DoD 51 OO.
52-M
CHAPTER 12
COMMUNICATIONS
12-1 GENERAL 12-3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
The On-Scene Commander (OSC) requires internal
a. Fast, reliable and accurate communications are
communications with the operations center and with
essential for nuclear weapon accident response opera-
forces in the field to control and keep abreast of response
tions. Moreover, securing adequate internal commun-
activities. External communications with higher echelons
ications to support activities at the accident scene is a
time-sensitive operation. Equally critical to effective of command are necessary to keep key personnel
command and control is the timely establishment of informed. Many initial communications requirements
external communications to higher echelons, particularly can be met by unsecure voice communications; however,
in the Washington arena. Therefore, the communications both secure voice and record communications are
officers of the Initial Response Force (IRF) and Service required early in the response.
Response Force (SRF) must take immediate action to
ensure that appropriate communications equipment is Communication requirements:
identified and requested early in response operations.
a. Establish internal communications.
b. Effective response to a nuclear weapon accident (1) Telephone communications between fixed site
relies heavily on a communications officer knowledge locations, for example, the operations center and the
about secure and non-secure tactical, strategic, and Joint Information Center (JIC).
commercial communications systems. He or she must (2) Field phones for EOD operations (secure
be able to apply conventional and imaginative methods phones are desirable).
and ensure that required communications are available. (3) UHF/VHF nets. Several minimum nets,
He or she should be equally adept at establishing command (secure desirable), weapons recovery opera-
communications support in remote locations, or in areas tions (secure), radiological operations (secure desirable),
near existing communications systems. security, public affairs will be required.
c. In addition to military communications at the b. Establish external communications.
accident site, the DoE, FE MA, State and/or civilian
officials establish their own communications. Careful (1) Telephone communications with the Service
attention must be afforded these installations to ensure operations center, the National Military Command
mutual support and eliminate interference. Center, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Public Affairs). Conferencing may suffice early
in the response.
12-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE (2) Multiple telephone lines to support response
force elements.
(3) Secure voice via satellite, telephone, .or HF.
This chapter provides guidance for establishing
(4) Access to the Defense Communications System
communications systems and capabilities to support
response operations. The requirements of both the IRF for record communications.
and SRF are “discussed, including personnel at the
accident scene (internal communications) and at long c. Coordinate frequency usage of all response
distances (external corhmunications). Also included are organizations to prevent interference and radio
treatments of various capabilities and hardware operations in areas where electromagnetic emissions may
(telephone, radio, satellite, and visual signal) that are. Create explosive hazards or affect electronic and field
available. laboratory instruments.
. .
12-1
d. Obtain frequency clearances, as necessary. gapped” to AUTODIN through the HAMMER ACE
operations center. Other capabilities include air-to-
e. Prepare a Communication-Electronics Operating ground communications and a privacy feature, land
Instruction for use by all response organizations. mobile radio network with a repeater/base station for
local communications. The land mobile radios can
interface with the secure satellite system. The limited
12-4 RESOURCES capability provided by HAMMER ACE is an initial
capability only. For this reason, HAMMER ACE
The communications capabilities and resources for personnel, in conjunction with the OSC, evaluate the
nuclear weapon accident recovery operations vary situation and determine what, if any, additional
widely. Resources are as familiar as the telephone or capabilities are required. HAMMER ACE equipment
as sophisticated as satellite capable secure voice radio. is capable of battery operations, and enough batteries
Communications assets must be capable of deployment are deployed to sustain 72-hour operation. A follow-
to, and operation in, remote locations. The following on deployment of generators or additional batteries is
presents a variety of communications resources for required for longer operations.
response organizations. Because the same equipment
supports numerous contingencies, only those assets ~. Requests for emergency HAMMER ACE
required for a specific nuclear weapon accident response support should be made directly to HQ AFCC/COXC
effort should be requested. Resources are available from (AFCC Command Center) or through the JNACC.
the DoD, other Federal organizations, or commercial Phone numbers are listed in Appendix 20-A. Any
sources. available communications media may be used to submit
the request; however, verbal requests must be followed
a. Service Assets. The Military Services maintain in writing within 24 hours. The requesting agency must
communications assets organic to combat support units provide the following information with the request.
as well as for contingency assets. Information about
specific assets as well as procedures for requesting and a. Deployment location, including coordi-
tasking Service assets can be obtained from the respective nates if avaiiabie.
Service operations centers, or operational commanders. ~. Situation, including type of emergency.
Telephone numbers are contained in Appendix l-G. c. Points of contact.
~. Remarks concerning any unusual condi-
(1) U.S. Army. U.S. Army signal units have tions for wh~ch the team should prepare.
communications assets to support battalion, brigade,
and division operations including wire/ telephone ~. Requests for additional information should
switchboards, multichannel radios, and record commun- “be directed to HQ AFCC/ DOXZ, Special Commun~’
ication systems. ications Division, Scott AFB, Illinois. Phone numbers
(2) U.S. Air Force. Tactical communications assets are listed in Appendix 20-A.
are available from both Combat Communication Groups
and HAMMER ACE as described in paragraph (a) (3) U.S. Navy. Each U.S. Navy Fleet Commanders-
below. “ in-Chief has control of ashore mobile contingency
communication units. These units are maintained in a
(a) HAMMER ACE. HAMMER ACE is a state of readiness to permit deployment within 24 hours
rapidly deployable team of engineers and technicians by COMMNAVSTA Philippines and NAVCAMSLANT
equipped with advanced technology communications Norfolk, VA, respectively.
equipment. The team can deploy within three hours and
establish communications within 30 minutes of arrival (a) Ashore Mobile Contingency Communica-
on-site. HAMMER ACE equipment can be transported tions (AMCC). The AMCC van is . a small mobile
on C-21, or equivalent-type aircraft, or commercial communications unit contained in one. transportable
airliners. Capabilities include secure satellite system for equipment shelter with two separately configured 55 kw
voice, facsimile, and limited data communications. The mobile diesel generators. The van contains sufficient
secure satellite link can interface with AUTOSEVOCOM, equipment to maintain the following circuits
STU-11, AUTOVON, and commercial telephone systems simul~aneously:
through the HAMMER ACE operations center at Scott ~. Two secure full duplex teletype circuits (one
AFB, Illinois. Record communications can be “air- via HF radio; or alternatively, two via HF radio).
12-2
~. One narrow band secure voice (CV-3333) (a) Switchboards.
via satellite with KG-36 security equipment. (b) HF radio.
~. Two UHF secure voice circuits with KY- (c) Microwave/ troposcatter radios.
28 voice security equipment. (d) UHF and VHF radios (secure and non-
~. HF High Command (HICOM) net. secure).
~. UHF satellite fleet broadcast receiver (AN/ (e) Secure record communications terminals.
SSR-I receiver only). (f) Weather dissemination equipment.
~. One PARKHILL narrow band secure voice (g) UHF and SHF satellite terminals.
circuit via HF or UHF satellite. (h) Secure TELEFAX (DACOM 412).
~. Two VINSON secure voice devices. (i) KY-65, KY-70 and KY-75 secure voice devices,
and
(b) When deployed, the AMCC uses local power (j) The AN/ URC Joint Airborne Communica-
where available. Power source must be 440V, three phase, tions Center/ Command Post (JACC/ CP).
60 Hz. Otherwise, mobile generators supplied with the
AMCC units will be used. A complete AMCC unit can ~. The Joint Airborne Communication& Cen-
be transported via one C-130 aircraft, one CH-53 ter/ Command Post (JACC/ CP), commonly referred t’o
helicopter, or one 6x65-ton truck. The mobile generators as JACKPOT, consists of several pieces of equipment
for the AMCC, if needed, requires an additional lift mounted in air transportable vans. The JACC/ CP has
if transported by helicopter. When transported via truck, four major components—operations center, commun-
an additional prime mover is required. ications control, generator, and an air conditioner/
(c) The AMCC units are, at all times, under the accessory trailer.
operational control of the respective Fleet Commanders- ~. The JACC/CP can provide one high
in-Chief (CINCS). All deployments of the AMCC are frequency, single sideband (HF/ SSB) voice or teletype
approved by the Fleet CINC based on requests submitted communication channel over its one-kilowatt transceiv-
by subordinate commands. Contingency requests should ers or high frequency, double independent sideband
be forwarded to the Fleet CINC as expeditiously as (HF/ ISB) with a total of four independent three-
possible. When the AMCC is deployed, and until it kilohertz (3 SPKHZ) voice or teletype channels over its
returns to its host command, it is under the custody 10 kw system. The 10 kw system is limited to ground
and operational control of the designated supported operations only. The JACC/ CP also contains three
command. radios, a AN/ARC-73 (VHF/AM), AN/ARC-54
(VHF/FM) and AN/ ARC-51BX (VHF/AM), for
(4) U.S. Marine Corps (USMC). The USMC signal ground-to-ground and ground-to-air communications.
units have multichannel radio, wire, and record 3. The voice radio system may be connected.
communication systems. to a 10-fine, 20-line, or 30-line, four-wire/two-wire
telephone switchboard. The switchboard can connect
b. Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Controlled Assets. any telephone subscriber to another telephone or a
JCS contingency support communications resources are JACC/CP radio.
requested according to procedures contained in ~. The complete JACC/ CP can be transported
“Mobile/ Transportable Communications Assets Con- in a winch equipped C-130 or larger aircraft. A wide
trolled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff” (CJCS MOP 3) lowboy trailer must be used to transport the vans any
and in Allied Communications Publication 134, distance or over other than paved/gravel roads.
Supplement 1, references (w) and (x). Additional ~. The JACC/ CP can be deployed within 24
information regarding these assets can be obtained from hours from the time the JCS issues deployment approval
the JCS Contingency and Crisis Management Division. messages.
(1) Joint Communications Support Element (2) JCS-Joint Controlled Tactical Communica-
(JCSE). Details of the JCSE deployment/employment tions Assets. Details on the JCCSA are In the U.S. Army
concepts capabilities and logistics requirements, plans for deployment of mobile/transportable commun-
reference (y), can be obtained by contacting the JCSE ications assets controlled by the JCS. During normal
at McDill AFB, Florida. The JCSE is a contingency duty hours, additional information can be obtained from
support unit consisting of Army, Navy, Air Force, and ,the U.S. Army Information Systems Command
Marine Corps personnel and a variety of communica- Contingency Branch, Ft Huachuca, Arizona, or from
tions equipment including: their EOC. Phone numbers are in Appendix 20-A. The
12-3
JCCSA consists of heavy mobile/transportable equip- (2) VHF radio to support on-scene Federal
ment which can be deployed separately or in packages Response Center (FRC) (internal) communications.
by C-141/ C-5 aircraft. Equipment includes: Equipment includes hand-held radios, suitcase repeater
and suitcase base station with telephone interconnect.
(a) Switchboards The quantities of these assets will vary depending on
(b) HF radio the size of the FEMA response contingent.
(c) Troposcatter radios
(d) Medium speed AUTODIN terminals e. Commercial Assets. In the CONUS, acquisition of
(e) Manual secure voice switch and terminals supporting communications systems from commercial
(f) SHF satellite terminals carriers (for example, American Telephone and
Telegraph AT&T) is possible. Commercial carriers can
(3) Other JCS Controlled Assets. Most SHF provide communications to a remote area via transpor-
satellite terminals are under JCS deployment control. table microwave, carrier systems, or cable. Leased
These terminals include the Ground Mobile Forces services, including telephone, data Teletypewriter
(GMF) te~minals assigned to the military Services. The Exchange (TWX), Telephone Exchange (TELEX), and
U.S. Army 235th Signal Company, Ft. Monmouth, New Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS), are available in
Jersey, maintains UHF and SH F research and devel- most locations.
opment satellite terminals which can be deployed for
contingency operations and exercises. Also, the U.S. Air
Force has communication assets similar to those in the 12-5 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
JCCSA. They are located at 3rd Combat Communi-
cations Group (CCG) and the 281st CCG, Air National Nuclear weapon accidents present a variety of technical,
Guard, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma. Equipment in the van logistical, and operational. communications problems.
includes a secure cord switchboard (SECORD), KY-3 Several factors, including the location of the accident,
secure voice terminals, and a narrow band (HY-2) trunk the response force involved, and the command and
which will interface with AUTOSEVO(DM. The van control arrangements of those forces, contribute to the
is outsized and requires C-5 aircraft transport. complexity of the problems. This concept of operations
focuses on the actions of the military response force(s)”
c. DoE Assets. The DoE maintains emergency communications officer(s). The approach is to present
response, air transportable communications services and items of concern sequentially without regard to whether
hardware. Systems include a multi-point telephone the IRF or the SRF communications officer takes the
switch, facsimile, HF/ VHF radio networks (with action. Incumbent upon the SRF communications
pagers), video teleconferencing, a point-to-point officer is the responsibility to ascertain what has been
microwave system, and data communications to include accomplished prior to arrival, and to carry on from that
local area networks and high speed transmission. A juncture.
multi-channel satellite system is available to provide
long-haul transmission capability. Single-channel a. Initial Actions. The initial task of the response force
INMARSAT terminals, with data interface, are included communications officer is to determine the commun-
for advance party use and emergency backup. Secure ications assets at, or close to, the accident site. The local
communications include voice, facsimile, data, teletype, telephone company, State/ local officials, or civilian
and still video operations. authorities can provide information on the commun-
ication infrastructure near the accident scene, and the
d. FEMA Assets. Deployable communication assets capabilities for long haul and local communications.
used by FEMA response groups are maintained at the Once existing capabilities are determined, the commun-
FEMA regional office level. Although the specific ications officer should use these resources with deployed
equipment varies between FEMA regions, the FEMA assets to establish an effective communications network.
response contingent usually arrives with the following
capabilities: (1) In remote or sparsely populated areas, the initial
communication capability may consist of only hand held,
(1) HF Radio (voice only) for external commun- short range VHF/ FM radios, portable HF radios, or
ication to their regional office, the State disaster response wire (field phones). Conversely, if an accident occurs
headquarters, and the Emergency Information and .close’to a populated area, a coin operated telephone,
Coordination Center (EICC) in Washington, DC. or even a business or private telephone may be available
12-4
immediately for emergency use. In either case, additional a Communications-Electronic Operating Instruction
leased communications such as WATS can be obtained (CEOI). The CEOI should be an easy-to-use instruction
to augment available communications. Naturally, more containing the capabilities and limitations of equipment
time is required to provide leased assets to remote areas. and detailed “how-to-use” procedures for all available
Therefore, the requirements must be identified and systems. The instructions should be unclassified, if
requested at the earliest possible time. Follow-on possible, and widely distributed. As a minimum, they
deployment of mobile communications provides the shouId include system descriptions (charts and diagrams
response force with additional local telephone and radio, are helpful), an on-site telephone directory, dialing and
as well as long haul secure voice and record capabilities. telephone routing instructions, message addresses,
(2) Another method of communications for message handling instructions and routing indicators,
external (long haul) communications, particularly if radio procedures and call signs, secure voice procedures,
assets are limited, is the telephone conferencing and communications security (COMSEC) operations
capability of Service operations centers and/or the security procedures including essential elements of
National Military Command Center (NMCC). Further, friendly information (EEFIs). An outline of a typical
if communication can be established from the site to CEOI is at Figure 12-1.
the DoD JNACC, the DoD JNACC will assist by relaying (6) Although COMSEC instructions are a part of
information or coordinating with other forces/agencies. the CEOI, COMSEC deserves additional emphasis.
When requested by the Services, DoD JNACC arranges Enemy or dissident elements may be able to intercept
for transportation of specialized communications and exploit command and control communications
resources. systems and traffic used for response to nuclear weapon
(3) The OSC may spend considerable time away accidents. Compilations of individually unclassified
from the command post. The response force commun- items concerning weapons communicated during
ications officer must, therefore, plan communication recovery procedures may well be classified, and
methods to support the mobility of the OSC. Radio unfriendly elements may be able to compile these items.
nets provided for OSC communications should have Therefore, the communications officer must plan to
sufficient range and be capable of frequent use. If defeat this threat by determining the EEFI for the
possible, the net should be secure and have a radio/ operation, and then by acting to preclude interception
wire integration capability into the local switchboard or exploitation of this information. COMSEC actions
and long haul voice circuits. The staff directors for to prevent exploitation of EEFIs may include using
support and operations, and the special staff advisors secure transmission facilities, communications disci-
should be included in this net. pline, codes and authenticators, and changing call signs.
(4) The communications officer must take prompt
action to obtain frequency clearances. Radio frequencies b. Follow-On Actions. As additional response forces
are managed at the national level by the Military deploy to the accident scene, and a support base camp
Communications:Electronics Board (Joint Frequency is established”, additional communication resources will
Management Office). Each Service@s membership on be deployed or acquired concurrent with the build-up.
the board. Moreover, each military department has a As this build-up occurs, the response force commun-
frequency management office, but in most cases these ications officer should establish and maintain a list of
offices have delegated the authority to assign frequencies communications assets and capabilities on-scene. The
to area coordinators. Additional details maybe obtained list should include assets and frequencies belonging to
from U.S. Army FM 24-2, “Radio Frequency Manage- non-DoD agencies identifying potential mutual inter-
ment,” or U.S. Air Force Regulation 700-14, Air Force ference, and should ensure that all possible assets are
Radio Spectrum Frequency Management, references (z) considered when meeting overall communication
and (aa). DoE and FEMA communications personnel requirements. Coordination should be made with the
should coordinate frequency requirements through their appropriate representative from Federal and civilian
own channeIs and keep the military communications . authorities/ officials agencies possessing on-scene
officer advised. Failure to obtain valid frequency communication systems.
authorizations could result in interferenw with other
critical communications. The use of unauthorized. (1) As emphasized throughout this chapter,
frequencies could lead to embarrassment for the U.S. increasing the quantity of communications assets and
Government. routing those assets into the appropriate users hands
(5) One of the more complex problems facing the ~ “ is of primary importance as the response organization
response force communications officer is preparation of grows. Additional communication assets, primarily in
12-5
Communications-Electronics Operating Instruction (CEOI)
(Sample Contents)
SECTION 1- Communications Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
SECTION ? - Telephone Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 2- I : Telephone Routing Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 2-2: Hot Line Routing Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
SECTION 3- Message Communications Instruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 3-1: Message Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 3-?: Eyes Only Message Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
SECTION 4- Radio Communications Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ANN EXA-Response Force Traffic Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ANNEX B - Telephone Numbers and Message Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B-1 - Tie Line Network Dialing Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B-2- On-Site Telephone Diagram. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B-3 - Off-Site Contact Telephone Numbers and Message Addresses . . . . . . . .
B-4 - Intercom Systems . . . . . . . .
Intercom #1 . . . . . . . . .
[ntercorn # 2 . . . . . . . . .
Intercom #3 . . . . . . . . . .
Intercom #4 . . . . . . . . . .
ANNEX C - Radio Call Signs . . . . . . . .
Net #1 Grader . . . . . . . .
Net #2 Looker . . . . . . . .
Net #3 Catcher . . . . . . . .
Net #4 Ivory . . . . . . . . .
Net #.5 Blue . . . . . . . . . .
N e t # 6 Angel . . . . . . . .
Net #7 Red . . . . . . . . . .
ANNEX D - DISTRIBUTION . . . . . . . .
.>
Figure 12-1. Communications-Electro;cs Operating Instruction (CEO).
12-6
the form of telephones and VHF/FM radios, are needed a. A description of actual or projected requirements
for effective operation of the JIC, and to support and the location of assets to fill requirements.
radiological monitoring and site restoration operations.
b. Procedures for establishing communications links
(2) As the response operations peak, so will the
with the NMCC and Defense Communications System
communications support required. As the response
from remote locations.
transitions into site restoration, the primary commun-
ications should be routine situation reports, supply c. Procedures for obtaining leased commercial
(MILSTRIP) messages, and other administrative communications.
messages. After the weapon(s) and weapon components
are removed from the site, little or no need will exist d. Procedures for obtaining Service and JCS
to communicate by secure voice. However, record deployable communications assets.
communications support provided on-site during the e. Procedures for establishing local radio nets and
early response and weapon recovery should continue assignment of call signs.
through site restoration.
f. Procedures for obtaining frequency cleara~ces.
12-6 ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNEX
g. Procedures for coordinating communications with
non-DoD agencies.
Procedures and information appropriate for the h. Procedures for using secure/clear fax resources.
communications annex to the accident response plan
include: i. Prepare an integrated communications plan.
,-
12-7
