly-created Army of the
Unfortunately for Rankin, Canadian authorities did not concur Potomac as it sought to defend the approaches to the federal capital
with his interpretation of the Foreign Enlistment Act. The day after against the alarmingly-successful Confederate Army.
his letter was published, he was arrested in Toronto for violat-
ing the legal ban on British subjects serving in foreign conflicts. Jasper was the first of the Wolverton boys to perish during the
Naturally, Rankin pleaded not guilty, and over the course of a war, succumbing to typhoid fever in Washington on 12 October
three-day trial, the charges against him fizzled out for a want 1861.21 Less than one month after his death, a Union warship seized
of evidence (despite the fact that his name was clearly listed a British mail steamer—the RMS Trent—that was carrying two
on recruiting posters for the unit) and questions of jurisdiction. Confederate diplomats to London, where they hoped to receive
Although never convicted, Rankin suffered repercussions for official recognition of the Confederacy from Lord Palmerston’s
his pro-Union enthusiasm: he was dismissed from his position government. The ensuing diplomatic confrontation between British
as commander of the Ninth Military District and deprived of his and Union governments stoked fears that an American invasion of

42 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 MILITARY HISTORY
L i b r a r y o f C o n g r e s s / L C - U S Z C 4 - 17 3 2
Battle of Franklin, 30 November 1864.

Canada was imminent, necessitating hasty preparations for war

north of the border. More than 11,000 British regulars arrived in
eastern Canadian ports and were dispersed inland, joining nearly
50,000 Canadian militia in varying states of preparedness.22

The prospect of war between their motherland and the nation

in whose army they served was unsettling for the thousands of
Canadians in the Union Army. Some began to doubt their com-
mitment to the Union cause when faced with the prospect of being
ordered north to invade their own country, and they contemplated
desertion. Amidst these tensions, a group of Canadian volunteers
came together in Washington to present their concerns to the Union
leadership. Surprisingly, the fifteen-year-old Newton Wolverton
was elected as their spokesman. Leveraging his contacts in the
Quartermaster’s Department, the young Canadian from Oxford
County secured a brief meeting with none other than Abraham
Lincoln himself.23 The President assured Wolverton that he had
no intention of pursuing a war with either Britain or Canada, and
cooler heads gradually prevailed in resolving the Trent Affair.24
A r c h i ve s o f O n t a r i o / F 4 3 5 4 - 4 - 0 - 12

The Wolverton family suffered its second loss on 24 April

1863, when Alfred died of smallpox while serving in Washington.25
By the end of that year, young Newton Wolverton was discharged
from the Union Army and returned home to Oxford County. With
his departure, Alonzo remained the only one of the four Wolvertons
still bearing arms for the Union. Like his brothers, Alonzo began
the war as a teamster, enlisting with the 20th Independent Battery of
the Ohio Light Artillery in 1864. In the spring of that year, Alonzo
Alonzo Wolverton.

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 43

 and his comrades were garrisoned in Chattanooga, Tennessee,
and then joined the Union advance as General William Tecumseh
Sherman launched his Atlanta Campaign, intent upon seizing the
eponymous city and devastating the heartland of the Confederacy.

Alonzo and the 20th Independent Battery found themselves

on the flank of Sherman’s march, repelling attacks by Nathan
Bedford Forrest’s Confederate cavalry as the Union Army manoeu-
vred towards Atlanta. After Sherman captured the city in early
September, Confederate General John Bell Hood counter-attacked
through northern Georgia, resulting in Alonzo Wolverton and
Q u e e n’s U n i v e r s i t y A r c h i v e s , Fr a n c i s M o s e s Wa fe r fo n d s , L o c a t o r 3 17 8 . 1- 1- 7

several of his comrades being taken prisoner. His captivity was

short-lived, as he was paroled by his jailers and quickly re-joined
Sherman’s forces.26 Alonzo saw action again at the Battle of
Franklin, on 30 November, and the Battle of Nashville, 15–16
December, when Hood’s Army of Tennessee was decisively
destroyed. In a letter to his sister Roseltha, Wolverton described
the fighting at Franklin as particularly brutal:

“[T]he rebs seemed determined to conquer or die. [T]

hey made thirteen desperate charges, several times they
planted their colors within feet of our cannon and our
men would knock them down with their muskets or the
artillerymen with their sponge staffs or handspikes.”27

The day following Hood’s defeat at Nashville, Corporal

Alonzo Wolverton accepted a commission as a Second Lieutenant
in D Battery of the 9th Regiment, U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery.28
The rest of his war passed by in comparative quiet, with his regi-
Francis Moses Wafer.
ment remaining in garrison at Nashville. Robert E. Lee surrendered
L i b r a r y o f C o n g r e s s / L C - U S Z 6 2 - 12 8 11 / E d w i n Fo r b e s

Union field hospital (Second Corps) near Chancellorsville battlefield.

44 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 MILITARY HISTORY
Science Histor y Images/Alamy Stock Photo/HRP4FP
Battle of Gettysburg, Pickett’s Charge, 1863.

his Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox Court House on In this they were not alone, as thousands more of their countrymen
9 April 1865, and the remaining Confederate commanders fol- crossed the border to take up the Union’s call to arms.
lowed suit over that spring. Alonzo Wolverton was discharged on
2 August 1865, and made his way home to his family’s village The Bloodiest of Classrooms: Frances Wafer Interns
in Oxford County. with the Army of the Potomac

Of the four Wolverton brothers, two—Alfred and Jasper—

died of disease during their service and were buried in the UnitedF rancis Moses Wafer was born near Kingston, Ontario on
31 July 1830, the son of a Roman Catholic farming fam-
States.29 Newton, the youngest, took his discharge and left America ily of Loyalist stock. The Civil War’s outbreak found him a
in 1863. He was soon back in uniform, this time in the dark green student in Kingston, studying at both Queen’s University31 and
of the 22nd Oxford Rifles, a Canadian militia the Kingston General Hospital. While his
unit. Newton spent the next several years on education made him much better prepared
periodic duty with his regiment, guarding the “The outbreak of the for his wartime role than many of his peers
Canadian border against a new threat from the in blue,32 medicine was still an ill-paying
Civil War caught the
south: the Fenian Brotherhood.30 profession by the standards of the 19th
Union Army woefully Century. Nonetheless, Wafer was intrigued
The story of the Wolverton brothers is ‘flat-footed’ in many by the prospect of furthering his practical
perhaps typical of Canadians who found them- medical skills by way of service with the
respects, from men
selves serving in the Union Army during the Union Army, following the conclusion of
Civil War. When the conflict began, they were to materiel.” the 1862–1863 school year at Queen’s.
already living in the United States. Both the At the end of the academic term, he made
desire for adventure and the financial incentive his way to the United States and was duly
of recruiting bonuses led them to serve a country that was not appointed as the assistant surgeon of the 108th New York
their own. For Alonzo and Newton, the war left a lasting impres- Volunteer Infantry Regiment.
sion upon their lives, and it was the defining event of their youth.

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 45

 The outbreak of the Civil War caught the Union Army the Army of the Potomac, albeit belatedly. Hooker was initially
woefully ‘flat-footed’ in many respects, from men to materiel. unaware of Lee’s intent, and the two armies came together in a
Prior to the conflict’s outbreak, the American military was first meeting engagement at Gettysburg on the first of July.
and foremost a frontier force, safeguarding the nation’s borders
and contributing to the country’s gradual expansion westward. Wafer spent the month following the federal disaster at
Neither the Union nor the Confederacy were prepared for an Chancellorsville serving in a divisional field hospital near Potomac
industrialized clash of arms that would last for years, and systemic Creek. He re-joined the 108th New York on 7 June, and one
failures in both military medical organization and preparation had week later, the regiment was ordered to march in pursuit of the
lethal consequences for those fighting on the battlefield. Confederates. On the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg, the
108th was ordered to defend a battery of Union artillery in the
The Union Army began the Civil War with a mere 114 doctors centre left of the federal line. At around 7:00 AM that day, “a
in service, of whom twenty-four resigned to join the Confederacy.33 thin straggling line of men in brown slowly advanced through
Even then, these medical professionals had spent much of their a wheat field about three-quarters of a mile to our front. These
careers in isolated frontier garrisons, without access to the most were the enemy’s skirmishers.”39 Coming under heavy rifle and
current training, and with limited exposure to any larger community artillery fire, the 108th New York sustained an increasing number
of medical practitioners. Following mobilization in the spring of of casualties throughout the day until the Confederate attack
1863, the Union Army required each regiment to provide its own ceased late that night.
surgeon, a policy that guaranteed a frightening variation in the
standard of care provided to wounded and ill soldiers.34

The 108th was raised for Union service in the

summer of 1862, and was bloodied at both Antietam
(September 1862) and Fredericksburg (December
1862). Within the first three months of its service,
the regiment sustained nearly 300 casualties.35 By
the time Wafer joined the unit in late-March 1863,
it was already a veteran regiment of the Army of the
Potomac. Along with tens of thousands of their fel-
low Union troops, Wafer and the 108th languished in
camp through the spring of 1861, beset by typhoid
fever and dysentery. During that time, the Army’s
commander, General Joseph Hooker, prepared for a
campaign that would destroy Robert E. Lee’s Army of
Northern Virginia and open a path to the Confederate
capital at Richmond.

Wafer’s own baptism by fire came at the Battle

of Chancellorsville in early-May 1863. The 108th
came into contact with Confederate forces on 2 May,
and Wafer’s proximity to the front line gave him
the grim realization that “…for the first time I felt
that in a few moments I would be literally ‘Staring
Death in the Face.’”36 With his fellow surgeons
in the 2nd Brigade,37 Wafer withdrew to a hastily-
established brigade medical station in the rear and
began to treat casualties as they were evacuated from Lebrecht Music & Ar ts/Alamy Stock Photo/ERG8K3
the front. Coming under artillery and rifle fire was a
new and unnerving experience for the untried Wafer.
Nonetheless, he persevered in treating his regiment’s
casualties. The 108th went into battle numbering less
than 400 soldiers, a dramatic decrease from the 950
who had enlisted less than one year before.38

Chancellorsville was a defeat for the Army of

the Potomac. Hooker failed to achieve his operational
aims, and Lee’s counter-attack into Pennsylvania
sent Union forces scrambling to both contain the
Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, and to defend
Surrender at Appomattox Court House, 9 April 1865. Confederate Army of Northern Virginia
Washington. As the Gettysburg Campaign began on 3 commander Robert E. Lee (left) officially surrenders to Union commander Ulysses S. Grant,
June 1863, Lee’s forces began their advance north from accompanied by Generals Merrit and Parker.
Fredericksburg. The Confederates were shadowed by

46 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 MILITARY HISTORY
As dawn broke on 3 July, Lee, determined to renew his assault, Their role in halting the Confederates at the battle’s critical
ordered General James Longstreet to take three Confederate divi- moment cost the 108th New York dearly: more than one-third of the
sions and attack the Union II Corps in force. Wafer witnessed roughly 250 men of the regiment who had joined the battle became
what became known as the “high-water mark casualties.41 As Wafer and his comrades began
of the Confederacy:” Pickett’s Charge. More to grasp the impact of Lee’s defeat, the Union
than 12,000 Confederate soldiers, “emerging “Hostility between the Army gained a renewed sense of confidence
from the woods immediately in front of the that their opponents were far from invincible.
2nd Corps…in solemn grandeur several lines Union government and Lee never again launched a strategic offensive
deep…across the open plain more than half Great Britain laid bare into the north, and spent much of the remainder
a mile of which was fully exposed to the fire just how vulnerable of the conflict on the defensive against the
of our artillery”40 came under withering bom- Union Army as it penetrated deeper into the
bardment from Union troops. Although some British North America Confederacy.
Confederate soldiers advanced to within mere remained to American
yards of the federal line, their advance was Francis Wafer’s service to the Union did
military aggression
defeated, with more than half the rebels falling not end at Gettysburg.42 Remaining with the
dead, wounded, or were captured. Pickett’s and expansion.” 108th, he campaigned through Virginia at such
Charge failed and, exhausted, Lee’s forces Battles as the Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court
began their withdrawal late the next day as House, and Cold Harbor. He was likely present
news arrived of Grant’s victory at Vicksburg. at Appomattox Court House on 9 April 1865, when Lee finally
surrendered his much-diminished army to Grant, precipitating
the final collapse and defeat of the Confederacy.

L i b r a r y a n d A r c h i v e s C a n a d a / A c c . N o. 19 4 6 - 3 5 - 1

Battle of Ridgeway. Desperate charge of the American Fenians under Colonel O’Neill near Ridgeway Station, 2 June 1866.

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 47

 The 108th New York was mustered out of service six weeks Hostility between the Union government and Great Britain
after Lee’s surrender. Francis Wafer returned to Kingston in July laid bare just how vulnerable British North America remained
and resumed his medical studies at Queen’s. He graduated in to American military aggression and expansion. The exorbi-
March 1867 and entered private practice that same year. Although tant cost of defending Canadian territor—and Canadians’ own
he survived his service in the Union Army, the war left its mark half-hearted interest in their defence—forced the British govern-
on Doctor Wafer. He was plagued by chronic ill-health beginning ment to re-examine how far it was willing to invest in a remote
in 1865, and eventually died from illness on 9 April 1876. His colony on the far side of the Atlantic. Canadians themselves—
surviving relatives spent years in the fruitless pursuit of a pension caught in the middle, of varied opinion regarding America’s
from the American government. Francis’ contribution to the Union masochistic struggle, and increasingly independent-minded—came
cause, like that of many of his fellow Canadians, passed largely to believe that taking their nation’s destiny into their own hands
unnoticed by the United States. was the best choice for its people.

The End of the War and the Beginning of Canada The Dominion of Canada was born on 1 July 1867. Across
the new nation, many of those celebrating would doubtless have

C anadian experiences during the American Civil War varied

widely. Arthur Rankin never heard a shot fired in anger,
although many of his volunteers did as they went on to serve in
been Canadian veterans of both the Union and Confederate armies,
their lives forever shaped by their service in that conflict. While
the role of Canadians in the American Civil War remains (and is
other regiments. The Wolverton brothers lost half their number likely to remain) a seldom-explored realm of Canada’s history, it
to the conflict’s greatest killer: disease. And finally, Francis is no less worthy of recognition than the service of Canadians on
Wafer was afforded a rare opportunity to apply his medical other foreign battlefields throughout the 19th Century.
education in armed conflict, that most dire of circumstances.
While it could be argued that Canadians did not make a grand
impression on the Civil War, the Civil War certainly left its
mark on Canadians.

NOTES
1 The American Battlefield Trust, at https://www. 10 Rankin was implicated in the so-called “Southern 28 Adjutant-General’s Office, Official Army Register
battlefields.org/learn/articles/civil-war-facts. Railway Scandal” of 1857. of the Volunteer Force of the United States Army
Accessed 13 August 2018. 11 Boyko, p. 115. for the Years 1861, ’62, ’63, ’64, ’65, Part VIII
2 As Canada did not exist as a nation during this 12 Buja, p. 97. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office,
time, the term British North American is more 13 Boyko, p. 116. 1867), p. 156.
common in scholarship on the subject. However, 14 Buja, p. 98. 29 Common at the time, disease remained the great
the terms Canada and Canadian will be used for 15 Ibid, p. 99. killer of both armies during the Civil War.
simplicity’s sake. 16 Robin W. Winks, The Civil War Years: Canada 30 Composed largely of Irish immigrant veterans of
3 John Graves Simcoe, the Lieutenant-Governor of and the United States (Montreal and Kingston: the Union Army, the Fenians launched several
Upper Canada from 1791-1796, was supportive of McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998), p. 190. raids into Canada between 1866 and 1871, in the
the Abolitionist cause and presided over the pas- 17 Seward officially denied any involvement in belief that seizing Canadian territory would force
sage of the province’s Act Against Slavery. Passed the scheme, although he allowed that American the British government to withdraw from Ireland.
on 9 July 1793, the Act forbid the introduction of authorities could not prevent immigrants from 31 Then known as Queen’s College.
new slaves into Upper Canada and granted free- serving in the Union forces. 32 Some fifty Union surgeons were court-martialled
dom to children born to female slaves once they 18 Boyko, p. 112. for incompetence during the Civil War.
reached the age of twenty-five. 19 David A. MacDonald and Nancy N. McAdams, 33 Francis M. Wafer, A Surgeon in the Army of
4 Danny R. Jenkins, British North Americans Who The Wolverton Family 1693-1850 and Beyond, the Potomac, Cheryl A. Wells, (ed.), (Montreal:
Fought in the American Civil War, 1861-1865 Volume II (Albuquerque, NM: Penobscot Press, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008), p. xxvii.
(Ottawa: MA thesis, University of Ottawa, 1993), p. 10. 2001), p. 882. 34 Ibid, p. xxviii.
5 William Seward, Lincoln’s Secretary of State, 20 A.N. Wolverton, Dr. Newton Wolverton: An 35 Steve A. Hawks, The Civil War in the East,
warned the British minister to the U.S.A. that Intimate Anecdotal Biography of One of the entry for the 108th New York Volunteer Infantry
British recognition of the Confederacy would lead Most Colourful Characters in Canadian History Regiment, at: http://civilwarintheeast.com/us-reg-
to war, beginning with an invasion of Canada. John (Vancouver: Unknown Publisher, 1933), p. 24. iments-batteries/new-york-infantry/108th-new-
Boyko, Blood and Daring: How Canada Fought 21 MacDonald and McAdams, p. 885. york/. Accessed 26 November 2018.
the American Civil War and Forged a Nation 22 Boyko, pp. 97-101. 36 Wafer, p. 21.
(Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 2013), p. 64. 23 Ibid, p. 120. 37 Of the 3rd Division, II Corps.
6 Several factors preclude precision when it comes 24 Ever-pragmatic, Lincoln concluded that a concur- 38 Wafer, p. 24.
to determining how many Canadians fought rent war with both the Confederacy and Britain 39 Ibid, p. 41.
in the war: record keeping was often faulty, would be a disaster for the Union. Eventually, the 40 Ibid, p. 47.
recruits’ hometowns were not always identified, two seized Confederate diplomats were released 41 Ibid, p. 49.
and British invocation of the Foreign Enlistment from custody and the actions of the Union war- 42 Francis Wafer was not the only Canadian doctor
Act of 1819 made it illegal for British subjects to ship’s captain were disavowed. serving at the battle. Solomon Secord, a descendant
participate in the conflict. 25 MacDonald and McAdams, p. 885. of the famed Laura Secord, was a surgeon in the
7 Jenkins, p. 23. 26 Boyko, p. 135. 20th Regiment, Georgia Infantry. He was captured
8 John E. Buja, Arthur Rankin: A Political 27 Alonzo Wolverton, letter to his sister Roseltha after he elected to remain with the wounded while
Biography (Windsor: MA thesis, University of Wolverton Goble, dated 4 December 1864. Archives Lee’s remaining forces withdrew (Boyko, p. 134).
Windsor, 1982), p. 1. of Ontario, at: http://www.archives.gov.on.ca/en/
9 Ibid, p. 3. explore/online/fenians/big/big_16_dec4b.aspx.

48 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 VIEWS AND OPINIONS
Tr i n i t y M i r r o r / M i r r o r p i x / A l a m y S t o c k P h o t o / B 4 W R 4 N

Lord Trenchard, right, after the foundation stone of a new RAF College was laid at Cranwell in July 1935.

“Parallel Warfare” in Conflicts with Limited

Political Aims
by Andrew McNaughton

Introduction against three limited operations that saw the decisive application

F
of air power: Desert Storm in Iraq, Allied Force in Kosovo, and
rom the dawn of heavier-than-air flight, many Unified Protector over Libya. As Western states shy away from
individuals, strategic planners, and armed forces ground-force commitments, air power continues to be the weapon
visualized a future where the devastations of ter- of choice in foreign intervention. These operations are almost
restrial war could be solved from above. However, always limited in scope, and therefore, political considerations
the airplane and air power theory did not entirely make the concept of parallel warfare less desirable when compared
live up to expectations. Only in 1991 did technology catch up to a graduated campaign of coercion.
to theory. The precision dreamt of from Douhet to Trenchard
was finally put on display in the First Gulf War. Air power Theoretical Concepts
theory was refined as well, including parallel warfare, where
military forces could win the war before the enemy knew what
hit them. Despite the coalescence of theory and technology,
several problems exist with the nature of this concept, particu-
L ike his air-minded predecessors, the American Colonel
John Warden was inspired by the possibility of bypassing
the front line altogether and striking the heart of the enemy.
larly recently, as limited political aims become the accepted Warden envisaged independent air power achieving more than
norm for intervention. it had during the strategic bombing campaigns of the 20th
Century.1 This ‘new’ way of war would be executed first by
After defining the theoretical concepts, this article will thinking of the enemy as a system, and then through a targeting
analyze the promise of parallel warfare and strategic paralysis framework consisting of five rings.2 At the centre of this system

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 49

DV I D S / U SA F / D o n n a L . B u r n e tt / 4 0 6 4 8 3 6

John A. Warden III.

D N D p h o t o I S C 9 1- 5 112 b y S e r g e a n t C. C o l o m b e

Canadian CF-18 pilots on the flight line in Qatar during Operation Friction (Desert Storm), January 1991.

50 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 VIEWS AND OPINIONS
E v e r e tt C o l l e c t i o n I n c / A l a m y S t o c k P h o t o / C 6 15 3 N

General Norman Schwarzkopf

lies enemy leadership. They not only direct the conflict, but the entire system would be ineffective. If this could be achieved
are also the only entity that can make concessions, and thus, quickly by air power, it was argued, then a bloody ground conflict
they are the primary target.3 When that is not possible, the could be avoided altogether.
focus then moves out one ring at a time, from leadership, to
organic essentials, critical infrastructure, population, and lastly, Opposite to strategic paralysis is the concept of coercion.
to fielded forces. The enemy’s centre of gravity in each ring Rather than freezing the enemy’s decision-making process, coer-
should be determined, and then attacked simultaneously - in cion works by “influencing the adversary’s calculus” to “force
parallel - from the inside out. Warden strongly advocated that the opponent to alter its behaviour.”8 The distinguished American
if military planners and their air forces followed his model, it political scientist Dr. Robert Pape, a professor at the University
would lead to the enemy forces freezing in a state of paralysis.4 of Chicago, breaks down coercion further into two strategies,
punishment and denial. Coercion by punishment is designed
The concept of parallel warfare has been defined as a to ‘raise the price’ to civilians, whereas coercion by denial is
simultaneous application of force at all three levels of war against directed at thwarting the enemy’s objectives.9 The stronger of the
key systems to effect strategic paralysis on the enemy. 5 This two, coercion by denial, requires a functioning enemy leadership
contrasts with the more traditional form of serial warfare in to make concessions. Both seek to raise the price of a continued
three ways. First, military forces can now attack a larger number policy over time by using a graduated escalation of force.
of targets in a shorter time frame. Second, distance is no longer
an effective defence as technology enables targets to be attacked The criticisms of these approaches are worth mentioning,
anywhere. Finally, it is argued that in serial warfare, tactical as each has its own deficiencies. Of the three concepts, parallel
effects take time to amount to strategic results, whereas parallel warfare has the fewest criticisms. When detached from other
warfare can generate effects across all three levels of conflict ideas, the idea of transcending the levels of war in an efficient
simultaneously.6 Warden’s model provides a method through which and devastating attack is enticing to the commander. However,
to rank the enemy’s centres of gravity. Once determined, they are where problems arise are in limited conflicts. The basis of this
targeted and defeated all at once. This eliminates time for the method is the destruction of targets across the system. In some
enemy to recover or re-assign assets, and ultimately, it paralyses conflicts, however, there may be entire industries or target bases
the enemy command apparatus.7 Warden theorized that once the missing, severely limiting the desired effect.
enemy leadership was cut off from the remainder of its network,

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 51

Wo r l d H i s t o r y A r c h i v e / A l a m y S t o c k P h o t o / K H W 5 16

Saddam Hussein, fifth President of Iraq.

Strategic paralysis has some notable criticisms as well. First, government is long, because governments hold on due to the
several pundits argue that strategic paralysis is a misnomer. One implications of defeat, as well as due to a poor evaluation of their
author argues that the chosen method to achieve this paralysis own military performance.17 Together, these reasons can become
is heavily tactical and operational in nature, making it “…not considerable disadvantages for Western governments looking for
really a way of war but a way of battle.”10 Another author furthers quick international engagements.
this thought that a collection of destroyed tactical targets does
not necessarily constitute a leap to strategic effect.11 The theory Decisive Air Campaigns
also considers the enemy as a “passive collection of targets” and
discounts the enemy’s language, culture, and politics.12

The second area of criticism for strategic paralysis is its legal-

P arts of these concepts were applied in the following three
air campaigns, in which air power played a decisive
role. Each of these campaigns were subordinate to limited
ity. A strict adherence to strategic paralysis through Warden’s model political aims, and therefore, they make an appropriate test for
could lead to the illegal targeting of enemy leadership. Political the theories.
leaders are protected through several articles of international
law, and strict considerations apply for those individuals directly Desert Storm
involved in hostilities.13 Another legal consequence is that a totally
paralysed enemy state may not be able to legally terminate the As the diplomatic tensions rose after the Iraqi invasion of
conflict, and their military forces could end up still fighting on, Kuwait in 1990, a planning cell within the US Air Force called
negating the endeavour.14 Checkmate began to develop plans for a military retaliation against
Iraq.18 Lead by Warden, a plan for an air campaign entitled Instant
Coercion depends greatly upon intelligence and a true under- Thunder was developed. This operation was based upon Warden’s
standing of the enemy’s motivations.15 Another drawback is that Five Ring Model, where in six days, aircraft would strike 84
commanders must be prepared for enemy “counter offers,” and targets to incapacitate key leadership and military capabilities.19
must be willing to risk the chance that a conflict could end up Although Warden promised this campaign would be sufficient, as
becoming a full-scale war.16 The largest drawback, however, is planning progressed, it was met with high level opposition due to
time. Pape argues that the time required to coerce an opposing the fact it neglected the Iraqi forces already in Kuwait.20 By August

52 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 VIEWS AND OPINIONS
D N D p h o t o C K D 9 9 - 2 0 2 9 b y M a s t e r C o r p o r a l Da n i e l l e B e r n i e r

A CF-18 awaiting takeoff at Aviano, Italy, as part of Operation Echo/Operation Allied Force.

1990, Instant Thunder was more-or-less incorporated into a more forces in Kuwait began to take a toll. Although falling short of
comprehensive plan consisting of four phases; revised Instant Schwarzkopf’s goal of 50% attrition, Iraq’s forces were attacked
Thunder strategic targets, suppression of enemy air defences in day and night with ever-increasing losses. Tanks, artillery, and
Kuwait, preparation of the battlefield, and air support during the armoured vehicles were especially targeted, leading to the news-
ground assault.21 worthy “tank-plinking” flights, where Iraqi armoured forces were
destroyed with precision bombs.24 It was this battlefield focus that
Although conforming to the Clausewitzian focus of identifying proved decisive in coercing Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait.25
the enemy centres of gravity, Warden and General Norman By mid-February, Saddam had accepted Soviet-brokered terms
Schwarzkopf, the Coalition Commander, saw the situation in for a “full and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait,” dropping
the Persian Gulf differently. Warden believed the solution rested his previous list of conditions.26 What this timing demonstrates
in bombing targets in Iraq, whereas Schwarzkopf and his head- is that if a centre of gravity is correctly identified and supporting
quarters staff correctly identified Saddam Hussein’s centre of targets are attacked, the concept of parallel warfare is a useful
gravity in the conflict, namely, his military forces in Kuwait.22 tool. Furthermore, the negotiations and the announcement of
Due to the abundance of combat aircraft available when the air withdrawal happened long after Warden’s strategic targets were
campaign began on 17 January 1991, the first three phases were destroyed, thus undermining the view of using a strategic paralysis
started simultaneously. In this respect, the concept of parallel campaign to win a conflict.27
warfare was utilized. Iraqi defences were attacked simultaneously,
with the neutralization of Iraqi command and control in the first Allied Force
eight hours and the dismantling of the air defence system within
thirty-six hours.23 Air power played a role in many of the conflicts following the
dissolution of Yugoslavia. However, it was during the Kosovo War
Within days of the first bombs being dropped on Baghdad, that air power proved decisive. Armed clashes between the Kosovo
Saddam’s regime and its forces were effectively strategically Liberation Army, made up of oppressed Kosovar Albanians, and the
paralysed. Nonetheless, his forces fought on. Due to advancements military forces of the former Yugoslavia (Serbia) began in earnest
in bombing and new tactics, the Coalition’s destruction of Iraqi in 1998, with Serbian troops arriving in Kosovo in force in 1999.28

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 53

M i k e G o l d w a t e r / A l a m y S t o c k P h o t o / A 2 W YA 5

President Slobodan Milosevic.

D N D p h o t o G D 2 011- 0 8 8 7- 0 9 b y C o r p o r a l L a u r a B r o p hy

A representative CP-140 Aurora, which were very active and productive during Operation Unified Protector / Operation Mobile.

54 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 VIEWS AND OPINIONS
eurokinissi/Alamy Stock Photo/J1J340

Muammar Gaddafi in Tripoli, 2010.

Serbian forces continually committed human-rights abuses areas, and lines of communication were attacked, as well as tank
in Kosovo, leading to multiple diplomatic coercion efforts from concentrations.36 Interestingly, due to the lack of a ground threat,
both the US and NATO, including economic and diplomatic Serbian tanks were well- concealed in the mountainous terrain, and
sanctions as well as a coercive military presence.29 These efforts were rarely spotted out in the open, making them very difficult to
failed, and it became clear that unless the diplomatic efforts locate and destroy.37 Four weeks into the campaign, NATO began
were paired with military force, they would be ineffective.30 bombing Belgrade itself, focussing upon those elements that sup-
In February 1999, US officials presented a bombing campaign ported Milosevic’s hold on power: the political machine, state
designed to coerce Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian president, to media, security forces, and the economic system. After weeks of
stop the ethnic cleansing, and pave the way for the deployment worries with respect to escalation, the campaign finally threatened
of a NATO peacekeeping presence.31 The campaign consisted of the livelihood of Milosevic’s friends in the political and media
three phases: soften the air defence system and command struc- elite.38 Heavy bombing operations continued, NATO announced
ture; strike military targets south of Belgrade; and finally, conduct air superiority had been attained at the end of April, and on 8 June,
attacks against targets within the city of Belgrade.32 Not only was Milosevic finally agreed to all NATO demands for withdrawal.39
it felt that a ground operation would produce greater casualties, Despite this progress, there had been difficulties in determining
but based upon experiences in Bosnia and the Gulf War, it was the Yugoslav centre of gravity, some authors even declaring that
believed that air power could provide a clean victory for NATO.33 it was never found during the entire campaign.40
Furthermore, in the beginning, the deployment of ground forces
was completely ruled out, further constraining NATO military Many pundits argue that an air campaign based upon Warden’s
planners and commanders.34 model rather than a coercive model would have achieved more.
The results of targeting Milosevic directly could have occurred
Serbian air defences were extensive, and their operators were at the beginning of the campaign, as opposed to a month into the
well-trained, putting up a strong defence when air operations campaign. One of the main detractors for using Warden’s model
began on 24 March 1999. Despite extensive damage to phase one in this conflict is the fact it relied upon unilateral action and did
targets, there was no appreciable effect upon Milosevic’s actions. not take into consideration the many intricacies of alliance inter-
In fact, atrocities increased, and it became clear that he was play- ventions. Furthermore, it was necessary for the Yugoslav state to
ing for time.35 During the second phase, choke points, marshalling remain intact during this conflict in order to prevent spillover into

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 55

Stocktrek Images, Inc.Alamy Stock Photo/D4T4EX

A CF-18 Hornet, also very active during Unified Protector.

the other unstable nations.41 The benefit of the coercive campaign organization as soon as possible. To that end, on 31 March, NATO
is that it may not always work, but the escalatory aspect is the assumed operational control.46
more humane approach in circumstances less than total war.42
Indeed, the fact remains that there was no real threat of ground The campaign’s focus was upon supporting the rebels, and
invasion in the 78-day NATO campaign, and it was successful. upon identifying the enemy centre of gravity as the Libyan fielded
forces.47 There were many critics of this approach, arguing that
Unified Protector air power’s true value was undermined by not targeting Gaddafi
and his headquarters in accordance with the Warden approach.
The third decisive air campaign was Unified Protector, These critics failed to realize the importance of the Libyan people
NATO’s intervention in the 2011 Libyan Civil War against deciding the outcome themselves, augmented with some precision-
Muammar Gaddafi. The non-violent protests that had marked bombing support from NATO. The air strikes also importantly gave
similar Arab Spring’s uprisings throughout northern Africa turned the rebellion time to organize and train, preventing a concerted
violent in late-February 2011, when Gaddafi directed his forces to Libyan intervention that would have quickly crushed the rebel-
quell the rebellion, rather than to capitulate.43 It became clear that lion.48 By 24 March, Libyan air defences, including the Libyan
civilians were quickly becoming the target of the crackdown. At air force, had been destroyed or rendered non-effective, and the
the UN, the US led the charge for intervention using the ‘respon- campaign shifted to interdicting Libyan army movements.49
sibility to protect’ initiative as impetus, and on 17 March 2011,
the resolution was granted “mandating ‘all necessary measures’ to As the rebels grew more competent, they began to feed
protect civilians.”44 International sanctions and an arms embargo tactical strike information over Twitter to NATO. An unlikely
followed, as well as the establishment of a no-fly zone. The US forum, Twitter proved essential to aiding NATO in distinguish-
quickly set up a task force to implement the resolution and then ing rebels from regulars using the same vehicles, as well as in
commenced air strikes on 19 March. These strikes destroyed the coordinating strikes for the rebel advance.50 This too was aided
Libyan air defence system, as well as concentrated groupings by the deployment of NATO surveillance and targeting aircraft,
of armoured vehicles besieging Benghazi.45 To garner broader providing a key data link from headquarters monitoring Twitter,
international support for interference in what was a civil war, to aircraft operating over the country.51 After 223 days of strikes
the US diligently worked to hand-over control to an international in support of the rebel advance to Tripoli, air attacks halted a

56 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 VIEWS AND OPINIONS
convoy carrying Gaddafi, which was quickly converged upon by Warden’s model gained traction, three decisive air campaigns
rebel fighters, ending the civil war.52 have taken place. Desert Storm was unique from the others in
that a ground invasion was both threatened and conducted. As
In a very different campaign from Desert Storm and Allied the West shied away from committing ground troops for combat
Force, Unified Protector produced a decisive air intervention in during the 1990s, as well as giving due consideration to the
support of a rebellion. Using a graduated approach in support of costs of occupation and rebuilding, the destruction wrought by
an untrained force, and leveling the playing field by removing parallel warfare and strategic paralysis became inappropriate
heavy firepower from the aggressor made all the difference in a for this level of conflict. Instead, coercive campaigns, such
successful transition of power, and not leaving a power vacuum in as Allied Force and Unified Protector, became more popular,
an already-unstable region.53 An attack against traditional strategic limiting initial commitments and allowing for multi-faceted
targets may have truly paralysed the Libyan state, especially with operations with complex goals. The use of precision-guided
the overwhelming advantages possessed by NATO. The appropri- munitions allows for much greater accuracy, as demonstrated
ateness of this approach is called into question, however, when through the three air campaigns. However, their effectiveness
the protagonist does not want to commit ground troops to occupy is only as good as the associated strategy. In conclusion, these
and rebuild from the destruction. decisive air campaigns tends to demonstrate that the concept
of parallel warfare is not the most effective method of warfare
Conclusion in future limited interventions.

T here have been many promises associated with air power

and its war-winning capabilities. The reach afforded to
commanders gave rise to the ability to affect strategic paraly-
Captain Andrew D. McNaughton is a pilot with 450 Squadron
in Petawawa, flying the CH-147F Chinook. He graduated from
the Royal Military College of Canada in 2015 with a degree
sis on their enemies through devastating attacks on parallel in Military and Strategic Studies. He is currently completing a
targets. Coalesced into Warden’s model, these theories have Master’s degree in Air Power at King’s College, London.
driven many air power practitioners to utilize these concepts
as the methods for downstream conflicts. In the time since

NOTES
1 Adrian Reeve, “The Expectations of Strategic Air from Ten Propositions,” in Airpower Journal 10, 32 Ibid.
Power,” in Australian Defence Force Journal 190, No. 1 (Spring 1996), p. 2. 33 Ritchie, “Air Power Victorious,” p. 320.
(March/April 2013), p. 54. 15 Alan J. Stephenson, “Shades of Gray: Gradual 34 Jessica Lecroy, “Centre of Gravity Schizophrenia
2 John Warden, “The Enemy as a System,” in Escalation and Coercive Diplomacy,” (Maxwell over Kosovo: An “Eccentric” War in Need of a
Airpower Journal IX, No.1 (Spring 1995), p. 42. AFB: Air University Press, 2002), p. 25. True Clausewitzian Analysis,” (Essay, National
3 Ibid, p. 47. 16 Ibid, p. 7. Defense University, 1999), p. 12.
4 John Warden, “Strategy and Airpower,” in Air & 17 Pape, Bombing to Win, p. 32. 35 Lambeth, Transformation, 184.
Space Power Journal 25, No.1 (Spring 2011), p. 18 Thomas A. Keaney and Elliot A. Cohen, “Gulf 36 Ibid.
71. War Air Power Survey Summary Report,” 37 Ibid.
5 Steven M. Schneider, “Parallel Warfare: A (Washington, D.C.: 1993), p. 36. 38 Ibid, p. 187.
Strategy for the Future,” (MA dissertation., U.S. 19 Ibid. 39 Nordeen, Air Warfare, p. 256.
Army Command and General Staff College, 20 Benjamin Lambeth, The Transformation 40 Lecroy, “Centre of Gravity,” p. 8.
1998), p. 1. of American Air Power, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 41 Ibid, p. 4.
6 Michael N. Schmitt, “Effects-Based Operations University Press, 2000), p. 106. 42 Stephenson, “Shades of Grey,” p. 6.
and the Law of Aerial Warfare,” in Washington 21 Ibid. 43 Ivo H. Daadler and James G. Stavridis, “NATO’s
University Global Studies Law Review 5, No.2 22 Andrew D. McNaughton, “What reasons are there Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run an
(2006), p. 271. for claiming that the Coalition’s focus on the Intervention,” in Foreign Affairs 91, No.2 (March/
7 Schneider, “Parallel Warfare,” p. 2. battlefield proved strategic in Operation Desert April 2012), p. 2.
8 Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Storm?” (Essay, King’s College London, 2018), 44 Ibid.
Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University p. 3. 45 Ibid, p. 3.
Press, 1996), p. 4. 23 Lambeth, Transformation, p. 113. 46 Jason R. Greenleaf, “The Air War in Libya,” in Air
9 Ibid, p. 13. 24 William F. Andrews, “Airpower against an Army: & Space Power Journal 27, No.2 (March/April
10 Adam Elkus, “The Rise and Decline of Strategic Challenge and Response in CENTAF’s Duel 2013), p. 30.
Paralysis” in Small Wars Journal, at: https:// with the Republican Guard,” (CADRE Paper, Air 47 Christian F. Anrig, “Allied Air Power over Libya,”
smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-rise-and- University, 1998), p. 59. in Air Power in UN Operations: Wings for Peace,
decline-of-strategic-paralysis. 25 Pape, Bombing to Win, p. 213. A. Walter Dorn (ed.), (Surrey, UK: Ashgate
11 Ibid. 26 Ibid, p. 216. Publishing Limited, 2014), p. 305.
12 David S. Fadok, “John Boyd and John Warden: 27 McNaughton, “Coalition’s focus,” p. 6. 48 Douglas Barrie, “Libya’s Lessons: The Air
Airpower’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis,” in The 28 Lon O. Nordeen, Air Warfare in the Missile Age, Campaign,” in Survival 54, No.6 (December
Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Books, 2002), p. 250. 2012 – January 2013), p. 59.
Theory, Phillip S. Meinlinger (ed.) (Maxwell 29 Stephenson, “Shades of Gray,” p. 4. 49 Robert H. Gregory, Clean Bombs and Dirty Wars:
AFB: Air University Press, 1997), p. 376. 30 Sebastian Ritchie, “Air Power Victorious? Britain Air Power in Kosovo and Libya, (Lincoln, NB:
13 Gary M. Jackson, “Warden’s Five Ring System and NATO Strategy during the Kosovo Conflict,” University of Nebraska Press, 2015), p. 181.
Theory: Legitimate Wartime Military Targeting in Air Power History: Turning Points from Kitty 50 Ibid, p. 187.
or an Increased Potential to Violate the Law and Hawk to Kosovo, Sebastian Cox and Peter Gray 51 Ibid, p. 183.
Norms of Expected Behavior?” (Maxwell AFB: (eds.), (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), p. 52 Ibid, p. 200.
Air University Press, 2000), p. 15. 318. 53 Greenleaf, “The Air War,” p. 46.
14 Richard Szafranski, “Twelve Principles Emerging 31 Lambeth, Transformation, p. 182.

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 57

Handout/Alamy Stock Photo/F6RX2C

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria propaganda photo showing ISIS militants parading, 30 June 2014, in Raqqa, Syria.

Legal Implications of Canadian Foreign Fighters

by Michael Wickson

Introduction could impact the status of the Kurdish militant groups, such as

T
the Peshmerga and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
he rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS) in 2014 captured international attention as Hillier chose to travel to Kurdistan because the Peshmerga
the group captured much of Iraq and Syria, com- were the only force capable of stopping ISIS.9 The Peshmerga are
mitting horrible atrocities in the process.1 Many the official armed force of the Kurdistan Regional Government
individuals ventured to join their cause, including under the Minister of Peshmerga Affairs.10 During his time there,
many Canadians.2 Many westerners also joined militant groups he also fought alongside the PKK, a communist militant group
as foreign fighters to oppose the rise of ISIS in the Middle that has been engaged in conflict with Turkey for several decades.
East, including a number of Canadians.3 The official nature of the Peshmerga contrasts sharply with the
PKK. The PKK was formed in 1974 to establish a communist
In 2016, Dillon Hillier chronicled his adventure fighting ISIS Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey.11 Inspired by Lenin, the
in Kurdistan in a book entitled One Soldier: A Canadian Soldier’s PKK operated in a military fashion by conducting insurgent
Fight against the Islamic State.4 Hillier travelled to Kurdistan from attacks within Turkey and violently eliminating Kurdish rivals.12
November 2014 to January 2015 and joined the Iraqi Kurdish The PKK waged a campaign of terrorism against Turkey which
armed forces, the “Peshmerga,” as a foreign fighter. Four criteria lasted throughout the 1990s, killing thousands of Turks.13 As a
define a foreign fighter:5 i) joining a militant group; ii) lacking result, the Canadian government placed the PKK on the list of
citizenship or kinship with the parties; iii) lacking affiliation with terrorist groups.14 However, with the emergence of ISIS, the PKK
an official military organization; and iv) being unpaid.6 cooperated with the Peshmerga to combat a common enemy.

Kurdistan is a region that encompasses the areas occupied by Shortly after arriving in Kurdistan, Hillier grew impatient
ethnic Kurds and covers approximately 230,000 square miles.7 It with the Peshmerga and found his way to the PKK in order to
sits at the confluences of Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey.8 Despite engage in combat. Unfortunately, by joining a listed terrorist
lacking recognition as a state, the formal structure of Kurdistan entity, Hillier could be vulnerable to potential criminal jeopardy.

58 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 VIEWS AND OPINIONS
The Law

A general principle
of international law
is that a state’s domes-
tic legislation cannot be
applied outside of that
state’s jurisdiction, which
is formalized in section
6(2) of the Criminal
Code whereby, “no per-
son shall be convicted …
of an offence committed
outside of Canada.”15

However, there are

Lake
Habbaniyah
exceptions, including
legislative exceptions
and the nationality of
the individual.

Extraterritorial
exceptions permit a state
R a i n e r L e s n i e w s k i / A l a m y S t o c k Ve c t o r / H D G 0 DW

to legislate regarding the

conduct of its citizens while
abroad, but must await that
citizen’s return before
enforcement.16 Canadian
foreign fighters could be
held criminally liable upon
returning to Canada for
actions taken while partici-
pating in a foreign conflict.
The nationality principle
could make Hillier crimi-
Map of the region, including Kurdistan.
nally liable under Canadian
law, due to his Canadian
citizenship. There are also
crimes that any state has
the jurisdiction to pros-
ecute regardless of where
the offence occurred.
These crimes are consid-
ered violations against
all humanity, includ-
ing torture, war crimes,
crimes against humanity,
and genocide.17 In addi-
tion, there are pieces of
Z U M A Pr e s s , I n c . / A l a m y S t o c k P h o t o / G J 4 B G R

Canadian legislation appli-

cable to Canadian foreign
fighters, specifically the
Foreign Enlistment Act
(FEA), and the treason and
terrorism offences found in
the Criminal Code.

A Peshmerga soldier at the frontline.

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 59

M a c k e n z i e - Pa p i n e a u B a tt a l i o n / L i b r a r y a n d A r c h i v e s C a n a d a / e 0 0 2 7 12 8 0 0

Members of the Canadian Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939.

The FEA was introduced in the 1937 in response to High treason applies to everyone while in Canada, but
approximately 1600 Canadians volunteering to fight in the Spanish Canadian citizens can be charged regardless of the location of
Civil War.18 The FEA makes it an offense to join, “…the armed the treasonous actions. Therefore, high treason includes any action
forces of any foreign state at war with any friendly foreign state,”19 taken within Canada, but is limited to Canadian citizens if the
as well as other offences, such as leaving Canada with the intention treasonous actions occur abroad.
to enlist, and recruiting others to enlist. However, the FEA requires
a “state at war,”20 a concept which is not particularly applicable High treason also requires the Canadian to assist an armed
to conflicts involving non-state actors. Also, the FEA does not force with whom Canada is engaging in hostilities. A foreign
include non-state actors in its definition of armed forces.21 Thus, fighter could be guilty of a very serious offence regardless of their
joining groups such as the Peshmerga, the PKK, or even ISIS, legal status within the conflict. A Canadian could be a fully lawful
would not violate the FEA. combatant in an armed conflict, but vulnerable to criminal sanc-
tion in Canada if they were affiliated with an enemy of Canada.
The Criminal Code contains a few offences that could be Although Hillier was affiliated with a listed terrorist organization,
applicable to foreign fighters. The first of these is high treason. the PKK, he was not engaged in hostilities against the Canadian
High treason includes several sub-categories, including killing or Armed Forces, and therefore, would not be liable for high treason.
threatening the life of Her Majesty, levying war against Canada,
and assisting an enemy at war with Canada.22 In contrast to high In the wake of 9/11, many terrorism offences were added
treason, treason focusses upon violent attempts to overthrow the to the Criminal Code., terrorism offences including financing,
federal or a provincial government, providing information to an facilitating, and harbouring.25 There are some sections of the
enemy state, or conspiring to commit high treason or treason.23 The Criminal Code that are particularly applicable to foreign fight-
third provision of high treason is most applicable to foreign fighters: ers, specifically, participating in a terrorist group, and the armed
conflict exception.
Every one commits high treason who, in Canada …
assists an enemy at war with Canada, or any armed A terrorist group is defined in two ways, either as having the
forces against whom Canadian Forces are engaged in purpose or intent to carry out terrorist actions, or to be a listed
hostilities, whether or not a state of war exists between terrorist group.26 Public Safety Canada maintains a list of groups
Canada and the country whose forces they are.24 suspected of terrorist activities, which includes the PKK. It is an
offence to participate in the activity of a terrorist group. Section
83.18(1) reads:

60 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 VIEWS AND OPINIONS
Every one who knowingly participates in or contributes … does not include an act or omission that is committed
to, directly or indirectly, any activity of a terrorist group during an armed conflict … in accordance with custom-
for the purposes of enhancing the ability of any terror- ary international law or conventional international law
ist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity is applicable to the conflict … to the extent that those activi-
guilty of an indictable offence …27 ties are governed by other rules of international law.29

This section has two elements to consider in the case of If Canadian foreign fighters joined an armed group that
Hillier. The first element is knowing participation in any activity complied with international law to participate in an armed con-
of a terrorist group. Foreign fighters provide a direct contribution flict, they would not be liable for terrorism offences under the
to the group during an armed conflict. While Hillier was fighting Criminal Code. Lacking a definition of armed conflict in both the
with the PKK, he was fighting closely with other soldiers, and Criminal Code and the Interpretation Act,30 it is necessary to look
the group benefited from his presence. The second element is the at international law to define an armed conflict and to determine
purpose of facilitating or carrying out terrorist activity. Section whether Hillier complied with the rules of international law.
83.01(1) contains a lengthy list of terrorist activities, and it would
only be an offence if the foreign fighter helped carry out one of To determine if an armed conflict truly exists, a test was
these activities.28 Engaging in combat is not a terrorist offence developed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
according to this section. Hillier may have fought with the PKK Yugoslavia (ICTY). In Prosecutor v Tadic the ICTY held that:
against ISIS, but he did not contribute to any terrorist activities.
Despite being a listed terrorist entity, the PKK was operating as an armed conflict exists whenever there is resort to
an armed group to oppose ISIS when Hillier was associated with armed force between States or protracted armed vio-
them. As such, he would not be liable under that section of the lence between governmental authorities and organized
Criminal Code. armed groups or between such groups within a State.31

Section 83.01 of the Criminal Code also includes an armed This decision established a two-part test for the existence
conflict exception that would be useful to exclude him from crimi- of an armed conflict by assessing the intensity of the fighting
nal liability. According to the Criminal Code, a terrorist activity: and the organization of the belligerent groups involved.32 Tadic
A s s o c i a t e d Pr e s s / H u s s e i n M a l l a / 18 2 4 7 2 7 76 5 0 0

Kurdish Peshmerga fighters are recruiting Westerners, including Canadian veterans, to fight with them against ISIS.

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 61

Ku r d i s h s t r u g g l e / A l a m y S t o c k P h o t o / F T 5 B G X

Women fighters with the Kurdish PKK guerrillas with rocket propelled grenades and a heavy machine gun shown in a propaganda photo released by
the PPK, 8 August 2014, in Iraqi Kurdistan.

demonstrated that only the organizational level of the armed group Foreign fighters would be no exception, and would need to qualify
was a necessary factor, and state affiliation was not required. In as combatants to avoid criminal liability.
Tadic, the ICTY determined that, “…[the] protracted, large-scale
violence” that occurred in 1991–1992 between the numerous Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 defines
organized armed groups met the definition of an armed conflict.33 lawful combatants as:

The conflict between Kurdish militant groups and ISIS was Members of other militias and members of other vol-
an armed conflict. In his book, Hillier described several combat unteer corps, including those of organized resistance
situations, most notably a battle at a village called Tal al-Ward.34 movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and
The intensity of the battle likely matched the level of fighting in operating in or outside their own territory.36
the former Yugoslavia in the early-1990s. He described a few other
skirmishes in which he participated, suggesting protracted, large- Members of the Peshmerga and the PKK could fall into this
scale violence. The Peshmerga and the PKK were both involved class. However, there are additional conditions that must be met.
in the battle of Tal al-Ward against ISIS. Therefore, the level of Specifically: they must be commanded by a person of responsi-
organization of the Peshmerga, PKK, and ISIS, plus the prolonged bility; they must be recognizable at a distance by a fixed distinct
nature of the violence, suggests an armed conflict did exist. Next, emblem; they must overtly carry weapons; and they must com-
it will be necessary to determine if Hillier had the requisite status ply with the laws and customs of war when conducting military
to lawfully participate in the armed conflict. operations.37 These conditions restricted combatant status to those
who waged warfare in the traditional sense.
The status of persons in an armed conflict has been histori-
cally defined by the Geneva and Hague Conventions, and was The Additional Protocols significantly broadened the
revised by the Additional Protocols in 1977. Under international definition of a lawful combatant:
law, there are only two categories of people on a battlefield:
combatants and civilians.35 Combatants can lawfully participate in The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all
an armed conflict, whereas civilians cannot, and they are subject organized armed forces, groups and units which are
to criminal liability if they do participate. In exchange, civilians under a command responsible to that Party for the con-
receive greater protection under international law and cannot be duct or its subordinates, even if that Party is represented
targeted by military forces. In fact, everyone on a battlefield is a by a government or an authority not recognized by an
civilian unless they meet certain criteria to become a combatant. adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to

62 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 VIEWS AND OPINIONS
an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall that the act was “widespread or systematic,” and so it would be
enforce compliance with the rules of international law a war crime rather than a crime against humanity, specifically
applicable in armed conflict.38 a willful killing under section 8(2)(a)(1) of the Rome Statute.42

This modernized definition of combatant achieved two things. Witnessing this war crime placed Hillier in an awkward
First, it removed the requirement for uniforms and for openly position for two reasons. First, he could be considered a party to
carrying weapons. Secondly, it reinforced the most important the act of the PKK soldiers and subject to prosecution because
aspect of qualifying for combatant status: “compliance with the he was actively working with the PKK. Second, the violation of
rules of international law.”39 This definition makes anyone into international law could compromise the combatant status of the
a combatant if they are part of an organized group fighting in an PKK and so jeopardize Hillier as a lawful combatant. Due to the
armed conflict, as long as they comply with international law. limited extent of the incident, the PKK soldiers would likely retain
Thus, members of the Peshmerga would likely be combatants, the status of combatants and be charged with a war crime. However,
and the members of the PKK could be combatants if they dem- there is no mention in the book of the PKK taking appropriate
onstrate compliance with the second condition. The requirement steps to discipline the guilty soldiers internally, suggesting that
to comply with international law would preclude any Canadian the responsible commanders of the PKK are accepting of such
who joined ISIS from using the armed conflict exemption under behavior. As a result, the PKK would lack the second condition
the Criminal Code, regardless of their individual acts. They would of the combatant definition under AP I, would not be lawful
not be lawful combatants because ISIS, as an armed group, failed combatants, and could be subject to criminal prosecution. As
to comply with international law, and so they would not be lawful such, foreign fighters affiliated with the PKK would also not be
participants in the conflict. considered lawful combatants. This was a startling development
for Hillier, which exposed him to criminal liability because the
Hillier would be a combatant in an armed conflict and immune armed conflict exception would not be applicable. It was impor-
from criminal liability as long he did not participate in any crimes tant for him to return to the Peshmerga as quickly as possible to
barred by international law, such as war crimes, crimes against reacquire his combatant status, which he promptly did.43
humanity, or genocide.40 Unfortunately, at one point in the book,
Hillier described the “worst day of his life” when he witnessed Conclusion
a war crime. He was with a group of PKK soldiers following the
battle at Tal al-Ward. The group encountered an unarmed villager,
who the PKK soldiers shot in the street.41 There is no indication T he recent conflict in the Middle East presented an interesting
situation for the law regarding foreign fighters. Foreign
Ku r d i s h s t r u g g l e / A l a m y S t o c k P h o t o / G 3 F 6 8 G

Kurdish YPG special operation YAT fighters during operations on the front lines against the Islamic State in a propaganda photo released by the YPG,
10 June 2016, in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 63

fighters travelled from many different countries to either join By travelling to Kurdistan to fight ISIS, Dillon Hillier took
ISIS or fight against them, including many Canadians. In a a serious risk. He put himself into a very dangerous situation, but
world where conflicts increasingly include non-state actors he also exposed himself to potential criminal liability, especially
and widespread use of social media, it is likely that foreign by joining the PKK. Hillier may not have known it at the time,
fighters, including Canadians, will be prevalent on the battle- but he avoided criminal sanction because he did not participate
fields in the future. in terrorist activities while fighting with the PKK, and because
he was a lawful combatant in an armed conflict as part of the
The terrorism offences under the Criminal Code created Peshmerga. The adventure described by Dillon Hillier in his recent
numerous potential criminal charges for those affiliated with book showed that the current laws applicable to foreign fighters
terrorist groups, which could be operating as belligerents to an have a common denominator: compliance with international law.
armed conflict. However, in cases where an armed conflict exists,
the terrorism provisions would not apply as long as foreign fight- Michael Wickson is a former Infantry Officer who currently
ers were lawful combatants respecting international law. Under lives in Edmonton with his wife and daughter. He holds a BSc
international law, foreign fighters may be considered combatants from the University of Calgary, a BMAS from the Royal Military
in an armed conflict if they are part of an organized group that College of Canada, and a JD from the University of Alberta.
respects international law. As combatants, they would evade This submission was adapted from a term paper for a course on
criminal liability as long as they do not participate in violations International Criminal Law, which was reviewed by Professor
of international law, such as genocide, crime against humanity, Joanna Harrington, JD, PhD.
or war crimes.

NOTES
1 Jessica Stern & JM Berger, ISIS: The State of 9 Dillon Hillier and Russell Hillier, p. 11. 23 Ibid., s 46(2).
Terror (London: HarperCollins, 2015), pp.44-51. 10 Mario Fumerton & Wladimir Van Wilgenurg, 24 Ibid., s 46(1)(c).
2 Craig Forcese & Leah West Sherriff. “Killing “Kurdistan’s Political Armies: The Challenge 25 Ibid., s 83.01.
Citizens: Core Legal Dilemmas in the Targeted of Unifying the Peshmerga Forces,” Carnegie 26 Ibid., s 83.01(1).
Killing Abroad of Canadian Foreign Fighters” Endowment for International Peace (16 27 Ibid., s 83.18(1).
(2016) 54 Can YB Intl Law 134, pp. 140-141; December 2015), at: https://carnegieendowment. 28 Ibid., s 83.01(1).
Christopher Anzalone. “Canadian Foreign org/2015/12/16/kurdistan-s-political-armies-chal- 29 Ibid., s 83.01.
Fighters in Iraq and Syria” (2015) 8:4 CTC lenge-of-unifying-peshmerga-forces-pub-61917. 30 Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21.
Sentinel 14. 11 Joost Jongerden. “A Spatial Perspective on 31 Prosecutor v Tadic, ICTY, Case No IT-94-
3 John Gallagher was killed in Syria while serv- Political Group Formation in Turkey after the 1-AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the
ing with the Kurdish Peoples’ Protection Unit 1971 Coup: The Kurdistan Workers’ Party of Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
(YPG) in 2015, Adnan R Khan, “Canadian Turkey (PKK)” (2017) 5:2 Kurdish Studies 134, Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995 at para 70 [Tadic].
John Gallagher killed by Islamic State Suicide pp. 144-148. 32 R Aubrey Davis III. “The Search for Combatant
Bomber,”in MacLean’s (4 November 2015), at: 12 Eric W Schoon. “Building Legitimacy: Status: Charting the Contours of Combatant
http://www.macleans.ca/news/world/canadian- International Dynamics and the Popular Status in the Age of ISIS” (2015) 223:3 Mil L
john-gallagher-killed-by-islamic-state-suicide- Evaluation of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party Rev 556, at 564.
bomber/ ; Hanna Bohman and Shaelynn Jabs (PKK) in Turkey” (2017) 28:4-5 Small Wars & 33 Ibid..
fought with the female arm of the YPG in Syria, Insurgencies 734, p. 741. 34 Dillon Hillier and Russell Hillier, pp. 71-94.
Andrea Hucnar, “Alberta Woman back in Syria 13 James M Poland. Understanding Terrorism: 35 Mark David Maxwell & Sean M Watts.
to fight ISIS militants,” CBC News (12 October Groups, Strategies, and Responses. 3rd ed. (Upper “’Unlawful Enemy Combatants’: Status, Theory
2016), at: http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2011), of Culpability, or Neither?” (2007) 5 JICJ 19, at
edmonton/alberta-woman-back-in-syria-to-fight- pp. 125-126. 20.
isis-militants-1.3800770.> 14 “Public Safety Canada: Listed Terrorist Entities,” 36 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
4 Dillon Hillier and Russell Hillier, One Soldier: at: < https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/ Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 972
A Canadian Soldier’s Fight against the Islamic cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-en.aspx#2035 art 4 (entered into force 21 October 1950) [GC
State (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2016). > III], art 4(2).
5 Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim 15 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 6(2). 37 Ibid.
Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of 16 Robert Cryer et al. An Introduction to 38 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
Jihad” (2010/2011) 35:3 International Security International Criminal Law and Procedure, 3rd of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
53, pp. 57-58. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
6 Being unpaid serves to differentiation foreign Press, 2014), pp. 53-56. (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 17512,
fighters from mercenaries, which by definition 17 Ibid., pp. 56-57. (1977) 16 ILM 1391 art 47(2)(c) (entered into
are motivated by private gain and criminals 18 Tyler Wentzell, “Canada’s Foreign Enlistment Act force 7 December 1978) [AP I], art 43.1.
under international law, Protocol Additional to and the Spanish Civil War” (2017) 80 Labour/Le 39 Ibid.
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Travail 213, at 213. 40 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 19 Foreign Enlistment Act, RSC 1985, c F-28 [FEA], 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3, Can TS 2002 No 13
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June s 3. arts 6-8 (entered into force 1 July 2002) [Rome
1977, 1125 UNTS 17512, (1977) 16 ILM 1391 20 Ibid., ss 3-5, 7, 9. Statute].
art 47(2)(c) (entered into force 7 December 1978) 21 Craig Forcese, & Ani Mamikon, “Neutrality 41 Dillon Hillier and Russell Hillier, p. 102.
[AP I]. Law, Anti-Terrorism, and Foreign Fighters: Legal 42 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
7 Kari J Bodnarchuk, Kurdistan: Region under Solutions to the Recruitment of Canadians to 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3, Can TS 2002 No 13
Siege (Minneapolis: Lerner Publications, 2000), Foreign Insurgencies” (2015) 48 UBC L Rev 305, arts 6-8 (entered into force 1 July 2002), arts 7-8.
p.10. p. 352. 43 Dillon Hillier and Russell Hillier, p. 122.
8 Ibid. 22 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 46(1).

64 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 VIEWS AND OPINIONS
J6 Imaging/CFC

Canadian Forces College Toronto

Strengthening the Canadian Armed Forces

Capacity to Address Child Soldiers
by Alan Okros

O
n 25 June 2019 at Canadian Forces College, Context
Minister of National Defence Harjit Sajjan
announced the establishment of the Dallaire
Centre of Excellence for Peace and Security.
Minister Sajjan stated that the Centre of
T he sad reality is that many conflicts around the world
involve children serving in armed groups as child soldiers.
Broadly defined, child soldiers “refers to any person below 18
Excellence’s initial focus will be to support the Canadian years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an
Armed Forces’ implementation of the Vancouver Principles armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not
on Peacekeeping and the Prevention of the Recruitment and limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks,
Use of Child Soldiers, stating that “…this practical resource porters, messengers, spies or for sexual purposes. It does not
will have real world impacts and help to protect children.” In only refer to a child who is taking or has taken a direct part
attendance, Lieutenant-General (ret’d) Roméo Dallaire stated: in hostilities.”1
“I have dedicated my life to ensuring soldiers are prepared and
children are protected in situations of armed conflict, because Underpinned by evolving International Human Rights Law
both are central to achieving peace. The establishment of the and International Humanitarian Law,2 the United Nations Security
Dallaire Centre of Excellence for Peace and Security will have Council has passed thirteen resolutions to address issues related
an impact on soldiers, on children, and on global peace and to children and armed conflict,3 as well as having encouraged
security.” This article provides the context for this initiative Member States to endorse a number of related principles and dec-
with a short summary of the Vancouver Principles; presentation larations. In November 2017, Canada hosted the UN Peacekeeping
of the concept of operations for the new Centre of Excellence; Defence Ministerial Conference leading to the articulation of the
and, a description of the contributions being made by the set of political commitments focused upon child protection in
Roméo Dallaire Child Soldier Initiative (RDCSI). peacekeeping, the Vancouver Principles, as they were referred to
by Minister Sajjan. These seventeen principles acknowledge the

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 65

 “In particular, the Paris Commitments and associated
Paris Principles (2007), which built upon the Cape
Town Principles (1997), lay out detailed guidelines for
protecting children from recruitment and use by armed
forces and armed groups, and for providing assistance
to those already involved with armed forces and armed
groups. The Safe Schools Declaration (2015) calls on
states to protect schools and universities from military
use during armed conflict. The Kigali Principles (2015)
establishes a set of commitments on the protection of
UPI/Alamy Stock Photo/W0B6JH

civilians in peacekeeping operations. Additionally, the

UN’s Sustainable Development Goals recognize the
dignity of children and their right to live free from vio-
lence and fear as a distinct priority in the international
development agenda.”4

Following the launch of the Vancouver Principles, individuals

from Global Affairs, National Defence, and Canada’s delegation to
Senator and Lieutenant-General (ret’d) Roméo Dallaire. the UN, working with representatives from endorsing States and
civil society organizations, developed implementation guidance.
unique challenges posed by child soldiers; prioritize the prevention Published concurrently with the MND’s June announcement, this
of the recruitment and use of child soldiers in UN peacekeeping guidance is intended to assist endorsing States in translating the
operations; and are intended to help ensure that all peacekeep- Vancouver Principles into national-level guidance, plans, and capa-
ers—military, police, and civilian—are prepared and directed to bilities. The objective is to ensure that police and military members
take appropriate action. Importantly, the Vancouver Principles contributing to UN missions are provided the direction, resources,
extend upon previous agreements. and the preparation required to prevent the recruitment and use of
Wa m o d o / A l a m y S t o c k P h o t o / C E 8 B J H

Child soldiers in the Sudan People’s Liberation Army.

66 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 VIEWS AND OPINIONS
CFB Kingston Base Photo

Canadian Defence Academy, Kingston, Ontario.

child soldiers; to be able to respond effectively when encountering Centre is designed to be innovative, creative, and adaptive with the
child soldiers in the context of UN peacekeeping operations; and capacity to quickly pivot to emerging issues, policy developments
to enable effective personal support post-deployment. or key updates to international frameworks, such as those expressed
through United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Children
Dallaire Centre of Excellence for Peace and Security and Armed Conflict, or the Women, Peace and Security agenda.

B ased upon MND direction and allocated resources, the

Dallaire Centre of Excellence for Peace and Security
is being established within the Canadian Defence Academy
As stated by Rear-Admiral Luc Cassivi, Commander Canadian
Defence Academy (CDA), when DCOE-PS was announced, “…
the Centre of Excellence will draw on a diversity of expertise
(CDA) to achieve initial operating capability (IOC) in 2020, and perspectives from across academia and civil society to effec-
and full operating capability (FOC) in 2021. The DCOE-PS tively fulfill its mandate. Its flexible nature will also position the
will serve as a strategic Defence asset to advance related Canadian Defence Academy to consider other emerging human
Government of Canada objectives through the enhancement of, security topics, such as sexual exploitation and abuse, conflict-
and contribution to, Defence capabilities. With a focus in the related sexual and gender-based violence, and human shields.”
first instance upon implementation of the Vancouver Principles
within the CAF, the Centre conducts research and analyses of At FOC, the Centre will have an establishment of seventeen
relevant policies, issues, perspectives, lessons learned, and best military and civilian personnel organized in three functional areas,
practices to enhance CAF operational and individual effective- and located in three cities. The Executive Director, along with
ness by contributing to concepts, doctrine, professional military staff responsible for key engagements are located in Ottawa, those
education, training, and related personnel readiness enablers. responsible for concepts are at CDA Headquarters in Kingston,
and those engaged in research are co-located at the Canadian
Recognizing the complexity of the issues involved and Forces College in Toronto. The Deputy Director Engagements
the importance of collaborative approaches, core activities and will monitor CAF/DND strategic objectives; conduct outreach
engagements are conducted internally within DND and the CAF; and engagements; contribute to interdepartmental liaison; estab-
horizontally, across associated Federal Government Departments lish grant programs; design and deliver symposia, short courses,
and Agencies; and, externally, with international organizations, and seminars on COE-related topics, as well as serving as the
Vancouver Principles endorsing nations, academic researchers, Centre’s Chief of Staff. The Deputy Director Concepts will support
civil society organizations, and other expert stakeholders. A range CAF OPIs responsible for Joint and Service concepts, doctrine,
of funding mechanisms are applied to: harness extant external training, and lessons learned by identifying lessons learned and
expertise; commission new research; engage in collaborative best practices, developing concepts, and conducting doctrinal
exchanges; and enable the development of the next generation of gap analyses against CAF operational requirements in order
scholars and National Security practitioners. Through the use of to contribute to updates or to the development of doctrine. The
flexible employment vehicles, including post-doctorate fellow- Deputy Director Research will conduct research and analysis of
ships, short-term secondments, and interchange opportunities, the current, emerging, and potential security policy areas; academic

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 67

 and professional literatures; perspectives of the national security housed at Dalhousie University, Halifax, and is dedicated to
practitioner community; and civil society discourse to identify the eradication of the use of child soldiers. The overarching
implications for CAF operational requirements and professional philosophy is as follows:
development.
The use of child soldiers is one of the farthest-reaching
As reflected in Rear-Admiral Cassivi’s reference to the and most disturbing trends in contemporary conflict.
DCOE-PS ‘flexible nature,’ the majority of individuals will be Through viewing child soldiers as a security sector
employed on a rotational basis for two-or-three-year employment concern, we work to counteract the strategic and tactical
lengths, and are thus beyond typical posting cycles for Regular advantages of child soldiers. By interrupting the reasons
Force members. The civilian personnel employment strategies for their use, we can end the recruitment and use of child
will include drawing upon policy experts from across National soldiers once and for all.5
Defence or Global Affairs; employing researchers from internal
academic faculty or Defence Research and Development Canada; A key contribution being made under the current agreement
attracting visiting faculty as Visiting Fellows and recent gradu- is to provide the CAF with valuable perspectives with respect to
ates with specific expertise for post-doctorate employment; and best practices in preparing troops to address child soldiers, as
enabling shorter-term engagements where CAF personnel, mem- well as lessons learned from those who have completed training
bers of the Public Service, or current graduate students could be and encountered child soldiers when deployed. With over 5,000
embedded within DCOE-PS to draw upon the resident expertise military members from several African Union (AU) nations hav-
and resources. ing completed courses, as well as training delivered with support
from Wounded Warriors to CAF and RCMP veterans through the
Roméo Dallaire Child Soldier Initiative Veteran Trainers to Eradicate the Use of Child Soldiers (VTECS),6
RDCSI is a leading organization world-wide in designing, deliv-

I n his June 2019 announcement, Minister Sajjan identified

that National Defence will draw upon the expertise of the
Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative (RDCSI) through a
ering, and evaluating relevant training. In his exchanges with
DCOE-PS staff, General Dallaire has emphasized two critical
points: that training must go beyond classroom delivery of factual
five-year contribution agreement to enable research and to information to the development of practical skills through realistic
identify lessons learned and best practices regarding the pre- scenarios and exercises; and, the need to validate the effective-
vention of the recruitment and use of child soldiers. RDCSI is ness of learning, including gathering perspectives from deployed
dpa picture alliance/Alamy Stock Photo /D3BGBE

A child soldier of the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) stands guard and holds a rifle in his hands in Bunia, Democratic Republic of Congo, 19 June 2003.

68 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 VIEWS AND OPINIONS
troops with respect to how they adapted techniques
when dealing with encounters with child soldiers,
or those who employ them. As one of the first sig-
nificant activities conducted under the contribution
agreement, the DCOE-PS acting-Deputy Director
Concepts attended an informative evaluation meet-
ing conducted by RDCSI in Kigali, Rwanda, with
representatives from several AU nations on their
insights and lessons learned following completion
of RDCSI designed training and deployments.

While RDCSI remains an independent not-

for-profit organization, the arrangements made
with the CAF and DND enable DCOE-PS to assist
the CAF to move forward quickly in assessing
concepts, doctrine, and training related to child
soldiers. Concurrently, the DCOE-PS research team
is conducting analyses of complementary issues,
since the issues of child soldiers are recognized to
be a sub-set of the challenges of children affected
by armed conflict and those populations encoun-
tering situations of vulnerability, usually referred
to as vulnerable populations. It is also recognized
that these topics are informed by the Women, Peace
and Security Agenda, as well as considerations of
Human Security.

Although significant work remains to be done

to ensure that CAF members are effectively pre-
pared, enabled, and supported to deal with child
soldiers, DCOE-PS is working to support CAF
Jack Picone/Alamy Stock Photo/AX3JXF

OPIs and to provide all members of Defence with

relevant references.

Dr. Alan Okros, OMM, CD, is a Professor

in the Royal Military College Department of
Defence Studies and Deputy Director Research
at the Dallaire Centre of Excellence for Peace
and Security.

A child soldier returns from the frontline in Luanda, Angola.

NOTES
1 United Nations International Children’s 2 These include, but are not limited to, the Geneva 3 UN Security Council resolutions regarding the
Emergency Fund, “The Paris Principles and Conventions (1949) and Additional Protocols I protection of children affected by armed conflict
Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed and II to the UN Geneva Conventions (1977), the include UNSCR 1261, 1314, 1379, 1460, 1539,
Forces or Armed Groups” February, 2007, Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), the 1612, 1882, 1998, 2068, 2143, 2151, 2225, 2427.
p 7; accessible at: https://www.unicef.org/ Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (1999), 4 Implementation guidance for the Vancouver
emerg/files/ParisPrinciples310107English.pdf and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on Principles accessible at: https://www.canada.
https://www.unicef.org/french/protection/files/ the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/
ParisPrincipesFrench310107.pdf Children in Armed Conflict (2000) as well as reports-publications/vancouver-principles.html,
the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of p. 6.
Children (1990) and the Covenant on the Rights 5 https://www.childsoldiers.org/
of the Child in Islam (2005). 6 https://www.childsoldiers.org/vtecs/

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 69

A i r b u s D e fe n c e a n d S p a c e / D N D

Canada’s new fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft, the Airbus CC-295.

Missing in Action: The Troubling Case of Defence

and the Election of 2019
by Martin Shadwick

T
he federal election campaign of 2019—a rather policy, and, in particular, defence policy, rarely figure prominently
testy, divisive and less than edifying affair— (or even moderately) in Canadian federal elections, the virtual
produced a curious amalgam of good news and disappearance of those public policy fields from electoral dis-
bad news for Justin Trudeau (who remained course should be a matter of grave concern and embarrassment
Prime Minister but lost his majority), Andrew for a supposed middle power that needs (and presumably still
Scheer (whose Conservative Party added more seats but failed wishes) to retain a credible presence at the global table, be it the
to defeat a government made vulnerable by an eclectic assort- G7, the United Nations (particularly if it involves an occasional
ment of self-inflicted wounds), Jagmeet Singh (who turned in seat on the Security Council), NATO or myriad other international
an impressive performance on the hustings and retained a criti- institutions. The election of only four years ago was no watershed
cal mass of New Democrat MPs while being virtually shut out in terms of foreign and defence policy discourse, but foreign
in Quebec), and Elizabeth May (whose Green Party advanced and defence policy at least managed—in part due to an excellent
in the popular vote and acquired an additional MP but was Munk Debate on foreign affairs—to register on the electoral
unable to secure a major breakthrough). Indeed, as the Globe radar screen. That the election of 2019—when the country faces
and Mail’s Campbell Clark observed, the only leader who dramatically more serious challenges in terms of trade, climate
“really triumphed” was Bloc Quebecois Leader Yves-François change, defence and international security, multilateralism and
Blanchet, who lifted “his party from the dead with a promise relationships with the United States and China—should see foreign
to speak for Quebec. The others have one main reason to be policy discourse reduced to negligible proportions and defence
pleased: It could have been worse.” policy sink below the level of a cameo appearance is supremely
ironic. There is, admittedly, more than a modicum of truth in the
If the Bloc Quebecois leader was a clear winner, a clear observation that Trumpian realities influenced how the Canadian
loser was Canadian foreign and defence policy. Although foreign foreign and defence policy discourse played out (or failed to play

70 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 COMMENTARY
In terms of the actual
campaign, the Liberal Party
stated that it would “continue to
move forward with a principled
approach that puts democracy,
human rights, international law,
and environmental protection at
the heart of foreign policy.” It
would consequently establish
the Canadian Centre for Peace,
Order, and Good Government
(“which will lend expertise and
help to people seeking to build
dpa picture alliance/Alamy Stock Photo/FM66KY

peace, advance justice, promote

human rights and democracy,
and deliver good governance”),
provide international institu-
tions such as the International
Criminal Court, the World Trade
Organization, and others, with
“additional resources to bet-
ter enforce international law”
and take a leadership role in
“ensuring the ethical use of new
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.
technology, by developing and
supporting international proto-
cols to ban the development and
use of fully autonomous weap-
ons systems.” It also pledged to
increase “Canada’s international
development assistance every
D N D p h o t o b y C o r p o r a l C o l i n T h o m p s o n , I m a g e r y Te c h n i c i a n , J o i n t Ta s k Fo r c e

year towards 2030, reflecting

our commitment to realizing
the United Nations’ Sustainable
Development Goals,” and to
improve “the way that we man-
age and deliver international
development assistance.”

To “ensure that Canada

continues to make a positive
contribution to international
peace and security, we will move
forward with new investments to
support United Nations peace-
keeping efforts—with more help
to advance the women, peace,
and security agenda; support
conflict prevention and peace-
An advanced light armoured vehicle (LAV 6.0) from the Canadian contingent of the multinational enhanced building; and respond to grave
Forward Presence Battlegroup Latvia on exercise at Camp Adazi, Latvia, 26 July 2017. human rights abuses. We will
also expand our cooperation and
training assistance—drawing on
out) in an aberrant 2019 election campaign. As Stefanie von Hlatky the expertise of the Canadian Armed Forces in responding to
asked in the waning days of the election: “Now that Canada sits natural disasters and humanitarian crises—to help other countries
uncomfortably in US President Donald Trump’s shadow, have at greater risk of disasters due to climate change.” As part of a
candidates decided it’s safest to be evasive about foreign policy?” “responsible approach to security” and “to build on the important

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 71

 In Canada’s north, “we
will continue to move forward
toward a future where northern
and Arctic people are thriving,
strong, and safe. We will work
closely with our partners through
the Arctic and Northern Policy
framework to make this a reality,
and to protect Canada’s rights and
sovereignty in the Arctic, and to
strengthen continental defence,
we will move forward with bet-
ter-developed surveillance and
rapid-response capabilities.”
The Liberal defence plank also
Au k A r c h i v e / A l a m y S t o c k P h o t o / R D 9 2 A 4

pledged to “move forward with

a new framework governing how
Canada gathers, manages, and
uses defence intelligence,” and,
“to ensure that Canada’s biggest
and most complex defence pro-
curement projects are delivered
on time and with greater trans-
parency to Parliament,” move
forward with the creation of
The Honourable Andrew Scheer, leader of the Conservative Party. Defence Procurement Canada.

The defence component

of the Liberal campaign plat-
form was unorthodox in certain
respects. Typically, the defence
planks of incumbent govern-
ments offer relatively little in
the way of new initiatives, but
provide staunch, and sometimes
voluminous, reaffirmations of
their existing policy statements
and fulsome recitations of their
force structure, procurement,
and other accomplishments.
The Liberal defence plank, in
contrast, had a decidedly modest
UPI/Alamy Stock Photo/2A4EFRA

word count, did not explic-

itly reference the 2017 policy
statement—Strong, Secure,
Engaged—and forewent mention
of, for example, the ordering of
the sixth Arctic Offshore Patrol
Ship (thereby fulfilling a 2015
campaign pledge), the selection
The Honourable Jagmeet Singh, leader of the New Democratic Party. of the Type 26 frigate to meet the
Canadian Surface Combatant
requirement, and the decision to
contributions our Armed Forces members have made to critical acquire 360 combat support Light Armoured Vehicles to replace
missions around the world, we will move forward with expand- aging M113s and earlier-generation LAVs.
ing Canada’s role in multilateral organizations—like the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations—and will Although the Conservative’s overall platform was not rolled
make sure that our Armed Forces have everything they need to out until very late in the campaign, the core of its defence plank
continue to do their job well.” had been unveiled in May 2019, as Murray Brewster notes,

72 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 COMMENTARY
peacekeeping mission to secure
the borders of Ukraine,” and
“diversify” Canada’s trading
partners. To “make sure that
foreign aid is only spent on the
countries that need it most,” the
party also pledged to “reprioritize
Canada’s foreign aid budget and
cut overall aid by 25 [percent].”
The latter, arguably, was the
only foreign policy pledge, by
dpa picture alliance/Alamy Stock Photo/JD0MFM

any party, that generated even

a modicum of attention on the
campaign.

The Conservatives pledged

to expedite the replacement of
the CF-18, acquire a second
interim supply ship and, since
“…submarine capability is vital
to protecting Canada’s vast coast-
lines, particularly in the Arctic,”
The Honourable Elizabeth May, leader of the Green Party. to replace the four Victoria-class
submarines. It also pledged to
“depoliticize” the defence pro-
curement system and to provide “focused [defence
procurement] leadership at the highest levels of the
Canadian government” by restoring “the Cabinet
Committee on Defence Procurement” and creating a
“Defence Procurement Secretariat within the Privy
Council Office”, to “enter discussions with the
United Sates to join the Ballistic Missile Defence
program and modernize the NORAD alliance,”
and to enhance—albeit without much detail—the
protection of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic.

On the CF-18 replacement front, the

Conservatives argued that “Justin Trudeau’s ill-
T h e Ca n a d i a n Pr e s s / G r a h a m H u g h e s / 2 2 0 4 9 3 6 8

considered commitment to run an ‘open’ fighter

jet competition while excluding the F-35 has left
Canada’s national defence vulnerable. He has
repeatedly compounded his errors, first by invent-
ing an alleged ‘capability gap’ that no defence
expert agreed existed, then promising to purchase
18 [F/A-18E/F Super Hornets] on an ‘interim’
basis, and finally agreeing to purchase a couple-
dozen 40-year-old [F/A-18A/B Hornets] from
Australia.” Where “Justin Trudeau has failed, we
will act immediately. We will select a replace-
The Honourable Yves-François Blanchet, leader of the Bloc Quebecois Party.
ment for the CF-18s in 2020, and have them enter
service by 2025.” For the RCN, a Conservative
government would “negotiate a contract with Davie
during “the first of a series of election-framing speeches” by party Shipyards to [convert] a second interim supply ship. We can-
leader Andrew Scheer. In pursuit of “more strength abroad,” the not continue to rely on other countries to sustain operations
Conservative platform signaled an intent to “revitalize important by both our Atlantic and Pacific fleets and around the globe.
relationships with democratic countries” by ‘reclaiming’ “Canada’s Canada requires two Auxiliary [Oiler] Replenishment vessels
role in NORAD, NATO, the Commonwealth, La Francophonie, to ensure our Navy can operate effectively abroad as it awaits
and the Five Eyes,” provide “military defensive aid to Ukraine’s the construction of the Joint Support Ships.”
military,” and “push for Canadian leadership in a United Nations

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 73

 better for Canadians in uniform and for the [defence of]
our country,” an NDP “government will make sure that
our troops have the equipment”—largely unspecified—
“training, and support they need to do the difficult and
dangerous work we ask them to undertake. We will
ensure that funding supports our national defence and
international commitments, with a renewed priority of
advancing multilateral peacekeeping initiatives around
the world.” At home, “New Democrats are committed
to bringing our search and rescue response times up to
international standards, and ensuring that our capabili-
ties are sufficient to meet the needs of the North.” In
addition, an NDP government “will keep shipbuilding
procurement on-time and on-budget, and ensure that the
work is spread out fairly across the country. Fighter jet
replacement will be based on a free and fair competi-
tion to make sure that we get the best fighters to meet
Canada’s needs, at the best price.” An NDP government
would “oppose the privatization of services on Canadian
[Armed] Forces bases across the country.”

In the international relations and defence component

of its platform, the Green Party pledged its adherence
to the principles of multilateralism, its commitment to
“building and keeping peace (including ‘post-conflict
work to strengthen civil society and democratic insti-
tutions around the world’) and expanding Canada’s
G o v e r n m e n t o f Ca n a d a

[peacekeeping] role internationally, and its support for

the “the United Nations’ doctrine of the duty to pro-
tect…” It further pledged to re-establish the Canadian
International Development Agency (CIDA) and increase
Canada’s overseas development assistance budget to
reach the goal of 0.7 percent of Gross National Income.
It cautioned that “not since end of the Cold War…has
In its 2019 campaign, the NDP argued that “Canadians are global security seemed so precarious,” adding that climate change
proud of our role in the world, and they want a government that will was contributing to this “disruption.”
make the right choices to help people—but under Conservative and
Liberal governments, decades of cynical politicking and cuts have The Green Party “understands that Canadian
meant that Canada is often on the wrong side of important global [military] personnel are appreciated worldwide for their degree
issues.” New Democrats “believe that Canadian interests are best of training, quality leadership at all levels and for the can-do and
served by a strong and principled foreign policy based on human cooperative attitude they bring to international operations. Canada
rights, multilateralism and the best interests of global peace and now needs a general purpose, combat capable force that can
security.” To that end, “Canada will be a force for peace. We will provide realistic options to the government in domestic security
support nuclear disarmament, recommit to peacekeeping, make emergencies, continental defence and international operations. This
sure that Canadian-made weapons are not fuelling conflict and includes protecting Canada’s northern borders as Arctic ice melts.
human rights abuses abroad” and commit “to boosting Canada’s A Green government will ensure that the Canadian Armed Forces
international development assistance, with the goal of contributing are prepared to serve in both traditional and new capacities.” The
0.7 percent of our Gross National Income to international aid.” party also pledged to ensure “a consistent capital investment plan
with stable funding so that service personnel have the equipment
The party’s defence plank acknowledged that “Canada’s mili- and training they need to fulfill an expanded mandate” (includ-
tary is responsible for three incredibly important roles—defending ing “naval and coast guard vessels that can operate in the Arctic
Canada, protecting Canadians at home, and contributing to a more Ocean, fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft, and helicopters”)
stable, peaceful world through operations abroad,” but charged that and to “normalize the deployment of military personnel to protect
“decades of Liberal and Conservative cuts and mismanagement” civilians and communities from extreme forest fires, flooding
have left the military with “outdated equipment, inadequate support and storms caused by climate change, and new pollution threats
and an unclear strategic mandate.” Arguing that “we need to do in Canada’s north”.

74 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 COMMENTARY
Although additional insights into the Green Party’s troika of work closely with our allies to maintain a peaceful international
non-military, quasi-military and military responsibilities would order” but offered no specifics on defence policy.
have been useful, the Party’s little-noticed Costing Notes brought
insightful value to its campaign platform. The Costing Notes, for At a time of uncertainty in the domestic political environment
example, observed that “Canada’s overall economic health is good. and at a time when, as Rob Huebert has reminded us, “the most
Relatively low unemployment, low rates of interest and inflation, dangerous geopolitical environment we’ve seen in our lifetime”
an excellent debt-to-GDP ratio, large but seemingly controllable requires “the clearest, most strategic thinking since the end of the
budget deficits, still-good export markets for various commodi- Second World War, in terms of how we do Canadian security,”
ties and other indicators show an economy doing moderately how are Canadian defence policy and the Canadian Forces likely
well.” However, the Green Party “has concerns that under these to fare? The Liberal’s 2017 policy statement—Strong, Secure,
promising statistics lurk substantial risks. Prudence requires that Engaged—may still provide a reasonably solid foundation for
government make allowance for these, and be prepared quickly the defence of Canada, but clearly needs to be revisited, and,
to react wherever possible.” where appropriate, modified or enhanced in light of an even more
challenging and less predictable geo-strategic environment. As
In terms of defence, “there is substantial uncertainty around in 2017, however, questions will surround the timely availability
government’s optimal response to rapidly shifting threats to inter- of adequate capital and other funding. The answers, as always,
national security and defence of the nation. Rising international will reflect political will, competing fiscal priorities, and the
tensions and reductions in control of development and deployment health of the economy, but the minority government dynamic
of nuclear armaments are a source of significant risk. Canada’s could raise new issues. If, as some observers speculate, fiscal
commitments to NATO are firm but underfunded. It is not clear discipline is sacrificed in a bid to garner the political support of
how or if a Canadian government should best meet them in a time another party (or parties), will that inevitably siphon money from
of rapidly shifting requirements. Should international insecurity defence in a country whose politicians are well aware that the
continue to rise, the government may need to devote more resources public constituency for defence is weak? Or might DND actu-
to and significantly shorten timelines for military procurement.” ally benefit financially if, in this minority environment, certain
Moreover, “the disruption caused by climate change is a threat capital projects can be “marketed” as middle class job-creating,
multiplier. If not brought within the 1.5 [degree] limit, tens of economic wealth-creating and industrial and technology base-
millions of people will be displaced from the places they currently enhancing mega-projects?
live to places where tens of millions of other people already live.
The potential for conflict is apparent. It is not clear how or if the A second question, clearly not unrelated to the first, is how
Canadian Armed Forces might be best deployed in such conflict.” to deepen and broaden public/attentive public interest in and
knowledge of defence and international security issues and thereby
Climate change “presents particular risks to Canada’s north. help to reinvigorate the discourse on those issues—and not just
Other countries, notably the United States and Russia, do not accept at election time. Some adjustments, such as routinely holding a
Canada’s claims of territorial sovereignty over waters in the Arctic Munk or Munk-style debate on foreign (and by extension defence)
Archipelago. Given the loss of Arctic sea ice, it would be impru- policy during election campaigns should, at least in theory, be
dent for the government of Canada to fail to plan for increased achievable. The decision of Justin Trudeau to eschew the proposed
surveillance and interception of unpermitted foreign shipping in 2019 Munk Debate on foreign policy, thereby leading to its cancel-
the north, and for deterrence of oil and gas exploration activities lation by the organizers, was perhaps understandable but deeply
by foreign companies and governments. Increased expenditures, regrettable. Elevating the country’s knowledge base and gener-
not shown in this [proposed] budget, will be required.” ating well-informed, meaningful and year-round discourse with
respect to issues of defence and international security, however,
In its platform, the resurgent Bloc Quebecois drew particu- is a far more ambitious goal and will require much more vigorous
lar attention to the need for continuity of employment at Davie and sustained action—and no little imagination—from a host of
Shipbuilding. To that end, it urged that Davie be designated as actors, both governmental and non-governmental. Exceptionally
the third shipyard under the national shipbuilding strategy, that difficult? Yes, but the status quo is untenable and unsupportable.
the firm receive a fair share of federal shipbuilding contracts, and
that a second supply ship be ordered from the firm. The People’s Martin Shadwick has taught Canadian Defence Policy at
Party of Canada, which failed to elect any of its candidates, argued York University for many years. He is a former editor of Canadian
that “Canada needs a common-sense foreign policy focused on the Defence Quarterly, and he is the resident Defence Commentator
security and prosperity of Canadians, not an ideological approach for the Canadian Military Journal.
that compromises our interests.” The PPC pledged to “continue to

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 75

 BOOK REVIEWS

Collapse of (locally-labelled POC), which did not

a Country necessarily provide safety (covered in
other chapters).
by Nicholas Coghlan
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017 Ambassador Coghlan was
283 pages, $39.00
familiar with the historical and
ISBN 978-0-7735-5126-8
physical landscape, as well as being
Reviewed by Roy Thomas the “Head of Office,” a title used to

C
conceal ambassadorial duties in both
ollapse of a Country Khartoum and Juba, in the face of
provides some ratio- the downsizing of Canada’s Foreign
nale as to why the Service. Although on arrival in Juba
present Canadian Nicholas found his “embassy” was in
Government has failed a garage, he states early in his book
to deploy ‘military elements’ to a that the substance of his work was
UN mission in Africa as promptly more important than any title or trap-
as promised. This book accounts pings. Ambassador Coghlan’s role
for why helicopters, not ‘boots on was to ‘try to figure out the politi-
the ground,’ were Canada’s contri- cal scene,” as well as to provide the
bution to Mali, where the United oversight of over 100 million dollars
Nations Multidimensional Integrated in Canadian humanitarian and devel-
Stabilization Mission in Mali opment aid. Communications were
(MINUSMA) has over 11,000 sol- a problem… In South Sudan, there
diers, not counting the French. In the were no land lines, only cell phones.
case of South Sudan, an even larger The Embassy’s means for contacting
UN force of soldiers, including tanks Ottawa are an embarrassment to read
and 2000 police, did not prevent about. There were almost no roads,
collapse. ‘Boots on the ground’ do except in towns and also from Juba to
not necessarily translate into either success or stability. Mali Kenya. The United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS)
and South Sudan have something in common. Canadians are was used by the Ambassador to go almost anywhere outside the
advised not to travel to either. Ten Canadian soldiers serve in capital, to any South Sudan destination. There are maps on the
the South Sudan under the auspices of Operation Soprano, and covers of this book that are very useful for reader situational
the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has awareness, as are the three pages dedicated to maps. Two maps
suffered 55 fatalities to date. depict what we might consider a form of gerrymandering, when
the President expanded the ten Provinces into 28 provinces.
Collapse of a Country is a memoir written by Canada’s first
official representative to South Sudan upon that entity becoming Ambassador Coghlan provides some additional facts.
the 193rd sovereign state to join the UN in 2011. Ambassador “Southerners,” i.e. South Sudanese, were in the Khartoum
Nicholas Coghlan was well qualified for this appointment in the Government (AKA, the enemy). South Sudan did have a source
new capital, Juba. He had been the sole Canadian diplomatic of revenue from the oil fields found primarily in Unity and Upper
presence in the capital of the Sudan, Khartoum, from 2000 until Nile provinces. That oil reached the sea through the Sudan, which
2003. As outlined by Coghlan, Big Men seeking political power charged a “fixed passage” fee, which, in times of low prices for
at any price contributed to the demise of peace in the fledgling oil, substantially lowered the government’s revenue stream. With
state within two years of its birth. an estimated 180 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in
country, there was substantial ‘tied’ money coming into the Sudan,
Ambassador Coghlan was an ‘audio witness’ to the clash that not to mention a significantly well-off foreign presence. There
sparked outright war between the Dinka supporters of one Big Man, were also refugees coming in from the two areas which had not
the President, Salva Kiir, and Nuer supporters of the next Biggest been allowed to join the “South,” where fighting continued with
Man, Vice President, Riek Machar, in Juba, just before Christmas, the Sudanese government. Fortunately for the reader, there is an
2013. The book’s prologue testifies to what Coghlan heard and excellent chronology of four pages in this book, as well as eight
first reported to Ottawa on 16 December 2013. Big Men seeking pages of acronyms, such as for “POC” in context. Further, many
power were the cause of the conflict, and the resort to weapons is of Coghlan’s insights are well-indexed.
no surprise in a country which ‘our man on the ground’ described
as a “…lawless wasteland where all that matters is your ethnicity The situation Coghlan faced during his tenure is captured
and the calibre of your weapon.” Recent history, demographics, in the acronym list. The simple acronym for the Sudan People’s
and geography, combined with an almost-complete lack of infra- Liberation Movement, (SPLM) founded in 1983 by John Garang as
structure all played roles in the Dinka/Nuer civil war that followed. the political wing of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, (SPLA)
There are mentions of other smaller tribes who either had to fight has several modifiers, starting with the states that did not join the
(Chapter 4, The Murle War), or flee to an UN-protected enclave new country, the SPLA (N) and the SPLM (N). Then there is the
SPLM-DC, as well as the SPLM/A-10. The latter is often referred

76 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019

 BOOK REVIEWS
to simply as the “10.” The South Sudan Liberation Movement/ There is no happy ending. There is no suggestion for suc-
Army (SSLA) which resisted integration into the SPLM and SPLA cess. No ‘good guy’ is seen on the horizon, only more villains
until 2013, is a very similar acronym. and victims. Only retirement could have permitted publication of
these memoirs in this easy-to-read but difficult-to-digest memoir
The Ambassador did his best to see as much of the coun- of being our first man in Juba.
try as possible, especially where Canadian aid or development
dollars were at work. This involved some risk, as he tells us in Major (ret’d) Roy Thomas, MSC, CD, MA, was awarded
the chapter labelled, “Maybe You Should Leave.” A UNHAS Force Commander Commendations for distinguished service in
helicopter had landed Coghlan and an accompanying NGO team both the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the
close to the village of Leer. No crowds rushed out to greet them, United Nations Multinational Interception Force (UNMIF). A
as was the norm when a helicopter landed. Instead, a surprising veteran of Canadian Forces service in seven UN mission areas,
silence greeted the team, and it was interspersed with gunfire. No he has also served tours in the NDHQ Planning Directorate
wonder… The village had just been assaulted. The leader of the (NATO and J3 Contingency Plans). Roy has written about his
attackers used the words that give this chapter its title. Mopping UN experiences, particularly about his nine months as Senior
up was still ongoing when the helicopter departed. UN Military Observer, Sector Sarajevo, 1993–1994, and he has
testified at four separate International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) trials.

Rise and Kill First: The Secret in the second case, Israel genuinely feared an Arab attack was
History of Israel’s Targeted about to occur, and so, elected to pre-empt.
Assassinations The Israeli assassination program had its genesis in the tar-
by Ronen Bergman geted killings of British troops and officials, and Arabs, by two
New York: Random House, 2018 Jewish terrorist groups, the Irgun and the Lehi, before the State
xxiv + 753 pages, $47.00 (hardcover)
of Israel came into being in 1948. From this point of departure,
ISBN: 978-1-4000-6971-2
Bergman devotes most of his attention to describing, in consider-
Reviewed by R. Geoffrey St. John able detail, a number of the more important assassinations since

I
the establishment of the State of Israel, and their consequences,
n its brief history as a sometimes good for Israel, and
nation, Israel has relied sometimes bad for Israel.
heavily on targeted
killing—assassination— Some key points brought out
for its security. Infrequent by Bergman merit particular atten-
headlines, like those referring to tion, although he could have placed
the killing of a key Hamas arms more stress upon them. It is insuf-
dealer in Dubai in 2010,1 only ficiently appreciated that, unlike
hint at the scale of the program. regular armies, many if not most
The book’s author is an Israeli terrorist groups do not have struc-
investigative reporter who has tured, agreed succession plans and
leveraged his extensive contacts well-groomed individuals ready to
within the Israeli intelligence and take over immediately should their
defence communities to produce current leaders die. More likely is a
this narrative. The result is reve- period of turbulence and diminished
latory, filling a gap in Middle East operational capacity as new would-
historiography. be leaders compete for command,
and as the newly-emerged leader
The assassination campaign endeavours to cement his control
should be viewed in the larger con- of the group’s members and tries
text of Israel’s broad security policy, to learn his operational business.2
which might also be summed up as And also not well-appreciated is
‘rise up and kill him first.’ Twice the fact that the assassination of
Israel has destroyed nuclear facili- a leader, despite considerable
ties in Arab countries (Iraq 1981, security measures, leads surviving
Syria 2007) to prevent them from members to view their comrades
making nuclear weapons (no bad suspiciously—which one provided
thing, in my view). In both the 1956 to the Israelis the intelligence on
and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars, Israel the leader’s whereabouts that led
‘pulled the trigger’ first—although to his killing?3 Finally, the amount

Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019 77

 BOOK REVIEWS
of time and energy required to remain safely hidden from Israeli and (sometimes) strategic impacts of each operation. Rather, he
assassins is time and energy not devoted to planning and execut- simply asserts: “On numerous occasions, it was targeted killing
ing attacks. The assassination of Hizballah’s operations chief, that saved Israel from very grave crises.”6 Does targeted killing
Imad Mughniyeh, in downtown Damascus in 2008—virtually work at least well enough to justify itself, practically speak-
‘under the noses’ of Syrian security—sent the clear message that ing? Meir Dagan, the head of Israel’s Mossad for eight years,
Israel’s enemies are not safe from attack anywhere, and hence, actually considered targeted killings to be morally preferable to
must devote much effort merely to staying alive.4 war, although it is hard to identify just what war or wars (if any)
have been prevented by the assassinations; and in some cases they
Bergman does not make an estimate about the future of Israel’s have exacerbated conflict.7
targeted killing campaign, perhaps because he sees no evidence
that it has ended. We do not know if some of the ongoing Israeli Still, that Israel has apparently persisted with assassinations
Air Force strikes on targets in the Gaza Strip, in Syria, and in the to this day leads one to conclude that the Israeli leadership consid-
Sinai Desert of Egypt are targeted killings. But it would be, I ers the campaign has worked well enough, despite some glaring
believe, most surprising if none of the Israeli missiles had a jihad- failures and some dire outcomes, to warrant a continuation of the
ist leader’s name on it. (Readers may be surprised to learn that killing. Israel—and its enemies—will continue to play according
these Israeli attacks number in the many dozens, perhaps several to ‘big boy’ rules. Bergman’s book spells out these rules.
hundred, over the past decade or so, including reportedly about
a hundred attacks in the Sinai.)5 Colonel (ret’d) R. Geoffrey St. John, MSM, CD, of the
Intelligence Branch, was Canadian Defence Attaché to Israel
Nor does Bergman make a detailed global judgement about from 2004 to 2008.
the strategic impact of the campaign, as opposed to the tactical

NOTES
1 pp. 610-621 4 pp. xxiii, 328, 595-604, 602 6 p. xxiii
2 pp. 323, 336, 500 5 https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-carrying- 7 p. xx
3 pp. 336 out-secret-air-strike-campaign-in-sinai-to-help-
egypt-report/
D N D p h o t o G N 2 019 - I 0 4 5 - 12 7 b y C o r p o r a l M . D. L e b l a n c

Pilots from 403 Helicopter Operational Training Squadron (HOTS), participate in Exercise Scorpion Sting, a challenging final training
exercise consisting mainly of long range patrolling through difficult terrain, at the Infantry School Combat Training Centre, Canadian
Forces Base Gagetown, 3 July 2019.

78 Canadian Military Journal  •  Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2019