Tia Safety
Tia Safety
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SIMATIC safety related programming with STEP 7 Safety in the TIA Portal
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1. Overview of Standards
2. Product Overview
SITRAIN
Training for Industry
3. Operating Principle-Safety
Configuring and
Programming with 5. Sensor / Actuator Connection
TIA Safety Advanced
7. Response Times
8. Acceptance
9. Service/Diagnostics
Location:
12. Training and Support
This document was produced for training purposes.
SIEMENS assumes no responsibility for its contents.
The reproduction, transmission or use of this document or its
contents is not permitted without express written authority.
Offenders will be liable to damages.
Contents 1
1. Overview of Standards and Directives ................................................................. 1-3
1.1. EU Legal Structure ................................................................................................................ 1-4
1.2. Who is a Manufacturer? ........................................................................................................ 1-5
1.3. What are Directives? ............................................................................................................. 1-6
1.4. Selecting the Directive(s) ...................................................................................................... 1-7
1.5. International Safety Standards.............................................................................................. 1-8
1.5.1. Harmonized Standards ....................................................................................................... 1-10
1.5.2. The Hierarchy of Safety Standards ..................................................................................... 1-11
1.6. "Labeler" Example Machine ................................................................................................ 1-12
1.7. Implementing the Machinery Directive for the "Labeler" ..................................................... 1-13
1.8. Risk Assessment according to EN ISO 12100 ................................................................... 1-14
1.8.1. Step 1: Define Machinery Boundaries ................................................................................ 1-15
1.8.1.1. Boundaries of the Example Machine "Labeler" .................................................................. 1-16
1.8.2. Step 2: Identify Hazards...................................................................................................... 1-17
1.8.2.1. Possible Hazards ................................................................................................................ 1-18
1.8.2.2. Exercise 1: Identifying Hazards on the Machine................................................................. 1-19
1.8.3. Step 3: Estimate the Risk.................................................................................................... 1-20
1.8.3.1. Risk ..................................................................................................................................... 1-21
1.8.3.2. Severity ............................................................................................................................... 1-22
1.8.3.3. Possibility of Occurrence .................................................................................................... 1-23
1.8.4. Step 4: Assess the Risk ...................................................................................................... 1-24
1.8.4.1. Exercise 2: Assessing the Risk (Lifting Device).................................................................. 1-25
1.8.4.2. Exercise 3: Assessing the Risk (Labeler) ........................................................................... 1-26
1.8.4.3. Exercise 4: Assessing the Risk (Robot) .............................................................................. 1-27
1.8.5. Summary ............................................................................................................................. 1-28
1.9. Risk Mitigation according to EN ISO 12100........................................................................ 1-29
1.9.1. Step 1: Safe Design ............................................................................................................ 1-30
1.9.1.1. Exercise 5: Measures for Safe Design ............................................................................... 1-31
1.9.2. Step 2: Technical Protective Measures .............................................................................. 1-32
1.9.2.1. Exercise 6: Possible Technical Protective Measures ......................................................... 1-33
1.9.2.2. Exercise 7: Evaluating Technical Measures ....................................................................... 1-34
1.9.2.3. Designing the Architecture of the Safety Functions Grading Risks by means of
Safety Levels....................................................................................................................... 1-35
1.9.2.4. Requirements according to EN ISO 13849-1 ..................................................................... 1-36
1.9.2.5. Meaning of the Safety Levels.............................................................................................. 1-37
1.9.2.6. What does a Safety Level say? .......................................................................................... 1-38
1.9.2.7. "Safe" Machine, Certificates for Safety Devices ................................................................. 1-39
1.9.2.8. The Principle of Safety Systems ......................................................................................... 1-40
1.9.2.9. Exercise 8: Requirements of the Safety Functions ............................................................. 1-41
1.9.2.10. Checking Safety Functions ................................................................................................. 1-42
1.9.3. Step 3: User Information about Residual Risks .................................................................. 1-43
1.9.4. Summary ............................................................................................................................. 1-44
1.10. Verification .......................................................................................................................... 1-45
1.10.1. Conformity Assessment ...................................................................................................... 1-46
1.10.2. Contents of the EC Declaration of Conformity .................................................................... 1-47
Safety Requirements
Article 95 of the EC Treaty Article 137 of the EC Treaty
(free movement of goods) (work safety)
Other machinery-
Individual directive
related directives Machinery
Use of work
such as Directive
equipment
EMC Directive (2006/42/EC)
(89/655/EC)
(2014/30/EU)
Manufacturer Users
Legally, two topic complexes need to be considered with regard to operation of machinery: work
safety and the internal market.
Internal Market:
When machinery is put into circulation in Europe via the internal market, such machinery must
fulfill the Machinery Directive. The Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC currently applies. It
superseded the previous MD 98/37/EC.
The EFTA states and also Switzerland and Turkey apply the Machinery Directive.
The current Machinery Directive focuses more on machines. The current Machinery Directive
does not consider technical facilities such as (aerial) cableways or medical equipment.
Harmonized Standards:
Harmonized standards are European standards and are drawn up by the organizations CEN,
CENELEC and ETSI by order of the European Commission and EFTA, that is, they have a
standardization mandate. Harmonization of standards is announced in the Official Journal of the
European Union.
Important: when applying harmonized standards, machine manufacturers only need to prove that
they have fulfilled the requirements of the harmonized standards, in which case conformity is
presumed.
... has the responsibility for the design and manufacture of machinery that falls under the
1 directive, and who places the machinery on the market in his own name. This is generally the
mechanical equipment manufacturer and plant builder.
... changes the purpose of use of the machinery or carries out a functional expansion. This can
2 be the plant operator or a company mandated by the plant operator that carries out
modernization work.
... imports machinery from a third country and is therefore legally obliged to assume the
3 manufacturer's obligations defined in the directive. This is generally the importer.
As one might possibly assume, the manufacturer is not only the one who builds the machine. The
machinery operator or anyone carrying out modernization work is also regarded as the
manufacturer if they change the machinery or extend its range of functions.
An example will clarify this: features are added to a machine or the originally intended throughput
of a machine is increased. New hazards can arise as a result. The importer introducing
machinery to Europe from Asia, for example, must also ensure that the machinery complies with
national legislation. The importer therefore also assumes the legal responsibility of the
manufacturer.
CE Directives
They are passed by the EC and must be implemented by the Member States into
national laws. CE is basically a technical passport (mandatory for export within
the EC)
CE
CE is the symbol for the free movement of products within the European Union. Formerly, it was
the abbreviation for Communauté Européenne, Comunidad Europea, Comunidade Europeia and
Comunità Europea.
the product formally falls within the area of validity of this directive
the product entails risks which are described in the basic requirements of this directive
information regarding the allocation to a directive can also be obtained from knowing
under which directive an associated product standard is listed as harmonized standard
Sector-specific rules have priority over general rules
instruments
Cableways
equipment
Toy safety
Machinery
Measuring
Directives
Pressure
Outdoor
Further
EMC
do not fall under a
specific directive
Europe:
EN
USA/Canada: e.g. EN 1050
EN 775 Japan:
UL(C), ANSI, CSA
JIS
Europa:
International
IEC, ISO
Australia:
e.g. IEC 61508,
IEC 62061, ISO 13849 C-Tick, A-Tick
■Crucial factors are the governing regulations and standards at the location where
the machine or system is used.
UL
Underwriters Laboratories: Certification organization for product safety in the USA and Canada
ANSI
American National Standards Institute: (US) American agency for industrial procedure standards
CSA
Canadian Standards Association: issues a product mark of conformity which proclaims the
compliance, for example, with ISO, ANSI, ULC
IEC
International Electrotechnical Commission: is an international standardization committee situated
in Geneva for electrotechnical and electronics standards. Several standards are developed
together with ISO.
ISO
International Organization for Standardization: is the international association of standardization
organizations
EN
European standards
JIS
Japan Industrial Standard: Japanese industrial standard (comparable to DIN)
C-Tick
Marking of the ACA (Australian Communications Authority), somewhat comparable to the
CE-marking
A-Tick
Marking of the Australian Telecommunication Standards, comparable to the EMC Directive
CEN
European Committee for Standardization, Brussels
CENELEC
European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization, Brussels (→ EN = European
standards)
DIN
German Institute for Standardization, Berlin
VDE
Association for Electrical, Electronic and Information Technologies, Frankfurt am Main
Examples (Germany):
• DIN EN IEC 62061
• DIN EN ISO 13849
Application Non-application
of harmonized standards of harmonized standards
Harmonized Standards
• The application of harmonized standards is voluntary!
• They are published in the Official Journal of the European Union under at least one directive
• All Member States transpose them into national standards without change
• They document the current state of the art
• They clarify the abstractly formulated protection aims of the directives
• They facilitate proof of conformity
• They have a precisely defined scope of application which describes the application area and
the environment.
Design principles
and
basic concepts for machines
Lifting device
Robot
W M1
Labeler
M2
V1
V2
Service control
center
The necessary phases on the way to a safe machine can be shown with a
process chain.
Risk assessment
Risk analysis
Step 2 Identify hazards
Risk assessment
User groups
• Training, experience, skills
• Other persons on the machinery
Physical Boundaries
• Dimensions of the machinery
• Interfaces
- to the power supply
- to upstream and downstream machines (if the machinery has been conceived for operation
in combination with other machinery)
- to cleaning systems
- to humans, etc.
• Intended workplaces and motion spaces
• Properties such as the dimensions and mass of the machinery
Time Boundaries
• Presumable service life
• Total number of revolutions
• Number of load cycles
• Filling or discharge operations
• Work cycles or operating hours, etc.
Note:
Data is needed when defining testing and maintenance measures and intervals.
Risk assessment
Example excerpt from the machine’s description:
Intended use
• Machine for labeling a package up to a maximum 500 mm x 500 mm and maximum 10kg
• Feed-in a workpiece using a hydraulic lifting device
• Removal using a 360°rotatable robot with gripping device
Application boundaries
• Power supply: 400 V 3~ 50 Hz
• Indoor use (IP54)
• Temperature range: -15°to +50°C
• Labeler: max. 50Nm W M1
• Lifting device: max. 10kg
• Robot: radius 2x2m
User groups
• Only specialist personnel, no laypersons M2
V1
• Trainees only under supervision by
specialists
Time boundaries V2
150,000 operating hours Control center
Physical boundaries
• The machine does not include loading aids
• Space required by persons handling the machine
Application Boundaries
• Use for the intended purpose
• Reasonably foreseeable incorrect use
• For example, properties and quantities of substances, materials, consumables or workpieces
• Operating parameters such as pressure, temperature, speed, power, etc.
• Intended or foreseeable areas of use (industry, household, etc.)
• Ambient conditions
Group of Persons
• Non-technical person
• Operator
• Maintenance personnel
• Machine setter
Note:
A certain qualification level must not be used as justification for a possibly lower technical
protection level.
Note:
Not all boundaries of the machine can be defined in the first assessment of the machine, e.g., the
question as to presumable useful life of safety-related parts does not arise until appropriate
measures for their use have been determined. The boundaries of the machine must be specified
in the operating instructions. To avoid foreseeable incorrect use, it is advisable to use exclusive
formulations if no technical measures can be taken against them.
Risk assessment
Risk assessment
When identifying hazardous locations, you must always consider the lifecycle phases and
operating modes of a machine. Example: in the series production lifecycle phase, hazards in
the manual and automatic modes can differ because the machine is operated at different
speeds depending on the mode of operation.
Risk assessment
W M1
M2
V1
V2
Control center
Risk assessment
Extensive estimation of the probability and the extent of damage caused by the
hazard situations determined:
Step 1 Define machinery boundaries • The associated risk is estimated for every
hazard.
1.8.3.1. Risk
Risk assessment
RISK
is the combination of
Severity Probability of
of occurrence of
damage damage
1.8.3.2. Severity
Risk assessment
When evaluating the extent of damage, you must generally distinguish between reversible and
irreversible damage.
Risk assessment
Risk assessment
The key question: Is the (original) risk of each hazardous location justifiable or do
measures have to be taken?
Risk assessment
Severity Probability
Probability of occurrence
A B C D
Severity of harm Very likely Likely Improbable Remotely
conceivable
Irreversible:
- Death
4 - Loss of an eye
- Loss of an arm
Irreversible:
3 - Broken limbs
- Loss of fingers
Reversible:
2 Treatment by a doctor
necessary
Reversible:
1 First aid necessary
With the risk detected on the example machine, you can determine a defined value for the risk in
the risk graph. By means of suitable measures, the risk should optimally be shifted from the red
area to the green area.
Risk assessment
Severity Probability
M1
Probability of occurrence
A B C D
Severity of harm Very likely Likely Improbable Remotely Press > Crushing, Cutting off
conceivable
Irreversible:
- Death
4 - Loss of an eye
- Loss of an arm
Irreversible:
3 - Broken limbs
- Loss of fingers
Reversible:
2 Treatment by a doctor
necessary
Reversible:
1 First aid necessary
Risk assessment
Severity Probability
Probability of occurrence
A B C D
Severity of harm Very likely Likely Improbable Remotely
conceivable
M2
Irreversible:
- Death
4 - Loss of an eye
- Loss of an arm
Irreversible:
3 - Broken limbs
- Loss of fingers
Reversible:
2 Treatment by a doctor
necessary
Reversible:
1 First aid necessary
1.8.5. Summary
Risk assessment
With the risk detected on the example machine, you can determine a defined value for the risk in
the risk graph. Suitable measures should be used to shift the risk from the red area to the green
area.
Risk mitigation
START
1 Safe design
YES
Risk appropriately reduced?
NO
2 Technical measures
YES
Risk appropriately reduced?
NO
YES
Risk appropriately reduced?
NO
Use the 3-step method in accordance with the harmonized EN ISO 12100 standard for definition
and evaluation of the safety measures. This method can be visualized with a decision-making
graph.
You begin by defining design-based safety measures. If these measures produce an accepted
residual risk, no further measures are necessary.
Purely design-based measures can often be circumvented by operating personnel and so these
measures do not yet produce an accepted residual risk on their own. Additional technical safety
measures are required in this case.
Residual risks remaining after technical safety measures can generally be mitigated by
information for the user and operating specifications. Examples: wearing protective clothing,
observing safety clearances, following a prescribed operating sequence, etc.
Risk mitigation
Risk mitigation
W M1
M2
V1
V2
Control center
Severity of harm
A B C D
Very likely Likely Improbable Remotely conceivable
Irreversible:
- Death 4A
4 - Loss of an eye
- Loss of an arm (Robot)
Irreversible:
- Broken limbs
3A 3B
3 - Loss of fingers (Labeler) (Lifting device)
Risk mitigation
START
Safe design
YES
JA
Risk appropriately reduced?
NO
2 Technical measures
YES
Risk appropriately reduced?
NO
YES
Risk appropriately reduced?
NO
If the design of the machine is safe, according to the 3-step method no further measures would
be necessary.
In the example, the design does not yet offer adequate safety, and you must take additional
technical measures.
Risk mitigation
W M1
M2
V1
V2
Control center
Risk mitigation
Probability of occurrence
A B C D
Severity of harm Very likely Likely Improbable Remotely conceivable
Irreversible:
4
- Death
- Loss of an eye
- Loss of an arm
4C
(Robot)
3A
Irreversible:
- Broken limbs
3 - Loss of fingers
(Labeler)
Reversible:
Treatment by a doctor necessary
2
Reversible:
1 First aid necessary
Risk mitigation
• Determining the risk and the resulting safety levels differ according to the standard
used
For the functional safety (safety of machines), there are 2 standards with different
safety levels
Risk mitigation
P1 PLr a
F1 P2
S1 PLr b
F2 P1
P2
Start PLr c
P1
F1 P2
S2
PLr d
F2 P1
P2
PLr e
High amount of
risk mitigation
Performance level (PL) reduction on the basis of a lower probability of the hazard occurring
(Section A.2.3.2)
There are several changes in Annex A. First, the informative nature of the process of PLr
determination presented in Annex A is highlighted more clearly: It is not binding and only
represents an estimation of the risk mitigation. Due to the normative compromise reached in the
circle of experts, taking into account reasons that may also lie outside the parameters of the risk
graph, type C standards can deviate in terms of their PLr definitions from the PLr that would
transpire from the risk graph.
The note on distinction of F1 and F2 is now formulated as follows:
• If no other justification exists, F2 should be chosen if the frequency is more than once every
15 minutes.
• F1 may be chosen if the total exposure time does not exceed 1/20 of the total service life and
the frequency is not more than once every 15 minutes.
The probability of a hazardous event has now been added. If it can be evaluated as low, the PLr
may be reduced by one level. A further reduction of ‘PLr a’ is not provided for.
Risk mitigation
The safety levels SIL and PL specify how high the reliability of a safety system must
be:
- PL a 10-5 to 10-4
Reliability
SIL 1 PL b 3x10-6 to 10-5 Use “proven components”,
SIL 1 PL c 10-6 to 3x10-6 Regular functional tests,
Automatic error detection,
SIL 2 PL d 10-7 to 10-6 Redundant design,
SIL 3 PL e 10-8 to 10-7 Redundancy + Error detection
With the correct use of a safety system, its probability of failure is equivalent to the
probability of a hazard.
EN 62061 and EN ISO 13849-1 therefore define a quantitative risk and go further
than EN 954-1.
Both assessments provide a result in which the failure rate allows an explicit statement about the
risk. It defines how high the probability of a hazard may be.
With the help of device-specific parameters, this failure rate can be calculated according to both
standards, thus allowing a statement of whether implementation of the safety function is sufficient
for the required safety level.
PL and SIL are comparable but cannot be equated.
Additional measures are required to achieve the other certificate in each case, e.g., from SIL2 to
SIL3.
EN 62061 and EN ISO 13849-1 regard safety functions as follows:
• A defined safety function can be assigned to a particular hazard (posed by the machine)
• The required safety level can be determined for a defined safety function
A safety function must be defined for each hazard that cannot be eliminated by structural
measures. This can be implemented using a safety system. Safety systems must have a certain
effectiveness, based on the examined hazard and the estimated risk.
• EN 62061: Safety Integrity Level (SIL)
• EN ISO 13849: Performance Level (PL)
Risk mitigation
Requirements relating to safety levels: Probability of failure
EN 62061 and EN ISO 13849-1 describe requirements for the maximum permissible
probability of failure of the safety function:
Probability of a dangerous failure per hour PFHD
The higher the safety level, the lower the PFHD must be
Statistical Values
Calculated and achieved safety levels that represent "dangerous failures per unit time" are
-5
always statistical values. In other words: If a safety level SIL1 achieves a value of 2.7 x 10 , this
means that 1.1826 dangerous failures could theoretically occur within 5 years. It does not mean
that such a failure will necessarily occur after almost 5 years; likewise, you cannot be sure that
"nothing will happen" for 4 years.
If a failure occurs, this also does not mean that nothing will now "happen" for the next 4 years.
Likewise, it is also possible (and probable) that nothing "will go wrong" for 12 years.
Risk mitigation
An efficient measure for achieving an acceptable risk is the use of certified
safety devices:
Measures SIL2/3
for risk
reduction
Acceptable
risk
■ The safety devices must be tested according to the respective relevant standards.
■ They receive a certificate regarding the safety level that was achieved, e.g. SIL 2/3.
■ The tests / acceptances are conducted by TÜV (German Technical Inspectorate), BG /
BGIA (BG-Institute for Occupational Safety and Health) or similar test centers.
Risk mitigation
& ≥1
Contactors, indicators,
Buttons and sensors Switchgear / controller power controllers, …
Sensing
Sensing can be divided into two subareas: optical sensors (light barriers, light curtains, laser
scanners, etc.) and switch technology (Emergency Stop buttons, position switches, etc.).
Evaluating
This includes safety relays (3TK28) and controllers with the associated I/O components (DIs,
DOs and bus systems); the logic operation between "sensing" and "reacting" takes place here.
Reacting
The actuators carry out the reaction. In the simplest case, these are lights or contactors, but also
include complex devices such as frequency converters (among others S120).
Risk mitigation
E-Stop E-Stop
Frequency / Possibility of
Severity of injury S F P
Duration of exposure prevention
Irreversible injury S2 Frequent to continuous / Hardly possible P2
F2
long
Reversible injury S1 Possible P1
Seldom to more often /
short
F1 P1 PLr a
F1 P2
S1 PLr b
F2 P1
P2
Start PLr c
P1
F1 P2
S2
PLr d
F2 P1
P2
PLr e
Risk mitigation
How can you check whether you are achieving the determined safety level by means of your
safety functions? The best thing is to use the free Safety Evaluation Tool SET from Siemens.
More information at www.siemens.com/safety-evaluation-tool
Risk mitigation
START
Safe design
YES
Risk appropriately reduced?
NO
Technical measures
YES
Risk appropriately reduced?
NO
YES
Risk appropriately reduced?
NO
In the example case, the additional technical measures offer sufficient certainty of arriving at an
accepted residual risk. This is why you do not need to take any additional technical measures.
If the technical measures do not lead to an accepted residual risk, according to the 3-step
method, user information about residual risks is necessary.
1.9.4. Summary
Risk mitigation
1.10. Verification
Verification
• Manuals
Verification
Verification
In the declaration of incorporation (not a complete machine, but a part for mounting
in other machines or systems…), you also have to declare the machine parts for
incorporation and include a statement that the machine must not be commissioned until
the machine into which it will be incorporated meets the provisions of the Directive.
1.11. Summary
Courses at SITRAIN
http://sitrain.automation.siemens.com/sitrainworld/
ST-FASAFN
CE-Marking & Functional Safety in Machine and System Manufacturing
The solutions are not binding but a possibility. In principle, there is no “one”
correct solution for the topics Risk assessment and Risk mitigation.
1.13.1. Exercise 1
Risk assessment
M2
V1 Transport rolls > Crushing, Pulling in
V2
Control center
1.13.2. Exercise 2
Risk assessment
Severity Probability
Irreversible: It is likely that an injury
- Broken limbs
- Loss of fingers occurs. Lifting device >
Crushing,
Compressing
Probability of occurrence
A B C D
Severity of harm Very likely Likely Improbable Remotely
conceivable
Irreversible:
- Death
4 - Loss of an eye
- Loss of an arm
Irreversible:
3 - Broken limbs 3B
- Loss of fingers
Reversible:
2 Treatment by a doctor
necessary Risk evaluation
Reversible: by the team
1 First aid necessary
1.13.3. Exercise 3
Risk assessment
Severity Probability
Irreversible:
It is very likely that an injury
M1
- Broken limbs
occurs.
- Loss of fingers
Probability of occurrence
A B C D
Severity of harm Very likely Likely Improbable Remotely Press > Crushing, Cutting off
conceivable
Irreversible:
- Death
4 - Loss of an eye
- Loss of an arm
Irreversible:
3 - Broken limbs 3A
- Loss of fingers
Reversible:
2 Treatment by a doctor
necessary
Risk evaluation
Reversible:
1 First aid necessary
by the team
1.13.4. Exercise 4
Risk assessment
Severity Probability
Irreversible:
It is very likely that an injury
- Death
occurs.
- Loss of an eye/arm
Probability of occurrence
A B C D
Severity of harm Very likely Likely Improbable Remotely
conceivable
M2
Irreversible:
4 - Death
- Loss of an eye
4A
- Loss of an arm
Irreversible:
3 - Broken limbs
Risk evaluation
- Loss of fingers
by the team
Reversible:
2 Treatment by a doctor
necessary
Reversible:
1 First aid necessary
1.13.5. Exercise 5
Risk mitigation
W M1
Enclosure:
Openings for the
workpiece
M2
V1
Enclosure:
V2 When the door is
Control center opened, the robot
continues to move
Severity of harm
A B C D
Very likely Likely Improbable Remotely conceivable
Irreversible:
- Death 4A
4 - Loss of an eye
- Loss of an arm (Robot)
Irreversible:
- Broken limbs
3A 3B
3 - Loss of fingers (Labeler) (Lifting device)
1.13.6. Exercise 6
Risk mitigation
W M1
M2
V1
V2
1.13.7. Exercise 7
Risk mitigation
Probability of occurrence
A B C D
Severity of harm Very likely Likely Improbable Remotely conceivable
Irreversible:
4
- Death
- Loss of an eye
- Loss of an arm
4C
(Robot)
3A
Irreversible:
- Broken limbs
3 - Loss of fingers
(Labeler)
Reversible:
2D
Treatment by a doctor necessary
2
Reversible:
1 First aid necessary
New risk evaluation
by the team
1.13.8. Exercise 8
Risk mitigation
Frequency / Possibility of
Severity of injury S F P
Duration of exposure prevention
Irreversible injury S2 Frequent to continuous / Hardly possible P2
F2
long
Reversible injury S1 Possible P1
Seldom to more often /
short
F1 P1 PLr a
F1 P2
S1 PLr b
F2 P1
P2
Start PLr c
P1
F1 P2
S2
PLr d
F2 P1
P2
PLr e
Contents 2
2. Product Overview ................................................................................................... 2-2
2.1. History of SIMATIC Safety .................................................................................................... 2-3
2.2. Positioning the Modular S7 Controllers ................................................................................ 2-4
2.3. Configurable Hardware ......................................................................................................... 2-5
2.4. SIMATIC S7-1200 ................................................................................................................. 2-6
2.4.1. S7-1214FC / 1215FC ............................................................................................................ 2-7
2.5. SIMATIC S7-1500 ................................................................................................................. 2-8
2.5.1. SIMATIC S7-1500F CPUs .................................................................................................... 2-9
2.6. Fail-safe I/Os ....................................................................................................................... 2-10
2.8. Additional Information ......................................................................................................... 2-11
2.8.1. ET 200SP and ET 200pro Controller .................................................................................. 2-12
2.8.2. Software Controller ............................................................................................................. 2-13
2.8.3. ET 200SP Open Controller “All in one” ............................................................................... 2-14
2.8.4. Overview Safety Functions SINAMICS S/G ....................................................................... 2-15
2.8.5. SIMATIC ET 200SP ............................................................................................................ 2-16
2.8.5.1. Overview of ET 200SP and ET 200S - I/O Modules ........................................................... 2-17
2.8.5.2. ET 200SP / F-DI and F-DO ................................................................................................. 2-18
2.8.5.3. ET 200SP / F-PM, F-RO and F-CM AS-i ............................................................................ 2-19
2.8.6. Available Licenses .............................................................................................................. 2-20
2. Product Overview
F-Systems
S7-300F/400F
As of Safety V13
New Generation
S7-1500F
TIA Portal
SIMATIC S7-400
Advanced
SIMATIC S7-1500
SIMATIC S7-300
Basic
SIMATIC S7-200
SIMATIC S7-1200
SIMATIC S7
The programmable logic controllers can be divided into the performance ranges Basic (S7-1200)
and Advanced (S7-1500).
The product range of the S7-1200 and S7-1500 will be expanded in the next few years such that
the S7-200, S7-300 and even the S7-400 can be completely replaced.
Peripherals
1200-CPUs
CPU Types
1211C 1212FC 1214FC 1215FC 1217C
1 1 1 1 1
Interfaces
1 1
Bit Performance 85 ns 85 ns 85 ns 85 ns 85 ns
Features
• Modular compact control system for the low-end performance range
• Scaled CPU range
• Extensive range of modules
• Can be expanded to up to 11 modules (depends on the CPU)
• Can be networked with PROFIBUS or PROFINET
• Slot
− Communication modules are placed to the left of the CPU (number depends on the CPU)
− Signal modules are placed to the right of the CPU (number depends on the CPU)
• "Total package" with CPU and I/O in one device
− integrated digital and analog I/O
− an expansion with signal board
• "Micro PLC" with integrated functions
Slot Rules
• Communication modules are placed to the left of the CPU (number depends on the CPU)
• Signal modules (digital, analog) are placed to the right of the CPU (number depends on the
CPU)
Signal Modules
• Digital input, output or mixed modules (24VDC, relay)
• Analog input, output or mixed modules (voltage, current, resistance, thermocouple)
Expansion Board
• The CPU can be expanded by the addition of one signal board for I/O or one communication
board.
• Optionally, a battery board can be installed to provide long-term battery backup for the CPU’s
real-time clock
MFP
ET 200SP 1500 CPUs T-CPUs
CPU
1511TF
1518F-
1510SP F- 1512SPF- 1511F- 1513F- 1515F- 1516F- 1517F- 1518F- 1515TF
CPU Types 4PN/DP
1PN 1PN 1PN 1PN 2PN 3PN/DP 3PN/DP 4PN/DP 1516TF
MFP
1517TF
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
As
Interfaces
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 Standard 1 3
Bit As
72ns 48ns 60 ns 40 ns 30 ns 10 ns 2 ns 1 ns 1 ns
Performance Standard
As
Width 100mm 100mm 35 mm 35 mm 70 mm 70 mm 175 mm 175 mm 175 mm
Standard
Certified according to
+
Type and parts reduction + EN 61508 2nd Edition
• Standard and fail-safe
automation with only • Proven Coded Processing instead
one controller of multi-processor system
• PROFINET and PROFIBUS are
integrated
Efficient engineering
+
• F-runtime group for
independent prioritization und
Information locally available + time settings
• Displays via Onboard Display
• Diagnostic data
• Safety status Highest manipulation protection +
(activated/deactivated) • Additional password protection for
• Safety signature access to F-configuration and
• Last F-program change F-program
F-DI/DO
F-DO
F-RO
F-PM
F-DI
F-AI
Fail-safe I/Os Properties
Modular, multifunctional
ET 200pro X - X - - X I/O in high degree of protection
IP 65/67
SINAMICS S150 STO SS1 SBC SLS SDI SSM SS2 SOS SLP SP SBT SGS
Notes
• Encoder-less operation is possible for all asynchronous motors and the synchronous motors
1FU8 (SIEMOSYN).
• If the Basic Functions are to be controlled via TM54F. The Extended Functions, that contain
the Basic Functions, must be used.
• Basic Functions are license-free, can also be controlled without license via PROFIsafe.
• For the Extended Functions, a license must be purchased for each axis.
• The Extended Functions can be controlled using PROFIsafe or the Terminal Module TM54F.
A special characteristic of the F-modules of the SIMATIC ET 200SP is the (station) device-wide
assignment of F-addresses using the engineering tool instead of the DIP switch setting on each
module (F-address).
When a module is replaced, the F-address, stored in the e-coding, remains in the base unit. If a
new module is plugged in, it receives the F-address automatically. New assignment of the
F-addresses is therefore unnecessary. This innovation simplifies installation and saves time.
The SIMATIC ET 200SP fail-safe power module can be used to switch off safety-related groups
of standard or fail-safe DQ modules. Evaluation of the safety function is then carried out either in
the F-CPU or in the F-PM-E power module. This fast and direct group switch-off can be carried
out up to SIL 2 / PL d or SIL 3 / Pl e.
ET 200S ET 200SP F
Digital inputs 4/8 F-DI 24VDC 8 F-DI 24VDC HF
• 15 mm module width
• Power supply per channel
Digital outputs 4 F-DO 24VDC/2A 4 F-DQ PM 24VDC/2A HF
• 15 mm module width
Relay module 1 F-RO 24VDC/230VAC/5A 1 F-RQ 24VDC/24..230VAC/6A
• 20 mm module width
PM-E F pm 24VDC F PM-E ppm 24VDC/10A
• 20 mm module width
• 2 F-DI DC24V
• 1 F-DQ PPM 2A
Power module
PM-E F pp 24VDC • PP/PM-switching, parameterizable
• Direct switching from F-DI to F-DO up to SIL3
• Fast group shutdown of F-DQ up to SIL3
Contents 3
3. Operating Principle of Safety Integrated .............................................................. 3-2
3.1. Conventional Safety Technology .......................................................................................... 3-3
3.2. Integrated Safety Technology ............................................................................................... 3-4
3.3. Safety Integrated Concept .................................................................................................... 3-5
3.4. Required Expansions ............................................................................................................ 3-6
3.5. What goes with which Software? .......................................................................................... 3-7
3.6. Hardware and Firmware Expansions .................................................................................... 3-8
3.7. PROFIsafe ............................................................................................................................ 3-9
3.7.1. Black Channel ....................................................................................................................... 3-9
3.7.2. PROFIsafe Layer ................................................................................................................ 3-10
3.7.3. Consecutive Numbering (Counter) ..................................................................................... 3-11
3.7.4. Monitoring Time (Watchdog Timer) .................................................................................... 3-12
3.7.5. Relationship F-Source Address/F-Destination Address ..................................................... 3-13
3.7.6. Formation of the CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check) ........................................................... 3-14
3.7.7. Checking the CRC .............................................................................................................. 3-15
3.8. Safety program ................................................................................................................... 3-16
3.8.1. Diversity .............................................................................................................................. 3-17
3.8.2. Diversity Example ............................................................................................................... 3-18
3.9. Additional Information ......................................................................................................... 3-19
3.9.1. Error Types ......................................................................................................................... 3-20
3.9.2. Remedies ............................................................................................................................ 3-22
Drive
Reacting
Functional Controlling
The dangerous machine function is switched via the two positively driven contactors (K1 and K2),
which are controlled by a safety relay. The safety relay receives the necessary control signals for
functional On/Off switching via wiring from a digital standard output of the standard PLC, which
also evaluates the corresponding signals from the plant (including signals of the HMI device) in
the standard program.
Protection Functions
For the protection of the operator, the dangerous machine function is equipped with an
Emergency Stop pushbutton and an isolating protection device in the form of a safety door. As
soon as a wiring error is detected, the Emergency Stop is pressed or the safety door is opened,
the safety relay switches off the motor via contactors K1 and K2 according to Stop Category 0 of
EN 60204-1 – independent of the control signals of the standard PLC.
Each time the contactors are energized, the safety relay first checks to determine whether the
contacts of the Emergency Stop and the safety door are closed and whether the contactors are
released and their feedback contacts are closed.
Wiring
The wiring and architecture of the protection functions are implemented according to EN 61508 in
SIL 3 or according to EN 954 in Cat.4: The Emergency Stop pushbutton and the position switches
of the safety door are wired via two channels to the safety relay. For control of the dangerous
machine function, two contactors connected in series are used. Their feedback and mirror
contacts return a feedback signal to the safety relay.
Fail-safe bus
Distributed
I/O with
F-modules
Safety Integrated
Drive with
integrated
Reacting safety
Safety Integrated
A PLC with a fail-safe CPU (F-CPU) and distributed I/O stations (ET 200S via PROFIBUS DP)
controls both the standard functions and the safety functions.
Functional Controlling
The dangerous machine function is switched via the two positively driven contactors (K1 and K2),
which are now controlled by the safety program of the F-CPU in conjunction with safety-related
input and output modules instead of by the safety relay. The conditions for functional On/Off
switching are still evaluated by the standard program, which uses tags (e.g. DB) to communicate
to the safety program when the contactors are switched on and off.
Protection Functions
The protection functions previously described are now no longer controlled by the safety relay,
but rather by the safety program of the F-CPU and the safety-related input and output modules
(F-DI/DO): As soon as a wiring error is detected, the Emergency Stop pushbutton is pressed or
the safety door is opened, the safety program must switch off the motor or contactors K1 and K2
according to Stop Category 0 of EN 60204-1 – independent of the control signals of the standard
program. The monitoring of the wiring of the safety-related actuators and sensors is now
performed by the F-DI / DO modules.
Wiring
The wiring and architecture of the protection functions according to SIL 3 (EN 62061) Cat.4
(EN 954) is in principle the same: The Emergency Stop command device and the position
switches of the safety door are still wired via two channels, however, no longer to a safety relay
but to an F-DI module of the safety-related ET 200S station. Two contactors connected in series
are still used to switch the dangerous machine function. They are now controlled by an F-DO
module and their feedback and mirror contacts are now evaluated by the safety program.
Standard-I/O Standard-PLC
PG/ES with
secure access
e.g. Firewall
F-Gate-
way Standard-I/O
TCP/IP
Engineering F-Sensor F-Field- F-Actuator
Tool Device other Master-Slave
Safety- Assignment
Bus
Safety Integrated
Safety Integrated is the completely integrated safety concept for automation and drives by
Siemens. Proven technologies and systems from automation engineering are used for the safety
technology. Safety Integrated covers the entire chain of safety from sensors and actuators to the
controller, including safety-related communication over standard fieldbuses. In addition to their
functional tasks, drives and controllers also take on safety tasks. A particular feature of Safety
Integrated is that it ensures not only reliable safety, but also a high level of flexibility and
productivity.
Standard and safety-related devices are connected by a common bus system. The bus can be
PROFIBUS, PROFINET or a combination of both, because fail-safe communication is also
possible beyond bus boundaries.
Advantages
Integration of safety technology into standard automation systems has the following important
advantages:
• Greater flexibility than electromechanical solutions
• Reduction of the wiring effort
• Only one CPU is required due to the coexistence of the standard program and safety program
• Simple communication between the standard program and safety program
• Less engineering effort because configuration and programming is carried out with standard
engineering tools
Exchange
+
expand
=
F-CPU
In general, it is adequate if the F-CPU used meets at least the same requirements as the
previously used standard CPU in terms of performance data and configuration limits (including
communication options). The most important parameters are the CPU processing speed, which
yields the cycle time and thus the response time of the automation system, and the amount of
work memory, which must accommodate the execution-relevant sections of the standard program
and safety program.
F-DI/DO
Standard and safety-related input and output modules (F-DI/DO) can also be used in mixed
operation. The F-DI/DO modules required instead of the safety relay could also be integrated in
an existing ET 200SP device. All I/O modules already in use including their wiring can continue to
be used unchanged.
The first BaseUnit must be a light-colored BaseUnit. Light-colored BaseUnit: Establishes a new
potential group, electrical isolation from the adjacent module on the left. The first BaseUnit of the
ET 200SP is always a light-colored BaseUnit for infeed of the supply voltage L+. During
commissioning, ensure that you only use digital signal modules and the power module with the
BaseUnit Type A0.
PROFIsafe Communication
The safety-related communication between the F-CPU and the F-DI/DO modules using
PROFIsafe is integrated in the fail-safe modules. This is handled automatically and does not need
to be programmed regardless of whether F-DI/DO modules are used centrally or as distributed
modules via PROFIBUS or PROFINET. Standard communication that has already been
configured remains unaffected by the safety-related communication via PROFIsafe.
Fail-safe Input Modules (SIL3/PLe): F-CPU (SIL3/PLe) Fail-safe Output Modules (SIL3/PLe):
• Discrepancy analysis • Operating system • Wire break monitoring
• Short-circuit / Cross-circuit monitoring expansions • Light test / Dark test
• Protective mechanisms • Switch-on test
F-CPU
F-CPU
Standard Program
Communication
with the PROFIsafe protocol
Standard Program
When safety-related functions are integrated in a SIMATIC controller, the standard control
functions and their implementation can continue to be used practically unchanged:
• Standard I/O modules and their wiring
• Standard program
F-I/O
The major difference between fail-safe modules and standard modules is that fail-safe modules
are designed with two channels internally. Both integrated processors monitor each other and
automatically test the input and output circuits. In the event of a fault, they put the F-module into a
safe state.
Fail-safe digital input modules acquire (sensing) the signal states of safety-related sensors (e.g.
Emergency Stop pushbutton), run short-circuit and cross-circuit tests as well as discrepancy
analyses and send corresponding safety message frames to the F-CPU.
Fail-safe digital output modules are suitable for switch-off operations with short-circuit monitoring
up to the actuator.
The F-I/O modules communicate with the fail-safe CPU using the PROFIsafe profile.
F-CPU
The standard CPU is simply replaced with a safety-related F-CPU. It combines the functionality of
a standard CPU with that of a safety CPU. With a single operating system expanded to include
protective mechanisms, standard and safety-related user programs can be executed on one
CPU.
3.7. PROFIsafe
3.7.1. Black Channel
Safety Safety
layer layer
Black Channel
PROFIsafe Layer
PROFIsafe is the first open standard (IEC 61784) for safety-related communication that allows
standard and safety-related communication via one and the same connection (cable or wireless
via WLAN).
With PROFIsafe, the existing network infrastructure for standard communication can also be used
at the same time for safety-related communication.
Safety-related data and standard data are transmitted over the same bus with PROFIsafe. The
existing standard bus protocols (so-called "Black Channel") are used in which the safety-related
data is transported as additional data (PROFIsafe Layer). This means that safety-related
communication is independent of the bus system and the lower-level network components.
PROFIsafe Layer
Input data / Output data CRC
Status / Control byte
(user data) (cyclic redundancy check)
1..12 13..123
or 1 byte 3 bytes or 4 bytes
byte(s) bytes
A PROFIsafe message (F-message) that is exchanged between F-Host and its F-Device is
carried within the payload of a standard PROFIBUS or PROFINET message. In case of a
modular F-Device with several F-Modules, the payload consists of several PROFIsafe messages.
It begins with the F-input / output data taking into account the mentioned data type subset. The
data structure of a particular F-Device is defined in the associated GSD file (General Station
Description). Production automation and process automation pose different requirements on an
F-System. The first works with short signals ("bits") which have to be processed very quickly. The
second works with longer process values ("floating point") which may be somewhat slower.
PROFIsafe therefore offers two different lengths for data structures. One is limited to 12 bytes
with a CRC signature of 3 bytes. The other is limited to 123 bytes with a 4 byte CRC signature.
For a PROFIsafe message (F-message) from an F-Host, a control byte follows the F-input /
output data, otherwise a status byte. Both serve the synchronization of the PROFIsafe protocol
machines. A PROFIsafe message (F-message) ends with a CRC signature which depends on the
length of the F-input / output data. The consecutive number is not transmitted with the F-
message. Sender and Receiver each have their own counters which are synchronized with the
help of the control byte and the status byte. The correct synchronization is monitored through
inclusion of the counter value in the CRC signature calculation. The "F-address", as well, is
safeguarded through inclusion in the CRC signature calculation.
Counter: 1002
1000 hex
1001 Counter: 1002
1000 hex
1001
Toggle Toggle
0 Increment 1
Toggle
1
24-bit counter
Increment after every cycle
Only one bit is transmitted in order to increment the counter
After an overflow, the counter begins again at “0”
Using the Consecutive Number, a Receiver can see whether or not it received the messages
completely and within the correct sequence. With the acknowledgement, the consecutive number
gets back to the Sender for verification. A simple "Toggle Bit" would have been sufficient here.
However, due to the storage buffers in some bus components, such as, switches, a 24-bit counter
was selected for PROFIsafe.
#1 #2 t in ms
#1
#2
Message arrived
on time. Message
Timer reset late or lost
The Watchdog is a monitoring function (timer) which trips the safety functions
when a data packet does not arrive on time or is lost.
In F-technology, it is not just a matter of transmitting correct process signals and process values,
but also of their update within a process error tolerance time.
This means that an F-Device can independently trigger the predefined safety measures when the
time is exceeded, for example, stopping a movement. For this, the F-Device uses a Watchdog
Timer that is restarted when an F-message with a new consecutive number arrives.
(Codename) (Codename)
Source address: 100 Destination address: 500
Addresses Addresses
100/500 100/ 501
Incorrect addresses or
Addresses correct relation does not match
The 1:1 communication relationship between controller and field device simplifies the detection of
misdirected F-messages. Sender and Receiver must have identification (codename) that is
unique in the network, and can be used for verifying the authenticity of a PROFIsafe message.
PROFIsafe uses an "F-Address" as the Sender/Receiver codename.
1 3 Counter:1001
1001 hex
Source address: 100 Destination address: 500
1
CRC
In order to ensure the data integrity, a checksum (CRC) is used. For this, the
following information must be read-in :
Message CRC: 6 A 4
Compare Calculated CRC: 6 A 4
Calculated CRC: 6 A 4
F-CPU
F-CPU
F-Program
Standard Program
F-Program
The safety program (F-program) for controlling the safety-related functions of the system is made
up of a section created in FBD or LAD by the user and a section generated by Safety Advanced
that contains, among other things, the diversified logic for the user section.
The standard program and safety program are created in the same programming environment.
TÜV-certified function blocks for all common safety functions further simplify programming
3.8.1. Diversity
User Program: A, B D
Operands Operation Result
the part of the safety program
created by the user
STOP when
Coding Compare D ≠ Dc
Coded Program:
the diverse part of the safety Diverse Diverse Diverse
program generated by operands operation result
Ac, Bc Dc
Safety Advanced
Example
A (1)
User Program: D=0
AND
the part of the safety program B (0)
created by the user
STOP when
Compare D ≠ Dc
Coded Program:
the diverse part of the safety Ac (0)
program generated by OR Dc = 0
Safety Advanced Bc (1)
Repetition
Old messages that have not been updated are sent again at the wrong point in time.
Deletion
A message is not received or not recognized.
Insertion
A message is inserted that refers to an unexpected or unknown source.
Wrong Sequence
The defined sequence (e.g. consecutive number, time references) of the messages of a particular
source is faulty.
Data Corruption
Messages can be corrupted due to faults in a bus node (device), faults in the transmission
medium or due to mutual interference of messages.
Delay
Messages can be delayed beyond the permissible window for arrival, e.g. as a result of faults in
the transmission medium, overloaded connection cables, mutual interference or bus nodes
(devices) that send messages in a manner such that services are delayed or not recognized
(e.g. FIFOs in switches, bridges and routers).
Masquerade
A message that comes from an apparently valid source is additionally inserted. Thus a non-
safety-related message can be received by a safety-related device, which then classifies it as
safety-relevant.
Addressing (Error)
The relationship between Sender and Receiver is not unique.
3.9.2. Remedies
Remedy Codename
(Virtual) Consec.
Watchdog CRC (Data) (Source/Target
Numbering
Error Type Address)
Repetition
Deletion
Insertion
Wrong Sequence
Data Corruption
Delay
Masquerade
Addressing (error)
Revolving Memory
Failures in Switches
Contents 4
4. Training Device and HW Configuration ................................................................ 4-2
4.1. Simulator Setup with S7-1500F and ET 200SP.................................................................... 4-3
4.1.1. System View of the Training Area......................................................................................... 4-4
4.2. Device Configuration of the Simulator’s Safety Controller .................................................... 4-5
4.3. Configuring an S7-1500F ...................................................................................................... 4-6
4.3.1. F-CPU in TIA Portal .............................................................................................................. 4-7
4.3.2. Fail-safe Capability and PROFIsafe Monitoring Time........................................................... 4-8
4.3.3. PROFIsafe Address Types ................................................................................................... 4-9
4.3.3.1. System Configuration Example 1........................................................................................ 4-11
4.3.3.2. System Configuration Example 2........................................................................................ 4-13
4.3.4. PROFIsafe Monitoring Time (Distributed) ........................................................................... 4-15
4.3.5. CPU Password Protection .................................................................................................. 4-16
4.4. Configuring an ET 200SP ................................................................................................... 4-18
4.4.1. Selecting the Correct Base ................................................................................................. 4-19
4.4.2. BaseUnit for F-PM and F-RQ.............................................................................................. 4-20
4.4.3. ET 200SP with Fail-safe and Non-fail-safe Modules .......................................................... 4-21
4.4.4. Assembly and Addressing of an ET 200SP/MP F-I/O Module ........................................... 4-22
4.4.6. F-I/O Parameters ................................................................................................................ 4-23
4.4.6.1. Potential Group ................................................................................................................... 4-23
4.4.6.2. F-Parameter ........................................................................................................................ 4-24
4.5. ET 200SP Assigning a Fail-safe Address ........................................................................... 4-25
4.5.1. Identifying F-Modules .......................................................................................................... 4-26
4.5.2. Assigning an F-Destination Address ................................................................................... 4-27
4.5.3. F-Destination Address Status ............................................................................................. 4-28
4.5.4. Configuration Control (Option Handling) for F-I/O .............................................................. 4-30
4.6. Task Description: Creating a Project and Hardware Station .............................................. 4-31
4.6.1. Exercise 1: Setting the IP Address of the PG ..................................................................... 4-32
4.6.2. Exercise 2: Erasing the SIMATIC Memory Card (SMC) ..................................................... 4-33
4.6.3. Exercise 3: Resetting and Restarting the CPU ................................................................... 4-34
4.6.4. Exercise 4: Creating a New Project .................................................................................... 4-35
4.6.5. Exercise 5: Checking the Project Settings .......................................................................... 4-36
4.6.6. Exercise 6: Creating an S7-1500F Station ......................................................................... 4-37
4.6.7. Exercise 7: Creating a Device Group and Configuring the S7-1500F ................................ 4-38
4.6.8. Exercise 8: CPU Properties: IP Address and PROFINET Name ....................................... 4-39
4.6.9. Exercise 9: ET 200SP: Resetting to Factory Settings ........................................................ 4-40
4.6.10. Exercise 10: Reading-out the Firmware Version of the ET 200SP..................................... 4-41
4.6.11. Exercise 11: Configuring the ET 200SP ............................................................................. 4-42
4.6.12. Exercise 12: Networking the ET 200SP with the CPU ....................................................... 4-43
4.6.13. Exercise 13: Configuring and Parameterizing the ET 200SP ............................................. 4-44
4.6.14. Exercise 14: Assigning the ET 200SP Device Name and IP Address................................ 4-45
4.6.15. Exercise 15: Assigning the ET 200SP Device Name ONLINE ........................................... 4-46
4.6.16. Exercise 16: Compiling the HW Configuration and Downloading it into the CPU .............. 4-47
4.6.17. Exercise 17: ET 200SP: Assigning a Fail-safe Address ..................................................... 4-48
or
• S7-1500 automation system with an S7-1500F CPU
• Digital input module DI 32x24VDC HF
• Digital output module DQ 32x24VDC/0.5A ST
• Analog input module AI 8xUI/RTD/TC ST
ET 200SP
• ET 200SP distributed I/O system with PROFINET interface
• Digital input module F-DI 8x24VDC, 8 inputs according to SIL 2/PL d or 4 inputs according to
SIL 3/PL e
• Fail-safe power module F PM-E ppm DC24V/8A
• Digital output module F-DQ 4x24VDC/2A PM HF, 4 outputs, PM-switching according to
SIL 3/PL e
• Digital input module F-DI 8x24VDC, 8 inputs according to SIL 2/PL d or 4 inputs according to
SIL 3/PL e
M1
Configuring an S7-1500F
You configure a SIMATIC Safety F-system just as you would a standard S7-1500 automation
system. You configure and parameterize the hardware in the Hardware and Network editor as a
central and/or as a distributed design (ET 200SP). The fail-safe components are selected, just as
in the standard, in the "Hardware catalog" Task Card and you place them in the working area of
the Network view or Device view. F-components are represented in yellow.
Safety Advanced
STEP 7 Professional
optional:
TIA Selection Tool
Hardware Configuration
The F-modules are configured and parameterized with the "STEP 7 Professional" Standard Tool;
the safety program is created with the "Safety Advanced" option package.
F-CPU Standard DI
CPU 1513F-1PN DI 16xDC24V
Configuring an S7-1500F
You configure a SIMATIC Safety F-system just as you would a standard S7-1500 automation
system. You configure and parameterize the hardware in the Hardware and Network editor as a
central and/or as a distributed design (ET 200SP). The fail-safe components are selected, just as
in the standard, in the "Hardware catalog" Task Card and you place them in the working area of
the Network view or Device view. F-components are represented in yellow.
Project view
Portal view
F-activation
The F-capability of the CPU must be activated, to download a safety program cannot later to
the CPU! This option is thus required for operation of the CPU in safety mode. The activation of
F-capability of the CPU is a default setting. If the F-capability activation is deactivated, only a
standard program and not a safety program can be downloaded to the CPU.
Defining the F-Destination Address Range for F-I/O of PROFIsafe Address Type 1
With the parameters "Low limit for F-destination addresses" and "High limit for F-destination
addresses" you define a range for this F-CPU in which the F-destination address of newly
inserted F-I/O of PROFIsafe address type 1 is automatically assigned. An F-destination address,
that does not already lie in the F-destination address range, is also newly assigned when you
assign a DP-Slave/IO-Device to the F-CPU or when you switch on the F-activation of the F-CPU.
The F-destination address is assigned from the "Low limit for F-destination addresses" in
ascending order. When no free F-destination address is available in the F- destination address
range, the next free F-destination address outside the F- destination address range is assigned
and a warning is sent during compilation. The maximum possible F-destination address for
ET 200S, ET 200eco, ET 200pro, ET 200iSP F-modules and S7-300 F-SMs is 1022. The
F-destination addresses for F-I/O of PROFIsafe address type 1 must be unique network-wide and
CPU-wide. Through the selection of different F- destination address ranges for different F-CPUs,
you can define different ranges for the automatic assignment of the F-destination address. This
makes sense when several F-CPUs are operated on one network. Later, manual address
changes are possible.
Example:
You have parameterized the range of the F-destination addresses as follows:
• Low limit for F-destination addresses = 100
• High limit for F-destination addresses = 199
When the first F-I/O of PROFIsafe address type 1 is inserted, the F-destination address 100 is
assigned. When a further F-I/O of PROFIsafe address type 1 is inserted, the F-destination
address 101 is assigned.
Defining the F-Destination Address Range for F-I/O of PROFIsafe Address Type 2
The F-destination address for F-I/O of PROFIsafe address type 2 is automatically assigned from
65534 in descending order for each F-CPU. The low limit represents the Value + 1 parameterized
with the parameter "High limit for F-destination addresses" (for F-I/O of PROFIsafe address
type 1).
When the value parameterized with the parameter "High limit for F-destination addresses" is
reached, a warning is output during compilation.
TIA-SAFETY - Training Device and HW Configuration
Training Document V15.00.00 4-9
SIMATIC TIA Portal Safety Advanced
Same interface
(F-CPU 1 and F-
CPU 2 are in the
same network)
PROFIsafe
address type 2
PROFIsafe
address type 1
The two system sections are connected via the PN-interface X1 on the respective F-CPU. The
two F-CPUs are configured as IO-Controller and have, via the second port of X1, lower-level
F-I/O.
Separate
interfaces (F-
CPU 1 and F-
CPU 2 are in
separate
networks)
PROFIsafe
address type 2
PROFIsafe
address type 1
The two F-CPUs are configured as IO-Controllers and have, via X1, lower-level F-I/O. The two
CPUs are connected by means of the I-Device communication via the PN-interface X2 (as of
Firmware 2.0).
Because no routing has been implemented between X1 and X2, the F-destination addresses can
be the same in both system sections.
PROFIsafe
monitoring time for
distributed F-I/O
modules
Standard Fail-Safe
HMI read Standard
/Fail-Safe functions
write write
read write
1
2
3
4
Protection Levels
With the following protection levels, the access rights (read / write) of the programming device to
the CPU are specified:
• Full access incl. fail-safe (no protection): → Default setting for F-CPU
Read and write access is always permitted.
• Full access (no protection): → Default setting for Standard CPU
Read access and write access is always permitted.
• Read access: → Write protection
Read-only access possible. No data can be changed in the CPU, and no blocks or modified
hardware configuration or parameter assignment can be downloaded to the CPU without
specifying a password.
• HMI access: → Write and read protection for STEP 7
No write or read access is possible from the engineering. Only the CPU type and
identification data can be displayed in the Project tree under "Accessible devices". It is not
possible to display online information or blocks under "Accessible devices" without entering a
password.
• No access (complete protection): → General write and read protection for STEP 7 and HMI.
Access for HMI devices without a configured password in the connection is also not possible.
AUX Terminals
BaseUnits with additional AUX terminals (for example, BU15-P16+A10+2D) facilitate the
additional connection of a potential (up to the maximum supply voltage of the module) which you
connect via the AUX bus.
Note
If the last 2 digits of the module’s order (article) number/MLFB are also found in the BaseUnit’s
order (article) number/MLFB, then you will have selected the correct BaseUnit.
Action
Parameterization of the PROFIsafe address in HW Config.
automatic or optional manual address setting
Potential Group
For the ET 200SP distributed I/O system, potential groups are created by a systematic
arrangement of the BaseUnits.
To form potential groups, a distinction is made for ET 200SP between 2 BaseUnits:
• BaseUnits BU...D (can be recognized by the light-colored terminal box and the light-colored
mounting rail release):
− open a new potential group (power bus and AUX bus is interrupted to the left)
− feed in the supply voltage L+ up to an infeed current of 10 A
• BaseUnits BU...B (can be recognized by the dark-colored terminal box and the dark-colored
mounting rail release):
− continue the potential group (power bus and AUX bus fed through)
− tap the supply voltage L+ for external components or
− loop through with a maximum total current of 10 A
4.4.6.2. F-Parameter
The general F-parameters are the same for all modules. PROFIsafe monitoring
time of the F-CPU
interface
Passivation behavior:
Passivate channel or
passivate entire module
F-Parameters
In the "F-parameters" tab, settings are made that affect fail-safe communication of the module
with the F-CPU.
F-Destination Address
These are the PROFIsafe addresses and serve to uniquely identify the source (F-CPU) and
destination (F-module). The PROFIsafe addresses must be unique station-wide and network-
wide. In order to prevent incorrect parameter assignment, the F-destination address is
automatically assigned. When the F-destination address is manually changed, its station-wide
uniqueness is automatically checked but not, however, the network-wide uniqueness! It is then up
to the user to ensure this!
The F-destination
Select “F-destination
address can only be
address”
assigned if the device
name is assigned
Select (check)
individual modules
for the F-addressing
Identifying F-Modules
By pressing the "Identification" button, you confirm the correctness of the addresses for the F-I/O.
Therefore, proceed cautiously when confirming (identifying) the F-I/O “by LED flashing” or “by
serial number” of the interface module. The following requirements must be fulfilled:
• The ET 200SP is configured.
• The configuration was loaded into the ET 200SP.
• The ET 200SP is accessible online.
Identification "by LED flashing"
This is the default setting. During the identification, the DIAG and STATUS LEDs of the
F-modules to be identified flash.
Identification "by serial number"
If you cannot see the F-modules, you can still identify them using the serial number of the
interface module.
No BaseUnit
detection
You have the possibility to detect a real existing IO device and to import it into your project. You
find the IO device in STEP 7 through the "Hardware detection" function. A detected device can be
imported into your project. STEP 7 inserts the IO device with all the modules and submodules.
Prerequisites
• STEP 7 (TIA Portal) as of V15
• It must be possible to technically access the IO device via IP
Option 1 Option 2
CPU 1
CPU 1
For configuration control (option handling) with F-I/Os proceed as with the standard I/O devices.
Detailed information can be obtained by searching for "Configuration control (option handling)" in
the help of STEP 7. You also find a detailed application example in safety advanced manual
(Entry ID: 54110126).
Task Description
You are to create the hardware configuration of the CPU and the ET 200SP in a new project.
What to Do
What you have to do will be explained on the following pages.
2. Assign the IP address 192.168.111.X and the subnet mask 255.255.255.0 to this PG
interface. Proceed as shown in the picture.
Task
In order to completely erase the CPU, the SIMATIC Memory Card of the CPU must also be
erased.
What to Do:
1. Insert the SIMATIC Memory Card in the PG’s card reader.
With the contact surfaces facing up, insert the Memory Card in the PG’s card reader. If it is a
SIMATIC Field PG of the type M4, it has two card readers. The left reader is used for SIMATIC
Memory Cards.
2. Erase the SIMATIC Memory Card.
A Windows dialog appears to open Windows Explorer. Open the folder. Depending on the
Windows Explorer settings, concealed files are either displayed or hidden.
Caution!
If they are visible, they must not be deleted under any circumstances! Delete the SIMATIC
directory and the Job file.
3. Do NOT insert the SIMATIC Memory Card in the CPU. Close the window with the Windows
Explorer and remove the memory card from the PG. Remember to first activate the Windows
function "Remove hardware safely"!
RUN
1. Set the mode selector switch to STOP
STOP
MRES
Task
In the last exercise you erased the SMC of the CPU. Now, you are to reset the CPU to its factory
settings. For this, an MRES without SMC must be carried out.
What to Do
1. Perform the MRES without SMC directly on the CPU following the steps shown in the picture.
2. Re-insert the SMC into the CPU.
3. Restart the CPU by switching the mode selector switch from STOP to RUN.
Result:
• The CPU remains in STOP because no user program is loaded.
• The I/O modules show with green flashing lights that they are not parameterized.
Task:
You are to create a new TIA Portal V15 project:
What to Do:
1. Open the TIA Portal V15.
2. Create a new project with the name “MyProject” in the folder D:\Courses.
Portal view > Start > Create new project or Project view > Project > New or via the “New”
button in the toolbar of the Project view.
Task
You are to check the project settings for STEP 7 Safety.
What to Do
1. Switch to the Safety-relevant project properties.
“Options” -> “Settings” -> “STEP 7 Safety”.
2. Activate the point “Generate default fail-safe program”.
3. Open the settings of the project languages.
"Project tree"->"Languages & resources"->"Project languages"
4. Activate the languages English (United States) and German (Germany).
5. Select English as Editing language and German as Reference language.
Portal view
Task
As a "new device", you are to create an S7-1500F-CPU whose firmware version corresponds to
that of your training controller.
What to Do
1. Read out the firmware version of your CPU. You can do this directly via the CPU-Display or
via the online function of the TIA Portal.
Note: If you want to read out the firmware via online function of the TIA Portal the CPU
need an IP address!
Task
You are to configure the S7-1500 station which matches your actual training device. In addition,
you are to create a new device group “Labeling machine”.
What to Do
1. Switch to the ‘Device view’ and open the ‘Hardware catalog’.
2. Using drag & drop configure the signal module of the S7-1500 station that corresponds exactly
to your training device. Pay exact attention to the firmware version of the module. You can
read out the firmware via the CPU-Display or via the online function of the TIA Portal.
Note: If you want to read out the firmware via online function of the TIA Portal the CPU
need an IP address!
Task
You are to assign a PROFINET name and an IP address to the CPU.
What to Do
1. Switch to the Project view.
2. Double-click on the "device configuration" of the CPU.
3. In the "Device view", select the CPU.
4. Open the “PROFINET interface” tab and enter the IP address, subnet mask and the device
name.
Task
All settings so far (IP address, subnet mask and PROFINET name) of the Interface module of the
ET 200SP station are to be deleted through a "Reset to factory settings". In the following
exercises, you will then transfer your own settings onto the ET 200SP station,
What to Do:
1. Open the Online access and there select the interface you are connected to your training
device.
2. There, activate "Update accessible devices" by double-clicking on it and wait until the list is
completed.
3. Open the ET 200SP and there activate the function "Online & diagnostics" by double-clicking
on it.
4. In the "Online & diagnostics" window, open the "Functions" tab.
5. There, activate "Reset to factory settings" and confirm the dialog.
6. Close the "Online & diagnostics" window.
7. Check the success of the reset to factory settings in the Inspector window under “INFO >
General”. In addition, you will find the ET 200SP without an IP address and without a device
name under “Accessible devices”.
Leave all windows open for the next exercise.
MAC address
of the ET 200SP
Temporary
IP address
Task
In the following exercises, the entire ET 200SP station will be read-in via the hardware detection
functionality of TIA Portal. For this function, the ET 200SP requires an IP address. In the previous
exercise, the IP address was deleted by the reset to factory settings (0.0.0.0). You are now to
assign a temporary IP address.
What to Do
1. Update the accessible devices of the interface.
"Update accessible devices".
-> The ET 200SP is now only accessible via MAC address (see picture).
2. To assign a temporary IP address, switch to the
"Functions -> Assign IP address" tab. There, enter the temporary IP address shown in the
picture as well as the subnet mask and confirm via "Assign IP address" (see above).
Task
You are to read-in the entire ET 200SP station into the project.
What to Do
1. Select (highlight) your project "MyProject" in the Project tree.
2. Start the Hardware detection for IO devices.
"Online" -> "Hardware detection" -> "IO devices"
3. In the dialog that appears, search the network for the ET 200SP station. To do so, select the
PG/PC interface used and press "Start search".
4. Select the ET 200SP station via the option box (left) and add the device.
OR
Task
After the ET 200SP IO-Device is added, it must now be assigned to an IO-Controller or
networked with a CPU. In case there are several CPUs in the network, a co-ordination or
monitoring of the I/O addresses by the IO-Controller and IO-Device can only be done through this
unique assignment.
What to Do
1. In the Hardware and Network editor, select the Network view and there choose the "Network"
tab.
2. Network the ET 200SP with the CPU by connecting the Ethernet interface of the ET 200SP
with the Ethernet interface of the CPU using drag & drop (right picture) or by directly assigning
the ET 200SP station to the CPU (left picture).
Task
The ET 200SP has digital input and output modules. The I/O addresses used in the STEP 7
program must match the addresses of the DI/DO modules parameterized here. The potential
groups (BaseUnit) must also be checked since these cannot be read-in via a hardware detection.
The current address assignment can be found in the lower/right section of the working area in the
Hardware and network editor in the "Device view" tab of the module. The addresses can be
changed in the table.
What to Do
1. In the Hardware and network editor, select the "Device view" tab of the ET 200SP.
2. Compare all potential groups (BaseUnit) in the project with the ones that exist physically. If
necessary, exchange unlike potential groups.
3. Open the "Device overview" tab and, in the table, enter the I/O addresses shown in the
picture.
4. Save your project.
4.8.14. Exercise 14: Assigning the ET 200SP Device Name and IP Address
XXX
Task
You are to set the IP address, the subnet mask and the PROFINET device name of the
ET 200SP.
What to Do
1. In the Hardware and Network editor, select the "Device view" of the ET 200SP.
2. Open the "Device overview" and enter the device name.
3. Select the IM module on Slot 0 and open the "Properties" tab in the Inspector window.
4. Then select the "Ethernet addresses" tab and under "IP protocol" enter a suitable IP address
and subnet mask. In the same tab you will also find the PROFINET device name that you
previously edited in the "Device overview" tab.
5. Also assign the ET 200SP station to the device group “Labeling machine”.
6. Save your project.
1xR
online
accessible device(s)
Task
The PROFINET device name previously assigned offline must now be assigned to the ET 200SP
online, so that the IO-Controller or the CPU can assign the offline-configured IP address during
system startup of the ET 200SP.
What to Do
1. In the Hardware and Network editor, select the "Device view" of the ET 200SP.
2. Right-click on the Interface module or the module on Slot 0 and in the menu that appears,
activate the item "Assign device name".
3. In the dialog that appears, check the (offline) PROFINET device name.
4. Under "Type of the PG/PC interface", select the interface through which you are connected to
the PROFINET (see picture). Click on "Update list" in order to display all accessible devices.
5. In the lower part of the dialog, under the (online) "Accessible devices in the network", select
the ET 200SP or the Interface module IM156-6 and activate "Assign name".
4.8.16. Exercise 16: Compiling the HW Configuration and Downloading it into the
CPU
2. Save
Task
Now that the PROFINET I/O system is completely configured and parameterized, the project
must be compiled, saved and downloaded into the CPU.
What to Do
1. Compile the station by selecting the S7-1500 station in the Project tree and then clicking on
the Compile button (see picture). In the Inspector window under "Info", check whether the
compilation was successful. Should errors have occurred, correct them.
2. Save your project.
3. Download the station into the CPU by clicking on the Download button (see picture). In the
Inspector window under "Info", check whether the loading was successful.
Note:
The buttons “Download” and “Compile” only carry out a download of changes or a compilation
of changes. Detailed information on the topic of Downloading and Compiling follows in
Chapter 6 “Programming”.
Result:
The ET 200SP should now be accessible but errors could still be pending in some F-modules.
Task
ET 200SP fail-safe modules do not have a DIP switch for assigning the unique F-destination
address for each module. Instead you assign the PROFIsafe address directly in STEP 7.
The fail-safe addresses must be assigned to the ET 200SP online. The assignment occurs via the
identification “by LED flashing”.
Note:
It may be that the currently assigned destination address by chance matches your
configured destination address. If this is the case, Step 6 cannot be carried out.
What to Do
1. In the "Hardware and network" editor, select the "Device view" of the ET 200SP.
2. Right-click on the ET 200SP station.
3. In the menu that appears, activate the item "Assign PROFIsafe address".
4. In the dialog that appears, on the left-hand side click on the first checkbox of “Assign”.
5. Then click on the button “Identification” to identify the F-destination addresses.
6. In the dialog, on the right-hand side click on the first checkbox of “Confirm” and then on the
button “Assign PROFIsafe address”.
7. After the F-destination addresses (PROFIsafe addresses) have been assigned, you can close
the dialog.
Result:
If there are still errors pending on modules, this is because the parameterization of channel
parameters of individual modules has not yet been adjusted.
The correct parameterization will be done in the next chapter “Sensor-Actuator Connection”.
Contents 5
5. Sensor / Actuator Connection ............................................................................... 5-3
5.1. Overview: Sensor Connection to F-DI Modules.................................................................... 5-4
5.2. F-DI Module Channel Structure ............................................................................................ 5-5
5.3. F-DI Parameters ................................................................................................................... 5-6
5.3.1. Sensor Supply (1) ................................................................................................................. 5-6
5.3.2. Short-circuit Test ................................................................................................................... 5-7
5.3.3. Sensor Supply (2) ................................................................................................................. 5-8
5.3.4. Channel Parameters for Single-channel Evaluation (1) ....................................................... 5-9
5.3.5. Channel Parameters for Single-channel Evaluation (2) ..................................................... 5-10
5.3.6. Chatter Monitoring .............................................................................................................. 5-11
5.3.7. Channel Parameters for Two-channel Evaluation .............................................................. 5-12
5.3.8. Discrepancy Behavior ......................................................................................................... 5-13
5.3.9. I/O Addresses ..................................................................................................................... 5-15
5.3.10. Example: Reading-in a Process Signal via 1 Channel 1oo1 up to SIL3/Cat.3/PLd........... 5-16
5.3.11. Example: Reading-in a Process Signal via 2 Channels 1oo2 up to SIL3/Cat.4/PLe ......... 5-17
5.3.12. Series Connection of Sensors ............................................................................................ 5-18
5.3.13. Examples for Connection of Electro-sensitive Protective Equipment: Light Curtains /
Grids / Laser Scanners ...................................................................................................... 5-19
5.4. Overview: Actuator Connection to F-DO Modules .............................................................. 5-20
5.5. F-DQ Parameters ................................................................................................................ 5-21
5.5.1. Channel Parameters (1)...................................................................................................... 5-21
5.5.2. Dark Test............................................................................................................................. 5-23
5.5.3. Dark Test Signal Sequence ................................................................................................ 5-24
5.5.4. Switch-on Test .................................................................................................................... 5-25
5.5.5. Light Test ............................................................................................................................ 5-26
5.5.6. Light Test Signal Sequence ................................................................................................ 5-27
5.5.7. I/O Addresses ..................................................................................................................... 5-28
5.5.8. Example: Actuator Connection up to SIL3/Cat.4/PLe ......................................................... 5-29
5.6. F-Power Module: F-PM-E 24VDC/8A PPM ........................................................................ 5-30
5.7. F-PM Channel Parameters ................................................................................................. 5-31
5.8. F-PM Actuator Connection: PM / PP Switching .................................................................. 5-32
5.9. Switching of loads with ground ........................................................................................... 5-33
5.10. F-Relay Module: F-RQ 1x24VDC/24..230VAC/5A ............................................................. 5-34
5.11. Switching an F-Relay Module with F-DQ ............................................................................ 5-35
5.12. Stop Categories in Accordance with EN 60204-1............................................................... 5-36
5.13. Task Description: Adjusting the F-Module Parameters ...................................................... 5-37
5.13.1. Exercise 1: Parameterizing F-DI Slot 3 ............................................................................... 5-38
5.13.1.1. Re: Exercise 1: Service Switch Channel 0, 4 ..................................................................... 5-39
5.13.1.2. Re: Exercise 1: E-Stop E1 Channel 1, 5 ............................................................................. 5-40
5.13.1.3. Re: Exercise 1: E-Stop E2 Channel 3, 7 ............................................................................. 5-41
5.13.2. Exercise 2: Parameterizing F-PM Slot 4 ............................................................................. 5-42
5.13.2.1. Re: Exercise 2: E-Stop E3 Channel 0, 1 ............................................................................. 5-43
5.13.2.2. Re: Exercise 2: Switching-off the Standard DQ, Channel 0 ............................................... 5-44
5.13.3. Exercise 3: Parameterizing F-DQ Slot 6 ............................................................................. 5-45
TIA-SAFETY - Sensor / Actuator Connection
Training Document V15.00.00 5-1
SIMATIC TIA Portal Safety Advanced
5.13.3.1. Re: Exercise 3: Controlling Motor 1 and Motor 2, Channel 0, 1 ......................................... 5-46
5.13.4. Exercise 4: Parameterizing F-DI Slot 7 ............................................................................... 5-47
5.13.4.1. Re: Exercise 4: E-Stop E4, Channel 0, 4............................................................................ 5-48
5.13.4.2. Re: Exercise 4: RFID Safety Switch, Channel 1, 5 ............................................................. 5-49
5.13.4.3. Re: Exercise 4: Two-hand Monitoring, Channel 2, 6 .......................................................... 5-50
5.13.5. Exercise 5: Compiling the HW Configuration and Downloading it into the CPU ................ 5-51
5.14. Additional Information ......................................................................................................... 5-52
5.14.1. Terminal Assignment ET 200SP / F-DI ............................................................................... 5-53
5.14.2. Terminal Assignment ET 200SP / F-DQ ............................................................................. 5-54
5.14.3. Terminal Assignment ET 200SP / F-PM ............................................................................. 5-55
5.14.4. Terminal Assignment ET 200SP / F-RQ ............................................................................. 5-56
5.14.5. SINAMICS G120: STO / SS1 in PL(e) SIL3 E-Stop via Terminals on
PM240-2 FSD-FSF ............................................................................................................. 5-57
5.14.6. Help on Using Safety Technology ...................................................................................... 5-58
Equivalent
For each process signal, one
two-channel or two
single-channel sensors are
One sensor is connected via one channel connected as an equivalent
(1oo1 evaluation). to two inputs of the F-module.
Any sensor supply of the module can be An external supply is
assigned to each input. also possible
Nonequivalent
For each process signal, one
two-channel or two
single-channel sensors are
You can also supply the sensor by means
connected as a nonequivalent
of an external sensor supply.
to two inputs of the F-module.
An external supply is
also possible
1oo1 Evaluation
For the 1oo1 evaluation, the sensor is present once.
Sensor Supply
The sensor supply can be powered internally or externally.
Wiring Scheme
For each process signal, a two-channel sensor is connected as an equivalent sensor to two
inputs of the F-module; or, for each process signal, two single-channel sensors that acquire the
same process value are connected to two inputs of the F-module.
Important:
For 2-channel read-in of the process signal via
the module (equivalent/nonequivalent), now only
the less significant bit is available in the
program for the user
Short-circuit Test
Here, you activate the short-circuit detection for the channels of the F-module for which "Internal
sensor supply" is set. The short-circuit test is only useful when you use simple switches that do
not have their own power supply. For switches with a power supply, for example 3-/4-wire
proximity switches, a short-circuit test is not possible.
The short-circuit detection temporarily switches off the sensor supply. The length of the switch-off
duration corresponds to the configured "Time for short-circuit test". If a short circuit is detected,
the F-module triggers a diagnostic interrupt, and the input is passivated.
The following short circuits are detected:
• Short-circuit of input to L+
• Short-circuit of the input of another channel if this has a "1" signal
• Short-circuit of the input with sensor supply of another channel
• Short-circuit of the sensor supply with sensor supply of another channel
If the short-circuit test is deactivated, you must route your cables in a short-circuit-proof and
cross-circuit-proof manner or select an interconnection type (discrepancy, nonequivalent) that
detects cross-circuits also based on discrepancy.
During the execution time of the short-circuit test (time for short-circuit test + startup time of
sensor after short-circuit test), the last valid value of the input before the start of the short-circuit
test is forwarded to the F-CPU. Activation of the short-circuit test thus affects the response time of
the respective channel or channel pair.
~24V
Short-circuit test
activated
Short-circuit test
deactivated
~0V
• If the channel is passivated, this can also be caused by too-high capacitance between the
sensor supply and input. This is made up of the capacitance per unit length of the cable and
the capacitance of the utilized sensor. If the connected capacitance is not discharged within
the assigned time, you must adjust the "Time for short-circuit test" parameter.
• The available values for the input delay depend on the "Startup time of sensor after short-
circuit test" and the "Time for short-circuit test" of the parameterized sensor supply.
Sensor supplies
• Every supply can be used for every input
• If you don’t use a supply, it is deactivated
Evaluation of a single-channel
sensor
Channel used
Activated
Inputs that are not used should be deactivated to lessen the load on the CPU and to allow faster
updating of the process image for inputs (PII).
Sensor Supply
Here, you select between one of the internal sensor supplies VS0 to VSn or an external sensor
supply. An internal sensor supply must be selected to make use of the short-circuit test.
Input Delay
An input delay is the minimum time that a changed input signal must be present at the module to
be detected and encoded as a new signal. The input delay serves to suppress ("debounce") short
interference pulses. To suppress coupled-in noise, you can set an input delay time for a channel
or a channel pair.
Interference pulses whose pulse time is less than the set input delay time (in ms) are suppressed.
Suppressed interference pulses are not visible in the PII. A high input delay suppresses longer
interference pulses but also has a longer reaction time as a result. The available values for the
input delay depend on the "Startup time of sensor after short-circuit test" and the "Time for short-
circuit test" of the parameterized sensor supply.
Chatter Monitoring
Chatter monitoring is a process control function for digital input signals. During 1oo1 evaluation, it
detects and signals unusual process-related signal characteristics, such as too frequent
fluctuation of the input signal between "0" and "1". If signal characteristics like these occur, it is a
sign that the sensors are faulty or there are process-related instabilities. Each input channel has a
parameterized (assigned) monitoring window. The monitoring window is started the first time the
input signal changes. If the input signal changes within the monitoring window at least as often as
the assigned "Number of signal changes", a chatter error is detected. If no chatter error is
detected within the monitoring window, the next signal change restarts the monitoring window. If
a chatter error is detected, a diagnostic is signaled. If the chatter error does not occur for a period
equal to three times the assigned monitoring window time, the diagnostic is reset.
Monitoring Window
This specifies the time for the chatter monitoring window. You can set the monitoring window time
from 1 to 100 sec in 1 sec increments. If you set 0 sec, you can parameterize a monitoring
window of 0.5 sec.
Reintegration behavior:
Test 0-Signal necessary /
not necessary
Discrepancy Analysis
When you use a two-channel sensor or two single-channel sensors that acquire (measure) the
same physical process variable, the sensors will, for example, respond slightly delayed with
respect to each other due to the limited precision of their arrangement. The discrepancy analysis
for equivalence/nonequivalence is used in the case of fail-safe inputs in order to infer the
presence of faults from the time characteristic of two signals with the same functionality. The
discrepancy analysis is initiated if a different level (for nonequivalence check, the same level) is
detected for two associated input signals. A test is conducted to determine whether the difference
(for nonequivalence check, the agreement) has disappeared after expiration of an assigned time
– the so-called discrepancy time. If not, a discrepancy error exists.
Discrepancy time
Discrepancy time (e.g. 100ms)
starts
1
Signal
sequence
Channel 0
0
Discrepancy time is t
reset Signal sequence
1 Channel 4 (discrepancy
error)
Signal
sequence
Channel 4
0
Discrepancy time t
exceeded
(discrepancy error) Supply PII for ‘0’
1 value PII for last valid
value
PII for last valid (discrepancy error)
value
0
t
Discrepancy Behavior
For "Discrepancy behavior" you parameterize (assign) the value that is to be made available to
the safety program in the F-CPU during the time that a discrepancy exists between the two input
channels involved, which means, when the discrepancy time is running. You assign the
discrepancy behavior parameter as follows:
• "Supply last valid value"
• "Supply value 0"
Two settings are possible for the behavior of the module channel while the discrepancy time is
running:
"Supply last valid value"
The last valid value (old value) from before the discrepancy occurred is made available to the
safety program in the F-CPU as soon as a discrepancy is detected between the signals of the two
input channels involved. This value is provided until the discrepancy has disappeared, or until the
discrepancy time has expired and a discrepancy error is detected. After expiration of the
discrepancy time, the value '0' is always signaled to the safety program of the CPU if a
discrepancy error is detected!
Caution:
Because a discrepancy error is only detected after the discrepancy time has elapsed, the reaction
time of the controller is prolonged. If very fast PLC reactions to fault conditions are required for
safety reasons, the discrepancy time should be set no longer than is actually necessary.
"Supply value 0"
Because, with this setting, the "safe" value "0" is already signaled to the safety program of the F-
CPU while the discrepancy time is running, the reaction time of the PLC is not increased. This is
because the value "0" is the value that is signaled to the CPU anyway under a fault condition
(after the discrepancy time has elapsed).
Discrepancy Time
The discrepancy behavior is only relevant while the discrepancy time is running! If the
discrepancy is still present even after expiration of the discrepancy time, the module detects this
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as an error and signals the value "0" to the F-CPU for the channel involved (same as always
under a fault condition).
In most cases, the discrepancy time is started, but does not fully expire because the signal
differences disappear again after a short time.
For equivalence check: Select a discrepancy time of sufficient length so that, under fault-free
conditions, the difference between the two signals always disappears before the discrepancy time
has expired.
For nonequivalence check: Select a discrepancy time of sufficient length so that, under fault-free
conditions, the agreement of the two signals always disappears before the discrepancy time has
expired.
Requirements
You have assigned parameters as follows:
"Sensor evaluation": "1oo2 evaluation, equivalent" OR "1oo2 evaluation, nonequivalent"
Process Image
In addition to the process images PII and PIQ that are updated automatically by the operating
system, up to 15 process image partitions (PIP) can be parameterized (CPU-specific, PIP 1 to
max. PIP 15). Thus it is possible, independent of the cyclically updated OB1 process image
(OB1-PI), to update process image partitions (PIP) depending on the execution of interrupt OBs.
Each I/O address range or each input module and output module can be assigned to only one
process image partition. If a module is assigned to one of the process image partitions (PIP), then
the module can no longer be part of the cyclic process image (OB1-PI).
Error detection
Internal Vs and short- Internal Vs and short-circuit
External sensor supply
circuit test activated test deactivated
Error
Discrepancy error - - -
*)The error detection only occurs with a signal distortion. That is, the signal read differs from the sensor signal.
If there is no signal distortion vis-à-vis the sensor signal, no error detection is possible and is also not necessary from a safety point of view.
Warning: If the short-circuit test is not activated or the sensor supply for digital inputs is set to "External sensor supply“,
you must route your cables in a short-circuit-proof manner.
Warning: In order to achieve SIL3/Cat.3/PLd with this wiring, a suitably qualified sensor is necessary.
Sensor Use
When fail-safe input modules are used, the substitute value '0' is forwarded to the CPU after
faults are detected, which causes the safety program to execute a safe reaction. Therefore, be
aware that the sensors must also be implemented in such a way that they supply a 0 signal if the
safety program is to execute the safe reaction.
Error detection
Error Equivalent evaluation Nonequivalent evaluation
*) The error detection only occurs with a signal distortion. That is, the signal read differs from the sensor signal (discrepancy error).
If there is no signal distortion vis-à-vis the sensor signal, no error detection is possible and is also not necessary from a safety point of view.
Warning: In order to achieve SIL3/Cat.4/PLe with this wiring, a suitably qualified sensor is necessary.
Nonequivalent Sensor
If a nonequivalent sensor is used for the shutdown, its normally closed contact must be wired to
the lower channel address of the input module so that the 0 signal can be evaluated in the safety
program when the button is actuated.
If the nonequivalent sensor is used as an enabling button, its normally open contact must be
wired to the lower channel address of the input module so that the 1 signal can be evaluated in
the safety program when the button is actuated.
Protective
door
EMERGENCY Closed
STOP n
Open
Evaluation unit
Evaluation unit Evaluation unit
max. PLe (Cat.4) / SIL3 max. PLd (Cat.3) / SIL2 max. PLd (Cat.3) / SIL2
Series connection
In general, sensors can be connected in series in all categories.
Cat.4 / PLe / SIL3 requires, however, that
− every fault is detected
and
− an accumulation of faults does not lead to loss of the safety function.
Light curtains / Light grids / Laser scanners* Light curtains / Light grids
with electronic outputs OSSD 1/2 with relay outputs
OSSD 1
OSSD 1
OSSD 2
OSSD 2
internal S e n s o r s u p p l y
external S e n s o r s u p p l y through E v a l u a t i o n u n i t
Connection of one load per output Connection of two loads per output
Recommended
Parallel to P and M
In order to manage cross-circuits between the P and M-switch
Each of the 4 fail-safe digital outputs consists
of a fail-safe digital output, both relays are connected in parallel to P and M.
of one P-switch (DQ-P) and one M-switch
(DQ-M). You connect the load between the
P-switch and the M-switch. So that voltage is
applied to the load, both switches are always
energized.
to L+ and M
You can switch two relays with one fail-safe digital output. Make sure that the
same reference potential is used and that the NO contacts of both relays are
switched in series.
Specifies the time in which the light, dark and switch on tests are to be
performed (100s/1000s). In case of a fault, the time is reduced to 60 seconds.
Activated
If you select this check box, you activate the corresponding channel for signal processing in the
safety program. You can deactivate an unused channel with this parameter.
Readback Time
The readback time is the maximum time after switching off the output that a feedback signal can
still be detected before the "short-circuit" error triggers passivation of the output channel. The
readback time must be set long enough, especially when capacitive loads are being switched, to
allow the discharge of the switched capacitance within the readback time.
The readback time is also the dark period for shutdown tests. For checking the actuator wiring,
0 signals are switched to the output while the output is active. A sufficiently slow actuator does
not respond to the temporary switch-off of the output and remains switched on.
Dark test
• The dark test is part of the bit pattern test.
• A test signal is switched to the output channel while the output channel is active ("1").
• The output channel is then briefly deactivated (= "dark period") and read back.
• A sufficiently slow actuator does not respond to this and remains switched on.
Switch on test
• The switch on test is part of the bit pattern test.
• During the switch on test, the P-switch and the M-switch of the output channel are
alternately closed and read back when the output channel is inactive ("0").
• Unlike the light test, no current flows through the connected load during the test.
Light test
• A test signal is switched to the output channel while the output channel is inactive ("0").
• The output channel is switched on briefly during the light test and read back. A sufficiently
slow actuator does not respond to this and remains switched off.
• Unlike the switch on test, the P-switch and the M-switch switch simultaneously during
the light test and current flows through the connected load.
Readback
Caution!
You must always install a feedback loop / feedback which monitors for a possible actuator failure!
F-DI
E-Stop F-DI
“Fast
reaction” DQ DQ DQ DQ DI
Acknowledgement
and/or F-DQ
SIL2 /PLd
PM switching PP switching
PM Switching PP Switching
Caution!
It is no longer possible to shut down an actuator if a cross circuit has developed between L+ and DQ. To prevent
cross circuits between L+ and DQ, you must route the cables used to connect the actuators in a cross-circuit proof
manner (for example, as separate, sheathed cables or in separate cable ducts).
Connection of One Load to the Digital Output, PP-switching (see picture, upper right)
The fail-safe digital output consists of two P-switches (current-sourcing switches) for DQ-P0 and
one M-switch (current-sinking switch) for DQ-M0. In this application, you connect the load
between the P-switch DQ-P0 and ground. So that voltage is applied to the load, the two P-
switches are always energized. With a suitably qualified actuator, you also achieve
SIL3/Cat.4/PLe with this circuit.
Connection of One Load to the Digital Output, PM-switching (see picture, upper left)
The fail-safe digital output consists of two P-switches for DQ-P0 and one M-switch for DQ-M0.
You connect the load between the P-switches DQ-P0 and the M-switch DQ-M0. So that voltage is
applied to the load, the two P-switches and the M-switch are always energized. With a suitably
qualified actuator, you also achieve SIL3/Cat.4/PLe with this circuit.
If the following two conditions are met a PM Switching module detects a short circuit:
• If loads that have a connection between
chassis and ground are switched by the
module for example to improve the
EMC properties.
• If chassis and ground are connected at the
power supply unit.
Remedy:
• Reduce the capacitance value between chassis and ground at the load end to less than 2 μF.
• Increase the value of the resistance between chassis and ground at the load end to more than 100 kΩ.
OR:
• Use a PP-switching module.
The shut-down of a drive can occur in various ways in accordance with EN 60204-1:
n
Stop Category 0 safe torque off
Stop Category 1 n
OFF 3 safe torque off
• Drive is electrically braked into shut-down (standstill)
• The energy supply is switched off when shut-down is completed
t
• Switch-off electromechanical or electronic brake uncontrolled
EN 60204-1
Safety of machinery – Electrical equipment of machines – Part 1: General requirements
Stop Cat. 0
Shut-down by immediately switching off the energy supply to the machines / drive machinery.
This does not have to occur electromechanically because; electrical isolation is not necessary.
Stop Cat. 1
Controlled shut-down, whereby the energy supply to the machines / drive machinery is
maintained to achieve shut-down; the energy supply is only interrupted when the shut-down has
been completed (standstill);
Controlled shut-down: shut-down of a machine movement with electric energy to the machines /
drive machinery which is maintained during the shut-down process.
Stop Cat. 2
Controlled shut-down in which the energy supply to the machines / drive machinery is maintained.
I 4.3 I 4.1
I 4.0 I 4.4
Channel pair 3,7 Channel pair 1,5
Channel 0 Channel 4
The channel pair 2, 6 is not used. The channels 2 and 6 can therefore be deactivated
deactivate
E-Stop E3:
one two-channel switch
with 1oo2 evaluation
and internal sensor supply
connected
Q10.0
deactivate
Channel 2 Channel 6
The channel pair 3, 7 is not used. The channels 3 and 7 can therefore be deactivated
deactivate
2. Save
Task
Now that the PROFINET I/O system is completely configured and parameterized, the project
must be completely compiled, saved and downloaded into the CPU.
What to Do
1. Compile the hardware configuration by selecting the S7-1500 station in the Project tree and
then clicking on the Compile button (see picture). In the Inspector window under "Info", check
whether the compilation was successful. Should errors have occurred, correct them.
2. Save your project.
3. Download the entire station into the CPU by clicking on the Download button (see picture). In
the Inspector window under "Info", check whether the loading was successful.
4. Save your project.
Result:
All modules should now be error-free and errors should no longer be pending on the CPU.
Terminal assignment
Terminal Assignment Terminal Assignment
1 DI0 2 DI1
DI0 DI1
3 DI2 4 DI3
5 DI4 6 DI5
7 DI6 8 DI7
US0 US1
9 US0 10 US1
11 US2 12 US3
13 US4 14 US5
15 US6 16 US7
L+ 24V DC M M
• DIn: Fail-safe digital input, Channel n
• USn: Internal sensor supply, Channel n
Terminal assignment
The F-DI 8×24VDC HF digital input module has 8 fail-safe inputs DI0 to DI7 (SIL3). You can
combine two of these inputs each into one input.
You can combine the following inputs:
• DI0 and DI4
• DI1 and DI5
• DI2 and DI6
• DI3 and DI7
Channels DI0, DI1, DI2 and DI3 supply the process signals.
Terminal assignment
Terminal Assignment Terminal Assignment
DQP0 DQP1
1 DQ-P0 2 DQ-P1
3 DQ-P2 4 DQ-P3
5 DQ-P0 6 DQ-P1
7 DQ-P2 8 DQ-P3
DQM0 DQM1
9 DQ-M0 10 DQ-M1
11 DQ-M2 12 DQ-M3
13 DQ-M0 14 DQ-M1
15 DQ-M2 16 DQ-M3
L+ 24V DC M M
• DQ-Pn: Fail-safe digital output, Channel n, P-switching
• DQ-Mn: Ground for fail-safe digital output, Channel n, M-switching
Terminal assignment
Terminal Assignment Terminal Assignment
DI0
1 DI0 2 DI1 US0
3 US0 4 US1 DQP0 DQM0
5 DQ-P0 6 DQ-M0
7 AUX 8 AUX
L+ 24V DC M M
L+ 24V DC M M
•DIn: Fail-safe digital input, Channel n
•USn: Internal sensor supply, Channel n
•DQ-P0: Fail-safe digital output, Channel 0, P-switching
•DQ-M0: Ground for fail-safe digital output, Channel 0, M-switching
•AUX: Terminal for PE or as voltage bus (free for use up to 230 V AC)
Terminal assignment
5.14.5. SINAMICS G120: STO / SS1 in PL(e) SIL3 E-Stop via Terminals on PM240-2
FSD-FSF
Contents Attainable
Contents 6
6. Programming .......................................................................................................... 6-4
6.1. User Program of an F-CPU................................................................................................... 6-5
6.2. Blocks of the Safety Program ............................................................................................... 6-6
6.3. Structure and Processing of the Safety Program ................................................................. 6-7
6.4. Main-Safety-Block S7-1500F ................................................................................................ 6-8
6.5. F-Runtime Group .................................................................................................................. 6-9
6.6. The Safety Program ............................................................................................................ 6-10
6.7. Structure of the Safety Program ......................................................................................... 6-11
6.8. Creating an F-FC / F-FB ..................................................................................................... 6-12
6.9. Programming an F-FC / F-FB in F-FBD / F-LAD ................................................................ 6-13
6.9.1. Safety Library ...................................................................................................................... 6-14
6.9.2. Instances ............................................................................................................................. 6-15
6.9.3. Multiple Instances ............................................................................................................... 6-16
6.9.4. Boolean constants FALSE for "0" and TRUE for "1" .......................................................... 6-17
6.10. Safety Administration Editor................................................................................................ 6-18
6.10.1. General ............................................................................................................................... 6-19
6.10.1.1. When does the Signature change? (1) ............................................................................... 6-20
6.10.1.2. When does the Signature change? (2) ............................................................................... 6-21
6.10.1.3. When does the Signature change? (3) ............................................................................... 6-22
6.10.1.4. When does the Signature change? (4) ............................................................................... 6-23
6.10.1.5. When does the Signature change? (5) ............................................................................... 6-24
6.10.1.6. When does the Signature change? (6) ............................................................................... 6-25
6.10.2. F-Runtime Groups .............................................................................................................. 6-26
6.10.3. Creating an F-Runtime Group............................................................................................. 6-27
6.10.4. F-Runtime Group - Settings ................................................................................................ 6-28
6.10.5. F-Blocks .............................................................................................................................. 6-29
6.10.6. F-Compliant PLC-Data Types ............................................................................................. 6-30
6.10.7. Access Protection ............................................................................................................... 6-31
6.10.8. Web Server F-Admins ......................................................................................................... 6-32
6.10.9. Settings (1) .......................................................................................................................... 6-33
6.10.10. Settings (2) .......................................................................................................................... 6-34
6.11. Know-how Protection .......................................................................................................... 6-35
6.11.1. Creating............................................................................................................................... 6-35
6.11.2. Removing ............................................................................................................................ 6-36
6.12. Compiling ............................................................................................................................ 6-37
6.12.1. Compiling the Safety Program (1) ...................................................................................... 6-37
6.12.2. Compiling the Safety Program (2) ...................................................................................... 6-38
6.13. Downloading into the CPU .................................................................................................. 6-39
6.13.1. Downloading the Safety Program into the CPU (1) ............................................................ 6-39
6.13.2. Downloading the Safety Program into the CPU (2) ............................................................ 6-40
6.13.3. Downloading the Safety Program into the CPU (3) ............................................................ 6-41
6.14. Uploading into the PG ......................................................................................................... 6-42
6.14.1. Uploading the Safety Program into the PG......................................................................... 6-42
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6. Programming
… be familiar with and will be able to use the operations permitted in the
F-program
… be familiar with and will be able to use the specified safety functions
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STEP 7 TIA
Standard program
Professional
F-Program
The safety program (F-program) is made up of a section created in FBD or LAD by the user and a
section generated by Safety Advanced that contains, among other things, the diversified logic for
the user section.
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F-FC, F-FB
The user can program the required safety functions in the programming languages "F-FBD"
and/or "F-LAD". These programming languages basically correspond to the standard FBD and
LAD languages, but are restricted in their set of operations and the data types and operand areas
they can use.
F-DBs
Data blocks for storing global data are also available in the safety program. The approach for
creating/modifying safety-related data blocks (F-DBs) and using them in programs is the same as
for standard DBs. The only restriction involves the data types available for use. Instance data
blocks of safety-related FBs (regardless of whether they are created by the user or copied from
the safety functions of Safety Advanced) are not edited by the user as in the standard case but
are instead generated by STEP 7.
SBs
In order to create an executable safety program from the user-programmed safety program,
Safety Advanced generates so-called "F-system blocks" (SBs) in the form of F-FBs when saving
and compiling the hardware configuration and when compiling the safety program. These blocks
serve to detect faults and ensure the fault reaction so that failures of the F-system result in a safe
state. Furthermore, they carry out the communication between the F-CPU (process image) and
F-I/O using the PROFIsafe safety protocol.
F-OB
The F-OB calls the main safety block of an F-runtime group in S7-1500 F-CPUs.
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Main-Safety-Block S7-1500F
Main-Safety-Block
Each runtime group is represented by a "main-safety-block", an F-FC or F-FB that serves as an
entry into the safety program and whose call for that purpose is ordinarily programmed in an F-
OB. The user can program the logic of the F-program directly in this block, and/or he can use it to
call other safety-related blocks for purposes of F-program structuring. In addition to the user-
created program in the main-safety-block, Safety Advanced also generates further calls of
automatically generated blocks with which safety functions are implemented, that serve as I/O
drivers, or which contain the diversified logic, etc.
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Compare results
F-Runtime Groups
To make it easier to handle, a safety program consists of one or two "F-runtime groups". An F-
runtime group is a logical construct of several related F-blocks which is formed internally by the F-
system.
An F-runtime group consists of:
• An F-OB which calls the Main-Safety-Block
• A Main-Safety-Block (F-FB/F-FC which you assign to the F-OB)
• If necessary, additional F-FBs/F-FCs which you program with FBD/LAD and call from the
Main-Safety-Block
• If necessary, one or more F-DBs
• F-I/O DBs
• F-runtime group information DB
• F-blocks from the project library or from global libraries
• F-system blocks (F-SBs)
• Automatically generated F-blocks (Compiler blocks)
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Note
You are not permitted to insert F-system blocks from the "System blocks" folder into a Main-
Safety-Block/F-FB/F-FC.
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F-FC / F-FB
The functions (FCs) and function blocks (FBs) of the safety program are created in exactly the
same way as those of the standard program; only the "Fail-safe" or "Create F-block" option has to
be activated.
Main-Safety-Block
The Main-Safety-Block of a runtime group is created and programmed just like any other F-block.
The user can program the safety-related logic directly in this block, and/or he can use the block to
call other safety-related blocks in it for purposes of program structuring.
The property - that an F-FC or F-FB is to be used as a "Main-Safety-Block" - is only assigned to
this block when the runtime group is created within the "Safety Administration". When the safety
program is compiled, the calls of the blocks generated by Safety Advanced are then integrated in
the Main-Safety-Block.
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6.9.2. Instances
F-Blocks
Safety-related block calls are programmed in exactly the same way as standard block calls. Only
safety-related blocks may be called in the safety program. Accordingly, only safety-related blocks
are available for selection in the "FB blocks" and "FC blocks" folders in the "Overview" of the
editor. When the call of a safety function is integrated or programmed, the required instance DBs
are generated by STEP 7.
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Multiple Instances
STEP 7 also supports the multi-instance concept in safety programs in order to also enable an
object-oriented programming style here. This allows multiple instances of user functions as well
as safety functions to be declared and called.
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6.9.4. Boolean constants FALSE for "0" and TRUE for "1"
The Boolean constants "FALSE" for ‘0’ and "TRUE" for ‘1’ are available for
S7-1500 F-CPUs.
You can also create "1" or "TRUE" in a tag with the help of the Assignment instruction.
To do so, do not interconnect the box input of the Assignment instruction in FBD. In LAD, you
interconnect the input directly with the power rail.
You obtain a tag with "0" or "FALSE" by subsequent inversion with the instruction Invert RLO.
Example FBD:
Example LAD:
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General
The safety mode status, the safety program status and the collective F-signature is displayed
under "General".
F-Runtime Groups
A safety program consists of one or two F-runtime groups. Under "F-runtime group" you define
the blocks and properties of an F-runtime group.
F-Blocks
Under "F-blocks" you obtain information about the F-blocks used in your safety program and their
properties.
Access Protection
Under "Access protection" you can set up, change or revoke the password for the safety
program. Access protection is mandatory for productive operation.
Settings
Under "Settings" you set the parameters for the safety program.
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6.10.1. General
• The safety mode status, the safety program status and the collective
F-signature are displayed in "General".
The collective F-signatures uniquely identify a particular status of the safety program and the safety-relevant
parameters of the F-CPU and F-I/O. They are important for the on-site acceptance of the safety program.
Program Signature
"Program signature" displays the collective F-signature offline, for F-CPUs S7-1200/1500 the
software F-signature as well as the hardware F-signature offline, and the "Time stamp" displays
the time of the last compilation process.
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A safety program
consists of one or
two F-runtime
groups.
It is possible to generate an
“F-I/O-status block”.
Under "F-runtime
group" you define
the blocks and
properties of an
F-runtime group.
Rules:
• The channels (channel values and value status) of an F-I/O may only be accessed from one
individual F-runtime group.
• Tags of the F-I/O DB of an F-I/O may only be accessed from one F-runtime group and only
from the F-runtime group from which access to the channels and value status of this F-I/O
occurs (if access exists).
• F-FBs can be used in several F-runtime groups but they must be called with different instance
DBs.
• Instance DBs to F-FBs may only be accessed from the F-runtime group in which the
associated F-FB is called.
• A tag of a global F-DB may only be accessed from one F-runtime group (however, a global F-
DB may be used in several F-runtime groups).
• (S7-1200, S7-1500) You cannot call the Main-Safety-Block. It is automatically called by the
assigned F-OB.
• (S7-1200, S7-1500) The F-OB should be created with the highest priority of all OBs.
• The process image for inputs and outputs of standard I/O, memory bits and tags of DBs of the
standard user program may be accessed either reading or writing from several F-runtime
groups. (also see data exchange between standard user program and safety program)
• F-FCs can generally be called in several F-runtime groups.
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For an F-OB you can select between the event classes "Program cycle", "Cyclic interrupt" or
"Synchronous cycle".
In the case of the F-runtime group created by default, the F-OB has the event class "Cyclic
interrupt". To change the event class of the F-OB of an already created F-runtime group, you
need to delete and F-runtime group and create a new one.
Cyclic interrupt
We recommend creating the F-OB with the event class "Cyclic interrupt" as "cyclic interrupt OB".
The safety program will then be called and run at fixed time intervals.
Synchronous cycle
F-OBs with the event class "Synchronous cycle" are only recommended in conjunction with F-I/O
devices that support isochronous mode, for example submodule "Profisafe Telgr 902" of drive
SINAMICS S120 CU310-2 PN V5.1.
Program cycle
F-OBs with the event class "Program cycle" are not recommended, as these have the lowest
priority "1".
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6.10.5. F-Blocks
Offline
Online
Displayed Information
The following information is displayed for F-blocks in offline mode:
• Has the F-block been compiled and used?
• Function of F-lock in the safety program
• Offline signature
• Time stamp of the last change
The following information is displayed for F-blocks in online mode:
• Status (whether block has the same time stamp online and offline)
• Function of F-block in the safety program
• Offline signature
• Online signature
• The F-blocks are hierarchically displayed just as in the "Program blocks" folder.
Filter Function
Using the filter function, you can select whether you want to view all F-blocks of a certain F-
runtime group or the entire safety program.
• Select "All F-blocks" from the drop-down list to view all F-blocks.
• Select an F-runtime group from the drop-down list to see all F-blocks of this F-runtime group.
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Displayed Information
The following information is displayed for F-compliant PLC data types (UDT) in offline mode:
• Is the F-compliant PLC data type used in the safety program?
• Time stamp of the last change.
The following information is displayed for F-compliant PLC data types (UDT) in online mode:
• Status (whether the F-compliant PLC data types (UDT) have the same time stamp online and
offline)
The F-compliant PLC data types (UDT) are displayed hierarchically just as in the "PLC data
types" folder.
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Access protection is
mandatory for productive
operation!
Note:
Safety program recompilation is required after changes to standard DBs to which the safety
program has read or write access. These standard DBs are not governed by the safety program
access protection.
Please note that you also need the online password to download the safety-relevant changes to
the hardware configuration. This is also true for changes to F-I/O not used in the safety program.
You must also recompile and download the safety program for the download to be consistent.
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Functionality
You must have the "F-admin" rights in order to carry out restoration of a backup via the Web
server of your F-CPU. You assign the "F-Admin" rights in the hardware configuration of the F-
CPU under the User management of the Web server.
In this section, you obtain information on which users have the "F-Admin" rights online or offline
for F-CPUs that support this right. You can see from this whether a change to the "F-Admin"
rights is active on the F-CPU. In order to make a change to the "F-Admin" rights effective, you
must load the configuration to the F-CPU.
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Checkmark set:
-> Button enabled
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Requirements
An F-block to which you wish to assign know-how
protection must be called in the safety program.
The safety program must be consistent.
Note:
In addition, the following protective mechanisms are
available (Block properties):
Write-protect
Copy protect (Binding to CPU or SMC)
Requirements:
• An F-block to which you wish to assign know-how protection must be called in the safety
program.
• Before you can set up the know-how protection for an F-block, the safety program must be
consistent. For this purpose, compile the safety program.
Notes:
• No source code is output for know-how protected F-blocks in the safety summary. Therefore,
create the safety summary (for example, to carry out a code review or to accept the F-block)
before you set up the know-how protection.
• If you would like to edit the program code and/or the block interface of a know-how protected
F-block, we recommend that you not open the F-block by entering a password. Instead
remove the know-how protection completely and to set it up again after compiling.
• When a know-how protected F-block or F-blocks called by it are renamed, the signature of the
know-how protected F-block is not changed until the password is entered when opening or
removing the know-how protection.
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6.11.2. Removing
Recommendation
If you would like to edit the program code and/or the
block interface of a know-how protected F-block, we
recommend that you do not open the F-block by
entering a password, but rather to remove the know-
how protection completely and to set it up again after
compiling.
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6.12. Compiling
6.12.1. Compiling the Safety Program (1)
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For S7-1200/1500 F-CPUs, only the "Consistent download" value is possible as an action in the
"Load preview" dialog. It is not possible to select separate loading of standard program or safety
program. The complete user program is automatically, consistently downloaded as soon as
changes have been made in both the standard program and in the safety program.
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Monitoring
Read-only test functions (such as monitoring tags of the safety program)
are available for safety programs as in the standard.
Modifying
Read and write test functions (such as controlling tags of the safety program) are only
available to a limited extent for safety programs and only in disabled safety mode.
Rules for testing
• Forcing of F-I/O inputs and F-I/O outputs is not possible.
• Controlling F-I/O outputs in connection with the function “Enabling F-I/O outputs" is
not possible.
• Setting breakpoints in the standard user program will cause errors in the safety
program (see also Testing the safety program.
Monitoring
All read-only test functions (for example, monitoring tags) are generally also possible for safety
programs and in safety mode.
Modifying
Modifying data of the safety program and write accesses to the safety program are only possible
with limitations and in disabled safety mode.
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Note
The data blocks "T1RTG_CURR" and "T1RTG_LONG" are currently not supported in STEP 7
Safety V14.
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Standard Program • may read all data of the safety program, but
cannot write to it
Safety Program
• Supported data types: BOOL / WORD / INT / DINT / TIME
UDT / ARRAY (restricted)
(not Byte, Real, complex data types)
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Data Transfer from the Safety Program to the Standard User Program
The standard user program can read all data of the safety program, for example, using symbolic
(fully qualified) accesses to:
• The instance DBs of the F-FBs ("Name of Instance DB".Signal_x)
• F-DBs (for example, "Name of F_DB".Signal_1)
• The process image for inputs and outputs of F-I/O (for example, "Emergency_Stop_Button_1"
(I 5.0))
Data Transfer from the Standard User Program to the Safety Program
As a basic principle, only fail-safe data or fail-safe signals from F-I/O and other safety programs
(in other F-CPUs) may be processed in the safety program, since all standard tags are unsafe.
If you must process tags from the standard user program in the safety program, however, you
can evaluate either memory bits from the standard user program, tags from a standard DB, or the
process image for inputs (PII) of standard I/O in the safety program (In the Safety manual: also
see the table of supported operand areas in: Restrictions in the programming languages
FBD/LAD).
Note that structural changes to standard DBs which are used in the safety program lead to
inconsistencies of the safety program and possibly to the password being requested. In this case,
the collective F-signature is once again the same as the original after compilation. To prevent this
effect, use "interprocess communication blocks" between the standard user program and the
safety program.
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Inputs
Standard
process image
Outputs
Inputs
Fail-safe
process image
Outputs
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Empfehlung:
Standard user program Safety program
• Use global standard data blocks to
exchange data between the standard user
program and the safety program.
Data buffer
• To ensure a good overview of which
program part reads and which one writes,
it is recommended to create two data
blocks for the two directions.
Advantages
• Lean F-runtime group
• Better overview of the exchanged data
• Changes of the diagnostic and signaling concept in the standard user program do not affect
the safety program's signature
• Minimized risk of downtimes caused by data corruption due to write access to the safety
program
• Simplified typing of F-blocks
• Changes to the standard user program can be loaded without stopping the CPU
• Standard user program and safety program can be created independently of each other,
provided that interfaces have already been defined
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Safety Output
Standard Condition
Safety Condition
Safety Output
Standard Condition
Safety Condition
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6.25.1. Re: Exercise 1: Copying a Touchpanel Project, Interface DBs and FCs from
the Library
Task
So far, your project does not contain an HMI device. Instead of creating a completely new
configuration, you are to copy a prepared Panel project and the data block "DB_OP", which is to
serve as the interface between the controller and the touchpanel, from the global library
"Safety_Lib" into your project. You will find the global library under:
"C:\02_Archives\TIA_Portal\TIA_SAFETY\Safety_Lib"
What to Do
1. Open the global library "C:\02_Archives\TIA_Portal\TIA_SAFETY\Safety_Lib".
2. Using drag & drop, copy the library elements found in the folder "06" -> "01"
to the appropriate locations in your project.
3. Assign the HMI to the device group "Labeling machine" by dragging it there using drag &
drop.
4. Save your project.
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Task
To ensure a data consistency, data which is written from the HMI into the user program at the
beginning of the cycle are to be copied in a separate data block (DB_OP -> DB_OP_Inputs). Data
which is read by the HMI is only to be transferred into the relevant data block
(DB_OP_Outputs -> DB_OP) at the end of the program cycle.
Note: The 1200/1500 CPU no longer works with a cycle control point (300/400) to update
HMI tags. The tags are updated at runtime.
What to Do
1. Call the "FC_Copy_OP_Inputs" (FC1) block in the first network of your cyclic OB1.
2. Call the "FC_Copy_OP_Outputs" (FC2) block in the last network of your cyclic OB1.
3. Save your project.
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6.25.3. Re: Exercise 1: Configuring, Networking and Adjusting the HMI Connection
1. Select HMI
connections
2. Drag connection
using drag & drop
Task
The touchpanel, which was added, is to be networked and connected offline to the Ethernet
network.
What to Do
1. In the Project tree, start the "Devices and networks" editor. Switch to the "Network view" and
there select "Connections".
2. Position the mouse pointer on the Ethernet interface of the HMI device and, while keeping the
left mouse button pressed down, drag a connection to the CPU. The connection is created.
The associated subnet and the parameters (IP address and subnet mask) appropriate for the
networking are automatically created.
3. If the current IP address of the HMI device does not match any subnet of the CPU, then the
subnet must be selected.
4. Check the local connection name of the just created HMI connection. It must match the name
preconfigured in the HMI project.
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6.25.4. Re: Exercise 1: Adjusting the IP Address and PROFINET Device Name
xxx
Task
Now that the HMI is networked and connected, the IP address and the PROFINET device name
are to be adjusted.
What to Do
1. Assign the touchpanel the appropriate IP address. This can be set via the ‘Properties’ in the
Inspector window.
2. Also assign the appropriate PROFINET device name. You can let it be automatically
generated from the Station name by setting the checkmark at "Generate PROFINET device
name automatically" or you can manually define it by removing the checkmark.
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6.25.5. Re: Exercise 1: Comparing the HMI / PLC Tags and Compiling
Start Synchronization
Synchronize with
PLC tags
Task
To make sure that every HMI tag is correctly connected to the corresponding PLC tag, you are to
carry out a synchronization between the HMI tags and the PLC tags.
What to Do
1. Open the "HMI tags" of the HMI device.
2. Then synchronize the WinCC tags (see picture).
3. Compile the HMI project by selecting the touchpanel in the Project tree and then clicking the
"Compile" button.
4. Save your project.
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Task
The now completed HMI and PLC projects are now to be downloaded.
What to Do
1. Download the Panel project into the touchpanel.
2. Compile the PLC project and download it to the CPU.
3. Save your project.
Result
The touchpanel should now be connected to your CPU. You can control the CPU tags of the
"DB_OP" data block with the touchpanel.
To check if it is working properly, switch to the "Controlpanel" screen on the Panel and there
press the "Start" button. In monitoring mode, you should see that the tag "Start" assumes the
value "1" in the data block "DB_OP".
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"F_OB" "FC_Main_Safety"
Task Description
You are to program the safety-related block "FC_Main_Safety" (FC100) which, through
evaluation of the RTG1Sys-DB, controls and displays the "Safety mode deactivated" display on
the Panel as long as the safety mode of the CPU is deactivated.
Note:
The evaluation of the RTG1Sys-DB could also be programmed in the standard program.
What to Do
The following pages explain what has to be done.
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3 2
Because a runtime group is automatically created when an F-CPU is created in TIA Portal, you
must delete this group and the associated F-blocks.
Note:
At this point, deleting the automatically created runtime group is only carried out as an exercise in
order to illustrate the creating of a new runtime group.
What to Do
1. Open the currently existing runtime group
"Safety Administration" -> "F-runtime group" -> "F-runtime group 1".
2. Delete the runtime group.
3. Delete the still existing F-blocks of the deleted runtime group.
4. Save your project.
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You are now to create a new runtime group. This runtime group will later contain your entire
safety program.
What to Do
1. Create a new runtime group
"Safety Administration" -> "F-runtime group" -> "Add new F-runtime group".
2. Select the name and the settings as shown in the picture.
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"FC_Main_Safety"
Task
The user must be informed immediately when the safety mode of the CPU is deactivated. This is
to be implemented via a display on the Panel.
What to Do
1. Program the "FC_Main_Safety" (FC100) in such a way that the "Safety mode deactivated"
(DB_OP_Outputs.DisableSafe) Display is displayed on the Panel as long as the safety mode
of the CPU is deactivated (RTG1SysInfo.MODE).
2. Download all blocks into the CPU.
3. Save your project.
Relevant Interfaces
Standard Fail-safe
Inputs
- -
Standard Fail-safe
Outputs
- -
Global System
Data blocks
DB_OP_Outputs.DisableSafe (DB99) RTG1SysInfo.MODE
Note
You will find the system data block RTG1SysInfo in the Program blocks folder under
"Program blocks" -> "System blocks" -> "STEP 7 Safety"
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Task
All relevant information about the safety program is to be provided to the user on the Panel.
What to Do
1. The current HMI project contains the "Runtimegroup Info" screen (see picture). On the Panel,
this screen is called via the "F-Runtimegroup" button. Configure individual output fields that
have the correct tag connection to the system data block "RTG1SysInfo" from the CPU.
2. Download your HMI project into the Panel.
3. Save your project.
Relevant Interfaces
Standard Fail-safe
Inputs
- -
Standard Fail-safe
Outputs
- -
Global System
RTG1SysInfo.TCYC_CURR
RTG1SysInfo.TRTG_CURR
Data blocks
- RTG1SysInfo.F_PROG_SIG
RTG1SysInfo.F_RTG_DAT
RTG1SysInfo.VERS_S7SAF
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Passivation
The safety concept is based on the existence of a safe state for all process variables. With safety-
related I/O modules, this "Fail-safe value" is the status '0'. If the safety-related I/O module detects
a fault, it passivates the channel involved or the entire module (all channels), which means the
channels are switched to the safe state.
The passivation of a channel or F-module occurs …
• During startup of the F-system
• In case of communication errors between the F-CPU and F-I/O
• In case of faults detected by the F-I/O (wire break, short-circuit, cross-circuit, etc.)
• Via the F-program (must be programmed by the user)
For passivated channels, a passivated F-DI module signals the logic state '0' to the process
image for inputs (PII) of the CPU, regardless of the actual sensor signals from the system.
A passivated F-DO module de-energizes passivated output channels regardless of the output
states transferred by the CPU from the process image for outputs (PIQ).
Depassivation
The depassivation of a channel or an F-module can occur …
• By a restart of the F-CPU automatically after fault elimination (not for communication errors)
• Via the F-program (must be programmed by the user)
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F-I/O DB
• Is generated for every F-module when it is inserted in the Device view
• Contains tags for evaluating the module status
• Is supplied with valid data by the PROFIsafe driver
F-I/O DB
For each F-I/O (in safety mode), an F-I/O DB is created automatically when the F-I/O are
configured in the Hardware and Network editor. The F-I/O DB contains tags that you can evaluate
in the safety program, or, that you can or must write in the safety program. A change of the start
values of the tags directly in the F-I/O DB is not permitted. When an F-I/O is deleted, the
associated F-I/O DB is also deleted.
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PASS_ON
You can use the PASS_ON tag to enable passivation of an F-I/O, for example, dependent on
certain states in your safety program. You can only passivate the entire F-I/O using the
PASS_ON tag in the F-I/O DB; channel-selective passivation is not possible. Passivation of the
associated F-I/O occurs as long as PASS_ON = 1.
ACK_NEC, ACK_REI
The depassivation (reintegration) of the module can be done manually or automatically. If the
initial value of the ACK_NEC tag remains '1', the module must be reintegrated manually. For this
purpose, the F-program assigns the state '1' to the ACK_REI tag. If the ACK_NEC tag is
overwritten with state "0", the module is depassivated or reintegrated automatically once the fault
has been eliminated (not after communication errors).
IPAR_EN
The IPAR_EN tag corresponds to the iPar_EN_C tag in the PROFIsafe bus profile as of
PROFIsafe Specification V1.20, fail-safe standard DP-slaves/IO-devices. To find out when you
must set/reset this tag when parameters of fail-safe standard DP slaves/IO devices are
reassigned, refer to the PROFIsafe specification V1.20 or higher or the documentation for the fail-
safe standard DP slave/IO device. Note that the passivation of the F-I/O involved is not triggered
by IPAR_EN = 1. If passivation is to occur when IPAR_EN = 1, you must also set the tag
PASS_ON = 1.
PASS_OUT
With state '1', the module indicates that it passivated itself due to a detected fault. If the module
was passivated by the PASS_ON tag via the F-program, the module leaves the PASS_OUT tag
in '0' state.
QBAD
With state '1', the module indicates that at least one channel is passivated. It does not matter in
this case whether passivation was brought about by the module itself or by the F-program using
the PASS_ON tag.
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ACK_REQ
After a fault is eliminated, the still passivated module indicates that it is ready for reintegration
with ACK_REQ= '1'.
IPAR_OK
The IPAR_OK tag corresponds to the iPar_OK_S tag in the PROFIsafe bus profile as of
PROFIsafe Specification V1.20, fail-safe standard DP-slaves/IO-devices. To find out how you can
evaluate this tag when parameters of fail-safe standard DP slaves/IO devices are reassigned,
refer to the PROFIsafe specification V1.20 or higher or the documentation for the fail-safe
standard DP slave/IO device.
DIAG
The DIAG tag is used for service purposes to provide non-fail-safe information (1 byte) regarding
faults that have occurred. You can read out this information using operator control and monitoring
systems or evaluate it in your standard user program, if necessary. The DIAG bits remain saved
until you carry out an acknowledgement with the ACK_REI tag or an automatic reintegration
occurs. You can assign this tag to a standard tag in the safety program using the MOVE
instruction
.
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Value status
• Additional information about the value of an F-I/O channel.
• The value status provides information about the validity of the associated channel
value:
• 1: A valid process value is being output for the channel.
• 0: A substitute value is being output for the channel.
• The channel value and value status of an F-I/O may only be accessed from the
same F-runtime group.
• The value status is entered in the process image for inputs (PII).
Value status
The value status is additional binary information for a channel value of an F-I/O. The value status
is entered in the process image for inputs (PII).
The value status is supported by fail-safe modules S7-1500/ET 200MP, ET 200SP, ET 200S,
ET 200iSP, ET 200pro, S7-1200 or S7-300 F-SMs, fail-safe standard IO-devices as well as fail-
safe standard DP-slaves which support the "RIOforFA-Safety" profile.
We recommend the assignment of a symbolic name for the value status, consisting of the name
of the channel value supplemented by "_VS", for example, "TagIn_1_VS".
The value status provides information about the validity of the associated channel value:
• 1: A valid process value is being output for the channel.
• 0: A substitute value is being output for the channel.
The channel value and value status of an F I/O may only be accessed from the same F-runtime
group.
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Address
assignment in
the PII
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Address
assignment in the
PII
Address
assignment in
the PIQ
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Address
assignment in the
PII
Address
assignment in
the PIQ
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Address
assignment in the
PII
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Why is every
signal and value
status 0?
Task
The behavior of the channel-specific value status of the fail-safe inputs / outputs of the training
device is now to be checked.
What to Do
1. Using drag & drop, copy the Tag table "Value Status F-Channels" and the Watch table
"Check Value Status" from the library into you project.
Safety_Lib: "06"->"03"
2. Monitor the value status and the process signal of the individual channels when you trigger
individual sensors (E1, E2, RFID, etc.).
3. Think about why all channels are currently passivated (value status = 0).
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"FB_Reintegration"
"FC_Diagnostic"
Pushbutton
“S_Reset” I 2.3
“P_Reset” Q2.7
Task
The user is to be signaled via the Panel as soon as a channel of an F-module has failed or is
passivated. In addition, the user is to receive a message as soon as a fault has gone and can be
acknowledged. So that the user can acknowledge a fault that has been eliminated, he is provided
with an acknowledgement button.
NOTE: For this exercise, please do not use the "ACK_GL" block from the Safety library. To
illustrate, the acknowledgement is to be triggered directly via the I/O DBs.
What to Do
1. Generate the safety block "FB_Reintegration" (FB110) and the standard block
"FC_Diagnostic" (FC12). Call these blocks in your program OB1->FC12 and FC100->FB110.
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2. Functionality "FB_Reintegration":
The reintegration (depassivation) of all F-modules is to be programmed in this block. As soon
as the acknowledgement button ("S_Reset") is pressed, a reintegration ("ACK_REI" of each
F-I/O data block) is to be triggered for each F-module.
3. Functionality "FC_Diagnostic":
The block is to read-in the passivation of at least one channel ("QBAD" of each F-I/O data
block) and display it on the Panel ("DB_OP_Outputs.ModulError"). In addition, the
reintegration request ("ACK_REQ" of each F-I/O data block) of an F-module is to be read-in
and displayed on the Panel ("DB_OP_Outputs.AckRequired") as well as via the LED of the
acknowledgement button ("P_Reset").
4. Download all blocks into the CPU.
5. Save your project and test the functionality.
Relevant Interfaces
Standard Fail-safe
Inputs
"S_Reset" (I 2.3) -
Standard Fail-safe
Outputs
"P_Reset" (Q2.7) -
Global System
Data blocks
DB_OP_Outputs.ModulError (DB99) F_Peripherie DB.ACK_REI
DB_OP_Outputs.AckRequired (DB99) F_Peripherie DB.ACK_QBAD
F_Peripherie DB.ACK_REQ
Note
All four F-I/O data blocks must be evaluated.
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Task
The behavior of the channel-specific value status of the fail-safe inputs / outputs of the training
device is now to be checked once again.
What to Do
1. Monitor the reaction of the tags when:
• a protective device is triggered (E-Stop, safety door, etc.)
• you press the short-circuit switch ("Short circuit") on the training device.
Result
All F-modules are now (because of Exercise 4) used in the safety program and are depassivated
after CPU startup and supply valid process values.
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Modify outputs
(only possible when CPU safety
mode is deactivated!)
Task
You are now to check the wiring of all inputs and outputs of the training device.
What to Do
1. Using drag & drop, copy the Watch table "Wiring check" from the library into your project.
Safety_Lib: "06"->"05"
2. Check the wiring of the inputs by activating the corresponding operating elements on the
training case and comparing them with the monitoring values displayed on the PG.
3. Check the wiring of the fail-safe outputs by setting the control values on the PG and
comparing them with the reactions of the actuators on the training case.
• Acknowledge the message "Safety mode active"
• Confirm that you want to deactivate the safety mode
Result
All inputs and outputs of the training device should be correctly connected. If not, check the
parameter assignments of the channels concerned and also the process image assignment.
Caution!
Please do not change the existing wiring in any way. If you are of the opinion that a wiring
error exists, please discuss it with your instructor.
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Case
"FC_Mode"
Start
"S_Start" I 2.0
Touchpanel
Task
The machine "Labeler" is to be considered as a stand-alone and independent system. As
operating mode, only an Automatic mode is to be implemented that simultaneously affects all
parts of the system. The user is to be able to switch the Automatic mode on and off via the Panel.
In addition, the user can trigger a Start command via a Start button on the station. With a
simultaneous Start and Stop command, the Stop command is to dominate.
What to Do
1. Generate the standard block "FC_Mode" (FC10). Call this block in your program OB1->FC10
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2. Functionality "FC_Mode":
You are to program the block in such a way that the Automatic mode is reset
("DB_OP_Outputs.mode" = 0) for a Stop command ("DB_OP_Inputs.stop" =1).
When a Start command ("DB_OP_Inputs.start"=1 or "S_Start" =1) is triggered, the Automatic
mode is to be switched on ("DB_OP_Outputs.mode" = 1).
Keep in mind that the Stop command is to dominate with a simultaneous activation.
3. Download all blocks into the CPU.
4. Save your project and test the functionality.
Relevant Interfaces
Standard Fail-safe
Inputs
"S_Start" (I 2.0) -
Standard Fail-safe
Outputs
- -
Global System
DB_OP_Inputs.start (DB99)
Data blocks
DB_OP_Inputs.stop (DB99)
DB_OP_Outputs.mode (DB99)
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„K_Valve1"(I3.0)
"FC_Lifting"
Operational
„K_Valve2" (I3.1) switch on and
switch off
Task
The lifting device part of the system serves to feed a workpiece to the labeling device. At this
point, we are only considering the functionality of the safety-relevant shut-off valves. The
functions ‘lower’ and ‘lift’ of the lifting device are not considered in this exercise.
The shut-off valves are to be operationally switched. In Automatic mode, the valves are to be
enabled and in Stop they are to be disabled. A safety-related shutdown is to be realized via an E-
OFF set-up. The safety program is to inhibit the operational control of the valves via the shutdown
of the energy supply. After triggering the E-STOP, an energy supply enable is only to occur after
an acknowledgement.
What to Do
1. Generate the safety block "FB_Lifting" (FB111) and the standard block "FC_Lifting" (FC11).
Call these blocks in your program OB1->FC11 and FC100->FB111.
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1. Functionality "FB_Lifting":
The block is to monitor the E-Stop E3 ("S_E3") by means of the safety function "ESTOP". As
soon as the E-Stop E3 is pressed ("S_E3" =0) the shutdown of the power supply for the
subsequent standard module DO (Slot 5) is to be triggered immediately ("K_PowerValves"
=0). After the E-Stop E3 ("S_E3" =1) is unlocked, the power supply is once again to be
switched-on ("K_PowerValves" =1) after the acknowledgement button ("S_Reset" =1) is
pressed.
2. Functionality "FC_Lifting":
The block is to check whether the Automatic mode switches on
("DB_OP_Outputs.mode" =1) and the safety program supplies an enable for the valve control
("K_PowerValves" =1). If these two conditions are fulfilled, both shut-off valves are to be
energized ("K_Valve1"=1 and "K_Valve2"=1).
If not, both valves are to be de-energized ("K_Valve1"=0 and "K_Valve2"=0).
3. Download all blocks into the CPU.
4. Save your project and test the functionality.
Relevant Interfaces
Standard Fail-safe
Inputs
"S_Reset" (I 2.3) "S_E3" (I 10.0)
Standard Fail-safe
Outputs "K_Valve1" (Q3.0) "K_PowerValves" (Q10.0)
"K_Valve2" (Q3.1)
Global System
Data blocks
"DB_OP_Outputs.mode" (DB99)
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"FB_Lifting"
"S_S1" "S_S2"
(I 22.2) (I 22.6)
"ESTOP1"
Two-hand operation
"TWO_H_EN" "K_Motor1" (Q17.0)
Contactor
Motor1
"FDBACK"
"S_FeedbackM1" (I 2.2)
Feedback Contactor M1
Task
In the Labeler part of the system, the supplied part is labelled. Just as in the Lifting device part of
the system, at this point, we are only considering the safety-relevant functionality.
The motor of the labeler is only to be energized if the following conditions are fulfilled:
• E-Stop (E4) is OK
• Two-hand operation is properly activated (t< 300ms)
• Automatic mode is active
After the E-Off is triggered, an enable for the energizing of the motor is only to occur after an
acknowledgement.
What to Do
1. Generate the safety block "FB_Labeling" (FB112). Call this block in your program
FC100->FB112
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1. Functionality "FB_Labeling":
The block is to monitor the enable for energizing Motor1 by means of the safety functions
"ESTOP", "TWO_H_EN" and the standard function "Mode". Collect all enable conditions
("ESTOP.Q", "TWO_H_EN.Q" and "DB_OP_Outputs.mode") and with it energize Motor 1 by
means of the safety function "FDBACK".
"ESTOP":
As soon as the E-Stop E4 is pressed ("S_E4" =0) the enable of ESTOP is to be inhibited
immediately ("ESTOP.Q" =0). After the E-Stop E4 ("S_E4" =1) is unlocked, the enable of the
ESTOP is once again to occur ("ESTOP.Q" =1) after the acknowledgement button ("S_Reset" =1)
is pressed.
"TWO_H_EN":
An enable ("TWO_H_EN.Q" = 1) is only to occur when Button1 ("S_S1") and Button2 ("S_S2")
assume the value 1 within 300ms.
"Mode":
It is only to be possible to energize the motor in Automatic mode ("DB_OP_Outputs.mode" =1).
For this, use the enable function of the two-hand monitoring ("TWO_H_EN.ENABLE").
"FDBACK":
As soon as the safety function receives the enable ("FDBACK.ON" =1) Motor 1 is to be energized
("K_Motor1" =1). Connect all relevant interfaces of "FDBACK" correctly (Help function with "F1").
The monitoring time "FDB_TIME" is to be set to 200ms.
2. Download all blocks into the CPU.
3. Save your project and test the functionality.
Note: You will find the description of the relevant interfaces on the next page.
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Relevant Interfaces
Standard Fail-safe
"S_Reset" (I 2.3) "S_E4" (I 22.0)
Inputs
"S_FeedbackM1" (I 2.2) "S_S1" (I 22.2)
"S_S2" (I 22.6)
Standard Fail-safe
Outputs
"K_Motor1" (Q17.0)
Global System
Data blocks
"DB_OP_Outputs.mode" (DB99)
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„B_RFID1“ "FB_Robot"
(I22.1)
„B_RFID2“
"ESTOP1"
(I22.5)
"SFDOOR"
„S_Auto“ "K_Motor2" (Q17.1)
(I4.0) Contactor Motor2
„S_Service“ "FDBACK"
(I4.4) "S_FeedbackM2" (I 2.5)
Feedback Contactor M2
Task
In the Robot part of the system, the processed workpiece is to be removed. Here we are only
considering the safety-relevant functionality.
The motor of the robot is only to be energized when the following conditions are fulfilled:
• E-Stop (E1) is OK
• Safety door is closed
• Safety switch is set to Automatic mode
• Automatic mode is active
In addition - for Service / Commissioning work - it should be possible to control the robot in jog
mode even if the safety door is open when the following conditions are fulfilled:
• E-Stop (E1) is OK
• Safety switch is set to Service mode
• Automatic mode is not active
• The "Jog" button on the Panel is pressed
After the E-Stop or the safety door monitoring is triggered, an enable for the control of the motor
is only to occur after an acknowledgement.
What to Do
1. Generate the safety block "FB_Robot" (FB113). Call this block in your program
FC100->FB113.
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2. Functionality "FB_Robot":
The block is to monitor the enable for energizing Motor1 by means of the safety functions
"ESTOP", "SFDOOR", the safety switch, the standard function "Mode" and the "Jog" button on
the Panel. Collect all enable conditions ("ESTOP.Q", "SFDOOR.Q" etc.) and with it energize
Motor 2 by means of the safety function "FDBACK".
"ESTOP":
As soon as the E-Stop E1 is pressed ("S_E1" =0) the enable of ESTOP is to be inhibited
immediately ("ESTOP.Q" =0). After the E-Stop E1 ("S_E1" =1) is unlocked, the enable of the
ESTOP is once again to occur ("ESTOP.Q" =1) after the acknowledgement button ("S_Reset" =1)
is pressed.
"SFDOOR":
An enable ("SFDOOR.Q" = 1) is only to occur when the safety door is completely closed
("B_RFID1" =1 and "B_RFID2" =1). The functionality "Opening necessary after startup" is not
required ("SFDOOR.OPEN_NEC" = 0). After the safety door is closed, the enable is only to occur
after the acknowledgement button ("S_Reset" =1) is pressed.
"FDBACK":
As soon as the safety function receives the enable ("FDBACK.ON" =1) Motor 2 is to be energized
("FDBACK.Q" = "K_Motor2"). Connect all relevant interfaces of "FDBACK" correctly (Help
function with "F1"). The monitoring time "FDB_TIME" is to be set to 200ms.
An enable for the energizing ("FDBACK.ON") of Motor 2 via the safety function "FDBACK" is now
formed via two possible paths:
Automatic mode:
• Enable E-Stop ("ESTOP.Q" =1)
• Enable Safety door ("SFDOOR.Q" =1)
• Safety switch is set to Automatic mode ("S_Auto" =1)
• Automatic mode is active ("DB_OP_Outputs.mode" =1)
Continued on the next page
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Service mode:
• Enable E-Stop ("ESTOP.Q" =1)
• Safety switch is set to Service mode ("S_Service" =1)
• Automatic mode is not active ("DB_OP_Outputs.mode" =0)
• The "Jog" button on the Panel is pressed ("DB_OP_Inputs.M2_Jog" =1)
Relevant Interfaces
Standard Fail-safe
"S_Reset" (I 2.3) "S_E1" (I 4.1)
"S_FeedbackM2" (I 2.5) "B_RFID1" (I 22.1)
Inputs
"B_RFID2" (I 22.5)
"S_Auto" (I 4.0)
"S_Service" (I 4.4)
Standard Fail-safe
Outputs
"K_Motor2" (Q17.1)
Global System
Data blocks "DB_OP_Outputs.mode" (DB99) -
"DB_OP_Inputs.M2_Jog" (DB99)
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"DB_SafetyTags"
"FB_Lifting"
"FB_Labeling"
"FB_Robot"
Task
The Service Control room serves to monitor the entire system. The Control room should be able
to bring the system to the safe state by means of the E-STOP. When the E-Stop is pressed, all
system parts (lifting device, labeler and robot) are to switch to the safe state.
After the E-Stop is triggered, an enable is only to occur after an acknowledgement.
What to Do
1. Generate the safety block "FB_ControlRoom" (FB114). Call this block in your program
FC100->FB114.
2. Generate the global fail-safe data block "DB_SafetyTags" (DB101) and create the Boolean
tag "Global_Estop_OK" (see picture).
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3. Functionality "FB_ControlRoom":
The block is to monitor the E-Stop E2 ("S_E2") by means of the safety function "ESTOP". As
soon as the E-Stop E2 is pressed ("S_E2" =0) the shutdown of all system parts is to be executed
immediately. The enable of ESTOP ("ESTOP.Q") is to be stored in the previously created global
fail-safe data block ("DB_SafetyTags.Global_Estop_OK"). After the E-Stop E2 ("S_E2" =1) is
unlocked, the enable of the ESTOP is once again to occur ("ESTOP.Q" =1) after the
acknowledgement button is pressed ("S_Reset" =1).
The global enable signal ("DB_SafetyTags.Global_Estop_OK") is now to be included in all parts
of the system. Expand the blocks "FB_Lifting", "FB_Labeling" and "FB_Robot" to include this new
enable condition.
4. Download all blocks into the CPU.
5. Save your project and test the functionality.
Relevant Interfaces
Standard Fail-safe
Inputs
"S_Reset" (I 2.3) "S_E2" (I 4.3)
Standard Fail-safe
Outputs
Global System
Data blocks
"DB_SafetyTags" (DB101)
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"FC_Diagnostic"
Task
Currently, the user is informed via the Panel as soon as an F-module/channel has a problem and
is passivated. The display is to be expanded with a status display of the safety functions. In
addition, the user is also to receive a message as soon as an error of a safety function has gone
and it can be acknowledged.
What to Do
1. Open the block "FC_Diagnostic" (FC12).
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2. Functionality "FC_Diagnostic":
The existing block is to be expanded with the status display of the safety functions. The block
is to read-in the triggering of at least one safety function and display it on the Panel
("DB_OP_Outputs.FunctionError"). The trigger of a safety function can be implemented via
the negated enable signal or an existing error bit.
In addition, the reintegration request (for example: "ESTOP.ACK_REQ") of every safety
function is to be read-in and displayed on the Panel ("DB_OP_Outputs.AckRequired").
Note:
The explicit acknowledgement for each safety function should have already been
implemented in the previous exercises.
3. Download all blocks into the CPU.
4. Save your project and test the functionality.
Relevant Interfaces
Standard Fail-safe
Inputs
- -
Standard Fail-safe
Outputs
- -
Global System
Data blocks "DB_OP_Outputs.FunctionError" (DB99)
"DB_OP_Outputs.AckRequired" (DB99)
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Task Description
Currently, the acknowledgement of all F-I/Os is implemented in the "FB_Reintegration" safety
block through the direct control of the individual F-I/O DBs. You are to replace the current
acknowledgement programming with the safety function "ACK_GL".
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This instruction creates an acknowledgment for the simultaneous reintegration of all F-I/O or
channels of the F-I/O of an F-runtime group after communication errors, F-I/O errors, or channel
faults.
A user acknowledgment with a positive edge at input ACK_GLOB is required for reintegration.
The acknowledgment occurs analogously to the user acknowledgment via the ACK_REI tag of
the F-I/O DB, but it acts simultaneously on all F-I/O of the F-runtime group in which the instruction
is called.
If you use the instruction ACK_GL, you do not have to provide a user acknowledgment for each
F-I/O of the F-runtime group via the ACK_REI tag of the F-I/O DB.
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Task
Currently, the acknowledgement of an F-module error or a safety function is only possible via the
acknowledgement button "S_Reset". You are to expand the Panel with a fail-safe
acknowledgement. For this, use the safety function "ACK_OP".
Note: In the "DB_OP" data block, a tag "Ackfailsafe" of the type Integer is already created. This
tag can be used for the safe acknowledgement.
Requirements:
• The acknowledgement on the Panel is to occur via 2 independent buttons
• The 1st. button is only to be visible when an acknowledgement request is pending
• The 2nd. button is only to be visible when the first acknowledgement step has been
completed successfully (see Help "ACK_OP")
• Acknowledgement via the "S_Reset" button is still to be possible.
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The F-shared DB (global) is a fail-safe data block that contains all of the shared data of the safety
program and additional information needed by the F-system. The F-shared DB is automatically
inserted when the hardware configuration is compiled.
Using its name F_GLOBDB, you can evaluate certain data elements of the safety program in the
standard user program.
You can read out the following information in the F-shared DB in the standard user program or on
an operator control and monitoring system:
• The operating mode: safety mode or disabled safety mode ("MODE" tag)
• Error information "Error occurred when executing safety program" ("ERROR" tag)
• The collective F-signature ("F_PROG_SIG" tag)
• The compilation date of the safety program ("F_PROG_DAT" tag, Data type
DATE_AND_TIME)
You use fully qualified access to access these tags (for example, "F_GLOBDB".MODE).
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QBAD_I_xx and QBAD_O_xx display the validity of the channel value channel-specific and thus
correspond to the inverted value status with S7-1200/1500. Value status or QBAD_I_xx and
QBAD_O_xx are not available with fail-safe standard DP-slaves and fail-safe standard IO-devices
without the "RIOforFA-Safety" profile.
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ACK_NEC
QBAD
PASS_OUT
QBAD_I_xx *
QBAD_O_xx *
Value status
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Q_BAD
Scenario Value status (S7-1500F)
(S7-300F/400F)
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Contents 7
7. TIA Safety: Response Times ................................................................................. 7-2
7.1. Response Time of the F-System: Overview ......................................................................... 7-3
7.1.1. Response Time if there is No fault ........................................................................................ 7-4
7.2. S7Safety_RTT....................................................................................................................... 7-5
7.2.1. Max. Runtime of the F-Runtime Group (1) ........................................................................... 7-6
7.2.2. Max. Runtime of the F-Runtime Group (2) ........................................................................... 7-7
7.2.3. Min. F-Monitoring Times ....................................................................................................... 7-8
7.2.4. Max. Response Times .......................................................................................................... 7-9
7.2.5. Typical Response Times (1) ............................................................................................... 7-10
7.2.6. Typical Response Times (2) ............................................................................................... 7-11
7.2.7. Typical Response Times (3) ............................................................................................... 7-12
7.2.8. Typical Response Times (4) ............................................................................................... 7-13
7.2.9. Typical Response Times (5) ............................................................................................... 7-14
7.2.10. Typical Response Times (6) ............................................................................................... 7-15
7.2.11. Typical Response Times / Result ....................................................................................... 7-16
7.3. Response Time and Safety Distance according to ISO 13855 .......................................... 7-17
Fail-safe Fail-safe
input output
F-CPU
F-CPU
module module
Fail-safe program
Response Time
The response time is the period that elapses between the detection of an input signal and the
change of a connected output signal. The safety clearances within danger zones depend mainly
on the approach speed and the stopping time of the machine. For time-critical applications, an
estimation of the response time of the fail-safe controller may be necessary for optimization of
safety clearances. Ultimately, smaller safety clearances usually also mean smaller plant areas
and with that reduced costs.
Fluctuation Range
The actual response time lies between the minimum and the maximum response time. You must
always take the maximum response time into account in your system configuration.
Standard Program
The F-CPU executes the standard program and the safety program independently of one
another. The maximum possible (OB1) cycle time and thus the response time of the standard
program is extended due to execution of the safety program. This depends on the size of the
safety program and how often it must be executed by the CPU.
F-Program
The response time of the safety program, however, does not depend on the size or execution
time of the standard program. Thus, the response time in the safety-related part of the system
does not depend on the execution time of the standard program.
F-CPU
Fail-safe program
7.2. S7Safety_RTT
Provision must still be made for measurement of the actual values in the ‘real’ system, taking into consideration
all actuators, sensors and possible conditions. The S7Safety_RTTplus*.xls is not legally binding and must
not replace a system acceptance or be included in its documentation.
S7Safety_RTT
SIEMENS AG provides the Excel sheet "S7Safety_RTT" as a free download with which, in
addition to the "(max.) Safety function response time ", the "F-monitoring times" can also be
calculated for configuration and programming.
The "max. runtime of F-runtime group" can be extended due to, among other things, the
communication load (e.g. S7 communication, PROFINET IO communication, PG/OP
communication), the processing of higher-priority interrupts and the testing and commissioning
functions.
You can determine the effect of these factors based on the documentation and configuration of
the standard system and add it to the value calculated up to now.
Max. runtime of
F-runtime group
General Formula:
For right-angled
S=KxT+C approach
Contents 8
8. Acceptance Test of a System ................................................................................ 8-2
8.1. Legal Basis: Machinery Directive .......................................................................................... 8-2
8.2. The Route to a Safe Machine According to the Machinery Directive ................................... 8-3
8.3. What is Validation? ............................................................................................................... 8-4
8.4. Position of the Overall Validation (Acceptance Tests) in the Process Model ....................... 8-5
8.5. Verification < > Validation ..................................................................................................... 8-6
8.6. Validation Measures before the Overall Product Validation ................................................. 8-7
8.7. Validation of the Overall Application ..................................................................................... 8-8
8.8. Authorized Persons and Acceptance Report ........................................................................ 8-9
8.9. Contents of a Complete Acceptance Test .......................................................................... 8-10
8.10. Safety Summary ................................................................................................................. 8-11
8.10.1. Creating a Safety Summary ................................................................................................ 8-12
8.10.2. Procedure for Creating a Safety Summary (Printout) ......................................................... 8-13
8.10.3. Example of a Safety Summary ........................................................................................... 8-14
8.11. Acceptance of Changes ...................................................................................................... 8-15
8.12. Exercise 1: “Overtravel Measurement” Motor 2 Using a Trace .......................................... 8-16
8.12.1. Re: Exercise 1: Creating a Trace ........................................................................................ 8-17
8.12.2. Re: Exercise 1: Downloading, Starting and Saving the Trace ............................................ 8-18
8.13. Exercise 2(Optional): Performing an Acceptance Test ....................................................... 8-19
8.13.1. Re: Exercise 2: Description of the Test Documentation ..................................................... 8-20
8.13.2. Re: Exercise 2: Test Cases before Startup Operation ....................................................... 8-21
8.13.3. Re: Exercise 2: Test Cases during Operation: Lifting Device............................................. 8-22
8.13.4. Re: Exercise 2: Test Cases during Operation: Labeler (1) ................................................. 8-23
8.13.5. Re: Exercise 2: Test Cases during Operation: Labeler (2) ................................................. 8-24
8.13.6. Re: Exercise 2: Test Cases during Operation: Robot Automatic Mode (1) ........................ 8-25
8.13.7. Re: Exercise 2: Test Cases during Operation: Robot Automatic Mode (2) ........................ 8-26
8.13.8. Re: Exercise 2: Test Cases during Operation: Robot Service Mode.................................. 8-27
8.13.9. Re: Exercise 2: Test Cases during Operation: Fault Seeding Test .................................... 8-28
8.13.10. Re: Exercise 2: Result ........................................................................................................ 8-29
(19) In view of the nature of the risks involved in the use of machinery
covered by this Directive, procedures for assessing conformity to
the essential health and safety requirements should be
established. These procedures should be devised in the light of the
extent of the danger inherent in such machinery. Consequently, each
category of machinery should have its appropriate procedure in
conformity with Council Decision 93/465/EEC of 22 July 1993
concerning the modules for the various phases of the conformity
assessment procedures and the rules for the affixing and use of the
CE conformity marking, which are intended to be used in the technical
harmonization directives (2), taking account of the nature of the
verification required for such machinery.
Describe the
Risk assessment machine
Identify hazards Assess risks
Prove conformity
Document Perform with the directive
Verification measures validation
Apply CE marking
Validation is a phase in the process model for the development of a safe machine. The validation,
therefore, applies to the entire machine. This phase includes validation of the safety system.
• Are the requirements of the safety requirements specification (SRS) correctly and
effectively implemented?
• Are the safety functions for the machine correctly implemented?
• Does the implementation meet the required safety quality?
Aim of Validation
The aim of validation is to verify that the implemented safety functions make the required
contribution to risk mitigation so that the machine becomes and remains safe.
Risk mitigation is achieved by the safety functions as well as other measures (design, technical,
organizational).
SRS stands for Safety Requirements Specification
Moreover, IEC 51508-2 (Annex B) and IEC 61508-3 (Annex A) each describe techniques and
measures for avoiding systematic failures. Compliance with them increases the quality of the
safety function and aids successful validation.
Architecture Integration
development
Design and
Verification
Validation
HW and SW testing
HW Design
HW Module test
Documentation
SW Design
SW Module test
Documentation
Implementation
Verification
Validation
The V-model shown is the generic model for the development and release of a safety system.
Verification
Confirmation by examination (for
example, tests, analyses) that
the safety-related system and the
parts of the safety-related system
? Validation
Confirmation by examination (for
example, tests, analyses) that
the safety-related system meets
the requirement for functional
meet the requirements of the safety for the respective
respective (associated ) application.
specification.
Green unbroken line,
Blue dashed line, activities in the V-model (checking
activities in the V-model (checking the suitability of the application)
of individual phases for correct
implementation)
Verification:
From the Latin Veritas:
proving the truth
Validation:
From the Latin Validus:
checking effectiveness
Aim of validation:
The aim is to prove that the safety functions have been implemented correctly according to
the requirements and that the (application) software supports the execution of the safety
functions and that the planned measures for error prevention have been effectively
implemented.
! How to validate:
Perform a functional test of the safety functions by
means of a black-box test. Perform selected fault
simulations (fault seeding tests) based on the results
of the analyses performed.
Before performing the functional tests, you must check that the correct configuration in the safety
device (MSS) is active. This is done by checking the displayed checksum of the configuration.
The test for each SI function must be conducted, recorded in the acceptance
report and signed by a person authorized to do this. The acceptance report
must be kept in a machine logbook.
In this context, an authorized person is a person who is authorized by the
machine manufacturer and who has suitable professional training and
knowledge of the safety functions to conduct the acceptance test in a proficient
manner.
Note
The guidelines and specifications for commissioning must be observed for this.
If parameters of SI functions are changed, the acceptance test must be conducted again and documented in the
acceptance report.
Authorized Person
An authorized person can, therefore, also be an employee of another company commissioned to
perform the test, if the requirements described above are met. In a practical sense, this means,
for example, that a SIEMENS service technician can be involved in carrying out the acceptance
test for an OEM and even provide his/her signature on the acceptance report. In addition,
however, a responsible employee of the machine manufacturer must always confirm the
correctness of the acceptance report. As a rule, this is the assigned safety officer of the company.
1. Documentation
(1) Machine description and overview image
(2) SI functions in the PLC program / printout
(3) Description of the safety equipment
2. Function test with check of each individual SI function used
(1) For example, safety door monitoring
(2) For example, Emergency Off function
3. Report completion – Documentation of commissioning and
signatures from parties involved
(1) Check of program printouts
(2) Recording of checksums
(3) Proof of data backups
(4) Signatures
4. Appendix – Measurement recordings of function tests
Safety Summary
You can print out all important project data of the hardware configuration of the F-I/O and the
safety program. As a result, you receive a "safety summary" that serves not only as
documentation but also as a basis for checking for correctness of the individual components of
the system. The correctness is a requirement for acceptance of the system. The declaration of
the collective F-signature in the footer of the printout pages guarantees a clear assignment of the
printout to a safety program.
For negligible changes, you do not have to have the entire system re-accepted, only
the changes!
For an acceptance of changes, the following tests are necessary:
• Risk Impact Assessment (assess the effect of the change)
• Checking the changed or newly added F-blocks
• Checking the changed or newly added instructions and F-system blocks
• Checking the safety-relevant parameters of the changed or newly added F-I/O
The Risk Impact Assessment also determines to what extent the function tests have
to be repeated or expanded.
Acceptance of Changes
In general, you can adopt the same approach for the acceptance of changes as the initial
acceptance. However, so that you can avoid the acceptance of the entire system in case of
negligible changes, STEP 7 Safety Advanced helps you to identify those parts of your safety
program that have changed. For an acceptance of changes, the tests shown in the picture are
necessary.
“Overtravel measurement” by
means of feedback signals of
the controlled relay
Task Description
An “Overtravel measurement” of Motor 2 is to be carried out using a Trace. The feedback signals
(“S_FeedbackM2”) of the relay are to be evaluated when Motor 2 is switched off. You are to
determine how long it takes for the feedback signal (“S_FeedbackM2”) to change after Motor 2 is
switched off. The switch off is to occur as a result of the opening of the safety door in Automatic
mode.
What to Do
Continued on the next page
What to Do
1. Create a Trace with the name “Overtravel measurement relays”.
2. Select the required signals that you want to monitor (see picture)
3. Set a Sampling and Trigger tag that makes sense (see picture)
4. Save your project.
2
1
4
3
5
What to Do
1. Download the Trace into the CPU.
2. Activate the recording. The recording is now temporarily stored in a ring buffer.
3. After activation, the recording waits until the Trigger is tripped (TRIG=yellow). After the
Trigger has been tripped, the recording (REC=red) starts. Wait until the recording is
completed (REC=gray).
4. The measurement is now available online in the CPU and is to be saved in the offline project
for evaluation.
5. Analyze the measurement and find out the “Overtravel time” of the feedback signal.
You are to perform a function test of the safety functions of a partner station
using the black-box test.
In addition, selected fault simulations (fault seeding tests) are performed based on the
results of the analyses performed.
Co Inputs Outputs Test case Test requirement Test description/ Expected result Test result
ns. affected affected Performance Tester / Date
No.
1.0 What is to Particular requirements for the Description of the test What is expected Was the test
be test case (for example, variations performance as the result of the successful?
tested? of the configuration) test?
Cons. No.:
For each test case, a consecutive test number is assigned in the test tables in order to be able to exactly subdivide and quantify
each test.
Inputs affected:
To provide a better overview, the inputs to be monitored in the test case are noted here
Outputs affected:
To provide a better overview, the outputs to be monitored in the test case are noted here
Note: If neither inputs nor outputs are entered in this column, then you are dealing with internal signals of the CPU which must
be monitored per program or must be checked per tag table.
Test case:
In the test case, the test object is described, that is, what is to be tested. Here, which behavior is to be tested or was checked is
briefly presented.
Test description/Performance:
The test description explains how the test case is to be tested, that is, which action must be performed by the tester.
Expected result:
After a test is performed, this can be used to check whether the test was successful or not by checking whether the result
matches the expected result described here.
Test result:
The test result is completed by the tester. Here, whether the expected result was achieved or not is entered during the test. If
the module / the system misses the test goal, then the reason or the erroneous behavior is briefly noted here.
Function Co Inputs Outputs Test case Test requirement Test description/ Expected result Test result
ns. affected affected Performance Tester / Date
No.
0.0 Test the wiring A test must be made (visible All cables are laid and OK
according to test) that cables (supply, connected according
the circuit signal lines, bus lines) are to the circuit diagram. Eberle Thomas
Wiring
Function Co Inputs Outputs Test case Test requirement Test description/ Expected result Test result
ns. affected affected Performance Tester / Date
No.
0.1 System restart Test case 0.0 is The system is disconnected System is ready for
completed from the power and then operation (CPU in
System restart
Functi Cons Inputs Outputs Test case Test requirement Test description/ Expected result Test result
on No. affected affected Performance Tester / Date
1.0 I 10.0 Q10.0 Press E-Stop The system must be in Pressing the E- The shutdown of the F-PM
Q3.0 operation and the Stop at the valve must occur immediately. Both
Q3.1 valves controlled in the field valves must close
Automatic mode I 10.0 1->0 (signal state “0”)
operating mode I 10.0 = 0
Q10.0 = 0
E-Stop Lifting Device
Q3.0 = 0
Q3.1 = 0
1.1 I 10.0 Q10.0 Unlock E-Stop Test case 1.0 is The E-Stop is An automatic restart must not
Q3.0 completed. unlocked occur.
Q3.1 I 10.0 0->1 I 10.0 = 1
Q10.0 = 0
Q3.0 = 0
Q3.1 = 0
1.2 I 2.3 Q10.0 Acknowledge Test case 1.1 is The safety-related The control of the valves is
completed. shutdown is once again enabled for
acknowledged via operation
the I 10.0 = 1
acknowledgement Q10.0 = 1
button I 2.3 0->1
Functi Cons Inputs Outputs Test case Test requirement Test description/ Expected result Test result
on No. affected affected Performance Tester / Date
2.0 I 22.0 Q17.0 Press E-Stop The system must Pressing the E-Stop at Motor Motor 1 must be de-
be in operation 1 energized immediately
and Motor 1 I 22.0 1->0 I 22.0 = 0
controlled Q17.0 = 0
E-Stop Labeler
2.1 I 22.0 Q17.0 Unlock E-Stop Test case 2.0 is The E-Stop is unlocked An automatic restart must
completed. and then two-hand operation not occur.
pressed I 22.0 = 1
I 22.0 0->1 Q17.0 = 0
2.2 I 2.3 Q17.0 Acknowledge Test case 2.1 is The safety-related shutdown The control of Motor 1 is
completed. is acknowledged via the once again enabled for
acknowledgement button operation
and two-hand operation I 22.0 = 1
pressed Q17.0 = 1
I 2.3 0->1
Functi Cons Inputs Outputs Test case Test requirement Test description/ Expected result Test result
on No. affected affected Performance Tester / Date
3.0 I 22.2 Q17.0 Two-hand monitoring The system must Pressing the S1 and S2 Motor 1 is controlled
I 22.6 within the discrepancy be in operation. buttons within the I 22.2 = 1
Motor 1 is not discrepancy time of 200ms I 22.6 = 1
switched on I 22.2 0->1 Q17.0 = 1
Two-hand monitoring Labeler
3.1 I 22.2 Q17.0 Two-hand monitoring The system must Pressing the S2 button and Motor 1 is controlled
I 22.6 outside of discrepancy be in operation. after the discrepancy I 22.2 = 1
(S1 comes too late) Motor 1 is not pressing the S1 button I 22.6 = 1
switched on I 22.6 0->1 A17.0 = 0
Q17.0 = 0 Wait: > 200ms
I 22.2 0->1
3.2 I 22.2 Q17.0 Two-hand monitoring The system must Pressing the S1 button and Motor 1 is controlled
I 22.6 outside of discrepancy be in operation. after parameterized I 22.2 = 1
(S2 comes too late) Motor 1 is not discrepancy I 22.6 = 1
switched on pressing the S2 button Q17.0 = 0
Q17.0 = 0 I 22.2 0->1
Wait: > 200ms
I 22.6 0->1
8.13.6. Re: Exercise 2: Test Cases during Operation: Robot Automatic Mode (1)
Functi Cons Inputs Outputs Test case Test requirement Test description/ Expected result Test result
on No. affected affected Performance Tester / Date
4.0 I 4.1 Q17.1 Press E-Stop The system must be in Pressing the E-Stop Motor 2 must be de-
Automatic mode and at Motor 2 energized immediately
Motor 2 controlled I 4.1 1->0 I 4.1 = 0
Q17.1 = 0
E-Stop Robot Automatic
4.1 I 4.1 Q17.1 Unlock E-Stop Test case 4.0 is The E-Stop is An automatic restart must not
completed. unlocked occur.
I 4.1 0->1 I 4.1 = 1
Q17.1 = 0
4.2 I 2.3 Q17.1 Acknowledge Test case 4.1 is The safety-related The control of Motor 2 is
completed. shutdown is once again enabled for
acknowledged via the operation
acknowledgement I 4.1 = 1
button Q17.1 = 1
I 2.3 0->1
8.13.7. Re: Exercise 2: Test Cases during Operation: Robot Automatic Mode (2)
Functi Cons Inputs Outputs Test case Test requirement Test description/ Expected result Test result
on No. affected affected Performance Tester / Date
5.0 I 22.1 Q17.1 Open safety door The system must be in The safety door is Motor 2 must be de-
Automatic mode and opened energized immediately
Motor 2 controlled I 22.1 1->0 I 22.1 = 0
Q17.1 = 0
Safety door monitoring
5.1 I 22.1 Q17.1 Close safety Test case 5.0 is The safety door is An automatic restart must not
door completed. closed again occur.
I 22.1 0->1 I 22.1 = 1
Q17.1 = 0
5.2 I 2.3 Q17.1 Acknowledge Test case 5.1 is The safety-related The control of Motor 2 is
completed. shutdown is once again enabled for
acknowledged via the operation
acknowledgement I 22.1 = 1
button I 2.3 0->1 Q17.1 = 1
8.13.8. Re: Exercise 2: Test Cases during Operation: Robot Service Mode
Functi Cons Inputs Outputs Test case Test requirement Test description/ Expected result Test result
on No. affected affected Performance Tester / Date
6.0 I 4.1 Q17.1 Press E-Stop The system must be in Pressing the E-Stop Motor 2 must be de-
Service mode and at Motor 2 energized immediately
Motor 2 controlled I 4.1 1->0 I 4.1 = 0
Q17.1 = 0
E-Stop Robot Service Mode
6.1 I 4.1 Q17.1 Unlock E-Stop Test case 6.0 is The E-Stop is An automatic restart must not
completed. unlocked occur.
I 4.1 0->1 I 4.1 = 1
Q17.1 = 0
6.2 I 2.3 Q17.1 Acknowledge Test case 6.1 is The safety-related The control of Motor 2 is
completed. shutdown is once again enabled for
acknowledged via the operation
acknowledgement I 4.1 = 1
button I 2.3 0->1 Q17.1 = 1
8.13.9. Re: Exercise 2: Test Cases during Operation: Fault Seeding Test
Functi Cons Inputs Outputs Test case Test requirement Test description/ Expected result Test result
on No. affected affected Performance Tester / Date
7.0 I 4.1 Q17.1 Activate The system must be in Activate Motor 2 must be de-
short-circuit operation and Motor 2 short-circuit switch energized immediately
switch controlled I 4.1 = 0
Q17.1 = 0
Short-circuit at E-Stop
7.1 I 4.1 Q17.1 Unlock short- Test case 7.0 is Short-circuit switch is An automatic restart and
circuit switch completed. unlocked depassivation must not
occur.
I 4.1 = 0
Q17.1 = 0
7.2 I 2.3 Q17.1 Acknowledge Test case 7.1 is The channel fault is An automatic restart must not
I/O completed. acknowledged via the occur.
acknowledgement I 4.1 = 1
button I 2.3 0->1 Q17.1 = 0
7.3 I 2.3 Q17.1 Acknowledge Test case 7.2 is The safety-related The control of Motor 2 is
E-Stop completed. shutdown is once again enabled for
acknowledged via the operation
acknowledgement I 4.1 = 1
button I 2.3 0->1 Q17.1 = 1
Summary
Contents 9
9. Service and Diagnostics ........................................................................................ 9-2
9.1. General Diagnostics .............................................................................................................. 9-3
9.2. LED Displays......................................................................................................................... 9-4
9.3. LED Evaluation (1) ................................................................................................................ 9-5
9.4. LED Evaluation (2) ................................................................................................................ 9-6
9.5. Display Expansions for 1500 F-CPU .................................................................................... 9-7
9.6. Procedure for Diagnosis of Safety-relevant Errors (1) .......................................................... 9-8
9.7. Procedure for Diagnosis of Safety-relevant Errors (2) .......................................................... 9-9
9.8. Consistent Upload of Safety Projects ................................................................................. 9-10
9.9. Exercise 1: Troubleshooting ............................................................................................... 9-11
9.9.1. Re: Exercise 1: Downloading the Service Project (CPU + HMI) into the Device................ 9-12
9.9.2. Re: Exercise 1: Assigning the ET 200SP Device Name ONLINE ...................................... 9-13
9.9.3. Re: Exercise 1: Troubleshooting ......................................................................................... 9-14
9.10. Additional Information ......................................................................................................... 9-16
9.10.1. TIA Portal – Compatibility Online ........................................................................................ 9-17
Diagnostic
possibilities same
as for Standard
CPUs
System Diagnostics
All SIMATIC products have integrated diagnostic functions with which you can recognize and
eliminate faults. The components automatically signal a possible fault of the operation and
provide additional detailed information. You can minimize unplanned downtimes through system-
wide diagnostics. The SIMATIC automation system monitors the following states in the running
system:
• Device failure/recovery
• Pull/plug event
• Module error
• I/O access error
• Channel fault
• Parameterization error
• Failure of the external auxiliary voltage
Diagnostic Messages
Module errors are displayed as diagnostics (module information). After error elimination, you must
reintegrate the F-module in the safety program.
F-DQ F-DI
Diagnostic display LED
Power LED
The LED DIAG and the LEDs channel status and channel fault of the inputs are not designed to
be safety-related and must therefore not be evaluated for safety-related activities.
F-DQ F-DI
F-DQ F-DI
Troubleshooting
1. Approach same as for Standard diagnosis
Diagnostic messages
Test wiring
Cross-references
Watch table
...
2. Special approach for Safety-relevant errors
Exceeding the monitoring time:
- Check PROFIsafe monitoring time of modules
Parameter-assignment error:
- Check the destination addresses and coding elements of F-modules
Data corruption, CRC-error:
- Do not execute standard program in order to detect possibly unallowed accesses
- Inhibit standard communication in order to detect possibly unallowed accesses
CPU 1 ET 200SP 1
Avoidance of errors and reduction of
service effort through reduction of
Project 1
CPU 2
ET 200SP 2
Project 2
Upload consistent
Service Technician
CPU 3 ET 200SP 3
Project 3
Task Description
A typical service case is to be simulated. You arrive on-site at the customer as a service
technician and you find the system in fault. You are now to find all errors/faults and eliminate
them so that the system is working again.
What to Do
See next page
9.9.1. Re: Exercise 1: Downloading the Service Project (CPU + HMI) into the
Device
Task
In order to carry out troubleshooting, you must first load a faulty project into the system. Under
“C:\02_Archives\TIA_Portal\TIA-SAFETY\Service_Project” you will find a prepared TIA V14SP1
project.
Note:
The service project does not contain an F-password and also no CPU protection. This is
permitted for exercise purposes but for productive operation, the CPU and also the F-program
must always be protected by a password.
What to Do
1. Save your current project “MyProject” and close the project.
2. Open the service project. You will find the project under the following path:
“C:\02_Archives\TIA_Portal\TIA-SAFETY\Service_Project”
3. Load the CPU and the HMI in your device.
1xR
online
accessible device(s)
Task
The PROFINET device name assigned offline in the service project must now be assigned to the
ET 200SP online, so that the IO-Controller or the CPU can assign the offline-configured IP
address during system startup of the ET 200SP.
What to Do
1. In the Hardware and Network editor, select the "Device view" of the ET 200SP.
2. Right-click on the Interface module or the module on Slot 0 and in the menu that appears,
activate the item "Assign device name".
3. In the dialog that appears, check the (offline) PROFINET device name.
4. Under "Type of the PG/PC interface", select the interface through which you are connected to
the PROFINET (see picture). Click on "Update list" to display all accessible devices.
5. In the lower part of the dialog, under the (online) "Accessible devices in the network", select
the ET 200SP or the Interface module IM156-6 and activate "Assign name".
6. Save your project.
Result:
The CPU is in RUN mode and the ERROR-LED flashes red.
The ET 200SP has received its parameterization and the “RN-LED” (RUN) of the ET 200SP head
station has a steady light. Through the “DIAG-LED”, several modules signal that an
error/diagnosis exists.
• First error:
− Error
− ..............……………………………………….............................................................................
..............……………………………………….............................................................................
− Correction:
− ……….……………………………………………………......................…………….............…….
..............……………………………………….............................................................................
• Second error:
− Error
− ..............……………………………………….............................................................................
..............……………………………………….............................................................................
− Correction:
− ……….……………………………………………………......................…………….............…….
..............……………………………………….............................................................................
• Third error:
− Error
− ..............……………………………………….............................................................................
..............……………………………………….............................................................................
− Correction:
− ……….……………………………………………………......................…………….............…….
..............……………………………………….............................................................................
• First error:
The shut-off valves can no longer be shutdown via the local E-Stop “E3”
− Error
− ..............……………………………………….............................................................................
..............……………………………………….............................................................................
− Correction:
− ……….……………………………………………………......................…………….............…….
..............……………………………………….............................................................................
• Second error:
Motor 1 can no longer be controlled via two-hand operation
− Error
− ..............……………………………………….............................................................................
..............……………………………………….............................................................................
− Correction:
− ……….……………………………………………………......................…………….............…….
..............……………………………………….............................................................................
• Third error:
Motor 2 can no longer be controlled in Automatic as well as Service mode (Jog)
− Error
− ..............……………………………………….............................................................................
..............……………………………………….............................................................................
− Correction:
− ……….……………………………………………………......................…………….............…….
..............……………………………………….............................................................................
Engineering Software
<= V11 V12.0 V12 SP1 V13 V13 SP1 V14/V14 SP1 V15
*without hardware configuration Upload in ES Download in PLC Online & Diagnostics Monitor
Contents 10
10. Fail-safe Communication ..................................................................................... 10-2
10.1. Overview of Safety-related Communication via PROFIBUS DP ........................................ 10-3
10.2. Overview of Safety-related Communication via PROFINET IO.......................................... 10-4
10.3. Fail-safe CPU-CPU Communication via Coupler ............................................................... 10-5
10.3.1. SENDDP / RCVDP Communication Blocks........................................................................ 10-5
10.3.2. SENDDP and RCVDP Overview ........................................................................................ 10-6
10.3.3. Defining Transfer Areas ...................................................................................................... 10-7
10.3.4. SENDDP and RCVDP Parameters ..................................................................................... 10-8
10.3.5. Assignment of SENDDP and RCVDP via Unique ID .......................................................... 10-9
10.3.6. Parameter LADDR, Absolute ............................................................................................ 10-10
10.3.7. Parameter LADDR, Symbolic ........................................................................................... 10-11
10.4. Short and Sweet: PROFINET I-Device ............................................................................. 10-12
10.5. Fail-safe I-Device/Slave Communication .......................................................................... 10-13
10.5.1. SENDDP / RCVDP Communication Blocks...................................................................... 10-13
10.5.2. Defining the Operating Mode, Assignment and Transfer Areas for an I-Device ............. 10-14
10.5.3. SENDDP, RCVDP and LADDR Parameter ...................................................................... 10-15
10.6. Fail-safe Communication with S7 F-Systems ................................................................... 10-16
10.6.1. SENDDP, RCVDP and LADDR Parameter ...................................................................... 10-17
10.7. Exercise 1: "Total E-STOP" via PN-PN Coupler............................................................... 10-18
10.7.1. Re: Exercise 1: Configuring the PN-PN Coupler and Transfer Areas .............................. 10-19
10.7.2. Re: Exercise 1: Configuring RCVDP and SENDDP ......................................................... 10-20
10.7.3. Re: Exercise 1: Flow Chart ............................................................................................... 10-21
10.8. Exercise 2 (Optional): "Total E-STOP" via I-Device ......................................................... 10-22
10.8.1. Re: Exercise 2: Correctly Configuring a Dummy CPU...................................................... 10-23
10.8.2. Re: Exercise 2: Defining the Transfer Areas .................................................................... 10-24
10.8.3. Re: Exercise 2: Addressing the Transfer Areas Symbolically .......................................... 10-25
10.8.4. Re: Exercise 2: Flow Chart ............................................................................................... 10-26
Fail-safe Communication
Fail-safe communications takes place with the PROFIsafe profile via PROFIBUS as well as
PROFINET.
PROFIsafe was the first communication standard based on safety standard IEC 61508 that
permit both standard and safety-related communication on the same bus. This not only brings an
enormous savings potential with regard to cabling and part variety but also the advantage of
retrofit ability.
PROFIsafe is one of the open solutions for safety-related communication via standard fieldbuses.
Numerous manufacturers of safety components and end users of safety technology have helped
to develop this vendor-neutral and open standard of PROFIBUS International (PI).
The PROFIsafe profile enables safe communication for the open standard buses PROFIBUS
and PROFINET on the basis of standard network components. In conjunction with PROFINET,
PROFIsafe also supports fail-safe wireless communication via IWLAN.
Safety-related communication
1 Safety-related IO-Controller-IO-Controller communication
with S7-1200 F-CPUs is only
2 Safety-related IO-Controller-I-Device communication permitted as of Firmware
3 Safety-related IO-Controller-I-Slave communication Version V4.1.2.
DP-Master DP-Master
or or
I/O-Controller I/O-Controller
F-CPU 1 (e.g. CPU1513F-1) F-CPU 2 (e.g. CPU1513F-1) RCVDP
Must always be called at
Safety program Safety program the beginning of the F-
program.
Safety-related
Note
You must call the RCVDP instruction at the beginning of the Main Safety Block. You must call the
SENDDP instruction at the end of the Main Safety Block. Note that the send signals are sent only
after the call of the SENDDP instruction at the end of execution of the corresponding F-runtime
group.
• Fail-safe data exchange between two safety programs via I/O coupling
(PROFIBUS + PROFINET)
Project 1 Project 2
Physically one
coupler
Data exchange
Note
In the Hardware and Network editor, deactivate the parameter "Data validity display DIA" in the
Properties of the PN/PN coupler. This corresponds to the default setting. Otherwise, a safety-
related IO-Controller-IO-Controller communication is not possible.
6 bytes as acknowledgement
"RCVDP", "SENDDP"
At SENDDP, the data to be sent is created at the "SD_..." parameters; at RCVDP, the received
data is output to the "RD_..." parameter (under fault conditions, the substitute values "SUB_...").
Input Parameters:
ACK_REI BOOL 1 = Acknowledgment for reintegration of the send data after
communication error
SUBBO_xx BOOL Substitute value for receive data BOOL xx (only RCVDP)
SUBI_xx BOOL Substitute value for receive data INT xx (only RCVDP)
SD_BO_xx BOOL Send data BOOL xx (only SENDDP)
SD_I_xx INT Send data INT xx (only SENDDP)
DP_DP_ID INT Network-wide unique identifier (user-assigned) for a
SENDDP/RCVDP pair
TIMEOUT TIME Monitoring time [ms] for F-communication
LADDR INT Address of the HW identifier (defined in the Device configuration)
Output Parameters:
ERROR BOOL 1 = Communication error
SUBS_ON BOOL SENDDP: 1 = Receiver outputs substitute values, RCVDP: 1 =
Substitute values are output
ACK_REQ BOOL 1 = Acknowledgment for reintegration of the received data required
(only RCVDP)
SENDMODE BOOL 1 = Sending F-CPU in deactivated F-mode
RD_BO_xx BOOL Receive data BOOL xx
RD_I_xx INT Receive data INT xx
RET_DPRD WORD Error code
RET_DPWR WORD Error code
DIAG BYTE Diagnostic data
Parameter DP_DP_ID
You assign the value for the respective address relationship to the DP_DP_ID inputs. This
establishes the communication relationship between the SENDDP instruction in one F-CPU and
the RCVDP instruction in the other F-CPU: The associated instructions receive the same value
for DP_DP_ID.
Note
The value for each address association (input DP_DP_ID; data type: INT) is user-defined;
however, it must be unique from all other safety-related communication connections network-
wide. The uniqueness must be checked in the (printout of the) safety summary during acceptance
of the safety program. You must supply the inputs DP_DP_ID and LADDR with constant values
when calling the instruction. Direct read or write access to the associated Instance DB is not
permitted in the safety program!
(CPU1) (CPU2)
282
283
(CPU1) (CPU2)
Note
If the amount of data to be communicated is greater than the capacity of the associated
SENDDP/RCVDP instructions, a second (or third) SENDDP/RCVDP call can also be used.
Configure an additional communication connection via the PN/PN coupler for this. Whether or not
this is possible with the same PN/PN coupler depends on the capacity limit of the PN/PN coupler.
IO-Device 1
Acyclic data:
Configuration, Interrupts
CPU2
DP-Master I-Slave
or or
I/O-Controller I-Device
F-CPU 1 (e.g. CPU1513F-1) F-CPU 2 (e.g. CPU1513F-1)
RCVDP RCVDP
SENDDP SENDDP
Safety-related
10.5.2. Defining the Operating Mode, Assignment and Transfer Areas for an
I-Device
(Controller) (I-Device)
LADDR Parameter
You assign the HW identifiers (system constants from the standard tag table) of the transfer
areas in the safety programs to the LADDR parameter of the SENDDP and RCVDP instructions
symbolically.
Note
If the amount of data to be communicated is greater than the capacity of the associated
SENDDP/RCVDP instructions, you can use additional SENDDP/RCVDP instructions. Configure
additional transfer areas for this. In doing so, heed the maximum limit of 1440 bytes of input data
or 1440 bytes of output data for transfer between an I-Device and an IO-Controller. Take into
account all other configured safety-related and standard communication connections (transfer
areas of type F-CD and CD) in the maximum limit of 1440 bytes of input data and 1440 bytes of
output data for transfer between an I-Device and an IO-Controller. In addition, data is allocated
for internal purposes so that the maximum limit may be reached sooner. When the limit is
exceeded, you receive a corresponding error message.
60
Reciprocal shutdown
through the E-Stop of
the Control room
Task
Currently, each individual system works separately without a connection to another station.
For this exercise you will set up fail-safe communication between 2 stations. Communication is
via PN-PN coupler. Once this is done, it is will be possible to switch off the partner system via the
E-Off of the Control Room. The partner system will also be able to do the same thing.
What to Do
1. Establish a PROFINET connection with the PN-PN coupler.
Note:
Coordinate with your partner as to which coupler is used and who uses which interface (X1 or
X2).
10.7.1. Re: Exercise 1: Configuring the PN-PN Coupler and Transfer Areas
1
3
What to Do
1. Using drag & drop, copy the correct PN-PN coupler version and interface into your Network
view.
2. Network the coupler with your CPU and adjust the device name and the IP address (see
training case supplement)
3. Configure a Send module (IN/OUT 6Byte/12Byte)
and a Receive module (IN/OUT 12Byte/6Byte)
Caution: Coordinate with your partner on which slot the Send module and Receive
module are configured!
4. Save and download your project.
5. As soon as the partner station has also been loaded, the entire station should be error-free. If
not, check the parameterization and the connection of the PN-PN coupler again (both
groups!)
"DB_SafetyTags"
"FC_Main_Safety"
"RCVDP"
.
.
. "FB_Lifting"
.
.
. "FB_Labeling"
"SENDDP"
"FB_Robot"
6. Generate a new tag "Remote_Estop_OK" in your fail-safe global data block "DB_SafetyTags"
(DB101).
7. Call the "SENDDP" send block and the "RCVDP" receive block at the correct location in your
safety program.
8. Connect your E-Off signal of the Service Control Room ("DB_SafetyTags.Global_Estop_OK")
to the first send bit ("SENDDP.SD_BO_00").
9. At the first receive bit ("RCVDP.RD_BO_00") connect the E-Off signal of the partner station
("DB_SafetyTags.Remote_Estop_OK").
10. Parameterize the remaining necessary interfaces of the send and receive block according to
your coupler configuration.
Note: You may have to coordinate with your partner.
11. The global enable signal of the partner station ("DB_SafetyTags.Remote_Estop_OK") is now
to be included in all system sections. Expand the blocks "FB_Lifting", "FB_Labeling" and
"FB_Robot" to include this new enable condition.
12. Download all blocks into the CPU.
13. Save your project and test the functionality.
Result:
Both stations should now be able to transfer the system of the partner into the safe state
(shutdown) via the E-Off of the Service Control Room (E2).
Reciprocal shutdown
through the E-Stop of
the Control room
Task
The existing F-communication via PN-PN coupler will be replaced with fail-safe I-Device
communication. It will still be possible to shut down the partner system via the Control room.
What to Do
1. Establish a direct PROFINET connection to the Partner CPU.
2. Define which group (CPU) is "I-Device" and which group (CPU) is "Controller".
Note:
The next steps are not always relevant for both groups. With the description "I-Device" or
"Controller" you recognize which group has to do this step of the exercise.
3. I-Device: Configurate the partner CPU in your project as "Dummy CPU".
9. Parameterize the "SENDDP" and "RCVDP" blocks. You will find the HW identifier of the
transfer areas in the standard tag table of your CPU.
Continued on the next page
10. The functionality should be the same as in Exercise 1. The global enable signal of the partner
station ("DB_SafetyTags.Remote_Estop_OK") will be included in all system sections. Expand
the blocks "FB_Lifting", "FB_Labeling" and "FB_Robot" to include this new enable condition.
11. Download all into the CPU.
12. Save your project and test the functionality.
Result:
Both stations should now be able to transfer the system of the partner into the safe state
(shutdown) via the E-Off of the Service Control Room (E2).
Contents 11
11. Appendix: Migration ............................................................................................. 11-2
11.1. Migration of Distributed Safety to STEP 7 Safety Advanced .............................................. 11-3
11.1.1. Structure Change ................................................................................................................ 11-3
11.1.2. Acceptance? ....................................................................................................................... 11-4
11.1.3. Signature ............................................................................................................................. 11-5
11.1.4. Download without Changes ................................................................................................ 11-6
11.1.5. Recompiling the Program ................................................................................................... 11-7
11.1.6. Versions in the Safety Program (1) ..................................................................................... 11-8
11.1.7. Versions in the Safety Program (2) ..................................................................................... 11-9
11.2. Migrating S7-300F to S7-1500F........................................................................................ 11-10
11.2.1. Instructions Not Supported ............................................................................................... 11-11
11.2.2. Changes to the Programming ........................................................................................... 11-12
11.2.3. Changes to the Safety Functions (1) ................................................................................ 11-13
11.2.4. Changes to the Safety Functions (2) ................................................................................ 11-14
11.3. Upgrading Projects from STEP 7 Safety V13 SP1 to V15 ................................................ 11-15
11.3.1. New Compilation is Required............................................................................................ 11-16
11.3.2. F-Convert Log ................................................................................................................... 11-17
11.4. Upgrading STEP 7 Safety Projects before V13 SP1 ........................................................ 11-18
TIA-SAFETY - Migration
Training Document V15.00.00 11-1
SIMATIC TIA Portal Safety Advanced
TIA-SAFETY - Migration
11-2 Training Document V15.00.00
SIMATIC TIA Portal Safety Advanced
In STEP 7 Safety Advanced V14, you can continue to use projects from
S7 Distributed Safety V5.4 SP5.
Main-
OB35
Safety
Migration of Projects from S7 Distributed Safety V5.4 SP5 to STEP 7 Safety Advanced V15
In STEP 7 Safety Advanced V15, you can continue to use projects with safety programs which
you created with S7 Distributed Safety V5.4 SP5. For this, you must have compiled the projects in
S7 Distributed Safety V5.4 SP5 and then migrate them.
TIA-SAFETY - Migration
Training Document V15.00.00 11-3
SIMATIC TIA Portal Safety Advanced
11.1.2. Acceptance?
As a result of the migration, you will have a complete STEP 7 Safety Project, which
has retained the program structure of S7 Distributed Safety and the collective
F-signatures.
As a result, the migrated project does not have to be accepted again and can be
downloaded directly into the F-CPU without a recompilation.
The acceptance [safety] summary (printout) created with S7 Distributed Safety V5.4
SP5 retains its validity.
Only when the migrated project is compiled again with STEP 7 Safety Advanced
V15, does it receive the new program structures and a new collective F-
signature.
Note
After the migration of an SM 326; DI 24 x DC 24V (6ES7 326-1BK01-0AB0 and 6ES7 326-
1BK02-0AB0), the following error message may be output when the hardware configuration is
compiled: "F_IParam_ID_1: Value outside permissible range".
Solution:
Delete the module and insert the module again. The error message "Internal error during CRC
calculation. The CRC (F_Par_CRC) of the module (x) does not match the calculated value (y)." is
a follow-on error and is eliminated when the original error is eliminated.
TIA-SAFETY - Migration
11-4 Training Document V15.00.00
SIMATIC TIA Portal Safety Advanced
11.1.3. Signature
TIA-SAFETY - Migration
Training Document V15.00.00 11-5
SIMATIC TIA Portal Safety Advanced
Password protection is
entered
TIA-SAFETY - Migration
11-6 Training Document V15.00.00
SIMATIC TIA Portal Safety Advanced
• After compilation:
Main-
OB35
Safety
TIA-SAFETY - Migration
Training Document V15.00.00 11-7
SIMATIC TIA Portal Safety Advanced
TIA-SAFETY - Migration
11-8 Training Document V15.00.00
SIMATIC TIA Portal Safety Advanced
If you change the version of an instruction, you must compile twice in order to
get a consistent safety program.
Note
Please note that the compiling of the migrated safety program could result in an extension of the
runtime of the F-runtime group(s) and an increased work memory need of the safety program.
TIA-SAFETY - Migration
Training Document V15.00.00 11-9
SIMATIC TIA Portal Safety Advanced
TIA-SAFETY - Migration
11-10 Training Document V15.00.00
SIMATIC TIA Portal Safety Advanced
TIA-SAFETY - Migration
Training Document V15.00.00 11-11
SIMATIC TIA Portal Safety Advanced
TIA-SAFETY - Migration
11-12 Training Document V15.00.00
SIMATIC TIA Portal Safety Advanced
TIA-SAFETY - Migration
Training Document V15.00.00 11-13
SIMATIC TIA Portal Safety Advanced
TIA-SAFETY - Migration
11-14 Training Document V15.00.00
SIMATIC TIA Portal Safety Advanced
If you want to continue to work with a project from STEP 7 Safety V13 SP1, you must first
upgrade the project to STEP 7 Safety V15.
Perform the upgrade following the usual procedure for STEP 7. After upgrading to V15, you have
to compile your safety program.
(S7-300/400): After compilation, the safety program is consistent and the collective F-signature of
the migrated safety program corresponds to the collective F-signature of the safety program from
V13 SP1. Acceptance of changes is not required.
TIA-SAFETY - Migration
Training Document V15.00.00 11-15
SIMATIC TIA Portal Safety Advanced
TIA-SAFETY - Migration
11-16 Training Document V15.00.00
SIMATIC TIA Portal Safety Advanced
(S7-1200/1500): After compiling, your safety program is consistent and the collective F-signature
of the migrated safety program has changed for system reasons. The new collective F-signature
of the safety program with STEP 7 Safety V15 replaces the former collective F-signature of the
safety program with STEP 7 Safety V13 SP1.
You can find an overview of all system-related changes under "Common data/Protocols/F-
Convert Log+CPU name+time stamp". One of the system-related changes is that STEP 7 Safety
V15 SP1 automatically replaces versions of instructions no longer supported with new,
functionally identical versions. The overview contains a comparison of the previous signatures
with STEP 7 Safety V13 SP1 to the new signatures with STEP 7 Safety V15 SP1 and displays
the automatically changed instruction versions. Print out the overview and store this printout with
your acceptance documents or your machine documentation. Change acceptance is not required,
since the "Collective F-signature with STEP 7 Safety V13 SP1" contained in the overview
matches the collective F-signature in your current acceptance documents.
Keep in mind that existing change histories are not upgraded. All previous entries are deleted
after the upgrade. If necessary, print out the change log before you upgrade.
TIA-SAFETY - Migration
Training Document V15.00.00 11-17
SIMATIC TIA Portal Safety Advanced
Open in V13
Upgrade compatibility
mode
<= V11 V12.0 V12 SP1 V13 V13 SP1/2 V14 V14 SP1
Project Project Project Project Project Project Project
Side-by-side installation of V13 SP2 and V14 makes it possible to access all project
versions
Projects of earlier versions must be upgraded to the V13SP1/SP2 version. This can be done with
the help of the V13SP1/SP2 version which can be installed alongside V15.
TIA-SAFETY - Migration
11-18 Training Document V15.00.00
SIMATIC TIA Portal Safety Advanced
Contents 12
12. Training and Support ........................................................................................... 12-2
12.1. Any Questions on our Training Courses Offered?? ............................................................ 12-3
12.2. www.siemens.com/sitrain ................................................................................................... 12-4
12.3. Learning path: SIMATIC S7 Prgramming in the TIA Portal ................................................ 12-6
12.4. Download the training documents ...................................................................................... 12-7
12.5. The Industry Online Support – the most important innovations.......................................... 12-8
12.6. The Principle of Navigation ................................................................................................. 12-9
12.7. Complete product information ........................................................................................... 12-10
12.8. mySupport – Overview...................................................................................................... 12-11
12.9. Support Request ............................................................................................................... 12-12
12.10. Support Request ............................................................................................................... 12-13
12.11. Industry Online Support – wherever you go ..................................................................... 12-14
12.11.1. Scanning product/EAN code ............................................................................................. 12-15
12.11.2. Scan functionality .............................................................................................................. 12-16
12.12. Forum - the communication platform for Siemens Industry products ............................... 12-17
12.12.1. Conferences and Forum management ............................................................................. 12-17
12.12.2. Interactions in the Forum .................................................................................................. 12-19
12.13. Task and Checkpoint ........................................................................................................ 12-21
General Information
We‘ll be glad to help you regarding any questions on our training courses offered.
12.2. www.siemens.com/sitrain
The complete range of courses offered can be accessed via the following links:
www.siemens.de/sitrain or
www.siemens.com/sitrain
Course Search
The course search permits the user to find the required courses by applying different search
1 filters such as keyword, target group, etc. The filters can also be combined.
Course Catalog
The course catalog permits you to find the required course via learning paths or via the Siemens
Mall structure.
Top Links
Various courses, e.g. SIMATIC S7-1500 solution line, etc., can be reached directly via the top
links.
Documents
Name Size
> SIMATIC S7 Sequence Control with … 18,47 MB
Hint:
Please note that the training documents may be used for personal purposes exclusively. You
agree that you will not copy the training documents or make them accessible to third parties and
that you will be liable for any damage resulting thereof.
1
3
4
2
The most important functions are always in the same place on all the pages:
The menu bar links to the main areas of the site. You can subscribe and register at any time to
1 benefit from the features the personalized mySupport option offers.
Links to our service offerings are in the center. On the start page, you will find up-to-date
2 information and links, which quickly brings you to your destination in other areas of Online
Support.
Links from the menu bar are repeated at the top of the page: Product Support, Services, Forum
3 and mySupport.
On every page, you will find your personal mySupport cockpit. There, for example, you can see
4 when the status of your support inquiry changes.
Here, you will find information about all the current and discontinued products, such as:
• Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
• Manuals and Operating Instructions
• Downloads
• Product Notes (product announcements, discontinuation, etc.)
• Certificates
• Characteristics
• Application Examples
You will not only be able to access these articles though the product tree, but also through a
central filter bar. The integration of various search filters will give you access to relevant
information after only a few clicks. The product tree has been moved to an equivalent filter. This
has the effect that several filter steps can be combined clearly and comprehensibly.
Based on the preview numbers you can see the expected set of results before using a filter. This
makes finding relevant information considerably easier and more efficient.
For example, you can customize your search by combining the product tree, a search keyword
and a document type in your search.
There will be no hidden search parameters; all the settings and results will be clearly displayed.
A powerful function of the Industry Online Support is the direct access to complete product
information. You can use it if you are looking for a quick and easy access to all the technical
information about a Siemens Industry product. For example, for comparing products, if you are
expanding your system or replacing individual components, this is how to do it:
In the Product Support area, there is the central navigation bar.
To select a product, simply select the filter “Product.” Enter an order number or a product name
here. You will be supported by a dynamic display of suitable products (list of suggestions).
One more click and the details of the selected product will be displayed – always up to date:
• Product life cycle, consisting of milestones with dates (e.g. delivery release, discontinuation of
the product, …). You will find out whether the selected product is a current product or whether
the product is already in the discontinuation phase.
• Successor products for discontinued products and new developments will be suggested. If
there is a successor product, you will get a direct link to the product information of this
product.
• Technical data – clear, compact and complete. You get all the available technical data
concerning the selected product here – dimensions, operating voltage or the number of
inputs/outputs, etc.
mySupport
The mySupport area will always remain your personal workplace; with this feature you can make
the best of your Industry Online Support experience.
The most important thing, if you're already working with mySupport, you can take all your
previous personal data and information you’ve filed away with you to the Industry Online Support.
In this area, you can compile the information that is important for your daily work – we provide
you with the suitable tools. Create your own folder structures and file information such as
bookmarks. There are numerous options, whether you want to file items by project or by
products.
Moreover, you can now add notes, comments and tags (keywords). The system automatically
creates a “Tag Cloud” based on your entries so you can access information quickly and easily by
means of your own terms. The operation is consistent throughout mySupport so that you will
easily find your way around. “Drag &drop” is also possible.
As soon as you are logged on, the mySupport cockpit is always at your side. It will immediately
show you when the status of a support request changes, or when you receive new personal
messages. You also have direct access to your personal keywords in the tag cloud, to the entries
last visited, and you can see which user is online.
Here, just a few highlights:
• The previous MyDocumentationManager is now completely integrated into mySupport under
the name of “mySupport-Documentation.” The function category “Documentation” contains all
the functions of the MyDocumentationManager and provides a few innovations, too.
• The Service & Support Newsletter has been completely revamped. An individual messaging
system will more than replace it.
Support Request
To create a Support Request, different options are available to you in Online Support:
• You will find the "Support Request" option in the menu on all Online Support pages.
• Alternatively, you can create a new request in mySupport in the "Requests" category.
• Or directly click on the following link:
http://www.siemens.com/automation/support-request
Tips for creating a request:
• Select your product and use case as accurately as possible; try to avoid selecting "Other". By
doing so, you ensure optimum support by our experts and appropriate suggested solutions.
• Did other users have a similar problem? This step already offers frequent problems and
solutions. Take a look – it will be worth your while!
• Describe your problem with as much detail as possible. Pictures or explanatory attachments
allow our experts to consider your problem from all sides and develop solutions. You can
upload multiple attachments up to 10 MB per file.
• Before each sending, verify your personal contact information and the data you have entered.
The final step additionally offers the option to print the summary.
As a logged in user, you can track the status of your requests online. To do so, navigate to "My
requests" in the "Requests" category in mySupport.
1
2
1 On the left side, you will find the so-called conference tree. It allows you to navigate through the
individual discussion areas.
The conference overview is the central discussion area of the Technical Forum. This is where the
2 community meets to discuss technical questions about Siemens Industry products.
In forum management, you will find your personal control center for the Technical Forum. It allows
3 you to manage your specific profile data and filters.
Conference filter
Add conferences to your personal filter of preferred conferences.
This allows you to enable a notification that informs you when new topics are started in these
conferences.
In Quicklinks, the Technical Forum additionally offers an overview page that contains all topics of
your preferred conferences.
Managing profile
Profile management provides interesting information and functions:
• You get an overview of your activities in the Technical Forum.
• You can view your rank, any special permissions and your ranking progress.
• You can store a signature and a personal description for your profile in the forum.
• You have direct access to the quick links to get an overview of all topics you have contributed
to.
User filter
Have you found a user in the Technical Forum who posts entries that are particularly interesting?
Then add this user to your list of "preferred users".
This allows you to enable a notification that informs you when the user has posted a new entry.
In Quicklinks, the Technical Forum additionally offers an overview page that contains all topics of
your preferred users.
Reacting to an
existing entry
Goal
Find out which current version of virus scanners is compatible with your engineering software.
Use all information sources available:
• Readme files in the installation folder
• The compatibility tool of the Industry Online Support
• Entries in the Product support
• Entries in the Forum
• Create a Support Request.
Checkpoint