Labor Relations

Case Assignment#1

1. Zambrano vs. Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation

G.R. No. 224099, June 21, 2017

FACTS:

On January 3, 2011, petitioners, who were employees of private respondent

Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation, were notified of the termination of
their employment effective February 3, 2011, on the ground of cessation of
operation due to serious business losses. They were of the belief that their dismissal
was without just cause and in violation of due process because the closure of Phil
Carpet was a mere pretense to transfer its operations to its wholly owned and controlled
corporation, Pacific Carpet Manufacturing Corporation (PacificCarpet). Petitoners
asserted that their dismissal constituted unfair labor practice as it involved the mass
dismissal of all union officers and members of the Philippine Carpet Manufacturing
Employees Association (PHILCEA).

In its defense, Phil Carpet countered that it permanently closed and totally ceased
its operations because there had been a steady decline in the demand for its
products due to global recession, stiffer competition, and the effects of a
changing market. 

Thus, in order to stem the bleeding, the company implemented several cost-cutting
measures, including voluntary redundancy and early retirement programs. Phil Carpet
likewise faithfully complied with the requisites for closure or cessation of business under
the Labor Code. The petitioners and the Department of Labor and Employment were
served written notices one (1) month before the intended closure of the company. The
petitioners’ •were also paid their separation pay and they voluntarily executed their
respective Release and Quitclaim before the DOLE officials.

In the September 29, 2014 Decision, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaints for
illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. The NLRC affirmed the findings of the
LA, which was subsequently affirmed by the CA.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioners were dismissed from employment for a lawful cause.

2. Whether or not the petitioners’ termination from employment constitutes unfair

labor practice.

3. Whether or not the quitclaims signed by petitioners are valid and binding.

HELD:

1. Yes. The petitioners were terminated from employment for an authorized cause. In
this case, the LA's findings that Phil Carpet suffered from serious business losses which
resulted in its closure were affirmed in toto by the NLRC, and subsequently by the CA. It
is a rule that absent any showing that the findings of fact of the labor tribunals and the
appellate court are not supported by evidence on record or the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts, the Court shall not examine anew the evidence submitted by
the parties.
Further, even if the petitioners refuse to consider these losses as serious enough to
warrant Phil Carpet's total and permanent closure, it was a business judgment on the
part of the company's owners and stockholders to cease operations, a judgment which
the Court has no business interfering with. The only limitation provided by law is that the
closure must be "bonafide in character and not impelled by a motive to defeat or
circumvent the tenurial rights of employees. Thus, when an employer complies with the
foregoing conditions, the Court cannot prohibit closure "just because the business is not
suffering from any loss or because of the desire to provide the workers continued
employment."

2. No. The dismissal of the petitioners did not amount to unfair labor practice. Unfair
labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers' right to organize. There should be
no dispute that all the prohibited acts constituting unfair labor practice in essence
relate to the workers' right to self-organization. Thus, an employer may only be
held liable for unfair labor practice if it can be shown that his acts affect in
whatever manner the right of his employees to self-organize.

The general principle is that one who makes an allegation has the burden of proving it.
The petitioners miserably failed to discharge the duty imposed upon them. They did not
identify the acts of Phil Carpet, which, they claimed, constituted unfair labor practice.
They did not even point out the specific provisions, which Phil Carpet violated.

3. Yes. The quitclaims were valid and binding upon the petitioners. Where the person
making the waiver has done so voluntarily, with a full understanding thereof, and the
consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be
recognized as being a valid and binding undertaking.

In this case, the petitioners question the validity of the quitclaims they signed on the
ground that Phil Carpet's closure was a mere pretense. As the closure of Phil Carpet,
however, was supported by substantial evidence, the petitioners' reason for seeking the
invalidation of the quitclaims must necessarily fail. Further, as aptly observed by the CA,
the contents of the quitclaims, which were in Filipino, were clear and simple, such that it
was unlikely that the petitioners did not understand what they were signing. Finally, the
amount they received was reasonable as the same complied with the requirements of
the Labor Code.

Wherefore, the SC affirmed the decision of the CA in toto.

2. T and H Shoplifters Corp./Gin Queen Corp. vs. T and H

Shoplifters Corp./Gin Queen Workers Union
G.R. No. 191714, February 26, 2014

T&H Shoplifters VS. THSGQ Union

 
FACTS: Respondents are all employees of petitioner. In their desire to
improve working conditions, they formed THS-GQ Union. A day after their
meeting, Seventeen (17) employees were barred from entering the
petitioner's factory premises located in Castillejos, Zambales, and ordered
to transfer to T&H Shopfitters warehouse at Subic Bay Freeport Zone
(SBFZ) purportedly because of its expansion. 
 
Afterward, the said seventeen (17) employees were repeatedly ordered to go
on forced leave due to the unavailability of work. Respondents contended
that the affected employees were not given regular work assignments, while
subcontractors were continuously hired to perform their functions. The
union filed a petition for certification election.
 
On October 10, 2004, petitioners sponsored a field trip to Iba, Zambales,
for its employees. The officers and members of the THSGQ Union were
purportedly excluded from the field trip. 
 
On the evening of the field trip, a certain Angel Madriaga, a sales officer of
petitioners, campaigned against the union in the forthcoming
certification election. The following day or on October 11, 2004, the
employees were escorted from the field trip to the polling center in
Zambales to cast their votes. On October 13, 2004, the remaining
employees situated at the SBFZ plant cast their votes as well. Due to the
heavy pressure exerted by petitioners, the votes for no union prevailed.
 
 
Respondents averred that the following week after the certification
elections were held, petitioners retrenched THGGQ Union officers and
members assigned at the Zambales plant. Petitioners claimed due to
the decrease in orders from its customers, they had to resort to cost
cutting measures to avoid anticipated financial losses. Thus, it assigned
work on a rotational basis. It was of the impression that the employees,
who opposed its economic measures, were merely motivated by spite in
filing the complaint for ULP against it.
 
LA found no basis on the complaint. Decision was reversed by NLRC. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.
 
 
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners committed Unfair Labor Practice
 
HELD: Yes. CA decision sustained
 
Labor Law: Acts which transgress right to self-organization essential
element of ULP
 
The questioned acts of petitioners, namely: 1) sponsoring a field trip to Zambales for its employees, to
the exclusion of union members, before the scheduled certification election; 2) the active campaign by
the sales officer of petitioners against the union prevailing as a bargaining agent during the field trip; 3)
escorting its employees after the field trip to the polling center; 4) the continuous hiring of
subcontractors performing respondents functions; 5) assigning union members to the Cabangan site
to work as grass cutters; and 6) the enforcement of work on a rotational basis for union members, all
reek of interference on the part of petitioners.
 
Indubitably, the various acts of petitioners, taken together, reasonably
support an inference that, indeed, such were all orchestrated to restrict
respondents free exercise of their right to self-organization. The Court is
of the considered view that petitioners undisputed actions prior and
immediately before the scheduled certification election, while seemingly
innocuous, unduly meddled in the affairs of its employees in selecting their
exclusive bargaining representative.
 
An employer has no concern with the certification election except when the
employer itself had to file the petition but after that, an employer should only
be a bystander. Thus, petitioners had no business persuading and/or
assisting its employees in their legally protected independent process of
selecting their exclusive bargaining representative. The fact and peculiar
timing of the field trip sponsored by petitioners for its employees not
affiliated with THSGQ Union, although a positive enticement, was
undoubtedly extraneous influence designed to impede respondents in their
quest to be certified. This cannot be countenanced.
 
Not content with achieving a no union vote in the certification election,
petitioners launched a vindictive campaign against union members by
assigning work on a rotational basis while subcontractors performed the
latters functions regularly. Worse, some of the respondents were made to
work as grass cutters in an effort to dissuade them from further collective
action. Again, this cannot be countenanced.

 
In fine, mindful of the nature of the charge of ULP, including its civil
and/or criminal consequences, the Court finds that the NLRC, as
correctly sustained by the CA, had sufficient factual and legal bases to
support its finding of ULP.

3. Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union

G.R. No. L-25246, September 12, 1974

Facts: Benjamin Victoriano (appellee), a member of the religious sect

Inglesia ni Cristo, is an employee of Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc.
(employer) and at the same time, a member of the Elizalde Rope
Workers Union (union) due to the company’s collective bargaining unit
wherein membership in the unions shall be a requirement for all permanent
employer’s workers. 

The collective bargaining unit was renewed on March 1964 and prior to
the amendment of R.A. 875 by R.A. 3350, the employer was not precluded
from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a
condition of employment membership in the organization if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees. However, on June 18
1961 R.A. 3350 was enacted wherein it introduced an amendment to R.A.
875 wherein it states that “such agreements shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibits affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization.” 

Appellee being a member of a religious sect that prohibits affiliation to any

labor organization presented his resignation to the union. 

In response, the union wrote a formal letter to the company asking the
employer to separate the appellee from the service due to the latter’s
resignation from the union. The employer in turn notified the appellee
that unless he could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the union
the company would be forced to dismiss him from the service.   This
prompted the appellee to file an action for an injunction in the court of the
first instance in manila to enjoin the company and the union from dismissing
the appellee. In response, the union invoked the security clause of the
collective bargaining agreement; questioned the constitutionality of
R.A. 3350. Upon review of the court of the facts, a decision was rendered
enjoining the employer from dismissing the appellee. From this decision, the
Union appealed directly to his court assigning the following issues.

Issue:
1) WON R.A. 3350 infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful
associations and bans all those belonging to religious sect from affiliating
with any labor organization. NO

Held:

No. Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and
coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor
organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members
of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor
unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the
employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said
religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their
jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective
bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from
infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of association,
upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said
religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said
members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with
labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of
said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do
so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign
up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does
the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or
labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does
not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association. 

4. Kapatiran sa Meat and Canning Division vs. The Hon. BLR

Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja
G.R. No. L-82914, June 20, 1988

KAPATIRAN SA MEAT AND CANNING DIVISION vs THE HONORABLE BLR

DIRECTOR PURA FERRER CALLEJA 
Facts: From 1984 to 1987 the petitioner, TUPAS was the sole and
exclusive collective bargaining representative of the workers in the
Meat and Canning Division of the Universal Robina Corporation. Their
CBA was to expire on November 1987. 

On September 1987 and Within the freedom period of 60 days prior to the
expiration of its CBA, TUPAS filed an amended notice of strike as a means
of pressuring the company to extend, renew, or negotiate a new CBA
with it. 

On October 1987, the private respondent, the NEW ULO, composed mostly
of workers belonging to the IGLESIA NI KRISTO sect, registered as a labor
union. And on the same month, the petitioner, TUPAS staged a strike.
ROBINA Corporation obtained an injunction against the strike, resulting
in an agreement to return to work and for the parties to negotiate a
new CBA. 

On the next day, NEW ULO, claiming that it has "the majority of the daily
wage rank and file employees numbering 191," filed a petition for a
certification election at the Bureau of Labor Relations. The petitioner,
TUPAS moved to dismiss the petition for being defective in form and
that the members of the NEW ULO were mostly members of the Iglesia
ni Kristo sect which three (3) years previous refused to affiliate with any
labor union. 

It also accused the company of using the NEW ULO to defeat TUPAS'
bargaining right. The Med-Arbiter ordered the holding of a certification
of election within 20 days. The petitioner appealed to the BLR, and in
the meantime, it was able to negotiate a new 3-year CBA with Robina.
However, respondent BLR Director Calleja dismissed the appeal. TUPAS'
motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence the petitioner filed this
petition alleging that the public respondent acted in excess of her
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in affirming the Med-
Arbiter's order for a certification election. 

Issue: WON the right of the members of Iglesia Ni Cristo sect not to join
a labor union for being contrary to their religious beliefs, bars them
from forming their own union.  NO

Ruling: No. Public respondent, correctly observed that the "recognition

of the tenets of the sect should not infringe on the basic right of self-
organization granted by the constitution to workers, regardless of
religious affiliation." 

Moreover, the fact that TUPAS was able to negotiate a new CBA with ROBINA within the 60-day
freedom period of the existing CBA, does not foreclose the right of the rival union, NEW ULO, to
challenge TUPAS' claim to majority status, by filing a timely petition for certification election before
TUPAS' old CBA expired and before it signed a new CBA with Robina. A certification election is the best
forum in ascertaining the majority status of the contending unions wherein the workers themselves
can freely choose their bargaining representative thru secret ballot. Since it has not been shown that
this order is tainted with unfairness, this Court will not thwart the holding of a certification election.

5. Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield

(MSMG-UWP) vs. Ramos
G.R. No. 113907, February 28, 2000
FACTS:
- The petitioner, Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield, Inc., (B)
(MSMG), hereinafter referred to as the "local union", is an affiliate of the private
respondent, United Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines (ULGWP),
referred to as the "federation".
- The local union held a general membership meeting. Several union members
failed to attend the meeting, prompting the Executive Board to create a
committee tasked to investigate the non-attendance of several union members
in the said assembly. It wrote respondent company a letter requesting it to
deduct the union fines from the wages/salaries of those union members who
failed to attend the general membership meeting.
- The Secretary General of the national federation, disapproved the resolution of
the local union imposing the P50.00 fine. The union officers protested such
action by the Federation.
- The imposition of P50.00 fine became the subject of bitter disagreement
between the Federation and the local union culminating in the latter's
declaration of general autonomy from the former.

- In retaliation, the national federation asked respondent company to stop the

remittance of the local union's share in the education funds. This was objected
to by the local union which demanded that the education fund be remitted to it
in full.
- Meanwhile, several local unions filed a Petition for Audit and Examination of
the federation and education funds of ULGWP which was granted.

- The officials of ULGWP called a Special National Executive Board Meeting where a
Resolution was passed placing the MSMG under trusteeship and appointing
respondent Cesar Clarete as administrator.

- The said administrator wrote the respondent company informing the latter of its
designation of a certain Alfredo Kalingking as local union president and
"disauthorizing" the incumbent union officers from representing the
employees. This action by the national federation was protested by the
petitioners.
- The petitioner union officers received identical letters from the administrator
requiring them to explain within 72 hours why they should not be removed
from their office and expelled from union membership.
- However, the officers were expelled from the ULGWP. 
- On the same day, respondent federation advised respondent company of the
expulsion of the 30 union officers and demanded their separation from
employment pursuant to the Union Security Clause in their collective bargaining
agreement.
- Thereafter, the Federation filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board to compel the company to effect the immediate
termination of the expelled union officers. Under the pressure of a threatened
strike, respondent company terminated the 30 union officers from
employment.

- The thirty (30) dismissed union officers filed an urgent petition. However, the petition
was dismissed on the ground that it is purely an intra-union matter.
 - A total of 78 union shop stewards were placed under preventive suspension by
respondent company. This prompted the union members to again stage a walk-out
and resulted in the official declaration of strike which was attended with violence,
force and intimidation on both sides resulting to physical injuries to several
employees, both striking and non-striking, and damage to company properties.

- The employees who participated in the strike and allegedly figured in the violent
incident were placed under preventive suspension by respondent company.
However, respondent company admitted that only 261 employees were eventually
accepted back to work. Those who did not respond to the return-to-work notice were
sent termination letters.

- petitioners filed a verified complaint charging private respondents of unfair labor

practice which consists of union busting, illegal dismissal, illegal suspension,
interference in union activities, discrimination, threats, intimidation, coercion,
violence, and oppression.
- Finding the termination to be valid in compliance with the union security clause of the
collective bargaining agreement, Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint.

- Petitioners then appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the Labor Arbiter's disposition.
- Hence, the petition attributing grave abuse of discretion to public respondent NLRC.

ISSUE: whether or not respondent company was justified in dismissing petitioner employees
merely upon the labor federation's demand for the enforcement of the union security clause
embodied in their collective bargaining agreement. NO

HELD: NO. Although this Court has ruled that union security clauses embodied in the
collective bargaining agreement may be validly enforced and that dismissals pursuant
thereto may likewise be valid, this does not erode the fundamental requirement of due
process. The reason behind the enforcement of union security clauses which is the sanctity
and inviolability of contracts cannot override one's right to due process.

In the case of Cariño vs. National Labor Relations Commission,15 this Court pronounced that
while the company, under a maintenance of membership provision of the collective
bargaining agreement, is bound to dismiss any employee expelled by the union for
disloyalty upon its written request, this undertaking should not be done hastily and
summarily. The company acts in bad faith in dismissing a worker without giving him the
benefit of a hearing.

The power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of the employer. However, this is not
without limitation. The employer is bound to exercise caution in terminating the
services of his employees especially so when it is made upon the request of a labor
union pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement, . . . Dismissals must not be
arbitrary and capricious. Due process must be observed in dismissing an employee
because it affects not only his position but also his means of livelihood. Employers
should respect and protect the rights of their employees, which include the right to
labor.

In the case under scrutiny, petitioner union officers were expelled by the federation
for allegedly committing acts of disloyalty and/or inimical to the interest of ULGWP
and in violation of its Constitution and By-laws. Upon demand of the federation, the
company terminated the petitioners without conducting a separate and independent
investigation. Respondent company did not inquire into the cause of the expulsion
and whether or not the federation had sufficient grounds to effect the same. Relying
merely upon the federation's allegations, respondent company terminated petitioners
from employment when a separate inquiry could have revealed if the federation had
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in expelling the union officers. Respondent
company's allegation that petitioners were accorded due process is belied by the
termination letters received by the petitioners which state that the dismissal shall be
immediately effective.

As held in the aforecited case of Cariño, "the right of an employee to be informed of

the charges against him and to reasonable opportunity to present his side in a
controversy with either the company or his own union is not wiped away by a union
security clause or a union shop clause in a collective bargaining agreement. An
employee is entitled to be protected not only from a company which disregards his
rights but also from his own union the leadership of which could yield to the
temptation of swift and arbitrary expulsion from membership and mere dismissal from
his job.

NOTE:
On procedural aspect

Before delving into the main issue, the procedural flaw pointed out by the petitioners should first
be resolved.

Petitioners contend that the decision rendered by the First Division of the NLRC is not valid
because Commissioner Tanodra, who is from the Third Division, did not have any lawful authority
to sit, much less write the ponencia, on a case pending before the First Division. It is claimed that
a commissioner from one division of the NLRC cannot be assigned or temporarily designated to
another division because each division is assigned a particular territorial jurisdiction. Thus, the
decision rendered did not have any legal effect at all for being irregularly issued.

Petitioners' argument is misplaced. Article 213 of the Labor Code in enumerating the powers of
the Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission provides that:

The concurrence of two (2) Commissioners of a division shall be necessary for the
pronouncement of a judgment or resolution. Whenever the required membership in
a division is not complete and the concurrence of two (2) commissioners to arrive
at a judgment or resolution cannot be obtained, the Chairman shall designate such
number of additional Commissioners from the other divisions as may be
necessary.

There is nothing irregular at all in such a temporary designation for the law empowers the
Chairman to make temporary assignments whenever the required concurrence is not met. The
law does not say that a commissioner from the first division cannot be temporarily assigned to the
second or third division to fill the gap or vice versa. The territorial divisions do not confer exclusive
jurisdiction to each division and are merely designed for administrative efficiency.

6. Carino vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 91086, May 8, 1990

FACTS: Cariño was investigated for allegedly mismanaging Union affairs during his
tenure as President of the Harrison Industrial Workers' Union. After several hearings,
Cariño failed to attend despite being notified. Eventually he was found guilty and the
Union recommended his termination from employment. The Union informed Harrison
Industrial Corporation of the expulsion of Cariño from the Union and demanded
application of the Union Security Clause of the then existing CBA. Cariño received a
letter of termination from the Company, effective the next day. Cariño filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter who ruled in his favor. The Labor Arbiter also
held that the manner of petitioner's dismissal had been in disregard of the requirements of
notice and hearing laid down in the Labor Code. The NLRC held Cariño's silence as
"tantamount to [an] admission of guilt" and as constituting the ultimate cause for his
dismissal. However, the NLRC agreed with the Labor Arbiter's finding that the manner of
petitioner Cariño's dismissal was inconsistent with the requirements of due process. The
NLRC accordingly found the Company and the Union solidarily liable, "by way of
penalty and financial assistance", to petitioner Cariño for payment of separation pay, at
the rate of one-half (1/2) month's salary for each year of service.
In the instant Petition for Certiorari, petitioner Cariño basically seeks reinstatement of the
Decision of the Labor Arbiter.

1. Petitioner Cariño contended that the NLRC had erred in taking cognizance
of the Union's admittedly late appeal. The court agrees, however, with the
Solicitor General that it is a settled principle of remedial law that reversal of a
judgment obtained by a party appealing from it also benefits a co-party who had
not appealed, or who had appealed out of time, where the rights and liabilities of
both parties under the modified decision are so interwoven and inter-dependent
as to be substantively inseparable.

In the instant case, the NLRC could take cognizance of the late appeal of the Union,
considering that the lawfulness of petitioner Cariño's dismissal by the Company
could be determined only after ascertaining, among other things, the validity of the
Union's act of expelling Cariño from its membership. In other words, the Company
having seasonably appealed the Labor Arbiter's Decision and the Company's and
the Union's liability being closely intertwined the NLRC could properly take
account of the Union's appeal even though not seasonably filed.

2. The NLRC in effect held that there had been just cause for petitioner Cariño's
dismissal. The NLRC impliedly recognized this when it described the charges of
mismanagement against Carino as serious. The NLRC, for its part, noted that while
the prescribed procedural steps had not all been followed or complied with, still,
despite the ample opportunity to explain his side, complainant failed to do so and
instead, relied completely on alleged denial of due process. Complainant's silence in
this respect is tantamount to [an] admission of guilt. 

3. Turning now to the involvement of the Company in the dismissal of petitioner Cariño
we note that the Company upon being formally advised in writing of the
expulsion of petitioner Carino from the Union, in turn simply issued a
termination letter to Cariño, the termination being made effective the very next
day. We believe that the Company should have given petitioner Carino an
opportunity to explain his side of the controversy with the Union. Notwithstanding the
Unions Security Clause in the CBA, the Company should have reasonably satisfied
itself by its own inquiry that the Union had not been merely acting arbitrarily and
capriciously in impeaching and expelling petitioner Cariño. From what was already
discussed above, it is quite clear that had the Company taken the trouble to
investigate the acts and proceedings of the Union, it could have very easily
determined that the Union had not acted arbitrarily in impeaching and
expelling from its ranks petitioner Cariño. The Company offered the excuse that
the Union had threatened to go on strike if its request had not been forthwith granted.
Assuming that such a threat had in fact been made, if a strike was in fact
subsequently called because the Company had insisted on conducting its own
inquiry, the Court considers that such would have been prima facie an illegal strike.
The Company also pleaded that for it to inquire into the lawfulness of the acts of the
Union in this regard would constitute interference by the Company in the
administration of Union affairs.

In Liberty Cotton Mills Worker's Union, et al. v. Liberty Cotton Mills, et al. the Court held
“It is OUR considered view that respondent company is equally liable for the payment
of backwages for having acted in bad faith in effecting the dismissal of the individual
petitioners. Bad faith on the part of respondent company may be gleaned from the fact that
the petitioner workers were dismissed hastily and summarily. At best, it was guilty of a
tortious act, for which it must assume solidary liability, since it apparently chose to summarily
dismiss the workers at the union's instance secure in the union's contractual undertaking that
the union would hold it "free from any liability" arising from such dismissal.”

The power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of the employer. However, this is not
without limitations. The employer is bound to exercise caution in terminating the
services of his employee especially so when it is made upon the request of a labor
union pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement, as in the instant
case. Dismissals must not be arbitrary and capricious. Due process must be observed
in dismissing an employee because it affects not only his position but also his means
of livelihood. Employers should therefore respect and protect the rights of their employees,
which include the right to labor. . . .

We conclude that the Company had failed to accord to petitioner Cariño the latter's
right to procedural due process. The right of an employee to be informed of the
charges against him and to reasonable opportunity to present his side in a
controversy with either the Company or his own Union, is not wiped away by a Union
Security Clause or a Union Shop Clause in a CBA. An employee is entitled to be
protected not only from a company which disregards his rights but also from his own
Union the leadership of which could yield to the temptation of swift and arbitrary
expulsion from membership and hence dismissal from his job.

The Court does not believe, however, that the grant of separation pay to petitioner
Cariño was an appropriate response (there having been just cause for the dismissal) to
the failure of the Company to accord him his full measure of due process. Since petitioner
Cariño had clearly disdained answering the charges preferred against him within the Union,
there was no reason to suppose that if the Company had held formal proceedings
before dismissing him, he would have appeared in a Company investigation and
pleaded his defenses, if he had any, against the charges against him. There was no
indication that the Company had in fact conspired with the Union to bring about the expulsion
and dismissal of petitioner Cariño indeed, the Union membership believed it was Cariño who
had conspired with the company in the course of negotiating the CBA. Considering all the
circumstances of this case, and considering especially the nature of the charges brought
against petitioner Cariño before his own Union, the Court believes that a penalty of P5,000
payable to petitioner Carino should be quite adequate, the penalty to be borne by the
Company and the Union solidarily. The Court also considers that because the charges
raised against petitioner and unanswered by him have marked overtones of dishonesty, this
is not a case where "financial (humanitarian) assistance" to the dismissed employee is
warranted.

7. Manila Mandarin Employees Union vs. NLRC

G.R. No. L-76989, September 29, 1987

FACTS:
Private respondent, Melba C. Beloncio, assistant head waitress at the
hotel's coffee shop, was expelled from the Manila Mandarin Employees Union
for acts allegedly inimical to the interests of the union. The charge of disloyalty
against Beloncio arose from her emotional remark to a waitress who happened
to be a union steward, "Wala akong tiwala sa Union ninyo." The remark was
made in the course of a heated discussion regarding Beloncio's efforts to make
a lazy and recalcitrant waiter adopt a better attitude towards his work. The
union demanded the dismissal from employment of Beloncio on the basis of
the union security clause of their collective bargaining agreement and the
Hotel acceded by placing Beloncio on forced leave. the Labor Arbiter held that
the union was guilty of unfair labor practice when it demanded the separation
of Beloncio and the employer was ordered to reinstate her.

ISSUES:
WON petitioner union is guilty of ULP by reason of the arbitrary use of
the union security clause in the CBA? YES

HELD:
Yes. The Hotel would not have compelled Beloncio to go on forced leave were it not
for the union's insistence and demand to the extent that because of the failure of the
hotel to dismiss Beloncio as requested, the union filed a notice of strike with the
Ministry of Labor and Employment on the issue of unfair labor practice. Although the
CBA contained a union security clause or closed-shop agreement, it is, however,
stressed that such are also governed by law and by principles of justice, fair play, and
legality. Union security clauses cannot be used by union officials against an employer,
much less their own members, except with a high sense of responsibility, fairness,
prudence, and judiciousness.

A union member may not be expelled from her union, and consequently from her job, for
personal or impetuous reasons or for causes foreign to the closed- shop agreement and in
a manner characterized by arbitrariness and whimsicality. Beloncio was merely trying her
best to make a hotel bus boy do his work promptly and courteously so as to serve hotel
customers in the coffee shop expeditiously and cheerfully. Union membership does not entitle
waiters, janitors, and other workers to be sloppy in their work, inattentive to
customers, and disrespectful to supervisors. The Union should have disciplined its erring and
troublesome members instead of causing so much hardship to a member who was only doing her
work for the best interests of the employer, all its employees, and the general public whom they
serve.

A closed-shop agreement is an agreement whereby an employer binds himself to hire only members of the
contracting union who must continue to remain members in good standing to keep their jobs. It is "the most
prized achievement of unionism." It adds membership and compulsory dues. By holding out to loyal
members a promise of employment in the closed-shop, it welds group solidarity.

8. Villar vs. Inciong

G.R. No. L-50283-84, April 20, 1983

Facts: 
Petitioners were members of the PAFLU, a duly registered labor
organization which was the existing bargaining agent of the employees in Amigo
Manufacturing, Inc. 
Villar, representing herself to be the authorized representative of the
Amigo Employees Union, filed a petition for certification election in the Company.
PAFLU intervened and moved for the dismissal of the petition for certification
election filed by Dolores Villar, citing as grounds: 
(1) the petition lacked the mandatory requisite of at least 30% of the
employees in the bargaining unit; (2) Dolores Villar had no legal personality to
sign the petition since she was not an officer of the union nor is there factual or
legal basis for her claim that she was the authorized representative of the local
union; (3) there was a pending case for the same subject matter filed by the
same individuals and (4) there was no valid disaffiliation from PAFLU. 
The petitioners, who are the disaffiliating union members insist that their
disaffiliation from PAFLU and filing a petition for certification election are not acts
of disloyalty but an exercise of their right to self-organization as the contention
was that these acts were done within the 60-day freedom period. 
PAFLU, in a letter, demanded the company the termination of petitioners’
employment. It was also stated that the Company is absolved from any liability or
damage that may arise from petitioner’s termination. 
Acting on PAFLU's demand, the Company filed the request for clearance
to terminate the petitioners and placed the latter in preventive suspension
pending the resolution of the said applications. 
Petitioners contend that the respondent Deputy Minister acted in grave
abuse of discretion when he affirmed the decision granting the clearance to
terminate the petitioners and dismissed petitioners' complaint, and in support
thereof, allege that their constitutional right to self-organization had been
impaired.
 Issue: Whether or not the dismissal was proper. 

Ruling: 
Yes.
The Court ruled that a closed shop is a valid form of union security, and
such provision in a collective bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right
of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution. 
PAFLU had the authority to investigate petitioners on the charges filed by
their co-employees in the local union and after finding them guilty as charged, to
expel them from the roll of membership of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU is
clear under the constitution of the PAFLU to which the local union was affiliated.  
And pursuant to the security clause of the new CBA, PAFLU was justified
in applying said security clause.

Whether or not the disaffiliation from its mother union is justified considering it
was done during the freedom period. NO

HELD:
No,because it must be supported by the majority of the union members. In the first place, 
had petitioners merely disaffiliated from the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, there cou
ld be no legal objections thereto for it was their right to do so. But what petitioners did by 
the very clear terms of their “Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan” was to disaffiliate the Amigo 
Employees Union-PAFLU from PAFLU, an act which they could not have done with any 
effective consequence because they constituted the minority in the Amigo Employees Un
ion-PAFLU.
Extant from the records is the fact that petitioners numbering ten (10), were among the ni
nety-six (96) who signed the “Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan” whereas there are two hundre
d thirty four (234) union members in the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU. Hence, petiti
oners constituted a small minority for which reason they could not have successfully disa
ffiliated the local union from PAFLU. Since only 96 wanted disaffiliation, it can be inferr
ed that the majority wanted the union to remain an affiliate of PAFLU and this is not deni
ed or disputed by petitioners. The action of the majority must, therefore, prevail over that 
of the minority members.

9. Wise and Co., vs. Wise and Co., Inc Employees Union
G.R. No. 87672, October 13, 1989

Facts: 
 The management issued a memorandum circular introducing a profit-
sharing scheme for its  managers and supervisors the initial distribution. The
respondent union wrote petitioner asking for  participation in this scheme but it
was denied by petitioner on the ground that it had to adhere strictly  to the CBA.  
Petitioner distributed the profit-sharing benefit not only to managers and
supervisors but also to all other  rank and file employees not covered by the
CBA. This caused the respondent union to file a notice of  strike alleging that
petitioner was guilty of ULP because the union members were discriminated
against  in the grant of the profit sharing benefits.  
Management refused to proceed with the CBA negotiations unless the last
notice of strike was  first resolved. The union agreed to postpone discussions on
the profit-sharing demand until a new CBA  was concluded. After a series of
conciliation conferences, the parties agreed to settle the dispute  through
voluntary arbitration. The voluntary arbitrator issued an award ordering petitioner
to likewise  extend the benefits of the 1987 profit sharing scheme to the
members of respondent union. 

Issue: 
Whether or not the grant by management of profit-sharing benefits to its
non-union member  employees is discriminatory against its workers who are
union members. 

Ruling: 
No. 
Under the CBA between the parties, there is a clause where the
employees are classified into those who are members of the union and those
who are not.  
The grant by petitioner of profit-sharing benefits to the employees outside
the “bargaining unit” falls under the ambit of its managerial prerogative. It
appears to have been done in good faith and without ulterior motive.  
In the case of the union members, they derive their benefits from the
terms and conditions of the CBA contract which constitute the law between the
contracting parties. Both the employer and the union members are bound by
such agreement. 
There can be no discrimination committed by petitioner thereby as the
situation of the union employees are different and distinct from the non-union
employees.

10. Rizal Cement Workers Union et. al. vs. Madrigal and
Company, Rizal Cement Company, Inc. et. al
G.R. No. L-19767, April 30, 1964

Facts: 
De Leon, the warehouseman, of Bodega Tanque was informed by the
manager of Binangonan  that a previous strike occurred in the Respondent’s
branch, hence, to take precautionary measures in  protecting the properties of
the company stored at the Bodega Tanque because of the strikers caused 
damage to the factory in Binangonan and sabotage might occur.  
 He was advised by the manager to request the members of the Union to
stay meanwhile outside  the premises of the Bodega Tanque and prohibited the
21 union members to enter the gate. Only those  non-members of said Union are
allowed to enter and work.  
The Union, through their Vice President, wrote a letter to the respondent
alleging the latter’s  discrimination acts. They filed a complaint against the
respondent Rizal Cement Co. Inc, for Unfair labor  practice on the ground of
discrimination.  
The respondent replied that a sabotage might be occur because of the
previous strike held by  their Union. After the complaining workers were not
allowed to work, respondent hired substitutes in  order that the work in Bodega
Tanque, may not be paralyzed. The Union picket line in front of where   the
Offices of the respondent companies located. 

Issue: 
Whether or not there was an Unfair Labor Practice on the part of the
Management on the ground  of Discrimination? 

Ruling: 
No. 
The acts of the company did not constitute an unfair labor practice. 
Its refusal to all complainants to work and requirement that the latter stay
out of the premises in  the meantime (perhaps while the strike was still going on
at the factory) was borne out of the Company's  justified apprehension and fear
that sabotage might be committed in the warehouse where the products 
machinery and spare parts were stored, as has been the case in Binangonan. It
has never been shown  that the act of the Company was intended to induce the
complainants to renounce their union 
membership or as a deterrent for non-members to affiliate therewith, nor as a
retaliatory measure for  activities in the union or in furtherance of the cause of the
union.

11. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. BPI Employees Union-

Davao Chapter-Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank
G.R. No. 164301, August 10, 2010

Facts: 
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas approved the Articles of Merger executed by
and between BPI and  Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) and was
approved by the Securities and Exchange  Commission.  
The Articles of Merger and Plan of Merger did not contain any specific
stipulation with respect  to the employment contracts of existing personnel of the
non-surviving entity which is Far East Bank.  Pursuant to the said Article and
Plan of Merger, all the assets and liabilities of Far East Bank were  transferred to
and absorbed by BPI as the surviving corporation.  
Far East Bank employees, including those in its different branches across
the country, were  hired by petitioner as its own employees, with their status and
tenure recognized and salaries and  benefits maintained. 
Issue: 
Whether or not the former employees of FEBTC (upon the merger) be
compelled to join the labor  union of BPI, the labor org. certified as the exclusive
bargaining agent? 

Ruling: 
Yes. 
There is no evidence that they are members of religious organizations that
prohibits its members  from joining. There is no evidence that they are already
members of other labor organizations. They  are, thus, not among those who
were exempted.

12. Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union (NUBE) vs.

The Honorable Ma. Nieves R. Confesor, et. al G.R. No. 114974,
June 16, 2004.

Facts:

- Standard Chartered Bank (the Bank, for brevity) is a foreign banking corporation
doing business in the Philippines. The exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file
employees of the Bank is the Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union (the
Union, for brevity).
- In August of 1990, the Bank and the Union signed a five-year collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) with a provision to renegotiate the terms thereof on
the third year.
- Prior to the expiration of the three-year period, the Union initiated the negotiations.
- Even during the final reading of the non-economic provisions, there were still
provisions on which the Union and the Bank could not agree.
- Except for the provisions on signing bonus and uniforms, the Union and the
Bank failed to agree on the remaining economic provisions of the CBA. The
Union declared a deadlock25 and filed a Notice of Strike before the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)
- On the other hand, the Bank filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP)
and Damages before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC)
- Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) Nieves R. Confesor, issued an
Order assuming jurisdiction and ordered to execute a collective bargaining
agreement. The SOLE also dismissed the charges of ULP of both the Union
and the Bank, explaining that both parties failed to substantiate their claims.
Citing National Labor Union v. Insular-Yebana Tobacco Corporation, 31 the
SOLE stated that ULP charges would prosper only if shown to have directly
prejudiced the public interest.
- Hence, the petition.
- Union alleges that the SOLE acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it found that the Bank did not commit unfair
labor practice when it interfered with the Union’s choice of negotiator.
- In its Comment, the Bank prayed that the petition be dismissed as the Union
was estopped, considering that it signed the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA).
- The Office of the Solicitor General, in representation of the public respondent,
prayed that the petition be dismissed.

The Issues

The issues presented for resolution are the following:

 (a) whether or not the Union was able to substantiate its claim of unfair labor practice
against the Bank arising from the latter’s alleged "interference" with its choice of
negotiator; surface bargaining; making bad faith non-economic proposals; and refusal
to furnish the Union with copies of the relevant data; NO

(b) whether or not the public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she issued the assailed order and
resolutions; NO

(c) whether or not the petitioner is estopped from filing the instant action. NO

HELD:

a. NO. Article 248(a) (ART 259 a) of the Labor Code, considers it an unfair labor
practice when an employer interferes, restrains or coerces employees in the
exercise of their right to self-organization or the right to form association. The
right to self-organization necessarily includes the right to collective
bargaining.

Parenthetically, if an employer interferes in the selection of its negotiators or

coerces the Union to exclude from its panel of negotiators a representative of the
Union, and if it can be inferred that the employer adopted the said act to yield adverse
effects on the free exercise to right to self-organization or on the right to collective
bargaining of the employees, ULP under Article 248(a) in connection with Article 243
of the Labor Code is committed.

In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code,
substantial evidence is required to support the claim. Substantial evidence has been
defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.48 In the case at bar, the Union bases its claim of interference on
the alleged suggestions of Diokno to exclude Umali from the Union’s negotiating
panel.

The circumstances that occurred during the negotiation do not show that the
suggestion made by Diokno to Divinagracia is an anti-union conduct from which it can
be inferred that the Bank consciously adopted such act to yield adverse effects on the
free exercise of the right to self-organization and collective bargaining of the
employees, especially considering that such was undertaken previous to the
commencement of the negotiation and simultaneously with Divinagracia’s suggestion
that the bank lawyers be excluded from its negotiating panel.

The records show that after the initiation of the collective bargaining process,
with the inclusion of Umali in the Union’s negotiating panel, the negotiations pushed
through. The complaint was made only on August 16, 1993 after a deadlock was
declared by the Union on June 15, 1993.

It is clear that such ULP charge was merely an afterthought. The accusation
occurred after the arguments and differences over the economic provisions became
heated and the parties had become frustrated. It happened after the parties started to
involve personalities. As the public respondent noted, passions may rise, and as a
result, suggestions given under less adversarial situations may be colored with
unintended meanings.

The Union alleges that the Bank violated its duty to bargain; hence, committed ULP under Article 248(g) when it
engaged in surface bargaining. It alleged that the Bank just went through the motions of bargaining without any intent of
reaching an agreement, as evident in the Bank’s counter-proposals. It explained that of the 34 economic provisions it
made, the Bank only made 6 economic counterproposals. Further, as borne by the minutes of the meetings, the Bank,
after indicating the economic provisions it had rejected, accepted, retained or were open for discussion, refused to make a
list of items it agreed to include in the economic package.

Surface bargaining is defined as "going through the motions of negotiating" without any legal intent to reach an
agreement.50 The resolution of surface bargaining allegations never presents an easy issue. The determination of whether
a party has engaged in unlawful surface bargaining is usually a difficult one because it involves, at bottom, a question of
the intent of the party in question, and usually such intent can only be inferred from the totality of the challenged party’s
conduct both at and away from the bargaining table. 51 It involves the question of whether an employer’s conduct
demonstrates an unwillingness to bargain in good faith or is merely hard bargaining.

The Union has not been able to show that the Bank had done acts, both at and away from the bargaining table,
which tend to show that it did not want to reach an agreement with the Union or to settle the differences between it and
the Union. Admittedly, the parties were not able to agree and reached a deadlock. However, it is herein emphasized that
the duty to bargain "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession." 53 Hence,
the parties’ failure to agree did not amount to ULP under Article 248(g) for violation of the duty to bargain.

b. NO. While it is true that a showing of prejudice to public interest is not a requisite for
ULP charges to prosper, it cannot be said that the public respondent acted in
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or
excess thereof. Neither was it shown that the public respondent exercised its power
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.

c. NO, because the approval of the CBA and the release of signing bonus do not
necessarily mean that the Union waived its ULP claim against the Bank during the
past negotiations. After all, the conclusion of the CBA was included in the order of
the SOLE, while the signing bonus was included in the CBA itself. Moreover, the
Union twice filed a motion for reconsideration respecting its ULP charges against the
Bank before the SOLE.

13. Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Dawal

G.R. No. 173921, February 24, 2016
The employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal of its employees is with a
valid and authorized cause. The employer's failure to discharge this burden makes
the dismissal illegal.

Facts:
- On September 1, 2000, PAL severed the employment of Dawal, et al.
Until their dismissal from work, they were regular rank-and-file
employees of PAL and "bona fide members "of the Philippine Airlines
Employees' Association (PALEA).
- In 1997, the Asian Financial Crisis devalued the peso against the dollar.
PAL claims that this strained its financial resources.
- Consequently, PAL issued a Notice of Separation to all the affected
employees, containing either of the following letters: (1) offer of new
employment from Lufthansa, should it choose to hire the affected
employees; or (2) PAL's offer of employment for a lower rank or job grade
and for a lesser salary, should Lufthansa not choose to hire the affected
employees.
- PALEA and Dawal, et al. filed before the Labor Arbiter a Complaint dated
January 31, 2001 for unfair labor practices and illegal dismissal.
- Labor Arbiter found PAL guilty of illegal dismissal and was ordered to
reinstate Dawal, et al. to their "former positionfs without loss of seniority
rights and privileges and to pay them full backwages. The Labor Arbiter
also found PAL guilty of unfair labor practice.
- the NLRC reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter's Decision in toto.
Stating that PAL validly exercised its management prerogative and that
PAL held the required consultations with PALEA much earlier than 45
days.
 - The Court of Appeals ruled that PAL's dismissal of Dawal, et al.'s services
was illegal and that PAL actually invoked redundancy, not retrenchment.
The Court of Appeals struck out the part of the decision finding PAL
guilty of unfair labor practice and reduced the award for moral and
exemplary damages.
- Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:
a. WON the termination of the employment of Isagani Dawal, Lorna
Concepcion, and Bonifacio Sinobago was due to an authorized cause, and
could be justified as redundancy or retrenchment; NO
b. WON the proper procedure in the PAL-PALEA Collective Bargaining
Agreement was followed; NO
c. WON Philippine Airlines, Inc. is guilty of unfair labor practice; NO

HELD:
a. NO, because when PAL spun off the engineering and maintenance
facilities, it also created a new engineering department called the
Technical Services Department. Moreover, after it fired the
affected employees, PAL offered to rehire the same retrenched
personnel as new employees. The Court of Appeals found that
there was "availability of work in PAL and held: [T]he dismissal of
the petitioners who were later on offered reemployment ... as new
employees of PAL appears to be merely a clever ruse ... to deprive
[Dawal, et al.], as well as the other employees similarly situated,
of the privileges and benefits to which they are already entitled to
by reason of the length of services they have rendered to PAL.
PAL's acts effectively defeated its employees' security of tenure
and seniority rights. The presence of bad faith cancels out any
claim of redundancy.

Granted that PAL suffered serious and actual business losses, it must still show that
the retrenchment was reasonably necessary to effectively prevent the actual or
imminent losses.

It is not enough for a company to simply incur business losses 224 or go through
rehabilitation225 to justify retrenchment. While it can be argued that undergoing
corporation rehabilitation evinces its substantial business losses, PAL must still prove
all the other elements for a valid retrenchment.

Article 298 of the Labor Code requires that the "retrenchment to prevent losses"
should not be used to circumvent the provisions of the Labor Code. Stated otherwise,
the retrenchment must not only be "reasonably necessary to avert serious business
losses; it must also be made in good faith and without ill motive.

b. NO, The spin-off and retrenchment were not made in accordance with the
PAL-PALEA Memorandum of Agreement.

c. NO. The SC ruled that there was not enough evidence to prove that
PAL committed unfair labor practices.

Art. 259. Unfair Labor Practices of Employers. - It shall be unlawful for an employer to
commit any of the following unfair labor practices:

(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization;

(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;

(i) To violate a collective bargaining agreement. (Emphasis in the original, citation

omitted)

In Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines, Inc.-NAFLU v.

Sulpicio Lines, Inc.,303 we have held that the union has the burden
to prove, by substantial evidence, its allegation of unfair labor
 practice.304 Neither PALEA nor Dawal, et al. have discharged this
burden.

On the first ground, Dawal, et al. only showed bare assertions that
PAL's real purpose was to bust the union. 305 In terminating the services of
those working for the maintenance and engineering facilities, PAL did not
single out between the union and non-union members. Instead, PAL
"phased out and sold"306 the whole department, thereby severing the
employment of all affected personnel. 307 Thus, contrary to Dawal, et al.'s
allegations,308 PAL did not discriminate against them by reason of their
membership in PALEA.

On the second ground, Dawal, et al. claim that PAL terminated their
services in violation of its duty to bargain. They assert that at the time of
their dismissal from work, PALEA was about to renew its Collective
Bargaining Agreement with PAL. They point to the fact that (protested)
new PALEA President Jose T. Peñas III submitted a list of economic and
non-economic proposals for the renewal of the PAL-PALEA Collective
Bargaining Agreement,310 which PAL ignored. --- The relevant dates,
however, must be set straight. Dawal, et al.'s dismissal was on
September 1, 2000. Meanwhile, PALEA President Jose T. Peñas III
submitted proposals through a letter dated September 7, 2000,
which PAL received on September 13, 2000. 312 Therefore, Dawal, et al.
cannot claim that they were dismissed to prevent the renegotiation of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement.

Moreover, PAL could not have validly negotiated for the renewal of its
Collective Bargaining Agreement with PALEA due to a leadership crisis in
PALEA at that time.313 The Court of Appeals properly found that PAL was
not motivated by malice or bad faith in its acts. 314 PAL validly declined to
meet with the alleged newly-elected PALEA officers because the election
was marred by "protests and petitions[.]

As borne by the records, the Department of Labor and Employment later

nullified the proclamation of the new PALEA officers.316 PAL's refusal to
recognize the contending factions of the union (and their
demands) was pursuant to "prudence and good sense. This does
not amount to unfair labor practice under Article 259(g) of the
Labor Code.

On the third ground, Dawal, et al. assert that PAL disregarded the
following provisions of the PAL-PALEA Collective Bargaining Agreement:
Section 1 (Security of Tenure), Section 7 (Lay-off), and Section 10
(Seniority, Promotion, Job Reclassification, Job Progression and Demotion)
of Article III on Job Security.319 These allegedly amount to unfair labor
practices under Article 259(i) of the Labor Code.

Dawal, et al. are mistaken.

Article 274321 of the Labor Code, as amended, qualifies Article 259(i):

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

[V]iolations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those

which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair
labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the
Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross
violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant
and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic
provisions of such agreement.

In Silva v. National Labor Relations Commission,322 we held that for there

to be unfair labor practice, the violation of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement must be gross and must be related to the Agreement's
 economic provisions.323 Here, Dawal, et al. charge PAL of violating
the provisions on Job Security in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, which are non-economic in nature. Thus, PAL's acts do
not constitute unfair labor practice under Article 259(i) of the
Labor Code.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Dawal, et al. are entitled to reinstatement
with full backwages or additional separation pay plus backwages.

PAL failed to prove all the requisites for a valid dismissal due to retrenchment.

Whether there was redundancy or retrenchment, or redundancy caused by

retrenchment, this court agrees with the Court of Appeals' and the Labor Arbiter's
finding325 that PAL illegally terminated the services of Dawal, et al.

14. Mendoza vs. Officers of Manila Water Employees Union

(MWEU)
G.R. No. 201595, January 25, 2016
DOCTRINE: In essence, unfair labor practice relates to the commission of acts that
transgress the workers’ right to organize. All the prohibited acts constituting unfair
labor practice in essence relate to the workers’ right to self-organization. The term unfair
labor practice refers to that gamut of offenses defined in the Labor Code which, at their
core, violates the constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization.
APPLICABLE LAWS: LABOR CODE, ART. 249

FACTS:
- Petitioner Mendoza was a member of MWEU, a DOLE-registered
labor organization consisting of rank-and-file employees within
Manila Water Company (MWC) while the respondents were
MWEU officers.
- In the April 2007 letter, Petitioner Mendoza was informed that the
union was unable to fully deduct the increased P200.00 union
dues from his salary due to lack of the required December 2006
check-off authorization from him and was was warned that his
failure to pay the union dues would result in sanctions upon him.
- Thereafter, Petitioner Mendoza was, after notice and
hearing, suspended for 30 days through a unanimous approval due
to the non-payment of union dues. 
- Meanwhile, MWEU scheduled an election of officers. Petitioner
filed his certificate of candidacy for Vice-President, but he was
disqualified for not being a member in good standing on
account of his suspension.
- In addition, petitioner was charged with non-payment of union dues
for the third time. He did not attend the scheduled hearing. This time,
he was meted the penalty of expulsion from the union, per
"unanimous approval" of the members of the Executive Board. His
pleas for an appeal to the General Membership Assembly were once
more unheeded.
- In 2008, during the freedom period and negotiations for a new
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with MWC, petitioner joined
another union, the Workers Association for Transparency,
 Empowerment and Reform, All-Filipino Workers Confederation
(WATER-AFWC). He was elected union President. Other MWEU
members were inclined to join WATER-AFWC, but MWEU
director Torres threatened that they would not get benefits
from the new CBA.
- October 2008, Mendoza filed a Complaint against respondents
for ULP, damages, and attorney’s fees and accused the
respondents of (1) illegal termination (removal) from MWEU in
connection with the events relative to his non-payment
of union dues; (2) unlawful interference, coercion, and violation
of the rights of MWC employees to self-organization in
connection with the proposed CBA submitted by MWEU
leadership, which petitioner claims contained provisions
that discriminated against non-MWEU members. 
- On the other hand, respondents claimed that LA has no
jurisdiction, which is intra-union in nature and that the Bureau of
Labor Relations (BLR) was the proper venue and that they were not
guilty of ULP, discrimination, coercion or restraint.
- The LA finding that the filing of the instant case is still
premature referred back the case to the Union level for the General
Assembly to act on complainant’s appeal- - - on the basis of Section 5,
Article X-Investigation Procedures and Appeal Process of the Union Constitution and
By-Laws.
- NLRC also found that this Commission lacks the jurisdictional
competence to act on this case.
- The CA held that Petitioner’s causes of action against MWEU are
inter/intra-union disputes cognizable by the BLR whose functions
and jurisdiction are largely confined to union matters, collective
bargaining registry, and labor education. Further, it held that Petitioner
failed to discharge the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the
allegations of ULP in his complaint.
- Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:
1. WON CA erred IN DECLARING THAT THE PRESENCE OF INTER/INTRA-
UNION CONFLICTS NEGATES THE COMPLAINT FOR UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICES AGAINST A LABOR ORGANIZATION AND ITS OFFICERS,
AND IN AFFIRMING THAT THE NLRC PROPERLY DISMISSED THE CASE
FOR ALLEGED LACK OF JURISDICTION.
2. WON CA erred IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE
GUILTY OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UNDER ARTICLE 249(a)
AND (b) OF THE LABOR CODE. YES
3. WON CA erred IN DECLARING THAT THE THREATS MADE BY A UNION
OFFICER AGAINST MEMBERS OF A RIVAL UNION IS (sic) MERELY AN
"INTERFERENCE" AND DO NOT AMOUNT TO "RESTRAINT" OR
"COERCION".
4. WON CA erred IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO PRESENT
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN PROVING RESPONDENTS’ SPECIFIC ACTS
OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES.
5. WON CA erred IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE SOLIDARILY
LIABLE TO PETITIONER FOR MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, AND
ATTORNEY’S FEES.

HELD: Petition is partly granted.

The Court ruled that that some of petitioner’s causes of action
constitute intra-union cases cognizable by the BLR under Article 226 of
the Labor Code. However, petitioner’s charge of unfair labor
practices falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Labor Arbiters, pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code. In
 addition, Article 247 of the same Code provides that "the civil
aspects of all cases involving unfair labor practices, which may
include claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages, attorney’s fees and other affirmative relief, shall be
under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters."

In the case at bar, the documentary evidence is clear that when petitioner received Borela’s
August 21, 2007 letter informing him of the Executive Board’s unanimous approval of the
grievance committee recommendation to suspend him for the second time effective August
24, 2007, he immediately and timely filed a written appeal. However, the Executive Board –
then consisting of respondents did not act thereon. Then again, when petitioner was charged
for the third time and meted the penalty of expulsion from MWEU by the unanimous vote of
the Executive Board, his timely appeal was again not acted upon by said board.

When an MWEU member is suspended, he is given the right to appeal such suspension
within three working days from the date of notice of said suspension, which appeal the
MWEU Executive Board is obligated to act upon by a simple majority vote. When the penalty
imposed is expulsion, the expelled member is given seven days from notice of said dismissal
and/or expulsion to appeal to the Executive Board, which is required to act by a simple
majority vote of its members. The Board’s decision shall then be approved/ disapproved by a
majority vote of the general membership assembly in a meeting duly called for the purpose.

Thus, contrary to respondents’ argument that petitioner lost his right to appeal when he failed
to petition to convene the general assembly through the required signature of 30% of the
union membership in good standing pursuant to Article VI, Section 2(a) of MWEU’s
Constitution and By-Laws or by a petition of the majority of the general membership in good
standing under Article VI, Section 3, this Court finds that petitioner was illegally suspended
for the second time and thereafter unlawfully expelled from MWEU due to respondents’
failure to act on his written appeals. The required petition to convene the general assembly
through the required signature of 30% (under Article VI, Section 2[a]) or majority (under
Article VI, Section 3) of the union membership does not apply in petitioner’s case; the
Executive Board must first act on his two appeals before the matter could properly be
referred to the general membership. Because respondents did not act on his two
appeals, petitioner was unceremoniously suspended, disqualified and deprived of his
right to run for the position of MWEU Vice-President in the September 14, 2007
election of officers, expelled from MWEU, and forced to join another union, WATER-
AFWC. For these, respondents are guilty of unfair labor practices under Article 249 (a)
and (b) – that is, violation of petitioner’s right to self-organization, unlawful
discrimination, and illegal termination of his union membership – which case falls
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters, in accordance with
Article 217 of the Labor Code.

The primary concept of unfair labor practices is stated in Article 247 of the Labor Code,
which states:

Article 247. Concept of unfair labor practice and procedure for prosecution thereof. –– Unfair
labor practices violate the constitutional right of workers and employees to self-
organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management,
including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an
atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial peace and hinder the
promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations.

"In essence, [unfair labor practice] relates to the commission of acts that
transgress the workers’ right to organize."  "[A]ll the prohibited acts
50

constituting unfair labor practice in essence relate to the workers’ right to self-
organization."  "[T]he term unfair labor practice refers to that gamut of
51

offenses defined in the Labor Code which, at their core, violates the
constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization."

As members of the governing board of MWEU, respondents are presumed to know,

observe, and apply the union’s constitution and by-laws. Thus, their repeated
violations thereof and their disregard of petitioner’s rights as a union member – their
 inaction on his two appeals which resulted in his suspension, disqualification from
running as MWEU officer, and subsequent expulsion without being accorded the full
benefits of due process – connote willfulness and bad faith, a gross disregard of his
rights thus causing untold suffering, oppression and, ultimately, ostracism from
MWEU. "Bad faith implies breach of faith and willful failure to respond to plain and
well understood obligation."  This warrants an award of moral damages in the
54

amount of P100,000.00.

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury. They may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant’s wrongful act or omission.

Under the circumstances, an award of exemplary damages in the amount of

P50,000.00, as prayed for, is likewise proper. "Exemplary damages are designed to
permit the courts to mould behavior that has socially deleterious consequences, and
their imposition is required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of the
offender."  This should prevent respondents from repeating their mistakes, which
56

proved costly for petitioner. 1âwphi

In brief, "Inter-Union Dispute" refers to any conflict between and among legitimate labor unions
involving representation questions for purposes of collective bargaining or to any other conflict or dispute
between legitimate labor unions.
"Intra-Union Dispute" refers to any conflict between and among union members, including grievances
arising from any violation of the rights and conditions of membership, violation of or disagreement over
any provision of the union’s constitution and by-laws, or disputes arising from chartering or affiliation of
union.
On the other hand, the circumstances of unfair labor practices (ULP) of a labor organization are stated in
Article 249 of the Labor Code, to wit:
Article 249. Unfair labor practices of labor organizations. It shall be unlawful for labor organization, its
officers, agents, or representatives to commit any of the following unfair labor practices:
(a) To restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization; Provided, That the
labor organization shall have the right to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or
retention of membership;
(b) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee, including
discrimination against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been
denied or terminated on any ground other than the usual terms and conditions under which membership or
continuation of membership is made available to other members;

15. Sonedco Workers Free Labor Union (SWOFLU) vs.

Universal Robina Corporation
G.R. No. 220383, July 5, 2017
Generally, a wage increase not included in the Collective Bargaining Agreement is
not demandable. However, if it was withheld by the employer as part of its unfair
labor practice against the union members, this benefit should be granted.

FACTS:
- This case arose from an unfair labor practice complaint filed by
SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union against its employer, Universal
Robina Corporation, Sugar Division-Southern Negros Development
Corporation (URC-SONEDCO).
- In 2007, while there was no Collective Bargaining Agreement in effect,
URC-SONEDCO offered, among other benefits, a ₱l6.00/day wage
increase to their employees. To receive the benefits, employees had to
sign a waiver that said: "In the event that a subsequent [Collective
Bargaining Agreement] is negotiated between Management and Union,
the new [Collective Bargaining Agreement] shall only be effective [on]
January 1, 2008. Realizing that the waiver was an unfair labor practice,
some members of SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union refused to sign.
- URC-SONEDCO offered the same arrangement in 2008.
- Consequently, they did not receive the wage increase which already
amounted to a total of ₱32.00/day, beginning 2009.
 - On July 2, 2009, SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union and its members
who refused to sign the 2007 and 2008 waivers filed a complaint for
unfair labor practices against URC-SONEDCO. They argued that the
requirement of a waiver prior to the release of the wage increase
constituted interference to the employees' right to self-organization,
collective bargaining, and concerted action. They asked that they be
granted a ₱l6.00/day wage increase for 2007 and an additional
₱l6.00/day wage increase for 2008. SONEDCO Workers Free Labor
Union also demanded a continuing wage increase of ₱32.00/day
"from January 1, 2009 onwards."
- Both the NLRC and CA found URC-SONEDCO not guilty of unfair labor
practice. Nonetheless, they ordered URC-SONEDCO to give petitioners
the same benefits their co-workers received in 2007 and 2008.
- Since a new Collective Bargaining Agreement was already in effect by
2009, this Collective Bargaining Agreement governed the relationship
between the management and the union.
- On October 5, 2016, this Court found URC-SONEDCO guilty of unfair
labor practice for failing to bargain with SONEDCO Workers Free Labor
Union in good faith.
- URC-SONEDCO restricted SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union's
bargaining power when it asked the rank-and-file employees to sign a
waiver foregoing Collective Bargaining Agreement negotiations in
exchange for wage increases. Thus, this Court ordered URC-SONEDCO
to grant the union members the 2007 and 2008 wage increases.
Nevertheless, this Court denied the claim for the 2009 wage increase and
ruled that if SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union wished to continue
receiving the additional wage after 2008, the proper recourse was to
include it in the 2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement.
- On February 20, 2017 petitioners, who are members of SONEDCO
Workers Free Labor Union, filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
Petitioners aver that the ₱l6.00 wage increases granted in 2007 and
2008 were integrated in the salary of the employees who signed the
waiver. Thus, since the start of 2009, employees who signed the
waiver have been receiving ₱32.00/day more than petitioners.
- Respondent argues that this issue has already been ruled upon.
Since the 2009 wage increase was not included in the 2009
Collective Bargaining Agreement, it cannot be demanded.

ISSUE: WON a ₱32.00/day wage increase beginning January 1, 2009 to present

should be awarded to petitioners.

HELD: YES. Generally, the Collective Bargaining Agreement controls the

relationship between the parties. Any benefit not included in it is not
demandable. However, in light of the peculiar circumstances in this case, the
requested wage increase should be granted.
The wage increase was integrated in the salary of those who signed the
waivers. When the affiants waived their rights, respondent rewarded them with
a ₱32.00/day wage increase that continues to this day. The respondent
company granted this benefit to its employees to induce them to waive their
collective bargaining rights. This Court has declared this an unfair labor
practice. Accordingly, it is illegal to continue denying the petitioners the wage
increase that was granted to employees who signed the waivers. To rule
otherwise will perpetuate the discrimination against petitioners. All the
consequences of the unfair labor practice must be addressed.
The grant of the ₱32.00/day wage increase is not an additional benefit
outside the Collective Bargaining Agreement of 2009. By granting this increase
to petitioners, this Court is eliminating the discrimination against them, which
was a result of respondent's unfair labor practice.
Considering that exemplary damages were imposed, this Court also
deems it proper to grant attorney's fees.
16. Ergonomic Systems Phils. Inc. vs. Enaje
G.R. No. 195163, December 13, 2017

Facts:
- Respondents were union officers and members of Ergonomic System Employees
Union-Workers Alliance Trade Unions (local union). 
- the local union entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)  with petitioner
6

Ergonomic Systems Philippines, Inc. (ESPJ),  which was valid for five (5) years or
7

until October 2004.

- The local union, which was affiliated with Workers Alliance Trade Unions-Trade
Union Congress of the Philippines (Federation), was not independently registered.
Thus, on 15 November 2001, before the CBA expired, the union officers secured the
independent registration of the local union with the (DOLE). 
- Later on, the union officers were charged before the Federation and investigated for
attending and participating in other union's seminars and activities using union
leaves without the knowledge and consent of the Federation and ESPI as well as in
initiating and conspiring in the disaffiliation before the freedom period.
- the Federation rendered a decision  finding respondents-union officers guilty of
9

disloyalty. They were penalized with immediate expulsion from the Federation.
- In effect, the Federation furnished ESPI with a copy of its decision against
respondents-union officers and recommended the termination of their employment by
invoking Sections 2 and 3, Article 2 of the CBA.

- ESPI notified respondents-union officers of the Federation's demand and gave them
48 hours to explain. Thereafter, respondents-union officers were issued letters of
termination. ESPI submitted to the DOLE a list of the dismissed employees. On the
same day, the local union filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB). 

- From 21 February to 23 February 2002, the local union staged a series of noise
barrage and "slow down" activities and refused to submit their Daily Production
Reports (DPRs).. Some union members also abandoned their work and held a
picket line outside the premises of ESPI. Also, other union members did not report
for work without official leave.

- The union members were required to submit their explanation why they should not
be sanctioned for their refusal to submit DPRs and abandonment of work, but they
either refused to receive the notices or received them under protest. Further, they did
not submit their explanation as required. Subsequently, for refusal to submit DPRs
and for abandonment, respondents-union members were issued letters of
termination.

- Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice against
ESPI.

- The LA held that the local union was the real party in interest and the Federation was
merely an agent in the CBA; thus, the union officers and members who caused the
implied disaffiliation did not violate the union security clause. Consequently, their
dismissal was unwarranted. Nevertheless, the LA ruled that since ESPI effected the
dismissal in response to the Federation's demand which appeared to be justified by a
reading of the union security clause, it would be unjust to hold ESPI liable for the
normal consequences of illegal dismissal.

- The LA further opined that there was no ground for the dismissal of the union
members because the refusal to submit DPRs and failure to report for work were
meant to protest the dismissal of their officers, not to sever employer-employee
relationship. He added that neither ESPI nor the respondents were at fault for they
were merely protecting their respective interests. In sum, the LA ordered all the
respondents to return to work but without back wages.
 - NLRC affirmed the ruling of the LA. The NLRC concluded that since there was no
disloyalty to the union, but only disaffiliation from the Federation which was a mere
agent in the CBA, the cause for the respondents' dismissal was non-existent.

- CA affirmed with modification the NLRC ruling. It held that ESPI and the respondents
acted in good faith when the former dismissed the latter and when the latter, in turn,
staged a strike without complying with the legal requirements. The CA, however,
pronounced that the concept of separation pay as an alternative to reinstatement
holds true only in cases wherein there is illegal dismissal, a fact which does not exist
in this case.

ISSUES:

1. WON the Federation may invoke the union security clause in the CBA. NO
2. Whether the strike conducted by the respondents complied with the legal
requirements; NO

HELD:

1. NO. Only the local union may invoke the union security clause in the CBA.
Before an employer terminates an employee pursuant to the union security clause, it
needs to determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is applicable; (2)
the union is requesting the enforcement of the union security provision in the
CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the union to
expel the employee from the union.

In this case, the primordial requisite, i.e., the union is requesting the enforcement of the
union security provision in the CBA, is clearly lacking. Under the Labor Code, a
chartered local union acquires legal personality through the charter certificate issued by a
duly registered federation or national union and reported to the Regional Office.23 "A local
union does not owe its existence to the federation with which it is affiliated. It is a
separate and distinct voluntary association owing its creation to the will of its
members. Mere affiliation does not divest the local union of its own personality,
neither does it give the mother federation the license to act independently of the local
union. It only gives rise to a contract of agency, where the former acts in representation of
the latter. Hence, local unions are considered principals while the federation is deemed to be
merely their agent.

A perusal of the CBA shows that the local union, not the Federation, was recognized
as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent for all its workers and
employees in all matters concerning wages, hours of work, and other terms and
conditions of employment. Consequently, only the union may invoke the union
security clause in case any of its members commits a violation thereof. Even assuming
that the union officers were disloyal to the Federation and committed acts inimical to its
interest, such circumstance did not give the Federation the prerogative to demand the union
officers' dismissal pursuant to the union security clause which, in the first place, only the
union may rightfully invoke. Certainly, it does not give the Federation the privilege to act
independently of the local union. At most, what the Federation could do is to refuse to
recognize the local union as its affiliate and revoke the charter certificate it issued to the
latter. In fact, even if the local union itself disaffiliated from the Federation, the latter
still has no right to demand the dismissal from employment of the union officers and
members because concomitant to the union’s prerogative to affiliate with a federation
is its right to disaffiliate therefrom.

In the landmark case of Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union vs. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc., we
upheld the right of local unions to separate from their mother federation on the ground that
as separate and voluntary associations, local unions do not owe their creation and existence
to the national federation to which they are affiliated but, instead, to the will of their members.
The sole essence of affiliation is to increase, by collective action, the common bargaining
power of local unions for the effective enhancement and protection of their interests.
Admittedly, there are times when without succor and support local unions may find it hard,
unaided by other support groups, to secure justice for themselves.
Yet the local unions remain the basic units of association, free to serve their own
interests subject to the restraints imposed by the constitution and bylaws of the
national federation, and free also to renounce the affiliation upon the terms laid down
in the agreement which brought such affiliation into existence.

In sum, the Federation could not demand the dismissal from employment of the union
officers on the basis of the union security clause found in the CBA between ESPI and
the local union.

"Union security is a generic term, which is applied to and comprehends 'closed shop, "union shop,’
‘maintenance of membership,' or any other form of agreement which imposes upon employees the
obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a condition affecting employment.

There is union shop when all new regular employees are required to join the union within a certain period
as a condition for their continued employment.

There is maintenance of membership shop when employees, who are union members as of the effective
date of the agreement, or who thereafter become members, must maintain union membership as a condition
for continued employment until they are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit, or the agreement
is terminated.

A closed shop, on the other hand, may be defined as an enterprise in which, by agreement between the
employer and his employees or their representatives, no person may be employed in any or certain agreed
departments of the enterprise unless he or she is, becomes, and, for the duration of the agreement, remains
a member in good standing of a union entirely comprised of or of which the employees in interest are a
part."

2. NO. Procedurally, for a strike to be valid, it must comply with Article 278 of the Labor
Code, which requires that: (a) a notice of strike be filed with the NCMB 30 days
before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) a
strike vote be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the
bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that
purpose; and (c) a notice be given to the NCMB of the results of the voting at
least seven days before the intended strike. These requirements are mandatory,
and the union's failure to comply renders the strike illegal.

The union filed a notice of strike on 20 February 2002.32 The strike commenced on
21 February 2002.33 The strike vote was taken on 2 April 200234 and the report
thereon was submitted to the NCMB on 4 April 2002.35 Indeed, the first requisite or
the cooling-off period need not be observed when the ground relied upon for the
conduct of strike is unionbusting.36 Nevertheless, the second and third requirements
are still mandatory. In this case, it is apparent that the union conducted a strike
without seeking a strike vote and without submitting a report thereon to the DOLE.
Thus, the strike which commenced on 21 February 2002 was illegal.

Read: Arts. 218-223

Arts. 258-260